Morality for the Ailing and Others E-Book

Indrani Sanyal

• Herausgeber: D.K. Printworld
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Seitenzahl: 478

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2023

Beschreibung

An Anthology on Applied Ethics, volume 2 is a collection of ten articles written by distinguished scholars who have provided exciting and interesting introduction to some domains of medical ethics, environmental ethics, ethics of politics, exploratory account of moral domains centring female sexuality, women’s position in society and prescribed code of conduct for women and analytic explanation of some hard-core ethical concepts and theories. This publication aims at carrying out the task of emphasizing the link, if any, between hard-core ethical theories and their applications to real life practical situations with special reference to Indian texts and literature. However, any holistic approach to ethics as a branch of philosophy hardly can deny drawing some contrast, comparison and analogy with the Western paradigms. The present anthology is no exception to this custom. Strictly speaking, this is a book on Applied Ethics which aims at exploring concrete suggestions, as far as possible, to meet challenges posed before human beings arising from moral conflicts and dilemmas at different levels of life. Whoever is interested in applied ethics – whether a researcher or a student or a lay reader – will be enormously benefited by the richness of the content of this volume. Authors have sharpened theoretical tools as per their requirements and credibly covered some of the fuzzy areas of practical moral situations. Articles are written in clear language and in very lucid but argumentative style.

Leseprobe

Morality for the Ailing and Others

Refugees, Marriage, Asuras and Varied

Volume 2

Morality for the Ailing and Others

(An Anthology on Applied Ethics)

Edited by

Indrani Sanyal

Ratna Dutta Sharma

Cataloging in Publication Data — DK

[Courtesy: D.K. Agencies (P) Ltd. <[email protected]>]

Refugees, marriage, asuras and varied, Volume 2,

Morality for the ailing and others : an anthology

on applied ethics / edited by Indrani Sanyal,

Ratna Dutta Sharma.

pages cm

Contributed articles.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 9788193607633 (hardbound)

1. Applied ethics. 2. Ethics – India. I. Sanyal,

Indrani, editor. II. Sharma, Ratna Dutta, 1952- editor.

III. Jadavpur University. Department of Philosophy, publisher.

IV. Title: Morality for the ailing and others.

LCC BJ1031.R44 2021 | DDC 170 23

ISBN: 978-81-936076-7-1 (E-Book)

ISBN: 978-81-936076-3-3 (Hardbound)

First published in India in 2021

© Jadavpur University, Kolkata

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Preface

Morality for the Ailing and Others is the second volume, a sequel to the work which has been published in 2015 by the title Refugees, Marriage,Asuras and Varied: An Anthology on Applied Ethics, vol. 1 under the editorship of Indrani Sanyal and Ratna Dutta Sharma. This volume, as a continuation of the previous one, has been preoccupied with the objective of highlighting the connection between theory and practice, specifically by taking into consideration the domain of morality. The present volume is a collection of ten articles, authored by distinguished scholars from their respective fields of specialization.

Among the articles included in this volume, two relate to the domain of medical ethics; one relates to the environmental ethics; three others relate to moral concerns about female sexuality, women’s position in society and the prescribed code of conduct for women; one article relates to the ethics of politics, whereas three others deal with concepts that may help us in understanding what morality actually is all about, from the point of view of different philosophical traditions. The articles published in this volume commonly deal with different moral codes, practices and some theoretical discussions in their favour or against. The areas of discussion covered are quite wide, and this volume in its orientation is strictly neither Western nor Indian, nor classical, nor modern or postmodern. The authors have exercised their freedom in selection of topics and perspectives from which these essays have emerged. Some of the diverse aspects of human life and society, where questions regarding morality are the burning issues of the day and are required to be addressed, have been touched upon. In the limited span of this volume, it is hardly expected that it would cover most of the aspects of the compelling issues relating to the theory and application in ethics.

We are very thankful to each of the authors for their valuable contributions to this volume and their patient cooperation with us at every point of time. In this connection, we would like to specially thank Krishna Roy, Former Professor of Philosophy, Jadavpur University; Pushpa Misra, Former Principal, Bethune College and Former Professor of Philosophy, West Bengal Education Service; Pradyot Kumar Mandal, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, University of Burdwan; Roma Chakraborty, Former Professor of Philosophy, University of Calcutta; Raghunath Ghose, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, University of North Bengal; Gopa Gupta, Former Professor of Philosophy, West Bengal Education Service; Santosh Kumar Pal, Professor of Philosophy, University of Burdwan; Krishna Dutta, Former Professor of Sanskrit, University of Calcutta and Gargi Goswami, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Jadavpur University, for their contribution to this volume. Without the cooperation and unflinching support of these learned academicians, the volume would not have seen the light of the day. Two other articles have been contributed by us, editors of this volume, Indrani Sanyal and Ratna Dutta Sharma, both are former professors of Philosophy, Jadavpur University.

We are equally very much grateful to the Centre of Advanced Study (CAS) in Philosophy, Jadavpur University, and the University Grants Commission, New Delhi, for providing us the financial support for this publication. We are also extremely thankful to the faculty members of the Department of Philosophy, Jadavpur University, for their encouragement and moral support that has helped us in carrying out this project successfully. We express our deep gratitude to Professor Ambika Dutta Sharma and Professor Pradip Gokhle, the external UGC members of CAS, Department of Philosophy, Jadavpur University, for their expert advice. We must thank Jadavpur University, the backbone of the project, for giving us this opportunity.

We are extremely grateful to Mr Susheel K. Mittal without whose guidance and encouragement this volume Morality for the Ailing and Others would not have been published at all.

We also extend our gratitude to Mr Rajendra Agarwal of Suryodaya Books, New Delhi, for giving a final shape to our project.

Indrani Sanyal

Ratna Dutta Sharma

9 October 2020

Kolkata

Contents

Preface

1. Hegelian Ethics and Its Actualization

- Krishna Roy

2. Tagore and Freud: Female Sexuality

- Pushpa Misra

3. The Vedic Notion of R̥ta

- Pradyot Kumar Mandal

4. The Concept of Asura in Indian Tradition

- Raghunath Ghosh

5. Responses from Dharma-Ethics to the Concept and Practice of Euthanasia in Medico-Legal Contexts

- Indrani Sanyal

6. Dos and Don’ts for the Persons Involved in the Health Care Domain

-Ratna Dutta Sharma

7. Deep Ecology and Jainism

-Santosh Kumar Pal

8. Society and Code of Conduct: A Deliberation with Reference to Women in Ancient India

-Gopa Gupta

9. Manusmr̥ti and the Position of Women in Society

-Krishna Datta and Gargi Goswami

10. Terrorism: Some Ethical Issues

-Roma Chakraborty

Contributors

Index

Introduction

Indrani Sanyal and Ratna Dutta Sharma

Morality for the Ailing and Others is the second volume, a sequel to the work which has been published in 2015, under the title Refugees, Marriage,Asuras and Varied: An Anthology on Applied Ethics, Volume One under the same editorship. This volume as a continuation of the previous one, has been pre-occupied with the objective of highlighting the connection between theory and practice, specifically by taking into consideration the domain of morality. The present volume is a collection of ten articles, authored by distinguished scholars from their respective fields of specialization.

Among the articles included in this volume, two relate to the domain of medical ethics; one relates to the environmental ethics; three others relate to moral concerns about female sexuality, their position in society and the prescribed code of conduct for women; one article relates to the ethics of politics, whereas three others deal with concepts that may help us in understanding what morality actually is all about, from the point of view of different philosophical traditions. The articles published in this volume, commonly deal with different moral codes, practices and some theoretical discussions in their favour, or against. The areas of discussion that are covered are quite wide, and this volume in its orientation is strictly neither Western nor Indian, nor classical, nor modern or post-modern. The authors have exercised their freedom in selection of topics and perspectives from which these essays have emerged. Some of the diverse aspects of human life and society, where questions regarding morality are the burning issues of the day, and require to be addressed, have been touched upon. In the limited span of this volume, it is hardly expected that it would cover most of the aspects, if at all, of the compelling issues relating to the theory and application in ethics.

We are very much thankful to each of the authors for their valuable contribution to this volume and their patient cooperation with us, at every point of time. In this connection, we would like to specially thank Krishna Roy, Former Professor of Philosophy, Jadavpur University; Pushpa Misra, Former Principal, Bethune College and Former Professor of Philosophy, West Bengal Education Service; Pradyot Kumar Mandal, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, University of Burdwan; Roma Chakraborty, Former Professor of Philosophy, University of Calcutta; Raghunath Ghose, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, University of North Bengal; Gopa Gupta, Former Professor of Philosophy, West Bengal Education Service; Santosh Kumar Pal, Professor of Philosophy, University of Burdwan; Krishna Dutta, Former Professor of Sanskrit, University of Calcutta and Gargi Goswami, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Jadavpur University, for their purposive contribution to this volume. Without the cooperation and unflinching support of these learned academicians, the volume would not have seen the light of the day. Two other articles have been contributed by us, editors of this volume, Indrani Sanyal and Ratna Dutta Sharma, both are former professors of Philosophy, Jadavpur University.

We are equally very much grateful to the Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy, Jadavpur University, and the University Grants Commission, New Delhi, for providing us the financial support for this publication. We are also extremely thankful to the faculty members of the Department of Philosophy, Jadavpur University, for their encouragement and moral support that has helped us in carrying out this project successfully. We express our deep gratitude to Professor Ambika Dutta Sharma and Professor Pradip Gokhle, the external UGC members of CAS, Department of Philosophy, Jadavpur University, for their expert advice. Finally, we must thank Jadavpur University, the backbone of the project for giving us this opportunity.

We are extremely grateful to Mr. Susheel K. Mittal without whose guidance and encouragment this volume Morality for the Ailing and Others would not have been published at all.

Last but not the least we extend our gratitude to Mr. Rajendra Agarwal of Suryodaya Books, New Delhi, for giving a final shape to our project.

9 October 2020

Kolkata

1

Hegelian Ethics and Its Actualization

Krishna Roy

It is undeniable that the relation between theory and practice is very close. A theory as theory may be good enough, but it becomes truly efficacious and significant only if the theory is implemented in practical lifeworld. Similarly, any practical action requires the guidance based on a theory to be implemented successfully. Such close relation between theory and practice becomes all the more evident and necessary when it comes to the question of ethics; since ethics deals with the actions of the human beings, living in societies, with reference to the principles of justice and good. This intimate connection between theory and practice has been recognized since the days of Aristotle, the ancient Greek philosopher, to many modern and contemporary thinkers. In the present paper, attempt has been made to give an overview of the ethical views of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831), and how those ideas are gradually actualized in concrete socio-political realms.

We all know that Aristotle is the first major exponent of the inalienable relation between theory and practice. Aristotle has made the distinction clearly between theoria and praxis, i.e. between theoretical knowledge and practical action. He further makes the distinction between poesis and praxis;poesis refers to the production of an artefact, e.g. a pen or a book, whereas praxis refers to those actions done with the intention of doing something good; in that case praxis is more directly connected with the ethical and social activities of men. Regarding such praxis or practical truth, Aristotle thinks that they are more directly related to a particular action. He maintains that when we say “this is good” and “that is unjust”, these utterances primarily refer to some action and not merely to the general conceptions of good and justice. In this context, he states in Nicomachean Ethics:

When we are discussing, actions, although general statements have a wider application, particular statements are closer to the truth. This is because actions are concerned with particular facts.

—Aristotle1986, 1107a: 30-61

He further states:

In the matter of conduct, truth is assessed in the light of the facts and of actual life; because it is in these that the decisive factor lies.

— Ibid. ,1179a: 19

Thus, it becomes evident that Aristotle is more interested in the application of the ethical theories, which finally lead to social and political activities.

Such a close relation between theory and practice can be noticed even in the writings of Hegel. Though Hegel is generally known as the propounder of Absolute Idealism and his writings are considered to be abstract and abstruse, a close and penetrating study reveals an underlying implication that directs to the inevitability of their actualization. It is true that Hegel primarily emphasizes on the Spirit or Reason as the ultimate reality, but this Spirit is the unity of the objective and the subjective; here Spirit is the self that becomes objective to itself through its action, and then comprehends itself as what it is.

One of the fundamental premises of Hegel’s philosophy is “what is rational is actual and what is actual is rational” and as such Reason rules both the universe of mind as well as the universe of nature; a knowledge of the laws of thought is the same as the knowledge of the nature of reality. Given his dialectical method, Hegel joins these two sets of laws. Although his ethical views can be noticed in some of his earlier writings, it becomes particularly evident in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, where he discusses the dialectical structures of Abstract Right, Subjective Morality and Social Morality (Sittlichkeit), which are primarily interested in implementing the concepts of Reason, Freedom and Morality. That Hegel is concerned with both Idea and its actualization is clear from his statement in the very Introduction of his Philosophy of Right:

The subject matter of the philosophical science of right is the Idea of right — the concept of right and its actualization.

— 1958: Sect. 1, p. 15

But Hegel’s method of actualization is quite distinctive; he is not in favour of first formulating ideas and then to find their actuality. He is rather keen to work out the essential implications in the existent to actualize the rationality that lies therein. In this context, he says:

The true ideal is not what ought to be actual but what is actual, and the only actuality. If an idea is held to be too good to exist, there must be some fault in the idea itself, since actuality is too good for it.

— 1968: 95

Hence, it appears that an idea becomes defective if it is not based on the rational essence of that to which it is applied.

It is well known that Hegel’s ethical view is explicitly elaborated in his Philosophy of Right (published in 1821), yet the elements of his ethical views can be found even in his earlier writings. Hegel is acquainted with the previous reputed ethical views, specially those of Aristotle, Kant and Fichte, and is impressed by some aspects of those views. Hegel wants to reconcile classical views of Plato and Aristotle with the modern philosophical trends. Aristotle considers ethics as aiming at a single final end, which is good (i.e. eudemonia) or happiness. Such happiness or eudemonia is the actualizing of soul’s potentialities in accordance with the excellences appropriate to them, as also with the actualization of its highest faculty, i.e. reason. Aristotle states that our rational excellences require both theory and practice, practical excellences include not only the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom (Phronesis) but also a range of distinct moral virtues of character. Aristotle defines man as a rational animal and the non-rational parts of our soul, the desires and feelings, should be governed by this reason. Hegel is impressed by Aristotle’s philosophy and incorporates some of these views in his own philosophy.

Immanuel Kant provides us with a different perspective of morality. Though we do not regard Kant primarily as a moral philosopher, he is rather, famous as a critical thinker, an epistemologist par excellence, yet his interest and acumen in moral principles can be noticed even in his earlier work, viz. Enquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality,published in 1764. Subsequently, Kant developed his distinct moral theory and published The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Yet Kant did not elaborately delineate these moral issues until he prepared his Critique of Practical Reason in 1780. There he discussed that some metaphysical questions like the existence of God, freedom of the will and immortality of the soul cannot be resolved by theoretical reason only, but can be dealt with from the practical and moral point of view. Similarly, in Kant’s later writings too, we notice his emphasis on the application of philosophical and ethical principles in human life. Kant situated ethics primarily on the autonomy of reason. Against the teleological theory based on telos (end), Kant supported deontological theory and held that the value of any end presupposes a process of rational deliberation.

Hegel is impressed by the Kantian ethical view and begins almost as a Kantian, for at the outset Hegel too is interested in reason, morality and freedom. But gradually, as he develops his own ethical view in detail, we notice some major differences between the two views.

Even in his earlier writings entitled Tübingen Essays of 1793, we notice Hegel’s dissatisfaction with rigid Kantian dichotomy between duty and inclination, and he becomes more concerned in reconciling man’s reason with his sensuous nature. Hegel considers Kant’s idea of duty as empty and formal, without having any positive account of particular duties. He further holds that the Kantian approach is unable to resolve the conflict of duties. Subsequently, Hegel opines that Kant’s conception of the state is individualistic and instrumental. According to Kant, the state proposes some conditions of negative freedom of the individuals. We notice a completely different approach in Hegel’s discussion of the state’s role in moral situation. In Hegel’s view the state is not merely instrumental but is also the embodiment or realization of that which is truly ethical. Hence, Hegel’s ethical theory is neither teleological (like Aristotle), nor deontological (like Kant); it is an agent-oriented and self-actualization theory. Its starting point is the conception of self that has to be actualized, embodied and expressed in action.

Hegel’s interest in ethical issues can be noticed even from his earlier writings, though his direct involvement with moral questions can be found in one of his major works, entitled Philosophy of Right. Here, Hegel discusses his views on morality along with the possibility of their actualization in socio-political realms. In consistency with his general philosophical method, Hegel develops his ethical theory dialectically, i.e. through a triadic process. The first stage, as discussed in the Philosophy of Right is Abstract Right. The German word Recht can be translated into English both as right and as law. As we take the more common meaning, i.e. right, we notice that there is a hierarchy among the rights; some are mere formal and limited, while others are more concrete and universal. Whether it is right or law, this stage is “abstract” in the sense that it is common, universal and equally applicable to each individual.

In this section on Abstract Right, Hegel discusses about personality; the individual man is conceived here as a person, a free volitional agent receiving respect from an external sphere where this freedom is being exercised. He holds: “Be a person and respect others as persons” (Hegel 1958: 36). This personality is characterized by freedom and universality. This personality has a dual nature; on the one hand, I am completely determined and finite; on the other hand, I am infinite, universal and free. Along with personality come the notions of property, contract and wrongs. Property refers to a person’s relation with external objects, how one acquires it, uses it and dissociates from it. From property, Hegel goes on to discuss contracts, which primarily deal with interpersonal relations of various types. In contract, the focus is no longer on the relation of the Will to an external object, but on the relation of the Will to another Will. Since there is the possibility that such contracts can be violated — we notice the outbreak of wrongdoings of various types. Such wrongs expose the contingency of those contracts. Hegel classifies three different types of wrongs: civil or unintentional wrongs, fraud and crime. Of all these types of wrongdoings, crime indicates total denial of right, it is “an infringement of right as right”. Hence, the crimes are liable to punishment. Hegel describes punishment as “negation of the negation” for to violate contract or property-right is to violate freedom of an individual, and punishment is the violation of such violation. In other words, for Hegel, punishment negates the crime and asserts the restoration of right. Hegel does not support those theories of punishment which try to justify punishment as bringing some “good” from it. Like Kant, his predecessor, Hegel is a supporter of the retributive theory of punishment, but his view is not, as it is generally supposed, to advocate robbery for robbery; here retribution is judged “in terms of value”. Hegel’s view of punishment is quite progressive as he has some reservations for capital punishment. We may sum up Hegel’s discussion of Abstract Right by noticing that this stage of Abstract Right is not self-complete and requires what is concrete as its essential foundation.

After dealing with Abstract Right, Hegel turns his attention to the subjective and the particular, which have not been discussed so far; this he does in the section entitled “Morality or Subjective Morality”. Here the Will expresses itself, not in something external (as in Abstract Right), but in something internal. In his Encyclopedia Philosophy of Spirit, Hegel says in this context:

The moral must be taken in the wider sense in which it does not signify merely the morally good. … The moral here has the meaning of a determinacy of the Will in so far as this determinacy is in the interior of the Will in general; it thus includes purpose and intention, as well as moral evil. — Quoted in Franco 1999: 207

Hence, in the section on “Morality”, Hegel gives the descriptions of an individual, completely different from that in Abstract Right. Here, the individual is not merely an “abstract person”, he is rather a person with particularity and subjectivity. Here, the individual is conceived as a person endowed with moral responsibility; his purpose is to seek not merely the welfare of his own but that of others as well. Here, the self seeks to actualize itself through volition and action, and as such, the focus is on the moral responsibility of the subject. According to Hegel, an individual receives credit or blame for those acts which are expressions of his inner intention.

In his discussion on Morality, Hegel focuses on the idea of good, which is the “unity of the concept of the Will and the particular Will” (1958: 129). In other words, in willing the good, the subjective will wills the free will. But this goodwill, unlike Kant, is not contentless and merely formal; it has the sanction of conscience. Conscience, according to Hegel, is the expression of the absolute title of subjective self-consciousness to know in itself and from within itself, what right and duty are, and to recognize only what it thus knows as the good (Hegel 1958: 137 R (remark)). Hegel thinks that it is only through conscience that we can distinguish between a moral and an immoral act and can determine whether an action is intended to be good or not. We notice that this conscience determines the universal modes of action which are valid for themselves, and for all as well. Hence, genuine conscience is both subjective and universal at the same time.

Hegel’s discussion of Abstract Right and Morality shows that both are partial and incomplete. Abstract Right is supporting objectivity without subjectivity, and morality emphasizes on subjectivity without objectivity. Both these stages of the triadic dialectical method need to be synthesized and elevated to some higher stage which, according to Hegel, is the stage of Social Morality or Sittlichkeit. Neither the sphere of right, nor that of morality, can exist independently (für sich); they must have the Ethical life as their support and foundation.

Hegel’s discussion of Ethical Life or Sittlichkeit is both novel and significant. The German word Sitte means custom and hence the word Sittlichkeit has been translated as social or custom-based morality; often it is translated as Ethical Life, as distinguished from Morality, which is generally private and subjective. This stage of Sittlichkeit is a stage of concrete whole. In his Philosophy of Right, Hegel holds that morality and the earlier moment of formal right are both abstractions whose truth can be attained only in ethical life. Thus, ethical life is the unity of the will in its concept and the will of the individual, i.e. of the subject.

According to Hegel, in Ethical Life, the image of the individual is more concrete as it addresses every aspect of the individual self and situates self in an actual social order. Such ethical spirit becomes gradually actualized though the stages of Family, Civil Society and the State. Sittlichkeit, or Social Morality, first expresses itself in the family. Family satisfies the basic human urge for love or unity with others at the level of feeling. Here Hegel discusses about marriage, in which two persons freely commit themselves to a life where they live together in love. Besides reproducing human organisms, the family educates the child and introduces him to social customs and norms. The family is based on the principle of love and our moral sense first develops at this early stage.

While family unites its members through love and care, civil society, which is the conglomeration of many families, is based on the principle of need. It is a system of social relationship where the individuals participate and interact freely and economically. As the owners of private property, individuals engage in economic relationships, which are recognized by legal procedures. In such a civil society people freely labour for producing goods which satisfy their needs. In this section on civil society, Hegel clearly explicates how the image of the individual gradually evolves. He says:

In (abstract) right, what we had before us was the person; in the sphere of morality, the subject; in the family, the family-member; in civil society as a whole, the bourgeois. Here at the standpoint of needs what we have before us is the composite idea which we call man. Thus this is the first time, and indeed the only time, to speak of man in this sense.

— Hegel 1958: 190

Such conception of bourgeois shows that a person is not merely a self-centred being, concerned not only with her/his own welfare but also has concern for and solidarity with others in the society; she/he also develops ethical qualities, values and fellow feelings. Such interaction and participation in civil society prepare for its transition to the universal life of the state.

Hegel emphatically suggests that the fullest actualization of Sittlichkeit or Social Morality is possible only in the state. It is an institution that is fully charged with reason and as such the highest actualization of individual’s freedom is possible only in the state. Hegel does not consider civil society as completely rational and concrete, for its parts are not organically connected. The state, on the other hand, is an organic unity, charged with the welfare of the “universal interests” of the community.

Hegel uses the term “state” in two different senses: in its broader sense, state refers to the entire community of people, and in its narrower sense, it refers to the political institutions only. Both these meanings are interconnected, for it is only in the state that the individuals find the unity of individuality and universality. Hegel considers only that social order as moral or ethical, which is charged with reason. If a social organization is not rational, it cannot be ethical. True moral qualities like virtue and duty are possible only in a society which is fully rational. Only in such a rational organization, the members are completely free in the sense that they are concerned with the goals, which are not merely personal, but universal and collective. In his Philosophy of Right Hegel offers some criteria for judging the rationality of a political organization; not only the state should be rational and ethical, but it must also consider the individual and her/his freedom as “value”. Thus, a rational state is based not on the principle of coercion but on freedom. Moreover, Hegel regards the state as the only social institution that is truly independent; family is economically dependent on civil society; both family and civil society are dependent on the state. It is the state which, according to Hegel, is fully sovereign and independent; it is the supreme power on earth. Of course, Hegel admits the possibility of conflict and even war between different states. Such war, he opines, unites the entire people, develops certain virtues like heroism and patriotism, and gradually strengthens the state in the process.

Now, we may sum up our present discussion by pointing out that Hegel’s characterization of the state as the march of God on Earth, the highest embodiment of Sittlichkeit or Social Morality and the like has received divergent interpretations from the later writers. One such interpretation, supported by Karl Popper among others, suggests that Hegel’s view is only a sanction to the then Prussian state, led by Frederick William III. Popper emphasizes that as the official philosopher of Prussia, Hegel’s “philosophy was influenced by the interests of the Prussian government by which he was employed” (1984: 34).

But a completely different interpretation of Hegel’s view can be found in the writings of many later writers, including the Young Hegelian thinkers, some of whom were direct students of Hegel. Without going into the details of those discussions (which do not come under the purview of the present theme), it may only be maintained that the rational state, discussed in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, does resemble the then Prussia, but that does not imply that Hegel is justifying the then socio-political status quo. Rather, Hegel’s goal is to support the gradual transformation of the socio-political realm, in order to bring out a fully moral and rational state. Supporting such view Allan Wood in Hegel’s Ethical Thought states:

Hegel insists that every existing state, standing as it does in the sphere of transitoriness and contingency, is disfigured to some extent by error and wickedness and fails to be wholly rational, because it fails to be wholly actual. The Philosophy of Right clearly leaves room for rational criticism of what exists, and also for practical efforts to improve the existing state by actualizing it, bringing it more into harmony with its own rational essence or concept.

— 1959: 9

Hence, we may sum up our present discussion by pointing out that it seems quite plausible that Hegel’s basic aim is to support the gradual actualization of Social Morality or Sittlichkeit through the dialectical process.

References

Aristotle, 1906, Nicomachean Ethics,tr.F.H. Peters, London: Kegan Paul, Trench and Trübner & Co.

Aristotle, 1986, The Nicomachean Ethics, tr. J.A.K. Thomson, England: Penguin Books.

Franco, Paul, 1999, Hegel’s Philosophy of Freedom, London: Yale University Press.

Hegel, G.F., 1958, Philosophy of Right, tr. T.M. Knox, London: Oxford University Press.

———, 1968, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, tr. E. Haldane, New York: Humanities Press.

Popper, Karl, 1984, The Open Society and Its Enemies, vol. II, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Wood, A., 1995, Hegel’s Ethical Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

2

Tagore and Freud

Female Sexuality

Pushpa Misra

Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941) and Sigmund Freud (1856–1939), were the two luminaries of late nineteenth and early twentieth century. There was, however, not much interaction between the two. They met only once, on 25 October 1926, when Tagore was visiting Vienna. Freud wrote to Anna von Vest in 1926:

Tagore invited us to pay him a visit on 25 October. We found him ailing and tired, but he is a wonderful sight, he really looks like the imagined Lord God looks, but only about 10,000 years older than the way Michelangelo in the Sistine. — Ahmad 2011

Tagore, on his part, was also not much interested in Freud’s work initially. Santanu Biswas, in his excellently researched article, quotes Tagore’s comments about psychoanalysis:

How can the world created by an individual in his own mind be understood by another individual having a different mind?

I think sex-instinct does not come at the beginning; self-assertion comes before it. The instinct of self-assertion is older than sex- instinct, and the influence of the former inseparably pervades our life.

— Biswas 2003: 720

Santanu Biswas also points out that Tagore’s opposition to psychoanalysis was finally overcome around 1936, by the influence of poet Amiya Chakravarty, who was close to Tagore. Tagore started reading the works of Sigmund Freud, Carl Gustav Jung and Alfred Adler. Nanda Gopal Sengupta informs that Tagore was also keen on writing something on psychoanalysis theory, which he could not do (Biswas 2003). Biswas also contends that some of his poems towards the end were influenced by the concept of unconscious, which he termed as magnachiatanalok.

On the other hand, Freud, though strongly a product of the period of enlightenment and influenced by logical positivism, was an extremely well-read person, even beyond his area of scientific interest. His writings are full of quotes from Johann Goethe, Heinerich Heine, William Shakespeare and other poets. He did accept that the poets have a special intuitive ability to fathom the complexities of unconscious mind. I quote:

In the past we have left to the poets to depict for us “the conditions of Love”, according to which people make their object-choices, and how they reconcile the demand of their fantasy and reality. Poets have certain qualities that enable them to solve such a task, in particular a great sensitive in the perception of hidden mental impulses in others, and the courage to make their own unconscious speak.

— Freud 2006: 241

However, lack of scientific precision and evidence in their account of reality forces the scientist to take up the task of depicting the reality in a more objective and realistic way. Hence, the entry of Freud, who intends to provide us with a scientific account of human mind which will take away a lot of pleasure but will provide us with an accurate and objective account of how the human mind works.

In this paper, I will try to explore the area of female sexuality as depicted by Freud and Tagore, and will try to see where they meet — if they meet at all; how they perceive women as sexual beings and whether they perceive women only as sexual beings. This is a very difficult endeavour and I can describe my attempt in one line of Shakespeare, “fools rush in where angels fear to tread”.

I shall bring up a brief account of Freud’s theory of female sexuality.

The problem of femininity has vexed Freud till the end of his life. He has said that women are like a dark continent to him and it is difficult to understand them. At one time, in exasperation, he had uttered, “What do they want?” In spite of all this, he has clearly stated his view regarding femininity, which he claims to be based on accurate empirical observation and the data obtained by him and a number of female analysts.

Sexuality in boys and girls is subject to a developmental process which is biphasic — infantile and adult. The former being right after birth and the latter when the child reaches puberty. In normal cases, the sexual developmental of a boy is comparatively uncomplicated, but the sexual development of a girl is a complicated one, with many twists and turns, which finally determine her choice of love object and to some extent, her personality traits also.

From birth onwards, the mother is the most loved object for both, the boy and the girl. Mother is the primary care-giver, provider of nourishment and her constant presence provides the child with a sense of reliability and trust. For the boy, the mother remains the love-object when he enters into oedipal phase of libido development at around the age of 4/5. His erotic fantasies are directed towards his mother and he develops a sense of intense rivalry and hatred towards his father. This creates enormous conflict and ambivalence in the mind of the child, which is resolved by the boy’s fear that his genital will be castrated if he does not give up these fantasies and related masturbatory activities. The terror of castration acts as a strong motive to give up his forbidden fantasies and leads to the complete resolution of oedipus conflict. Parts of his fantasies are repressed and a boy identifies with his father, and the prohibitions of father form his super-ego, i.e. conscience.

For the female child, Freud says, the process is much more complicated. Female sexuality develops normally (and here Freud means heterosexuality) only after the girl child has passed through the oedipal phase.

As the girl child enters the phallic phase, she discovers her lack of penis and feels inferior, because of this deficiency. She soon discovers that her mother also lacks a penis. This discovery shatters the girl child. She feels betrayed and deceived, and this strong emotion turns her away from her first love-object, namely, her mother. As a reaction she also renounces her most pleasurable activity, namely, clitoral masturbation. With this, a certain amount of activity is also given up and passive sexual aims take the upper hand. Unless too much repression occurs, Freud says, this paves the way to normal femininity.

She now turns to her father with the desire to get a penis — a desire that, by an archaic symbolic equivalence, is substituted by the desire to get a male child from her father. This is the most powerful feminine wish. With this, the entrance to oedipal situation is complete. The girl’s hostility towards her mother now compounds, because she is now her rival for her father’s affection, and is getting everything that the little girl wants for herself. Her negative feelings towards the mother, which were already present for various reasons, such as not giving her enough milk and loving her siblings more than her, etc. make her hatred towards the mother stronger.

The girl-child lacks any strong motivation to give up her desires towards her father. As a result her oedipus complex is never fully resolved. Freud observes:

Girls remain in it for an indeterminate length of time; they demolish it late and, even so, incompletely. In these circumstances the formation of the super-ego must suffer, it cannot attain the strength and independence which give it its cultural significance, and feminists are not pleased when we point out to them the effects of this factor upon the average feminine character.

— Freud 1933: 160-61

In general, there are three possible consequences of the oedipal phase in case of a girl child. First, she proceeds towards normal heterosexuality by identifying with her mother; second, she reacts to it with rebelliousness and with an exaggeration of her previous masculinity and her clitoral masturbatory activities which Freud terms “masculine protest”. The extreme consequence of such a state would influence the choice of her sex object leading to homosexuality. Third, failing to obtain the longed for penis, she renounces her sexuality, does not marry and pursues masculine professions like teaching.

A number of personality characteristics in women are connected with this developmental process in women though Freud says he is not sure how much of these traits are due to the social influence and how much due to sexual function. But he maintains that:

1. Since their resolution of oedipus complex is incomplete, a female seeks a father-figure as her love-object. Their sense of rivalry with their mothers becomes most prominent during puberty when the mother is perceived as creating obstructions in the way of her sexual freedom.

However, a strong identification with the mother occurs when the woman becomes a mother herself. Her pre-oedipal strong attachment to the mother is the decisive one for her future. As Freud observes:

… during it preparations are made for the acquisition of the characteristics with which she will later fulfil her role in the residual function and perform her invaluable social tasks.

— Freud 1933: 66

2. Envy and jealousy play a stronger role in the love-life of women, hence, sense of justice takes rear seat in her life.

3. The strong physical vanity of women also is an attempt to conceal their sense of deficiency.

4. Women are more narcissistic than men. Their need to be loved is greater than their need to love. This has a strong impact on the object-choice of women.

There are two types of object-choice: (i) attachment or analytic type, and (ii) narcissistic type.

As the child grows up, his primary narcissism and his libido extends to the outside world. In such cases, usually the first love object is his mother/or who takes care of him. This kind of object-choice is called narcissistic type.

However, Freud does not claim that human being can be divided into two classes on the basis of their object-choice. He wants to say that two kinds of choices are open to each individual, and he can show preference for any one of them.

There are women whose object-choice is of extreme narcissistic type. They love only themselves with such an intensity with which a man could love them.

A complete object-love of the attachment type is the characteristic of males. Males overvalue their sexual object by transferring their own narcissism, which is a characteristics of the state we call love. That is why, when a man is in love, he feels empty and devoid of all values within, unless the love is reciprocated.

However, Freud does not claim that women are incapable of analytic type of love. He clearly states that there are quite a number of women who develop the “masculine type” of love and overvalue their love-object in the same way as the males do.

He also points out that there is, at least, one area even in narcissistic women that leads to complete object-love. It is the love of the mother for her child, whom she considers as part of her own body and can give complete object-love, especially if the child is a son.

This is a very brief account of female sexuality as given by Freud. I am not defending his account. Suffice it to say that the account has been strongly objected to, not only by the later female psychoanalysts like Melanie Klein and Karen Horney, but also by his long-time male collaborator, Ernest Jones. Freud was also aware of the objection from feminists. But he refused to alter his account.

I would, however, like to emphasize one point. Freud was not antagonistic to women, nor did he hold them in less esteem. Though he admitted constitutional factors in the genesis of neurotic illnesses, he was vocal against the injustice, social and sexual repression that, according to him, was the strongest casual factor behind hysteria and other neurotic symptoms of women. As Nancy Chodorow points out:

He is firm in his strong defense of the morality and upstanding qualities and capabilities of the women whom contemporary neurologists and psychiatrists considered degenerate, morally and mentally contaminated, and inferior as a result of their heredity. In his early discourse on “Civilized Sexual Morality and Modern Nervousness”, Freud mounts a powerful critique of the societally, culturally, and familially induced constraint on women’s (and men’s) sexuality and of the trap that marriage is for many women.

— Chodorow 1991: 235

Freud has said that his account and his knowledge of women is incomplete, but in spite of this, has given us a theory regarding femininity with quite a few generalizations. Some of these generalizations have been questioned, and are still being questioned, but quite a few still remain alive, at least in the clinical field.

As far as penis envy is concerned, it seems that it is incapable of bearing the heavy burden of a female’s personality formation, her neurotic symptoms, and at the same time, determining the major aspects of her relationship with men. However, the picture changes if we take the penis envy as a symbol of inequality and justice against women prevailing in a patriarchal society. In such a society, the difference in sex-organs symbolizes a gamut of advantages and disadvantages and often becomes a determining factor of what a woman would become and what course her sexuality would take.

We now have a Freudian picture of a woman as a sexual being — as a being who loves, cares, feels jealous, tries to overcome her sense of deficiency — physical and social — and quite frequently, falls prey to neurotic symptoms. She is narcissistic, prone to neurotic disorders, emotionally labile and at times capable of transcending her narcissism by sacrificing her life and happiness for her love.

Let us now see Tagore’s idea of female sexuality as expressed in his works. It goes without saying that it is not possible to touch even a small fraction of Tagore’s work in this small paper. Psychoanalysts believe that poets and writers, in their creative works, give sublimated expression to the unconscious needs and cravings of humans. One needs to undo the defensive structures of the composition and find out the latent meaning in their compositions. I will discuss some of the more familiar works of Tagore in this connection.

Though not directly connected with female sexuality, the name of the first poem that came to my mind, when I was writing this paper, is “Birpurush” of Tagore. One doesn’t need to be a psychoanalyst in order to understand the almost obvious oedipal theme of the poem — a most beautiful rendition of every child’s desire to be the rescuer of his mother who is under the “oppressive” attack of the father. This account seems to me to be the basis of all rescue fantasies of all ages — rescuing of the princess from the demons by Prince Charming.

In the poem, when dacoits are vanquished by Khoka, the mother acknowledges the courage and bravery of Khoka, and covers him with kisses and caresses and says:

tumi shune palki theke neme

chumo kheye nichbhho aamaay kole

balachho, “bhaagye khoka sange chhilo,

ki durdashaai na hoto ta na hole”

On hearing that you get down from your palanquin, take me in your lap and cover me with kisses and say, “Oh! what a good fortune it was that Khoka was with me otherwise who knows what miserable things would have happened”.*

Khoka has proved himself stronger than his father — an eternal fantasy of all male children. He has proved himself stronger than his elder brother also.

dada bolbe “ta ki kare hobe

khokar gaye eto ki jor aache?

The wish-fulfilling quality is so clear in the lines:

roj kato ki ghate jaha taha

emon keno satti hoy na aha.

So many trivial and unnecessary things happen everyday. Why doesn’t this become true?

I am reminded of a patient of mine, a 35-year-old male doctor who lost his father when he was only four. He reported that he often has a fantasy. He visualizes that a four-year old child is standing in front of the door of a room with two elongated sticks in his hands. The child is moving the sticks like swords. He will not allow anyone, except his father, to enter the room. A lady is inside the room. “This lady”, he said, “is my mother and child is me”. No clearer example probably can be given of the reality of Oedipus complex.

Tagore had an extraordinary capacity for identification with women. He has portrayed with masterful strokes the infinitely subtle nuances of almost every feeling and emotion a woman is capable of experiencing. Her anger, rage, her submission and complete surrender to her object of adoration, her sacrifice, her envy and jealously – all have found a place in Tagore’s various poems, short stories, novels and songs.

The oedipal theme has come up repeatedly in Tagore’s poems albeit in a disguised form. Tagore’s “Nishkriti” in Palataka is one such poem. The oedipal theme is the main determining feature of the poem, though it is not as obvious to the uninitiated as in “Birpurush”.

Manjulika, a little girl, was married to an aged man Panchanan by a pseudo-orthodox father against her and her mother’s wishes. She comes back to her father’s house as a widow, within two months of her marriage. Her mother’s pleas to her father to get the daughter remarried fall on deaf ears. The mother dies broken hearted. Manjulika takes up the duties of her mother, satisfies every whim of her father. The father is never happy and nothing Manjulika did “was like her mother”. This makes Manjulika all the more attached to her father.

manjuli taar baaper naalish dande dande shone

hasse mone mone

“babar kaachhe maayer sriti katoi mullaban”

sei kathata mone kare garbe sukhe purna taahar praan-

“aamar maayer janto je jan peyechhe ekbaar

aar kichhu ki pachhondo hoy taar?”

Manjuli listens to the constant complaints of her father and smiles to herself. Her heart fills with pride and happiness thinking “How precious is the memory of my mother in the heart of my father. Whoever has experienced the care of my mother, how can he like anything else?”

She is only sixteen but follows a strict, disciplined life of self-abnegation, declining the offer of marriage from her childhood doctor friend Pulin, who loves her so dearly. She earns the praise of the entire neighbourhood and becomes the pride of her father. However, within eleven months of the demise of Majulika’s mother, the father decides to remarry.

maar katha aaj manjulikar porhlo mone

buk bhaga ek bishom byathar sone

hok na mrityu, tobu

ei barhir ei hawar sange, biraho tanr ghate nai to kabhu …

e sansare tnar aaj hobe parom mrityu, boshhom apoman

sei bhebe je manjulikar bhange porhalo pran.

With a deeply saddened heart, Majulika remembered her mother that day — thought her mother was dead, yet she was never absent from the atmosphere of this house. Today she will really die in this house and will suffer this deep insult. Thinking this, Manjulika became totally broken hearted.

The day her father went to remarry, she left her father’s home, married Pulin, and went to Farakkabad, her new home.

The oedipal theme here is represented through Manjulika’s identification with her mother. The burden of household duties after the death of the mother usually falls on the daughter. But Manjulika could have remained satisfied by just performing her duties. This was, however, not enough for her. She wanted to keep the memory of her mother alive. As long as her mother remains in the heart of her father, she too remains there. The infantile oedipal cravings were thus fulfilled in an indirect way. This becomes clear, when she left her father with the news of his second marriage. Her mother is no longer important to her father, nor is she anymore. She becomes disillusioned with her infantile love-object, and is able to sever the ties and proceed with her life in a mature way. It is to be noted that oedipal attachment and a mature attitude towards life and reality enable one to take a more realistic approach towards one’s love-life.

We have mentioned that Freud thinks that women largely make narcissistic choices regarding their love-object. In real life, we do come across the narcissistic type of women described by Freud. The narcissism, however, varies in degrees. But we get to see the perfect narcissistic type of Freud in Tagore’s “Mayar Khela”. In fact, in this same dance-drama, we see both the narcissistic type and the analytic type of love-personified in the charcters of Pramada and Shanta, respectively.

Describing the narcissistic type of women, Freud says:

Women, especially if they grow up with good looks, develop a certain self-contentment which compensates them for the social restrictions that are imposed upon them in their choice of objects. Strictly speaking, it is only themselves that such women love with an intensity comparable to that of the man’s love for them. Nor that their need lies in the direction of loving, but of being loved; and the man who fulfils this condition is the one who finds favour with them.

— Freud 1914: 82

Freud also says that such women hold a very important place in the erotic life of men. Since men renounce their primary narcissism, they are attracted towards those women in whom they could find part of their renounced narcissism.

The importance of this kind of women for the erotic life of men is very high. Such women have the greatest fascination for men, not only for aesthetic reasons, since as a rule, they are the beautiful, but also because of a combination of interesting psychological factors.

… another person’s narcissism has a great attraction for those who have renounced part of their own narcissism and are in search of object-love.

— Freud 1914: 82-83

Every claim that Freud has made in these passages is borne out in the characters of Pramada and Shanta.

We first see Pramada engrossed in her make up expressed in the song,

de lo sakhi de, paraiye gale saadhero bakul phul haar

Dear friend, help me put on the so desired necklace made of bakul flowers.

The description of how engrossed she is in decorating herself, clearly brings out her own values in her eyes as a sex object. She wants to look beautiful and that also for herself only.

When her friends tease her about falling in love, and ask what she would do with her beauty without a lover, she refuses to allow love in her life because it will bring about only pain.

tilek darosh parosh lagia

barosho barosho katore jagia

parero mukher hasir lagia

ashru sagare bhasha —

jiboner sukh khunjibare giya

jiboner suchh nashaa.

Friends, for a momentary pleasure of seeing someone and touching someone, if one has to wait for years with pain in her heart, and for a smile in someone else’s face, if one has to drown herself in the sea of tears, then one destroys one’s happiness for the sake of a fruitless search for happiness.

The classic expression of narcissistic love is in her song:

sukhe aachhi sukhe aachhi sakha apono mone

kichhu cheyo na, dure jeyo na

shudhu cheye dekho, shudhu ghire thako kachhakachhi …

aami aponar majhe aaponi hara, aapon saurabhe sara-

jeno aponar mono aaponar prano aaponare sanpiyachhi.

Oh! I am happy, I am happy with myself. Do not ask anything from me but do not go away, just look at me, be near, surround me. I am lost within myself, lost in my own fragrance, I have surrendered my heart and my life to myself.

An ideal expression of narcissism — a self engrossed in one’s own vain beauty, a love that does not know how to give, and considers herself to be the centre of everyone’s universe.

This is exactly what Freud says: as the child grows up, he also extends his love beyond itself. It is usually the primary care-giver, in most cases the mother, who is the first recipient of this object love. In a narcissistic type personality, instead of loving the mother, the child loves himself only. It may be argued that Pramada has not yet matured into a woman, she is still a child who is engrossed in herself. I think the argument should go the other way round. It is because of her narcissism that she has not allowed love to enter her heart. As she says:

ke dake aami kabhu phire nahi chai

kato phul phute uthe, kato phul jay tute

ami shudhu bohe chole jai.

Who calls me? I do not look back ever. Many flowers bloom, many flowers wither away, but I keep on flowing.

However, Shanta’s total surrender and her deep love have no appeal for Amar. Both Ashoke and Kumar are attracted towards Pramada — the more narcissistic of the two. As Freud has said, the importance of the narcissistic women is very high in the erotic life of men. As he says:

It displays the marked sexual overvaluation which is doubtless derived from the child’s original narcissism and thus corresponds to a transference of that narcissism to the sexual object. This sexual overvaluation is the origin of the peculiar state of being in love, a state suggestive of a neurotic compulsion, which is thus traceable to an impoverishment of the ego as regards libido in favour of the love-object.

— Freud 1914: 82

True to the last sentence of the quotation above, Amar is devastated, he does not get Pramada, and it is Shanta who readily comes forward to bear the burden of his broken heart.

When Amar comes back to her, refused by Pramada, like a very mature woman, Shanta says:

dekho, sakha, bhul kore bhalobesho na

ami bhalobasi bole kaachhe esho na

tumi jahe sukhi hao, tai karo sakha,

aami sukhi hobo bole jeno heso naa.

Oh my friend! do not love by mistake. Do not come near me because I love you. Do, what makes you happy, and do not smile because it will make me happy.