Asia: Changing the World E-Book

• Herausgeber: Bertelsmann Stiftung
• Kategorie: Bildung
• Sprache: Englisch
• Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2010

Seitenzahl: 317

Beschreibung

Asia continues to assert ist status as a major force in the global economy, as well as a formative influence on several key political, cultural and religious issues now affecting our daily lives. This collection of articles responds to the challenges posed by Asia's emergence and gives a lucid and thorough account of the most important developments in the world's largest continent and their consequences for Europe. The following prominent authors have contributed their unique perspectives to this volume: José Manuel Barroso, Michael von Brück, Delfín Colomé, Aurel Croissant, John Elkington, Carl Haub, Paul Kennedy, HansGeorg Knopp, Eduard Kögel, Pascal Lamy, Kazuo Ogoura, Demetrios G. Papademetriou, Amartya Sen, Horst Siebert, Karan Singh, Jodie Thorpe and Werner Weidenfeld.

Leseprobe

© 2010 E-Book-Ausgabe (EPUB)

© 2010 Book edition (EPUB) © 2007 Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung, Gütersloh

All rights reserved

Editor: Malte Boecker on behalf of Bertelsmann Stiftung

Responsible: Matthias Jäger

Translation: Tim Schroder, Frankfurt; Patricia Stokes, Athens

Copy editing: Barbara Serfozo, Berlin

Production editor: Sabine Reimann

Map: Peter Palm, Berlin

Design and typesetting: Groothuis, Lohfert, Consorten | glcons.de

ISBN : 978-3-86793-250-9

www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/verlag

Foreword

The Chinese have a proverb, “Tong chuang yi meng,” which translates roughly as “Two people might share the same life, but they will still have different dreams.” Applied to Asia and Europe, this can be understood as meaning that although Asians and Europeans live on the same planet, they undoubtedly have different ideas concerning their future prospects and their role in the world. According to a survey conducted by the Pew Global Attitudes Project in 2005, more than 75 percent of Chinese and Indians regarded their living situation and future development with optimism. By contrast, in nearly every European country, a majority of people saw their future pessimistically.

The end of colonial rule in Asia, explosive economic growth (especially the unleashing of mass markets in China after 1978 and in India after 1991), and the disintegration of the basic bipolar alignment of international relations following the end of the Cold War have all bolstered the confidence and self-assurance of many Asian countries. Asia is breaking into the global market with billions of new workers and a historically unprecedented potential in terms of producers and consumers. In addition, it is increasingly articulating its right to influence globalization processes and to have a voice in global politics. Moreover, it is challenging the eurocentric attitudes that have determined our worldview for centuries. Asia is asserting that it has every right to continued autonomous development, exercise of cultural influence, and sovereign foreign policy decisions.

The full implications of these challenges are hard to grasp for the simple reason that Asia is not a homogenous continent. It is a continent of extremes, contradictions and diversity. The highest point on the earth-Mount Everest, at 8848 meters-and its lowest point-the Mariana Trench, at 11,000 meters below sea level- are both located in Asia. More than half the world’s population lives on the earth’s largest continent. It is home to an unparalleled ethnic and cultural diversity. All of the faiths referred to as world religions originated in Asia (if one includes its Middle Eastern portion), as did many advanced cultures and civilizations.

If this volume nonetheless attempts to look at Asia as a whole, this is due to the increasing economic integration of Asian states and a burgeoning sense of an “Asian” identity, as well as the momentum being generated by forces in Asia that are both highly contradictory and mutually reinforcing.

With all its facets and dichotomies, Asia lends itself as the ideal screen for Europe’s projection of its own yearnings, hopes and fears. And at least with regard to the varied publications on Asia in recent years, it seems to depend mostly on the individual observer whether Asia is addressed as a continent of the future, brimming with infinite possibilities as the motor of global growth, or whether Asia is considered a global rival and ticking time bomb capable of plunging the world into the abyss. However, alongside this ambivalence, it is the lack of serious effort in getting to know the region’s inhabitants that continues to shape our relationship with Asia.

During a discussion at the Trilogue Salzburg, the famous Chinese television producer and entrepreneur Yue-Sai Kan pointed out the great effort many Asians invest in Western culture and Western languages, and she rightly criticized us Europeans for demonstrating too little curiosity about the other side of the Euro-Asian continent. This may sound paradoxical in light of the massive flows of investment and trade from Europe to China, India and other Asian countries, but economic relations do not automatically lead to a better understanding of one’s partner. On the contrary, Asia’s rapid ascendancy has given rise to growing alarm in the Western world. Fear is spreading in both Europe and the United States, fear of aggressive competition, fear of dwindling resources, fear of losing power and influence-and one’s own job.

But fear is a poor counselor. What’s needed instead is a realistic look at the opportunities and risks coming from this largest of all continents, which indisputably ranks among the world’s most dynamic and vibrant regions today, and whose basic economic and demographic conditions translate directly into growing political relevance.

Such an unbiased, balanced and deepened understanding of Asia and of the West’s options for action has been the aim of numerous discussions and panels of experts organized by the Bertelsmann Stiftung in Japan, China, and India. At the Trilogue Salzburg 2006 on the topic “Asia’s New Powers-Repercussions for Europe” the participating decision-makers from the political, economic and cultural spheres recommended above all that Europeans’ predominantly economic view of Asia be supplemented by political and cultural perspectives.

The present volume, published by the Bertelsmann Stiftung on the occasion of the Asia-Pacific Weeks 2007, is the first fruit of this demand for a holistic look at Asia. Many renowned authors have contributed their individual perspectives toward developing this comprehensive picture. Their main focus is Asia’s economic, demographic and political potential. This is supplemented with analyses of Asia’s internal challenges and its influence on international organizations, and the formation of values and culture.

At the end of the book, the question remains of how Europe should respond to these changes. Obviously, one part of the answer lies in recognizing the new, multipolar world order. Furthermore, Asia is forcing us to continuously reform our own economy and society, to further build upon our core competencies and innovative strength, and to cleverly exploit niches in order to remain competitive. In addition, we must face the fact that many areas of policy-especially the fields of trade, environmental, energy, democracy and human rights policy-hold the potential for tension and conflict. This requires that Europe work all the more on its capacity for political action so that it can better bundle its interests and represent them more effectively.

Asserting oneself in a multipolar world in a way that is more strongly based on one’s own interests does not necessarily mean entering into rivalry with existing or rising power-blocs. Numerous partnerships present themselves, particularly with Europe’s strategic partners China, India and Japan, but obviously with the democracies in South Korea and Indonesia, to name a few, as well. The more extensive and intensive this reciprocal interdependence becomes, the more the risk of conflict will diminish. A basic knowledge of Asia’s history, culture and present is the prerequisite for an honest attempt to better understand Asia. For Europe, intercultural dialogue, cooperation and finding ways for a peaceful coexistence with Asia in the 21st century will be the key to coping with all of its geostrategic and global challenges.

We hope that the articles in this volume will inspire further engagement with Asia-including a view that looks beyond European concerns-and above all, that they reveal the unparalleled opportunities and possibilities that emerge through Asia changing the world.

Liz MohnWolfgang Schüssel

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Titel

Impressum

Vorwort

Einleitung

I - ASIA’S POTENTIAL AS A WORLD POWER

Demographic Dynamics of Asia

The role of fertility

The sex ratio

Population size

Demographic transition and dependency

Focus: India

Focus: China

Notes

Asia’s Economic and Technological Outlook

Powerful dynamics

Factors limiting growth

Asia’s innovation potential

Economic integration as a stimulating factor

Conclusion

Notes

Asia, Europe and the Global Power Balances

Asia’s economic ascendency

Gains in military power

Asia’s influence in international organizations

Geopolitical Consequences

Conclusion

II - ASIA’S CHALLENGES

Inner-Asian Fragilities

Conflicts in Asia at the beginning of the 21 century

Conflict potential and sensitive areas

Outlook

Notes

Asian Mobility and Europe: Managing and Benefiting From a Near Inevitability

The dawn of the age of mobility

Asia’s share of international migration

The promise and limits of migration as a “neighborhood affair”

The Asian migration juggernaut and Europe

What will the future bring?

Conclusion

Is It Possible to Sustain Asia?

China: Environment degradation and social tensions

India: Resource scarcity and poverty

Conclusion

Notes

III - ASIA’S SOFT POWER

Perspectives on the Economic and Human Development of India and China*

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

Notes

Asian Civilization and Culture in a Globalized World

The Cultural Diplomacy of East Asian Nations

1.

2.

3.

4.

Where Is Chinatown?

The example of Hungary

The example of Italy

And Germany?

Notes

The Future of Classical Music Depends on Asia

Asia and Europe: Competition or Spiritual Synthesis?

The historical perspective

Today

Outlook

Works consulted

IV - ANSWERS TO ASIA

Cultural Foreign Policy: Opportunities for Asia and Europe

1.

2.

3.

4.

An Open, Innovative Europe for a Global World

Globalization’s challenges

The challenges for Europe

The challenge for European policy: Facilitating change

1. Providing the framework conditions on which Europe can improve its ...

2. Facilitating transition and adjustment to shocks

Europe’s policy agenda: The renewed Lisbon Strategy

Are we on the right track?

Employment performance

Productivity performance

Innovative performance

The way ahead

An Equal Partnership in the 21 Century: Europe’s Answer to Asia’s Challenges

A reality check

Europe’s responses to Asia’s challenges

Conclusion

Requirements for a European Asia Strategy

Economic and political interdependencies

The diversity of bilateral relations

Requirements for a European Asia strategy

Notes

V - APPENDIX

Introduction

Within the area delineated by Pakistan in the west, Japan in the east, China in the north and Indonesia in the south, Asia’s economic development in the past two decades has been unparalleled in its extent and impact. Asia’s players are now an accepted-and self-confident-part of the globalized world. Yet developments in Asia are also subject to the unforeseeable. It remains an open question, for example, whether the region’s current dynamism and the resulting increase in power will continue apace. How its impressive growth will affect its social systems and environment is also not entirely clear. Any number of inter-state conflicts might impinge upon the “Asian Century.” Neither the West’s unmitigated decline nor an Asian crisis of global proportions is desirable from a European perspective. Yet is either scenario in fact realistic?

This collection of essays attempts to provide a comprehensive look at the developments currently unfolding in Asia. It is meant to present a balanced view of the region and highlight the options that Europe has at its disposal for responding to the challenges it faces. China, India and Japan are, of course, central to the observations made here, although other players-above all in East, Southeast and South Asia-are also given their due. The authors examine the diverse economic, sociopolitical and cultural forces emanating from Asia’s new global powers. Each essay is predicated, moreover, on the question of what all of this means for Europe.

The first part of the book examines the factors that are immediately and increasingly influencing the economic and political spheres.

For demographics expert Carl Haub, the key to Asia’s significance can be found in its share of the global population and its changing age-related structures. To Haub, 4 billion people, some 60 percent of the earth’s inhabitants, represent Asia’s inexhaustible potential, both as a market and as a producer of goods and services. Despite national variations, the gainfully employed or “working ages” will continue to make up an ever-growing share of Asia’s population, while this same demographic declines in Europe-a state of affairs that Haub identifies as one of Asia’s key advantages vis-à-vis the West.

In his essay, Horst Siebert, longtime president of the highly regarded Kiel Institute for the World Economy, explains how Asia has increasingly become the globe’s economic lynchpin. In his view, Asia’s growth rates will continue to exceed the global average. At the same time, however, related environmental and social costs will have to be accounted for in Asia, as elsewhere, thereby slowing the region’s growth. Yet the increased levels of innovation, economic integration and technological leadership that can be found in Asia’s major players will continue to stimulate regional development.

In the face of rising defense budgets and expanding arms capabilities, historian Paul Kennedy deems the rise of Asia’s new- although, in fact, ancient-powers, above all China and India, the epoch-making change in global politics. In geostrategic terms, none of the world’s regions will remain unaffected by the changes currently impacting the global division of power. Consequently, Europe will suffer a relative decline in importance, especially in terms of its influence within international organizations. For Kennedy, it is also clear that Asia will become a venue for classic power politics, the kind Europe has not experienced since the middle of the 20th century.

Against this background, the book’s second section analyzes some of the sociopolitical challenges that could potentially undermine Asia’s ongoing economic and political development.

Political scientist and conflict researcher Aurel Croissant demonstrates in his essay that, unlike almost any other global region, Asia is home to considerable social tensions, which often devolve into violence. Above all, the continent’s ethnic, linguistic and religious fragmentation brings with it the potential for inner-regional fragility and for a transnationalization of conflict. Other conflict drivers include unstable political regimes, scarce resources, absolute and relative poverty, health issues and environmental overexploitation.

The essay jointly authored by Jodie Thorpe and John Elkington-a pioneer in the area of corporate social responsibility- focuses on resource deficiencies and poverty in India, as well as social tensions and environmental pollution in China. For Thorpe and Elk ington, the enormous consumption of energy, the increasing degradation of water supplies and the environment, and the mounting threats to biodiversity and social cohesion that are currently being witnessed in Asia must be addressed by actors on both sides of the Asian-European partnership. In the authors’ view, Asia’s nations will not be able to respond on their own to sustainability issues arising from global growth and thus must collaborate with others in order to find workable solutions.

Demetrios Papademetriou, president of the Migration Policy Institute, foresees a similar interdependence based on an exponential increase in Asian migration. Migration flows primarily take place in a westward direction. The cause is less economic, demographic or ecological pressures in Asia than it is the growing need for workers in the West, those with both low- and high-level skills, as well as an increasingly selective immigration policy on the part of the European Union. Papademetriou purposefully does not assess to what extent the growing number of migrants might lead to an Asian “brain drain.” He feels it to be more probable instead that Europe’s best and brightest will head to Asia, where they are likely to find the world’s most favorable working conditions.

The third section looks at the cultural dimension of the globalization process. Asia is also changing the world in terms of its values and artistic endeavors, not to mention in the realms of spirituality and religion. Given the continent’s heterogeneity and its various historical experiences, it is not possible to speak of one single Asian culture. As a result, Asia’s cultural impact is hard to measure. The essays do, however, provide examples of those instances where various cultural influences meet.

Economist, philosopher and Nobel Prize laureate Amartya Sen begins with a brief history of the concepts that have influenced Chinese-Indian relations. By examining the spread of Buddhism, developments in astronomy and mathematics, historical trends in health care and traditions of public discourse, Sen makes clear the extent to which China and India have taken turns spurring economic growth and social change around the world. For Sen, these civilizing influences are not only the key to understanding the history of one-third of humanity, but also, in an extended sense, to comprehending the productive potential of “cultural globalization.”

Karan Singh, Indian politician, visionary and president of the Indian Council for Cultural Relations, concurs with Sen that inner-Asian cultural relations are not at all accorded the attention they deserve. For Singh, they are the cultural and social roots of a budding Asian identity that must still prove itself in the context of globalization. This identity, in his opinion, comprises a plurality of religious and philosophic identities while embracing a multipolar world order at once accompanied by growing Asian integration. To that end, Singh draws a direct comparison to the European Union and calls for intensification of European-Asian cultural exchange.

In his essay, Japanese diplomat and Japan Foundation president Kazuo Ogoura examines current tendencies in East Asian cultural diplomacy. Using Japan, China and South Korea as examples, he confirms that a growing cultural exchange is taking place, interpreting it from a Japanese perspective as proof of the increasing integration of these nations into the globalization process. At the same time, he remains skeptical that East Asia can point to any increased “soft power” as a result of its heightened cultural diplomacy. For Ogoura, this term, coined by Joseph S. Nye, cannot be applied to governmental actions, but solely to civil society and its activities-and is thus challenged in the East Asian region, where autonomous engagement on the part of civil society is often limited.

As urban planner Eduard Kögel details in his essay on East Asian immigrant communities in Hungary and Italy, changes in Europe’s metropolitan landscapes must be counted among the cultural repercussions resulting from growing flows of migrants from Asia. A clearly delineated infrastructure is being replaced by decentralized, informal and flexible networks uniting demographic segments of common ethnic heritage, whose interaction with European society remains limited to commercial relations. As Papademetriou does before him, Kögel poses the increasingly pressing question of how Europe can integrate its Asian immigrants.

Spanish composer, conductor and diplomat Delfín Colomé shows that classical music, a cultural realm traditionally reserved for the West, no longer influences Asia unilaterally. Instead, the world of classical music is being shaped to an increasing degree by determined, talented and superbly educated Asian artists. Colomé gladly welcomes the two-sided interplay, as this form of cultural globalization is proving an unsuspected source of innovation for the world of music, itself a universal communications medium.

The essay by religion specialist Michael von Brück is based on his many years’ expertise in the areas of oriental philosophy and religion. In a review that extends back to Greek antiquity, von Brück shows that East Asia has fascinated Europeans since their earliest days. Currently, ayurveda, yoga and Zen Buddhism are the holistic, spiritual experiences that exert the greatest appeal for the highly specialized, culturally jaded West.

As the 21st century dawns, Asia is indeed changing the world, and we in Europe must decide if we are to make appropriate use of the attendant opportunities. Our interconnected world offers a host of possibilities for working together-and benefiting together. This volume’s concluding section thus looks at Europe’s potential strategies for responding to Asia’s transformation-culturally, economically and politically.

Hans-Georg Knopp, secretary general of the Goethe Institute, calls for a cultural dialogue with Asia that is fundamentally different from the political dialogue taking place with Islam. At the same time, despite the diminishing impact of Western values, this cultural dialogue should not derive from a defensive, fear-ridden posture. Instead, it must foster an openness among Europe’s artists and intellectuals vis-à-vis Asia, while also promoting their willingness to experiment and work together with their Asian counterparts as a means of discovering new forms of aesthetic expression. Such processes necessarily give rise to authentic intercultural exchange and a global perspective, which can then serve as a source of stability for the economic and political spheres as well.

For José Manuel Barroso, president of the European Commission, in terms of its economic endeavors, Europe must keep its sights set on the Lisbon Strategy, the initiative designed to transform the European Union into the world’s most dynamic, competitive economy. The key here lies in fostering a knowledge-based, innovation-friendly society through increased investment in education and research, a more robust focus on intellectual property rights and expanded technology transfers. Such efforts are critical, since only an emphasis on innovation will ensure that Europe’s social and ecological achievements continue to benefit future generations and will allow it to expand into new, forward-looking market segments.

According to Pascal Lamy, secretary general of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the economic challenges stemming from Asia’s rise call for fundamental reform on the part of the European Union and United States. Domestically, both must take action to increase their global competitiveness. In dealing with the world abroad, they and others must work to combat protectionist tendencies, strengthen the multilateral trading system and ensure that Europe’s markets remain open so that others can benefit from the opportunities to be had there. First and foremost for Lamy, Europe must take the initiative in helping Asia assume the decision-making and leadership roles within international organizations that are commensurate with its growing importance.

In the view of political scientist and on European issues specialist Werner Weidenfeld, the geopolitical developments taking place in Asia, especially the transformation of China and India into new global powers, demand that the European Union, working together with its international partners, develop and implement a coherent, strategic and active Asia policy. He feels that such a policy’s cohesiveness, in particular, poses problems, since Europe tends to set its foreign-policy goals according to the partner it is currently engaged with, and since the EU’s member states tend to pay more attention to their individual economic concerns than to taking advantage of their combined global competitiveness. In addition, he writes, Europe lacks a strategic dialogue with the United States on issues relating to Asia, as it does the capability for assuming its global political and-where necessary-military responsibilities. According to Weidenfeld, the current security-policy challenges are well known; the EU’s strategic responses, however, require further thought.

What remains is the realization as expressed both in the title of this book and the 2007 Asia-Pacific Weeks: Asia is changing the world. Only if the European Union, its member states and its individual citizens respond by stepping up to the attendant challenges and, in so doing, transcend their eurocentric viewpoint will they be able to contribute proactively to the Asian development instead of merely reacting after the fact to the numerous changes it will inevitably bring.

Malte C. Boecker

I

ASIA’S POTENTIAL AS A WORLD POWER

Demographic Dynamics of Asia

CARL HAUB

“Demography is destiny.” So stated the 19th-century French sociologist Auguste Comte. If that is so, Asia must certainly hold the key to the world’s economic future. In terms of the size of its population and growth, no other region looms as large. As a region, Asia is home to the world’s largest numbers of consumers and producers. It enjoys, and will continue to enjoy, a favorable ratio of workers to retirees and dependent children. Yet no single adjective can describe any one Asian country, as it is a collection of some of the most diverse nations on earth.

Asia has been the world’s largest region in terms of population throughout history and is virtually certain to remain so far into the future. Asia is home to 4 billion people - 6 out of 10 of the world’s inhabitants - and that figure is expected to rise to at least 5.3 billion by mid-century, 1.3 times what it is today. That increase is not as dramatic when compared to Africa’s, which is expected to more than double, rising from 0.9 billion inhabitants today to 2.0 billion by mid-century.1 But its slower population increase is, in fact, a key element in Asia’s rise to political and economic influence on the global stage.

The world population “explosion” of the 20th century - and it truly was an explosion-was triggered by a rapid improvement in health conditions in developing countries that was not accompanied by a decrease in birth rates.2 Simply put, death rates, particularly infant mortality rates, dropped far more quickly in developing countries following World War II than they ever had in developed countries due to the rapid importation of improved public health measures into the poorer nations. Population growth rates in developing countries rose to levels never before seen, even above 3 percent per year. Such rates will double a population in only 23 years. Never before in history had the world experienced this situation. If their governments did not comprehend the implication of such a growth rate, countries that were already living in poverty would almost certainly be doomed to remain in that state. In the second half of the 20th century, however, Asian countries did recognize the new dilemma and did react, while Africa largely did not.

It has been observed that, historically, countries tend to progress from a period of high birth and death rates to low ones as they become more urban, educated and industrial. Demographers refer to this process as “demographic transition.” Asia entered its transition decades ago, a key reason for its emergence as a global force today. In addition to lower population growth, an important result of demographic transition is an altered age structure, often expressed as the percentage of the population to be found in one of three categories: below the age of 15, between 15 and 64 (the “working ages”), and above 65.

Countries with high birth rates, such as an average of six or more children, are considered quite young, with 45 percent or more of their population below age 15. Under those circumstances, it can be difficult for a country to develop economically, as a constantly rising population places great pressure upon often meager national budgets. It can also indicate a country’s lack of concern over the ill effects of persistently rapid population growth.

The role of fertility

The key to Asia’s present and future demographic development lies in the total fertility rate, or TFR. The TFR is the average number of children a woman would have in her lifetime if the country’s overall birth rate were to remain constant. For example, there are about 27 million births per year in India, which equals a birth rate of 24 births per 1,000 inhabitants. At that rate, women in India would average about three births each in their lifetime, or a TFR of three. The TFR has the advantage of expressing fertility in terms of the number of children, or “family size.” 3

Related to the TFR is the concept of replacement level fertility. This occurs when couples average about two children, simply replacing themselves and not increasing the size of successive generations. If maintained for a long period, a TFR of about two will result in a population with zero growth. Some Asian countries are currently above replacement level, some quite close to it and some well below it. Europe is familiar with the last case, since its very low fertility rates have led to growing concerns about aging and declining populations.

Asia is different from the other large developing world regions, Africa and Latin America, in that the TFR in Asia shows the greatest range of variation, from 1.1 in South Korea and Taiwan to 6.8 in Afghanistan. Some of Asia’s most economically successful countries have very low TFRs. In addition to South Korea and Taiwan, the TFR in Singapore is 1.2; in Japan, it is 1.3; in China, 1.6; in Thailand, 1.7; and in Sri Lanka, 2.0. Countries with low or medium-level TFRs include Vietnam (2.1), Indonesia (2.4), Malaysia (2.6), India (2.9) and Bangladesh (3.0). TFRs are higher in the Philippines (3.4), Nepal (3.7) and Pakistan (4.6).4

As can be observed from the TFRs noted above, a country’s status as an emerging world economic power is not necessarily tied to the current level of its birth rate, no matter how important that may be to its future demographic experience. Countries with very low TFRs but with considerable economic influence-such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan-now face serious societal aging. That implies a waning domestic market, a labor force whose seniority requires higher wage rates and a declining ratio of workers to retirees. These countries might therefore be termed the “aging Asian tigers.” In Vietnam, low birth rates have been dictated from above, yet the country is, at present, poorly prepared to realize its genuine economic potential due to low levels of education and the lack of a qualified workforce. Bangladesh, which has achieved a remarkable decline in its TFR despite an agrarian, poverty-stricken population and few natural resources, is many decades from being considered a global economic player. The TFR, then, while not itself a predictor of a country’s economic influence, should be watched closely, since it can help predict the future proportion of a country’s population in the productive working ages, a factor now popularly called the “demographic dividend.”

The sex ratio

Another issue that has grown in importance and must be mentioned is the abnormal sex ratio at birth in several major Asian countries. In countries where there is a strong preference for male births, couples may resort to the abortion of females following an ultrasound test, skewing the normal worldwide ratio of 105 male babies born per 100 females. The situation has grown quite serious in China,5 where there are now 119 male babies born for every 100 females, and in India,6 where the ratio is 114. In both China 7 and India8 the situation appears to be getting worse. In South Korea, the sex ratio at birth is 108, although the situation may be slowly improving.9 All three countries are making considerable efforts to stop the practice of aborting female fetuses, yet considerable damage to the normal gender structure has been done. Such unprecedented sex ratios are certain to result in some social disruption, such as a lack of brides. This may result in the importation of women from other countries or a partial exodus of males.

Population size

Although it clearly suggests a country’s potential as both a market and a producer, population size is not the only indicator of a country’s influence. Of Asia’s 3.9 billion people, just over 60 percent live in two countries, China and India, with 1.3 and 1.1 billion residents, respectively. Indonesia, with a population of 226 million, is the world’s fourth largest, ranking after the United States. Other large nations include Pakistan (166 million), Bangladesh (147 million), the Philippines (86 million), Vietnam (84 million), Thailand (65 million), Myanmar (51 million) and South Korea (49 million).10 Future economic and political development, however, is contingent upon many other factors, such as a country’s social conditions, political history, cultural and religious situation, and its regulations regarding foreign investment. Yet Asia’s sheer size alone will make it a player.

One rather stunning indicator of Asia’s population size is the simple fact that, at 62 million, just one age-sex group in India-males below the age of 5-is larger than the entire population of France.11 Even if the proportion of people in India who live a more Western-style consumer lifestyle is relatively small, the potential size of such a market is quite large.

Demographic transition and dependency

The demographic key to Asia’s economic emergence is its changing age structure. As fertility falls and the proportion of a population’s youth declines, those in the working ages make up an increasingly larger share of the total. In Asia, 40 percent of the population was below the age of 15 in 1970. In 2007, that had fallen to 27 percent and will almost certainly continue to drop, to about 24 percent in 2020. From 1970 to 2007, the percentage of the population aged 65 and over grew only modestly, from 4.1 to 6.6 percent.12 Thus, the “nonworking” age groups fell quite dramatically.

Analysis of such changes is often conducted in terms of measures such as dependency ratios, or the ratio of non-workers to workers and, perhaps more intuitively, workers to non-workers. The classic non-worker age groups are ages 0-14 and 65 and over, although few societies fit quite so neatly into those categories. In developed countries, for example, far fewer people aged 15-19 are in the labor force, and many retire before age 65. Such will undoubtedly be the case in developing countries as educational levels increase and pension systems mature. Still, these classic “dependent” age groups will be used here for discussion.

In Asia, the number of people of working age per 100 persons in the dependent ages rose from 126 in 1970 to 193 in 2007. That ratio is expected to increase to 207 by 2020. On the surface, Europe’s figures for the same three years compare favorably: 179, 217 and 194. It is when we look below the surface that the real significance emerges. In Europe, the age pyramid has been turning upside down for some time. The number of people in Europe in 2005 who were aged 40-44 was about 56 million; those aged 0-4 were but 37 million. In Asia, those same age groups were 259 and 357 million, respectively.13 It is this stark difference that defines Asia’s demographic dividend and the youthfulness of its labor force and market. Even with declining birth rates, Asia will maintain a population pyramid with a base that is at least as wide as the age groups above it. Thus, Asia will stay young.

In other words, Asia is aging, but only slowly. In 2005, the median age of Asia’s population was 27.7 years, and that is projected to rise to just 32.2 by 2020. Europe’s median age in 2005 was 39.0 and that is expected to increase to 43.1 in 2020. In Europe, moreover, the group aged 65 and over is likely to rise from 16.0 percent to 19.1 percent over the same time period.14

As a region, Asia stands at a remarkable point in its history. Only a few decades ago, Asian societies were largely agricultural and what might be called “too young,” burdened with the impossible task of delivering education to ever-growing numbers of young people while providing housing, food and health care to the general population. As population growth has slowed, these tasks have not only become more manageable, but it has been possible to increase the quality of services delivered. From a demographic standpoint, Asia has reached this stage, although some countries have arrived at it before others.

Focus: India

While Asian countries will become world economic contenders, as some already have, this will not happen automatically. India, the country most often mentioned in recent times as a rising power, must still contend with an undernourished, poorly educated society based mostly in villages, while upper middle class consumers remain an elite subgroup, largely confined to metropolitan areas. Its birth rate has come down, but not equally in all areas. Birth rate decline has been quite stubborn in many large, poorly educated northern states. Still, India has both the energy and imaginative leadership to involve a larger share of the population in its growing economy. The potential demographic dividend, moreover, is significant.

In 1970, India’s worker-to-non-worker ratio was but 127. By 2007, the country’s declining birth rate raised it to 173. In addition, if the birth rate continues its decrease, the ratio will rise to 200 or more. But the overall worker-to-nonworker ratio conceals the fact the India’s working age population will itself be a young one, as shown by the country’s median age. That is expected to rise from a young 24 years at present to only 29 by 2020. Part of the reason India will stay young is its higher birth rate in the past and the fact that the proportion in the older ages, 65 and over, will likely rise from about 5.5 percent today to just 7 percent in 2020.15

Focus: China

China, as is well known, has had a much lower birth rate than India due to its stringent national population policy. Today, the TFR in China is a low 1.6. That would lead one to suspect that China is likely to confront an aging situation similar to what can be seen in European countries. While that may well prove true in the more distant future, China’s present and nearer-term prospects point to its own demographic dividend, also due to a more recent history of higher fertility. In 1970, when the country’s TFR was about 5.5 children per woman, the ratio of workers to non-workers was 152. Following the dramatic drop in fertility, that stands at about 250 today. It is still projected to be quite high in 2020, at about 230.16 With that, however, it will have an older working-age population than will India. China’s median age of 32.6 in 2005 is expected to rise to 37.9 in 2020, a consequence of its very low current birth rate. Similar conclusions can be drawn about many additional Asian countries whose development today is at a medium level or somewhat below it. Virtually all countries are in transition demographically, either having completed their transformation or continuing to do so. Thus, the stage is set.

Looking again at China and India, the countries with the largest number of potential consumers and producers, it should be noted that while population figures are a fundamental indicator of a country’s potential, they are only that. The speed of economic emergence will depend on many factors. Even today, 44 percent of China’s employment17 and 57 percent of India’s18 are still generated in the agricultural sector, and often only at a subsistence level.

Yet regardless of its speed or ultimate extent, Asia’s influence will grow in coming years. The size and youthfulness of its population ensures this. In the future, Asia’s power will be felt across both the political and economic spectrums, thanks to a host of factors ranging from its market size to its production capabilities to its influence in global organizations.

Notes

1 Population Reference Bureau, World Population Data Sheet (Washington D. C.: 2006).

2 The designation of developed and developing countries used here follows United Nations practice. The developed countries comprise Europe (including Russia), North America, Australia, Japan and New Zealand. The developing countries comprise the remaining countries of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean and Oceania.

3 In this discussion, “fertility” does not refer to the physiological capacity of a woman to conceive, but to the actual number of births a woman bears in her lifetime.

4 Population Reference Bureau, World Population Data Sheet (Washington D. C.: 2006).

5 China Population Information and Research Center, “China to keep population below 1.3 b[illion],” (Beijing: 2006) http://www.cpirc.org.cn/en/enews20060107.htm (accessed April 20, 2007).

6 Registrar General and Census Commissioner of India, Sample Registration System Report (New Delhi: 2005).