Chinas Changing Approach to International Intervention E-Book

Oliver Bräuner

• Herausgeber: GRIN Verlag
• Sprache: Englisch

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2010

Beschreibung

Thesis (M.A.) from the year 2009 in the subject Orientalism / Sinology - Chinese / China, grade: 2,0, University of Heidelberg (Institut für Sinologie), language: English, abstract: This work tries to answer these questions by analyzing China’s changing policy on the principle of national sovereignty and international military intervention, especially since the end of the Cold War era. The result is of course a much more complex picture than the one painted by the Western media: Beijing’s interpretation of national sovereignty is by no means static, despite all its conservative rhetoric. In addition, China has increasingly acquiesced to some forms of international military intervention, while continuing to oppose it in certain cases. Although there are some visible red lines, there seems to be no ideologically-driven Chinese strategy on international intervention. Beijing rather seems to follow a pragmatic approach of muddling through (mosuo, 摸索), testing a number of different approaches in order to find the best possible way to promote its interests. This thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 provides an analysis of the general development of Chinese foreign policy since the end of the Cold War era. This chapter focuses especially on the issues and motivations that have dominated Chinese foreign policy in the past twenty years. It starts with a brief analysis of the Chinese foreign policy decision-making process and of the Chinese foreign policy think tank landscape. Chapter 3 looks into China’s changing position on the principle of national sovereignty. The chapter also discusses the historical development of the principle of national sovereignty, and the factors constraining and conducing change in the Chinese position towards it. Chapter 4 examines Beijing’s changing approach to international intervention. To illustrate this approach, two concepts of international military intervention will be examined: UN Peacekeeping Operations and a new concept, the Responsibility to Protect. The analysis of China’s position on these concepts will employ a mix of discourse analysis (comprising official statements and unofficial foreign policy elite views) and policy analysis. Thus following a Chinese saying, ‘listen to their words, and watch their actions’ (ting qi yan, guan qi xing, 聽其言, 觀其行). Finally, a summarization of the findings and the corresponding conclusions can be found in chapter 5. The chapter ends with some policy recommendations for Western foreign policy decision-makers.

Leseprobe

Table of Content

Technical notes.

1 Preface.

2 Chinese foreign policy after the Cold War

2.1 Actors and foreign policy decision-making processes

2.1.1 Party and government actors

2.1.2 Think Tanks and foreign policy elite

2.2 Development of Chinese foreign policy after the Cold War

2.3 Competing goals and motivations

2.3.1 Regime survival, economic development, nationalism

2.4 Conclusion: Muddling through.

3 China’s approach to sovereign change.

3.2 China’s changing position

3.3 Factors constraining change

3.3.1 Traditional Chinese conceptions of sovereignty

3.3.2 Official PRC historiography and nationalism.

3.3.3 Example: The Taiwan conflict.

3.4 Factors conducive to change

3.4.1 Growing global economic and political interests

3.4.2 China’s international socialization

3.4.3 Example: Flexibility in border disputes

3.5 Conclusion: Mixed signals.

4 China’s changing position on international intervention.

4.1 UN Peacekeeping Operations

4.1.1 Definition and controversies

4.1.2 Historical development

4.1.3 China’s changing policy on UN PKO

4.1.4 Foreign policy elite analysis

4.1.5 Conclusion

4.2 The Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

4.2.1 From Humanitarian Intervention to R2P

4.2.2 China’s policy on R2P

4.2.3 Foreign policy elite analysis

4.2.4 Conclusion

4.3 Conclusion: Limited progress

5 Conclusion

6 References.

A. Deutsche Zusammenfassung

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Technical notes

1. For my thesis I will use the Hanyu Pinyin system of Romanization, which is generally used in the People’s Republic of China today. Exceptions are made for historical figures like Chiang Kai-shek, as well as the proper names of Taiwanese personalities. They are better known by these names than by their names in Hanyu Pinyin. The (traditional) Chinese characters of the Chinese author’s names and their works which I have quoted in my thesis can be found in the bibliography.

2. Terms and journal/book titles will be written in italic; quotations will be enclosed between quotation marks.

3. Accentuations and underlining of words and expressions in the original text of quotations will be written in bold in this thesis.

4. The (traditional) Chinese characters and the Hanyu Pinyin romanization of terms and expressions translated from Chinese will be parenthesized and written in italic as they appear for the first time.

5. Quotations from Chinese-language sources will be translated into English. Usually I will produce the translations myself. Translations by other authors will be indicated as such.

6. A CD-ROM with a detailed list of the internet sources and the downloaded internet sources is attached to the hardcopy of this thesis.

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Abbreviations

ARF - ASEAN Regional Forum

ASEAN - Association of South East Asian Nations AU - African Union CCP - Chinese Communist Party DPKO - Department of Peacekeeping Operations DPP - Democratic Progressive Party (Taiwan) ECOWAS - Economic Community of West African States FALG - Leading Small Group for Foreign Affairs GATT - General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GDP - Gross domestic product ICC - International Criminal Court

ICISS - International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty INGO - international nongovernmental organization(s) IMF - International Monetary Fund IR - International Relations KMT - Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party) NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization OSCE - Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe P-5 - Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council PKO - peacekeeping operation(s) PLA - People’s Liberation Army PRC - People’s Republic of China R2P - Responsibility to Protect ROC - Republic of China SAR - Special Administrative Region SCO - Shanghai Cooperation Organization UDHR - Universal Declaration of Human Rights UN - United Nations UNHRC - United Nations Human Rights Council (UN) PKO - (United Nations) Peacekeeping Operation(s) UNSC - United Nations Security Council WHO - World Health Organization WTO - World Trade Organization

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1 Preface

In September 2007, Buddhist monks and ordinary citizens protested in the streets of Rangoon and other major cities against the oppressive regime of the Burmese (Myanmar) military junta. After a few days, the military responded with a violent crackdown, killing and arresting an unknown number of protesters in the process. ‘Western’1governments, media and public figures were appalled by this ‘bloody crackdown’.2Professor Shen Dingli, an international relations expert at Shanghai's Fudan University, offered a different opinion: ‘China has used tanks to kill people on Tiananmen Square (in 1989). It is Myanmar's sovereign right to kill their own people, too.’3The Chinese government subsequently blocked Western efforts to impose sanctions on the military junta in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), describing the events as a purely ‘domestic affair’.4

However, Beijing does not only disapprove of non-military forms of foreign intervention such as sanctions: Stretching from its stubborn opposition against United Nations peacekeeping operations (UNPKO) in the 1970s to its furious reaction to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) ‘humanitarian intervention’ in Kosovo in 1999 and finally to its much criticized role in the Darfur conflict today, China has made quite a name for itself as a staunch and passionate opponent of all forms of international intervention. In the Western media, China is regularly portrayed as a representative of radically conservative interpretations of national sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries. Driven by its hunger for all sorts of national resources, Beijing is said to be prepared to protect even the most brutal regimes in outlawed ‘rogue states’, such as Sudan, Iran and Burma. But does China really categorically reject international intervention? Is Beijing following a static interpretation of national sovereignty, which is a principle that has itself undergone pro-found changes in the past decades of accelerated globalization and information revolution? Which factors motivate the Chinese leadership’s policy decisions on international intervention? What does China’s position on international intervention tell us about the overall development of Chinese foreign policy?

This work tries to answer these questions by analyzing China’s changing policy on the principle of national sovereignty and international military intervention, especially since the end of

1In this thesis, the terms ‘Western’ and ‘West’ refer to the liberal democracies of Europe and North America plus Japan. This is not meant to imply that the ‘West’ represents a totally homogeneous block, but only that these countries are similarly structured and that the mainstream of their publics share basic common values, such as support for liberal democracy, respect for human rights and individual freedoms, the rule of law, etc.

2USA Today: China not likely to rebuke Burma (accessed on 24 February 2009)

3Ibid.

4The New York Times: China Blocks Move to Condemn Crackdown (accessed on 5 March 2009)

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the Cold War era. The result is of course a much more complex picture than the one painted by the Western media: Beijing’s interpretation of national sovereignty is by no means static, despite all its conservative rhetoric. In addition, China has increasingly acquiesced to some forms of international military intervention, while continuing to oppose it in certain cases. Although there are some visible red lines, there seems to be no ideologically-driven Chinese strategy on international intervention. Beijing rather seems to follow a pragmatic approach ofmuddling through(mosuo,·I),testing a number of different approaches in order to find the best possible way to promote its interests.5

How to explain the differentiated Chinese approach towards international intervention? This work is based on several assumptions:

First, political survival and maintaining the party’s power monopoly are the primary motivations of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) leadership.

Second, because the CCP regime lacks both electoral and ideological legitimacy, it maintains its legitimacy through rapid economic development. High rates of economic growth are a simple measure of CCP performance.

Third, any policy of the Chinese government therefore has to serve the goal of regime survival based on economic development.

This has resulted in a highly pragmatic foreign policy, which does not shy away form sacrificing parts of Chinese national sovereignty, as long as this contributes to the survival of the CCP regime. It explains why Beijing has been willing to give up parts of its national sovereignty related to economic issues, and why it remained at the same time determined to defend the principle against competing human rights norms that might weaken its monopoly on power. The Chinese attitude towards international intervention can also be explained through this political survival model: International intervention always infringes on national sovereignty. The difference is in the degree to which such infringements challenge regime survival. Beijing supports international intervention when it contributes to the creation of a stable international environment for China’s economic development. When international intervention poses a threat to regime survival (for example by promoting the accountability of national

5A scientific concept of muddling through was first developed by the American economist Charles E. Lindblom in the late 1950s. He developed the method ofSuccessive Limited Comparisonsfor the field of public administration. Lindblom rejects the employment of unrealistically ‘comprehensive’ and strictly theory-based approaches to solve complex policy questions. Instead, he suggests that policy-makers use a succession of incremental changes, making slight changes to policies presently in effect and comparing the respective outcome. By ‘muddling through’ the policy-makers can gradually move towards their desired outcome without previously setting a ‘grand strategy’. Charles E. Lindblom, 1959: The Science of ‘Muddling Through’, in: Public Administration Review, Vol.19, No.2, p.79-88

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governments for human rights abuses, thus endangering their monopoly on domestic power) Beijing opposes it.

However, rational considerations about regime survival through economic development are not the only factor influencing the Chinese approach towards national sovereignty and international intervention. Two other factors are also involved: nationalism and, to a lesser extent, China’s international socialization. The end of the Cold War and the break-up of the Soviet Union brought about the demise of Socialist ideology. Subsequently, the Chinese leadership sought for a new ideological basis for CCP rule that would complement its strategy of economic development. Beijing quickly found and opened the ‘Pandora’s Box’ of nationalism. The CCP has successfully equated itself with the Chinese state and nation, thus intrinsically linking regime survival to the survival of the Chinese nation as a whole. But while the party’s nationalist credentials helped strengthen regime legitimacy at home, public nationalist pressure became a liability for the Chinese government’s pragmatic foreign policy and its image abroad. At the same time, China’s increasing participation in international institutions has resulted in what has been called its ‘international socialization’. Some analysts argue that Chinese officials and foreign policy decision-makers have become socialized through their long-term involvement in these institutions. They have come to accept the norms and behav-ioral rules that come with membership in the ‘international society’, at least partly. In some cases this has lead to foreign policy decisions that seem to be at odds with the primary goal of regime survival.

China's changing approach to international intervention since the end of the Cold War illustrates how and why the overall dynamic between sovereignty and intervention has changed over time. It also provides a useful yardstick for measuring the degree of China's integration into the international system and its international socialization since the late 1980s. This can give us important clues about the future direction of Chinese foreign policy: Will China develop into a reliable partner in securing international peace? Or will it develop into an aggressive and bellicose competitor of the West?

This thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 provides an analysis of the general development of Chinese foreign policy since the end of the Cold War era. This chapter focuses especially on the issues and motivations that have dominated Chinese foreign policy in the past twenty years. It starts with a brief analysis of the Chinese foreign policy decision-making process and of the Chinese foreign policy think tank landscape. Chapter 3 looks into China’s changing position on the principle of national sovereignty. The chapter also discusses the historical development of the principle of national sovereignty, and the factors constraining and conduc-

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ing change in the Chinese position towards it. Chapter 4 examines Beijing’s changing approach to international intervention. To illustrate this approach, two concepts of international military intervention will be examined: UN Peacekeeping Operations and a new concept, the Responsibility to Protect. The analysis of China’s position on these concepts will employ a mix of discourse analysis (comprising official statements and unofficial foreign policy elite views) and policy analysis. Thus following a Chinese saying, ‘listen to their words, and watch their actions’ (tingqi yan, guan qi xing,«!â,!é).Finally, a summarization of the findings and the corresponding conclusions can be found in chapter 5. The chapter ends with some policy recommendations for Western foreign policy decision-makers.

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2 Chinese foreign policy after the Cold War

PRC foreign policy has undergone radical changes after the death of Mao Zedong in 1976. In the Mao era, the goals of Chinese foreign policy were nothing less than Socialist world revolution and the fight against the ‘Western capitalists, imperialists and colonialists’. After their fallout with the Soviet Union in the early 1960s, Chinese foreign policy also turned against the alleged ‘Socialist imperialism’ of the Soviets.6Especially during the most tumultuous years of theGreat Proletarian Cultural Revolution(WenhuaDageming,®UN),China was isolated internationally and Beijing supported revolutionary movements and liberation movements in Africa, Asia and Latin America.7The PRC later gradually improved its relations with the West in general, and with the United States in particular in order to make up for the loss of its Soviet ally and to have leverage in its conflict with Moscow. It slowly abandoned its aggressive revolutionary foreign policy, became a permanent member of the United Nations in 1971 (replacing the Kuomintang-regime of Chiang Kai-shek) and established diplomatic ties with the US in 1979. Under its new paramount leader8, Deng Xiaoping, China adopted theReform and Opening policy(GaigeKaifang,rË)in 1978, which led to further adjustments to its foreign policy: The new goal was national rejuvenation through rapid and massive economic growth. As a framework for the smooth achievement of this goal, Deng Xiaoping expressed his famous28-character guidelines(ershibazi fangzhen,2<6— ±¾)in the wake of the Tiananmen crackdown of 4 June 1989:

‘Watch and analyse [the developments] calmly (lengjing guan cha,i˜);secure [our own] positions (wenzhuzhen jiao,yðĬ);deal with [the changes] with confidence (chenzhe ying fu,¨¨Ñ);conceal [our] capacities (taoguang yang hui,È`,¤);be good at keeping a low profile (shanyu zang zhuo,óJò¿);never become the leader (juebu dang tou,êl]p);make some contributions (yousuo zuo wei,¶¬a).’9

6Kay Möller, 2005: Die Außenpolitik der Volksrepublik China 1949-2004, p.63 et seqq.

7Ibid.: p.70 et seq.

8The termparamount leaderrefers to the single most important political leader of the party-state’s power hierarchy. Unlike Deng Xiaoping, who did not hold any of the China’s highest offices (with the exception of chairman of the Central Military Commission), his successors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao both assumed the posts of General Secretary of the CCP, President of the PRC and chairman of the Central Military Commission.

9Zhao Quansheng, 1998: Chinese Foreign Policy Today (accessed on 8 May 2008), and Guo Xiaolin, 2008: Repackaging Confucius. PRC Public Diplomacy and the Rise of Soft Power, p.11

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China today basically still follows this type of conformist, cautious and pro-status quo foreign policy line.10But given its growing stake in the present international political and economic order, these guidelines seem a little out of date. After all, a rising power can hardly keep a ‘low profile’ in the long term. An active and responsible member of the international community has to make more than just ‘some contributions’. And would a China, strong enough to be a leader, not want to be one? So how far has China’s foreign policy changed since the end of the Cold War under the post-Deng era leaders Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao? What are its basic goals and motivations today? What are the decisive actors and decision-making processes in China’s foreign policy today?

The next section will briefly discuss the current relevant actors and decision-making processes behind China’s foreign policy. Before analyzing Chinese foreign policy, it is essential to have a basic understanding of who is in charge of making it.

2.1 Actors and foreign policy decision-making processes

Hu Jintao is the General Secretary of the CCP, President of the PRC and chairman of the Central Military Commission. He is thus the head of all three key administrative groups governing China: party, government and military. But since the Maoist period the relative power of China’s paramount leaders has gradually decreased. Liao Xuanli calls it the shift fromcentralized elitismunder Mao topluralistic elitismunder Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin (and now under Hu Jintao). Chinese paramount leaders are no longer able to make arbitrary policy decisions without consulting other key members of the leadership.11Today, there are a much greater number of people inside and outside the Chinese administration who have an interest or influence in the decision-making in Chinese foreign policy. Chinese national interests have become more multifaceted, especially in terms of international economics and global stability. This is in contrast to China’s predominantly security-oriented approach during much of the Cold War. Chinese foreign policy decision makers today also hold a more cosmopolitan outlook that is more in line with the prevailing international trends. The decision making structure and processes are regularized and institutionalized to a greater extent than they were in the past.12Like most countries, when it comes to foreign policy, the Chinese want to hold their cards close to their chest. While there is increasing transparency regarding the decisionmaking on economic issues, Chinese policy and intentions on major security issues remain

10Wang Fei-Ling, 2005: Beijing’s Incentive Structure, in: Deng/Wang (ed.), 2005: p.25

11Liao Xuanli, 2006: Chinese Foreign Policy Think Tanks and China’s Policy towards Japan, p. 11

12Robert G. Sutter, 2008: Chinese Foreign Relations, p.53 et seq.

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shrouded in secrecy. Revealing ‘state secrets’ or information related to national security will lead to serious punishment in China (a criminal offence that is very broadly defined and can include anything from informing foreign media about protests in the Chinese countryside to selling military secrets to Taiwan).13The next section will briefly present some of the known facts about the PRC foreign policy decision-making structure, actors and processes. The main actors include government, party, and military bureaucracies, government-affiliated and nongovernment think tanks, and provincial and local governments.

2.1.1 Party and government actors

Although their power has decreased since the Maoist era, China’s paramount leaders still continue to play a decisive role in the making of China’s foreign policy. Currently, Hu Jintao as General Secretary of the CCP, President of the PRC and chairman of the Central Military Commission is the key final decision-maker.14Next in the hierarchy is the CCP’s ninemember Politburo Standing Committee which supports and influences the decisions of Hu Jintao. Premier Wen Jiabao and Vice-President Xi Jinping (Hu’s possible successor as the next paramount leader) also play leading roles in the making of China’s foreign policy. The broader CCP Politburo and the CCP secretariat play supporting roles for the paramount leader’s decision-making as well. But of greater significance is the so-calledLeading Small Group for Foreign Affairs(FALG,Zhongyang Waishi Gongzuo Lingdao Xiaozu,m`Ƅ[4),which is the key decision-making and deliberative body on foreign affairs. It is currently chaired by Hu Jintao and comprises other top leaders and top-level officials of the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and State Security ministries. Matters of national security are dealt with by the CCP’sCentral Military Commission(ZhongyangJunshi Weiyuanhui,mèaI),currently chaired by Hu Jintao. It comprises key representatives from different departments and services of the PLA. There also have been unconfirmed reports about the existence of aLeading Small Group on National Security.PRC Taiwan policy is made by theLeading Small Group on Taiwan Affairs,currently chaired by Hu Jintao. The central purpose of theseleading small groups(lingdaoxiaozu,Ƅ[4)is to provide an opportunity for key government, party, and military constituents to have input into key foreign policy decisions. It also allows Chinese top leaders to benefit from the expertise of central parts of the administration to formulate effective policies and also to take their interests into consideration during the

13For an overview of China’s national security and state secrets legislation see Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Virtual Academy: Silencing Critics by Exploiting National Security and State Secrets Laws (accessed on 18 March 2009)

14Sutter, 2008: p.56 et seqq.

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decision-making process. Among the principal administrative actors consulted during the foreign policy decision-making process are (among others) the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Commerce Ministry, the CCP International Liaison Department, and PLA components dealing with intelligence and arms transfers.15All of these different actors have their own agendas and are therefore propagating different priorities for Chinese foreign policy. On the other hand, all of them also have a vested interest in the preservation of the current political system of CCP one-party-rule. One would therefore expect them to act with certain prudence, not pushing any policies that would endanger regime legitimacy.

Although Chinese foreign policy decision-making is still dominated by the paramount leader and the members of the Politburo Standing Committee, it has become more dynamic over the past 30 years and there is more policy input from different sources.

2.1.2 Think Tanks and foreign policy elite

Among all the different sources of intelligence influencing Chinese foreign-policy, think tanks stand out by their extraordinarily dynamic development from mere intellectual talking shops to serious intelligence units. This section will briefly discuss their significance for the foreign policy decision-making process.

Allen Carlson defines theChinese foreign policy eliteas a ‘group of scholars affiliated with a short list of prominent government-sponsored research institutes, think tanks and universities within China involved with analyzing China’s foreign relations and broader issues of international politics’.16Liao Xuanli distinguishes between three categories of Chinese International Relations (IR) think tanks: government think tanks, academic specialized think tanks, and university-affiliated think tanks.17In his authoritative 2002 articleChina’s International Relations Think Tanks: Evolving Structure and Process,David Shambaugh surveys the organization and state of research of China’s foreign policy think tanks. He draws several interesting conclusions regarding the landscape of Chinese international relations think tanks and their role in the Chinese foreign policy decision-making process: as China’s has become ever more

15Sutter, 2008: p.59 et seq.

16Allen Carlson, 2004: Helping to Keep the Peace (Albeit Reluctantly). China’s Recent Stance on Sovereignty and Multilateral Intervention, in: Pacific Affairs, Vol.77, No.1, p.10 footnote 4

17Liao, 2006: p.56; Important government think tanks are the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR,Zhongguo Xiandai Guoji Guanxi Yanjiusu,ßÒ·ßo°`èJ)affiliated with the State Council Ministry of State Security and the CCP Central Committee Foreign Affairs Office, and the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS,Zhongguo Guoji Wenti Yanjiusuo,ßßoèJ)affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Academic specialized think tanks are for example the institutes under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS,Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Yuan,ß×¥L6),like the Institute of World Economics and Politics (IWEP,Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi Yanjiusuo,êC³Û èJ).An example for university-affiliated think tanks is the Institute of International Relations at Peking University.

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involved in international affairs and as it has seen its relations with other countries and regions of the world continuously grow, the community of foreign policy think tanks and institutes has also expanded over time. It is difficult to assess the real influence of these think tanks on actual foreign policy decision-making, but the decision making-system itself has certainly become more consultative. Also, the policy influence of certain think tanks tends to change in the course of time.18

Shambaugh lists four functions of Chinese IR think tanks: providing analyses for government officials; providing channels for information/intelligence collection and policy testing/dissemination for the Chinese government; carrying specific messages to foreign officials, specialists or public audiences (e.g. ‘Track II diplomacy’ or informal diplomacy); and trying to use foreign specialists with whom they are familiar to try and influence the policies of their governments and publics (Shambaugh compares this to the old stratagem of ‘using barbarians to control barbarians’ [yiyi zhi yi,Ў+Ž]).19Liao lists three areas where Chinese IR think tanks differ greatly from their Western counterparts: they have a higher level of monopoly, fewer sources of financial support and more channels to influence the top leadership (like the FALG or government ministries).20Zhao Quansheng identifies seven communication channels or points of access for Chinese think tank analysts vis-à-vis foreign policy decision makers in party and government: direct consultations, internal reports via government channels, conferences and public policy debates, emerging policy NGOs (often led by former diplomats), outside-system discussions (e.g. in public internet forums) and the growing influence of respected Overseas Chinese scholars and the highly specialized professional community (e.g. experts for issues of arms control). Unlike their Western counterparts, Chinese IR think tanks do not engage in lobbying or partisan advocacy.21Personal relations (guanxi,)play a decisive role in determining who gets the best and most direct access to policymakers.22Given the sensitivity of foreign policy and security issues in China, there is no such thing as a truly ‘independent’ IR think tank in the PRC. They all operate within administrative hierarchies under a government ministry, a CCP Central Committee department or one of the PLA’s general departments. Some also have more than one line of authority, like for example

18David Shambaugh, 2002: China’s International Relations Think Tanks. Evolving Structure and Process, in: The China Quarterly, Vol.171, p.575 et seq.

19Ibid.: p.576

20Liao, 2006: p.60

21Ibid.: p.243

22Zhao Quansheng, 2005: Impact of Intellectuals and Think Tanks on Chinese Foreign Policy, in: Hao/Su (ed.), 2005: p.126 et seqq.