Beyond Good and Evil E-Book

Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche

• Herausgeber: Youcanprint
• Kategorie: Gesellschafts- und Liebesromane
• Sprache: Englisch
• Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2018

Beschreibung

Beyond Good and Evil (German: Jenseits von Gut und Böse), subtitled "Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future" (Vorspiel einer Philosophie der Zukunft), is a book by the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, first published in 1886. It takes up and expands on the ideas of his previous work, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, but approached from a more critical, polemical direction. In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche attacks past philosophers for their alleged lack of critical sense and their blind acceptance of Christian premises in their consideration of morality. The work moves into the realm "Beyond Good and Evil" in the sense of leaving behind the traditional morality which Nietzsche subjects to a destructive critique in favour of what he regards as an affirmative approach that fearlessly confronts the perspectival nature of knowledge and the perilous condition of the modern individual.

Leseprobe

Table of Contents

PREFACE

CHAPTER I. PREJUDICES OF PHILOSOPHERS

CHAPTER II. THE FREE SPIRIT

CHAPTER III. THE RELIGIOUS MOOD

CHAPTER IV. APOPHTHEGMS AND INTERLUDES

CHAPTER V. THE NATURAL HISTORY OF MORALS

CHAPTER VI. WESCHOLARS

CHAPTER VII. OUR VIRTUES

CHAPTER VIII. PEOPLES AND COUNTRIES

CHAPTER IX. WHAT IS NOBLE?

Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche

Beyond Good and Evil

First digital edition 2018 by Anna Ruggieri

PREFACE

SUPPOSING that Truth is a woman—what then? Is there notground for suspecting that all philosophers, in so far as they havebeen dogmatists, have failed to understand women—that theterrible seriousness and clumsy importunity withwhich they haveusually paid their addresses to Truth, have been unskilled andunseemly methods for winning a woman? Certainly she has neverallowed herself to be won; and at present every kind of dogmastands with sad and discouraged mien—IF, indeed, it stands atall! For there are scoffers who maintain that it has fallen, thatall dogma lies on the ground—nay more, that it is at its lastgasp. But to speak seriously, there are good grounds for hopingthat all dogmatizing in philosophy, whatever solemn, whateverconclusive and decided airs it has assumed, may have been only anoble puerilism and tyronism; and probably the time is at hand whenit will be once and again understood WHAT has actually sufficed forthe basis of such imposing and absolute philosophical edifices asthe dogmatists have hitherto reared: perhaps some popularsuperstition of immemorial time (such as the soul-superstition,which, in the form of subject- and ego-superstition, has not yetceased doing mischief): perhaps some play upon words, a deceptionon the part of grammar, or an audacious generalization of veryrestricted, very personal, very human—all-too-human facts.The philosophy of the dogmatists, it is to be hoped, was only apromise for thousands of years afterwards, as was astrology instill earlier times, in the service of which probably more labour,gold, acuteness, and patience have been spent than on any actualscience hitherto: we owe to it, and to its "super-terrestrial"pretensions in Asia and Egypt, the grand style of architecture. Itseems that in order to inscribe themselves upon the heart ofhumanity with everlasting claims, all great things have first towander about the earth as enormous and awe-inspiring caricatures:dogmatic philosophy has been a caricature of thiskind—forinstance, the Vedanta doctrine in Asia, and Platonism in Europe.Let us not be ungrateful to it, although it must certainly beconfessed that the worst, the most tiresome, and the most dangerousof errors hitherto has been a dogmatist error—namely, Plato'sinvention of Pure Spirit and the Good in Itself. But now when ithas been surmounted, when Europe, rid of this nightmare, can againdraw breath freely and at least enjoy a healthier—sleep, we,WHOSE DUTY IS WAKEFULNESS ITSELF, are the heirs of all the strengthwhich the struggle against this error has fostered. It amounted tothe very inversion of truth, and the denial of thePERSPECTIVE—the fundamental condition—of life, to speakof Spirit and the Good as Plato spoke of them; indeed one mightask, as a physician: "How did such a malady attack that finestproduct of antiquity, Plato? Had the wicked Socrates reallycorrupted him? Was Socrates after all a corrupter of youths, anddeserved his hemlock?" But the struggle against Plato, or—tospeak plainer, and for the "people"—the struggle against theecclesiastical oppression of millenniums of Christianity (FORCHRISTIANITY IS PLATONISM FOR THE "PEOPLE"), produced in Europe amagnificent tension of soul, such as had not existed anywherepreviously; with such a tensely strained bow one can now aim at thefurthest goals. As a matter of fact, the European feels thistension as a state of distress, and twice attempts have been madein grand style to unbend the bow: once by means of Jesuitism, andthe secondtime by means of democraticenlightenment—which,with the aid of liberty of the press andnewspaper-reading, might, in fact, bring it about that the spiritwould not so easily find itself in "distress"! (The Germansinvented gunpowder—all credit to them!but they again madethings square—they invented printing.) But we, who areneither Jesuits, nor democrats, nor even sufficiently Germans, weGOOD EUROPEANS, and free, VERY free spirits—we have it still,all the distress of spirit and all the tension of itsbow! Andperhaps also the arrow, the duty, and, who knows? THE GOAL TO AIMAT....

Sils Maria Upper Engadine, JUNE, 1885.

CHAPTER I. PREJUDICES OF PHILOSOPHERS

1. The Will to Truth, which is to tempt us to many a hazardousenterprise, thefamous Truthfulness of which all philosophers havehitherto spoken with respect, what questions has this Will to Truthnot laid before us! What strange, perplexing, questionablequestions! It is already a long story; yet it seems as if it werehardly commenced. Is it any wonder if we at last grow distrustful,lose patience, and turn impatiently away? That this Sphinx teachesus at last to ask questions ourselves? WHO is it really that putsquestions to us here? WHAT really is this "Will to Truth" in us?Infact we made a long halt at the question as to the origin of thisWill—until at last we came to an absolute standstill before ayet more fundamental question. We inquired about the VALUE of thisWill. Granted that we want the truth: WHY NOT RATHER untruth?Anduncertainty? Even ignorance? The problem of the value of truthpresented itself before us—or was it we who presentedourselves before the problem? Which of us is the Oedipus here?Which the Sphinx? It would seem to be a rendezvous of questions andnotes of interrogation. And could it be believed that it at lastseems to us as if the problem had never been propounded before, asif we were the first to discern it, get a sight of it, and RISKRAISING it? For there is risk in raising it, perhaps there is nogreater risk.

2. "HOW COULD anything originate out of its opposite? Forexample, truth out of error? or the Will to Truth out of the willto deception? or the generous deed out of selfishness? or the puresun-bright vision of the wise man out of covetousness? Such genesisis impossible; whoever dreams of it is a fool, nay, worse than afool; things of the highest value must have a different origin, anorigin of THEIR own—in this transitory, seductive, illusory,paltry world, in this turmoil of delusion and cupidity, they cannothave their source. But rather in the lap of Being, in theintransitory, in the concealed God, in the'Thing-in-itself—THERE must be their source, and nowhereelse!"—This mode of reasoning discloses the typical prejudiceby which metaphysicians of all times can be recognized, this modeof valuation is at the back of all their logical procedure; throughthis "belief" of theirs, they exert themselves for their"knowledge," for something that is in the end solemnly christened"the Truth." The fundamental belief of metaphysicians is THE BELIEFIN ANTITHESES OF VALUES. It never occurred even to the wariest ofthem to doubt here on the very threshold (where doubt, however, wasmost necessary); though they had made a solemn vow, "DE OMNIBUSDUBITANDUM." For it may be doubted, firstly, whether antithesesexist at all; and secondly, whether the popular valuations andantitheses of value upon which metaphysicians have set their seal,are not perhaps merely superficial estimates, merely provisionalperspectives, besides being probably made from some corner, perhapsfrom below—"frog perspectives," as it were, to borrow anexpression current among painters. In spite of all the value whichmay belong to the true, the positive, and the unselfish, it mightbe possible that a higher and more fundamental value for lifegenerally should be assigned to pretence, to the will to delusion,to selfishness, and cupidity. It might even be possible that WHATconstitutes the value of those good and respected things,consistsprecisely in their being insidiously related, knotted, andcrocheted to these evil and apparently opposed things—perhapseven in being essentially identical with them. Perhaps! But whowishes toconcern himself with such dangerous "Perhapses"! For thatinvestigation one must await the advent of a new order ofphilosophers, such as will have other tastes and inclinations, thereverse of those hitherto prevalent—philosophers of thedangerous "Perhaps" in every sense of the term. And to speak inallseriousness, I see such new philosophers beginning toappear.