Essentials of Biological Security E-Book
101,99 €
Mehr erfahren.
- Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
- Kategorie: Wissenschaft und neue Technologien
- Sprache: Englisch
Essentials of Biological Security A guide to minimizing the threat of misusing benignly intended and dual-use biological research In Essentials of Biological Security: A Global Perspective, a team of distinguished researchers delivers a fundamental resource designed to raise awareness and understanding of biological security as it pertains to the malign manipulation of benignly intended scientific research. Written by experts who have spent decades involved in biological security issues, the book is systematically organized to make it accessible to a wide range of life scientists likely to encounter dangerous opportunities for the deliberate misuse of their research. Readers will also find: * A thorough introduction to biological security and the chemical and biological weapons (CBW) threat spectrum * Comprehensive explorations of the history of biological weapons from antiquity to modern day * Practical discussions of dual-use technologies and how to minimize their risk * Expert analyses of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and other relevant international agreements and organizations Perfect for professionals working in life sciences, medicine, global health, biosafety, and biosecurity, Essentials of Biological Security: A Global Perspective will also benefit anyone with an interest in and being responsible for biological security.
Sie lesen das E-Book in den Legimi-Apps auf:
Seitenzahl: 653
Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2024
Ähnliche
Table of Contents
Cover
Table of Contents
Title Page
Copyright Page
Endorsement
List of Figures
List of Tables
List of Contributors
Foreword
Acknowledgements
Acronyms
1 Biological Security After the Pandemic
1.1 The Objective of the Book
1.2 The Structure of the Book
1.3 Overview of the Chapters
Author Biography
References
2 Falling Between the Cracks and by the Sides: Can Disarmament Treaties Respond to Scientific and Technological Developments?
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Concepts of Disease and Toxicants in Relationship to CBW
2.3 Capturing Evolving Concepts of Disease and Toxicants in Restraining Warfare
2.4 Further Development of the Control of Toxic Weapons
2.5 Implications of Evolving Concepts and S&T Developments for Disarmament Law
2.6 Conclusions: Responding to S&T Developments
Author Biography
References
3 A Multifaceted Threat
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Assessing the Utility and Scope of Biological Weapons at Various Scales
3.3 Diverse Objectives of Bioweapon Use: Past and Present
3.4 Evolving Biotechnologies
3.5 Changing Biothreat Landscapes
3.6 Conclusion
Author Biography
References
4 Biological Weapons from the Ancient World to 1945
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Map of the Literature
4.3 Historical Review
4.4 Conclusions
Author Biography
References
5 Biological Weapons from 1946 to 2000
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Overview of State BW Programmes
5.3 Offensive Aspects of BW Programmes
5.4 Non‐state Actors
5.5 Drivers and Inhibitors of State BW Programmes
5.6 Conclusions
Author Biography
References
6 The Problem of Dual Use in the Twenty‐first Century
6.1 Relationship of the Advances in Science and Technology to the BTWC
6.2 Evolution of the Dual‐Use Dilemma
6.3 DURC Criteria with Examples in Each Case of Published Research Reports of Work That Has DURC Character
6.4 Problems in Dealing with Dual Use: Debates About What Should Be Done
Author Biography
References
7 Key Cutting‐Edge Biotechnologies Today
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Development and Application of Synthetic Biology
7.3 Development and Application of Genome Editing
7.4 Main Biosafety and Biosecurity Concerns Associated with Key Cutting‐Edge Biotechnologies
7.5 Conclusions
Author Biography
References
8 Convergence of Science and Technology
8.1 Introduction
8.2 Convergence of Science and Technology in the Life Sciences
8.3 Convergence and Arms Control and Security
8.4 Technologies of Particular Relevance for Possible Misuse of Biology for Nefarious Purposes
8.5 Mitigation of the Evolving Misuse Potential Resulting from Convergence
Author Biography
References
9 Role of the Life Science Community in Strengthening the Web of Prevention for Biosafety and Biosecurity
9.1 Introduction
9.2 Integrating Biosafety with Biosecurity: The Web of Prevention as a Model Concept
9.3 Addressing the Threat of Deliberate Biological Events and Life Science Misuse
9.4 Implications for the Governance of Biotechnology in the Twenty‐first Century
Author Biography
References
10 The 1925 Geneva Protocol and the BTWC
10.1 Introduction
10.2 The Origins and Evolution of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the BTWC
10.3 The Review Conferences of the BTWC and Their Outcomes: 1980–2022
10.4 Biological Disarmament as It Is: Strengths and Weakness of the BTWC and the Geneva Protocol in the Twenty‐first Century
10.5 The BTWC Beyond 50 and the Geneva Protocol Beyond 100: Can They Prevent Biological Warfare?
10.6 Conclusion
Author Biography
References
11 Constraining the Weaponisation of Pathogens and Toxic Chemicals Through International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law
11.1 Introduction
11.2 International Humanitarian Law
11.3 International Human Rights Law
11.4 Conclusions
Author Biography
References
12 The Role of International Organisations in Biosecurity and the Prevention of Biological Warfare
12.1 Introduction
12.2 The Role of IOs in Fostering the Norm Against Biological Weapons
12.3 IOs in the Genesis of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
12.4 IOs and the Evolution of Biosecurity Governance
12.5 The Strengths of IOs in Biosecurity and Prevention of Biological Warfare
12.6 The Limits of IOs in Biosecurity and Prevention of Biological Warfare
12.7 Conclusions
Author Biography
References
13 Laboratory Biorisk Management as a Key Tool for Scientists to Understand Future Biological Threats and Strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention
13.1 History, Context and Current International Guidance
13.2 Biosafety and Biosecurity Awareness
13.3 The Role of Scientists: Tailored Biorisk Management Practices
13.4 Case Scenarios: Practical Examples
13.5 An Ongoing Cycle to Strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention
Author Biography
References
14 Examples of Biorisk Management National Regulatory Frameworks
14.1 Introduction
14.2 Laboratory Biosafety and Biosecurity in the US
14.3 Import–Export and Transportation of Infectious Substances in the US
14.4 Genetic Engineering and Dual‐Use Oversight in the US
14.5 The Culture of Biosafety, Biosecurity and Responsible Conduct in the US
14.6 The Biorisk Management National Regulatory Framework of Georgia
14.7 Conclusion
Author Biography
References
15 Lessons from ePPP Research and the COVID‐19 Pandemic
15.1 Advances in Life Science and Technology and the Emergence of ‘So‐Called GOF Studies’ to Create ePPPs
15.2 Controversy Surrounding GOF Studies on H5N1 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus
15.3 COVID‐19 and GOF Studies on SARS‐like Viruses
15.4 Ongoing Discussions at the NSABB and Governance by HHS
15.5 Future Governance of GOF Research and Prospects
Author Biography
References
16 The Hague Ethical Guidelines and the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines
16.1 Relations Between the Hague Ethical Guidelines and the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines
16.2 BTWC Advances the Formulation of the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Responsible Scientific Research
16.3 Constitution of the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines: Ideas, Principles, Elements and Path Formation
16.4 Future Discussion
Author Biography
References
17 Engaging Scientists in Biorisk Management
17.1 Introduction: Scientists Engagement and Biorisk Management
17.2 Engaging Scientists in Biorisk Management at International Level: Case from IWG Assessment Framework
17.3 Engaging Scientists in Biorisk Management in National Institutional Oversight: Case from the Netherlands
17.4 Engaging Scientists in Biorisk Management in Community: Case from iGEM
17.5 Conclusion: How to Engage Scientists in Management of Biorisk and Other Emerging Fields
Author Biography
References
18 The Role of Ethics in Dealing with Dual Use
18.1 The Dual‐Use Concept and Concerns
18.2 Ethics as an Instrument on Dual‐Use Governance
18.3 Existing and Complementary Ethical Guidelines on Dual Use
18.4 Recent Dual‐Use Scenarios
18.5 Ethical Education for Future Dual Use
Author Biography
References
19 Where Is the Governance of Dual‐Use Science Going?
19.1 Background: Genetic Technologies and Their Applications
19.2 Dual‐Use Science: Evolving Story of a Dualistic Term
19.3 Begin with the Experts: Models of Self‐regulation
19.4 Alternative Governance Structures
19.5 Conclusion
Author Biography
References
20 Towards an International Biosecurity Education Network (IBSEN)
20.1 Introduction
20.2 The Need for Biosecurity Education, Awareness‐Raising and a Culture of Responsibility in the Life Sciences
20.3 Past Efforts in Educating Life Scientists and Establishing a Culture of Responsibility
20.4 Challenges Faced by Biosecurity Education and Awareness‐Raising
20.5 Comparable Approaches Implemented in Analogous Frameworks in the Nuclear and Chemistry Fields
20.6 Conclusion
Author Biography
References
Appendix A: The Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Codes of Conduct for Scientists
**
Index
End User License Agreement
List of Tables
Chapter 1
Table 1.1 Topics and numbers of biosecurity questions.
Table 1.2 Priority DURC issues identified in the five‐year timescale.
Table 1.3 Stakeholders identified by the WHO.
Table 1.4 Some recommendations made by the NSABB.
Table 1.5 The sections of the book.
Chapter 6
Table 6.1 Criteria for the identification of DURC along with an example of ...
Chapter 9
Table 9.1 Overview of the Joint External Evaluations (JEE) Tool.
Chapter 15
Table 15.1 Criteria for guiding HHS funding decisions for certain H5N1 gain...
Chapter 17
Table 17.1 The 15 themes of Dual‐Use Quickscan.
Chapter 18
Table 18.1 Main principles on bioethics.
Chapter 20
Table 20.1 Selection of education and awareness‐raising initiatives for lif...
List of Illustrations
Chapter 2
Figure 2.1 Development of international law banning poison weapons.
Chapter 8
Figure 8.1 Relative ranking of concerns related to synthetic biology‐enabled...
Chapter 9
Figure 9.1 Biological threat spectrum.
Figure 9.2 WOAH organisational and operational guidelines for investigation ...
Figure 9.3 Indicative legal frameworks applicable to the biological crime li...
Chapter 20
Figure 20.1 Example of biosecurity education graphic novel produced by the U...
Guide
Cover Page
Table of Contents
Title Page
Copyright Page
Endorsement
List of Figures
List of Tables
List of Contributors
Foreword
Acknowledgements
Acronyms
Begin Reading
Index
WILEY END USER LICENSE AGREEMENT
Pages
iii
iv
xv
xvi
xvii
xviii
xix
xx
xxi
xxii
xxiii
xxv
xxvii
xxviii
xxix
xxx
xxxi
xxxii
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
Essentials of Biological Security
A Global Perspective
Edited by
Lijun Shang
Biological Security Research CentreSchool of Human SciencesLondon Metropolitan UniversityLondon, UK
Weiwen Zhang
Center for Biosafety Research and StrategyTianjin UniversityTianjin, China
Malcolm Dando
School of Social SciencesUniversity of BradfordBradford, UK
This edition first published 2024© 2024 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, except as permitted by law. Advice on how to obtain permission to reuse material from this title is available at http://www.wiley.com/go/permissions.
The right of Lijun Shang, Weiwen Zhang, and Malcolm Dando to be identified as the editorial material in this work has been asserted in accordance with law.
Registered Office(s)John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 111 River Street, Hoboken, NJ 07030, USAJohn Wiley & Sons Ltd, The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, PO19 8SQ, UK
For details of our global editorial offices, customer services, and more information about Wiley products visit us at www.wiley.com.
Wiley also publishes its books in a variety of electronic formats and by print‐on‐demand. Some content that appears in standard print versions of this book may not be available in other formats.
Trademarks: Wiley and the Wiley logo are trademarks or registered trademarks of John Wiley & Sons, Inc. and/or its affiliates in the United States and other countries and may not be used without written permission. All other trademarks are the property of their respective owners. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. is not associated with any product or vendor mentioned in this book.
Limit of Liability/Disclaimer of WarrantyWhile the publisher and authors have used their best efforts in preparing this work, they make no representations or warranties with respect to the accuracy or completeness of the contents of this work and specifically disclaim all warranties, including without limitation any implied warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. No warranty may be created or extended by sales representatives, written sales materials or promotional statements for this work. This work is sold with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering professional services. The advice and strategies contained herein may not be suitable for your situation. You should consult with a specialist where appropriate. The fact that an organization, website, or product is referred to in this work as a citation and/or potential source of further information does not mean that the publisher and authors endorse the information or services the organization, website, or product may provide or recommendations it may make. Further, readers should be aware that websites listed in this work may have changed or disappeared between when this work was written and when it is read. Neither the publisher nor authors shall be liable for any loss of profit or any other commercial damages, including but not limited to special, incidental, consequential, or other damages.
Library of Congress Cataloging‐in‐Publication Data
Names: Shang, Lijun, editor. | Zhang, Weiwen (Professor of microbiology and biochemical engineering), editor. | Dando, Malcolm, editor.Title: Essentials of biological security : a global perspective / edited by Lijun Shang, Weiwen Zhang, Malcolm Dando.Description: Hoboken, NJ : Wiley, 2024. | Includes index.Identifiers: LCCN 2023053440 (print) | LCCN 2023053441 (ebook) | ISBN 9781394189014 (cloth) | ISBN 9781394189021 (adobe pdf) | ISBN 9781394189038 (epub)Subjects: LCSH: Biosecurity.Classification: LCC JZ5865.B56 E88 2024 (print) | LCC JZ5865.B56 (ebook) | DDC 363.325/3–dc23/eng/20231201LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023053440LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023053441
Cover Design: WileyCover Image: © Image Source/Getty Images
Endorsement
Impressive dedication displayed by prominent experts, led by Lijun Shang, Weiwen Zhang and Malcolm Dando, has culminated in the creation of this remarkable book, a testament to their commitment. It delves into the pressing issue of biosecurity with a specific focus on preventing intentional disease outbreaks in humans, animals, and plants. It underscores the intricate connections between natural, accidental, and deliberate disease prevention, with a particular emphasis on preventing acts of malevolence.
The realm of biosecurity is extensive, extending far beyond the boundaries of life sciences and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. This publication is in harmony with the WHO's Global Framework, placing significant emphasis on the collaborative role of various stakeholders in bolstering the management of biohazards and focusing on the crucial areas of biosecurity education and code of conduct.
The book comprehensively covers the threat posed by biosecurity concerns, the international responses to these challenges, the pivotal role played by scientists and the prospective future of biosecurity. Notably, it underscores the pressing need for the establishment of an International Biosecurity Education Network and the responsible engagement of scientists.
Prof. Aamer Ikram, HI(M)
Ex‐CEO National Institute of Health PakistanChair Board International Federation of Biosafety AssociationsChair Advisory Board TEPHINETMember Executive Board IANPHI, Gavi; The Vaccine Alliance, ISTR
The global biosecurity situation has become increasingly severe in recent years due to emerging threats from natural epidemic outbreaks, the misuse and abuse of biotechnology and bioterrorism, among others. Biosecurity has become an important part of overall national security in many nations. Such challenges highlight the needs to reform the existing biosecurity education system. I am thus very delighted to see the book by a group of world‐prominent experts led by Profs. Lijun Shang, Weiwen Zhang and Malcolm Dando specifically address the needs and create an updated biosecurity resource book that could easily be utilised by practicing life scientists in an educational programme. Under the framework of the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines of the UN Biological Weapon Convention, the book presents an excellent overview of the entire landscape of key fundamentals essential for biological security education for future life scientists. The broad topics covered by the book include most of the issues related to biosafety and biosecurity and therefore will attract experts and students, which will eventually help build suitable biosecurity education systems across the world.
Prof. Ying‐Jin Yuan
Professor of Synthetic BiologyAcademician of Chinese Academy of SciencesTianjin University, P.R. China
The new book edited by Prof. Lijun Shang, Dr. Weiwen Zhang and Em. Prof. Malcolm Dando on different aspects of biological security will drive the readers on a journey that goes from framing the problem by first understanding the past events in the biological weapons arena; to then putting in context the current threats and possible responses and, finally, thinking of future scenarios, particularly in the current fast‐evolving scientific and technological world.
Following the logic presented in the WHO Global framework, when it comes to the importance of understanding the roles and needs of different actors, the book includes chapters from experts from different countries, representing universities, international organisations, NGOs and government and private companies, collecting, in this way, the opinions of the major biological security stakeholders and, consequently, building a broad and multidisciplinary perspective on biorisks management.
One of the outstanding conclusions is the importance of increasing education on biosecurity and biorisks management as a way to improve biological security in a sustainable way.
Dr. Maria Espona
ArgIQ codirector, professor at UCA, Catholic University Argentina
List of Figures
Figure 2.1
Development of international law banning poison weapons
Figure 8.1
Relative ranking of concerns related to synthetic biology‐enabledcapabilities, according to US National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, Medicine (2018)/National Academies Press
Figure 9.1
Biological threat spectrum
Figure 9.2
WOAH organisational and operational guidelines for investigation of suspicious biological events
Figure 9.3
Indicative legal frameworks applicable to the biological crime lifecycle
Figure 20.1
Example of biosecurity education graphic novel produced by the US Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense (2019)
List of Tables
Table 1.1
Topics and numbers of biosecurity questions
Table 1.2
Priority DURC issues identified in the five‐year timescale
Table 1.3
Stakeholders identified by the WHO
Table 1.4
Some recommendations made by the NSABB
Table 1.5
The sections of the book
Table 6.1
Criteria for the identification of DURC along with an example of work published in scientific Journals that illustrate each type
Table 9.1
Overview of the Joint External Evaluations (JEE) Tool
Table 15.1
Criteria for guiding HHS funding decisions for certain H5N1 gain‐of‐function research proposals
Table 17.1
The 15 themes of Dual‐Use Quickscan
Table 18.1
Main principles on bioethics
Table 20.1
Selection of education and awareness‐raising initiatives for life scientists
List of Contributors
Mayra AmeneirosCentre for Science and Security StudiesKing's College LondonLondon, UK
Lela BakanidzeEU CBRN Centers of Excellence RegionalSecretariat for Central AsiaTashkent, Uzbekistan
Brian BalmerDepartment of Science andTechnology StudiesUniversity College LondonLondon, UK
Yuhan BaoiGEM FoundationCambridge, MA, USAandTsinghua University, Beijing, China
Gemma BowsherSchool of Security StudiesKing’s College LondonLondon, UK
Nancy ConnellRutgers New Jersey Medical SchoolNewark, NJ, USA
Michael CrowleyBradford UniversityBradford, UK
Malcolm DandoSchool of Social SciencesUniversity of BradfordBradford, UK
Brett EdwardsDepartment of Politics, Languagesand International StudiesUniversity of BathBath, UK
Alonso FloresiGEM Foundation, CambridgeMA, USA
Gigi GronvallCenter for Health SecurityJohns Hopkins University BloombergSchool of Public HealthBaltimore, MD, USA
Jaroslav KrasnyWeapons of Mass DestructionProgramme, UNIDIRGeneva, Switzerland
Jez LittlewoodIndependent Consultant, EdmontonAB, Canada
Louison MazeaudWeapons of Mass DestructionProgramme, UNIDIRGeneva, Switzerland
Kathryn MillettBiosecure LtdCheltenham, UK
Kathryn NixdorffDepartment of Microbiology and GeneticsTechnical University of DarmstadtDarmstadt, Germany
Tatyana NovossiolovaLaw Program‐Center for the Studyof DemocracySofia, Bulgaria
Dana PerkinsFormer member of the Group of Expertssupporting the United Nations SecurityCouncil 1540 Committee on Weapons ofMass Destruction Non‐ProliferationNew York, NY, USA
James RevillWeapons of Mass Destruction Programmeand Space Security Programmes, UNIDIRGeneva, Switzerland
Lijun ShangBiological Security Research Centre,School of Human SciencesLondon Metropolitan UniversityLondon, UK
Nariyoshi ShinomiyaNational Defense Medical CollegeTokorozawa, Japan
Xinyu SongCenter for Biosafety Research and StrategyTianjin UniversityTianjin, China
Ralf TrappIndependent ConsultantChessenaz, France
Leifan WangCenter for Biosafety Research and StrategyTianjin University Law SchoolTianjin, China
Yang XueCenter for Biosafety Research and StrategyTianjin UniversityTianjin, China
Jean Pascal ZandersIndependent disarmament researcher atThe Trench
Weiwen ZhangCenter for Biosafety Research and StrategyTianjin UniversityTianjin, China
Vivienne ZhangWeapons of Mass Destruction Programmeand Space Security Programmes, UNIDIRGeneva, Switzerland
Foreword
Studying biosecurity after the great COVID‐19 pandemic has two different levels of importance. The first is a relative value, represented by the dynamics of the pandemic crisis itself. It has affected the entire world’s society in a historically novel framework because it is marked by disruptive advances in the life sciences. This scientific aspect is apparently secondary to the growth of the world's population and the consequent mobility of large masses of people, which, together with the concentration of even larger masses of people, has outlined an unprecedented scenario for the viral spread and thus for the pandemic. Indeed, the growth of the world's population has also been made possible by advances in the life sciences and access to medicines for ever‐larger sectors of the world's population. An advance in applied knowledge has allowed a technological shift in some biomedical research laboratories, transforming them from low‐security sites into fully fledged critical infrastructures. The effects of a security/safety breach can now go far beyond the loss of materials and equipment and constitute a serious risk whose extent is still being defined. The very solutions offered to the pandemic crisis can be placed within this framework of advancement in the life sciences, in particular for mRNA vaccines, but also for virus detection. Possible technical solutions are intertwined with possible safety solutions in their application, shaping the options on which political decisions have been exercised.
The second value of biosecurity studies is an absolute one, which invests in institution‐building and the work of the institutions themselves, starting with research institutions and moving on to international institutions via national ones. Working on biosafety means embracing a range of issues that affect the economy and society, as well as the policymaking that drives both. But it also means interacting with other applied research and security paradigms such as cybersecurity and in some cases radionuclear security. Therefore, biosecurity research must and can, as the chapters in this book testify, bring security applied to other technologies under a new approach. This leads us to reflect on the specifics of biosecurity in relation to the other securities that make up CBRN+Cy (Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear plus Cyber). If we think about the possibility of controlling and tracking the material, biosecurity is at the other end of the controllability scale compared to nuclear security. While nuclear material is undoubtedly the most controlled and controllable for mankind, the materials that biosecurity has to control are the most uncontrollable. This material fact has implications for security institutions and their activities.
Material difficulty, even before the secrecy of information, has informed the development and spread of nuclear technology. A material difficulty that was and is composed of various elements, such as the costs of nuclear fuel cycle management, nuclear material procurement and reprocessing equipment. The difficult technical and economic viability constituted a first line of 'passive' limitation to the uncontrolled spread of nuclear materials, effectively restricting the possibilities of the use of nuclear technology by another State other than the ‘club’ of nuclear powers. This point, which is politically fundamental, is useful in comparative terms with respect to the biological. For the first period in the history of nuclear weapons, the US monopoly subsumed control of nuclear materials, which continued after the Soviet test in a shared and normed control. Added to the impossibility for the majority of States in the international community to bear the costs of uranium enrichment was the model of international cooperation agreement that the US offered after the launch of the ‘Atoms for Peace’ programme. An agreement that conditioned the transfer of materials and technology on the US verifying their use by the receiving state. This model was gradually extended to other nuclear technology and materials providers through the technical role assigned to the IAEA.
On these assumptions, the safeguards system was built, which from the point of view of international instruments differed profoundly from an arms prohibition agreement. Indeed, it was not through prohibition that the superpowers exercised control over the spread of nuclear weapons, but through cooperation and the promotion of nuclear technology itself. Hypothetically, cooperation could provide the means for a nuclear weapons programme, but instead it implemented the exact opposite, subjecting the recipient state to controls that prevented the realisation of a weapons programme. This form of control implied the distinction between dual‐use and non‐dual‐use technologies and materials and equally implied the creation of institutions to control dual‐use. Why this choice of controlled openness instead of maintaining the previous closure and secrecy? By the end of the 1950s, the US leadership had realised that the secrecy of information and the cost and technical difficulties of enriching uranium and separating plutonium could not forever prevent many States from acquiring nuclear weapons. It was in some respects what Thomas P. Hughes called ‘technological momentum’. With ‘Atoms for Peace’, a phase of building a technodiplomatic system was opened that led up to the Nuclear Non‐Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which remains in force to this day. The creation of this system was made possible by a substantial convergence between the superpowers, a détente that benefited the entire international system.
On the other hand, along with the control of weapons programmes, the only other problem that affected the community of States when the NPT came into force was that of the safety of nuclear facilities, hence of the personnel working in them, and subsequently of the environment. Safety covered the possibilities of accidents or unintentional mishandling of nuclear materials and radiological sources. There was therefore no question of malicious use, hence security. Everything was attributable to State action, and therefore non‐State actors such as criminals and terrorist organisations could only make malicious use of nuclear materials and radiological sources in James Bond films. But the continuation of the aforementioned technological dynamic led not only to a vast number of States being able to approach a nuclear weapons programme, but also to non‐State actors appropriating nuclear materials and technology. The nuclear black market obviously saw other States as its first customers, but it was conducted by criminal organisations. This made it possible not only for North Korea to have a nuclear weapons programme but also for the risk of nuclear terrorism.
Thus, a distinction had to be made between safety and security, in languages where this distinction is possible. Obviously, the linguistic distinction followed a conceptual distinction, which developed a consequent institutional creation in the IAEA system. This distinction does not develop in parallel because security is an additional element of safety. If a plant is not safe, it will also inevitably have a security risk. If a plant is only safe, it cannot respond to a security risk. So, safety is a necessary condition for developing security. What has been said may logically seem a banality, but it is precisely on the common factors of safeguards, safety and security that the three ‘S’ approach has been promoted in Japan, which rationalises costs and optimises systems. An optimisation that, it must be said, is by no means the majority both at the level of States and in international organisations, for different reasons between the two plans (national and international). In fact, security belongs primarily to States, while safeguards and part of safety belong to international organisations, mainly the IAEA.
This summary of things that are already known may seem too long and distracting, but these are considerations arising from the coherent structure of the chapters in this book and from the intentions stated by the editors. Precisely because the biological is as far removed from the radionuclear, it is possible and necessary to organise the three ‘S’s differently. In the half century from the Geneva Protocol of 1925 to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1975, it has not been possible to establish a control regime similar to that of nuclear safeguards. Following the Convention, however, it was possible to establish a system of confidence‐building measures, which is similar to what the IAEA is promoting in nuclear security. Or, if one looks at safety, it is immediately apparent from reading the chapters of the book how much more intertwined it is with security than in the nuclear realm. There is a natural tendency, due to the very materiality of the biological, to move without hiatus from the interdiction of bacteriological and toxin weapons to biosafety and biosecurity, as the book makes clear.
Hence, biosecurity, rather than being an additional element of safety, conforms to a possible synthesis between safety and confidence‐building measures, suited to the current international risk scenario. The value of the book, however, is not only contained in the quality of the individual chapters but also in the technopolitical proposal to create an international network for education in biosecurity, with the dramaturgical acronym IBSEN. Experience would be all in favour of such an attempt, promoted by the WHO just as the IAEA has promoted the international network for nuclear security education. With the significant difference of being able to develop and promote transnational education programmes in a booming technoscientific field. And in a field in which biosecurity must not be limited by a strict separation from safety, which is bureaucratic before being conceptual, as is the case with nuclear power. As Harvard's Belfer Center also reports, the life sciences are fundamental to driving scientific progress, benefiting everything from public health to agriculture and environmental preservation. Yet, it is vital to recognise and mitigate potential risks, especially in the realms of biosafety and biosecurity. Training and education are needed to do this because the critical element in safety/security in life sciences is the human element, much more so than in other CBRN. Anyone wishing to develop an education programme in biosecurity will find in the following pages not only insightful researches but also a relevant contribution to many courses of study.
Professor Matteo Gerlini
Chair of the International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN)University of Siena, Department of Political and International SciencesSienaItaly
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank all of the authors for submitting their chapter outlines, drafts and final versions according to the very tight agreed timetable, and some of the authors for engaging with us in discussions of their chapters. The chapter authors, nevertheless, have sole responsibility for their own chapters. We would also like to thank the members of the Tianjin University Faculty who kindly assisted us in checking the format of all of the chapters and references.
The Editors
Acronyms
A
ABEO
Advisory Board for Education and Outreach (of OPCW/SAB)
ACE2
Human receptor type
Ag‐RDTs
Antigen detecting rapid diagnostic tests
AI
Artificial intelligence
AM
Additive manufacturing
APHIS
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (USA)
APP3
Action Package Prevent‐3, Biosafety and Biosecurity (of the GHSA)
ASAP
Artificial starch anabolic pathway
ASPR
Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response (USA)
B
BACAC
Biosafety Association for Central Asia and Caucasus
BMBL
Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (Guidance)
BSAT
Biological select agents and toxins
BSE
Bovine spongiform encephalitis
BSL
Biosafety level
BTRP
Biological Threat Reduction Program
BTWC
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
BW
Biological weapon
BWC
Biological Weapons Convention (short form of BTWC)
C
CAR T
Cell therapy
CAT
Chloramphenicol acetyl transferase (Enzyme)
CB
Chemical and biological
CBP
Customs and Border Protection (USA)
CBRN
Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
CBRS
Center for Biosafety Research and Strategy (Tianjin University)
CBW
Chemical and biological weapons
CCD
Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
CD
Conference of Disarmament
CDC
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (USA)
CIA
Central Intelligence Agency (USA)
CIDTP
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
CND
Campaign for nuclear disarmament
CO
2
Carbon dioxide
CoE
Centres of Excellence (EU CBRN Risk Mitigation)
COVID‐19
COVID‐19 pandemic (virus)
Cpf1
CRISPR effector
CPT
Committee for the Prevention of Torture
CRISPR/Cas
Genome editing technique
CTBT
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
CTR
Cooperative threat reduction
CW
Chemical weapon
CWC
Chemical Weapons Convention
CWS
Chemical Warfare Service (USA)
D
3D
Three dimensional (protein folding)
DHB
District Health Board (Waikato, New Zealand)
DNA
Deoxyribonucleic acid
DOD
Department of Defense (USA)
DTRA
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (USA)
DURC
Dual Use Research of Concern
E
E&O
Education and outreach
EAR
Export Administration Regulations (USA)
EDP
Extremely dangerous pathogens
EEAS
European External Action Service
ELBI
Emerging Leaders in Biosecurity Fellowship
ENMOD
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques
ENDC
Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee
ePPPs
Enhanced potential pandemic pathogens
EU
European Union
EU CBRN CoE
EU CBRN Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence Initiative
EWARS
Early Warning, Alert, and Response System (of the WHO)
F
FAO
Food and Agriculture Organization
FBI
Federal Bureau of Investigation
FDA
Food and Drug Administration (USA)
FESAP
Federal Experts Security Advisory Panel (USA)
FIRES
Documentary Video Project (OPCW)
FSAP
Federal Select Agent Program (USA)
G
GASR7
Gene
GeBSA
Georgian Biosafety Association
GHSA
Global Health Security Agenda
GHSI
Global Health Security Initiative
GMO
Genetically Modified Organism
GOARN
Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network
GOF
Gain‐of‐Function (experiment)
GPC
General purpose criterion
gRNA
Guide ribonucleic acid
H
H1N1
Novel influenza virus
H5N1
Avian influenza virus
H7N5
Avian influenza virus
HIV
Human immunodeficiency virus
HHS
Department of Health and Human Services (USA)
I
IAEA
International Atomic Energy Agency
IAP
InterAcademy Panel
IAP
International Association of Prosecutors
IBSEN
International Biosecurity Security Education Network
ICCA
International Council of Chemical Associations
ICCPR
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICPO‐INTERPOL
International Criminal Police Organization
ICRC
International Committee of the Red Cross
ICST
International Collaborations in Science and Technology
ICT
Information computer technology
ICTA
International Chemical Trade Association
IFBA
International Federation of Biosafety Associations
iGEM
International Genetic Engineering Machine Competition
IHL
International Humanitarian Law
IHR
International Health Regulations
IHRL
International Human Rights Law
IL‐4
Interleukin‐4
INB
International Network on Biotechnology
INSEN
International Nuclear Security Education Network
INTERPOL
International Criminal Police Organization
IO
International Organisation
IRB
Institutional Review Board
ISO
International Organisation for Standardisation
ISTC
International Science and Technology Center
ISU
Implementation Support Unit (of the BTWC)
ITA
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (USA)
INTERPOL
International Criminal Police Organisation
IUPAC
International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry
IWG
International Working Group
J
JEE
Joint External Evaluation Tool (of the IHR)
L
LMO
Living modified organisms
M
MERS
Virus
MIT
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
ML
Machine learning
MMUST
Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology (Kenya)
MoJ
Ministry of Justice (Georgia)
mRNA
Messenger ribonucleic acid
MSP
Meeting of States Parties (BTWC)
MX
Meeting of Experts (BTWC)
MYBPC3
Gene
N
NASEM
National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine (USA)
NCDC
National Center for Disease Control and Public Health (Georgia)
NGO
Non‐government organisation
NPT
Nuclear Non‐Proliferation Treaty
NRC
National Research Council (USA)
NSABB
National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (USA)
NSC
White House National Security Council (USA)
NUSEC
Nuclear Security Information Portal
O
OPCW
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OSH Act
Occupational Safety and Health Act (USA)
OSHA
Occupational Health and Safety Administration (USA)
OSTP
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (USA)
P
P3CO
Potential Pandemic Pathogen Care and Oversight (USA)
PAM
Protospacer adjacent motif
PDCA
Plan–do–check–act (cycle)
POC
Point of care
PPE
Personal protective equipment
R
R&D
Research and development
RCAs
Riot control agents
RISE
Group of American teenage criminals
S
S&T
Science and technology
SAB
Scientific Advisory Board (of the OPCW)
SARS
Virus
SARS‐CoV‐2
Virus
SEB
Staphylococcal enterotoxin B
SGTEB
Sous Groupe de Travail et d’Etudes Biologiques
SIRUS
Superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering (prohibition)
STCU
Science and Technology Center in Ukraine
T
TALENs
Traditional genome editing tools
TCR
Genetically engineered T cells
TJU‐CBRS
Tianjin University Center for Biosafety Research and Strategy
TPNW
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
U
UK
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UN
United Nations
UNBP
UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials
UNCoC
UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials
UNEP
United Nations Environment Program
UNESCO
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICRI
United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute
UNIDIR
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNODA
United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs
UNSC
United Nations Security Council
UNSCR 1540
United Nations Security Council 1540
UNSGM
United Nations Secretary General’s Mechanism
US$
United States dollars
US(A)
United States of America
USDA
US Department of Agriculture
USG
US Government
USSR
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
V
VEREX
Verification Experts Group (of the BTWC)
VX
Nerve agent
W
WAHIS
World Animal Health Information System
WHO
World Health Organization
WILPF
Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom
WINSI
Women in Nuclear Security Initiative
WMD
Weapons of Mass Destruction
WOAH
World Organisation for Animal Health
WWI
World War One
WWII
World War Two
Z
ZFNs
Traditional genome editing tools
1Biological Security After the Pandemic
Lijun Shang1, Weiwen Zhang2, and Malcolm Dando3
1 Biological Security Research Centre, School of Human Sciences, London Metropolitan University, London, UK
2 Center for Biosafety Research and Strategy, Tianjin University, Tianjin, China
3 School of Social Sciences, University of Bradford, Bradford, UK
Key Points
Biosecurity concerns the prevention of natural, accidental and deliberate disease in humans, animals and plants. All three aspects of preventing natural, accidental and deliberate disease are interrelated and improvements in each can support the others, but the focus here is on preventing deliberate disease.
While the focus is on the life sciences and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), we take a broad view of the threat and the regulatory regime, particularly to include mid‐spectrum agents such as toxins and bioregulators and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
We follow the World Health Organisation's Global Framework in seeing multiple stakeholders having a range of tools and mechanisms that can be used to improve biorisk management. The focus here is on the need for biosecurity education, particularly for life and associated scientists in support of the Tianjin Guidelines.
The book is divided into 20 chapters in five sections: Introduction and Overview (1 chapter); The Threat (7 chapters); The International Response (4 chapters); The Role of Scientists (6 chapters); and The Future (2 chapters).
In the longer term, we see the need for an International Biosecurity Education Network (IBSEN) similar to the International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN) run by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Summary
The chapter begins by stressing the importance of improving biosecurity after the pandemic and defines biosecurity as the prevention of natural, accidental and deliberate disease in humans, animals and plants. While stressing the all three aspects are interrelated and critical to each other, the chapter makes it clear that the focus of this book is on the prevention of deliberate disease. Moreover, while the focus is on the life sciences and the BTWC, a broad view is taken of the threat and the regulatory regime so as to include mid‐spectrum agents such as toxins and bioregulators and particularly the CWC. It is argued that the WHO Global Framework is the best approach to biosecurity, with multiple stakeholders being seen as having a range of tools and mechanisms available to help improve biorisk management and that the essential component that is of concern here is biosecurity education in support of the Tianjin Guidelines. The sections and chapters of the book are then outlined before it is suggested that in the longer term an International Biosecurity Education Network (IBSEN) similar to The International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN) run by the IAEA will be needed to effectively improve biosecurity.
1.1 The Objective of the Book
In 2019, a large group of government and non‐government experts were drawn together in an exercise to produce a list of critical questions for future biosecurity in the United Kingdom. The exercise had been organised by the Biosecurity Research Initiative at St. Catherine's College, University of Cambridge, and consisted of a three‐phase process in which firstly a panel identified 59 experts from a range of disciplines, then secondly these experts were asked to draw on their own contacts to propose lists of tractable but unanswered biosecurity questions and finally a subset of 32 experts voted anonymously to select the top 10% of the 450 questions (which had been divided into 6 categories). And then 35 of the experts met at St. Catherine's to discuss, vote and rank the questions to provide a final list of 80 questions. The categories and the number of questions in each category are set out in Table 1.1.
It is clear from this exercise that ensuring future biological security was considered a complex task even before the pandemic struck in late 2019, and the pandemic has obviously made taking effective action to improve biological security for every nation much more urgent today.1
For this exercise, biological security was defined broadly to encompass the prevention of natural, accidental and deliberately caused diseases to humans, animals and plants. It suggested that:2
… Consistently emerging themes included: the nature of current and potential biological security threats, the efficacy of existing management actions, and the most appropriate future options …
Table 1.1 Topics and numbers of biosecurity questions.
Source: Adapted from reference 2.
Bioengineering technologies Questions 1–6
Communication and behavioural change Questions 7–17
Disease threats Questions 18–35
Governance and policy Questions 36–52
Invasive alien (non‐native) species Questions 53–67
Securing against misuse Questions 68–80
And the authors added that the resulting questions provided an ‘agenda for biological security’ in the future. They also noted that:
Many emerging biosecurity dilemmas, such as the malicious use of synthetic biology, require new approaches to biosecurity, including the engagement of social scientists and policy‐makers in forecasting …
In this book, we take a similarly broad science and social science approach, as we concentrate on the specific aspect of the potential deliberate disease in future biological security and the role that scientists can play in preventing the hostile misuse of their benignly intended work, but the much wider context of biological security must also be kept in mind.
Our understanding of deliberate biological threats has evolved rapidly in recent years. In the final decades of the last century, the threat was widely considered to be from biological warfare conducted by States, but early in this century, the rising concern about terrorism expanded that concern to include non‐State actors and sometimes indeed eclipsed the concerns about States. Then in the last two decades, concerns about experiments in the life and associated sciences that seemed to perhaps enable dangerous malicious activities by those with hostile intentions led to increasing concerns also about the direction and governance of the life and associated sciences. A concept that proved to be useful in considering how to deal with this expanded range of threats in a coherent manner started out as a ‘web of deterrence’ against State actions but has evolved into the idea of a ‘web of prevention’ linking a wide range of policies that together can help to minimise the possibility of the deliberate misuse of the life sciences.
As the authors of one study of this concept noted:3
… Biological threats are complex and multifaceted and hence, their effective prevention and countering require multiple lines of collaborative action and sustained cross‐sectorial coordination …
Therefore, they argued, actions required for biosafety and actions required for biosecurity, including the problem of the malign dual use of benignly intended work, should be integrated and seen as an:
… integrated and comprehensive web of prevention in which the efforts aimed at preventing the accidental release of biological agents or toxins, including naturally occurring disease and the efforts aimed to prevent the deliberate release of biological agents and toxins and the misuse of life sciences are complementary and reinforce each other … (Emphasis added)
We follow this reasoning here with biosafety, biosecurity both within the laboratory and outside of the laboratory being seen as complementary to other means of minimising the possibility of deliberate misuse of the life sciences such as export controls and codes of conduct for scientists, and regulatory measures seen as covering both pathogens and toxins (defined to include natural bioregulatory chemical agents such as neurotransmitters if used in unusual amounts or by unusual means).
As has been pointed out by many authors, one of the major difficulties anticipated for the future of assuring biosecurity is the very rapid rate of the advances being made in the life and associated sciences. The precise topics of concern will obviously vary given the different backgrounds and interests of various groups of authors, but this theme emerges strongly in all attempts to assess future developments over the next decades. For example, the World Health Organisation (WHO) published a horizon scan in 2021 titled Emerging technologies and dual‐use concerns: a horizon scan for global public health. This study was organised by the Science Division of the organisation and involved numerous outside experts. For the purpose of this study, dual‐use research of concern (DURC) was defined as:4
… life science research that is intended for benefit but which might be misapplied to do harm …
The study was organised to assess how such research that could have high impact might evolve over three time periods, up to 5 years, from 5 to 10 years and after 10 years. As in the UK study of biosecurity questions, the answers were derived from a systematic process involving topic identification, scoring, expert discussion and refinement and re‐scoring of the refined list. Table 1.2 shows the topics that were identified in the five‐year timescale.
Table 1.2 Priority DURC issues identified in the five‐year timescale.
Source: Adapted from reference 4.
Bioregulators
Cloud laboratories
De novo
synthesis of variola virus
Research on SARS‐Cov‐2
Synthetic genomics platforms for virus reconstruction
Now, most of these topics would not be of great surprise, few would dissent from the finding that:
… The expert group expected that there will be significant research into the determinants of the infectivity, severity and host specificity of SARS‐CoV‐2 within the next 5 years, as well as of immune evasion strategies …
However, it has to be stressed that the expert group saw potential dual‐use problems well beyond the frequent concentration on pathogens and genomics. In the five‐year timeframe, for example, it suggested that:
Bioregulators are biochemical compounds, such as peptides, that affect cellular processes. Research has identified a number of bioregulators and synthetic analogues that can modify life processes, including cognition, reproduction and development …. They can … be misused, and … have profound effects within minutes of exposure …
It should also be noted that in the longer beyond 10‐year period the ‘Hostile Exploitation of Neurobiology’ was identified as an additional field of dual‐use concern.
In 2022, the WHO published its up‐to‐date definitive Global guidance framework for the responsible use of the life sciences. This document was again the result of the work of numerous experts from diverse parts of the work that had been organised by the WHO, and it clearly identified the multiple stakeholders (Table 1.3) who can play a critical role in ensuring future biological security, and the many tools and mechanisms that are available to those stakeholders.
Important to note here is the clear identification of scientists and their institutions as having a key role to play in ensuring future biological security and that codes of ethics are one of the tools and mechanisms that can be utilised. As the guidance notes:5
… Codes of ethics can be a useful tool to raise awareness of the need for biorisk management and provide norm setting standards …. There have … been initiatives to outline high‐level principles that can serve as references in developing or amending codes of conduct …. The most recent is the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Codes of Conduct …
Table 1.3 Stakeholders identified by the WHO.
Source: Adapted from reference 5.
National governments
Scientists
Research institutions
Funding bodies
Publishers and editors
Standard‐setting institutions
Educators
International organisations
Civil society networks and publics
The private sector
However, the guidance stresses a major problem in its rationale for the global guidance framework stating that:
… A chronic and fundamental challenge is a widespread lack of awareness that work in this area – which is predominantly undertaken to advance knowledge and tools to improve health, economies and societies – could be conducted or misused in ways that result in health and society risks to the public. Also, incentives to identify and mitigate such risks are lacking.
Our objective in producing this book is to provide a one‐stop‐shop, where any interested scientist or other stakeholder can quickly grasp the main issues involved in dealing with the problem of dual use and ensuring biological security more generally. We additionally hope that it can easily be used by educators to add material about biological security to their teaching of life and associated science courses at multiple levels.
The difficulties in adding biosecurity to the education and culture of the life and associated scientist should not be under estimated in view of the vast numbers of such scientists around the world, the disparate nature of the fields within which they work and the rate of the advances being made in many of these fields of research. A further factor that needs to be taken into account is that scientists will increasingly have to take part in discussion with governments about how dual‐use dangers are to be regulated. An example of what may increasingly become matters of concern to scientists occurred in January 2023 when two Working Groups of the United States National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) put forward new recommendations for the regulation of such experiments within the United States.6 The proposals related first to ‘Research with enhanced potential pandemic pathogens (ePPPs)’ and second to ‘Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC)’. The proposals were based on consideration of the efforts within the United States, particularly in the last decade, to minimise the dangers from particular types of experiments that could be of concern. The technical details of the recommendations need not be dealt with in this introduction and overview, except to note (Table 1.4) that should the proposals be accepted by government extra responsibilities will certainly fall upon practicing scientists.
Table 1.4 Some recommendations made by the NSABB.
Source: Adapted from reference 6.
Recommendation 3.1. Amend the US Government (USG) potential pandemic pathogen care and oversight (P3CO) framework to include and articulate specific roles, responsibilities and expectations for investigators and institutions in the identification, review and evaluation of research for potential involvement of ePPPs, taking into account existing review and oversight processes.
Recommendation 3.2. Local, institutional compliance procedures must be better harmonised, strengthened where needed and adequate technical and financial assistance provided.
Recommendation 8.2. Any updates to USG DURC policies, particularly updates regarding the scope of research subject to review and/or the relevant entities to which the policies apply, must involve relevant stakeholders and be accompanied by robust USG outreach and education and an adequate implementation period.
Table 1.5 The sections of the book.
Introduction and overview Chapter 1
The threat
Chapters 2
–
8
The international response
Chapters 9
–
12
The role of scientists
Chapters 13
–
18
The future
Chapters 19
–
20
It also seems most unlikely that other governments will not, in the not‐too‐distant future, also be moving along similar lines of requiring much more involvement of practicing life and associated scientists in the regulation of their benignly intended work.
1.2 The Structure of the Book
In order to meet our objective of providing a comprehensive, but also easy to use, source of information on biological security after the pandemic, we have divided the subject into 19 short chapters that are grouped into four sections following this introduction and overview section (Table 1.5). References have been kept to a small number but chosen so that they can provide a quick route into the more detailed literature for those who need or are interested in following up the issues discussed (however, some chapters have larger numbers of references, as the authors considered the material, they were covering, would be less familiar to readers than most of the book). The main sections of the WHO global guidance framework document, for example, have 154 references, and there are additional references in the annexes to the report.
The next part of this chapter briefly introduces the chapters and themes of the book.
1.3 Overview of the Chapters
Section 2 on the threat begins with an extended account, in Chapter 2 by Jean‐Pascal Zanders, of the way in which our understanding of poisons and infections has developed over the last 200 years as the sciences of first chemistry and then biology became established, and of how the international community has attempted to prevent the hostile use of these new sciences since the nineteenth century. Then in Chapter 3, Gemma Bowsher reviews how the many different actors with many different purposes have sought to use biological weapons in the past and also how the possible use of biological weapons is now being utilised in disinformation campaigns and infodemics. Brett Edwards describes the way in which the context and state of scientific knowledge influenced the potential to use biological weapons in antiquity through to 1946 (Chapter 4), and Brian Balmer reviews the offensive biological weapons programmes of States during the latter half of the twentieth century (Chapter 5). In Chapter 6, Kathryn Nixdorff investigates the developing concerns about dual‐use raised by a series of experiments in the early years of this century, and Xinyu Song and Weiwen Zang describe some of the key cutting‐edge technologies of concern today focusing particularly on synthetic biology and genome editing (Chapter 7). The section on the threat is rounded off by Chapter 8 in which Ralf Trapp discusses the convergence of other technologies, such as artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) with biotechnology, that is causing increased concern about dual‐use applications.
Section 3 of the book begins with an account of the origin and development to date of the idea of the web of prevention by Tatyana Novossiolova in Chapter 9, and this is followed by a review of the structure and functions of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the BTWC by Jez Littlewood (Chapter 10) and other relevant international agreements such as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) by Michael Crowley (Chapter 11). The section ends with a review of the role of relevant international organisations such as the WHO and the International Committee of the Red Cross by Louison Mazeaud, James Revill, Jaroslav Krasny and Vivienne Zhang (Chapter 12).
Section 4 of the book turns to the key role that life and associated scientists can play in improving biosecurity and begins with a review of the elements of biorisk management by Mayra Ameneiros (Chapter 13), and this is followed by a description of two national regulatory systems one in the United States and the other in Georgia by Dana Perkins and Lela Bakanidze (Chapter 14). The lessons that can be derived from our recent experiences of ePPP research and the COVID‐19 pandemic are then investigated by Nariyoshi Shinomiya in Chapter 15. The Hague Ethical Guidelines and the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines are reviewed by Yang Xue (Chapter 16), and then the problem of engaging scientists in biorisk management is described by Yahan Bao and Alonso Flores in Chapter 17. Underpinning all the chapters lies the question of appropriate ethics and how this is to be applied, and this issue is discussed in the final Chapter 18 of the Section by Leifan Wang.
The book ends with two chapters in Section 5 which look towards the future. In Chapter 19, Nancy Connell and Gigi Gronwall examine the multi‐layered system of different components that are becoming interwoven in the efforts to effectively prevent the misuse of the life and associated sciences, and finally, in Chapter 20, Kathryn Millett and Lijun Shang stress the need for an IBSEN to be established quickly to support the effective biosecurity education of life and associate scientists in support of the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines.
Given the current shortage in resource books for teaching biosecurity, we hope that the book makes a useful contribution in helping to assist lecturers and teachers in universities and colleges to add elements of this subject to their courses, and we would like to particularly thank members of the faculty at Tianjin University who helped with the task of finalising the editing of this book.
Author Biography
Dr. Lijun Shang, BSc, MSc, PhD, FPhysoc., London Metropolitan University (LMU), United Kingdom. Lijun Shang is a professor of Biomedical Sciences at School of Human Sciences in London Metropolitan University (LMU). He is the founding director of Biological Security Research Centre at LMU. His research focuses mainly on ion channels in Health and Disease. Since 2015, he expanded his research interest into biochemical weapons and science convergence, as he wished to incorporate studies of the social impact of the advances in the life sciences. Since 2020, Professor Shang has been leading a series of projects in the effort to provide a civil society input into the broad Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).
Dr. Weiwen Zhang,
