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- Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
- Kategorie: Religion und Spiritualität
- Sprache: Englisch
Buddhist Philosophy: A Comparative Approach presents a series of readings that examine the prominent thinkers and texts of the Buddhist tradition in the round, introducing contemporary readers to major theories and debates at the intersection of Buddhist and Western thought.
- Takes a comparative, rather than oppositional, approach to Buddhist philosophy, exploring key theories and debates at the intersection of Eastern and Western thought
- Addresses a variety of topics that represent important points of convergence between the Buddhist and Western philosophical traditions
- Features contributions from a wide array of acclaimed international scholars in the discipline
- Provides a much-needed cross-cultural treatment of Buddhist philosophy appropriate for undergraduate students and specialists alike
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Table of Contents
Cover
Title Page
Notes on Contributors
Acknowledgments
Abbreviations
Editor’s Introduction
1 Buddhist Philosophy as a Way of Life
Hadot on Philosophy as a Way of Life
Tsongkhapa on Philosophy as a Way of Life
Convergences and Divergences
References
2 The Other Side of Realism
Buddhism and Panpsychism
Subjective and Absolute Idealisms in Yogācāra
Conclusion
References
3 Emergentist Naturalism in Early Buddhism and Deweyan Pragmatism
A Middle Way Between Dualism and Reductive Physicalism
Comparing Deweyan Pragmatism and Early Buddhism
Defining Emergentist Naturalism
A Metaphysics of Causality and Emergent Levels of Reality
The Principle of Continuity and Biological Emergence
The Human Person: The Emergence of Mind and Consciousness
Karma and Moral Agency in Emergentist Naturalism
Emergentist Naturalism and Religious Meaning
References
4 Metaphysical Dependence, East and West
Introduction
A Taxonomy
Metaphysical Dependence in the Buddhist Traditions
Metaphysical Dependence in Western Traditions
The Fruits of Dialogue
Conclusion
References
5 Metaphysics and Metametaphysics with Buddhism
Buddhist Metaphysical Argumentation: Unqualified and Qualified
The Majority View: Metaphysics is Both Legitimate and Necessary
A More Promising Metametaphysical Stance: Quietism
Qualified Argumentation and Quietism
Remaining Matters
References
6 Are Reasons Causally Relevant for Action? Dharmakīrti and the Embodied Cognition Paradigm
Causality, Intentionality, and Mental Content
Cognition and Pragmatic Efficacy
A Theoretical Model for Causal Inference
Conclusion
References
7 Zen’s Nonegocentric Perspectivism
The Ambivalence of Nietzsche’s Perspectivism
Does a Buddha have (Perspectival) Omniscience?
Huayan’s Jewel Net of Indra and Leibniz’s Monadology
Fazang’s Principal and Satellites, Linji’s Host and Guests
Alberti’s Egocentric and Guo Xi’s Floating Perspectivism
Cusanus’ Infinite Sphere Whose Center is Everywhere
Ecstatic Empathy, Kenotic Compassion
The Multiverse of Perspectival Events of Interconnection
Nishitani on the Mutual Circulation of Host and Guest
8 Rhetoric of Uncertainty in Zen Buddhism and Western Literary Modernism
Uncertainty as a Model of Self‐Realization
Evaluative Method of Kōan Commentary
Song Dynasty Resonances with Modernism
Uncertain of Uncertainty
9 From the Five Aggregates to Phenomenal Consciousness
The Meaning of Mindfulness
A Buddhist Model of the Mind
Attention and Consciousness
Conclusion
References
10 Embodying Change
Women’s Bodies in Buddhism: A Brief Overview
Dōgen’s Feminism
Nondualism
Revalorizing the Maternal Body
References
11 Buddhist Modernism and Kant on Enlightenment
What is Buddhist Modernism?
What is Enlightenment?
The Kantian vs. Scottish Enlightenment
Conclusion
References
12 Compassion and Rebirth
Buddhism as a Salad Bar
Rebirth in the Pāli Canon
Very Hidden Phenomena
Ethical Behavior and Its Consequences
The Practice of Compassion
Jay Garfield: Team Buddha
Conclusions
References
Further Reading
Index
End User License Agreement
Guide
Cover
Table of Contents
Begin Reading
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Buddhist Philosophy
A Comparative Approach
Edited by Steven M. Emmanuel
Virginia Wesleyan CollegeVA, USA
This edition first published 2018© 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
We gratefully acknowledge the following for granting us permission to use their material in this book:
“From the Five Aggregates to Phenomenal Consciousness: Towards a Cross‐Cultural Cognitive Science,” by Jake Davis and Evan Thompson, reprinted in expanded and revised form from A Companion to Buddhist Philosophy ed. Steven Emmanuel, Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Used with permission.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, except as permitted by law. Advice on how to obtain permission to reuse material from this title is available at www.wiley.com/go/permissions.
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Library of Congress Cataloging‐in‐Publication Data
Names: Emmanuel, Steven M., editor.Title: Buddhist philosophy : a comparative approach / edited by Steven M. Emmanuel, Virginia Wesleyan College, VA, US.Other titles: Buddhist philosophy (John Wiley & Sons)Description: First edition. | Hoboken : Wiley, 2017. | Includes bibliographical references and index.Identifiers: LCCN 2017017089 (print) | LCCN 2017017825 (ebook) | ISBN 9781119068259 (pdf) | ISBN 9781119068402 (epub) | ISBN 9781119068242 (cloth) | ISBN 9781119068419 (pbk.)Subjects: LCSH: Buddhist philosophy.Classification: LCC B162 (ebook) | LCC B162 .B848 2017 (print) | DDC 181/.043–dc23LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017017089
Cover image: © Jonathan Fife/GettyimagesCover design: Wiley
Notes on Contributors
Ricki Bliss is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Lehigh University. Her publications include “On Being Humean about the Emptiness of Causation,” in The Moon Points Back, edited by Yasuo Deguchi, Jay Garfield, Graham Priest, and Koji Tanaka (Oxford University Press, 2015); “Viciousness and Circles of Ground,” Metaphilosophy 45(2) (2014); and “Viciousness and the Structure of Reality,” Philosophical Studies 166(2) (2013).
Christian Coseru is Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the College of Charleston. He is the author of Perceiving Reality: Consciousness, Intentionality, and Cognition in Buddhist Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 2012), in addition to a number of articles that explore topics in Buddhist metaphysics and epistemology, including “Buddhism, Comparative Neurophilosophy, and Human Flourishing,” Zygon 49(1); “Taking the Intentionality of Perception Seriously: Why Phenomenology is Inescapable,” Philosophy East and West 65(3); “Dignāga and Dharmakīrti on Perception and Self‐Awareness,” in The Buddhist World, edited by John Powers (Routledge, 2013); and “Reason and Experience in Buddhist Epistemology,” in A Companion to Buddhist Philosophy, edited by Steven M. Emmanuel (Wiley‐Blackwell, 2013).
David Cummiskey is Professor and Chair of Philosophy at Bates College. His research focuses on contemporary issues in moral philosophy, political theory, and intercultural philosophy. He is the author of Kantian Consequentialism (Oxford University Press, 1996). Recent articles include “Comparative Reflections on Buddhist Political Thought: Asoka, Shambhala and the General Will,” in A Companion to Buddhist Philosophy, edited by Steven M. Emmanuel (Wiley‐Blackwell, 2013); “Competing Conceptions of the Self in Kantian and Buddhist Moral Theories,” in Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy (Walter de Gruyter, 2010); and “Dignity, Contractualism, and Consequentialism,” Utilitas 20(4) (2008).
Bret W. Davis is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Loyola University Maryland. Among his books are Heidegger and the Will: On the Way to Gelassenheit (Northwestern University Press, 2007); co‐edited with Brian Schroeder and Jason M. Wirth, Japanese and Continental Philosophy: Conversations with the Kyoto School (Indiana University Press, 2011); and co‐edited with Fujita Masakatsu, Sekai no naka no Nihon no tetsugaku (Japanese Philosophy in the World) (Showado, 2005). He has also published numerous articles in English and in Japanese on continental and comparative philosophy, on the Kyoto School, and on Zen.
Jake H. Davis is Visiting Assistant Professor of Religious Studies at Brown University. He trained in Buddhist theory and meditative practice under the meditation master Sayadaw U Pandita of Burma and served for a decade as an interpreter between Burmese and English for meditation retreats in Burma and abroad. He has authored and co‐authored articles at the intersection of Buddhist philosophy, moral philosophy, and cognitive science, and is editor of the forthcoming volume, ‘A Mirror is For Reflection’: Understanding Buddhist Ethics (Oxford University Press).
Douglas Duckworth is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Temple University. He is the author of Mipam on Buddha‐Nature: The Ground of the Nyingma Tradition (SUNY Press, 2008) and Jamgön Mipam: His Life and Teachings (Shambhala, 2011). He also translated Bötrül’s Distinguishing the Views and Philosophies: Illuminating Emptiness in a Twentieth‐Century Tibetan Buddhist Classic (SUNY Press, 2011).
Christopher W. Gowans is Professor of Philosophy at Fordham University. In addition to his numerous articles on topics in moral philosophy and Buddhist thought, he is the editor of Moral Disagreements (Routledge, 2000) and Moral Dilemmas (Oxford University Press, 1989), and author of Buddhist Moral Philosophy: An Introduction (Routledge, 2014) and Philosophy of the Buddha (Routledge, 2003).
Steven Heine is Professor of Religious Studies and History as well as Associate Director of the School of International and Public Affairs and Director of Asian Studies at Florida International University. His research specialty is the origins and development of Zen Buddhism, especially the life and teachings of Dōgen, founder of the Sōtō sect. He has published two dozen books, including The Zen Poetry of Dōgen (Tuttle, 1997) and, with Oxford University Press, Opening a Mountain (2002), Did Dōgen Go to China? (2006), Zen Masters (2010), and Dōgen: Textual and Historical Studies (2012).
John J. Holder is Associate Professor of Philosophy at St. Norbert College. He is the author of Early Buddhist Discourses (Hackett, 2006), a volume containing English translations of Pāli discourses that are essential for the study of early Buddhist philosophy. He has also published articles on early Buddhist epistemology, ethics, and social theory, including “A Survey of Early Buddhist Epistemology,” in A Companion to Buddhist Philosophy, edited by Steven M. Emmanuel (Wiley‐Blackwell, 2013). His research focus is on comparative philosophy, specifically comparing early Buddhism and classical American pragmatism with the aim of developing a naturalistic theory of aesthetics and religious meaning.
Erin A. McCarthy is Professor of Philosophy at St. Lawrence University. Her research interests include Asian, feminist, continental, and comparative philosophy. She is the author of Ethics Embodied: Rethinking Selfhood through Continental, Japanese and Feminist Philosophies (Lexington, 2010).
John Powers is Research Professor at the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin University. A specialist in Tibetan Buddhism, he is the author of numerous articles and books, including A Bull of a Man: Images of Masculinity, Sex and the Body in Indian Buddhism (Harvard University Press, 2009), A Concise Introduction to Tibetan Buddhism (Snow Lion Publications, 2008), and Introduction to Tibetan Buddhism (Snow Lion Publications, 2007).
Graham Priest is Boyce Gibson Professor of Philosophy at the University of Melbourne, Distinguished Professor at the Graduate Center, City University of New York, and Arché Professorial Fellow at the University of St. Andrews. His books include In Contradiction (Nijhoff, 1987), Beyond the Limits of Thought (Clarendon Press, 2002), Towards Non‐Being (Clarendon Press, 2005), Doubt Truth to be a Liar (Clarendon Press, 2006), and Introduction to Non‐Classical Logic (Cambridge University Press, 2008).
Evan Thompson is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Toronto. He is the author of Waking, Dreaming, Being: Self and Consciousness in Neuroscience, Meditation, and Philosophy (Columbia University Press, 2014), and Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind (Harvard University Press, 2007); co‐author of The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience (MIT Press, 1991); and co‐editor of Self, No Self? Perspectives from Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions (Oxford University Press, 2010).
Tom J.F. Tillemans is Emeritus Professor of Buddhist Studies at the University of Lausanne, Switzerland. He is the author of numerous books and articles on Buddhism and currently serves as editor in chief of the “84000” (see http://84000.co), a long‐term project to translate Buddhist canonical literature.
Acknowledgments
Thanks to Wiley‐Blackwell for permission to reprint an expanded version of Jake H. Davis and Evan Thompson’s “From the Five Aggregates to Phenomenal Consciousness: Towards a Cross‐Cultural Cognitive Science,” which first appeared in A Companion to Buddhist Philosophy (Wiley‐Blackwell, 2013).
Thanks also to the editorial team at Wiley‐Blackwell for skillfully guiding this volume through every phase of its production.
Finally, I would like to express my deep gratitude to the contributors for generously lending their scholarly expertise to this project.
Abbreviations
Bibliographical
AN
Aṅguttara Nikāya: The Book of the Gradual Sayings
. Trans. F.L. Woodward and E.M. Hare. 5 vols. London: Pali Text Society, 1932–36;
The Numerical Discourses of the Buddha
. Trans. Bhikkhu Bodhi. Boston: Wisdom, 2012.
DN
Dīgha Nikāya: Dialogues of the Buddha
. Trans. T.W. Rhys Davids and C.A.F. Rhys Davids. 3 vols. London: Pali Text Society, 1899–1921;
Long Discourses of the Buddha
. Trans. M. Walshe. Second rev. edn. Boston: Wisdom, 1996.
MN
Majjhima Nikāya: The Collection of the Middle Length Sayings.
Trans. I.B. Horner. 3 vols. London: Pali Text Society, 1954–59;
The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha
. Trans. Bhikku Ñāṇamoli and Bhikku Bodhi. Boston: Wisdom, 1995.
MN‐a
Majjhima Nikāya Aṭṭhakathā (Papañcasūdani)
. Commentary on MN.
SN
Saṃyutta Nikāya: The Book of the Kindred Sayings
. Trans. C.A.F. Rhys Davids and F.L. Woodward. London: Pali Text Society, 1917–30;
The Connected Discourses of the Buddha
. Trans. Bhikkhu Bodhi. Boston: Wisdom, 2005.
Sn
Sutta‐nipāta: The Group of Discourses.
Trans. K.R. Norman. Second edn. London: Pali Text Society, 2001.
General
Ch.
Chinese
Eng.
English
Gk
Greek
Jp.
Japanese
K.
Korean
Skt
Sanskrit
Tb.
Tibetan
Editor’s Introduction
Steven M. Emmanuel
In 1906, William DeWitt Hyde, then president of Bowdoin College, penned the words to “The Offer of the College,” his inspiring statement of the value of a liberal education. Chief among the benefits he cited was the promise of becoming a citizen of the world – or as Hyde more elegantly put it, the ability to “be at home in all lands and all ages; …to carry the keys of the world’s library in your pocket, and feel its resources behind you in whatever task you undertake” (Hyde 1906, 3). In retrospect, one would have to say that the claim to global literacy was something of an overstatement. For the students of Bowdoin’s class of 1906, the world’s library did not extend beyond the classics of the Western tradition. In the philosophy department, for instance, where Hyde served as a faculty member, the curriculum was comprised mainly of courses in psychology (“treated from the point of view of natural science”), introduction to philosophy (being a survey of the familiar “problems” and their proposed “solutions”), history of philosophy (focused on the formation of “the occidental mind”), and ethics (organized around the writings of Plato, Aristotle, Mill, and Spencer).1
While the curricula of American universities and colleges would, over the course of the twentieth century, gradually expand to include the study of non‐Western civilizations, academic philosophy would remain notably resistant to recognizing the contributions made to its subject matter by other cultures. Indeed, the curriculum taught by Hyde in 1906 was not very different from what we would find in many philosophy departments today, especially in the way it approached the study of mind from “the point of view of natural science.” The insularity of the profession is reflected in the “American Philosophical Association Statement on the Philosophy Major,” which explicitly aligns the discipline with “an intellectual and historical tradition that began some 2,500 years ago in the Greek culture of the eastern Mediterranean region.”2 Although the statement does acknowledge the existence of “similar developments” in other cultures, it goes on to define the scope of the discipline by reference to the prominent figures and texts of the Western canon. Even in the association’s statement regarding the “global character” of philosophy – where one might have expected to find a robust call for greater diversity in the curriculum – the reader is merely cautioned that “[t]erms such as ‘History of Philosophy,’ ‘Ancient Philosophy,’ and even ‘the Classics’ are ambiguous” and can easily give rise to confusion, “as when a specialist in the history of Chinese philosophy applies for a job advertised as ‘history of philosophy,’ in the expectation that his or her specialization is among those sought; usually such expectations will be disappointed.”3
Despite the narrow Eurocentric focus of the profession, interest in Asian philosophy has risen steadily in recent decades. This research has been supported mainly by independent societies and a handful of peer‐reviewed journals dedicated to publishing articles in area and comparative studies. We have also seen a noticeable increase in the number of titles on Asian philosophy coming from the most highly respected academic presses. Yet, philosophy departments have been slow to reflect these developments in their course offerings. Even at some of the nation’s most prominent institutions, which have large, well‐staffed philosophy programs,4 students who wish to become acquainted with Eastern thought must look for opportunities in other departments. When Asian philosophy courses do appear, they are often limited to a single general survey. These courses vary in scope, from presentations of major themes in classical Chinese philosophy or Buddhist thought, to sweeping overviews of the philosophical traditions of South and East Asia. Needless to say, the sheer breadth of such courses does not allow for a very detailed treatment of the material, let alone a substantive engagement with the diversity it represents.
The tendency to treat Western philosophy as though it were coextensive with the history of the subject is not a harmless conceit. For one thing, it fails to appreciate the fact that philosophy is a universal human activity, and that the Western tradition is but one strand of thinking about questions that have preoccupied human beings for millennia. It suggests, moreover, an artificial and misleading picture of the history and transmission of ideas – one that fails to acknowledge the extent to which the philosophical traditions of every culture have been shaped by their interactions with others. As Justin E.H. Smith observed in a New York Times piece on “Philosophy’s Western Bias,” what we call the “Western” tradition of philosophy is “in the end only a historiographical artifact, a result of our habit of beginning our histories when and where we do, for there was always influence from neighboring civilizations” (Smith 2012). One pertinent example of this influence is the crucial role that scholars in the Islamic world played in preserving, interpreting, and transmitting the ideas of ancient Greek philosophers to medieval Europe.5 Smith’s observation is not intended to diminish the value of the Western tradition, but rather to remind us that its richness “has always been a result of its place as a node in a global network through which ideas and things are always flowing. This was true in 500 B.C. and is no less true today” (Smith 2012).
There is a certain irony in the fact that globalization was already creating vibrant and diverse intellectual cultures throughout the pre‐modern world – not least among these the ancient Greco‐Buddhist and medieval Islamic civilizations that flourished in Central Asia6 – and yet, in the present age of unprecedented global interconnectedness, we manage to proceed as though the philosophical traditions of half the world did not exist. This irony is not lost on Smith, who concludes his editorial with an admonition:
Western academic philosophy will likely come to appear utterly parochial in the coming years if it does not find a way to approach non‐Western traditions that is much more rigorous and respectful than the tokenism that reigns at present.
(Smith 2012)
Accomplishing this goal will not be easy. First and foremost, it will mean committing ourselves to a philosophical pluralism that not only welcomes non‐Western voices into the conversation but also engages them on their own terms. Further, it will mean fostering the kind of intellectual humility exhibited in Philip L. Quinn’s acknowledgment that we “have much to learn about and from the philosophical theology of medieval Islam, Indian logic and metaphysics, Buddhist philosophy of mind and language, Confucian and Taoist ethics and social philosophy, Zen spirituality and other non‐Western traditions” (Quinn 1996, 172).7
Progress toward a globalized philosophical curriculum will undoubtedly be incremental at best. But shifting demographics, combined with a growing recognition that we must prepare our students to live and work in a world of increasing economic and political interdependence, will provide added impetus to change. As Quinn noted twenty years ago, “the waxing economic power of Asia provides an argument from prudence for the conclusion that Americans ought to be learning a lot more than they currently are about Asian cultures, including their philosophical traditions” (Quinn 1996, 172). The force of that argument has not diminished.
However, the pluralist faces other, more practical challenges, as decisions about which courses should be offered and the depth of coverage they should receive are invariably tied to programming constraints and the limitation of resources. The literature comprising the Western tradition is vast, and many departments already struggle with questions about how to provide adequate coverage of its history, seminal thinkers, texts, and problems. The prospect of adding the literatures of other cultural traditions complicates this task considerably. For smaller departments, faced with hard decisions about where to concentrate the talents and energies of their faculty, a truly globalized philosophy curriculum may seem virtually impossible to attain.
Even in departments that have the resources to expand, opponents of change may worry that pluralism threatens to undermine the integrity of the curriculum by promoting multiculturalism and inclusiveness at the expense of depth and specialization.8 The preference for depth over breadth is stressed in the American Philosophical Association (APA) statement on the major, which notes that “[a] good understanding of a few important philosophers and central problems of philosophy is better than a mere acquaintance with many of them.” Every philosophy major, we are told, should be introduced to the writings of figures “whose historical importance is beyond dispute, such as Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Hume, and Kant,” as well as “various problems central to the major areas of philosophical inquiry, pertaining to the world’s and our own nature and existence (metaphysics), the knowledge we may have of them (epistemology), sound reasoning (logic), and human conduct (ethics).” These elements are said to constitute the “core” of a good philosophy program, which can then be filled out with a complement of courses that reflect the particular interests of a department. Here, however, the decision to cover non‐Western traditions must compete with the potential value of exploring other periods of Western thought (e.g., Hellenistic or medieval philosophy) or other important subfields of philosophical inquiry, or adding courses in applied philosophy, or utilizing the research specializations of the faculty to engage in a deeper study of selected topics related to the core.
Let us be clear about the nature of the problem. The pluralist’s goal is not, as some in the academy fear, to overturn the Western philosophical canon, but rather to broaden and enrich the curriculum by adding other cultural voices to the conversation.9 As Jay L. Garfield and Bryan W. Van Norden explain,
Clearly, there is nothing intrinsically wrong with philosophy written by males of European descent; but philosophy has always become richer as it becomes increasingly diverse and pluralistic. Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) recognized this when he followed his Muslim colleagues in reading the work of the pagan philosopher Aristotle, thereby broadening the philosophical curriculum of universities in his own era. We hope that American philosophy departments will someday teach Confucius as routinely as they now teach Kant, that philosophy students will eventually have as many opportunities to study the “Bhagavad Gita” as they do the “Republic”….
(Garfield and Van Norden 2016)
The question is whether, given the aforementioned constraints, we can realistically hope to accomplish this goal while honoring our commitment to preserve and transmit what is most valuable in the Western tradition. Can we do better than simply adding a perfunctory survey course on Asian philosophy? Must we settle for what John J. Stuhr has called “a pluralism by partition,” or a “mere plurality” (Stuhr 1997, 52) that amounts to the kind of tokenism decried by Smith?
It is the premise of this volume that we can do better. The goal of adding diversity to the philosophy curriculum does not require a proliferation of courses. A meaningful pluralism can be achieved simply by introducing a comparative element into the courses we already teach – that is, expanding our inquiry into the central problems of philosophy by incorporating the ideas and arguments of thinkers from other traditions. This comparative approach sidesteps concerns about watering down the curriculum, as it offers us a natural way of integrating different cultural perspectives into any course at any level, whether an introduction to philosophy, an advanced seminar in analytic epistemology, or a course on feminist thought.
The present volume demonstrates how a “more rigorous and respectful” engagement with the great thinkers and texts of the Buddhist tradition can expand and enrich our philosophical discourse. The contributors are all trained in the Western tradition but have a firm grounding in Buddhist philosophical literature. While the approach they take is comparative, their goal is not merely to provide descriptive accounts of what influential Buddhist thinkers have written. Nor is it simply to pose Western questions and look for Buddhist answers to them. Rather, the contributors have set up their discussions in a way that allows for a genuine cross‐cultural dialogue by engaging Buddhist thinkers on their own terms, thereby allowing different questions and answers to be framed through the Buddhist texts.
The comparative approach modeled in this volume is informed by a deeper understanding of diversity – one that moves beyond the tokenism that includes but does not necessarily value different points of view. For what the pluralist seeks is not merely variety, but a richer sort of diversity that implies what Peter D. Hershock calls “a distinctive and achieved quality of interaction” (Hershock 2012, 49). Among other things, this means engaging culturally different perspectives in a way that allows for a process of rigorous critical assessment in both directions. As Julian Baggini commented in a recent piece,
The point of cross‐cultural inquiry is not to reach some kind of warm, ecumenical mutual understanding, rooted in profound respect for difference. Rather it is to see that our questions are not the only ones worth asking and that by considering others, we might not only open up new vistas but also see our familiar intellectual territory in a different light.
(Baggini 2016)
A substantive engagement with Buddhist thought creates opportunities for us to gain insight into the nature of the philosophical process by reflecting on the kinds of questions we ask and the methods we use to arrive at answers to them.10 It may even point to the limitations of certain questions that have been central to the Western tradition – questions that may not be as useful or meaningful today as they were in earlier times, and perhaps never were for thinkers in other traditions.
A key feature of this volume is the recognition that philosophical traditions are not monolithic. The history of Buddhist thought is long, culturally diverse, and informed by different textual traditions. One is always on thin ice when making blanket generalizations about what “Buddhists” think. The Western tradition is similarly heterogeneous, with a wide variety of methods and approaches having developed over the course of its rich history. For this reason, the chapters are organized around the writings of prominent thinkers and movements in Buddhist and Western thought, with a view to reflecting the diversity found within each tradition.
In the opening chapter Gowans compares Buddhist and Hellenistic conceptions of philosophy as a way of life. Focusing on a seminal text in Tibetan Buddhist literature, Tsongkhapa’s Great Treatise, the discussion highlights the similarities between the two traditions, but also draws attention to some important differences between Tsongkhapa’s approach, which emphasizes the importance of serenity meditation as a basis for sound philosophical reflection, and the various forms of “spiritual exercise” presented in Stoic and Epicurean writings.
Duckworth (Chapter 2) offers an illuminating discussion of the sixth‐century philosopher Dignāga that draws important parallels between his Yogācāra theory and the panpsychism developed in the work of F.H. Bradley and others. The result is a nuanced reinterpretation of Dignāga’s position that reveals it to be more complex than the version of subjective idealism commonly ascribed to him.
Holder (Chapter 3) explores the deep connections between Deweyan pragmatism and early Buddhist metaphysics. Borrowing philosophical ideas from each tradition, he constructs a strong ontological form of emergentist naturalism: a metaphysical view that represents a middle way between dualism and reductive physicalism.
Bliss and Priest (Chapter 4) investigate the concept of metaphysical dependence. They show that while Buddhist and Western philosophers put forward radically different accounts of the dependence relation (Buddhist accounts being largely anti‐foundationalist, and Western accounts largely foundationalist), careful consideration of the arguments developed on each side provides rich opportunities for cross‐cultural dialogue and critical reassessment.
Tillemans (Chapter 5) moves from metaphysical questions about the nature of reality to second‐order questions about metaphysics itself. After sketching out the main types of metaphysical argumentation found in the Buddhist literature, he presents a comparative examination of various Buddhist metaontological stances, and considers the implications of these positions for traditional Buddhist teachings.
Coseru (Chapter 6) puts the seventh‐century Indian Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti into conversation with contemporary epistemologists regarding the relation between reasons and causes. He shows that the causal model of embodied cognition implied in Dharmakīrti’s theory of inference can be read as a version of “process externalism,” according to which reasons depend on bodily processes that are embedded in the environment.
Davis (Chapter 7) discerns in Zen’s nondualist approach a form of perspectivism that differs from egocentric versions of the theory developed in the West, most notably by Nietzsche. This nonegoistic perspectivism involves more than an awareness of the limits of any particular knowledge claim. In Zen Buddhism, meditation on the emptiness of the self cultivates one’s ability to respond empathetically and compassionately to the world by alternately occupying the perspectives of “host” and “guest.” Thus, like Nietzsche’s theory, Zen offers a way of appreciating perspectival plurality, but it differs from Nietzsche’s theory in offering a way of “engaging in perspectival delimitation in a manner that is neither willful nor egocentric.”
Heine (Chapter 8) compares the view of enlightenment found in the kōan collection known as the Blue Cliff Record with the notion of epiphany developed in the writings of James Joyce. The discussion focuses on the rhetorical strategies of uncertainty, ambiguity, and incompleteness which, in the case of the Buddhist trainee, create the conditions for an instantaneous spiritual awakening, and in the case of Joyce’s reader, a sudden and profound insight into a character whose deeper motives and reactions are not directly revealed in the story.
Davis and Thompson (Chapter 9) draw primarily on Pāli textual sources to develop a cross‐cultural approach to cognitive science. In this expanded version of a chapter that was originally published in A Companion to Buddhist Philosophy (Emmanuel 2013), the authors combine a traditional Buddhist framework for understanding mind and the practice of mindfulness meditation with scientific methods currently used by clinical researchers to investigate the relation between attention and consciousness.
McCarthy (Chapter 10) employs the radical nondualism of Zen to develop a comparative feminist philosophical framework for the project of revalorizing women’s bodies. Drawing on the writings of the thirteenth‐century Zen master Dōgen, she demonstrates how the perspective of emptiness can help us transcend the limiting conceptualizations of “feminine” and “masculine” without discarding the difference of gender as the “lived experience of being in differently sexed bodies.”
Cummiskey (Chapter 11) compares the concept of enlightenment developed in early modern European thought and Buddhist Modernism.11 He shows that while both call for “a transformative reorientation of the self,” socially engaged Buddhism presents a more complete account of the integration of personal moral development and social engagement, as well as of the challenges involved in achieving enlightenment.
In the concluding chapter, Powers reexamines the role of rebirth in Buddhist thought in light of the tendency among modernist Buddhists to downplay the importance of that teaching. Powers’ discussion not only illuminates the deeper ethical implications of rebirth for understanding Buddhist compassion and social engagement, but also demonstrates some of the dangers involved in comparative studies that attempt to decontextualize Buddhist ideas.
References
Baggini, Julian. 2016. “What Is the Self? It Depends.”
New York Times
, February 8.
Beckwith, Christopher I. 2011.
Empires of the Silk Road: A History of Central Eurasia from the Bronze Age to the Present
. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Beckwith, Christopher I. 2015.
Greek Buddha: Pyrrho’s Encounter with Early Buddhism in Central Asia
. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Emmanuel, Steven M. 2013.
A Companion to Buddhist Philosophy
. Malden: Wiley‐Blackwell.
Garfield, Jay L. and Van Norden, Bryan W. 2016. “If Philosophy Won’t Diversify, Let’s Call It What It Really Is.”
New York Times
, May 11.
Hershock, Peter D. 2012.
Valuing Diversity: Buddhist Reflection on Realizing a More Equitable Global Future
. Albany: SUNY Press.
Hyde, William DeWitt. 1906.
The College Man and the College Woman
. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company.
McMahan, David L. 2008.
The Making of Buddhist Modernism
. New York: Oxford University Press.
Quinn, Philip L. 1996. “Pluralism in Philosophy Departments.”
Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association
70(2): 168–172.
Schneewind, J.B. 2005. “Globalization and the History of Philosophy.”
Journal of the History of Ideas
66(2): 169–178.
Smith, Justin E.H. 2012. “Philosophy’s Western Bias.”
New York Times
, June 3.
Stuhr, John J. 1997.
Genealogical Pragmatism: Philosophy, Experience, and Community
. Albany: SUNY Press.
Watt, M.W. 1972.
The Influence of Islam on Medieval Europe
. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press [reprinted 1987].
Notes
1
Catalogue of Bowdoin College & the Medical School of Maine for the Year 1906–1907
(Cambridge: The University Press, 1906), 62–64.
2
Published in
Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association
80(5): 76 (2007).
3
Published in
Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association
66(5): 38 (1992).
4
For example, as of this writing, the departments at Princeton and Yale offer no courses in Asian philosophy.
5
For a detailed account of this see Watt (1972).
6
See Beckwith (2011, 2015).
7
From an address presented at the Eastern Division Meeting of the APA on December 28, 1995. It was part of a symposium sponsored by the Metaphysical Society of America and the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy and published the following year in
Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association
70(2): 167–187 (1996).
8
See Stuhr (1997, 82).
9
Even Smith (2012) concedes that the West has “an extremely rich philosophical tradition – one of the two or three richest, in fact – and it is eminently worthy of preservation and transmission to future generations.”
10
J.B. Schneewind notes this role for comparative philosophy: “We find striking parallels in philosophies in different cultures at different times, and we can see how similar contexts shape problems in similar ways. If globalized history can produce more cases like this, it might help us to a better understanding of philosophy as a cultural form” (Schneewind 2005, 176).
11
For a comprehensive discussion of the development of Buddhism in the West, see McMahan (2008).
1Buddhist Philosophy as a Way of Life: The Spiritual Exercises of Tsongkhapa
Christopher W. Gowans
Pierre Hadot’s signature theme, that for which he is best known – indeed what made him rather well known – is his thesis that the ancient Greek and Roman philosophers regarded “philosophy as a way of life” devoted to bringing about a radical transformation of the self, so as to attain genuine well‐being, through the practice of an ensemble of “spiritual exercises,” of which the study of philosophical discourses is one part, but by no means the only or even most important part.1 As an interpretation of ancient philosophy, Hadot’s thesis is not without its critics.2 But I suspect that, for many, the interest in Hadot has as much to do with the attraction of regarding philosophy as having such a practical aim as it does with the accuracy of his proposal as an interpretation of the early formative period of Western philosophy. In any case, that philosophy, with its propensity for rather abstract and often esoteric modes of rational reflection, could have “living well” as its primary rationale is certainly a thought worthy of consideration.
It has been suggested that Hadot’s understanding of philosophy as a way of life might be valuable in interpreting Buddhist thought and practice.3 From one perspective, this is a rather natural suggestion. Buddhist practice often involves spiritual exercises, and Buddhist philosophy is sometimes intimately related to these exercises. However, more inquiry is needed to see just how fruitful this interpretive proposal may be. The great diversity of Buddhist traditions should caution us against the temptation to make unqualified statements in this regard.
In this chapter I explore this proposal by reference to a single important text: Tsongkhapa’s The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment (Byang chub lam rim che ba) (Tsongkhapa 2000–2004). The Great Treatise is a lengthy discourse on a form of Buddhist practice, and an understanding of Buddhist philosophy plays a crucial role in this practice. Hence, we have considerable reason to expect that Hadot’s notion of philosophy as a way of life will be an illuminating interpretive strategy in reading this text. Though I hope to fulfill this expectation, I will also propose that the differences between Tsongkhapa and Hadot’s philosophers are as important as the similarities. A central lesson is that Buddhist philosophy as a way of life, as understood by Tsongkhapa, takes us in directions that depart in important ways from the philosophical ways of life considered by Hadot.
I will begin with a brief elaboration of some central themes in Hadot based on a distinction between the concept of philosophy as a way of life and particular conceptions of this idea that he supposed were dominant in ancient Greek and Roman philosophy. I will then examine the Great Treatise in some detail and argue that it clearly exemplifies Hadot’s concept of philosophy as a way of life. Finally I will highlight some of the main ways that Tsongkhapa’s particular conception of this converged and diverged from the conceptions of the philosophers featured in Hadot’s accounts.
Hadot on Philosophy as a Way of Life
Though Hadot believed that his account of philosophy as a way of life applied rather broadly to ancient Greek and Roman philosophers, he stressed that in some respects these philosophers developed it in divergent ways. For example, there are key differences in the manner in which the Stoics and the Epicureans envisioned philosophy as a way of life. In light of this, and in light of my interest in employing Hadot’s account in interpreting Tsongkhapa, it will be helpful to distinguish the concept of philosophy as a way of life and particular conceptions of philosophy as a way of life. The concept is the basic idea, that which is largely shared by all proponents of philosophy as a way of life, and the conceptions are different ways the proponents fill out this idea by explaining, elaborating, and applying it in accordance with their distinctive philosophical visions.4
There are two interrelated aspects to Hadot’s concept of philosophy as a way of life (sometimes referred to as an “art of living”). First, it is supposed that, in their ordinary condition, human beings are quite deficient in well‐being in significant respects, but human beings have the capacity to undergo a radical transformation so as to achieve, or at least approach, an ideal state in which there is genuine well‐being (the state of “the sage”). The deficiencies pertain primarily to beliefs, desires, passions, and actions. These deficiencies render our lives unsatisfactory in some fundamental ways: we are frustrated, anxious, fearful, angry, alienated, and so on. The ideal state is characterized by some kind of understanding or wisdom, a high level of contentment typically involving tranquility (ataraxia), and (at least often) some form of moral virtue.
Second, it is thought that the way to bring about this transformation is to practice a set of spiritual exercises (askēsis or meletē) in which philosophy plays an essential, but not exclusive, role. The exercises are wide‐ranging: they involve cognitive, affective, sensory, imaginative, volitional, moral, and other aspects of a person’s character. They are needed because the obstacles to our well‐being are deep and diverse: only exercises that alleviate the totality of these obstacles can hope to liberate us from the suffering that is our usual condition. Though many religious ways of life involve spiritual exercises, what is distinctive about the idea of philosophy as a way of life is that philosophical reflection is regarded as one of the essential spiritual exercises.5 Philosophy, in this view, is not a specialized theoretical or academic discipline: it is a way of living for all persons, practiced at each moment, and it has a practical goal. Philosophy as a way of life involves philosophical reflection. But this intellectual activity is not sufficient by itself to live in this way and attain the goal of well‐being: philosophical reflection must be combined with the full range of spiritual exercises to be effective.
The concept of philosophy as a way of life is nicely captured in a well‐known statement attributed to Epicurus: “Empty are the words of that philosopher who offers therapy for no human suffering. For just as there is no use for medical expertise if it does not give therapy for bodily diseases, so too there is no use in philosophy if it does not expel the suffering of the soul” (Long and Sedley 1987, 155 (25C)). The medical analogy – that philosophy cures the soul just as medicine cures the body – was a prominent theme in ancient philosophy.6 According to Hadot, “philosophy presented itself as a therapeutic, intended to cure mankind’s anguish” (Hadot 1995, 265–266). That philosophy must be understood by reference to a set of exercises with this practical goal is the key idea in the concept of philosophy as a way of life.
The different conceptions of philosophy as a way of life are distinguished in part by the different ancient schools of philosophy and their distinctive metaphysics (physics), epistemology (logic), and ethics – those of the Platonists, Aristotelians, Stoics, Epicureans, Skeptics, and the like (but especially the Stoics and Epicureans, the schools that are constantly at the center of attention in Hadot’s analysis). However, though the philosophical doctrines associated with these schools are important, much of the substance of Hadot’s account of the different conceptions emerges in his discussion of the various spiritual exercises that he thinks were important for the ancient philosophers.7 He believes that these exercises were communicated primarily through “oral instruction” and, lacking a text that systematically outlines them, Hadot provides a reconstruction based on a variety of sources.8 According to Hadot, some of the exercises were common to different schools, but some were practiced or at least emphasized only in certain schools. In any case, these exercises will provide a fertile field for comparison with Tsongkhapa’s Great Treatise.
As noted above, some of the exercises are in the neighborhood of what nowadays would be regarded as philosophical inquiry. Hadot says that “philosophical discourse is one of the forms of exercise of the philosophical way of life” (Hadot 2002, 178). This discourse justifies the way of life, and it is important to learn the doctrines it articulates as well as to reflect on, question, and examine these doctrines. A related exercise is intellectual dialogue concerning these doctrines in the context of a community. Socratic dialogue is a “communal spiritual exercise” (Hadot 1995, 90). Also important are dialogues with one’s self (meditations). Hence, rational reflection on and discussion of philosophical ideas are important parts of the spiritual exercises. To this extent, there is some resemblance to what goes on in a typical graduate seminar in philosophy today. The difference, Hadot insists, is that for the ancient schools, philosophical thought and conversation was in the service of – in fact was one part of – living a philosophical way of life, such as the life of the Stoic or the life of the Epicurean. But it was only one part since other spiritual exercises were also necessary and perhaps even more important. Living a philosophical way of life required understanding some philosophy, but it did not require anything resembling an academic degree in philosophy, as may be seen in a figure such as Marcus Aurelius.
Some spiritual exercises directly focused on the practical application of philosophical ideas. We needed to meditate on (meletē), remember (mneme), and have readily available for everyday use basic doctrines, practical maxims, and even arguments of the favored philosophy. This is why it was important to assimilate brief résumés of the philosophy such as Epictetus’s Handbook (Enchiridion) or Epicurus’s Principal Doctrines – and also very brief formulae such as the Epicurean’s “fourfold remedy”: “the gods are not to be feared, death is not to be dreaded; what is good is easy to acquire, what is bad is easy to bear” (Hadot 2002, 123). Likewise, it was valuable to incorporate the philosophies into our daily life, not only by thinking, but by writing. Hadot interprets Marcus’s Meditations as a spiritual exercise – “exhortations to himself” – intended to transform himself throughout his life so as to live in accord with Stoic doctrine (see Hadot 1995, ch. 6; 1998, ch. 3; 2002, 177).
Other spiritual exercises were more overtly practical in that they were designed to transform our habits. They focused on eliminating or at least limiting various troublesome desires and passions. For example, enduring forms of physical depravation was undertaken to learn how to become detached from external goods that are not necessary for well‐being. That these goods are not necessary is something philosophical reasoning could teach us. For instance, the Stoics argued that all external goods are unnecessary for well‐being while the Epicureans maintained that well‐being requires fulfillment only of natural and necessary desires. But understanding the teaching and its rationale needed to be supplemented by practical training that would reshape our habits so that we would no longer want the goods we now understood we did not need. Since there were many troublesome desires and passions there were many exercises devoted to alleviating their various demands. Other practical exercises also contributed to these ends – for example, for the Epicureans, these included daily examination of one’s conscience, public confession, and correction by other members of the community.
Many spiritual exercises centered on the theme of “philosophy as training for death” first articulated by Socrates in Plato’s Phaedo (Plato 2002, 67e; see Hadot 1995, 94). These diverse exercises sometimes reinforced one another and sometimes pulled in opposite directions. They included: learning to appreciate the insignificance of human affairs; coming to accept whatever happens in life; learning to live each day as if it were one’s last; realizing that death is nothing to fear (either on account of immortality or because the dead do not experience being dead); knowing how to separate one’s true self, the soul, from what is foreign to it, the body with its partial senses, desires, and passions; focusing on the present moment and its value; and contemplating nature and the universal, objective character of the cosmos or whole.
The last two points relate to two sets of exercises Hadot believes were especially important for the ancient philosophers. According to Hadot, the most important spiritual exercises involve attention (prosoche) and concentration. It is this above all that gives rise to the detachment, tranquility, and freedom that is characteristic of genuine well‐being. One form of attention centers on the present moment. Another form focuses on the cosmos as a whole. Both of these are sometimes described in terms of meditations regarding the self or “I,” the first a concentration of the “I” and the second an expansion of the “I” (see Hadot 2002, 189–211).
Focusing attention on the present moment means realizing that, since happiness is to be found only in the present, we should not be preoccupied with regrets about the past or worries about the future. Rather, we should recognize that the present has “infinite value” and is the only thing that really matters. However, Hadot thinks that directing attention to the present meant quite different things for the Stoics and the Epicureans. For the Stoics, we are to focus on what we choose and do, and be constantly watchful of the moral quality of these, in light of the recognition that our well‐being is up to us, up to our choices and actions, and does not depend on what happens to us. We are to purify our intentions so as to bring our will into accord with the will of universal nature (identified as reason). For the Epicureans, we are to focus on what happens and the pleasure of existing in each moment, free from unwarranted fears (of the gods and death) and unfulfilled desires (that are unnatural or unnecessary). We are to enjoy pleasant memories and the pleasures of friendship, and we are to take joy in and feel gratitude for our existence. Hadot says that “Stoicism and Epicureanism do seem to correspond to two opposite but inseparable poles of our inner life: tension and relaxation, duty and serenity, moral conscience and the joy of existence” (Hadot 1995, 108).
Attention to the present moment is said to relate to attention to the cosmos or the whole (the totality of nature, the universe, the infinite, the All). In this mode of attention, we realize that we are a part of the cosmos and feel unified and in harmony with it. This recognition enables us to transcend our individuality and humanity. According to Hadot, “the sage never ceases to have the whole constantly present to mind. He thinks and acts within a cosmic perspective. He has the feeling of belonging to a whole which goes beyond the limits of his individuality” (Hadot 1995, 273). Another aspect of this mode of attention is that it allows us to look down on earth from above so as to situate ordinary human affairs in the cosmic perspective and realize their insignificance. This is said to impart a measure of objectivity, impartiality, and detachment to our outlook. According to Hadot, physics was meant to be a reasonable explanation of nature, but was always understood within this moral orientation (at least for the Hellenistic philosophers). Hence, for the Stoics physics allows us to accept our fate while for the Epicureans it enables us to overcome our fear of death and the gods.
There is tremendous richness in Hadot’s account of the spiritual exercises. The diverse practices just outlined are interconnected in a variety of ways, and there are many details and differences between the various schools that I have not discussed. But this summary should be sufficient to bring his account into conversation with Tsongkhapa.
Tsongkhapa on Philosophy as a Way of Life
Tsongkhapa was a Buddhist monk who lived in Tibet in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries (1357–1419). He is often considered Tibet’s most important and influential Buddhist philosopher, and his Great Treatise of 1402 is commonly regarded as his best‐known and most significant work. The Dalai Lama says that Tsongkhapa “is one of the very best Tibetan scholars,” and that he carried a copy of the Great Treatise with him when he fled Tibet for India in 1959 (Dalai Lama 2013, 1–2). As we will see, this work clearly exemplifies Hadot’s concept of philosophy as a way of life. To this extent it provides powerful support for the contention that Hadot’s concept is useful for understanding Buddhist thought. Nonetheless, it is only one example, and a central theme in the book is a critique of an alternative understanding of Buddhism, represented by Ha‐shang (Hva‐shang Mohoyen), that appears not to exemplify Hadot’s concept. In the background is a famous debate that according to Tibetan tradition took place near the end of the eighth century at the Samyé monastery between Ha‐shang, representing the “Chinese” simultaneous (or sudden) enlightenment approach (an outlook associated with Chan), and Kamalaśīla, representing the “Indian” gradual enlightenment approach.9 According to the simultaneous approach, enlightenment is an instantaneous, non‐conceptual experience that does not require, and in fact is inhibited by, any prior discursive analysis. By contrast, for the gradualist approach, enlightenment can only be achieved through long practice, centering on the six perfections, in which discursive analysis is crucial (as essential to the perfection of wisdom). Discursive analysis is a form of rational philosophical reflection on topics such as no‐self and emptiness. Hence, a central issue in the debate was to a significant extent the role of philosophy, so‐understood, in attaining Buddhist enlightenment. Tibetan tradition maintains that the “winner” of the debate was Kamalaśīla and the gradualist approach, and this is the position that Tsongkhapa defends. But his defense draws attention to the fact that not all Buddhist approaches regard philosophy in this sense as an important spiritual exercise.10
Tsongkhapa had a Buddhist monastic education centered on study of, and debate about, Indian and Tibetan Buddhist texts. Various phases of his life were devoted to meditation, ritual practices, monastic reform, and philosophical reflection. His mature philosophical works were composed in the last two decades of his life, beginning with the Great Treatise. Tsongkhapa developed his own distinctive interpretation of the Prāsaṅgika‐Mādhyamika philosophy rooted in Nāgārjuna and subsequently developed by later Mādhyamika thinkers such as Āryadeva, Buddhapālita, Bhāvaviveka, and especially Candrakīrti. However, his version of the Middle Way perspective, aiming to avoid both over‐negation (to preserve conventional truth) and over‐reification (to preserve emptiness), involved using reasoning to establish the absence of intrinsic existence. It is for this synthesis of different Indian Buddhist traditions that he is best known as a philosopher.11 He also wrote on the ethical codes of different levels of Buddhist practitioners and the “deity yoga” of tantric practice (and the relationship between these).12 In addition, he played an important role in the development of the Geluk order that has had such importance in Tibetan Buddhism through its relationship with the position of the Dalai Lama. Tsongkhapa was obviously well positioned to speak authoritatively about Buddhist spiritual practices and Buddhist philosophy as they had developed in a key phase of Tibetan history.
The Great Treatise is plausibly and informatively read as presupposing a concept of philosophy as a way of life as understood by Hadot. First, Tsongkhapa supposes that human life is ordinarily problematic insofar as it is permeated by suffering, but human beings have the capacity to radically transform themselves so as to attain genuine well‐being by achieving enlightenment. The ways in which our lives are problematic have much to do with our beliefs, desires, passions, and actions: our lives are full of misunderstandings, cravings, emotions such as anger, and vicious actions. By contrast, enlightenment involves wisdom, tranquility, and virtue. Second, it is possible to bring this transformation about by a set of diverse spiritual exercises, and one of these exercises is necessary but not sufficient, namely philosophy – specifically for Tsongkhapa the perfection of wisdom on the basis of insight. This requires reasoning, analysis, and examination, all employing conceptual thought, in order to understand the ultimate truths of selflessness and emptiness. Insight is a recognizable kind of philosophy, and as a crucial spiritual exercise in Tsongkhapa’s program we evidently have a form of Hadot’s philosophy as a way of life.
The primary purpose of Tsongkhapa’s text is to provide a guide to an extensive set of Buddhist spiritual exercises. It is implicitly divided into four parts: after several preliminary chapters, there are three groups of chapters devoted to persons of small, medium, and great capacity, respectively. These categories represent increasing levels of understanding, well‐being, and virtue. The last, the exercises for persons of great capacity, receives the most attention and includes a long, detailed discussion of Prāsaṅgika‐Mādhyamika philosophy (over 200 pages, nearly a quarter of the entire text). This is the main place in which philosophy is discussed, though the importance of philosophy is insisted upon throughout.
Tsongkhapa opens the book with praise for the qualifications of Atisha and the greatness of his teaching in the Lamp for the Path to Enlightenment (Bodhipathapradīpa; see Atisha 1997). Atisha (982–1054) is regarded by Tibetan Buddhists as the leading figure in the “second dissemination” of Buddhism from India to Tibet in the eleventh century. His Lamp is a brief sixty‐eight verse summary of Buddhist gradualist practice from a Mahāyāna – and ultimately Vajrayāna – perspective. It became the basis for the “stages of the path” (lam rim) literature in Tibet of which Tsongkhapa’s Great Treatise is a prominent example.13 Tsongkhapa says that the Lamp is his “root text” (11/1:45).14
