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Seminar paper from the year 2000 in the subject Politics - Topic: European Union, grade: 1,0 (A), University of Freiburg (Political Science), course: VL/HS: Issues of Contemporary International Politics, language: English, abstract: In the last months the discussion about a European Constitution has gained further popularity with the highly controversial speech of German foreign minister Joschka Fischer at the Humboldt University3. Until recently, most draft constitutions like the Spinelli initiative of the European Parliament in 1994 or the Herman Report in 1994 were discussed on a theoretical level without a hope for realization. Now there is a wave of speeches and contribution of key politicians on this subject. In fact, there are reasons to assume that there is more to it that just the typical German focus on constitutionalism4 but that “a window of opportunity is opening”5: the need for legal and institutional reform becomes evident in view of the incipient eastern enlargement and the results of the Amsterdam Conference and its postponing strategy have satisfied only few. Moreover, the fact that ECSC expires in 2002 gives further monumentum to the discussion about where Europe should be heading in the years to come and how the problems of a deeper and enlarged Union can be overcome. 1 see Schneider, Heinrich: Gesamteuropäische Herausforderungen an eine Europäische Union, in: Wildenmann, Rudolf (Hrsg.): Staatswerdung Europas? Optionen für eine Europäische Union, Baden-Baden Nomos, 1991 (Studien zur gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung, Bd. 9), pp. 125. 2 see Weidenfeld, Werner: Die Reformbilanz der Europäischen Gemeinschaft: ′Bundesrepublik Europa′ als Perspektive? in: Weidenfeld, Werner/Wessels, Wolfgang (Hrsg.): Wege zur Europäischen Union. Vom Vertrag zur Verfassung? Bonn Europa Union, 1986, pp. 28, and Hertel, Wolfram: Supranationalität als Verfassungsprinzip. Normativität und Legitimation als Elemente des Europäischen Verfassungsrechts, Berlin Duncker und Humblot, 1999 (Tübinger Schriften zum internationalen und europäischen Recht, Bd. 47), Diss. Univ. Tübingen 1998, pp. 21. 3 Fischer, Joschka: Vom Staatenbund zur Föderation – Gedanken über die Finalität der europäischen Integration. Rede am 12. Mai 2000 in der Humboldt-Universität in Berlin, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/4_europa/index.htm. 4 Kohler-Koch, Beate: A Constitution for Europe?, Mannheim, 1999 (Arbeitspapiere - Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung, Bd. 8), pp. 2. 5 ibid. pp. 3.
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Why Europe Does Not Need
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I. Introduction Seite 1
I. Introduction
The history of attempts for giving Europe a constitution is long and encompasses some famous names like the Abbé de Saint Pierre or Immanuel Kant, but also resistance groups during WWII1and Winston Churchill, who presented his vision of the United States of Europe in 1946 in Zurich2. In the last months the discussion about a European Constitution has gained further popularity with the highly controversial speech of German foreign minister Joschka Fischer at the Humboldt University3. Fischer, who had already at the beginning of German Presidency expressed before the European Parliament that he deemed necessary a fundamental revision of the European integration process, develops in this speech his vision of a federal constitution for Europe. Until recently, most draft constitutions like the Spinelli initiative of the European Parliament in 1994 or the Herman Report in 1994 were discussed on a theoretical level without a hope for realization. Now there is a wave of speeches and contribution of key politicians on this subject. In fact, there are reasons to assume that there is more to it that just the typical German focus on constitutionalism4but that “a window of opportunity is opening”5: the need for legal and institutional reform becomes evident in view of the incipient eastern enlargement and the results of the Amsterdam Conference and its postponing strategy have satisfied only few. Moreover, the fact that ECSC expires in 2002 gives further monumentum to the discussion about where Europe should be heading in the years to come and how the problems of a deeper and enlarged Union can be overcome. In the following, it will be shown that a European Constitution does not offer a solution to these problems. Constitutions usually form the legal basis of states. Therefore, it is necessary to clarify first to what extent the EU is comparable to statal structures and then proceed to the question whether the founding treaties can be regarded as the constitution of the EU. The first part of the analysis is therefore centered around the question whether the EU does already have a constitution with its founding treaties and hence does not need one. It will be shown that this is not the case. Consequently, the second part will deal with the question whether Europe can and should give itself a constitution, i.e. if one can expect the EU to develop the currently missing attributes to qualify for a constitution in the full sense and if such a development would be a desirable one.
1see Schneider, Heinrich: Gesamteuropäische Herausforderungen an eine Europäische Union, in: Wildenmann, Rudolf (Hrsg.): Staatswerdung Europas? Optionen für eine Europäische Union, Baden-Baden Nomos, 1991 (Studien zur gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung, Bd. 9), pp. 125.
2see Weidenfeld, Werner: Die Reformbilanz der Europäischen Gemeinschaft: 'Bundesrepublik Europa' als Perspektive? in: Weidenfeld, Werner/Wessels, Wolfgang (Hrsg.): Wege zur Europäischen Union. Vom Vertrag zur Verfassung? Bonn Europa Union, 1986, pp. 28, and Hertel, Wolfram: Supranationalität als Verfassungsprinzip. Normativität und Legitimation als Elemente des Europäischen Verfassungsrechts, Berlin Duncker und Humblot, 1999 (Tübinger Schriften zum internationalen und europäischen Recht, Bd. 47), Diss. Univ. Tübingen 1998, pp. 21.
3Fischer, Joschka: Vom Staatenbund zur Föderation - Gedanken über die Finalität der europäischen Integration. Rede am 12. Mai 2000 in der Humboldt-Universität in Berlin, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/4_europa/index.htm.
4Kohler-Koch, Beate: A Constitution for Europe?, Mannheim, 1999 (Arbeitspapiere - Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung, Bd. 8), pp. 2.
5ibid. pp. 3.
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II. Does the EU have a constitution? Seite 2
II. Does the EU have a constitution?
As Dieter Grimm has pointed out6, the debate about whether Europe (or more precisely: the EU) needs a constitution to some extent resembles a fight against windmills: The European Court of Justice as well as the German Bundesverfassungsgericht have repeatedly referred to the treaties which are the foundation of the European Communities as its 'Constitutional Charter'7. On the other hand, the current legal basis of the Community is seen as being insufficient and the urgent need for a European constitution is claimed. In a first step, a clarification seems therefore necessary if the current legal system of the EU can be characterized as a constitution or not. If the first turns out to be true, the discussion will have to focus the problem on how to amend and improve the current constitution. If, however, the second should be the case, it will be necessary to discuss if the EU can and should have a constitution.
Before we can decide upon the constitutional character of the European treaties, a closer look at the specifics of a constitution seem necessary. What are the distinctive marks of a constitution and what are the differences vis-a-vis other forms of written law? First, it should be noted that there are two different meanings of the term 'constitution' - one is purely descriptive the other is normative.8In the descriptive sense, every community has a constitution9, be it a gang of criminals or a totalitarian regime. In this sense, the Community obviously already has a constitution. Therefore, when discussing thecreationof a constitution, only the normative meaning of the term can be of interest. In the normative sense, the term constitution refers to the basic legal order for the polity that has been developed at the end of the 18thcentury as a result of the revolutions in France and America.10These revolutions did not only aim at changing the ruler or the form of government but to change the basis for rule11. The novelty of the normative concept of a constitution was legitimization as a requirement for public authority12since rule was no longer accepted as a god-given fact13. The normative concept of a constitution did not aim at modifying rule but to constitute it14. The underlying idea - derived from natural-law theory -
6cf. Grimm, Dieter: Braucht Europa eine Verfassung? München Carl Friedrich von Siemens Stiftung, 1995 (Themen, Bd. 60), pp. 11.
7see Schwarze, Jürgen: Auf dem Wege zu einer europäischen Verfassung -Wechselwirkungen zwischen europäischem und nationalem Verfassungsrecht, Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt, Jg. 114 (1999) Heft 24, pp. 1681 and Weiler, Joseph H. H.: The Constitution of Europe. „Do the new clothes have an emperor?“ and other essays on European integration, Cambridge and New York Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 12. Ipsen explicitly uses the term constitution for the founding treaties, cf. Ipsen, Hans-Peter: Zum Parlaments-Entwurf einer Europäischen Union, in: Der Staat, Jg. 24 (1985), Heft 3, pp. 326.
8on this distinction see Hertel, Wolfram: Supranationalität als Verfassungsprinzip. Normativität und Legitimation als Elemente des Europäischen Verfassungsrechts, Berlin Duncker und Humblot, 1999 (Tübinger Schriften zum internationalen und europäischen Recht, Bd. 47), pp. 29 and Grimm, Dieter: Braucht Europa eine Verfassung? München Carl Friedrich von Siemens Stiftung, 1995 (Themen, Bd. 60), pp. 16.
9cf. Hertel, Wolfram: Supranationalität als Verfassungsprinzip. Normativität und Legitimation als Elemente des Europäischen Verfassungsrechts, Berlin Duncker und Humblot, 1999, pp. 29, 43.
