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Democracies are struggling to respond to the climate crisis. One promising approach to the ecological transition is based on innovations involving panels of citizens drawn at random. Many countries have experimented with this form of deliberative democracy at national and local levels. These citizens’ assemblies formulate public policy proposals.
The French Citizens' Convention for Climate is the largest in terms of size, duration and mandate. Thanks to a multi-disciplinary field survey involving around twenty researchers, this book provides an understanding of the complexity of this experience from several angles: procedures and processes; the identity and roles of its members; relationships with expertise and representatives; evaluation and comparison with other cases.
Deliberative Democracy and Ecological Transition plays an important role in reflecting on an original practice of democratic innovation and its potential for fair governance of climate policies.
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Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2025
Cover
Table of Contents
Title Page
Copyright Page
Endorsements
Acknowledgements
Introduction Multi-disciplinary Analysis of a Complex Deliberative Process
I.1. Deliberative mini-publics, elsewhere and previously
I.2. An exceptional scheme
I.3. A cross-disciplinary study to move past an oversimplistic narrative
I.4. Presentation of the book
I.5. An atypical field study for a multidisciplinary collective
I.6. References
PART 1: A Complex Deliberative Process
1 Genesis and Evolution of the Citizens’ Convention for Climate
1.1. Precursors and context: the Grand débat national and the citizen group of the ESEC
1.2. A negotiated and hybrid device: between militant lobbying and political strategy
1.3. Modifications and crises
1.4. Conclusion
1.5. References
2 Governing Committee and Political Role
2.1. Self-government or external leadership of citizens’ assemblies
2.2. Composition of the governing committee: a political negotiation
9
2.3. Role of the governing committee and scope of autonomy
2.4. “Sovereignty” of the Convention
2.5. Conclusion: an innovative participatory device or a new form of democratic representation
2.6. References
3 Comparing Ireland’s Citizens’ Assembly and France’s Citizens’ Convention
3.1. Random selection to the rescue of democracy and ecology
3.2. Ireland’s Citizens’ Assembly: between citizen autonomy and control by the managers
3.3. Comparative analysis with France’s Convention: a more partial but more productive deliberation
3.4. Conclusion
3.5. Acknowledgements
3.6. References
4 The Pandemic and Conflicts of Legitimacy: Session 6bis
4.1. Accelerated improvisation
4.2. Influences on the Co-Chairs’ and citizens’ reactions
4.3. Management, selection and cascading votes
4.4. Media leak and crisis within the governing committee
4.5. Conclusion
4.6. References
PART 2: Convention Members and Public Opinion
5 France in Miniature: The Descriptive Legitimacy of the Random Selection Process
5.1. Initial recruitment of the 150 citizens
5.2. Changes in the Convention’s composition as it progressed
5.3. Sociodemographic characteristics of the participants in the Citizens’ Convention for Climate
5.4. Composition of the thematic groups
5.5. References
6 Profiles and Opinions of the Convention Members Compared to Those of the Population
6.1. Introduction
6.2. Statistical representativity
6.3. Deliberative citizens
6.4. The general public’s perceptions of the Convention
6.5. Conclusion
6.6. References
7 The Convention Members’ Opinions on Climate Measures
7.1. Originally, mass support for the measures... with three exceptions
7.2. Sociodemography of the support for the climate measures
7.3. Perceptions relating to climate change and support for the measures
7.4. Trust, life satisfaction, expectations and degree of support for the measures
7.5. Citizens divided on the issue of the carbon tax, from the outset
7.6. Evolution of the degree of support for the measures over the course of the Convention
7.7. Conclusion
7.8. References
PART 3: Deliberations, Proposals and Expertise
8 Deliberative Impartiality and Legitimacy of the Influences
8.1. Impartiality as a deliberative imperative
8.2. Objectivizing impartiality
8.3. Around the citizens: politically committed organizers and experts
8.4. Evaluating attempts to influence: modes of interaction and legitimacy
8.5. Conclusion: proceduralizing impartiality
8.6. References
9 Roles of the Experts and of the Citizens in Devising the Measures Put Forward: The Thematic Group “Housing”
9.1. Characteristics and issues surrounding “Housing” as a field
9.2. Experts and stakeholders
9.3. Development and progression of the measures
9.4. Role of the citizens, and role of the experts
9.5. The measures, and what became of them
9.6. Conclusion
9.7. References
10 The Relationships to Expertise in Light of “Technical” Democracy
10.1. The C3 in line with a dialog-based model?
10.2. Acting in a situation of “consensus on the diagnosis”
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10.3. Expanding the approach to the climate problem
10.4. Relaying the experts’ proposals, and making them fairer
10.5. Conclusion
10.6. References
11 Getting Around the Issue of the “Carbon Tax”
11.1. Initial rejection of the “carbon tax”
11.2. In search of substitute measures
11.3. Conclusion
11.4. References
PART 4: Social Movements, Justice and Exceptions
12 Conceptions of Social, Environmental and Climate Justice
12.1. Definitions of social, environmental and climate justice
12.2. Political and organizational frameworks
12.3. Debates on social justice in Session 2 of the C3
12.4. A step toward environmental and climate justice
12.5. Conclusion
12.6. References
13 Contestation and Deliberation: Activists and the Randomly Selected Citizens
13.1. An organization open to social dynamics
13.2. Diversity of interactions between activists and randomly selected citizens
13.3. Moving past the dichotomy between contestation and deliberation
13.4. References
14 Representativity and Exceptionality: Citizens from Overseas and Co-decision
14.1. Dynamics of co-decision on public policy and construction of the research object
14.2. Descriptive representativity and political representation: the exceptionality of the Overseas Territories
14.3. The argument of exceptionality
14.4. Conclusion
14.5. Acknowledgements
14.6. References
PART 5: Comparisons, Filters and Accountability
15 The Bürgerrat Klima: Germany’s Informal Model for Integrating Citizen Deliberation into Politics
15.1. Bürgerrat Klima’s internal characteristics
15.2. The Assembly’s integrative characteristics
15.3. Conclusion
15.4. References
16 Ambiguities of the Phrase “With No Filter” and the Necessary Filters
16.1. “With no filter”: the ambiguity of a promise
16.2. The filters of the Convention
16.3. Legal filters
16.4. The lacking filters of conceptions of justice
16.5. Evaluation of the accountability process
16.6. Conclusion: filters as “fictions”, necessary for mutual understanding
16.7. References
Conclusion The Filters of Evaluation of Mini-publics
C.1. Evaluation as a conflictive issue: doing better than the GDN
C.2. No analysis without descriptive and normative filters
C.3. The filters represented by the criteria used, and adherence to them
C.4. Justifications of the criteria
C.5. Presuppositions
C.6. With and beyond Habermasian fiction and Rawlsian conjecture
C.7. References
List of Authors
Index
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Chapter 3
Table 3.1. The division of the labor of deliberation: typology of actors linke...
Table 3.2. Comparison of the processes by which the mini-publics came about
Table 3.3. Comparison between the ICA and the C3
Chapter 5
Table 5.1. Process of recruitment of the group of citizens
Table 5.2. The sociodemographic characteristics of the recruitment and of the ...
Table 5.3. Sociodemographic characteristics used for recruitment and control v...
Table 5.4. Gender and age per thematic group of those present at the second: “...
Chapter 6
Table 6.1. Comparison of respondents to the questions on policies in sessions ...
Chapter 7
Table 7.1. Proportion of respondents in favor of the different measures, as a ...
Table 7.2. Proportion of respondents in favor the various measures, depending ...
Table 7.3. Proportion of respondents in favor of the various measures, dependi...
Table 7.4. Proportion of respondents in favor of the different measures, as a ...
Table 7.5. Proportion of respondents in favor of the various measures, as a fu...
Table 7.6. Degree of support for a carbon tax depending on the way in which th...
Chapter 14
Table 14.1. Observation of amendments concerning the Overseas Territories tabl...
Chapter 15
Table 15.1. The governance structure of Bürgerrat Klima
Chapter 6
Figure 6.1. “Do you believe that climate change is due... (Select only one optio...
Figure 6.2. “Of these three opinions on the climate disruption, which is closest...
Figure 6.3. “Do you believe that climate change will be limited to acceptable le...
Figure 6.4. “If climate change continues, in your opinion, what will be the cons...
Figure 6.5. “Do you believe that France should lead the way over other countries...
Figure 6.6. Responses 1 or 2 to the following question: “In your view, what are ...
Figure 6.7. “Of these four opinions, which is closest to your own?”
Figure 6.8. “Do you believe that climate change needs to be tackled by public po...
Figure 6.9. Citizens in the C3. “For each of the measures that could be adopted ...
Figure 6.10. PSE external survey. “For each of the measures that could be adopte...
Figure 6.11. PSE external survey. “Would you be in favor of the following enviro...
Figure 6.12. PSE external survey. “If there were a referendum on the following m...
Figure 6.13. “Generally speaking, would you say that...? (1) You can trust most ...
Figure 6.14. “At the beginning of this Citizens’ Convention, what is your level ...
Figure 6.15. “Do you have the feeling of personally dealing with major difficult...
Figure 6.16. “How satisfied are you with the life you lead? [scale from 0 (Absol...
Figure 6.17. “To what extent do you agree with the following statement: “In orde...
Figure 6.18. “Here is a list of qualities which are often encouraged in children...
Figure 6.19. “In relation to the schooling system, which of the following two op...
Figure 6.20. “For each of the following things, state how important it is to you...
Figure 6.21. “For each of the following things, state how important it is to you...
Figure 6.22. “For each of the following things, state how important it is to you...
Figure 6.23. PSE external survey. “Have you heard of the Citizens’ Convention fo...
Figure 6.24. PSE external survey. Responses to the open question: “Describe what...
Figure 6.25. PSE external survey. Sample of individuals who did not answer “No” ...
Figure 6.26. PSE external survey. Sample of individuals who did not answer “No” ...
Figure 6.27. PSE external survey. Sample of individuals who did not answer “No” ...
Figure 6.28. PSE external survey. Sample of individuals who did not answer “No” ...
Figure 6.29. PSE external survey. Sample of individuals who answered “No” to the...
Figure 6.30. “What is your level of trust in the ability of randomly selected ci...
Figure 6.31. PSE external survey. “Would you be in favor of a constitutional ref...
Chapter 7
Figure 7.1. Degree of support for different climate measures (session 1, on entr...
Figure 7.2. Correlation between the degree of approval for the various measures ...
Figure 7.3. Correlation between support for different types of carbon taxes depe...
Cover Page
Table of Contents
Title Page
Copyright Page
Endorsements
Acknowledgements
Introduction
Begin Reading
Conclusion
List of Authors
Index
Other titles from iSTE in Ecological Science
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Planetary Changes, Decision, Governance Set
coordinated byJoël Guiot and Bernard Reber
Volume 1
Edited by
Dimitri Courant
Bernard Reber
First published 2025 in Great Britain and the United States by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Apart from any fair dealing for the purposes of research or private study, or criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, this publication may only be reproduced, stored or transmitted, in any form or by any means, with the prior permission in writing of the publishers, or in the case of reprographic reproduction in accordance with the terms and licenses issued by the CLA. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside these terms should be sent to the publishers at the undermentioned address:
ISTE Ltd27-37 St George’s RoadLondon SW19 4EUUKwww.iste.co.uk
John Wiley & Sons, Inc.111 River StreetHoboken, NJ 07030USAwww.wiley.com
© ISTE Ltd 2025The rights of Dimitri Courant and Bernard Reber to be identified as the authors of this work have been asserted by them in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s), contributor(s) or editor(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of ISTE Group.
Library of Congress Control Number: 2025933200
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication DataA CIP record for this book is available from the British LibraryISBN 978-1-83669-006-1
“The French Citizens’ Convention for Climate was a true landmark in the history of citizen deliberation. Featuring contributors with intimate knowledge of the Convention and the capacity to bring to bear broader insights, this book is the perfect guide to how the Convention happened and worked, what went right, what went wrong, how it affected climate policy outcomes, and how it compares with other important deliberative processes.” – John S. Dryzek, Distinguished Professor, University of Canberra.
“A magisterial overview of a unique national experiment – the French Citizens’ Convention on Climate Change. This is indispensable reading for anyone trying to understand the context and the complexities of this important initiative.” – James Fishkin and Janet M. Peck, Professor of International Communication, Stanford University.
“The edited volume by Dimitri Courant and Bernard Reber on the French Citizens’ Convention for Climate is not only one of the most comprehensive case studies I ever read, but derives convincingly general conclusions. Applying a variety of methods, scholars cover the complete process, look at a variety of involved actors and address crucial topics such as justice, accountability and legitimacy. The book is highly recommended for everybody working on mini-publics.” – Brigitte Geißel, Professor for Comparative Politics, Goethe-University Frankfurt a.M.
“At a time when democracies are under siege around the globe, it is crucial to understand new ways to involve citizens more directly in constructive solutions to societal problems. Courant, Reber and their colleagues’ multidisciplinary and nuanced analysis of the 2019/20 French Citizens’ Convention for Climate provides important and actionable insights about the role of deliberative democracy in the ecological transition.” – Elke U. Weber and Gerhard R. Andlinger, Professor in Energy and the Environment, Professor of Psychology and Public Affairs, Princeton University.
“This book provides a reflective account of La Convention Citoyenne pour le Climat, drawing on rigorous research and critical analysis to unpack its complexities. Moving beyond celebratory narratives and simplistic critiques, it offers a nuanced examination of one of the most ambitious and contested experiments in deliberative democracy. Essential reading for supporters, sceptics, and the undecided alike, this work sheds light on the role of citizens’ assemblies in shaping climate action.” – Nicole Curato, Professor of Democratic Governance, University of Birmingham.
“Citizens’ assemblies on climate change are an exciting democratic innovation that promise to move political debate and policy on climate forward and in the right direction. Courant and Reber’s edited volume is a painstakingly researched detailed account of the French Citizens’ Climate Convention arguable the most significant such democratic experiment to date. Bringing together democratic innovation theory with climate policy science, this book is a must read for all of us interested in how democracies can and should deal with climate insecurity.” – Simone Chambers, Professor of Political Science, University of California Irvine.
“Taking on an absolutely urgent problem, France’s ambitious Citizens’ Convention for Climate was a study in political complexity, embedded in political ecology comprised of the president, parliament, experts, advocacy groups, industry, and the broader public. As a result of an extensive study by a multidisciplinary collective of 20, the book addresses the challenges of citizens’ assemblies as no other study has done. Essential reading for anyone interested in innovative democratic approaches to wicked problems.” – Mark E. Warren, Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Emeritus Merilees Chair for the Study of Democracy, University of British Columbia.
“The French Citizens’ Convention for the Climate achieved a level of political and public recognition that is rare for a citizens’ assembly. But its significance and impact remain widely contested. Dimitri Courant and Bernard Reber’s wide-ranging collection offers us a clearer understanding of the context, organization and impact of the Convention. The scope and sensitivity of the analyses are particularly impressive because many of the authors were present at the Convention itself, so draw on first-hand experience and knowledge. Deliberative Democracy and Ecological Transition sets the terms for a more sophisticated and nuanced debate”. – Graham Smith, Professor of Politics, Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster – Chair of Knowledge Network on Climate Assemblies.
The work presented in this book received support from the European Union (Horizon Europe 2020, Research and Innovation Program, project No. 872 441), “Participatory Real Life Experiments in Research and Innovation Funding Organisations on Ethics”1 and the Centre des politiques de la terre (Université Paris Cité-Sciences Po-Institut de Physique du Globe de Paris); Project “Responsiveness : ajustement, sensibilité et réactivité des savoirs pour la transition écologique. La Convention citoyenne pour le climat”.
In particular, the editors wish to thank:
the contributing authors for their participation in the book;
the organizers and citizens who took the time to give us interviews;
the citizens who made the effort to respond to our questionnaires;
the
CESE
(ESEC) for hosting the C3;
the handful of observing researchers who did not contribute to this book, but participated in our work of pooling observations from the thematic groups: Hazem Arab, Nicolas Berghmans, Jean-Yves Boulin, Eric Buge, Amy Dahan, Hélène Landemore, Claire Mellier, Sylvain Mounier, Ana Póvoas and Philippe Stamenkovic;
the participants at the conference “Convention Citoyenne pour le climat : premiers résultats de la recherche” (C3: initial research findings) (Paris, 17–18 November 2020) for their questions and comments;
the participants and the team at Princeton University for the lecture on “Deliberative Climate Politics: from citizens’ assemblies to responsive democratic systems?” (Princeton, 26 October 2022) for their questions and comments (in particular, Christopher H. Achen, Jan-Werner Müller and Deborah Yashar).
Dimitri Courant also wishes to thank the Universities of Lausanne, Paris 8, Princeton and Harvard for providing the necessary conditions to bring this project to fruition.
Chapter written by Dimitri Courant, Bernard Reber.
1
See:
https://pro-ethics.eu/
.
Dimitri COURANT and Bernard REBER1
Of all of the issues facing today’s world, climate is the most crucial. However, as we face the prospect of an unprecedented disaster, the institutions of what is termed “representative democracy” appear to be relatively impotent. They are afflicted by: short-term vision linked to relatively short electoral cycles; the preponderance of lobbyists and interest groups; reticence to change on the part of general populations; difficulties in effecting systemic transitions; etc. Clearly, there is no shortage of challenges. As a potential remedy, while some people advocate a so-called “green dictatorship”, others propose innovative democratic measures. Such innovations would ensure pluralism and efforts to find compromise. Above all, they would ensure an informed, collective decision-making process, in line with the freedoms that the Rule of Law States guarantee to their citizens. The goal of this approach is to enhance citizen participation, improve the quality of political deliberation, and adopt an alternative method for making long-term decisions; decisions that are urgently needed but that elected officials, constrained by short-term popularity, are reluctant to take. In recent years, many citizens’ assemblies on the climate issue have been held in the Global North. However, these assemblies do not always share the same goals. France’s Convention citoyenne pour le climat (C3 – Citizens’ Convention for Climate) leads the pack in this area, in terms of size, duration and the number of political proposals it produced. With an official mandate from the French government, the C3 included 150 citizens selected at random, making up a diverse panel designed to represent the diversity of French society. Launched in October 2019, participants listened to presentations from guest experts, deliberated for nine months, and put forward 149 recommendations to the French President in June 2020. In February 2021, a final session was held for the citizens to appraise the government’s response to the recommendations. This lengthy process involved organizers, facilitators, experts, representatives of special interest groups, journalists, and political figures. Any worthy analysis of the C3 must reflect the complexity and richness of the process. In order to analyze and evaluate the C3, a group of researchers worked throughout the Convention – and indeed outside and beyond it – conducting observations, surveys, and interviews. Their work is intended to be more than merely a simplified overview of this extraordinary initiative.
What lessons can be drawn from the Citizens’ Convention for Climate? Is it possible to combine deliberative democracy with an ecological transition that advances social justice? These two questions are addressed throughout this book. Their implications extend beyond France. The French President, Emmanuel Macron, later opined that the question put to the Convention – “How can we achieve a 40% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030, in keeping with the spirit of social justice?” – was too broad. Nevertheless, this question is at the heart of the balance which needs to be struck in order to bring about an ecological transition within any democracy, where decision-making and sustainable implementation are informed by true deliberation (Reber 2023).
Hereafter in this introduction, we will briefly examine the C3’s place in relation to similar initiatives; specifically, the constellation of deliberative mini-publics, which pre-date the C3 by some distance. Thus, it was not a radical innovation which came out of nowhere. However, we will underline some of the features which set it apart from other initiatives (it was notably distinguished by its exceptional scale). We will then describe how this book is structured and provide overviews of the individual chapters. Finally, we will reflect on the unusual research carried out in this field study, by a multi-disciplinary group of some twenty researchers, studying just one experiment (an extraordinarily high number). The conclusion completes this reflection and looks at the problem of evaluation: the levels, bases, and criteria used. Indeed, the assessment criteria and the way in which they are interpreted serve as filters to allow for an analysis to be carried out. The aim of this book is to analyze the process of the C3, with all its strengths and weaknesses, in order to enrich our knowledge of citizen deliberation, in particular, on climate policies.
The C3 would not have been possible, or even conceivable, without the development of other deliberative mini-publics, over a long period of time. Mini-publics constitute a type of democratic innovation (i.e. a set of practices and devices which allow for the involvement of ordinary citizens beyond the usual context of voting and elections, social movements, or trade unions). Widely varying arguments have been employed to justify these practices, based on a range of democratic theories or simple interpretations of guidelines to lend them legitimacy. Such is the case, for example, with the theory of deliberative democracy (Reber 2011a, 2011b, 2023; Bächtiger et al. 2018). At least four types of democratic innovations can be distinguished: 1) local assemblies and participatory budgeting; 2) referenda and popular initiatives; 3) “e-democracy” (electronic/digital); and 4) mini-publics constituted by random selection (Smith 2009; Elstub and Escobar 2019). Mini-publics are diverse panels of citizens selected at random, who deliberate on one or more political issues, and make recommendations (Grönlund et al. 2014; Harris 2019). The lottery procedures are combined with selection criteria to ensure that the diversity of the resulting panel reflects that of society.
After the advent of commonly known legal juries (or lay juries) (Gissinger-Bosse 2019), it was not until the early 1970s that new randomly selected citizens’ assemblies emerged. We can point to at least six generations of mini-publics (Courant and Sintomer 2019). First of all, in 1969 in France, came the launch of the Conseil supérieur de la fonction militaire (High Council of Military Function). It was the world’s first mini-public, but also the longest-lasting and the first permanent assembly of randomly selected members in the 20th century. This deliberative body brings together 80 military personnel who are proportionally representative of the various ranks and groups within the army twice a year. It then produces a report that is submitted directly to the Minister for Defense (Courant 2019b).
Subsequently, in the 1970s, came the citizens’ juries and planning cells, set up respectively in the USA and Germany (Dienel and Renn 1995; Crosby and Nethercut 2005; Vergne 2010). In the 1980s, the Danish Board of Technology organized a number of “consensus conferences” to produce reports on controversial technologies. Other European countries, including Switzerland, used this same model to implement “hybrid forums” (Joss and Bellucci 2002; Hendriks 2005; Reber 2005, 2011). France also adopted them, albeit much later than Denmark. However, in France, they are held less frequently and are known as citizens’ conferences (Boy et al. 2000; Bourg and Boy 2005). All of these democratic innovations brought together between 15 and 40 citizens for three weekends. Thus, they were on a smaller scale than those which were to follow. France also experimented with citizens’ conferences within a larger setting: the États généraux de la bioéthique (Reber 2010). This very French name harkens back to the country’s historical Estates General.
In the 1990s, deliberative polls offered greater representativity, thanks to the larger number of participants (between 100 and 600). However, they were a decrease in terms of deliberative production, as they merely expressed the “enlightened opinion” of a representative sample through surveys, instead of asking the panel to produce recommendations on public policies (Fishkin 2009; Mansbridge 2010).
The next stage takes us from the 2000s up to today, with Citizens’ assemblies commissioned by the state, made up of between 100 and 200 participants. Pilot projects in this direction have been run in Canada (Warren and Pearse 2008; Lang 2010), the Netherlands (Fournier et al. 2011), Ireland (Suiter et al. 2019; Courant 2021), France (Reber 2020), the United Kingdom, and many other countries. In parallel to these “state-led citizens’ assemblies”, NGOs have organized “civil society-led citizens’ assemblies” (Courant 2019a) in Belgium (Caluwaerts and Reuchamps 2018), Iceland (Bergmann 2016), Germany (see Chapter 15) and Australia (Carson et al. 2013). Similar initiatives have also been set up by universities (Reber 2011b).
Finally, in the 2010s, many US states set up a Citizens’ Initiative Review (CIR): a deliberative panel of around thirty participants, charged with producing a statement to inform voters about the opportunities and risks surrounding an upcoming referendum (Knobloch et al. 2015). This process was replicated in Switzerland at local level in 2019 by the Demoscan project2.
These experimental programs, of which only a small number are mentioned here, give some indication of the multitude of mini-publics that can be envisaged. “Citizens’ conventions” could be included in this category of citizens’ assemblies. Though this list is not exhaustive, it is important to note that multiple “citizens’ assemblies on climate” have taken place, both at national level (Germany, UK, Austria, Denmark, Scotland, Spain, the Netherlands) and at regional and local levels (in France in the Occitanie region, and in the metropoles of Grenoble, Nantes and Est Ensemble near Paris; in the USA, in Washington state; in the UK, in numerous cities). However, France’s Citizens’ Convention for Climate can be considered an “influential” or “important” case (Seawright and Gerring 2008), on both a social and a political level. It should be noted that the scale of the C3 was unprecedented in terms of the duration and the civic commitment required of the participants, size, the resources made available, the degree of media coverage, and the level of the official mandate. Thus, the C3 has unparalleled international recognition, including among the academic community.
Arising in the context of a political crisis, and in the wake of the Grand débat national (GDN, Great national debate) (Courant 2019c; Reber and Buge 2020), the C3 was an extraordinary deliberative device. Readers can refer to the various chapters for details on how it was created (Chapters 1–4 and 16), and details of the work that took place in the thematic groups (Chapters 8–11). For example, Graham Smith (2022) – the driving force behind the KNOCA (Knowledge Network On Climate)3, who consequently has an excellent comparative perspective – describes it as the “crest of what the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development terms the ‘deliberative wave’” (OECD 2020), but also as “‘aberrant data’ in terms of social sciences” (p. 261). This exceptionality means the C3 can “play an important role in re-examining the principles established by the practice of holding deliberative mini-publics”. Smith states:
[The C3] is an exception to the rule, in the sense that it actually gained a political profile and has become an object of public concern, more than has any other deliberative mini-public. This will be an uncomfortable realization for those [...] who believe it achieved such heights by undermining the commonly accepted core principles of deliberative theory (p. 279)4.
With an official mandate from the public authorities, and made up of 150 (or rather, 1605) citizens drawn at random and weighted on the basis of six socio-demographic criteria6, it discussed and deliberated over the course of nine months, before submitting its proposals to the French government. The C3 began working in early October 2019. Its mission, set out by the Prime Minister, was to make recommendations in response to the question: “how can we reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 40% by 2030, in keeping with the spirit of social justice?”. The body had considerable financial resources (6,655,465€)7 at its disposal, along with institutional and human resources: the support of the Conseil économique, social et environnemental (ESEC, Economic, Social and Environmental Council); three firms of professional facilitators; fact checkers; and internal experts including a legislative committee, this latter being an innovative feature (Reber 2020, Chapter 16). The C3 heard contributions from many speakers in topic-specific subgroups (TGs, for Thematic Groups) and in plenary sessions. The exchanges between members, usually in these thematic sub-groups of thirty people – which were sometimes subdivided themselves – were extremely lengthy, over intense weekend sessions which began early on Friday afternoons and concluded on Sunday afternoons (see Chapters 8–14).
Originally intended to complete its work by January 2020, the Convention worked over a period of nine months and, in June 2020, put forward 149 proposals which were directly transmitted to the Minister for Ecological (see Chapter 1). The President then received the citizens in the gardens of the Élysée to deliver his initial response. In addition to the announcement of his intention to carry forward 146 out of the 149 proposals in the Convention’s report, the President had another surprise in store. He invited those Convention members who were willing and able to present the proposals themselves and advocate in defense of them, in hearings within the Ministries, as part of the drafting of the “Climate and Resilience” law. The first line of this law states that it was “derived from the work of the Citizens’ Convention for Climate”8. Everyone was taken aback by this invitation to present the report; not least the governing committee, several of whose members felt that it was a bad idea. However, this certainly unusual invitation9 could have been interpreted as the implementation of the famous (and much criticized) undertaking to transmit the Convention members’ proposals to government “with no filter” (see Chapter 16). Clearly, this extension of the process, and of the time they were required to be available, was particularly favorable to those Convention members who lived and worked in Paris. It should also be noted that not all members had a detailed understanding of all of the measures, which were sometimes dependent on a few proponents (see Chapter 8). Furthermore, the impact that the citizens’ contributions may have had during the Ministry meetings was not clear. The majority of those questioned on the subject expressed their frustration, feeling that the exercise primarily served as an opportunity for the administration and interest groups to justify their decisions in rejecting or amending the proposals put forward by the C3. In addition, the Convention members had no mandate to negotiate on the amendment of their text. Furthermore, they were divided after submitting their report.
This book aims to establish certain truths about the Citizens’ Convention for Climate (C3), on the basis of cross-referenced analytical work, alongside direct observations over an extended period of time. The journalists who were occasionally present have also written about the Convention, sometimes in a rather slapdash manner, and always from a very limited perspective. A number of the organizers have also produced their own analyses and testimony (Pech 2021). However, they tend to lack a critical perspective, and at best, engage in self-assessment. Several researchers have published articles on the basis of only tenuous observations. On the other hand, there have been few publications based on continuous observations of the C3, numerous in-depth interviews and individual questionnaires, supplemented by theoretical knowledge and empirically proven data on deliberative democracy10. This book is the first collection of articles from the multidisciplinary group of researchers who closely and steadfastly observed the work of the Convention11.
The gulf between these detailed analyses and the simplistic “narrative” (the latter being far from a detailed reflection of the C3) should be pointed out. However, this narrative has come to be generally accepted over time. It could be summarized as follows: a group of randomly selected citizens made up a convention and did remarkable work. They produced bold and relevant proposals impartially to speed up the ecological transition in keeping with the spirit of social justice, which the French President and his government then failed to act upon12. The emergence of this simplified narrative is a subject that, in itself, merits attention. A large share of responsibility for such a narrative is borne by the political opposition: elected representatives can constantly be heard to peremptorily declare that the government did not take any of the Convention’s proposals on board, and even confuse the Convention with the Grand Débat National (GDN). One example of this can be seen in this statement made by Jean-François Copé (Républicains) on a public channel with a wide viewership: “when he [Emmanuel Macron] selected the citizens at random, and heard the proposals which emerged, he chose to follow through on absolutely none of them”13.
In addition to understanding and improving the conduct of such deliberative experiments, the book questions this “narrative”, which is taken as a condemnation. Our aim is to give a proper account of matters, of the complex process of bringing this sociopolitical experiment to life (Chapter 1), how it was conducted and the improvisations that had to be made (Chapters 4, 8 and 16), the quality of the deliberations and the proposals (Chapters 3, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 11), and the formidable and particular task involved in providing accountability on the Convention (Chapter 16), in which the government engaged. Indeed, while research on deliberation shows accountability to be a crucial element, in practice it is a step that is rarely taken by the powers that be. In addition, the accountability in this case does not correspond to either a full or partial account of the proposals themselves, but rather of the justifications for adopting, rejecting or adapting them. Such adaptations follow different types of logic: contextual, political and legal. A full and true account may have called for Parliament to become involved, by once again amending the draft bill on “Climate and Resilience”. However, some feel that the promise of relaying the proposals “with no filter” went further than a simple commitment to an exercise in justification (see Chapter 16).
Analyzing an experiment such as the C3 while taking account of the context in which it emerged, developed and evolved, presents a very real challenge. By way of illustration, one of the documentaries14 about the C3, broadcast on the television channel ARTE, did not accurately reflect the different actors involved, their roles, and the phases included in the process. Certainly, the C3 was far more sophisticated than Ireland’s assemblies (see Chapter 3), which have, nevertheless, often been held up as exemplary in narratives legitimizing the C315. In addition, the makers of this documentary were pressured by the broadcaster to present it as a series of portraits of Convention members. This is an often-employed approach to avoid viewer disengagement, though it tends to reinforce the producer’s point of view in order to create a sense of drama. The process involved in leading tense discussions toward deliberation is not easy to depict. Incidents during the exchanges, or the rehashing of little phrases muttered on the sidelines, make for more engaging viewing experience.
Using different disciplines (together with their constraints) that – at times – operate together, the chapters that make up this book are designed to draw the reader in and offer real insight into this complex process. They go beyond mere narratives, addressing the more demanding task of interpreting this tumultuous and multi-faceted experiment, or assessing it in light of what is expected of deliberation: a prime interpretative concept (Dworkin 2015). In a manner of speaking, this book serves as a Session 9, which would have been the C3’s evaluation session, given that in Session 8, the Convention members judged the government’s only partial uptake of their proposals very harshly (see Chapter 16).
The book’s sixteen chapters are divided into five parts, which bring contributions from twenty researchers together.
Part 1 presents the deliberative process from various angles, in particular, the negotiations by which the C3 was established and the tensions it resulted in.
In Chapter 1, Dimitri Courant provides a wealth of detail on the context of political crisis and the largely unknown premises underlying the C3. The story that most actors like to tell – for example, the activist documentary-maker Cyril Dion, who served as a guarantor for the C3 – is overly simple and partial. With the meticulous analysis in this chapter, it becomes clear that the creation of the C3 resulted from the momentary coalescence of very different actors: the government, professionals in participation and “sortition activists”, ecological activists, and finally the ESEC. The interests of these groups briefly converged, giving rise to a citizens’ assembly that was prone to various sources of tension. Even after it was established, the C3 was continually punctuated by crises, which are presented in this contribution. Such a context may make it seem surprising that the C3 was ultimately capable of accomplishing its mission.
Chapter 2 provides an insight into the workings of the governing committee. It is written by one of the members of that committee, Jean-Michel Fourniau, who is also a researcher. The chapter presents the fault lines of conflict which divided the committee and reflects on the political role of the C3. It deals with the issues of power raised by running and organizing citizens’ assemblies, depending on how these political exercises are conceived: as an innovative participatory scheme or as a new form of democratic representation. These different interpretations were palpable during the political negotiation which led to the formation of the governing committee as a “representative” entity. This in turn affected the way in which the committee worked.
Chapter 3 compares the C3 with its forerunners in Ireland, the success of which was an argument in favor of the C3. Ireland offers a particularly pertinent case study, as the only country where so many assemblies took place at a national level. Additionally, some of the proposals made were then ratified by referendum, particularly, same-sex marriage and the right to abortion. Having directly observed the cases in Ireland, Dimitri Courant describes their deliberative process and compares it to that of the C3. While the Irish assembly produced fewer recommendations, its way of working ensured that the deliberation was more collective and more fairly balanced. Conversely, in France, the choice was made to have a higher proportion of experts, and have the citizens specialize in particular areas, with very small groups working almost exclusively on one or two specific proposals. This led to a higher rate of productivity, with 149 detailed measures put forward.
In Chapter 4, Bernard Reber and Nathalie Blanc examine one of the events that has been forgotten from the collective memory and omitted from the C3’s website: Session 6bis, which was held by videoconference. The purpose was to “jump on board” with the economic recovery plan to deal with the impact of Covid-19, and the session put proposals forward to the government which the members had not yet voted on. They therefore opted not to make that transmission to the government public. While it went almost unnoticed by the media, two major newspapers, Alternatives économiques and Le Monde, broke the embargo the following Monday, violating the deontological rules of the moral contract with the organizers and the Convention members’ vote to keep that communication with the government confidential.
Part 2 presents the results of quantitative surveys of the Convention members and public opinion.
In Chapter 5, Jean-Michel Fourniau, Bénédicte Apouey and Solène Tournus analyze the manner in which the random selection of participants was run. It was subject to selection criteria on the composition of the assembly by those who had agreed to commit to a process that was originally planned to last seven weekends, over the course of five months. They study what they term the descriptive legitimacy of this “France in miniature”. Its perceived legitimacy is based on its descriptive representativity of the population (the fact of “resembling” the population it represented). The chapter presents the selection process in great detail. Tables depict how the citizens were whittled down over time and recap the distribution of citizens present at the sessions in terms of the various sociodemographic characteristics employed for selection, in particular, their level of education, which is often overlooked.
Drawing on questionnaires handed out during the sessions, Chapter 6 compares the profiles and opinions of Convention members on deliberation, climate policy, and values, to those of the French population as a whole, on the basis of two surveys. This research, conducted by Adrien Fabre, Bénédicte Apouey, Thomas Douenne, Jean-Michel Fourniau, Louis-Gaëtan Giraudet, Jean-François Laslier and Solène Tournus, provides an idea of how the C3 was perceived by the population at large. The C3 appears relatively well representative of the population of France. Even though from the outset, the citizens that composed the C3 were more in favor of climate-oriented policies than the general population, practically all of the measures the C3 proposed are supported by a majority of the population. However, the chapter demonstrates the lack of knowledge and mistrust among the population toward the C3, which respondents do not consider to be fully representative.
Chapter 7 analyzes the questionnaires distributed at the start and end of each session. These questionnaires recorded the individual opinions of Convention members on twelve climate-related measures (including raising the carbon tax and lowering the speed limit on national highways to 110 km/h), together with their understanding of global warming. These data are cross-referenced with some of the participants’ sociodemographic characteristics and their degree of trust in the government. Through this approach, Bénédicte Apouey, Thomas Douenne and Jean-François Laslier document certain gaps between these individual responses and the results of final votes and also show shifts in opinions. They show that the Convention members were divided on the issue of the carbon tax, and in particular, how it should be used. The measure receives widespread support if the money generated goes solely towards bringing about the energy transition, but not if it is diverted to other uses.
Part 3 analyzes the deliberations, proposals and relationship to expertise within the C3.
Chapter 8, written by Dimitri Courant and Simon Baeckelandt, focuses on the quality of the deliberative process, from the standpoint of impartiality as a democratic imperative. How is impartiality actually implemented in such an assembly, and how can it be assessed? While deliberation inevitably involves attempts to influence other people’s thinking, some forms of such influence are not only perfectly legitimate but also desirable. However, other attempts to influence could be considered illegitimate and may even overshadow the credibility of the mini-publics. To distinguish between them, this chapter introduces three categories of indicators designed to assess “deliberative impartiality”: pluralism, equality and transparency. The interactions between multiple types of actors are studied empirically: members of the governing committee, guarantors, experts, facilitators, guest speakers, lobbyists and activists, in particular. On that basis, the authors propose an inductive typology of six modes of interaction and influence observed, ranging from the most conventional, such as public presentations by experts, to the most informal (and problematic), such as private exchanges between lobbyists and citizens.
In Chapter 9, Louis-Gaëtan Giraudet and Hélène Guillemot focus on one of the thematic groups (TGs), “Housing”, aiming to understand how measures were devised in interactions with the contributing experts. They compare these proposals, the available expertise and the stakeholders in energy renovation of existing buildings. The authors ask: were the citizens’ proposals inspired by, or dictated by, the experts? Conversely: why use people selected at random to make proposals when well-known technical solutions already exist? They show that the measures were largely proposed by the guest experts and adopted wholeheartedly by the Convention members in the absence of presentations of the problems, or of solutions that take account of existing controversies. Above all, the role of the randomly selected citizens was to define how these solutions should be put into practice.
In Chapter 10, Selma Tilikete looks more broadly at the problem of relations between the Convention members and the experts. Drawing on the work of Callon et al. (2011) on “technical” democracy (or dialogic democracy) and hybrid fora, she shows how the C3 differs from initial pioneering work on participatory technological assessment. She asks the following questions: is climate change, in essence, a “complex” problem? Did the framing of the problem within the C3 accentuate its technical aspect, or did the requirement for precision in the measures lead the citizens to go into relatively great detail in writing their proposals? Notably, she shows that the major role of the citizens in relation to the appointed experts was not to make a decision when the experts failed to reach a consensus, because the controversies surrounding the issues had not been fully explored, but rather to opt for certain solutions, or to draw on their diverse experiences in an attempt to ensure that the solutions put forward by the experts were fairer and more effective.
The carbon tax, or specifically, the “conscious avoidance” of it in the C3 and the consequences of that avoidance, is at the heart of Chapter 11. Written by Romane Rozencwajg, Bénédicte Apouey, Maxime Gaborit, Laurent Jeanpierre and Jean-François Laslier, it looks at how the TG on “Transportation” evolved. The methodology employed is both qualitative and quantitative. This fuel tax was one of the elements which triggered the “Gilets jaunes” (Yellow Vests) nationwide wave of protest, which was one of the necessary but not sufficient conditions that led to the GDN and the establishment of the C3. While that tax as such was not discussed, other taxes and fiscal incentives relating to automobile use, and a carbon tax charged at the national borders (which were deemed socially acceptable), were included in the final range of measures proposed. The Convention members’ reasoning and the steps leading to their decision in this matter are analyzed in detail here.
Part 4 deals with issues linked to social movements, conceptions of justice, and the notion of exception.
Chapter 12 presents and discusses how social justice – an important part of the general question, and one which was undoubtedly understandable to the randomly selected ordinary citizens – was, paradoxically, given too little attention: it was discussed for just over one hour in subgroups (Session 2). Nathalie Blanc and Laurence Granchamp extend the scope of social justice to include environmental and climate justice, presented during the C3 plenary session when an older report from the ESEC on the matter was included. In particular, they study the work of the TG “Food” presented in relation to the literature on these three types of justice. The qualitative and comprehensive approach is based on interviews with the citizens drawn at random in order to understand their conceptions of what is just and unjust.
Chapter 13 examines the relations between social movements and the C3. Indeed, the transition from protest movements (involvement in protest) to the requirements of regulated deliberation (i.e. deliberative participation) was not a foregone conclusion. Maxime Gaborit describes some of the interactions between the two and relativizes the opposition between them. He addresses the following questions: what role did activists – in particular, ecological activists – play in the implementation and running of the C3? What were the positions of the randomly selected citizens in relation to protest movements? What were the consequences of these positions, in terms of decisions and proposals? By shedding light on the different forms of interactions between activists and ordinary citizens, this chapter seeks to show the decisive role that social movements played throughout the C3 experiment.
Chapter 14 deals with the interesting question of exceptionality, due to the presence of seven Convention members (representing 2.7 million inhabitants) from overseas territories. Two of these only attended the early sessions of the C3. Christiane Rafidinarivo explores exceptionality in relation to three dimensions: responses to a given crisis in the overseas territories, the processes involved in recruiting Convention members from these territories, and the use of the argument of exceptionality to take account of the specific features of these overseas territories. The exceptionality relates to the representativeness of territories and of particular types of citizens. It stems from the agency of those actors who claim exceptionality in order to exempt themselves from following the rules or the measures proposed by the majority. Finally, the chapter touches on the question of the legitimacy of the decisions and actors, both in procedural and material terms.
Part 5 compares the C3 with other European pilot citizens’ assemblies on climate, and deals with the question of filters and accountability.
Chapter 15 looks at the German Federal Citizen Assembly on Climate (Bürgerrat Klima). The latter was influenced by at least two earlier citizen assemblies: firstly, the C3, and subsequently, Climate Assembly UK. The German case is interesting because the organizers and the process itself came from civil society. In that respect, it is unique. It was the third in a series which had previously covered other subjects. In analyzing these experiments, Gabriel Pelloquin and Rikki Dean examine the role they play in the relationship between civil society and decision-making bodies, together with their potential capacity to influence public debate. They stress that this “informal integration model” may have important albeit unrecognized benefits, in that it could serve as a mediator between civil organizations and political parties and institutions. It could thus play an intermediary role between political influence and influence on public debate. The authors draw attention to the question of institutionalization, which remains open, to the compromises that it involves, and to the variety of potential approaches to integration, in order to inform future experiments (see also Courant 2022).
The lengthy final chapter (Chapter 16) analyzes the expression “with no filter”, which is as well known as it is ambiguous. Not only does the chapter examine this expression in its entirety, together with the nuances of the contexts in which it was used, it also interprets it from the angle of the filters that were needed to organize the C3. Bernard Reber addresses the problem of filters from five perspectives:
the meanings of the expression “with no filter”;
the filters used to set the C3 in motion;
the legal perspectives (the legislative committee);
the perspectives relating to the “spirit of social justice”;
the filters used during the accountability process, and for the Convention participants’ evaluation of the government’s response. On this last point, it is possible to question the simplistic narrative about the C3 mentioned at the beginning of this introduction.
Rather than recapping the main results, which are presented at the end of each chapter, the book concludes by extending its examination of the filters inherent to institutional design choices for the C3 (method, charter and principles, random selection supplemented by diversity-related criteria, interpretation of deliberative expectations including the “living filters” – the three guarantors) and the analytical criteria that were used firstly to describe and secondly to assess the mini-publics.
The problem with evaluation, as highlighted in Chapter 8, goes beyond the case study of the C3. This is not a new issue for research, but the lists of criteria produced for evaluation are seldom well known (Reber 2011a). This makes it easy to say that the experiments are unprecedented. More problematic is the fact that some – often the organizers – could say that they are successes. Others could say that they are failures: firstly those who observe vaguely from the sidelines, and secondly those who are fiercely opposed to such deliberative experiments.
At the beginning of this introduction, we pointed out that a simplistic narrative actually turned out to be divisive in terms of how the assembly was evaluated. Evaluation of the C3 itself was essentially positive while it was negative in relation to the government’s follow-through on the recommendations made, their legislative implementation, and how they were discussed in the usual institutional setting. Evaluating the C3 was still more problematic and tricky. This was because a number of its proponents, who became members of the governing committee, were critical of the GDN. They claimed that they would do better, and perhaps even give the government a lesson in deliberative democracy.
The list of these criteria is potentially lengthy and their coherence is rarely discussed. More fundamentally, as they are being produced, certain questions about the presuppositions and expectations of such participatory and deliberative experiments must be made explicit (Gillier 2021). These presuppositions are frequently assumed to hold true without question; they are neither discussed, nor justified. We could even argue that such an absence of justification betrays a lack of deliberative spirit. What purpose should a mini-public serve? These questions, of which we have noted at least twenty, themselves point toward various options in answer to them (Bernasconi 2021)16