Foundation and outline of a historical theory of society E-Book

Balogh István

• Herausgeber: novum publishing
• Kategorie: Gesellschafts- und Liebesromane
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 376

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2024

Beschreibung

After his first great deed of creating history, man now seems to be working on another great deed of equal importance, but perhaps the last: to destroy himself by eliminating the conditions of his existence. Aware of the consequences, he continues to destroy his living environment, to wage war against each other, to pursue his self-destructive passions. In the face of the clamorous contradiction expressed in the characterisation 'they know but do not do', the question arises with compelling force: what are the 'driving forces' and where do they arise, which determine the actions of individuals and groups of people, as well as the functioning of the majority of social institutions, with such force that they ultimately override the motives, the instinct and the discernment of life, as well as the conscious sense of danger, which are essential to the survival of human life. Is there any chance of taming this vexing contradiction?

Leseprobe

Foundation and outline of a historical theory of society.

Citation from

...there is one history, but it is a history with a thousand faces, and

should be as close as possible to a thousand-faced one.

(Frank Tibor)

Foreword

The theory of the open history of man-made society necessarily takes a particular perspective on the interlocking crises and conflicts of our time. Therefore, although not without reason, it would be rash, dear reader, if the title of this book were to lead you to believe that, following the intellectual fashion of our time, what follows will be a refutation of some vision of a future threatened with cataclysm or a utopia of universal happiness, or even the end of human history. On the contrary, you will find here the structure of the foundations of a new, viable form of human cooperation and a systematic outline of the path to this new way of being. It is just that, whether you are looking back into the distant historical past or exploring the possible future, you are living in the present. At the same time, you can see that the historical epochs leading up to the present, separated by some new historical form of human coexistence, appear on the ruins of the past, and as man builds the new world on its foundations and moves ever more decisively beyond the old, including all that his predecessors had found an intolerable part of their lives, he is increasingly feeling that he is suffering some loss. He also feels that the ruins of the old world have buried something (achievements, works of art and, not least, ideas and inspiring illusions) which he can now not only look back on with nostalgia as a precious part of the past and its beauty, but also turn back to the past in his thinking. In this way, modern man evokes the now vanished world of the heroes, or the cohesiveness of primitive communities, their closeness to nature, their limited, moderate needs, or, more recently, the idea of progress leading to human emancipation. This process of transformation is perceived by modern man as a destruction of values, and the world is being destroyed. Looking out from the present thus constructed, man then creates utopias driven by his desires as a counterpoint to the cataclysm, thinking of his future.

This conception of historical change by those involved in it is an indication that what is regarded as development cannot be adequately captured in its theoretical-logical description either along a linear historical logic or through a radical rupture of thought. At the same time, nothing is more indicative of the need for a new era than the fact that, in the midst of a crisis that threatens to collapse the modern world and in search of a way out, the modern man, even if he may feel a certain nostalgia for the important but fleeting achievements of the present that is falling apart, is not in a position to build on the values of past ages that he has subsequently recognised and found attractive, beyond nostalgic recollection of the past. Nor can it now rely on the rules of its past way of life to resolve the ever more imminent crisis. In today's modern age, man cannot sustain himself by continuing his present way of life, nor by radically rewriting his past history. Nor can he hope that, as has always happened, the collapse of the order of his life will somehow give rise to a new order, as it has always done in the past, out of the process of 'they can't but they will'.

In this book, I argue that from a historical-social theoretical perspective, the modern era can be systematically examined, and that, beyond that, the question of the way out of the impending crisis of collapse can be approached with the possibility of a reasoned response. But the visions of historical catastrophe, on the one hand, and desire-driven utopias, on the other, can only be replaced by the elaboration and solution of the problem of the foundation of historical theory of society, by a vision of the future that is based on - and thus feasible in terms of - the tendencies that are still only emerging in our world today. Looking ahead to the eventual outcome of an investigation in this spirit, two conclusions can be drawn. The first is that we must reckon with the promise of human emancipation, with its promise of eternal peace and shared prosperity, and that this reckoning will have a negative outcome. On the other hand, in the process of reflection leading to this conclusion, we can systematically, step by step, arrive at the basic structure of a possible and viable human existence for a new historical state of affairs after the present form of human coexistence. We can thus see both our world falling apart in the crises of our time and the outlines of the foundations of a new world, and in so doing, we can also assess the price to be paid.

Introduction

After his first great act of creating history, man now seems to be preparing for another, equally momentous - but perhaps final - step: to destroy himself by eliminating the conditions of his existence. The question is, is this end inevitable in the history of man as he has created it, and is man today doing nothing more than fulfilling his inherently destined destiny? Is it merely the case that, in the unfolding of the activity by which man, not least to the detriment of other living beings, has left his direct determination by nature, he is gradually dismantling the particular natural conditions for the maintenance of his life, which, taken as a whole, as a ready-made environment, have provided the conditions for the development of his way of life? Is it the case that man is exercising this self-destructive function to such an extent and with such efficiency that, by extending his limits of existence to a global level, he is using up the natural resources still available to him at an accelerating rate and with ever greater intensity? It may seem as if man has in this way taken to a new dimension the peculiar Darwinian law of life, that species grow and multiply until they encounter an external obstacle. The peculiar feature of man in this respect would be that, having successively transcended the ready-made natural obstacles to his life, he would now find himself at the very limits of the global conditions of life on earth - indeed, of higher life in general. This contradiction - in contrast to the optimistic conceptions of history, perhaps most eloquently formulated by Marx in the well-known thesis 'they do not know, but they do', following Hegel - should be replaced today by the paradoxical expression 'they know, but they do not do'. By this we mean that, while our everyday experience and empirical scientific research increasingly highlight the process of destruction of the habitable environment (to which the climate catastrophe, the accelerating loss of the Earth's biodiversity, is linked as a not inconsiderable consequence), the paradoxical paradox is not only a paradox, but also a paradox, overpopulation and global inequality), while, despite increasingly radical ecological movements, actions and institutional interventions, the conditions for life on earth continue to deteriorate and the inevitable catastrophe process can only be slowed down to a certain extent at the cost of great effort. Our question, then, arising from this crying contradiction, is what and where are the driving forces that determine the actions of individuals and groups of people, and the functioning of social institutions, with such force that they ultimately override the motives, the instinct and discernment for the survival of human life, and indeed of all higher forms of life in general, as well as the conscious sense of danger.

This question gives rise to two hypotheses that lead to alternative answers. On the one hand, it could at least be assumed that man shares the general characteristic of the living world, as just mentioned, that he reproduces and multiplies as long as he does not encounter an external obstacle to his development (e.g. depletion of food sources or competition with other living beings), which then acts as a regulating force on his internal biological potential (e.g. the development of his abilities). In this respect, humans would differ from other species in that they have broken down, or are constantly breaking down, or rather transgressing, the specific biological regulatory constraints that characterise other species. Consequently, it is no longer in the struggle for existence with other species that his qualities and capacities are developed. At the same time, it is not to be expected that, when the external conditions for its growth and development cease to exist, it will develop a new internal regulatory mechanism to suspend or replace the inherent, elementary rules of its life by modifying its biological-organic organisation. The other hypothesis that needs to be examined in depth is whether the lessons learned so far from the 'management' of a problem that has its roots in the emergence of man but has been transformed into an ecological crisis under modern conditions - i.e. a rational recognition of the threat to his existence and an understanding of the historical course and 'logic' of cooperation - can bring about a change in the human relationship to the conditions of existence. In this case, the systemic analysis of human cooperation becomes the focus of investigation.

Comment

More recently, Niklas Luhmann has developed a systemic perspective of the ecological problem within the framework of a comprehensive and unified theory, in such a way that he conceives the ecological crisis - albeit in the sense of a specific, social-cbernetic (autopoietic) paradigm - not as a question of man's biological-biological nature, but as a general system-theoretical question. In Luhmann's view, the systemic functioning of modern society can be characterised in several aspects of the ecological problem. First, as a lack of perspective. According to this view, since the primary and determining driving force of complex modern systems operating according to their own logic is their self-perpetuation - their autopoiesis - regardless of the external conditions of their existence. Consequently, the solution of immediate tasks is more important to them than the evolution of the conditions of their more distant future. The reference point is that the future cannot be achieved without the next step. Secondly, as a low degree of threat perception. The divergent and specific operating logic of the functional subsystems of the system, such as politics, economics, science, law, religion and education (defined by Luhmann as linked to binary codes), not only makes it difficult to recognise the simultaneity, interconnectedness and systemic magnitude of the threats, but also creates an obstacle to coordinated action to avert them. Third, as limited openness. Because, according to Luhmann, the system creates its own environment, it is only with this constraint that it can be considered open to its environment. Moreover, the complex system, which reproduces itself in a closed and recursive process, does not respond to environmental influences one by one, that is, it does not respond directly to environmental influences, but rather 'resonates' in the aggregate and selectively.Fourthly, the possibility cannot be excluded that the 'resonance' of the system, due to its over-regulation, may reach a level of intensity and intensity that would lead to a disruption of its functioning, or even to its disintegration.

By constructively applying the not always well understood social-cybernetic thought and conceptual tools, Luhmann concluded that the exclusive normative-based regulatory-prohibitory approach to the ecological crisis, because it is a systemic problem, cannot lead to results. 1It is characterised by the transformation of the systemic issue into a moral issue at the very beginning of the response, by appealing to human responsibility and good will for change. But what emerges from a study of the system from all four points of view is that it is not able to remove from within the environmental obstacles it creates to its continued functioning, because thesubsystemsperceive their environment in different times and logics. Luhmann is sharply critical of contemporary ecological literature and practice for what he calls its moral and normative bias in the analysis of the crisis and its attempts to resolve it. In contrast, he offers a unilogic of self-constructing systems, but one that turns off the historical possibilities and limits of human activity in clarifying and addressing the crisis between humans and the natural environment. Within these limits, Luhmann relates the change or transformation of the system primarily to a self-reflexive process (re-entry). In this case, the problems that arise in the system are solved on the basis of a reapplication of the system's principles, i.e. the system's original organizing principles. In other cases, i.e. in a social-historical approach, he indicates the limits of linear logic by analysing the tension between the real structure of society and itssymbolic structure.2

In our study, we follow the recent approach to system structure and the general principles of system dynamics, and within this, the ecological crisis, as characterised by Niklas Luhmann's concept, in that we consider the organisation, dynamics and crises of human existence as a systemic, social-theoretical problem. At the same time, we conceive of society, in contrast to Luhmann, as a system of human existence in its various historical forms, which is changing and transforming. Therefore, we must begin a systematic analysis where the transformation of modern society emerged as a system-critical programme.

Part One

Establishing the theoretical critique of systems as a problem:

the three generations of critical theory

In his inaugural speech at the inauguration of the director of the Institut für Sozialforschung in Frankfurt (1930), Max Horkheimer outlined a crucial shift in emphasis in the research programme of the institute. While maintaining his concern for the legacy of Marx and his desire to continue the theoretical tradition he had established, he nevertheless focused on the theoretical investigation of real conditions, which had changed considerably since the 19th century. In doing so, he also made it clear that not only was a comprehensive social theoretical examination of the profound historical changes that had taken place in the first two decades of the century indispensable, but that - not independently of this - a rethinking of Marx's theoretical legacy was now inevitable. The most essential element of this is that a comprehensive critical analysis of modern capitalism (and, unspokenly, of universal social history) cannot be based solely on the relations of capitalist private ownership of the means of production and the directly related dual class structure, the capitalist-worker dichotomy, or the economic and class relations of society in general.

This turn of the social theoretical foundation has a number of consequences and raises a number of new questions, such as the relationship between theory and practice (especially political practice, party movements and programmes), social structure (especially intellectuals), and the relationship between the branches of intellectual culture, especially socitheory, the sciences and philosophy. According to Horkheimer, the clarification of all these issues and the search for answers together require, on the one hand, the maintenance of the continuity of the Marxian theoretical tradition and, on the other hand, the analysis of the historical developments of the turn of the century (20th century) requires an openness of theoretical interest. Taken together, these tasks call for the development of a new paradigm of historical theory of Society. The foundation and development of a macro-level approach to historical theory of cociety must be at the heart of a comprehensive theoretical critique of the system, which is not directy linked to practical action but which does not turn away from it. As Axel Honneth, as the youngest generation of scholars working on this critical theoretical task, will later point out, the most pressing problem is to resolve the newly emerging theoretical dilemma of normative critique: the 'transcendence within immanence' of modern society. For this is most directly related to the socio-social transformation for which the dual class division was previously the basis (starting point and assumed practical task) of social critique. However, once this division - and with it the prognosis of the history-shaping role of the working class - became questionable, it became inevitable to revisit the foundation of social critique.

With this in mind, we must therefore concentrate our analysis on two topics in order to develop the theory of critique in more detail. On the one hand, we will review three distinctly different attempts to solve the problem of the founding of theoretical criticism, which, both chronologically and in terms of their basic position, fragment the history of the critical theoretical tradition. We characterise the paradigmatic shifts in the work of one of the three key theorists of each of the three generations. The thematic variations of the theoretical tradition are interpreted in relation to these three attempts to solve the problem of grounding. Secondly, in the second part of our study, we shall examine the problem of the foundation in detail, given that the significance of the result of this examination for a comprehensive (systemic) social-critical theory lies in the fact that it can be used as a basis for a macro-level description of the relations of modern society, in which both the decisive historical changes and the internal dynamics of the theory itself, the 'immanent transcendence' leading to a practice beyond itself, can be interpreted. A more precise formulation of the problem of theoretical grounding and the analysis, comparison and critique of alternative attempts to solve it will, we believe, lead to a further, new proposal for a solution, conceptually different from all three previous versions.

We will therefore first examine the concept of Horkheimer and Adorno, mainly on the basis of the essay Traditional and Critical Theory, and then on the basis of the text of The Dialectic of Enlightenment. We will then consider the status claims and performance of Habermas' theory of interpersonal relations (intersubjectivity) as a basis for normative critique, focusing on The Theory of Communicative Action. Finally, the concept of Axel Honneth, a more recent exponent of the critical theoretical tradition, will be analysed, focusing on his works The Critique of Power and The Struggle for Recognition.

1Luhmann, N. [1986], Ecological Communication, Westdeutscher Verlag. Opladen.

2Luhmann, N. [1973]: Concept of purpose and system rationality. Suhrkamp. Frankfurt/M. Luhmann, N. [1993]: Social Structure and Semantics, I-II. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M; Luhmann, N. [1997]: The Society of Society I-II. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M.

1. Theory critique and critical theory

The discrepancy between, on the one hand, the political and social events of the first two decades of the twentieth century and, on the other, the research conducted in the early period of the Institut für Sozialforschung - the years of the founding, "cathedral socialist" Carl Grünberg's directorship - became more and more striking by the end of the twenties. This gave the new director, Max Horkheimer, the impetus to review the results of the programme announced at the time of its foundation, as a summary (not a sharply critical), and to present a programme that would represent a fundamental change of emphasis for the future. 3 The renewal of a comprehensive theory of society is now an urgent scientific-theoretical task, but it can only be successful if, in addition to the theoretical tradition and the analysis of the development of economic relations, research into culture and the individual as a history-maker is included in the scope of the programme and becomes a prominent part of it. It is an unstated premise of the programme that theoretical social research, in cooperation with economists, historians, sociologists, psychologists and philosophers, will provide a comprehensive picture of the historical changes and trends that are unfolding.

On the face of it, the new programme of social research formulated by Horkheimer is nothing more than a proclamation of an interdisciplinary approach. In fact, however, it was a response to two developments at the end of the first third of the twentieth century which raised fundamental questions of Marxism relevant to the political movement of the time. One of these was the relationship between practice-oriented historical theory of society and the practice of the political movement. The other problem that arises in connection with this is the question of reformulating theory at a comprehensive level, understood as social critique. As part of this, the new programme of the Institut für Sozialforschung has in fact constituted a double demarcation and inspired a redefinition of the two-way link between theoretical research. On the one hand, a break with the programme of directly linking philosophical theorizing and socially transformative practice, most explicitly as Marx had laconically summarized in his 'Feuerbach Theses'. The Marxian thesis, while not advocating the rejection of a comprehensive theoretical investigation of the world and society, radically redefined its social function and context in relation to the earlierphilosophical tradition. It did so by establishing a direct link between practical action to change society at the macro level and a radical - or rather in-depth and comprehensive - theoretical critique. In this sense, it is the practice of changing society that provides the programme, the object and the criterion of justification for the analysis. Consequently, theoretical critique cannot - or at least need not necessarily - raise questions of justification or justification that can be formulated independently of practical-political critique.

Horkheimer's concept, on the other hand, in seeking the possibility of a new relation between theory and practice, expressed in a general formula, implied the need to rethink this thesis, namely by rejecting (if not in a declarative form) Marx's thesis of the coincidence of the basis of theoretical and practical critique. This could be stimulated by more recent academic theorising based on the results of empirical and methodological research, categorically detached from direct political practice, and conducted within a disciplinary framework. However, for Horkheimer, interdisciplinary orientation did not mean seeking the limits of a new and independent scientific discipline within the existing 'science enterprise', but insisted on maintaining a comprehensive, systemic theoretical-critical approach open to practice. Consequently, he also considered it essential to revise 'traditional' theories (structured according to disciplines). In both of these directions (on the one hand, the theoretical and the practical-political, and on the other, the interdisciplinary research method and empirically grounded theorizing), Horkheimer precisely expressed both an open and a critical relationship, when he defined the research programme of the Institut für Sozialforschungas a critical theory on the basis of a double demarcation - on the one hand, a theory based on a thesis directly related to the political practice of the movement, and on the other hand, a theory that transcended the 'traditional' disciplinary division of labour, i.e. the logic of the social division of labour. This definition expressed both the dual objectives of the research programme: theoretical critique and theoretical social critique.

The juxtaposition of these hitherto contradictory directions of theoretical inquiry in this way has proved to be a research strategy of theoretical historical significance, creating a tradition. At the same time, however, it also became a source of a new problem that has accompanied the further history of the critical theoretical tradition and has remained unresolved: the question of the foundation of a comprehensive theoretical critique of systems. The problem of the founding of the foundations arose because Marx's critique of the philosophical approach (that it is the task of theoretical work to change social relations as opposed to philosophical explanations), which he formulated in a thesis-like brevity, goes beyond the critique of philosophical theorizing in its implications. As it were, it 'liberates' social theory from the theoretical clarification of its own presuppositions. In so doing, it also eliminates the ongoing interest in the problem of justification maintained in the philosophical tradition by reference to social critical practice. And since Marx's thesis shifted the grounding role of theory to the practice of social change, it also opened up the possibility of the subsequent transformation of theory into ideology, in conjunction with institutionally organised political power. Indirectly, of course, the shift of emphasis in Marx's work from to practical action could also have meant a critique of political-social action blind to theory and without strategic goals, but the possibility of this soon disappeared under the pressure of party politics. In any case, from the beginning of the twentieth century, this change in the position of theoretical work became increasingly noticeable and became a source of sharp confrontation. Sensing and experiencing the growing contradictions between the branching alternatives, even Carl Grünberg made a hesitant attempt to bridge the gap when he envisaged the further cultivation and application of Marxist theory in the future programme of the Institute, while adhering to the strict requirement of 'political neutrality'. 4Grünberg's bridging solution, however, did not prove to be a sufficiently profound consideration of the problem to at least prevent, within the theory, the transformation of social theory into ideology, on the one hand, and, on the other, to prevent the political practice that would later shape society from coming into conflict with scientific research and the social theoretical investigations based on the results of this research. Thus, the main result of Karl Grünberg's directorship was to bring the 'cultivation of scientific Marxism' closer to university life: on the one hand, it aroused the interest of university students in Marxism, and on the other, it provided an opportunity for the academic activity of some of the movement's theorists, mostly those (such as Karl Korsch, Max Adler, Otto Bauer) who had already noticed the initial manifestations of the emergence of Soviet Marxism. 5

The origin of the problem of the foundation of theoretical criticism.

The new research programme formulated by Horkheimer excluded the immediate practical-political-movement problems of the labour movement - and of contemporary politics in general. As a result, however, the theoretical programme, which focused from two opposite directions on a single point, opened up a wide space for a new approach to the various academic questions of the period. It provided an impetus for an overview of the disciplines of science and for critical analysis. The fact that Horkheimer's inaugural lecture did not focus on the history of the movement, nor on the closely related history of theory (history of Marxism and life history), had strategic consequences for the Institute's research, and not only for the programme. The need for an interdisciplinary approach integrating the disciplines of social science (he himself mentioned philosophy, sociology, economics, history and psychology) raised two 'borderline problems'. 6On the one hand, by requiring the joint cultivation of the various social science disciplines, Horkheimer did not abandon but reformulated the original theoretical and practical programme of the comprehensive analysis of society, as formulated by Marx. In this way, he integrated the increasingly autonomous disciplines as a kind of 'independent'mediatingsphere, i.e. one that functions and organises itself according to the logic of its own specific object-defining approach and method of analysis, between practical social criticism and critical thought linked to direct practice. On the other hand, from the point of view of the scientific practice and the basic stance of the period, it confronted the tradition of a rigid separation of the acting subject and the object, based on philosophical foundation. György Lukács,in History andClass, provided a kind of illustrative example of the latter critique,7but in a way that did not at the same time place a conceptual obstacle in the way of an ideology-driven interpretation of theory. By contrast, Horkheimer's new thesis, which branched off in two directions, was ajointclarification of the problem of critical-historical theory of society the one hand and that of the theory of justification on the other. Accordingly, immediately following his inaugural lecture, he elaborates on his related position inBemerkungen über Wissenschaft und Krise 8. On the one hand, it is a selective reference in that, despite the obvious points of convergence, Horkheimer, distancing himself from the direct political debates of the labour movement and the class party, does not even mention Lukács's relevant study on this topic published almost ten years earlier. On the other hand, he explains: scientific truth is not the same as the direct utility of science, i.e. it is not the prevailing, and currently predominant, social interest that decides the question of scientific truth. However, this does not (and cannot) mean that scientific research is socially neutral. From this basic position, as acriticalapproach toscience,the Institute's journal has reviewed the relationship between psychology and history, the opposition between materialism and metaphysics, and moral theories (among other things) in a series of papers. 9Of particular importance in these reviews for clarification purposes are the two studies in which Horkheimer indicates both the provenlabilities of the critical theory outlined at the intersection of the two-way critique and the emergent problems it raises. Among these problems, the most immediate inspiration for this review of the possibilities of scientific forecasting is the greatest difficulty of critical theory and Marx's prognosis of the future - or, more precisely, the emergence of doubts about this prognosis.10For Horkheimer rightly sees it as insufficient to revise the basic thesis of the Marxian tradition that the history of labour is the organization of the class and its vocation the abolition of capitalism. Theoretical analysis must go further and reformulate the Marxian characterisation of the social structure of modern capitalism and, consequently, its basic stance on historical prognosis. Among the academic disciplines, the source area for these problems has been revealed by sociological studies which have increasingly revealed the picture that the history of labour, contrary to the Marxian prognosis, is nothing but the history of the suffering of the most numerous social group of capitalism. Consequently, in order to reformulate the theory, the prognosis for the future must be sketched in the light of this change, instead of the increasingly vague and ideologically obscured notions of class vocation and class consciousness.The starting point of Horkheimer's thought is that, if another, newer possibility for the realisation of human emancipation is to be developed as a prerequisite for a theoretical critique of the system in contrast to the Marxian concept, the sciences (and sociology in particular, alongside economic theory) must now also be critically examined for their insensitivity to or lack of preparation for prognoses. As an initial thesis of this line of thought, Horkheimer states that science and forecasting do not necessarily contradict each other. The thesis also implies that the possibility of prediction in sociology 'depends not only on the perfection of sociological methods and the perspicacity of the sociologist, but on the development of the subject of sociology itself'. In short, on changes in the structure of society. Beyond this point, however, and beyond the question of how social structure is now changing, Horkheimer avoids a closer analysis of the question. Instead, he makes a very far-reaching, vague normative claim - one that anticipates the basic thesis ofthe Enlightenment dialectic. That is, to the extent that society transcends the nature of blind natural processes and develops the institutions of the conscious subject, sociology and social science and theory in general can make historical prediction increasingly reliable.

The fact that Horkheimer does not return to the theoretical discussion of his question of the normative principles of shaping the future, which he has now put in brackets, not here, but only two years later, when he approaches the answer by studying the philosophical anthropology that was then developing, is an indication of the halt in the consistent pursuit of the line of thought that he had followed up to that point.11It is in the programme of this new discipline that he sees the possibility of developing a concept that at first sight seems unresolvable and therefore bridges a previously unresolved contradiction. To do so, however, he must first critique his programme of philosophical anthropology.Only then will it become clear, writes Horkheimer, that philosophical anthropology is trying to achieve too much and too little at the same time. To be more precise: on the one hand, it seeks to grasp the essence of man as a fixed historical given of the permanent human, and on the other, it attempts to interpret the historical changes and contradictions that disrupt it. But, he goes on, it is still an achievement of philosophical anthropology to demonstrate more convincingly than ever before how hopeless it is to attempt to find the inherent or even feasible unity of man and his relations on the ground of modern society and its relations. Horkheimer concludes by saying that in the modern age it is hopeless to realize the program of philosophical anthropology, because "there is no formula that can unite the relations of the individual, society and nature."12Nevertheless, it is possible to identify with sufficient precision the prospective task of philosophical anthropology: the joint investigation of thecontradictoryrelations and historical development of the individual, society and nature. In so doing, he is also focusing on the beginnings of philosophical anthropology by formulating an implicit (and not clearly thought through) preliminary critique of the basic concept of theEnlightenment dialecticin his later work with Adorno, and by flashing an alternative to its unexplored anthropological background. According to this, precisely because human history cannot be regarded as a continuous unfolding process of some given, unified human nature, the programme of philosophical anthropology must include other factors, such as the individual, the psyche, and the social world, in its analytical scope.

Horkheimer published the results of his analysis, which sought to renew theory of society, in a summary and programmatic form in the second issue of the Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung in 1937 under the titleTraditionelle und kritische Theorie.According to him, critical theoretical investigation, in contrast to thetheoretical activities in the scientific 'shops' of most universities and research centres, is characterised by the fact that, on the one hand, it goes beyond the scientific disciplines and considers society itself as its object, and, on the other hand, its critical and evaluative perspective is not limited to the identification of anomalies and deformations. Critical theory sees the subject areas of the scientific enterprise, whether 'cut out' according to disciplinary or any other but directly practical criteria, as interrelated sub-phenomena of the social order. In contrast to fragmentation, therefore, the social theoretical critique of realities must place the system itself and its mode of operation at the centre of the critique. Thus, in order to study the interrelations and interactions between the general relations of the social order and the individual 'anomalies', the analyst must not only have knowledge of the individual pathologies, but also of the concepts of the overall relations of the social order (system) in question and the theories constructed from these concepts.13In defining critical theory, Horkheimer leaves no doubt that his basic position is based on a programme for the abolition of capitalism. His endeavour is thus - ultimately - linked to the theory of Marx (and, he adds, Engels). But the connection is not directly a political-movement connection, nor is it a theoretical reconstruction of the text, but an analytical-critical investigation, which further reflects on the sources of criticism, explores the problem, and interprets science and reality. Without examining in depth the economic and social changes in capitalism between the two world wars, Horkheimer bases his critique primarily on the relationship between social structure and theoretical critique, and on a critique of the 'traditional' approach to social analysis. Nevertheless, and in this respect, as if presupposing the validity of Marx's analysis, he generally concludes that the social relations of the period appear to both actors and practitioners of science as natural processes outside the human. From this overall observation, he does not deny that the division of society means class division, but he is not content with this dichotomy, either in terms of the social structure as a whole or in terms of a theoretical critique of society in general. Inasmuch as, he adds, his basic position as theorist is a rejection of the dehumanisation of social relations, his analytical work is opened up to the requirement and possibility of a broader and more comprehensive critical approach. Consequently, although critical thinking sees the modern division of society as a contradiction in terms and therefore considers it necessary to rejectanyidentification with it (including the unrevised acceptance of the principles drawn from the analysis of history), the reconsideration of the starting position that has just been made offers the possibility of not excluding the working class from the critique. This critical approach must also be extended to the (working) class and to the criticism of "one of its more advanced sections, a party or the leadership of that party." As a conclusion to the critique of the class, Horkheimer formulates his thesis that the situation of the proletariat does not provide a correct understanding, for two reasons. On the one hand, 'from the surface (in immediate practical life) the world looks different for the proletariat', i.e. personal and class interests are far from coinciding, and this contradiction can only be resolved in exceptional moments. In this context, on the other hand, the proletariat is an integral part of the system of social division of labour, and therefore there is no guarantee that it is theoretically above the system.14

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Even the later continuators of the critical theoretical tradition, such as Habermas and Honneth, note that Horkheimer's theoretical statement, which is considered to be of general validity, was influenced by historical events in the first decades of the 20th century. These included, in particular, the pro-war stance of the workers' parties and their involvement in the First World War and its early stages, the conclusions drawn from the contradictions within the labour movement after the peace accords, and the increasingly pronounced features of the one-party dictatorship in the Soviet Union. These not only revealed the limits of the validity, or even the invalidity, of the Marxian concept of the idealised (working) class or proletariat. The conclusions that could be drawn directly inevitably also touched on other, more general social theoretical contexts and necessarily led to the foundations of class theory. The first and most important question that arises from this is - since neither the working class endowed with a historical vocation nor its political representation proves to be a reliable theoretical support - what are the normative principles on which the analyst can rely in his systemic critique. Since no philosophical-metaphysical or universal principle outside the world of man can be taken into account, there is no other way, Horkheimer writes, than for the analyst to develop the basic principles of critical theory from the study of the social-historical process itself. Undoubtedly, this is a fundamental consideration, both theoretically and methodologically, for critical theory, and it is both a rethinking continuation and an overgeneralization of the Marxian intellectual legacy. For Marx 'read' from the course of history that its changes are fundamentally determined by the development of property relations (in the broad sense, the relation of the producer to his means), moving from communal to private property.The conclusion to be drawn from this historical process, according to Marx, is that the most fully developed form of private property cannot be followed by anything other than the complete abolition of private property relations. The notion of the workingclassis thus nothing other than the endowment of a social group without private property - the working class - with the capacities that make it capable of the radical abolition of private property relations. Thus, the working class, deprived of the means of production, constitutes, through its qualities capable of fulfilling this historical role, a class which is the shaping subject of history. Therefore, even in the light of recent historical experience, we cannot think anything about the working class without inevitably having serious consequences for the whole of a logically rigorous and consistent theory. Now the unresolved tension betweenTraditional and Critical theoryarises precisely from the difficulty of working out the contradiction between the factual and postulated historical role of the working class and strict theoretical-logical consistency. Horkheimer is faced with the - in fact insurmountable - task of drawing the lessons of historical experience of the working class without abandoning the rigour of the original Marxian theoretical logic. However, in the background of this task, ideas for the development of an alternative theory have occasionally recurred, mostly in the broader field of critical theory, and more strongly in the work of subsequent generations. For his part, Horkheimer, for his part, for his part, saw the validity of the Marxist 'reading' called into question by the historical events of the first third of the century, in so far as he himself, as an alternative reading of the course of history so far, came to the conclusion that its defining feature, more profound than the class struggles, was man's striving to gain control over nature. However, as Marcuse would later write (in agreement with Horkheimer), "[t]he use of all the intellectual and physical forces of domination over nature is prevented by entrusting them to the competing interests of the partykular in the dominant relations".15In this line of thought, history now appears as man's struggled relationship with nature. The progress and pace of this constant and linear process is the result of the application and development of means - of technology - according to particular interests. Marx takes aim at this latter contradiction, but without going beyond the property relations to the specific anthropological background of the historical perspective of development. On the contrary, the generating effect and consequence of the fundamental contradiction indicated by Horkheimer permeate all social groups in society, all spheres of human activity, including science, and the relationship between science and practice. In this sense, critical theory, which, in Horkheimer's conception, goes beyond the defining contradiction of human history, is no longer, and will never become, a theory of classes and class struggle. In contrast to Marx, Horkheimer thus unfolds a different, more profound 'reading' of the dynamics of history, or more precisely of the source of the dynamics. In doing so, he comes to the conclusion - now also taking further his earlier reflections on the possibility of prognoses in social science - that it is not the working class as a (in this respect) privileged social group, but the struggle of man with nature in general, that can bind together present and future society.

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Following Horkheimer in a deeper investigation, we may come to the conclusion that the most fundamental question of historical theory of society that he highlights but does not ask is not only the different "readings" of history - or the possibility and problem of different readings at all - but whether a well-founded perspective of historical theory of society can be developed from a detailed overview and description of the human element. Like historical social theories in general, Horkheimer's overall theoretical outline amounts to a prognosis of the main direction of change in social history and of the possible future mode of human coexistence. In this context, a prognosis is a theoretical conclusion that also sets out alternatives for practical action. Horkheimer approaches scientific forecasting at two levels. First, even before writing 'Traditional and Critical Theory', he argues in 1933, in a sometimes contradictory line of thought, that reliable scientific (sociological) forecasting (prévision) of society can only be achieved in a rational society. This thesis is then linked to intellectual-theoretical work on the future prospects of human domination over nature. To establish this inspirational link, Horkheimer directs the sociologist, one of the most qualified to make this inspirational connection, to political - albeit non-party political - practice: 'the sociologist must turn in his work of anticipation to the political forces striving for the realisation of a rational society'.16The further question now is what is the role of social science and theory in general in relation to sociology (and social science in general) in the relationship between the possibility of sociological (and social scientific) forecasting and the political forces (broadly understood as the working class) that change society, especially in the light of experience in the meantime. The questionwill be raised again in the 1937 paper, but this time in a different form from the previous one. Horkheimer, in his thought-process"Traditional and Critical Theory",