On the constitutionality of a national bank E-Book

Alexander Hamilton

• Herausgeber: DigiCat
• Kategorie: Fachliteratur
• Sprache: Englisch
• Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2022

Beschreibung

Alexander Hamilton's 'On the constitutionality of a national bank' is a seminal work that delves into the debate surrounding the establishment of a national bank in the early years of the United States. Written in a clear and persuasive style, Hamilton presents a detailed analysis of the Constitution to argue for the need of a national bank to support the fledgling financial system of the country. The book provides a fascinating insight into the legal and political considerations of the time, making it a valuable resource for students of American history and constitutional law. Hamilton's meticulous reasoning and logical arguments showcase his keen intellect and understanding of the complexities of governance. The book offers a nuanced perspective on the balance of power between the federal government and the states, shedding light on the challenges faced by the young nation. Readers interested in the origins of American financial policy and the interpretation of the Constitution will find Hamilton's work both informative and thought-provoking.

Leseprobe

Alexander Hamilton

On the constitutionality of a national bank

 

EAN 8596547315391

DigiCat, 2022 Contact: [email protected]

Table of Contents

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Titlepage

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ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A NATIONAL BANK.

Table of Contents

The Secretary of the Treasury, having perused with attention the papers containing the opinions of the Secretary of State and Attorney-General, concerning the constitutionality of the bill for establishing a National Bank, proceeds, according to the order of the President, to submit the reasons which have induced him to entertain a different opinion.

It will naturally have been anticipated, that in performing this task, he would feel uncommon solicitude. Personal considerations alone, arising from the reflection that the measure originated with him, would be sufficient to produce it. The sense which he has manifested of the great importance of such an institution to the successful administration of the department under his particular care, and an expectation of serious ill-consequences to result from a failure of the measure, do not permit him to be without anxiety on public accounts. But the chief solicitude arises from a firm persuasion, that principles of construction, like those espoused by the Secretary of State and Attorney-General, would be fatal to the just and indispensable authority of the United States.

In entering upon the argument, it ought to be premised, that the objections of the Secretary of State and Attorney-General, are founded on a general denial of the authority of the United States to erect corporations. The latter, indeed, expressly admits, that if there be any thing in the bill which is not warranted by the constitution, it is the clause of incorporation.

Now, it appears to the Secretary of the Treasury, that this general principle is inherent in the very definition of government, and esential to every step of the progress to be made by that of the United States; namely, that every power, vested in a government, is in its nature SOVEREIGN, and includes by force of the term, a right to employ all the means requisite, and fairly applicable, to the attainment of the ends of such power and which are not precluded by restrictions and exceptions specified in the constitution or not immoral; or not contrary to the essential ends of political society.

This principle, in its application to government in general, would be admitted as an axiom; and it will be incumbent upon those who may incline to deny it, to prove a distinction, and to show, that a rule, which, in the general system of things, is essential to the preservation of the social order, is inapplicable to the United States.

The circumstance, that the powers of sovereignty are, in this country, divided between the national and state governments, does not afford the distinction required. It does not follow from this, that each of the portions of power, delegated to the one or to the other, is not sovereign with regard to its proper objects. It will only follow from it, that each has sovereign power as to certain things, and not as to other things. To deny that the government of the United States has sovereign power as to its declared purposes and trusts, because its power does not extend to all laws, would be equally to deny, that the state governments have sovereign power in any case, because their power does not extend to every case. The tenth section of the first article of the constitution exhibits a long list of very important things which they may not do; and thus the United States would furnish the singular spectacle of a political society without sovereignty; or of a people governed without government.

If it would be necessary to bring proof to a proposition so clear, as that which affirms that the powers of the federal government, as to its objects, are sovereign, there is a clause of its constitution which would be decisive: It is that which declares, that the constitution, and the laws of the United States made in pursuance of it, and all treaties made, or which shall be matle, under their authority, shall be the Supreme Law of the land. The power which can create the supreme law of the land, in any case, is doubtless sovereign as to such case.

This general and indisputable principle, puts at once an end to the abstract question, Whether the United States have power to erect a corporation; that is to say, to give a legal or artificial capacity to one or more persons, distinct from the natural? For it is unquestionably incident to sovereign power to erect corporations; and, consequently, to that of the United States, in relation to the objects intrusted to the management of the government.

The difference is this: where the authority of the government is general, it can create corporations in all cases; where it is confined to certain branches of legislature, it can create corporations only in those cases.

Here, then, as far as concerns the reasonings of the Secretary of State and Attorney-General, the affirmative of the constitutionality of the bill might be permitted to rest. It will occur to the President, that the principle here advanced has been untouched by either of them.

Nevertheless, for a more complete elucidation of the point, the arguments which they had used against the power of the government to erect corporations, however foreign they are to the great fundamental rule which has been stated, shall be particularly examined. And after showing that they do not tend to impair its force, it shall also be shown, that the power of incorporation, incident to the government in certain cases, does fairly extend to the particular case which is the object of the bill.

The first of these arguments is, that the foundation of the constitution is laid on this ground, "that all powers, not delagated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited to it by the states, are reserved for the states or to the people;" whence it is meant to be inferred, that Congress can, in no case, exercise any power not included in those, nor not enumerated in the constitution. And it is affirmed, that the power of erecting a corporation is not included in any of the enumerated powers.

The main proposition here laid down in its true signification, is not to be questioned. It is nothing more than a consequence of this republican maxim, that all government is a delegation of power; but how much is delegated in each case, is a question of fact, to be made out by fair reasoning and construction, upon the particular provisions of the constitution—taking as guides, the general principles and general ends of government.

It is not denied that there are implied, as well as express powers; and that the former are as effectually delegated as the latter: and for the sake of accuracy, it shall be mentioned, that there is another class of powers, which may be properly denominated resulting powers. It will not be doubted, that if the United States, should make a conquest of any of the territories of its neighbours, they would possess sovereign jurisdiction over the conquered territory: This would rather be a result from the whole mass of the powers of the government, and from the nature of political society, than a consequence of either of the powers specially enumerated.

But be this as it may, it furnishes a striking illustration of the general doctrine contended for. It shows an extensive case, in which a power of erecting corporations is either implied in, or would result from, some or all of the powers vested in the national government. The jurisdiction acquired over such conquered territory, would certainly be competent to every species of legislation.

To return. It is conceded, that implied powers are to be considered as delegated, equally with express ones.

Then it follows, that a power of erecting a corporation may as well be implied as any other thing; it may as well be employed as an instrument or mean of carrying into execution any of the specified powers, as any other instrument or mean whatever. The only question must be, in this, as in every other case, whether the mean to be employed, or, in this instance, the corporation to be erected, has a natural relation to any of the acknowledged objects or lawful ends of the government? Thus a corporation may not be erected by Congress for superintending the police of the city of Philadelphia, because they are not authorized to regulate the police of that city. But one may be erected in relation to the collection of taxes, or to the trade with foreign countries, or to the trade between the States, or with the Indian tribes; because it is the province of the federal government to regulate those objects; and because it is incident to a general sovereign or legislative power to regulate a thing, to employ all the means which relate to its regulation, to the best and greatest advantage.