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The German polymath Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz has been called the “last universal genius” due to his vast expertise across numerous fields. A prominent figure in both the history of philosophy and the world of mathematics, Leibniz produced groundbreaking works on theology, ethics, politics, law, history, physics, music and other studies. As a philosopher, he was a leading representative of seventeenth century rationalism and idealism, being especially noted for his optimism and his famous conclusion that our world is “the best possible world that God could have created”. As a mathematician, he developed the main ideas of calculus and devised the binary number system that is the basis of modern digital computing and communications. This eBook presents Leibniz’ collected works, with numerous illustrations, rare texts, informative introductions and the usual Delphi bonus material. (Version 1)
* Beautifully illustrated with images relating to Leibniz’ life and works
* Concise introductions to the major texts
* Features rare treatises and dialogues
* Images of how the texts were first published, giving your eReader a taste of the original texts
* Excellent formatting of the texts
* Easily locate the sections you want to read with contents tables
* Special criticism section, with essays evaluating Leibniz’ contribution to world literature
* Features two biographies – discover Leibniz’ incredible life
CONTENTS:
The Works
System of Theology (1686)
Discourse on Metaphysics (1686)
A Philosopher’s Creed (1673)
Extracts from the ‘New Essays on the Understanding’ (1704)
Theodicy (1710)
Monadology (1714)
The Philosophical Works of Leibnitz (1890)
Correspondence with Baruch Spinoza
The Criticism
An Abstract of a Book Lately Published Entitled a Treatise of Human Nature Etc. (1740) by David Hume
Leibnitz (1837) by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel
Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibnitz (1858) by Frederic Henry Hedge
Leibniz Rewritten (1899) by Charles Sanders Peirce
Leibniz as a Politician (1911) by Adolphus William Ward
The Biographies
Life and Philosophy of Leibnitz (1856) by Alexander Campbell Fraser
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz (1911) by William Ritchie Sorley
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Seitenzahl: 2510
Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2025
The Collected Works of
GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNIZ
(1646-1716)
Contents
The Works
System of Theology (1686)
Discourse on Metaphysics (1686)
A Philosopher’s Creed (1673)
Extracts from the ‘New Essays on the Understanding’ (1704)
Theodicy (1710)
Monadology (1714)
The Philosophical Works of Leibnitz (1890)
Correspondence with Baruch Spinoza
The Criticism
An Abstract of a Book Lately Published Entitled a Treatise of Human Nature Etc. (1740) by David Hume
Leibnitz (1837) by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel
Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibnitz (1858) by Frederic Henry Hedge
Leibniz Rewritten (1899) by Charles Sanders Peirce
Leibniz as a Politician (1911) by Adolphus William Ward
The Biographies
Life and Philosophy of Leibnitz (1856) by Alexander Campbell Fraser
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz (1911) by William Ritchie Sorley
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The Collected Works of
GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNIZ
By Delphi Classics, 2025
Collected Works of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
First published in the United Kingdom in 2025 by Delphi Classics.
© Delphi Classics, 2025.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of the publisher, nor be otherwise circulated in any form other than that in which it is published.
ISBN: 978 1 80170 235 5
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Explore the unique heritage of German art, science, music, literature and philosophy at Delphi Classics
Leipzig, the most populous city in the German state of Saxony, c. 1804 — Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’ birthplace
Leipzig today
Alte Nikolaischule, the first municipal school in Leipzig, which Leibniz attended for six years
Germany’s second oldest university, Leipzig University main building in 1917. It was demolished by the socialist administration in 1968 — Leibniz’ father had been a Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Leipzig, where he also served as dean of philosophy. In April 1661 Leibniz enrolled here at age 14 and completed his bachelor’s degree in Philosophy in December 1662.
Original Title: ‘Systema theologicum’
Translated by Charles William Russell, 1850
Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz was born in Leipzig in 1646. He entered the University of Leipzig as a student of philosophy and law, and in 1666 he obtained the degree of Doctor of Law at Altdorf. The following year he met the diplomat Baron von Boineburg, at whose suggestion he entered the diplomatic service of the Elector of Mainz. During the years of 1672 to 1676, he served as the diplomatic representative of Mainz at the Court of Louis XIV. He also paid a visit to London and made the acquaintance of the learned English mathematicians, scientists and theologians of the day. While at Paris he became acquainted with prominent representatives of Catholicism and was soon interested in the questions that were in dispute between Catholics and Protestants. In 1676 he accepted the position of librarian, archivist and court councillor to the Johann Friedrich, Duke of Brunswick, who was a recent convert to Catholicism.
Almost immediately Leibniz began to exert himself in the cause of reconciliation between Catholics and Protestants. At Paris he had come to know many prominent Jesuits and Oratorians, and at this time he stared his celebrated correspondence with Bossuet. With the sanction of the Duke and the approval of Innocent XI, the project to find a basis of agreement between Protestants and Catholics in Hanover was inaugurated. Leibniz soon took the place of Molanus, president of the Hanoverian Consistory, as the representative of the Protestant claims. He tried to reconcile the Catholic principle of authority with the Protestant principle of free enquiry. He favoured a species of syncretic Christianity first proposed at the University of Helmstadt, which adopted for its creed an eclectic formula made up of the dogmas supposed to have been held by the primitive Church. At length, he drew up a statement of Catholic doctrine, entitled “Systema Theologicum”, which met the approval not only of Bishop Spinola of Wiener-Neustadt, who conducted the case for the Catholics, but also of the Pope, the Cardinals, the General of the Jesuits, the Master of the Sacred Palace and various others.
Leibniz was actuated as much by patriotic motives as he was by religious reasons. He saw clearly that one of the greatest sources of weakness in the German States was the lack of religious unity and the absence of the spirit of toleration. The role he played was that of a diplomat rather than that of a theologian. However, his correspondence with Bossuet and Pelisson and his acquaintance with many prominent Catholics produced a change in his attitude towards the Church, and, although he adopted for his own creed a kind of eclectic rationalistic Christianity, he ceased in 1696 to attend Protestant services.
Leibniz by Andreas Scheits, Bibliothèque de Hanovre, 1703
SYSTEM OF THEOLOGY.
APPENDIX.
I. PRIVATE THOUGHTS
II. THE DECLARATION OF M. FABRICIUS
III
John Frederick by Johann Hulsman, c. 1675 — αs Duke of Brunswick-Lüneburg, Frederick ruled over the Principality of Calenberg, a subdivision of the duchy, from 1665 until his death.
AFTER ALONGand mature examination of the controversies on the subject of religion, in which I have invoked the Divine assistance, and divested myself, as far, perhaps, as is possible for man, of party-feeling, as though I came from a new world, a neophyte unattached to any party, I have at length fixed in my own mind, and, after full consideration, resolved to adopt, the following principles, which, to an unprejudiced man, will appear to carry with them the recommendation of sacred Scripture, of pious antiquity, and even of right reason and the authority of history.
In the first place, then, I believe in the existence of a Most Perfect Substance, one, eternal, omnipresent, omniscient, and almighty, which we call GOD; by whom all other things have been created in a most beautiful order, and are preserved by a sort of continual production. The doctrine, therefore, of those who conceive God to be corporeal, finite, circumscribed by place, and ignorant of future contingent events, whether absolute or conditional, is utterly intolerable; and hence I strongly reprobate certain Anti-trinitarians and kindred sectaries, who have not spared even this first principle of faith, and who entertain most unworthy conceptions of God.
Now this Supreme Intelligence created, in order to his own glory, other intellectual beings, whom He governs with most perfect justice; insomuch that any one who could understand the whole order of the Divine economy, would find therein a model of the most perfect form of commonwealth, in which it would be impossible for a philosopher to discover a single want, or to supply any thing in desire.
Hence we must avoid those opinions which represent God as a certain Supreme Power, from which all things, although they emanate, yet emanate indiscriminately, by a kind of necessary existence, and without any selection of the beautiful or the good; as if these notions were arbitrary, or had no foundation in nature, but only in the imagination of men. For God is not only the supreme Creator of all existing things, but He is also the beneficent Prince of all intellectual beings, and in some sense their Legislator; — a Legislator, however, who requires nothing from his subjects but souls actuated by sincere affection, animated with a right intention, persuaded of the beneficence, the consummate justice, the beauty, and goodness, of the most amiable of all lords; and therefore, not merely fearing his power as that of a supreme and all-seeing Monarch, but also confiding in his benevolence, and, in fine, glowing with the love of Him above all things — a sentiment which comprises all the rest.
For those who are impressed with such sentiments, who fix them deeply in their souls, and evince in their lives the sincerity of their convictions, never murmur against the Divine will; being well assured that all things must conduce to the good of those who love God: and, as they are content with the past, so, in what concerns the future, they seek always to act in conformity with that which they presume to be the will of God. Now all that God, in proposing rewards and punishments, requires of each of us, is, that he labour for the fulfilment of his own especial duties; that, like the first man, he cultivate the garden in which he has been placed, and that, in imitation of the divine goodness, he diffuse his beneficence on every object around him, but especially, within the due proportions which justice requires, on all those with whom he may be thrown into intercourse, as being his neighbours; because, among the creatures which come within our sphere, there is none more excellent than man, none whose perfection is more grateful to God.
If, therefore, all intelligent beings always thought and acted in accordance with these principles, they would unquestionably live happily. But as it is certain that this neither always is, nor has been, the case, a question arises, whence it is that sin, and through sin, misery, entered into the world; for it is clear that God, the author of all good, cannot be the cause of sin. It must be borne in mind, therefore, that in all creatures, however exalted, there is, antecedent to all sin, a certain inborn and original finiteness, which renders them liable to fall; and in this sense is to be understood the sentiment which Job appears to have meant to convey, that not even the holiest angels are free from stain, that is, from imperfection. Nor is this incompatible with the existence of original justice in “God’s image because the rational creature, in so far as it is perfect, derives this perfection from the Divine image; but in so far as it is limited and devoid of certain perfections, so far does it partake of privation, or of nothing. And this is the purport of St. Augustine’s opinion, that the cause of evil arises not from God, but from nothing; that is, not from the positive, but from the privative; — or, in other words, from that finiteness of creatures of which we have already spoken.
And although it would have been possible for God to have created only such intelligences as, though they possessed the power of falling, yet, in point of fact, never would fall, nevertheless it pleased his inscrutable wisdom to create this present order of things, wherein, from among countless others equally possible, certain possible intelligences, which, in the notion of their possibility, or in the idea of them which exists in God, involve a certain series of free actions and divine helps — of faith, charity, eternal happiness, or the contrary — are selected, and admitted to existence, or created: — as, for instance, Adam, who was to be exiled from Paradise; Peter, prince of the apostles, to be a renegade, a confessor, and a martyr; Judas, a traitor, &c. And this, doubtless, because God knew how to convert this partial and particular evil, the occurrence of which He foresaw and permitted, into a good far greater than should have existed without this evil; so that in the end, the present order should, as a whole, be more perfect than all others. Thus, for example, the fall of Adam was corrected, with an immeasurable gain of perfection, by the Incarnation of the Word, and the treason of Judas by the Redemption of the human race.
Hence when some of the angels fell, through an impulse, as it appears, of pride; and when afterwards the first man, under the seduction of the evil angel, fell through concupiscence; — for the former is a sin characteristic of the diabolical, the latter of the animal nature; — original sin invaded the human race in the person of our first parent; that is to say, a certain depraved quality was contracted, which, from the darkness of the intellect and the predominance of the senses which it induces, renders men slothful in the performance of good, and prompt in the commission of evil actions. And although the soul, as it emanates from God, (for the notion of a transmission of souls is unintelligible) is pure, yet, through the sin of our parents, it is corrupted by its very union with the body; in other words, by its connexion with external things, original sin, or a disposition to sin, is produced in the soul; although it is not possible to conceive any moment at which it was itself pure from stain, and was doomed to be imprisoned in an infected body. And thus were all made “children of wrath,”“concluded under sin,” and doomed to inevitable perdition, unless preserved by a great grace of God. We are not, however, to extend the effect of original sin so far as to hold that children who have committed no actual sin will be damned — an opinion which many maintain; for, under God, who is a just judge, no one can be condemned to misery without a fault of his own.
Actual sins are of two kinds; some venial, which must be expiated by temporal chastisement, others mortal, which merit eternal perdition. And this division of sin not only is an ancient one, but also appears perfectly consonant with the divine justice; nor can I commend the views of those, who, like the Stoics, regard all sins as almost equal, or all alike worthy of the extreme punishment of eternal damnation. Now those sins appear specially to merit the name of mortal, which are committed with a perverse intention, and against the express dictate of conscience, and the principles of virtue implanted in the mind. For it would seem that those who depart from this life at enmity with God (as they are no longer recalled by external impressions of sense,) persevere in the course which they have commenced, and retain the state of mind in which they were surprised, and that, by this very fact, they are separated from God; whence, by a kind of consequence, they fall into the supreme misery of the soul, and thus become, so to speak, the instrument of their own damnation.
Now all men, being born in sin, and not as yet regenerated by the grace of the Holy Ghost, are wont, when they have attained the use of reason, to fall into mortal sins, at least unless they are withheld by some singular favour of God; for, by the voice of conscience, all are admonished of the distinction of good and evil, and yet are occasionally overcome by the passions. And consequently the whole human race would perish, had not God, from eternity, formed a design for its redemption or expiation, worthy of his mercy, as well as his unspeakable wisdom, which He executed in his own season.
For we must hold as a certain principle, that “God desireth not the death of the sinner,” but “will have all men to be saved;” — not, it is true, with an absolute and irresistible will, but with a will ordered and limited by certain laws; — and consequently, that He assists each individual as far as is consistent with the order of his wisdom and justice.
The principles hitherto stated are almost all evident from the light of reason itself; but it is only from the revelation of God that we could have learnt what was the hidden economy of the Divine counsel in the restoration of the human race.
We must call to mind, therefore, that God is not only the First Substance, the Author and Preserver of all others, but that He is also the most perfect Intelligence; and that, in this relation, He is invested with a moral quality, and enters into a certain society with other intelligences, over all of whom, collected into a most perfect commonwealth, which we may call “the City of God,” He presides, as a supreme monarch over his subjects.
God, therefore, not only acts by that general and hidden will by which He governs, according to certain fixed rules, the entire machine of the universe, and by which He concurs with all the actions of intelligent beings; but also, in his capacity of legislator, declares, and sanctions by rewards and punishments, his particular and public will with regard to the acts of intelligent beings and the government of his city; and for this purpose He has instituted revelations.
Now, revelation must be invested with certain notes (commonly called motives of credibility), from which it may appear, that what is contained therein and declared to us, is the will of God, not an illusion of the evil genius, or a false interpretation of our own; and if any revelation be destitute of these notes, we cannot embrace it with security: with this restriction, however, that sometimes, in a case of doubt, when the mandate in itself is not at variance with reason or with any previous revelation, and is supported by probable reasons, it is better to obey it than to expose ourselves to danger of sin. In this, however, we must be cautious lest fear should degenerate into superstition, and credit be given to every “old wives’” tale. For it would be unworthy the Divine Wisdom to omit a precaution which no prudent legislator neglects, that of notifying sufficiently the will of the lawgiver. Hence faith is not lightly to be given to lots, to visions, or to dreams, and not at all to auguries, omens, and such other trifles, which (under the notion that they are signs of the Divine counsel) we absurdly call divinations.
As right reason, therefore, is the natural interpreter of God, it is necessary that, before any other interpreters of God be recognised, reason should be able to pronounce upon their authority; but when they have once, so to speak, established their legitimate character, reason itself must thenceforward submit to faith. And this may be understood from the example of a governor who commands in a province or garrison as the representative of his prince; he will not lightly, nor without cautious scrutiny of his credentials, yield up his authority to the successor who may be sent to replace him, lest an enemy steal in under this guise. But the moment he recognises his master’s will, he will at once, without dispute, submit himself and the entire garrison to the new authority.
Nevertheless, in addition to the evidences of human faith, or motives of credibility, there is further required a certain internal operation of the Holy Ghost, which invests it with the title of divine faith, and confirms the mind in the truth; and hence it is that faith may exist where there is not, and perhaps never has been, any advertence to these motives drawn from human reason; for it is not necessary at all times, nor for all persons, to enter into an analysis of faith, nor is every person equal to the difficulty of such an examination. The very nature of true faith, however, necessarily supposes that those who, in the fear of God, attentively examine the truth, should be able, when occasion requires, to institute an analysis of its motives; if it were not so, the Christian religion would have nothing to distinguish it from a false system, speciously adorned.
All the notes of divine revelation, with the exception of one — the excellence of the doctrine itself — may be resolved into that of confirmation by miracle, or by some wondrous and inimitable circumstance, or event, or coincidence, which it is impossible to ascribe to chance. For this is an especial sign that the admonition is from Providence. Now this is peculiarly the effect of prophecy; for to predict future events accurately and circumstantially exceeds not only all human, but even all created powers. Hence we are bound to give credit both to the prophet himself and to the person whose coming is found to verify the conditions of the prophecy. So, also, if any one perform other wonderful and, humanly speaking, incredible works, we must recognise him as aided by a superhuman power.
Furthermore, if miracles of this character, though performed long since, be attested by those arguments by which, in other cases, the truth of historical facts is legitimately proved, we are bound to believe them, just as well as if they were performed to-day. For, even in the management of our human affairs, how many things do we admit as undoubted (and that with perfect propriety and prudence) which we have neither tested by our senses, nor are able to prove by demonstrative arguments! And, indeed, as St. Augustine well shews in his book On the Utility of Believing, most of our actions, even in the affairs of common life, rest on faith, and yet are not on that account less successful in their issue, or less prudent in their design. Nor can we hesitate to hold as certain, that the Providence which rules the universe will never permit falsehood to invest itself with all the distinctive badges of truth, and, so to speak, her official robes.
The brevity which we propose to ourselves does not permit our entering, in this place, into the evidences of the truth of the Christian religion. Many eminent men have already ably executed this task; as, for example, Origen, Arnobius, Lactantius, Eusebius, Cyril, Theodoret, St. Thomas in his work Against the Gentiles; and, more recently, Steuchus, Mornay, Grotius, Huet; and although we might be able to add much to what they have written (for the various evidences of truth are innumerable), yet we are far from seeking to detract from their merit.
The sacred monuments of Christians teach that the Supreme God (whose unity is established by the evidence of reason itself) is nevertheless three in Persons, and consequently (a mystery which surpasses all reason) that, in one only God, there are three Persons of the Divinity; that these, to human comprehension, may very fitly be called the Father, the Son or Word, and the Holy Ghost; and that the Son is born of the Father, and the Holy Ghost proceeds, according to the Latins, from both the Father and the Son, or, according to the Greeks, from the Father through the Son (and that as from one principle).
This, however, must be understood so as to avoid all suspicion of Tritheism; and therefore, when it is said, “the Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Ghost is God, and these three are different from one another” (so that the Father is not the Son or the Holy Ghost, nor the Son the Holy Ghost or the Father, nor the Holy Ghost the Father or the Son), it must be understood in the sense that nevertheless there are not three Gods, but only one God, though three in Persons.
The Anti-trinitarians, indeed, insist that this is a contradiction, and that the plural number has no other force but to express that the three Beings, distinct from one another, each of whom is God, are three Gods, and that things which are distinct in number cannot be one in number.
But they should reflect that the Church does not assert of the Father, for instance, or of the Son, that He is three in Persons, but that He is one Person of the Divinity; hence the multiplication of Persons does not involve the multiplication of God, three in Persons; nor, therefore, does the Trinity of Persons imply three Gods. Moreover, a person, generally, is a substance numerically one and incommunicable; and, in God, it essentially involves a relation, and, together with its correlates, constitutes an absolute substance numerically one. There are, therefore, three singular substances, and one absolute relation which embraces these, and whose undivided nature is communicated to each. Of this we may discover some faint resemblance in the operations of our own mind, considering and loving itself.
It was by this illustration, adapted to our comprehension, that the ancients were wont, and, in my opinion, judiciously, to explain this mystery, viz. by the analogy of the three chief faculties of the mind or requisites of action, namely, Power, Knowledge, and Will; Power being ascribed to the Father, as the source of the Divinity; Wisdom to the Son, as the Word of the mind; and Will or Love to the Holy Ghost: for, from the Virtue or Power of the Divine Essence spring Ideas of things, or Truths; these Wisdom embraces; and thus, in the end, they become, according to their several perfection, objects of the Will: an illustration which also explains the order of the Divine Persons.
As it had been decreed, therefore, in the eternal secrets of the Divine counsel, that one of the Persons of the Divinity should take upon Him the nature of the creature, and, in a peculiar manner, adapted to our comprehension, should govern, like a king, familiarly and openly, the city of God, or the commonwealth of intelligences, it pleased the only-begotten Son of the Father to take this office upon Himself, the Word of the Divine Mind already eminently containing in itself the ideas or natures of creatures.
And He assumed the nature of man, not alone because in man the superior and inferior natures meet, as if upon a common boundary, but also because there is no other more worthy means of attaining the expiation of the human race, which was the first care of God; and it seemed fitting that the Son made Man should Himself exemplify every virtue, and should triumph by perfect humility and patience, before man should be crowned with the incredible glory to which he is thus elevated.
We learn, therefore, from Divine revelation, that, when the pre-ordained time arrived, the Word, or only-begotten Son of God, assumed our entire human nature, consisting of soul and body; and that, while He sojourned on earth, He acted as man, in every thing except sin, from which He was exempt, and miracles, by which He shewed Himself to be greater than man. And He was called Jesus, surnamed Christ, as being the Anointed of the Lord, or the King or Messiah, the Restorer of the human race long foretold by the oracles of the prophets.
The holy Fathers admirably illustrate the mystery of the Incarnation by the analogy of the union of soul and body: “for as soul and body is one man, so God and Man is one Christ.” The illustration, however, is imperfect, for the soul partakes in some things of the imperfections of the body, while the Divine Nature cannot admit imperfection. Still the words ‘person’ and ‘nature’ are very fitly applied; for as a plurality of Persons possess the one nature of the Divinity, so, on the other hand, one Person of the Divinity embraces a plurality of natures, the divine and human.
Nor do I see any reason for the abhorrence which many sectaries, both ancient and modern, exhibit for these opinions. For if one weigh the matter fairly, he will find that the doctrines of the Catholic Church on the Trinity and Incarnation are safe, and that those of her adversaries are replete with danger. Because the Church defines that only one absolute substance is to be adored, viz. the supreme, omniscient, and almighty God; and neither in the Word, nor in the Holy Ghost, nor in the man Jesus, does she honour with supreme adoration aught else than this one eternal Being.
The practice of the Church, therefore, is blameless, if it be but duly inculcated upon the people; nor does there appear any reason why we should regard as unworthy of God, either this internal undivided Trinity, or the external assumption of the human nature, which receives perfections from the Godhead, but does not return its own imperfections thereto.
Now the Arians, on the contrary, regard the Son of God merely as the first of creatures, and some of them under the name of the Holy Ghost understand the angels; and yet they scruple not to worship, with divine honours, what they thus regard as a creature. The Photinians, regarding Christ as a simple man, make Him an adoptive Son of God, and yet adore this factitious and subordinate Deity — a doctrine which certainly appears to coincide with that of the Pagans; and, if their hypothesis be once admitted, Francis Davidis acted more consistently in denying all adoration to one whom he professed to be a mere man; although how slight the interval between this opinion and that of Mahomet himself!
With regard to the mode of the union of natures, many subtle questions are raised, which it would have been better to have left untouched; among others, that respecting the “communion of properties,” namely, whether, and how far, the properties of one nature may be attributed to the other; as though it were necessary to decide this question. It is enough to know that the properties which are attributed to each nature separately may rightly be attributed to the concrete; for it is correct to say, that, in Christ, God suffered, man is omniscient and omnipotent; but to attribute to the humanity, in virtue of the union, omnipotence, ubiquity, and (what especially follows) eternity, is as incongruous, as to ascribe to the Divinity the having been born and suffered; a form of speech which is either an impropriety or a contradiction.
We must hold, however, that, by the union with the Word, all the perfection, knowledge, and power, which man, as man, is capable of receiving, have been imparted to the humanity in itself; and it is safer to affirm this regarding Christ, even in the state of exinanition; although in that state, as the body remained passible, the hidden glory only appeared, as it were, by a few rays, shining out through the night.
Christ, then, the Son of God and of man, born, without man’s agency, of a Virgin Mother, and exempt from all sin, offered Himself to God the Father, a most worthy victim, for the expiation of the guilt of the human race; satisfied, by his perfect humility and his passion, for the sins of men; and therefore, as far as was in Him, died for all.
Nevertheless, it has pleased God to ordain as the law of man’s redemption, that its benefit should extend to all who, having been born again in Christ by the grace of the Holy Ghost, should elicit a filial act of faith and love: for although a perpetual purity of mind and fervour of disposition towards God are, in the rigour of justice, always necessary, yet, through the equity of Divine grace, it has been effected by Christ, that, even in a person who falls after regeneration, every past sin shall be effaced by the sincere love of God, and (what is included therein) repentance for the past and a resolution of amendment.
In the course of the last century, certain angry controversies arose on the questions of the conversion of man, of the justification of the sinner, and of the merit of good works, occasioned by the inconvenient expressions of some of the disputants, and the excesses of others on the opposite side. In my opinion, however, they may easily be adjusted, if one will but discard the sophistry in which they have been involved, and consider the subject on its own merits.
In the first place, therefore, we must hold that, by the fall, human nature has been so thoroughly corrupted, that, without the aid of Divine grace, it is unable not alone to perform, but even to originate, any good work or any act agreeable to God. Without the aid, therefore, of preventing and exciting grace, we are not capable either of prayer, or of the wish or desire of amending our life or seeking the true faith, or, in general, of any good motion.
But, upon the other hand, we must also hold that man’s free will is not destroyed by the fall, even in things divine and necessary for salvation; but that all voluntary acts (although they are excited by grace if they be good, and proceed from our corrupt nature if they be bad,) are, nevertheless, “spontaneous with election,” and therefore free: — in the same way as it does not interfere with the liberty of our actions in common life, that we are excited to these actions by rays of light which are transmitted through the agency of the eyes, and though the excitement is sometimes so powerful that, notwithstanding our deliberation, and the power which we still retain of resisting the impressions, it may yet be foreseen that the act will certainly follow; — for the certainty of an act is one thing, and its necessity another. And hence a sinful action is contingent, and the act of eliciting good motions is free. And although the impulse under which we act, and the aid which we receive, are from God, yet there is always some co-operation on man’s part, else he could not be said to have acted.
The ulterior questions — as, whether, in the unregenerate, these powers of producing good motions are mutilated or only impeded, and what illustrations may best be employed to explain the aid afforded by grace — are very idle and profitless discussions, raised by those who exert all their ingenuity to discover, in the doctrines of the Church, matter at which to cavil, with any shew of reason, however trivial.
To all men God gives sufficient grace? in so far that, supposing only a serious will on their part, there is no further requisite for the attainment of salvation which it is not in their own power to secure. And hence many pious men have held it as certain, that “every man who cometh into this world” is so “enlightened” by the Light of Souls, the eternal Son of God, and by his Holy Spirit, that, at least before his death, provided he himself wills it, he may attain, either by external preaching or by internal enlightenment of the mind, to such knowledge as is sufficient and necessary for salvation; so that if, after this enlightenment, he obstinately resist the call of God, he may at least be rendered inexcusable; for this is necessary for the vindication of the Divine justice. But as to the means by which God effects this, even in the case of those to whom no suspicion of the Gospel of Christ has ever been conveyed by the external preaching of the word this is a question which we may not venture hastily to decide, but must leave to his wisdom and mercy.
God, however, does not grant always, and to all men, that efficacious or victorious grace which actually produces the good-will, overcomes the inclinations of man, and outweighs the opposing solicitations of imperfect or corrupt nature; otherwise all men, without exception, would be saved. But the reason why this is not done, — that is, why, in preference to many others equally possible, certain persons are admitted into existence by God, although the notion or foreknowledge of them involves the idea of impenitence, and of other free actions incompatible with salvation, and of certain degrees of divine grace inferior to the crowning and victorious grace, — belongs to the mysteries of God’s government, inaccessible to mortals; and on such questions we must rest satisfied with this one principle, that whatever has pleased God is best; that in no other order could the perfection of things be better attained; and that, as we have already observed, the evils which God permits are always converted into a much greater good.
Nevertheless, we are not to imagine that the Divine will for men’s salvation, or the merits of Christ, or, at least, efficacious grace, are confined solely to the elect — that is, to those to whom the crowning and final grace of blessed perseverance is vouchsafed. For Christ died for all; and efficacious grace, and that true conversion and regeneration through the Spirit of God, whereby we are received into the number of his children, may be granted to many who will not persevere. Nor do I see how certain learned men can have been betrayed into such monstrous paradoxes, revolting both in their intrinsic meaning and in their consequences, as, (fixing a law, as it were, for God, and circumscribing according to their caprice the economy of Divine grace,) to imagine that a person who is not to persevere does not really receive grace, and is not really regenerated by the Holy Ghost, no matter what works he may perform, no matter how pious and well-disposed he may appear to himself and to others; and on the contrary, that a person who is truly elect, and destined to final penitence, never forfeits the grace once received from God, and the indwelling of the Holy Ghost, even though he should spend his whole life in a series of adulteries and murders. Indeed, even though it were possible to excuse these novel and offensive dogmas, I do not see on what foundation they rest, or what purpose of edification they can serve. For, if expressions occasionally occur which would appear to favour this revolting opinion, it is better to soften them down by comparison with others far more numerous, than to add to their harshness by a rigorous interpretation. And it seems more consonant with the attributes of God to grant a temporary and revocable, but visible, grace, than a grace perpetual and inadmissible, but utterly hidden, and compatible with the most depraved habit of soul and the most heinous crimes.
When man, therefore, by God’s preventing grace, is aroused from the deadly sleep of sin to a knowledge of his misery, a spirit of self-examination, and a firm resolve of seeking and following the saving truth; and when, rejecting or disregarding all other thoughts and affections, and all worldly or carnal maxims, he devotes his whole energies to the care of salvation; he perceives, even from the light of nature, what is the law and the will of God; and, admonished by memory, he acknowledges with groans and trembling how far he has strayed therefrom, what grievous punishment he has merited, and how heinously he has offended his Creator, to whom he owed supreme honour and love. Pursuing this consideration, he elicits from amid the terrors of conscience the light of returning hope; for he discovers that the same most just Judge, in his infinite mercy, still takes pity upon human weakness, and that He has not laid aside his good-will towards sinners, provided, while there is yet time, they seek a refuge in his mercy. And thus as, to all who seriously turn to God, the Gospel holds forth Christ as the haven of salvation, which all may reach by true penitence — (and penitence, in order to be sufficient, must proceed, not from fear of punishment or hope of reward alone, but from sincere love of God) — whether it be the penitence of those who are received for the first time into the Church of God, as in the baptism of adults, or of those who, having been again imperilled in the gulf of sin, betake themselves anew to penance, as to a second plank after shipwreck; — and as God promises to those who turn to Him and do penance, not only pardon of past sins, but also new strength for a better life, and the Holy Ghost and regeneration; — hence follows the justification of the sinner; whereby he is not only absolved from guilt, through the satisfaction of Christ laid hold on by faith, but also, by the infusion of the charity of Divine love, is invested with the habit of justice and the new man.
Now, as these principles are certain and almost universally admitted, it seems to me very idle to enter into the controversies which have been raised by certain writers concerning the form of justification, viz. whether it consists in the imputation of the merit and satisfaction of Christ, or in habitual infused justice. For as all are compelled to admit that both are necessary, where is the need for further discussion? and where shall we find a dispute about words, if this be not such? If justification be taken, as it is usually taken by jurists, to mean freedom from imputability, it is manifest that the essence of our justification, that is, of our innocence, consists in the imputation of Christ’s satisfaction to us, in virtue whereof pardon is granted to those who believe, and do penance. But if justification be understood, as in ethics, to mean, the being invested with the habit of justice — as it is said in the Apocalypse: “He that is just, let him he justified still — that is, “let his habit of justice increase;” — it is evident that this habit of justice is infused into us by God in the act of regeneration, when we put on the new man. Whence it may not inaptly be said that the gift of penance and of pardon (not to speak of the other favours, by which God assists and prevents us, even before the work of regeneration is complete,) is a “grace given gratuitously whereas the infusion of the new habit is a grace given to penitents in virtue of an institution congruous to the Divine wisdom— “a grace which renders us grateful and pleasing” to God, which really operates a conversion of our mind, and crowns the whole work of our regeneration. But, however this may be, we must hold, that to the notion of justification, even considered as consisting in the remission of imputability, not faith only, but also penance, and therefore charity, is necessary.
Equally profitless is it to contrast the two divine virtues, faith and charity, with one another, to raise, as it were, a question of precedence between them, and to discuss anxiously which of them has the principal share in justification. For in the same way as it is certain that faith without charity is dead, so also is it certain that charity without faith (love without knowledge) is of no effect. And hence faith is an essential of charity, charity a complement of faith.
And indeed some of those who attribute justification entirely and exclusively to faith, and maintain that the other virtues will indubitably follow as fruits of justification by faith, seem to adopt a notion of faith different from that which has heretofore been received in the schools; for they refer faith not only to the intellect, but also to the will; nay, they extend their notion of the idea of faith so far as to make it comprise filial confidence in God, which seems to me to involve charity or the love of God. It is not wonderful, therefore, that they hold men to be justified by faith alone, whereas under faith they comprise hope and charity; and therefore, if they think so, the question becomes a mere dispute of words.
It must be admitted, indeed, that, even according to the received notions, faith, or assent, partakes, in a certain sense, of the will; for, were it otherwise, the act could not be commanded by God, nor elicited by men in obedience to the command, though they desired to do so. And, in truth, we often see men hold a thing as true, although they are not able to assign, nay perhaps never have been conscious of, any reason for their opinion; and this is the nature of the faith which, as we have said above, is excited by God in the minds even of simple people who do not inquire into the reasons of their belief; so that, in truth, this unreasoning assent consists in that state of mind which produces in those who are under its influence the same dispositions, and prepares them to act and to suffer as efficaciously as the persons who are conscious of motives for their belief, and sometimes more efficaciously. The matter may be understood from an illustration: We know that there are persons who, as far as arguments go, are satisfied that they will never meet ghosts in the dark, and who, nevertheless, will not venture to walk alone at night, or, if they do, are seized with a kind of panic fear. On the contrary, there are others who never even think of arguments against the fear of ghosts, and who, notwithstanding, secured by the firm faith and conviction which they possess, fearlessly spend whole nights alone in the woods and in the dens of wild beasts. Thus, in the case of the former, there seems to be a kind of speculative opinion, in that of the latter, rather a practical assent — a quality which undoubtedly is especially required in faith. And Christ himself has said that there are many degrees of faith; and the highest of these are to be derived, not so much from the mere intellect (otherwise those whose learning was greater would have the greater faith, which certainly was not true of the Canaanite woman, or of the centurion of Capharnaum, though Christ himself attributed great faith to them), as from the affection of the mind, and its readiness to embrace the doctrine when imparted, although reason should appear not only not to favour it, but even to be at variance with it. However, faith, or practical assent to the articles of the Christian religion as a whole, may be altogether distinguished from hope and charity, and from the filial confidence by which we apply general doctrines specially to ourselves.
Nor are we to imagine, as some have done, that, in order to justification, it is required that a man should believe with divine faith that he is justified, much less that he is elect and secure of persevering; for, as there are many who have true faith, and yet will not persevere, it would follow that these persons were bound, by virtue of the faith which is necessary to justification, to believe what is false. But, besides, those who require in the person who is justified a previous belief of his own justification, involve themselves in contradictions. For, if the belief of one’s justification is required for justification, and therefore precedes it, it follows that a man who is not yet justified must believe that he is justified, and, therefore, that he must believe what is false. And if they content themselves with requiring from him a belief that he certainly will be justified, they escape these contradictions, it is true, but, on the other hand, they arbitrarily invent conditions of justification which are entirely without any warrant either of reason or of Scripture. For if a man possess faith and charity, he will also have the grace of justification, though he should not even advert to the reflex act, whether he receives it or not. Nor does this filial confidence, or the hope by which we believe and trust that our sins are remitted, and that we are received into favour and made children of God, belong to that divine faith in the general promises and infallible revelations of God; because this confidence has for its object not alone the contemplation of the Divine goodness, but also individual human things regarding matters of fact; and it springs from the consideration and memory of things which pass in our mind; and consequently does not rise beyond moral certainty. Should any doubts, therefore, arise from the consciousness of our own infirmity, they do not destroy this filial confidence; in the same way as temptations of doubt regarding the articles of religion do not destroy the substance of faith, even though it be languid. It is our duty, however, to struggle against these doubts; for, if we but fix our thoughts firmly upon God’s goodness, we must conclude that He will never suffer those who “thirst after truth,” and seek grace, to be deceived by falsehood to their own destruction, or to fail of obtaining mercy.
That charity, or love, which is a divine virtue, consists in our loving God above all things, and seeking in Him our sovereign good; and, therefore, we are to love Him, not only for the benefits which He bestows on us, but also for Himself, and as our last end. For, in general, it is of the nature of that true love which is called “the love of friendship,” to place our happiness and perfection in the perfection or happiness of the beloved object; in part, if the object be of finite perfection (as when we love children or friends), but entirely, if it be of supreme excellence and goodness.
Hope, as used by theologians, is that love which is called “a love of concupiscence,” or an affection towards God, springing from the consideration, not of God’s excellence and perfection, but of his beneficence towards ourselves, and of the great benefits which He promises to his servants, and especially that of eternal life; — although it may be that the consideration of God’s benefits may also manifest his perfection to us; in which case hope is elevated into charity.
And as the evidence of reason and of Scripture assures us that true and perfect charity is not only prescribed by God, but is moreover the highest service which man can render to his God, and that without it faith is dead, therefore has it been justly and congruously ordained that through it our justification, reconciliation, and renovation are completed; although the actual grace of charity is obtained for us, and granted to us, solely through Christ, while we are still separated from God; and although its power of effacing sin springs solely from Christ’s merit, imputed to us through a lively faith. For, as we have already said, in the rigour of Divine justice it would not suffice for the pardon of past sin to love once, but it would be necessary to have always maintained these good dispositions. But, seeing that Christ has satisfied for us, the conditions which God requires in order that we be made sharers of Christ’s merit are easy of fulfilment; for it is not possible, consistently with the order of the Divine justice and wisdom, to understand or imagine any condition more easy of fulfilment, than that of the love of God himself, the most amiable and fairest of all conceivable objects, which is the sole condition required of us by Him, after Christ’s satisfaction, as the price of the restoration of his friendship, — a price in itself utterly inadequate.
And whereas in those to whom God’s abiding grace has been vouchsafed through Christ, there is no longer any sin, any thing hateful to God, “any condemnation”it appears inconsistent with the form of sound words to say that original sin remains after regeneration, though it is weakened or is not imputed; and we shall consult more for the propriety of language if we say, that what constitutes in the original evil the distinctive character of sin, is effaced in regeneration through the merits of Christ and the efficacy of the Holy Spirit; although the flame of corrupt nature is not entirely extinguished; and although, from the infirmity of human nature, even the just are occasionally betrayed into venial errors.
The question then arises, what it is in original sin that possesses the distinctive character of sin? for neither the sole privation of original justice, nor the positive stain of our nature which always clings to us, constitutes the distinctive character of sin. There are some Catholic divines, therefore, who hold that, in original sin, what constitutes the form of sin, is nothing else than the imputation of the crime committed by Adam, or simply the imputability itself; others acknowledge in it nothing, at least nothing positive, in which the nature of sin can be placed, and seek it altogether in the defect of original justice; they conceive, however, that there is something more than this, which they explain by an illustration. It is certain that the intention, like every other act of the mind, is of two kinds — virtual and actual; a virtual intention, such as they contemplate, is sometimes found in a person baptising, or administering any other sacrament; for the intention, provided it existed in the beginning, is supposed to endure throughout the entire time of the, act, although the mind may not always advert to what it is doing, or, perhaps, may even be carried away by other thoughts, during the entire action, without ever reverting to the act in which it is engaged. Hence it may be said that the condition of those who are affected by original sin is somewhat similar; and we may conceive that all men have, in some hidden way, sinned in Adam, and that, as their will has been depraved by Adam’s sin, they have always retained, until the restoration of grace, something analogous to a virtual intention of sinning, which, before regeneration, prevails over even their good motions, or, at least, mingles itself with them. It must be understood, however, at the same time, that this virtual evil intention is removed by true penance along with the guilt; and that the only effect which remains is the concupiscence of the flesh rebelling against the spirit.
We must be careful however, not to underrate the evil influence of original sin, as though the natural powers which existed before the fall are not much lessened and depraved thereby; lest, having been delivered from it, we should detract from the favour which God has thus bestowed on us; nor should we think lightly of the relics of it which still cling to us, as though they were trifling and easily overcome, lest perchance we be betrayed into undue arrogance.
But neither should we, on the other hand, so far exaggerate its evil effects, as to say that no good whatever is left, and that every act of the unregenerate is of itself a sin; for St. Augustine (Ep. 130) admits that the continence of Polemon was a gift of God; now, who would assert that to be a sin, which is given by God? Nor, again, are to imagine that original sin has struck its roots so deeply, as not to give way even to Divine grace and to the cleansing and sanctifying blood of the Saviour; as though even that involuntary concupiscence which, from the very composition of the human machine as at present constituted, remains even in the pious, is to be regarded as a sin; whereas no involuntary act can ever be a sin; and it is wrong to pervert the true notions of things, under pretence of a mistaken interpretation of Scripture.
Let us now examine what are the fruits of regeneration, in what manner good works arise therefrom, and what is the efficacy of such works. We have already said that, before regeneration, the love of God is necessary for the performance of that penance which is available for salvation; that from this penance, through the merit of Christ apprehended by faith, follows pardon of sin and renovation of the entire man, or the virtue of Divine charity; and that (although the habits of the other virtues are acquired only by repeated acts) this virtue, through the mercy of God, is infused on account of a single act of love. Now this habit is essentially active; for by its very nature it is constantly endeavouring to burst forth into action, seeking opportunities of acting, and turning them to a profitable account. It may be safely asserted, therefore, that good works, as far as they consist in a serious will, are necessary to salvation; for a man who does not love God is neither a friend of God nor in the state of grace, because both penance and the renovation of man involve a contradiction, unless they are accompanied by love. Now all good works are, according to the received phrase, virtually contained in this right intention and sincere affection towards God; and this is the “one thing necessary,” which Christ admonished us should be preferred to all else beside.
Whosoever, therefore, loves God above all things, acquiesces, as I have already observed, in his will as regards the past, even though he should seem to be deserted, and should find himself condemned to struggle with many adversities; being firmly persuaded that God is good and faithful, that He tenderly loves “men of good will,” and that He disposes all things so as to turn, in the end, to the good of those who love Him. And, as regards the future, he endeavours with all possible fervour to obey the commands of God, not alone those which are expressly revealed, but also those which are presumed from the consideration of the Divine glory or of the public good. And in cases of doubt he chooses the part which is safer, more probable, and more advantageous; in the same way as an active, industrious, and zealous minister would act, if entrusted by a great prince with the management of his affairs. For there is no greater or better master than God; none to whose exclusive service all our powers may more rightfully be devoted.
From the love of God springs the love of our brother; that is to say, of every man with whom we may in any way be brought into connexion. And the idleness and insincerity of professions of the love of God in one who loves not his brother, are admirably inculcated by John, of whom it is related by Jerome, that in his extreme old age, when carried in the arms of his disciples to the church, he used to confine himself to one single exhortation, “My little children, love one another!” — and that when, at last, some one, wearied by the unvarying repetition, asked why he always inculcated this precept, and this alone, he replied by a sentiment truly worthy of John: “Because,” said he, “it is our Lord’s command, and its observance is alone sufficient.” Now Christ himself has prescribed an admirable rule of fraternal love, and one which even the Gentiles warmly applauded, viz. “that we love our neighbour as ourselves, and therefore that we do, or refrain from doing, to others, what we would, or would not, that others should do to us.” But, although there is no doubt that “charity begins at home,” and that, as regards others, this all-embracing and universal benevolence should make us select as its object that person on whom the conferring the benefit will be productive of the greatest advantage to the glory of God and the common good, yet it is right, notwithstanding, to prefer the salvation, the life, or any other great advantage, even of a stranger, to an inconsiderable inconvenience of ourselves or others.