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- Herausgeber: GRIN Verlag
- Sprache: Englisch
Essay from the year 2013 in the subject Politics - General and Theories of International Politics, grade: 73/100, University of Leicester, language: English, abstract: Nuclear weapons undeniably constituted a powerful deterrent against the renewed outbreak of major international conflict in the past seven decades, yet it would be wrong to infer from that reality that they might consequently always serve as an unfailing source of peace, stability and mutual security. Supposing them capable of doing so by mere virtue of their destructive potential and/or presumed stabilizing powers is essentially to discount that whatever agency they may have for underwriting peace and stability ultimately does not issue from their physical presence alone, but rather from the distinct set of international arrangements and conditions under which they actually exist. Any major change in the basic fabric of that order likely stands to not only sharply decrease their capacity at deterrence, but may likewise turn them into a dangerous mechanism for undermining the very 'nuclear peace' which some neo-realists erroneously credit these armaments capable of maintaining irrespective of the historical circumstances surrounding them.
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Nuclear weapons undeniably constituted a powerful deterrent against the renewed outbreak of major international conflict in the past seven decades, yet it would be wrong to infer from that reality that they might consequently always serve as an unfailing source of peace, stability and mutual security. Supposing them capable of doing so by mere virtue of their destructive potential and/or presumed stabilizing powers[1] is essentially to discount that whatever agency they may have for underwriting peace and stability ultimately does not issue from their physical presence alone, but rather from the distinct set of international arrangements and conditions under which they actually exist. Any major change in the basic fabric of that order likely stands to not only sharply decrease their capacity at deterrence, but may likewise turn them into a dangerous mechanism for undermining the very 'nuclear peace' which some neo-realists erroneously credit these armaments capable of maintaining irrespective of the historical circumstances surrounding them.[2]
More specifically, their assertions that nuclear weapons help stabilize state interactions can effectively only hold true when presupposing a variety of indispensable preconditions which, importantly, however, must not be mistaken for integral and continuously valid attributes of interstate relations. In so analyzing the merits and demerits of a nuclear world, significant aspects requiring critical consideration will primarily concern the assumed rationality of political actors; the necessity of distinguishing between weapons of deterrence and weapons of compellence; as well as the pursuit of national objectives in alternate strategic settings as opposed to the supposedly immutable nature of the international system.
By furthermore assessing current approaches to nuclear warfare and proliferation while also revisiting relevant cases of potential nuclear arms employment in the past, the essay will seek to demonstrate that atomic weapons can essentially only keep the peace when being handled by rational decision-makers for exclusively defensive/deterring purposes in a conducive strategic environment. As these vital conditions are, however, not perforce endemic to international relations, nuclear arms can accordingly only under very specific circumstances, and thus by no means as a general rule, help to preserve international peace and stability.
Irrational Behaviour
The only conceivable way how nuclear weapons might strengthen international peace and security is by presupposing that judicious reasoning will generally form a reliable attribute of international relations.[3] However, such a presumption of strictly rational and responsible decision-makers is ultimately untenable in real-life international politics.[4] In particular, one should not take for granted that cautious judgment will by default inform the actions and behaviour of individual state actors.[5] A multitude of disparate, yet frequently interrelated factors might after all realistically cloud their thinking, most often as a result of such inimical influences as, among others, flawed and sketchy intelligence; misconceptions about the nature and intentions of a perceived adversary; institutional pressures; and, in particular, disproportional assessment of imminent threat risk.[6]
