Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion E-Book

• Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Serie: Contemporary Debates in Philosophy
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 1141

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2019

Beschreibung

Lively debates on controversial and compelling questions in the philosophy of religion -- an updated edition of the bestselling title Building upon the reputation of the first edition, the extensively revised second edition of Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion features fifteen essays which present arguments on some of the most central and controversial topics in philosophy of religion from the discipline's most influential thinkers. Considering questions of both emerging and perennial interest from atheistic, theistic, and agnostic viewpoints, the book adopts the series structure which pairs essays espousing opposing perspectives on a particular question or theme in an engaging pro and con format. Following accessible introductions to each debate, the volume's new and newly-revised contributions set the stage for thoughtful and lively discourse between philosophers in philosophy of religion and analytic theology. Debates range from vigorous disagreements between theists and their critics to arguments between theists of different philosophical and theological persuasions, highlighting points of contrast for readers while showcasing the field's leading minds in dialogue. The head-to-head chapters offer forceful advocacy for some of the most compelling ideas, beliefs, and objections in the philosophy of religion, opening the conversation up to students to weigh the arguments and engage in comparative analysis of the concepts for themselves. Written to appeal to the non-specialist as well as the professional philosopher, Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion is ideal as both a provocative primary text for coursework in analytical theology and philosophy of religion, and as a broad survey of the field for scholars and general readers with an interest in the questions which underpin contemporary philosophy of religion and theology.

Leseprobe

Table of Contents

Cover

Notes on Contributors

Preface to the First Edition

Preface to the Second Edition

Acknowledgements

ARGUMENTS FOR RELIGIOUS BELIEF

CHAPTER ONE: Does the Universe Have a Cause?

The Universe Has a Cause

The Universe Does Not Have a Cause

Reply to Oppy

Reply to Koons

Suggestions for Further Reading

CHAPTER TWO: Is Fine‐Tuning Evidence that God Exists?

Fine‐Tuning is Evidence that God Exists

Fine‐Tuning is Not Evidence that God Exists

Reply to Sober

Reply to Collins

Suggestions for Further Reading

CHAPTER THREE: Is God Necessary for Morality?

God is Necessary for Morality

Atheism, Naturalism, and Morality

Reply to Antony

Reply to Linville

Suggestions for Further Reading

CHAPTER FOUR: Does Religious Experience Justify Religious Belief?

Religious Experience Justifies Religious Belief

Do Mystics See God?

Reply to Fales

Reply to Alston

Suggestions for Further Reading

CHAPTER FIVE: Does Testimony about Miracles Provide Evidence for Religion?

The Case for Miracles

Testimony about Miracles Does Not Provide Evidence

Reply to Ahmed

Reply to Anderson and Pruss

Suggestions for Further Reading

CHALLENGES TO RELIGIOUS BELIEF

CHAPTER SIX: Is Evil Evidence against Belief in God?

Evil is Evidence against God’s Existence

Evil Does Not Make Atheism More Reasonable Than Theism

Reply to Howard‐Snyder and Bergmann

Reply to Rowe

Suggestions for Further Reading

CHAPTER SEVEN: Does Divine Hiddenness Justify Atheism?

Divine Hiddenness Justifies Atheism

Divine Hiddenness Does Not Justify Atheism

Reply to Moser

Reply to Schellenberg

Suggestions for Further Reading

CHAPTER EIGHT: Does Science Discredit Religion?

Science Discredits Religion

Science Does Not Discredit Religion

Reply to Peterson

Reply to Ruse

Suggestions for Further Reading

CHAPTER NINE: Is the God of the Hebrew Bible Perfectly Good?

The God of Ancient Israel is Not Perfectly Good

The Perfect Goodness of God in the Hebrew Scriptures

Reply to Murphy

Reply to Morriston

Suggestions for Further Reading

CHAPTER TEN: Is it Reasonable to Believe That Only One Religion is True?

It is Reasonable to Believe That Only One Religion is True

It is Not Reasonable to Believe That Only One Religion is True

Reply to Byrne

Reply to Basinger

Suggestions for Further Reading

ISSUES WITHIN RELIGION

CHAPTER ELEVEN: Is Evidence Required for Religious Belief?

Evidence is Required for Religious Belief

Evidence is Not Required for Religious Belief

Reply to VanArragon

Reply to McAllister

Suggestions for Further Reading

CHAPTER TWELVE: Should we Think of God as Masculine?

Is God a Man?

God is Not Male

Reply to Pogin

Reply to Rea

Suggestions for Further Reading

CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Does God Take Risks in Governing the World?

God Takes Risks

God Does Not Take Risks

Reply to Helm

Reply to Hasker

Suggestions for Further Reading

CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Should Christians Endorse Mind‐Body Dualism?

Christians Should Affirm Mind‐Body Dualism

Christians Should Reject Mind‐Body Dualism

Reply to Baker

Reply to Zimmerman

Suggestions for Further Reading

CHAPTER FIFTEEN: Is Eternal Damnation Compatible with the Christian Concept of God?

Eternal Hell and the Christian Concept of God

No Hell

Reply to Talbott

Reply to Walls

Suggestions for Further Reading

Index

End User License Agreement

Guide

Cover

Table of Contents

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Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion

In teaching and research, philosophy makes progress through argumentation and debate. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy provides a forum for students and their teachers to follow and participate in the debates that animate philosophy today in the western world. Each volume presents pairs of opposing viewpoints on contested themes and topics in the central subfields of philosophy. Each volume is edited and introduced by an expert in the field, and also includes an index, bibliography, and suggestions for further reading. The opposing essays, commissioned especially for the volumes in the series, are thorough but accessible presentations of opposing points of view.

Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion

edited by Michael L. Peterson and Raymond J. VanArragon

Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science

edited by Christopher Hitchcock

Contemporary Debates in Epistemology

edited by Matthias Steup and Ernest Sosa

Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics

edited by Andrew I. Cohen and Christopher Heath Wellman

Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art

edited by Matthew Kieran

Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory

edited by James Dreier

Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science

edited by Robert Stainton

Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind

edited by Brian McLaughlin and Jonathan Cohen

Contemporary Debates in Social Philosophy

edited by Laurence Thomas

Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics

edited by Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne, and Dean W. Zimmerman

Contemporary Debates in Political Philosophy

edited by Thomas Christiano and John Christman

Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Biology

edited by Francisco J. Ayala and Robert Arp

Contemporary Debates in Bioethics

edited by Arthur L. Caplan and Robert Arp

Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Second Edition

edited by Matthias Steup, John Turri, and Ernest Sosa

Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics, Second Edition

edited by Andrew I. Cohen and Christopher Heath Wellman

Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, Second Edition

edited by Michael L. Peterson and Raymond J. VanArragon

Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion

SECOND EDITION

Edited by

Michael L. PetersonRaymond J. VanArragon

This second edition first published 2020© 2020 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

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Notes on Contributors

Arif Ahmed is Reader in Philosophy at Cambridge and a Fellow of Gonville and Caius. He writes mainly on decision theory, but also has an interest in religion and has debated whether God exists against William Lane Craig, Tariq Ramadan, Rowan Williams and others. He is an atheist and a classical liberal, his philosophical outlook being most closely allied with those of David Hume and Friedrich Hayek.

William P. Alston (1921–2009) was Professor Emeritus in the Philosophy Department at Syracuse University. He made many contributions in philosophy of language, epistemology, and philosophy of religion. His books include Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience (1991) and Beyond “Justification”: Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation (2005).

Charity Anderson is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Baylor University. Her research is primarily in epistemology and philosophy of religion, with a focus on issues concerning fallibilism, evidence, epistemic modals, invariantism, and knowledge norms. She is currently engaged in a research project on the topic of divine hiddenness.

Louise Antony is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Massachusetts. She has published many articles in philosophy of mind, epistemology, feminism, and philosophy of religion, and co‐edited two volumes: A Mind of One’s Own: Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity (1993) with Charlotte Witt, and Chomsky and His Critics (2003) with Norbert Hornstein. She edited the anthology Philosophers Without Gods: Meditations on Atheism and the Secular Life (2010) which includes her own essay “For the Love of Reason.”

Lynne Rudder Baker (1944–2017) was Distinguished Professor of Philosophy Emerita at the University of Massachusetts – Amherst. She is best known for her work in metaphysics, and her key books include Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View (2001), and Naturalism and the First‐Person Perspective (2013).

David Basinger is Professor of Philosophy and the Chief Academic Officer at Roberts Wesleyan College. Current research interests include epistemic humility, religious diversity, and the interplay between divine control and human freedom. He is the author of the “Religious Diversity” entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy and his most recent book is Miracles (2018) in the Cambridge Press “Elements in the Philosophy of Religion” series.

Michael Bergmann is Professor of Philosophy at Purdue University. In addition to dozens of articles in epistemology and philosophy of religion in journals and edited volumes, he is author of Justification without Awareness (2006) and co‐editor of Divine Evil? The Moral Character of the God of Abraham (2011), Challenges to Religious and Moral Belief (2014), Reason and Faith (2016), and Intellectual Assurance: Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism (2016).

Peter Byrne is Emeritus Professor of Ethics and the Philosophy of Religion at King's College London. He is the author of Prologomena to Religious Pluralism (1995) and seven other books in ethics and the philosophy of religion. He is a past editor of Religious Studies: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion.

Robin Collins is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at Messiah College in Pennsylvania. He has written over forty‐five substantial articles and book chapters in philosophy, spanning the areas of philosophy of physics, philosophy of science, philosophy of religion, and philosophy of mind. He is a leading expert on the fine‐tuning of the universe for life and its philosophical implications. His current work is on how the universe appears to be fine‐tuned to optimize scientific discovery.

Evan Fales is emeritus faculty at the University of Iowa. In the area of philosophy of religion, he has written on explanations for mystical experience and its significance as evidence for theism, divine command theory, Biblical hermeneutics, the problem of evil, the moral content of the Bible, miracles, and other topics. His book Divine Intervention: Metaphysical and Epistemological Puzzles (2015) examines questions related to whether and how an immaterial god can interact with the world.

William Hasker is Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at Huntington University, where he taught from 1966 until 2000. He was the editor of Christian Scholar’s Review from 1985 to 1994, and the editor of Faith and Philosophy from 2000 until 2007. He has contributed numerous articles to journals and reference works, and is the author of Metaphysics (1983), God, Time, and Knowledge (1989), The Emergent Self (1999), Providence, Evil, and the Openness of God (2004), The Triumph of God Over Evil (2008), and Metaphysics and the Tri‐ Personal God (2013).

Paul Helm is Professor of the History and Philosophy of Religion Emeritus, King's College, London, UK. Before that he taught in the Department of Philosophy, University of Liverpool. Among his books are Eternal God 2nd edition (2011), and John Calvin's Ideas (2006). His latest book is Human Nature from Calvin to Edwards (2018).

Daniel Howard‐Snyder is Professor of Philosophy at Western Washington University. His interests include philosophy of religion and epistemology. He is author of dozens of articles and editor of The Evidential Argument from Evil (1996) and, with Justinn McBrayer, The Blackwell Companion to the Problem of Evil (2013).

Robert C. Koons is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Texas at Austin, where he has taught since 1987. Specializing in metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of religion, Koons has written four books, most recently The Atlas of Reality (2017) with Tim Pickavance, and has co‐editied (with George Bealer) The Waning of Materialism (2010) and (with William Simpson and Nicholas Teh) Neo‐Aristotelian Perspectives on Contemporary Science (2017). He has authored over 50 journal articles.

Mark D. Linville is Senior Research Fellow and Philosophy Tutor in the PhD Humanities program at Faulkner University. He has written numerous essays on the relationship between religion and morality, including “The Moral Argument,” in The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology (2009).

Blake McAllister is Assistant Professor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy & Religion at Hillsdale College. He publishes mainly in epistemology, early modern philosophy, and the philosophy of religion—often at the intersection of these fields. His work has appeared in venues such as Synthese, Religious Studies, History of Philosophy Quarterly and The Journal of Scottish Philosophy.

Wes Morriston is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the University of Colorado Boulder, where he taught for forty‐two years. He has published dozens of papers on various topics in philosophy of religion, including divine freedom, the problem of evil, and the Kalām cosmological argument.

Paul K. Moser is Professor of Philosophy at Loyola University Chicago. He is the author of several books, including The Elusive God (2009), The Evidence for God (2010), The Severity of God (2013), and The God Relationship (2017). He is also editor of The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology (2005) and Jesus and Philosophy (2008). He is the co‐editor of the two book series Cambridge Studies in Religion, Philosophy, and Society, and Cambridge Elements: Religion and Monotheism.

Mark C. Murphy is the McDevitt Professor of Religious Philosophy at Georgetown University. He works primarily at the intersection of ethics and philosophy of religion. He is the author of six books, among them God's Own Ethics: Norms of Divine Agency and the Argument from Evil (2017), God and Moral Law: On the Theistic Explanation of Morality (2011), and Philosophy of Law: The Fundamentals (2007).

Graham Oppy is Professor of Philosophy at Monash University. He is the author of Ontological Arguments and Belief in God (1996), Arguing about Gods (2006), The Best Argument against God (2013), Describing Gods (2014), Reinventing Philosophy of Religion (2014), Atheism and Agnosticism (2018), Naturalism and Religion (2018), and Atheism: The Basics (2018).

Michael L.Peterson is Professor of Philosophy at Asbury Theological Seminary. His books include C. S. Lewis and the Christian Worldview (forthcoming), God and Evil (1998), and With All Your Mind (2001). He is senior author of Reason and Religious Belief, senior editor of Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings, and editor of The Problem of Evil: Selected Readings. All three have multiple editions. With Michael Ruse, he co‐authored Science, Evolution, and Religion: A Debate about Atheism and Theism (2017). He is Managing Editor of the scholarly journal Faith and Philosophy.

Kathryn Pogin is a PhD Candidate in Philosophy at Northwestern University and a J.D. Candidate at Yale Law School. She has done work in social epistemology and feminist philosophy. She has published a number of popular‐level pieces, including “Discrimination is Un‐Christian, Too” (2014) which was a commentary on the Supreme Court case Burwell vs. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and appeared in the New York Times’ philosophy blog, The Stone.

Alexander Pruss is Professor of Philosophy at Baylor University, and works in metaphysics, formal epistemology, philosophy of religion, applied ethics, and philosophy of mathematics. His latest books are Infinity, Causation and Paradox (2018) and Necessary Existence (2018), co‐ authored with Joshua Rasmussen.

Michael Rea is Rev. John A. O’Brien Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Center for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Notre Dame, where he has taught since 2001. He is also a Professorial Fellow at the Logos Institute for Analytic & Exegetical Theology at the University of St Andrews. His research focuses primarily on topics in metaphysics, philosophy of religion, and analytic theology. His books include Metaphysics: the Basics (2014), and World without Design: The Ontological Consequences of Naturalism (2002).

William L. Rowe (1931–2015) was Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at Purdue University. He specialized in metaphysics and philosophy of religion, and his work on the problem of evil remains extremely influential. His books include The Cosmological Argument (1998), God and the Problem of Evil (2001), and Can God be Free? (2006).

Michael Ruse is the Lucyle T. Werkmeister Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Program in the History and Philosophy of Science at Florida State University. He is the author or editor of over fifty books. He was the founding editor of the journal Biology and Philosophy. He has co‐edited the Cambridge Companion to the Origin of Species (2008) and recently edited The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Charles Darwin and Evolutionary Thought (2013) which won a PROSE award. Extending his Darwinian analysis of philosophical issues it The Problem of War: Darwinism, Christianity, and their Battle to Understand Human Conflict (2019).

J. L. Schellenberg is Professor of Philosophy at Mount Saint Vincent University. He is the author of half a dozen books, including The Hiddenness Argument: Philosophy's New Challenge to Belief in God (2015). His articles have appeared in such journals as American Philosophical Quarterly, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Faith and Philosophy, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, and Religious Studies, as well as in edited collections published by such presses as Blackwell, Cambridge University Press, and Oxford University Press.

Elliott Sober is a philosopher of science at University of Wisconsin‐Madison. His interests center on probability theory and evolutionary biology. His books include Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior (1998, co‐authored with David Sloan Wilson), Evidence and Evolution: The Logic Behind the Science (2008), Did Darwin Write the Origin Backwards? (2011), and Ockham’s Razors: A User’s Manual (2015). He is also winner of the 2014 Carl Hempel Prize for lifetime achievement in Philosophy of Science, awarded by the Philosophy of Science Association.

Thomas Talbott is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at Willamette University in Salem, Oregon. His publications in the area of his topic in this volume include “The Doctrine of Everlasting Punishment” in Faith and Philosophy (1990), the entry on universalism in Jerry Walls (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Eschatology (2007), “Grace, Character Formation, and Predestination unto Glory” in Joel Buenting (ed.), The Problem of Hell: A Philosophical Anthology (2010), The Inescapable Love of God, 2nd ed. (2014) and “Heaven and Hell in Christian Thought” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2017).

Raymond J. VanArragon is Professor of Philosophy at Bethel University in St. Paul, MN. He has published many articles in philosophy of religion, including the entry on “Reformed Epistemology” in the forthcoming Wiley Blackwell Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Religion. He is also editor (with Kelly James Clark) of Evidence and Religious Belief (2011) and author of Key Terms in Philosophy of Religion (2010).

Jerry L. Walls is a Scholar in Residence and Professor of Philosophy at Houston Baptist University. His primary focus is on philosophy of religion, ethics and Christian apologetics. He has authored, co‐authored, edited or co‐edited more than a dozen books and over eighty articles and reviews. Among these is a trilogy on the afterlife: Hell: The Logic of Damnation (1992); Heaven: The Logic of Eternal Joy (2007); and Purgatory: The Logic of Total Transformation (2011).

Dean W. Zimmerman has taught at the University of Notre Dame, Syracuse University, and Rutgers University, where he is co‐director of the Rutgers Center for the Philosophy of Religion and a professor in the philosophy department. Zimmerman is founding editor of Oxford Studies in Metaphysics (now co‐edited with Karen Bennett), and co‐editor of Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. He has co‐edited several other books, and his publications include over fifty articles.

Preface to the First Edition

This is the first book in Blackwell’s Contemporary Debates textbook series. It was designed to feature some of the most important current controversies in the philosophy of religion. In the Western philosophical tradition, theism – the belief that an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good God exists – has been the focus of much philosophical debate and discussion. Although not a living religion itself, theism forms a significant conceptual component of three living religions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Moreover, beliefs within living religions – particularly beliefs of the historic Christian faith – have also occupied the attention of philosophers of religion. So, in staking out the territory for this book, we selected some issues related to classical theism and some related to Christian faith in particular.

Most Anglo‐American philosophy is oriented toward the rigorous analysis of ideas, arguments, and positions – and this orientation certainly flourishes in the philosophical treatment of religion. Since the analytic approach lends itself to crisp, straightforward debate, we have made “debate” the central motif of the book. With its most notable origins in Socratic dialectic, debate is essentially the interplay between opposing positions. Each debate here is organized around a key question on which recognized experts take drastically different positions. For each question, one expert on the subject answers in the affirmative and develops his or her argument, another answers in the negative with a corresponding argument. Brief rejoinders are also included to allow writers to clarify further their own positions, identify weaknesses in the opposing position, and point out directions for further discussion. Each debate on a given question has a short editorial introduction, and then the following structure: Affirmative Essay – Negative Essay – Reply to Negative Position – Reply to Positive Position.

Teach the conflicts! We are convinced of the pedagogical value of teaching vigorous, well‐argued debate for encouraging students to sharpen their own critical abilities and formulate their own points of view. The noteworthy growth and vibrancy of contemporary philosophy of religion provide a wide range of exciting topics for debate. From this rich vein of discussion, we have chosen topics that fall into three general categories: those involving attacks on religious belief, those involving arguments for religious belief, and those involving internal evaluation of the coherence or appropriateness of certain religious beliefs. In the first two categories, the debates are waged between theists and nontheists; in the last category, the debates are largely between religious believers who differ over the implications of their faith commitments. In all, these debates provide an ideal format not simply for students but for professional philosophers and interested nonprofessionals to explore issues in the philosophy of religion.

M.L.P.

R.V.A.

Asbury College

December 12, 2002

Preface to the Second Edition

This second edition of Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion is, like the first, intended to feature some of the most important current controversies in the philosophy of religion. The book has three sections, each containing five debates, one chapter for each. The first section includes debates about considerations in favor of religious belief, while the debates of the second section are about challenges to religious belief. The debates of the third section cover issues that are internal to religious belief.

Each chapter begins with a question for debate and follows with statements of the affirmative position, then the negative position, and then responses to each. (There are two exceptions: in Chapter 9, about the morality of the God of the Hebrew Bible, the negative position goes first; and in Chapter 12, about whether we should think of God as masculine, both essays in fact take negative positions, but for different reasons.) The essays are intended to be accessible to undergraduates, though the content will also be of interest to professional philosophers and interested nonprofessionals who wish to explore issues in the philosophy of religion. The essays are also of necessity quite brief, so they make many points that cannot be fully developed, and they do not end the discussion! For that reason, each chapter is followed by suggestions for further reading. Readers are encouraged to study further by following those suggestions and by exploring the articles and books cited in the essays themselves.

Welcome to the debates! We hope that you learn from experts in the field and use their work as a springboard for development of your own views.

M.L.P.

R.V.A.

July 31, 2018

Acknowledgements

Our thanks to Chris Holland for his excellent work as our research assistant, to Luke Arend and Christa Holland for their careful proofreading, to Lin Maria Riotto for creating a thorough index, and to Marissa Koors and Manish Luthra for indispensable editorial help and advice.

ARGUMENTS FOR RELIGIOUS BELIEF

CHAPTER ONEDoes the Universe Have a Cause?

The question of whether the universe has a cause typically falls under the umbrella of the cosmological argument, the aim of which is to establish the existence of something outside the natural order. In this debate, Robert Koons argues that the universe must have a cause, and that there must be something distinct from the universe that is uncaused. On the other side, Graham Oppy argues that if there is an uncaused cause, we should prefer the hypothesis that that cause is a part of the natural order to the hypothesis that it exists outside that order.

The Universe Has a Cause

Robert C. Koons

I. Introduction

Causation is one of the most fundamental building blocks of metaphysics, the “cement of the universe,” as J. L. Mackie once put it. Consequently, I do not have a definition to offer, but we can say this much: when we discover the causes of something, we are in a position to explain it. Since explanations cannot be circular, neither can be causation itself.

Causation is a kind of relation, but what kind of things does it relate? What are its relata? Some suggest that the relata are states of affairs, others facts, others events, and still others fundamental truths (i.e. the truth of certain fundamental propositions). I will take no position here on this question, but for the sake of simplifying the exposition, I will speak of states of affairs, understanding by this something like David M. Armstrong’s conception,1 according to which an actual state of affairs is something that actually exists and that actually combines certain entities and properties into a fact‐like complex, corresponding to a simple, atomic proposition. In addition, I will argue (in section II) that we must take pluralities of these states of affairs as potential joint causes and effects, rather than focusing exclusively on individual ones.

I argue in section II that not everything has a cause. First, I offer two arguments there against the possibility of an infinite causal regress. I also argue that the plurality of all states of affairs (“Reality”) must be uncaused. So, there is at least one uncaused thing (or plurality of things). In section III, I provide a set of epistemological arguments for thinking that we must know a priori a principle that successfully draws the line between the caused and uncaused things. I apply this principle in section IV to the universe, with the result that the universe (properly defined) falls within the class of caused things. In section V, I offer one supplemental argument for the conclusion that the universe has a cause.

II. Does Everything Have a Cause?

Does absolutely everything have a cause? By “everything,” I mean everything, and all pluralities of things, in the appropriate ontological category. If the causal relata are states of affairs or situations, then causal universalism would be the thesis that all states of affairs, both individually and in all combinations, have causes. If we think instead in terms of causal explanation as a relation between ontologically fundamental truths, then the thesis would be that all such truths and all pluralities of such truths have causal explanations. For the sake of simplicity of exposition, I will assume that the basic relata of causation are states of affairs, but all of my arguments would apply with equal force on the alternatives.

Causal universalism invites assent because of its simplicity. However, there are two considerations that provide grounds for denying it. First, there are good reasons to embrace causal finitism, the thesis that all causal chains are finite in length, ruling out all causal cycles and infinite causal regresses. Second, the ban on causal circularity also rules out infinite regresses. Finally, if we assume that self‐causation is impossible, then causal universalism leads to a contradiction when it is applied to the totality of all states of affairs.

A. Causal Finitism

In some important recent work,2 Alexander Pruss has defended the thesis of causal finitism, the thesis that any state of affairs can have only a finite number of causes in a well‐founded network. This entails that there can be no cycles or infinite regresses, which in turn entails that causal universalism is false, since every causal network must terminate in one or more uncaused nodes.

One argument for causal finitism relies on a family of hypothetical “super tasks,” such as the Grim Reaper paradox of Jóse Benardete.3 Benardete asks us to imagine a victim, Fred, who is assailed by an infinite phalanx of would‐be executioners, the Grim Reapers. Each Grim Reaper is assigned a deadline between midnight and 12:01 a.m.: if the Reaper finds Fred alive at its assigned moment (because no earlier Reaper has killed him), then it kills Fred. If an earlier Reaper has already killed Fred, it does nothing. The Reapers’ assigned deadlines are arranged in the following way: for Reaper #1, the deadline is 12:01 a.m.; for Reaper #2, it is 30 seconds after midnight; for Reaper #3, it is 15 seconds after midnight; and so on, ad infinitum. There is no first Reaper (in the order of time): in order to survive any finite period after midnight, Fred must escape an infinite number of earlier deadlines (which is, per hypothesis, impossible).

The story leads quickly to a contradiction, on the assumption that Fred does not die unless one of the Reapers kills him. At least one Grim Reaper must act, since if all of the Reapers whose numbers are greater than 1 do nothing, then Reaper #1 will act. However, it is impossible for any Grim Reaper to act, since, for any n, Grim Reaper #n cannot do so unless Fred survives until its assigned deadline at seconds after midnight. It is impossible for Fred to survive that long, since Fred’s surviving until Reaper #n’s deadline entails that no Grim Reaper with a number larger than (n + 2) has acted, but, in that case, Reaper #(n + 1) must have acted.

Let us modify Benardete’s Grim Reaper scenario in order to eliminate extraneous elements for our purposes. All we need is an infinite series of Signalers, each of which is capable of receiving a signal (in the form of a finite number) from its predecessor at a pre‐assigned deadline and of sending an appropriate signal in time to its successor. Each Signaler is assigned a number, from 1 to infinity. Signaler #n acts according to the following rule: (i) if it receives a signal in the form of a number m > n from its predecessor, then it passes this number along to its successor, and (ii) if it does not receive such a signal from its predecessor, then it sends the number n as a signal to its successor. It is easy to prove that at least one Signaler will send its number to its successor: for example, if no Signaler with a number greater than 1 does so, Signaler #1 will. However, it is also impossible that any Signaler send its number to its successor. Suppose, for contradiction, that Signaler #n does so. This means that it did not receive any number greater than n from its predecessor, but this is impossible. If Signaler #(n + 1) did not receive any number m greater than (n + 1) from its predecessor, it would have sent (n + 1) to Signaler #n.

When a story like this yields a contradiction, we can use this contradiction as a way to falsify at least one of the presuppositions that led us initially to the necessarily false conclusion that the story was possible. I will argue that the presupposition of the story that we should reject is the assumption that it is possible for an event to have an infinite causal history. The story clearly assumes this, since each Signaler’s action or inaction at the moment of its assigned deadline depends on an infinite number of prior events (the signals created or transmitted by each of the preceding signalers). If no event can have an infinite causal history, then causal finitism must be necessarily true.

I have two arguments for this verdict. First, we can appeal to a version of what David Lewis called “patchwork principles.” A patchwork principle is a principle that guides us in making judgments about what is metaphysically possible. The principle relies on two assumptions. First, we assume that some particular, localized situation, S, is metaphysically possible (and so contained in some possible world w1). Second, we assume that there is a second possible world w2 with a spatiotemporal or causal structure that provides enough “room” for S to be repeated κ (where κ is a cardinal number, either finite or infinite). On these two assumptions, the patchwork principle licenses us to conclude that there is a third possible world, w3, in which a situation intrinsically identical to S has been repeated κ times (in the arrangement corresponding to the structure of w2). The picture is that w2 provides the frame, w1 the sample patch, and w3 the completed quilt.

As Lewis argued, patchwork principles are quite plausible. We seem to make use of such principles whenever we infer in everyday life that some situation that has never before occurred in exactly the way we envisage is nevertheless really possible. We take elements drawn from the actual world and arrange them hypothetically in a structure also drawn from the actual world.

If causal finitism is not necessarily true, then there is a possible world w2 in which an infinite number of situations are arranged in an infinite causal regress, with each situation causally dependent in some respect on its predecessor. We have good reason to believe that an individual Signaler scenario is possible (contained in some world w1): it is trivial to describe, for each number n, a simple electrical circuit that will do the job. Consequently, the patchwork principle entails that there must be a possible world w3 in which the infinite Signaler scenario is realized. We know, by logic alone, that this is false. Hence, causal finitism must be necessarily true.

My second argument for causal finitism, also drawing on Pruss’s work, is an inference to the best explanation. There are, in fact, a large number of paradoxes involving super tasks of various kinds. For example, Pruss has recently shown4 that, if causal finitism is false, it would be possible to construct an infinite fair lottery, a lottery in which an infinite number of outcomes are possible with exactly the same probability. For example, suppose that it were possible to flip a coin an infinite number of times (with each flip assigned its own, unique natural number) and to assemble all the results in a single announcement. If so, it would be metaphysically possible for all but one of the flips to come out Heads, in which case the sole Tails result would pick out the corresponding natural number as the winner. This would be an infinite fair lottery, since each number would have (by symmetry considerations) an equal chance of being the “winner.”

However, this is metaphysically impossible, since if it were to occur, it would force us to violate principles of rationality that are both fundamental and essential. Suppose, for example, that you and I both ran such lotteries and in both cases there was a winner. No matter how large my number is, I should assign a probability of 1 (or some number infinitely close to 1) that any other natural number selected in another infinite fair lottery is larger than mine, since there will be only finitely many numbers smaller and infinitely many greater. If we each prefer to “own” the larger number, then I have an overwhelmingly strong reason to prefer your unknown number to mine. But, you would have an equally strong reason to prefer my unknown number to yours, for the same reasons. In such a situation, we could both be exploited by a third party who is completely ignorant of both numbers, who could induce each of us to bet against his or her own number as the greater.

B. Non‐Circularity Rules Out Regresses

As Pruss has pointed out,5 there is a connection between the prohibition of circular explanations and the prohibition of causal regresses. Suppose that there is a causal regress of the form: S1, S2, S3, etc. ad infinitum, with each Si caused by Si+1. Now consider the existence of the even‐numbered situations (call this fact or plurality E) and the existence of the odd‐numbered situations, O. Clearly, E is causally explained by O, since every member of E is immediately caused by a member of O. But, for exactly similar reasons, O is causally explained by E. Since such circular explanation is impossible, so must be infinite causal regresses.

C. Pluralization

Causation cannot be circular. If every state of affairs and every plurality of state of affairs had a cause, the totality of all states of affairs (the maximum plurality) would have to have a cause. Causes are real things, so the cause of Reality itself (if we let “Reality” be the name of the plurality of all actual states of affairs) would have to be an actual state of affairs or a plurality of actual states of affairs, and so would have to be a part or a sub‐plurality of Reality. This would mean that the whole of Reality would be caused by a part, a violation of non‐circularity.

Is it reasonable to suppose that not only individual states of affairs but also pluralities of states of affairs are in the category of possible relata of causation? Yes, because we often do seek and find causes of such pluralities. For example, we might seek the cause (or causes) of the American Civil War, or of the existence of the solar system, or of the existence of the four fundamental forces. In addition, we often seek causal explanations for correlations and coincidences. In each of these cases, we are looking for the cause or causes of a plurality of states of affairs.

In his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, David Hume objects to the assumption that a plurality of things must have its cause in some distinct and separate plurality. We can, Hume argues, fully explain the plurality by explaining each of its parts, even if each of those parts is explained by another part of the same plurality.6 If we accept Hume’s principle, then we should say that Reality is causally explained so long as each state of affairs within it is explained by another state of affairs within it. However, Hume’s claim is obviously wrong‐headed. I cannot causally explain the Civil War (which is a plurality) by explaining each part of that War by reference to another part. Alexander Pruss illustrates this response well by means of his cannonball example.7 The path of a cannonball (from cannon to destination) can be divided into an infinite number of segments in such a way that there is no earliest segment. For example, we could divide it into the second half of the movement, the second half of the first half, the second half of the first quarter, etc. ad infinitum. We can now explain each part of the path causally by referring to earlier parts, and yet we clearly have not thereby explained the cannonball’s path as a whole.

III. Is There a Principle of Causation?

From section II, we can conclude that there is at least one state of affairs or plurality of states of affairs that is uncaused. We can take for granted that some states of affairs do have causes (I will set aside causal nihilism or global causal skepticism as obviously unacceptable). Is there a principled distinction between those pluralities that do and those that do not have causes? If there were no principle at all, not even a defeasible or presumptive one, then we would have to take seriously the possibility that any given situation or plurality of situations might be uncaused. Such openness to the absence of causation would lead inexorably to global skepticism about empirical or a posteriori knowledge (as well as to any a priori knowledge that depends on intuition or the intellectual appearance of truth).

All of our empirical knowledge depends on our being able to presume, with good reason, that our experiences, both sensory and mnemonic (memory‐related), and all of the other natural facts that interpose causally between those experiences and the facts that they seem to represent have been caused (and caused in the appropriate way). If we had to take seriously the possibility that they were uncaused, we would face a situation very similar to that faced by Descartes in the First Meditation,8 in which Descartes has to take seriously the possibility that all of his present experiences have been caused by a powerful demon bent on deceiving him. If we suppose instead that there is no demon but that all our present experiences have come into existence without cause, then we are no better off, since there could be no reliable correlation between uncaused experiences and the putative facts they present to us.

Without a priori knowledge of a causal principle, we would also be unable to have knowledge of the future or of any prospective future, since we could never rule out the possibility that some uncaused state of affairs could appear and influence the future in unpredictable ways.

In the absence of a causal principle, we could not even say that uncaused events are improbable. An event is improbable only if its potential causes are such as to produce the event in question only in exceptional cases. To assign an objective probability to an event is to ascribe a certain kind of cause to it, and, as a result of de Finetti’s theorem (as explained by Brian Skyrms9), it is impossible to assign subjective probabilities coherently without a tacit commitment to objective probabilities.

Moreover, we need not only a known causal principle but also a causal principle that can be known a priori (prior to and independent of all empirical knowledge). Since all of our empirical, a posteriori knowledge presupposes our rational certainty in commitment to some causal principle, that principle must be knowable a priori. Our belief in a causal principle must be constitutive of being reasonable.

In addition, the a priori causal principle must be in the form of a conditional whose antecedent is itself applicable on a priori grounds to all of our empirical data. If the applicability depended on empirical knowledge, this would make the justification of our empirical knowledge viciously circular.10 Therefore, what is needed is a principle that is itself a priori knowable and that can be applied to particular situations with a priori confidence. Such a priori knowledge is possible only in the case of necessary truths. Thus, it should apply equally to worlds that are “small” (relative to our world) and those that are large.

There are only four conditions that will meet all of these requirements. The conditions are (1) a plurality of states of affairs each of which is wholly metaphysically contingent; (2) a plurality of states of affairs each of which is possibly wholly temporal;11 (3) a plurality of state of affairs each of which is such that it is possible that an intrinsic duplicate of it have a cause; and (4) a plurality of states of affairs each of which is measurably finite (one that attributes only finite degrees of any quality or quantity to entities). I claim (without argument here, due to lack of space) that these conditions are closely related: (1) entails (2), (2) entails (3), and (3) entails (4). Thus, (4) has the widest scope and is therefore the strongest principle. I will focus here on the weakest causal principles, (1) and (2), which claim that all possibly contingent and possibly temporal pluralities have causes.

Causal Principle 1

All pluralities of states of affairs each of which is wholly contingent have joint causes.

Causal Principle 2

All pluralities of states of affairs each of which is possibly wholly temporal (locatable in time) have joint causes.

Accepting the a priori knowability of any of these causal principles is sufficient to avert the threat of global skepticism. We can know a priori that all of our sensory and mnemonic experiences and appearances are contingent and temporal in character. We can also know this a priori about any body of conceivable scientific data, including all experimental results, observations, traces, remnants, and fossils.

In contrast, here are some failed candidates of adequate causal principles:

Every plurality of non‐first events (events preceded in time by other events) has a cause.

12

Every plurality of situations not including an infinite causal regress has a cause.

Every plurality of situations that is not both cosmic in scale and low in entropy has a cause.

Each of these three principles fails to dispel the threat of Cartesian skepticism. For all I can know a priori, it might be that the states of affairs making up my present state of consciousness are all first events. I cannot know the reality of the past a priori and without any tacit appeal to causation. Similarly, the events making up my consciousness over a very short period might contain one or more infinite causal regresses, similar to the cannonball regress discussed by Pruss.13 Finally, it might well be (for all I can know a priori) that my present state of consciousness is the whole of the cosmos. I also cannot know a priori that its entropy is very high. Thus, I cannot know a priori on the basis of (5), (6), or (7) that my present state of consciousness has any cause whatsoever, much less that it has the sort of cause needed for me to have any empirical knowledge.

IV. Does the Universe Have a Cause?

We’re finally in a position to answer the main question: does the universe have a cause? To begin with, what is the universe? We could simply define the universe as the complete plurality of all states of affairs that are possibly wholly temporal or wholly contingent. Defined in such a way, the universe would obviously fall within the scope of causal principles (1) or (2). Since causation is non‐circular, we can infer the existence of at least one necessary and eternal (i.e., not possibly temporal) state of affairs. We can say that the cause of the universe is simply the plurality of necessary, eternal states of affairs that are, individually or collectively, causes of some constituent of the universe. So defined, there is a unique cause of the universe.

Do we have any reason to think that there is a single necessary and eternal state of affairs that is the cause of the universe? First, compositional universalism seems plausible in the case of states of affairs, in which case the plurality of all necessary or eternal states of affairs would together compose a single state. Second, Ockham’s Razor (the rule of thumb that recommends against “multiplying entities needlessly”) would suggest that we prefer the hypothesis that there is just one such state of affairs. In addition, the apparent unity of the universe, both in terms of its having a single origin event (the Big Bang) and its being governed by a consistent and relatively simple set of natural laws, supports the singular‐cause hypothesis.

Here is the argument so far, in a nutshell:

Human beings have empirical knowledge.

Human empirical knowledge requires that we have

a priori

knowledge that our empirical data has been caused (in the appropriate way).

In order to have empirical knowledge that our data have causes, it must be that there is some property

F

such that (a) we have

a priori

knowledge of some causal principle of the form,

All pluralities of F’s have causes

; and (b) we have

a priori

knowledge that all of our empirical data has

F

.

For any

F

satisfying these two conditions, the world is a plurality of such

F

’s.

Therefore, the world has a cause (an extra‐cosmic state of affairs or plurality of such states of affairs).

The argument is clearly valid, and premises 1 through 3 strike me as virtually undeniable. So, it is premise 4 that requires the most scrutiny. Since the causal principle is a priori knowable, we can assume that it is also metaphysically necessary. A metaphysically necessary principle ought to be anthropically neutral: it should not be in any way biased toward the causation of states of affairs simply because those states of affairs are or would be somehow relevant to us. To think otherwise would be to introduce an unacceptable element of anthropocentricity into our metaphysics (something that should be, in particular, anathema to those naturalistically inclined). In addition, the property F should be essential to any state of affairs that has it: the F‐ness of the state of affairs should be a necessary consequence of the canonical description of the state of affairs in terms of its constituent entities and properties. This means that the applicability of a causal principle should not depend on its spatiotemporal location (relative to other states of affairs) or its contingent effects or consequences.

Suppose, for reductio ad absurdum, that premise 4 is false, in which case there is a scenario s1 that is consistent with our a priori knowledge and in which part (a sub‐plurality) of the universe is uncaused (because it is outside the scope of the F’s). Now consider a scenario s2 that is like s1 except that the uncaused sub‐plurality of the universe in s1 has been replaced by a plurality of state of affairs that are perfect duplicates of the present contents of my mind. Since the causal principle is anthropically neutral, s2 is as consistent with our a priori knowledge as s1 is. So, it is a priori conceivable that a mental state just like my current one be uncaused, and, since the causal principle is indifferent to the spatiotemporal location of a state of affairs, I cannot know a priori that my current state has any cause, leading to global skepticism. If global skepticism is false, premise 4 must be true.

V. Supplemental Argument: The Kalām Argument

Benardete’s Grim Reaper paradox can also be used as an argument for the finitude of the past. To reach this conclusion, we must simply replace the causal‐network patchwork principle with a temporal patchwork principle: if a scenario (described in wholly intrinsic terms) S is possible (included in a possible world w1), and there is a second world w2 containing an infinite number of disjoint temporal regions stretching infinitely far in the past, with each region large enough to accommodate S, then there is a third possible world w3 in which S is repeated an infinite number of times, stretching infinitely far into the past.

We can take the Grim Signaler scenario and try to build a world in which an infinite number of Signalers have existed, each with a deadline at the beginning of an infinite number of years stretching into the past. Given the temporal patchwork principle, we must conclude that no possible world can accommodate such an infinite past, and so such an infinite past is metaphysically impossible.

From the fact that the past is finite, we can infer that every temporal being has begun to exist at some point in the past. Causal finitism entails that there can be no infinite causal regress of temporal beginnings. Hence, there must be some temporal beginnings that are not caused by other temporal beings. To reach the conclusion that these original temporal beings have been caused to exist by some eternal (non‐temporally located) being, we can assume a much weaker causal principle, namely, the Kalām causal principle (after the medieval Islamic tradition, including al‐Kindi and al‐Gazzali, that championed this principle):

Kalām Causal Principle

: Everything that begins to exist (in time) has a cause.

Denying the Kalām causal principle would be both highly implausible and very costly in epistemological terms. We would have to take seriously the possibility that any origin event might occur uncaused at any time. There is a second variant on the Kalām, one that does not depend on using a temporal patchwork principle and a supertask to establish the finitude of the past. Instead, we can argue for the finitude of the past given just causal finitism. Suppose, for a proof by contradiction, that the past is infinite in extent even though every state of affairs has only finitely many causes. In such a case, we would eventually reach an infinite simple past, that is, an era of time infinite in duration (in the direction of the past) consisting entirely of uncaused states of affairs. If we assume again the Kalām causal principle, none of these uncaused states of affairs could have had a beginning to their existence. Hence, each must be infinitely old. Let S be one of these uncaused, beginningless, and infinitely old states of affairs. S persists throughout some infinitely long, beginningless duration T.

At this point, I can introduce a dilemma: either time itself is self‐measuring, or not. A period of time is self‐measuring if it contains sub‐periods with definite duration even in the absence of any events occurring during the period, that is, if empty time can have duration. If time can be self‐measuring in this sense, then time itself divides S into an infinite number of sub‐events, each corresponding to the existence of some persisting entity in each of the infinitely many sub‐periods of T. In this case, there is an infinite causal regress, as each sub‐event of S is caused by the immediately preceding sub‐event, in contradiction to causal finitism. If time is not self‐measuring, then it is impossible for T to have any temporal measure, since there have occurred with T no beginning or endings from which any temporal measure could be derived.

There is a third variant of the Kalām tradition (inspired by an idea of Joshua Rasmussen’s),14 one that does not even require a proof that the world has a finite past. It is sufficient if it is possible that the universe (defined as the plurality of wholly contingent states of affairs) has a finite past. If we assume that the Kalām causal principle is necessarily true, then we can infer that in any possible world w, in which the totality of wholly contingent states of affairs has a beginning in time, it must have a cause in w. The only possible cause of such a totality would have to be a necessary state of affairs. By S5,15