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- Herausgeber: Shepheard Walwyn Publishers
- Kategorie: Gesellschafts- und Liebesromane
- Sprache: Englisch
- Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2021
Ficino's commentary on Plato’s Timaeus offers the English reader, for the first time, an opportunity to share the insights of this highly influential Renaissance philosopher into one of Plato's most important and controversial works. Here are discussed the perennial questions which affect us all: What is the nature of the universe? How did it begin? Does it have a cause outside itself? What is our place in it? What is the nature of mind, soul, matter and time?
The central portion of the work, focusing on number, harmony, and music, has exerted a strong influence on the history of Western musical theory. Ficino added an appendix which amplifies and elucidates Plato’s meanings and reveals fascinating detail about Ficino himself.
This volume provides rich source material for all who are interested in philosophy, the history of cosmic theory, and Platonic and Renaissance studies.
This completes the four-volume series, including Gardens of Philosophy, 2006 (ISBN 978-0-85683-240-6), Evermore Shall Be So, 2008 (978-0-85683-256-7) and When Philosophers Rule, 2009 (978-0-85683-257-4), which contain all Ficino’s commen-taries not previously translated into English.
Arthur Farndell is one of the world’s leading translators of Renaissance philosophy, having worked for many years on the translations of The Letters of Marsilio Ficino, eight volumes of which have been published by Shepheard-Walwyn to date.
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All Things Natural
All Things Natural
FICINO ON PLATO’STIMAEUS
ARTHUR FARNDELL
Notes and Additional Material by
PETER BLUMSOM
SHEPHEARD-WALWYN (PUBLISHERS) LTD
Commentaries by Ficino on Plato’s Writingsa four-volume series
Gardens of PhilosophyEvermore Shall Be SoWhen Philosophers RuleAll Things Natural
© Arthur Farndell 2010
All rights reserved.copy No part of this book may be reproduced in any form without the written permission of the publisher, Shepheard-Walwyn (Publishers) Ltd
First published in 2010 by Shepheard-Walwyn (Publishers) Ltd 107 Parkway House, Sheen Lane, London SW14 8LS
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record of this book is available from the British Library
ISBN: 978-0-85683-258-1
Typeset by Alacrity, Sandford, Somerset
CONTENTS
Acknowledgements
Translator’s Note on the Latin Texts
Marsilio Ficino’s Compendium on the Timaeus
1 The subject matter of the book
2 The arrangement of the book and its parts
3 Introduction to the dialogue
4 An allegory of history; contents of the prologue
5 The fall of Phaethon; floods; fires; a description of Minerva
6 The finest directions concerning prayers and entreaties
7 The world has three causes higher than itself, depends on the incorporeal cause, and is ever in flux
8 The Good Itself, rather than subsequent causes, is the cause of all things, and it has no direct relationship with anything
9 The dependence of matter on the Good Itself; the action of the mind and soul upon matter; and the intelligible world
10 The Sun, light, radiance, brilliance, heat, procreation; likewise unity, goodness, intellect, soul, nature, the body of the world, the image of the higher worlds
11 Individual orders are taken back to individual heads, and the universal order is taken back to the universal head, by which all things are composed through action and power
12 Matter was not in disarray prior to the world in time, but was arranged according to some principle of order or origin
13 Two views concerning the origin of the world
14 A threefold inference drawn from Plato’s view of the world, and what is undisputed about his view
15 By the grace of the Good the world has been brought into being in the likeness of the divine principle and the divine word
16 Why the world is one, why it is spherical, and why its movement is spherical
17 Why the world is divided into five or six regions; how the number seven is right for it; circular number; and how the world is arranged in the likeness of the intelligible wold
18 Why there are distinct parts within the world and why there is opposition among them; also concerning thefour elements
19 Numbers linear, plane, and solid; why a single intermediary is sufficient between planes but is not sufficient between solids; how mathematical ratios are related to physical ratios
20 The first consideration: why the number four in relation to the e ements befits the world
21 The second consideration: proving the same
22 The third consideration: confirming the same
23 The fourth consideration of the same; and the powers and ratios of the elements
24 The whole world is composed of four elements; how these elements are under a particular principle in the heavens and under a different principle beneath the Moon
25 Circular motion is the property of every sphere in constant movement; and light is the principal property of fire
26 A confirmation of what was said earlier; concerningfire, ether, the composition of the heavens, and the daemons in the heavens and beneath the heavens
27 On the spirit of the world, that is, on intellect, soul, intelligence, and nature
28 On the composition of the soul, and why the soulneeds five elements for its constitution
29 Why the soul is compared to a compound and to musical harmony
30 The propositions and proportions related to Pythagorean and Platonic music
31 In musical harmonies one is produced from the many; how harmony is defined
32 Which harmonies arise from which proportions
33 On the harmonious composition of the soul
34 The main points about the harmonic numbers which lead to the composition of the soul 34*From the intervals of the spheres Plato seeks the intervals of the ratios between the parts of the soul
35 How the intervals of the double and triple numbers are filled
36 The division of the soul; motion; and time
37 The arrangement of the living world through its limbs; the opposite movements of revolutions; and the intersectors of axes and orbits
38 Right and left in the cosmos; the movements of the firmament, of the planets, and of the fixed stars; the arrangement of the soul
39 The great harmony, within the cosmic being, between the soul and the heavens and between the heavens and the elements, in relation to the higher worlds and the orders of divinities
40 Those things which come into being directly from God, and those things which come into being through intermediaries; the words of God in relation to the gods; and the providence of the gods
41 Man’s relationship to soul and
42 How the world is composed of mind and necessity
43 Natural phenomena are based on the principles of mathematics; concerning the elements and compounds
44 More on man: how much regard he gives to the soul, and how much to the body
45 On the outward and inward breath, according to Plato and Galen
46 On the good health and poor health of the body and the soul
The Chapter Divisions of the Timaeus with brief commentaries as given by Marsilio Ficino
Notes to the Compendium
Soul Numbers
Glossary
Bibliography
Index
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
SINCE THE TIMEwork on this series began, there have been wars and rumours of wars, accompanied by vast changes on the national and international stage.
In the midst of reflections on changes of any kind, it is good to acknowledge what is constant. As far as this series is concerned, the constants, in terms of human contributors other than myself as the translator, are my wife Phyllis, John Meltzer, Nathan David, Anthony Werner, and Jean Desebrock.
Work on this particular volume has been enormously helped by a group of composers and musicians who graced our home three times a year for almost a decade to consider Chapters 28 to 35 of Ficino’sCompendium.Leading regulars in this group were Peter Blumsom (who kindly wrote the notes and additional material to this volume), Bruce Ramell, and David Goymour, and valued contributions were also made by David Fletcher, the late Geoffrey Mulford, Noel Skinner, and David Ward.
For the supply of source material I am deeply indebted to Adrian Bertoluzzi and Christophe Poncet.
The constant of constants is the source of all, the Truth itself, acknowledged as supreme by Plato and Ficino. To this Truth, which shines in the hearts of all, this final volume and the whole series are dedicated.
Arthur Farndell
TRANSLATOR’S NOTE ON THE LATIN TEXTS
THE FLORENCEtext of 1496 is the principal authority for the translation of theCompendium, but use has also been made of the Venice edition of 1491 and the Basle version of 1576.
Minor differences, too numerous to list in this volume, appear in these three versions: for instance, the last word of Chapter 8 of theCompendiumis given as ‘confirmavimus’ in Florence and Venice, but as ‘confirmabimus’ in Basle.
The major variations in these three publications, however, are given below, with references from the English of this present translation:
Compendium, Chapter 7: Six consecutive paragraphs almost at the end of the chapter (‘When we say – if we follow Plato … according to the poets.’) occur in Florence only.
Compendium, Chapter 11: The final paragraph (‘He says that … would come forth from it.’) is in Florence and Basle but not in Venice.
Compendium, Chapter 19: In the sixth paragraph, the words beginning ‘since in this way twelve borrows two sides’ and ending ‘from the further cube, namely, eight’ are in Florence but not in Venice or Basle.
Compendium, Chapter 23: Basle gives a table of the elements and their qualities which does not appear in Florence or Venice.
Compendium, Chapter 26: This chapter is not in Venice. In Basle it is numbered XXVII.
Compendium, Chapter 27: In Basle this is numbered XXVI. Thus Basle reverses Chapters 26 and 27 of Florence. In the second paragraph, the second sentence and the single word ‘moreover’ of the third sentence appear only in Florence. Likewise, the penultimate paragraph of this chapter appears only in Florence.
Compendium, Chapter 29: The final paragraph occurs in Florence and Basle, but not in Venice.
Compendium, Chapter 32: Paragraph 23 (‘But when we said that Saturn …’) and paragraph 24 (‘We should, however, assign …’) appear only in Florence.
Compendium, Chapter 33: Paragraph 3: The words beginning with ‘Stillness, and Motion’, which conclude the first sentence, and ending with ‘the Same, and the Different’ in the third sentence, occur in Florence and Venice, but not in Basle.
Compendium, Chapter 34: The penultimate paragraph is given in Florence, but not in Venice or Basle.
Compendium, Chapter 34*: The second paragraph occurs in Florence only. Note also that the English translation follows the Florence text in attributing the number 34 to two consecutive chapters, this being the second of those two chapters. The result is that, from here until the end of theCompendium, the chapter numbers will lag one behind those of Venice and Basle.
Compendium, Chapter 35: Both Venice and Basle include a triangular figure with numbers. In Basle the topmost number shown is 6, whereas Venice shows the numeral 1 above the 6. This figure does not appear in Florence.
Compendium, Chapter 36: Venice has only the first six paragraphs of this chapter.
Compendium, Chapter 37: Venice lacks this chapter.
Compendium, Chapter 38: Venice lacks this chapter. It is erroneously numbered XXXVII in the Basle text.
Compendium, Chapter 39: This chapter is not in Venice.
Compendium, Chapter 40: In the title, only Florence has ‘the words of God in relation to the gods; and the providence of the gods’. Venice has only the first six paragraphs of this chapter.
Compendium, Chapter 41: Paragraph 6: Only Florence has ‘We have also spoken about sight in our commentaries on Plotinus.’
Compendium, Chapter 42: Basle erroneously gives the number XL to this chapter.
Compendium, Chapter 43: Basle assigns the number XLI to this chapter. The eighth paragraph (‘Euclid demonstrates …’) occurs only in Florence. In the tenth paragraph, the words ‘and so twice sixtyTRANSLATOR’S NOTE ON THE LATIN TEXTSscalenes are produced. In this shape there are twelve solid angles, each produced from five planes’ and the words ‘having eight solid angles, each of which is made of three right-angled planes’ likewise occur only in the Florence text.
Compendium, Chapter 44: Basle gives the number XLII to this chapter.
Compendium, Chapter 45: This chapter appears only in Florence.
Compendium, Chapter 46: Venice and Basle have this as the final part of the chapter entitled ‘More on man: how much regard he gives to the soul, and how much to the body’ [Chapter 44 in Florence]. The chapter title is therefore only in Florence. In the third paragraph, the words ‘that no one who has clearly perceived, at the outset, the misery which depravity brings in its train will voluntarily direct all his desires towards this end. You should also understand him to mean’ occur only in Florence. In the penultimate paragraph, between ‘just as the poets do’ and ‘So take these’, Venice and Basle have ‘Atque Timaeus Locrus in Lib. de Mundo fabulosa haec esse fatetur’ [‘And Timaeus of Locri, in his bookOn the World, says that these things are fictitious (or mythical)’].
For the translation of ‘The Chapter Divisions of theTimaeus’, the Florence text has remained the principal guide, but the Basle of 1576 has also been consulted. In this part of the work there are numerous minor discrepancies between the two texts, but no major divergences.
Marsilio Ficino’s Compendium on the Timaeus
Marsilio Ficino’s Compendium on the
Chapter 1The subject matter of the book
JUST ASPlato devotes his energies, in theParmenides, to encompassing all matters divine, in the same way he embraces, in theTimaeus, all things natural; and in both dialogues he is principally aPythagorean, his discourse being uttered through the mouths of Pythagoreans. In theParmenideshe emulates two Pythagoreans from Elea, Parmenides and Zeno, who wrote on divine matters. In theTimaeushe follows a Pythagorean from Locri named Timaeus, who wrote a book on the nature of the universe.
All this he does in such a way, however, that he includes in these writings the mysteries as well as eloquence. But since the divine world is the cause and model of the natural world, while the natural world is the effect and image of the divine world, it is for these reasons, too, that Plato, while speaking of the divine world in theParmenides, occasionally moves down to the natural world, and when dealing in theTimaeuswith the natural world he quite often soars up to the divine world. And it is not without some justification that he links divinity with nature, for nature is the instrument of divinity. And so Plato treats divinely of the natural world, as does Aristotle, and he treats of the divine world naturally.
He also interweaves mathematical items as the means between the divine world and the natural world. Through numbers the study of mathematics indicates the divine world, and through measurements it indicates the natural world.
The subject matter of this book may therefore be said to be the very nature of the universe, that is, a seminal and quickening power pervading the whole of the cosmos, being subject to the world-soul but exercising control over matter, and begetting all things in the sequence with which the soul itself conceives, while looking up to the divine mind and seeking the Good.
Chapter 2The arrangement of the book and its parts
IT WILL BE SHOWNthat the universe and its nature are not self-existent but depend on a higher, divine cause. It will also be shown that nature is arranged in many levels: celestial, elemental, simple, compound, rational, and irrational. All creation beneath the Moon will be seen to be related to a rational being, which is its end and its lord. Many more things will be said of this being, in relation to both the soul and the body; and more will also be said about those things which are compounded by nature beneath this rational being. Indeed, to put it briefly, the threefold world will be considered: the divine, the celestial, and the human.
It will further be shown that for all the things that are compounded in this world, and for the world itself, there are two chief internal elements: matter and form. But there are three external principles: the efficient cause of the world, the model cause of the world, and the final cause of the world. The efficient cause is divine power, intelligence, and will; the model cause comprises the Ideas conceived by divine intelligence; and the final cause is the Good.
Chapter 3Introduction to the dialogue
LET US PROCEED, in any case, to the contents of the dialogue. Plato devotes five successive days to discussions. On the first day Socrates is at the Piraeus, discussing the State in the company of Polemarchus, Glaucon, Adeimantus, and Thrasymachus the Sophist. On the second day, in the city, he goes over the same topic again with Timaeus, Critias, Hermocrates, and a fourth person, an anonymous foreigner, who is perhaps a companion of Timaeus. On the third day they make an end of this topic. As if starting afresh, Timaeus immediately talksabout nature, in the company of Socrates, Critias, and Hermocrates; for the fourth person, who anonymously attended the second discussion, is absent from the third, since it is not right for all to share in matters that are somewhat secret. On the fourth day Critias speaks out. The fifth day has not yet dawned.
After the arrangement and concluding speech about the divine Republic in the world of men, Plato moves in theTimaeusto the celestial Republic, which is the model for the earthly one and is composed by God Himself. Then he proceeds to the antiquity of the world and of the human race, and to the wondrous deeds that were energetically accomplished by the ancients.
Chapter 4An allegory of history;contents of the prologue
NEAR THE BEGINNINGof this dialogue Plato relates an account of the war that was once fought between the Athenians and the men of Atlantis. It is clear that Crantor, the principal expounder of Plato at the time, takes the account to be devoid of any allegory. Some, on the other hand, take it as pure allegory, but they are refuted by Platonists of the highest standing, who declare that it is an historical account because Plato has uttered it. The tale that follows is indeed amazing, but totally true. They also consider that an allegorical meaning should be given to Plato’s account, for he never exerts himself without good reason.
They therefore think that the war between the Athenians and the Atlanteans presents an image of all the confrontations in the universe. For, according to Heraclitus, war or opposition is the father of all things. Amelius gives the example of the opposition between the firmament and the planets, especially since it is said inCritiasthat the island of Atlantis was divided into seven circles. Origen, for his part, cites the opposition of the higher daemons towards the lower daemons and their victory over them, for the higher daemons had more power, whereas the lower daemons were greater in number. Numenius refers to the pre-eminent souls which follow Pallas and which are hostile towards other souls who pursue the procreative process under Neptune.
Porphyry alludes to the battle between the daemons which entice towards procreation and the souls which strive for the realms above. He distinguishes three types of daemons: those that are divine; those that conform to a particular disposition, and whose ranks are filled with the specific souls that have obtained the daemoniacal lot; and those that are evil and harmful to souls. He therefore says that these lowest daemons assail the souls in their unending ascent and descent; and this is especially true of the daemons of the West, for he says that that region is considered by the Egyptians to be suitable for the harmful daemons.
Similarly Iamblichus, Syrianus, and Proclus add the never-ending opposition which holds sway everywhere between the One and the Many, Limit and Limitlessness, the Same and the Different, and between Stillness and Motion. All things are composed of these elements from the beginning. Again, being is either of itself or not of itself. Essence is either incorporeal or corporeal; and the incorporeal either moves down towards the corporeal or does not; while the corporeal is either permanent, being celestial, or it is transient, being elemental. Finally, in the heavens movements are opposed to each other, as are diverse powers; but beneath the heavens it is the qualities that repel each other.
In brief, all these differences are indicated by that war of old; and in all cases the Athenians represent what is higher and more excellent, while the men of the West stand for their opposites. Such an allegory is to no small extent applicable to the discussion by Timaeus and is confirmed by what we say in our commentary toCritias.
Chapter 5 The fall of Phaethon; floods; fires; a description of Minerva
HERE I ASK YOUonce more to remember that nine thousand years are calculated by Eudoxus as a thousand months; and that Phaethon, offspring of the Sun, consumed the Earth with thunderbolts, which, according to some, means that a huge comet, solar by nature and eventually disintegrating, provoked unbearable periods of heat and perhaps the fires which Moses says were sent by divine intervention.
But when the floods are spoken of, remember that fire is the most effective of all the elements; water is more effective than earth and less amenable than air. Again, fire has the power to divide and penetrate, while water always has the power to strike with great force. Thus it is through these two elements that major calamities occur.
There is still the final cause to consider: from the destruction wrought by these two elements there ensues a greater good, a regeneration of creation which is more fertile than that produced by the pestilence of the air and the fissuring of the earth. This is why providence employs these two in particular to accomplish the most widespread destruction. Just as the celestial orbits obey providence, so God has ordained that there will be destruction and regeneration at those periods of time when all the planets properly coincide with the fiery or watery signs and when the fixed stars lead to the same position.
You will also remember that Neptune signifies natural providence, while Pallas indicates the providence of the intellect, and that Pallas herself is described by the followers of Plato as the goddess who, with her wisdom and power, adorns all that is heavenly and builds up all that comes into being beneath the heavens. Among the constellations, it is Aries over which she wields special authority; and she presides over the celestial equator, where they believe the motive power of the universe to be particularly active.
You will commit to memory the golden saying which, according to what Proclus read in the annals of the Egyptians, was inscribed in the temples of Minerva: ‘I am whatever is, whatever will be, and whatever has been. No one has lifted my veil. The fruit that I have brought forth is the living Sun.’
Chapter 6The finest directionsconcerning prayersand entreaties
BUT WHENPlato speaks of God, who is worthy of adoration and supplication, you should hear Porphyry expressing his approval of prayers offered to God, for he says:
‘Since God provides for us, and since our affairs can change, we certainly worship Him to good purpose by the use we make of all that is ours, provided that we are good; for in this way, being made like unto God, we are united more closely with Him. The whole power of worship lies in this union. For there is no doubt that we are the children of God, but we are cut off from Him, as if in a dungeon in the land of exile. We should beseech Him that we may be freed and thus return to our Father. Otherwise we shall be like those who have been deprived of parental protection.
‘Indeed, since we are parts of the universe, we undoubtedly depend on the universe, for turning towards the whole bestows salvation on the parts. If you therefore follow virtue, you should worship Him, who holds all virtue within Himself. For the whole of the Good Itself will be for you the motivating force of that which makes the Good available to you. If you choose the physical good, there is in the universe a power that holds all physical things within itself. Thus all the parts need to be maintained in good health. But we have found that, in all nations, the men who are outstanding for their wisdom have devoted their energies mainly to prayers to the divine. This is particularly true of the Hindu Brahmanas, the Persian Magi, and the Greek theologians (although the Chaldeans worshipped something different). Giving the name of God to the power of those above, they offered their worship in this one name.’
That is what Porphyry says.
After Porphyry, let us listen to his disciple, the divine Iamblichus, whose words are fully confirmed by Proclus:
‘All things are of God, so that nothing, however small, is ever away from God. For in all places divine unity prevails. Through this unity all things come to rest, and, in a never-ending circle of close relationship, they turn towards God Himself, from whom and in whom they miraculously have their being. If it were not so, they would at once rush headlong into nothingness.
‘All things proceed from the divine unity, and as they proceed they retain a particular unity which has been impressed upon them as an image of divine unity. Through this particular unity they are called back to the divine unity, and, being called back, they find their completion.
‘This unity seizes souls in accordance with their prayers, through which our union with God is deeply fulfilled. For if nature, which emanates from God, has introduced certain qualities which resonate with what is higher, so that through these qualities they turn in some measure to what is higher, as all that is solar turns towards the Sun, while all that is lunar turns towards the Moon, how much more deeply has the Father of souls impressed upon them powers which will seize them for Himself.
‘Now these powers seem to be located particularly within a divine unity which is higher than the intellect: in fact, within the very act of the intellect as it turns back. The prayerful worship which arises from this brings our re-instatement in God to complete fulfilment, for by a natural affinity it draws into us the divine beneficence and unites the worshippers with the object of their worship. It joins the prayers of the devotees to the intelligence of the higher beings, and it moves the will of those who embrace all good things within themselves to impart good things to us in accordance with our desires. It is the agent of divine conviction, and all that we have it establishes in the steadfastness of the higher realms.
‘But there are five principal prerequisites for the fulfilment of prayer. The first is some concept of the object of worship and of the reason for worship. The second is the approximation of our life to the divine life, starting with purity, integrity, holiness, discipline, and order; seeking God’s blessing; and submitting our souls to His bounty. The third prerequisite is some contact through which we can for much of the time attain the divine essence and sink into it through the most exalted condition of our soul. The fourth pre-condition is entry into the forecourt of divine light. The fifth is a union which enables the unity of the soul to penetrate deeply into the divine unity and remain connected, thus making the action of the soul and of God one and the same, so that we are no longer under our own law but are under God’s law, being overwhelmed and enveloped by divine glory.
‘However, the supreme purpose of this worship, which should be undertaken unceasingly, is to conjoin this turning of the soul with that unchanging state, to restore indissolubly to the divine unity whatever has come forth from it, and to flood our light with the supernal light. Thus true worship alone restores souls to their home country. Holiness alone is the fullness of virtue. Only the good man, as Plato writes in theLaws, prays to God in a fitting and auspicious way. Only intercourse with those above confers blessings on men. Those who lead disgraceful lives are completely estranged from this; such sacrilegious people should be kept away from prayers and devotions.
‘But those who are pure come to offer their entreaties in a fitting manner, bringing with them three special companions: faith, truth, and love. Encompassed by these three, let them conceive an unshakeable hope in whatever is good; and being thus taken beyond all else and beyond themselves, let them dive deeply into the divine light. For a man vainly seeks after God if he does not apply himself in solitude to that which is solitary, in stillness to that which is still, and in simplicity to that which is utterly simple. Just as we cannot be united to being through non-being, so we cannot be united to unity through multiplicity, to stillness through movement, or to simplicity through complexity, but rather do we fall back into their opposites.’
That is what Iamblichus and Proclus say.
The great Theodorus adds that anyone who carefully examines the nature of things will find that, in addition to souls and minds, everything apart from the First is engaged in worship and prayer.
Chapter 7The world has three causes higher than itself, depends on the incorporeal cause, and is ever in flux
LATER,NOW THATprayers have been offered, Timaeus, deeming that the world has been created, and therefore created by something outside itself, examines its threefold cause: the efficient cause, which is the divine mind; the model cause, or the series of Ideas conceived by the divine mind; and the final cause, which is the Good.
That the world is made by something other than itself he shows by the fact that, although it is fully complete in its physical nature, it is not totally complete in its absolute nature, since it admits of irregularities and deformities through the nature of matter, and through the nature of measurement it suffers defects in its excellence and is open to division. If it is a victim of further division on account of its composite nature, it is liable to disintegrate. On account of the mutual repulsion of its parts it devises evil. On account of its motion it reveals its deficiency and suffers further deprivation. In brief, its constitution, being compounded of diverse elements, has no single higher power to hold it together, a power that has perfect being since it is from itself. The world, not having perfect being, is thus known not to be of itself.
Yet every kind of composite thing is taken back to something which is not composite within the kind: dimensions to a point, which has no dimensions; numbers to unity, which is not composed of numbers; elements to that which is not compounded of elements. In this way the entire order of all beings is taken back to that being which does not consist of beings. This will be a substance unmixed with contingent attributes, a substance without quantity or quality, a substance whole and indivisible.
That which is single, utterly simple, and alone does not have less than those things which, apart from substance, are subject to contingencies, for those attributes which are contingent within all that follows must be a substance within the supreme and, indeed, the finest substance. But the more you add to what is excellent, the further do you force things away from excellence itself, for from the admixture there arises a quality that is new and inferior.
This world, therefore, being composite in all respects, depends, as does any world that is higher but still composite, on a higher simplicity which stands above even eternity and from which are derived the fullness of eternity within divine minds, the eternity that is mixed with time within rational creatures, the temporal everlastingness within the spheres of the world, and a portion of time within those things which arise from the motion and power of the spheres.
Thus whatever is considered to be above the soul always is and never becomes. But the soul itself is and ever becomes. The world never is, but ever becomes. Whatever is born in the world never is, but becomes for a time. Indeed, we say that to become is to be enacted by time, and since the world is driven by ceaseless movement and unending time it is judged to be ever becoming. But because it is becoming, it is not yet, and so it is said never to be, just as the reflection of a mountain in a rushing stream is ever becoming and being re-formed, ever led into becoming and never staying at rest in being.
But the followers of Plato think that the difference between the soul and the world is that the heavens are continually becoming, both in action and in essence, whereas the soul becomes through action, but through its essence it is from God and does not become from God; and since essence is indivisible it has a generative power of its own by which it projects into itself its own life and movement, while the heavens are fully dependent on something other than themselves.
In brief, just as from the same rock, which lies between the still pool and the rushing stream, the reflection in the pool constantly is, as it appears, and in the rushing stream constantly becomes and after vanishing is constantly re-created, in the same way they both depend on God, but in different ways. For from God the soul ever is, while the world ever becomes.
When we say – if we follow Plato – that the world is always becoming, we must understand that the heavens, too, are in some way becoming, through motion that is, as it were, both spatial and natural. For since the entire mechanism is beneath soul which is set in motion through action, it itself must naturally be subject to motion.
Consistent with this kind of susceptibility to motion are matter without form, dimension that is naturally divisible, polarity of qualities, and motion that is extremely swift; so that, just as the intelligible world always is and never becomes, so the whole of the perceptible world, as Timaeus says, is always becoming but never really is.
This is why, in theRepublic, Plato calls all perceptible things images and shadows. This is what is implied by that divine statement, ‘All is vanity’; and again, ‘The world passeth away’. Concerning this kind of passing away we have spoken at greater length in theTheology.
We shall therefore say, in company with Plato, that nothing flows externally into or out of the world as a whole, but that outflow and inflow always occur within the world, and this causes the world to always become. The elemental region does not in any way change into the celestial region, or vice versa. The elements gradually penetrate each other and, intermingling in this way, they allow outflow and inflow within their respective regions, whereas the celestial spheres, like eight worlds, do not intermingle, for each sphere is held intact by its own extremely powerful soul. But from the stars something flows everlastingly through their heavens and flows back again; and this reciprocal flow is assisted by the circular movement of the heavens.
Thus in the eighth sphere, through those stars known as the fixed stars, and in the subsequent spheres, through the planets and the other dwellers in the heavens which are hidden from our eyes, mutual interchange takes place. The stars, however, appear ever the same, for the outflow and inflow are always brought into balance by the governing soul: their shape remains unchanged and their light remains much the same, but their matter is replenished. In addition, beneath the Moon, there are aeons in which the inflow is equally balanced in all places with the outflow for very long periods of time, but not for ever.
In this way, if we accept that the Sun of Thales, Democritus, and Heraclitus is new every day and that everything is in perpetual flux, there will be no discord at all between the ancient writers and Plato, and it will not escape our notice what banquets and nectar and ambrosia of the gods they require, according to the poets.
But let us now make a new start.
Chapter 8 The Good Itself, rather than subsequent causes, is the cause of all things, and it has no direct relationship with anything
ALL THE FOLLOWERSofPlato concur in declaring that this universe receives everything from the supreme God, including action, power, and essence; for this is what they find in all his books and what they hear confirmed in his letters. Indeed, in all his writings he most mysteriously withdraws the tertiary effects into the tertiary cause, the secondary effects into the secondary cause, and all effects into the one cause of all. He does not say that the primary effects are to be withdrawn into the primary cause, lest by calling them the primary effects he might mislead us into thinking that they alone depend on God or that God combines with the other causes in every genus and with theeffects in some kind of lordship. And so he shows that all things come forth together from Him and that He is completely free of all contact with whatever comes forth.
On account of its absolute simplicity he calls it the One Itself; and on account of its unbounded beneficence, through which, and as the beginning, it creates all things by bringing them forth and, as the end, perfects all things by bringing them back, he calls it the Good Itself. But he thinks that whatever comes into being depends more on it than on the other causes, since in every activity it operates earlier, for longer, and more powerfully than the other causes; and whatever the other causes are, it is under its operation that they are so; and whatever they do, they do under its authority.
But in order to show that each and every thing emanates from it rather than from the other causes, Plato says three times that it is the beginning of all. For he says that all things surround the King of all, that all things exist for His sake, and that He is the cause of all, in order that we might understand that all things arise primarily from Him and that God is the maker of all, the model of all, and the end of all. In the same way Plato clearly shows, in the sixth book of theRepublic, in theParmenides, and in theSophist, that the One Itself, the Good Itself, is higher than every essence and every intellect and is the cause of both essence and intellect.
But it is clear that the One and the Good are the same; for if they were different there would of necessity be two supreme principles. The principle, or beginning, must of course be utterly simple and utterly good; and nothing is simpler than unity or better than goodness. Unity is not better than goodness, and goodness is not simpler than unity. Thus both are one, the supreme God. That this is wholly above essence and mind we have clearly shown in theTheologyand elsewhere.
Chapter 9The dependence of matter on the Good Itself; the action of the mind and soul upon matter; and the intelligible world
FROM THIS UNQUALIFIEDOne, the Good that soars above every essence, Plato, in hisParmenidesandSophist, derives all the levels of beings; next, the levels of those things that truly are, the separate forms; then the levels of those that truly are not, the forms inherent in matter; and finally, the lowest level of matter, which is so far from the truth that it is next to that which is imagined to no longer have true being. This unqualified matter, which in theParmenidesis derived from the Good Itself and found at the last level of creation, Plato accepts in theTimaeusas already begotten by the maker of the world and as subordinate to the effect of cosmic operation.
But can it be said that God, the creator of the world, is also the producer of matter? The followers of Ammonius and Origen will reply that He is; that theParmenidesdeals with how matter receives being from God; and that in theTimaeusthe way in which matter receives well-being from God is carefully thought out, although it must receive some measure of being before it can receive well-being. A different reply will be given by the main body of Plato’s followers, who will say that the one who makes matter and the one who shapes it soon afterwards are not the same God; that matter is, in fact, from the highest Good, but is shaped by the intellect and then moved by the soul; that all these things are indeed from the First, but being is from the First only, is shaped by the First through the intellect, and is moved and, being moved, is quickly given shape by the First through both the intellect and the soul.
In a similar way, let us imagine a potter who prepares the clay with his own hand and, once it is prepared, shapes it on the wheel, and as he shapes it he defines and fashions it with a wooden spatula. No one would say, without some qualification, that the vessel was made by the spatula and the wheel rather than by the potter, although it does come into being from the potter by means of the wheel and spatula.
They deem that this universe likewise comes forth from the Good Itself by means of a divine intellect and the soul of the universe; that from the One Itself the world is made primarily one, and from theGood Itself it is made primarily good. But since this visible world, on account of its manifold division into parts, the opposing natures of its qualities, the diversity of its effects, and the imperfections of its material forms is not primarily one or primarily good, they deem that prior to this world another world emanates from unity itself and from divine goodness, a world which resembles the visible world as closely as nature will allow, a world which is not visible but intelligible and intellectual, containing the models for all those things which come into being in this visible world. They call this other world the divine intellect, not the Good Itself, but the noblest child of the Good. If we understand this to be of one substance with the First, we shall unite Plato more closely with Christian theology, but the other interpreters of Plato will voice their protests.
Chapter 10 The Sun, light, radiance, brilliance, heat, procreation; likewise unity, goodness, intellect, soul, nature, the body of the world, the image of the higher worlds
THEREFORE LETthe truth, Christian and Mosaic, persist. But in the meantime, as most expositors agree, it was possibly the view of Plato or of Pythagoras that the intelligible world is intermediate between the visible world and the Good Itself, an image of the Good and the model for the physical world; it depends on the Good, just as the radiance outside the Sun depends on the light within the Sun; and it very soon brings forth from itself the soul of the world, just as radiance pours forth brilliance from itself; and through the soul it continually begets all things, just as brilliance begets bodily forms through heat.
These six levels are arranged in a hierarchy. The first is the very substance of the Sun; the second is that light which is substantial and innermost; the third is the radiance emanating from it; the fourth is the brilliance which pours forth from the radiance; the fifth is the heat kindled by the brilliance; and the sixth is the procreation produced by the blazing heat.
The six other levels are distinguished in a similar way. The first is unity, and the second is goodness, but these two are not truly distinct – although reason can distinguish them to some extent – for they have the same divine nature; and because unity soars high above everything, yet at the same time fills everything, it is called goodness. This unconditioned power to fill all things Plato, in the sixth book of theRepublic, calls the Idea of the Good, but in his letters he calls it the Idea of good things; and so he calls it the Idea of the Good Itself and of those good things that come forth from the Good. At the third level, corresponding to the radiance which emanates from the light, is a divine mind, which, if I may express it thus, conceives within itself manifold Ideas from the warmth of the single and supernal light and of the Idea of the One, just as within the radiance many rays originate from a single ray of light. Not only are the Ideas of created things comprised within this mind, but to this mind are related, as to their leader, many hosts of minds springing forth from that same divine light from which that mind itself also comes forth.
All of this is called the higher world, but all that concerns the subsequent minds is called the intellectual world, while whatever concerns the leader is called the intelligible world.
But that mind which is the leader of minds is called partly intellect and partly intelligible: intellect insofar as it applies itself to distinguishing the principles of created things, and intelligible insofar as such principles are held within its Ideas.
Finally, the Idea of the Good presides not only over the intellect but also over the intelligible.
After this world-archetype there follows, at the fourth level, the soul of the physical world. This is the rational world, coming forth from the intellectual world, as brilliance comes forth from radiance. And just as the brilliance is now combined with movement, so the soul, with a quick movement, reaches and pervades the principles of the unmoving Ideas. This is followed by the fifth level, the nature of things, the seed-world, proceeding from the rational world of the soul as heat proceeds from brilliance. At the sixth level is found this physical world, arising unconditionally from the seed-world, just as the procreation of things arises from warmth.
And if you wish to draw a more suitable comparison with all the items that have been omitted, you will consider firstly the natural power and goodness found in an architect of surpassing wisdom; secondly, the contemplative intellect related to geometry and
