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Use this guideline to develop an effective Process Safety Knowledge Management system When managing the risks of hazardous materials and energies, a well-developed process safety program is critical for maintaining a healthy workforce, for protecting the environment, and for sustaining the business. The Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) has identified Process Knowledge Management as one of its twenty Elements in its Risk Based Process Safety (RBPS) approach. With an effective Process Safety Knowledge Management (PSKM) system, an organization will be able to capture, organize, maintain, and access its technical, engineering, and administrative information. Thus, an effective PSKM system will help an organization successfully manage its risks. This book provides a set of comprehensive guidelines for implementing a Process Safety Knowledge Management (PSKM) system, which will help an organization improve its process safety performance. The book begins with a discussion on the characteristics of a PSKM system. Then it describes the underlying factors for successful implementation and ends with guidance on overcoming common implementation difficulties. Produced by a leading global process safety organization, this book is essential for any organization looking to ensure that systems are in place to sustain their process safety knowledge during the life of the process. Guidelines for Process Safety Knowledge Management readers will also find: * Case studies throughout the book, with PSKM-related lessons * Detailed discussions of how a PSKM system helps cultivate leadership, improves organizational culture, and involves employees * A business case for PSKM, demonstrating the benefits to the business Guidelines for Process Safety Knowledge Management is ideal for process safety professionals, engineering managers, facility managers, maintenance managers, production managers, and others responsible for creating or managing their process safety knowledge management systems.
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Cover
Table of Contents
Title Page
Copyright
List of Figures
List of Tables
Acronyms and Abbreviations
Glossary
Acknowledgments
Dedication
Preface
1 Introduction
1.1 What Is Process Safety Knowledge Management (PSKM)?
1.2 Purpose and Scope of this Book
1.3 Historical Development of PSKM
1.4 Knowledge Pyramid
1.5 Audience
1.6 Elements Not Covered in This Book
1.7 Content and Organization of this Book
2 The Business Case for Process Safety Knowledge Management
2.1 Generating Process Safety Knowledge
2.2 Retaining Process Safety Knowledge
2.3 Sharing Process Safety Knowledge
2.4 From Knowledge to Wisdom
3 PSKM and Risk Based Process Safety
3.1 Process Knowledge Management vs. PSKM
3.2 PSKM Cycle Impacts on the Four Pillars of RBPS
3.3 Commit to Process Safety
3.4 Understand Hazards and Risk
3.5 Manage Risk
3.6 Learn from Experience
3.7 Chapter Summary
3.8 Introduction to the Next Chapter
4 Developing and Implementing PSKM
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Resources for Capturing, Organizing and Providing PSK
4.3 Capturing Knowledge and Information
4.4 Organizing Knowledge and Information
4.5 Providing Knowledge and Information
4.6 Organizational Structure to Build PSKM
4.7 Establishing PSKM Culture
4.8 Chapter Summary
4.9 Introduction to the Next Chapter
5 Maintaining and Improving PSKM
5.1 People, Roles and Responsibilities for Managing the PSK
5.2 Tools to Maintain the PSK
5.3 Assessing and Improving the PSKM Program
5.4 Information Management
5.5 Chapter Summary
5.6 Introduction to the Next Chapter
6 Case Studies and Lessons Learned
6.1 Introduction to PSKM Focus Charts
6.2 Case Studies from Significant Incidents
6.3 Key Factors from PSKM Success Stories in Other Industries
6.4 Understanding Knowledge Management System Failures
6.5 Chapter Summary
6.6 Introduction to the Next Chapter
7 Summary of Process Safety Knowledge Management (PSKM)
References
Index
End User License Agreement
Chapter 1
Table 1-1 Example Inputs and Outputs of the DIKW Pyramid
Chapter 3
Table 3-1 RBPS Pillars and Corresponding Elements
Table 3-2 Process Safety Competency Interactions with RBPS and PSKM
Table 3-3 Examples of PSKM Interactions on the Second Pillar of RBPS
Table 3-4 PSKM Impact on Operating Procedures
Chapter 4
Table 4-1 Example PSKM Roles and Responsibilities
Table 4-2 RACI Role Definitions
Table 4-3 Example PSKM RACI Chart
Table 4-4 Example Activities for Building PSKM Management System
Table 4-5 Example Logic Model Components to Capture the Knowledge
Table 4-6 Organizational Methods
Table 4-7 Example Logic Model Components to Organize the Knowledge
Table 4-8 Example Logic Model Components to Provide Knowledge
Table 4-9 Steps to Implement PSKM
Table 4-10 Workplace Factor Effects on PSKM implementation
Table 4-11 Potential Barriers to PSKM and Strategies to Drive PSKM
Table 4-12 Effect of Human Factors on the PSKM System
Table 4-13 Types of Software for PSK Management
Table 4-14 Example Template Inputs for a Hazard Registry
Table 4-15 Example Template for an Incident Investigation Registry
Chapter 5
Table 5-1 Example PSKM RACI Chart for Maintaining Knowledge
Table 5-2 Example Logic Map Components to Maintain Knowledge
Table 5-3 Examples of Static and Dynamic Information
Table 5-4 Tools and Methods for Maintaining Maintenance-related PSK
Table 5-5 Core Components of a Successful PSKM Program
Table 5-6 Suggested PSKM Health Measurement KPIs
Table 5-7 PSKM Performance Indicators
Table 5-8 Example Four Level Organizational Maturity Model
Table 5-9 Example Logic Map Components to Gauge PSKM Maturity Level
Table 5-10 Example Gap Assessment Questions
Table 5-11 Types of Audit Teams
Table 5-12 Knowledge Audit Criteria
Table 5-13 Knowledge Management Software Evaluation Criteria
Chapter 1
Figure 1-1 Data-Information-Knowledge-Wisdom (DIKW) pyramid
Chapter 3
Figure 3-1 PSKM system
Figure 3-2 Continuous PSKM cycle
Figure 3-3 Impact of the PSKM Cycle on the Four RBPS Pillars
Figure 3-4 Integration of PSKM Into HIRA Activities
Chapter 4
Figure 4-1 Example Resources for PSKM Development and Implementation
Figure 4-2 Sequence of Actions of PSKM Development Process
Figure 4-3 Inputs to a PSKM Logic Model
Figure 4-4 Types of Information to Capture
Figure 4-5 Information Sources
Figure 4-6 PSKM Organizational Structure
Figure 4-7 Example PSKM Business Management Plan
Chapter 5
Figure 5-1 Knowledge Sources
Figure 5-2 Performance Measurement and Performance Management
Figure 5-3 Auditing Resources
Figure 5-4 Characteristics of a Storage and Retrieval Information System
Figure 5-5 Characteristics for Data Preservation in Operations Environment
Chapter 6
Figure 6-1 BP Texas City Raffinate Splitter Tower and the Blowdown Drum
Figure 6-2 BP Texas City PSKM Focus Chart - Provide Knowledge Gap
Figure 6-3 BP Texas City PSKM Focus Chart - Maintain Knowledge Gap
Figure 6-4 BP Texas City PSKM Focus Chart - Organize Knowledge Gap
Figure 6-5 BP Texas City Case Study PSKM Focus Chart
Figure 6-6 Destroyed trailers near ISOM unit at BP Texas City
Figure 6-7 CSI Vacuum Distillation Process
Figure 6-8 CSI Case Study PSKM Focus Chart
Figure 6-9 Aerial view of Concept Sciences Inc.
Figure 6-10 Merrimack Valley Gas Distribution Configuration
Figure 6-11 Merrimack Valley Case Study PSKM Focus Chart
Figure 6-12 Firefighters Battling Merrimack Valley Fire
Figure 6-13 Tesoro Anacortes NHT Unit Heat Exchangers
Figure 6-14 Anacortes Tesoro Case Study Focus Chart
Figure 6-15 Image of the Fire After the Heat Exchanger Failure
Figure 6-16 Access Paths to SCBAs
Figure 6-17 Dispersion Impact of Methyl Mercaptan
Figure 6-18 Loss of level in Methyl Mercaptan Storage Tank
Figure 6-19 Excerpt from CSB Investigation Report
Figure 6-20 DuPont LaPorte Case Study Focus Chart
Figure 6-21 Buncefield Oil Storage Depot
Figure 6-22 Description of the IHLS Design
Figure 6-23 Buncefield Case Study Focus Chart
Figure 6-24 Aerial View of Buncefield Fire
Figure 6-25 Example Bow Tie
Figure 6-26 Bow Tie Diagram - Inadequate PSKM System Design
Figure 6-27 Bow Tie Diagram - Inadequate Attention to Human Factors
Chapter 7
Figure 7-1 Data-Information-Knowledge-Wisdom (DIKW) pyramid
Cover
Table of Contents
Title Page
Copyright
List of Figures
List of Tables
Acronyms and Abbreviations
Glossary
Acknowledgments
Dedication
Preface
Begin Reading
References
Index
End User License Agreement
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Center for Chemical Process Safety
American Institute of Chemical Engineers
New York, NY
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Cover Images: Silhouette, oil refinery © manyx31/iStock. com; Stainless steel © Creativ Studio Heinemann/Getty Images; Dow Chemical Operations, Stade, Germany/Courtesy of The Dow Chemical Company
This book is one in a series of process safety guidelines and concept books published by the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS). Please refer to wiley.com/go/ccps for a full list of titles in this series.
It is sincerely hoped that the information presented in this document will lead to a better safety record for the entire industry; however, neither the American Institute of Chemical Engineers, its consultants, CCPS Technical Steering Committee and Subcommittee members, their employers, their employers' officers and directors, nor PSRG, and its employees and subcontractors warrant or represent, expressly or by implication, the correctness or accuracy of the content of the information presented in this document. As between (1) American Institute of Chemical Engineers, its consultants, CCPS Technical Steering Committee and Subcommittee members, their employers, their employers' officers, and directors, and PSRG and its employees and subcontractors, and (2) the user of this document, the user accepts any legal liability or responsibility whatsoever for the consequence of its use or misuse.
Figure 1-1 Data-Information-Knowledge-Wisdom (DIKW) pyramid
Figure 3-1 PSKM system
Figure 3-2 Continuous PSKM cycle
Figure 3-3 Impact of the PSKM Cycle on the Four RBPS Pillars
Figure 3-4 Integration of PSKM Into HIRA Activities
Figure 4-1 Example Resources for PSKM Development and Implementation
Figure 4-2 Sequence of Actions of PSKM Development Process
Figure 4-3 Inputs to a PSKM Logic Model
Figure 4-4 Types of Information to Capture
Figure 4-5 Information Sources
Figure 4-6 PSKM Organizational Structure
Figure 4-7 Example PSKM Business Management Plan
Figure 5-1 Knowledge Sources
Figure 5-2 Performance Measurement and Performance Management
Figure 5-3 Auditing Resources
Figure 5-4 Characteristics of a Storage and Retrieval Information System
Figure 5-5 Characteristics for Data Preservation in Operations Environment
Figure 6-1 BP Texas City Raffinate Splitter Tower and the Blowdown Drum
Figure 6-2 BP Texas City PSKM Focus Chart - Provide Knowledge Gap
Figure 6-3 BP Texas City PSKM Focus Chart - Maintain Knowledge Gap
Figure 6-4 BP Texas City PSKM Focus Chart - Organize Knowledge Gap
Figure 6-5 BP Texas City Case Study PSKM Focus Chart
Figure 6-6 Destroyed trailers near ISOM unit at BP Texas City
Figure 6-7 CSI Vacuum Distillation Process
Figure 6-8 CSI Case Study PSKM Focus Chart
Figure 6-9 Aerial view of Concept Sciences Inc.
Figure 6-10 Merrimack Valley Gas Distribution Configuration
Figure 6-11 Merrimack Valley Case Study PSKM Focus Chart
Figure 6-12 Firefighters Battling Merrimack Valley Fire
Figure 6-13 Tesoro Anacortes NHT Unit Heat Exchangers
Figure 6-14 Anacortes Tesoro Case Study Focus Chart
Figure 6-15 Image of the Fire After the Heat Exchanger Failure
Figure 6-16 Access Paths to SCBAs
Figure 6-17 Dispersion Impact of Methyl Mercaptan
Figure 6-18 Loss of level in Methyl Mercaptan Storage Tank
Figure 6-19 Excerpt from CSB Investigation Report
Figure 6-20 DuPont LaPorte Case Study Focus Chart
Figure 6-21 Buncefield Oil Storage Depot
Figure 6-22 Description of the IHLS Design
Figure 6-23 Buncefield Case Study Focus Chart
Figure 6-24 Aerial View of Buncefield Fire
Figure 6-25 Example Bow Tie
Figure 6-26 Bow Tie Diagram - Inadequate PSKM System Design
Figure 6-27 Bow Tie Diagram - Inadequate Attention to Human Factors
Figure 7-1 Data-Information-Knowledge-Wisdom (DIKW) pyramid
Table 1-1 Example Inputs and Outputs of the DIKW Pyramid
Table 3-1 RBPS Pillars and Corresponding Elements
Table 3-2 Process Safety Competency Interactions with RBPS and PSKM
Table 3-3 Examples of PSKM Interactions on the Second Pillar of RBPS
Table 3-4 PSKM Impact on Operating Procedures
Table 4-1 Example PSKM Roles and Responsibilities
Table 4-2 RACI Role Definitions
Table 4-3 Example PSKM RACI Chart
Table 4-4 Example Activities for Building PSKM Management System
Table 4-5 Example Logic Model Components to Capture the Knowledge
Table 4-6 Organizational Methods
Table 4-7 Example Logic Model Components to Organize the Knowledge
Table 4-8 Example Logic Model Components to Provide Knowledge
Table 4-9 Steps to Implement PSKM
Table 4-10 Workplace Factor Effects on PSKM implementation
Table 4-11 Potential Barriers to PSKM and Strategies to Drive PSKM
Table 4-12 Effect of Human Factors on the PSKM System
Table 4-13 Types of Software for PSK Management
Table 4-14 Example Template Inputs for a Hazard Registry
Table 4-15 Example Template for an Incident Investigation Registry
Table 5-1 Example PSKM RACI Chart for Maintaining Knowledge
Table 5-2 Example Logic Map Components to Maintain Knowledge
Table 5-3 Examples of Static and Dynamic Information
Table 5-4 Tools and Methods for Maintaining Maintenance-related PSK
Table 5-5 Core Components of a Successful PSKM Program
Table 5-6 Suggested PSKM Health Measurement KPIs
Table 5-7 PSKM Performance Indicators
Table 5-8 Example Four Level Organizational Maturity Model
Table 5-9 Example Logic Map Components to Gauge PSKM Maturity Level
Table 5-10 Example Gap Assessment Questions
Table 5-11 Types of Audit Teams
Table 5-12 Knowledge Audit Criteria
Table 5-13 Knowledge Management Software Evaluation Criteria
AIChE
American Institute of Chemical Engineers
API
American Petroleum Institute
CCPS
Center for Chemical Process Safety
CRW
Chemical Reactivity Worksheet
DIKW
Data‐Information‐Knowledge‐Wisdom
HAZID
Hazard Identification
HAZOP
Hazards and Operability Study
KM
Knowledge Management
KPI
Key Performance Indicators
MOC
Management of Change
MOOC
Management of Organizational Change
PHA
Process Hazards Analysis
PSI
Process Safety Information
PSK
Process Safety Knowledge
PSKM
Process Safety Knowledge Management
RACI
Responsible, Accountable, Consulted, and Informed chart
RAGAGEP
Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices
RBPS
Risk Based Process Safety (CCPS)
SDS
Safety Data Sheet
This Glossary contains Process Safety terms significant to this CCPS publication, which are current at the time of publication. For other CCPS Process Safety terms and updates to these terms, please refer to the CCPS Process Safety Glossary [1].
Term
Definition
Accident precursors [
2
]
Events that must occur for an accident to happen in each scenario but have not resulted in an accident so far
Cause (Incident)
An event, situation, or condition which results, or could result (Potential Cause), directly or indirectly in an accident or incident [
1
].
Chief Knowledge Officer
Person accountable for the overall PSKM strategy, planning and implementation (Highest position within PSKM)
Contributing Cause
Factors that facilitate the occurrence of an incident such as physical conditions and management practices (also known as contributory factors) [
1
].
Key Performance Indicators (KPI)
A quantifiable way to monitor the health of the overall PSKM System and proactively identify potential issues early to be corrected or improved. KPIs tell an organization how effective their PSKM is at supporting their RBPS program.
Logic Model
A logic model is a tool that can be used to develop and implement the PSKM System [
3
]. Logic models are graphic illustrations of the PSKM Implementation Plan and show the relationship between the planned work and anticipated results.
Management of Organizational Change (MOOC)
Framework for managing the effect of new business processes, changes in organizational structure or cultural changes within an organization
Process Safety Knowledge (PSK)
Knowledge is related to information, which is often associated with policies, and other rule‐based facts. It includes work activities to gather, organize, maintain, and provide information to other process safety elements. Process Safety Knowledge primarily consists of written documents such as hazard information, process technology information, and equipment‐specific information.
Process Safety Knowledge Management (PSKM)
System for capturing, organizing, maintaining, and providing the right Process Safety Knowledge to the right people at the right time to improve process safety in an organization
Process Safety Knowledge Management Focus Chart
A chart divided into three columns that depict causes and other factors related to the incident, and four rows that show elements of the PSKM System (i.e., Capture, Organize, Maintain, and Provide).
Process Safety Knowledge Management System
A tool that makes necessary Process Safety Knowledge available to everyone who needs it, when they need it, and at the right level of detail
Proximate Cause
The cause factor which directly produces the effect without the intervention of any other cause. The cause nearest to the effect in time and space [
1
].
PSKM Audit
A PSKM audit expands on a regulatory audit such that it covers not only availability of documents but their content, accuracy, system/process to create/update, and how the information is shared and utilized. A PSKM audit benefits an organization by identifying gaps in the system and improvement opportunities.
PSKM Champions
A PSKM Champion will promote PSKM in the workplace and facilitate Communities of Practice.
PSKM Editors
A PSKM Editor is someone who knows where PSKM is located and manages format and language of knowledge so users can easily use it.
PSKM Navigators
Navigators connect people who need knowledge with systems and people who have knowledge.
PSKM Project Manager
An executive who manages the implementation of the PSKM initiatives
PSKM Stewards
A steward is responsible for ensuring PSKM updates are made following Management of Change and track changes for follow‐up and validation.
Root Cause
A fundamental, underlying, system‐related reason why an incident occurred that identifies a correctable failure(s) in management systems. There is typically more than one root cause for every process safety incident [
1
].
The American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) and the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) express their appreciation and gratitude to all members of the Guidelines for Process Safety Knowledge Management Subcommittee for their generous efforts in the development and preparation of this important guideline. CCPS also wishes to thank the subcommittee members' respective companies for supporting their involvement during the different phases in this project.
Subcommittee Members:
Michelle Brown, Chair
FMC
Denise Albrecht, Co‐Chair
3M
Jennifer Brittain
AdvanSix
Brian Farrell
CCPS Consultant
Linus Hakkimattar
ReVizions
Mark Hall
Mallinckrodt Pharmaceuticals
Dan Hannewald
BASF
Rainer Hoff
Gateway Group
Allison Knight
3M
Jennifer Mize
Eastman chemical
Steve Murphy
Syngenta
Mohammad Nashwan
Saudi Aramco
Ravi Ramasamy
Nghi Son Refinery & Petrochemical LLC
Jeffery Todd
Holly Frontier
Florine Vincik
BASF
Jerry Yuan
IRC Risk
Hafiz Zeeshan Ahmad
TRONOX Australia
The book committee wishes to express their sincere appreciation to PSRG (Robert J. Weber, Tekin Kunt, Madonna Breen, Michael Munsil, Ester Zelaya, Aaran Green, Ngoc “Annie” Nguyen, Carolina Del Din, Jimmy D Trinh, Russ Kawai, Ryan Terry, and Sonny Sachdeva) for their contributions in preparing the guideline's manuscripts.
Before publication, all CCPS guidelines are subjected to a peer review process. CCPS gratefully acknowledges the thoughtful comments and suggestions of peer reviewers. Their work enhanced the accuracy and clarity of this guideline.
Although the peer reviewers provided comments and suggestions, they were not asked to endorse this guideline and did not review the final manuscript before its release.
Peer Reviewers:
Jack Chosnek
Knowledge One
Raj Dahiya
AIG
Emmanuelle Hagey
NOVA
Trish Kerin
IChemE
Joompote Ketkeaw
SCG Chemicals
Shannon Ross
Chevron
Juliana Schmitz
Linde
Herve Vaudrey
Dekra
This book is dedicated to:
Kenneth E. Tague, CCPSC, CSP
Ken Tague is a Rose‐Hulman Institute of Technology graduate with a career spanning over 38 years in chemical operations. His many roles have included Production Manager and Plant Manager. Before retirement, he was the CCPS Technical Steering Committee (TSC) representative for Archer Daniels Midland Company (ADM) and was on the CCPS Planning Board. His experience and presentation skills have made him a sought‐after instructor for CCPS's flagship course, Foundations of Risk Based Process Safety. He has contributed to the AIChE SAChE and RAPID education programs by developing e‐learning courses related to process safety.
Ken also served on CCPS book committees, contributing to the development of two CCPS books: Dealing with Aging Process Facilities and Infrastructure and Recognizing and Responding to Normalization of Deviance. Based on his hands‐on experience, he also significantly contributed to the web‐based training on Process Safety for Maintenance Workers and Operators.
He is a strong proponent of process safety, having shared his commitment to Process Safety at the 2018 Global Congress on Process Safety in the session “When PSM Hit Home." Preventable incidents continue to stir his passion for sharing his experiences to strengthen the expertise of engineers new to and within the Process Safety field.
Ken is a CCPS Certified Process Safety Professional (CCPSC), a Certified Safety Professional (CSP) in the Safety, Health, and Environmental (SH&E) field, and was an active member of the CCPS Pharma, Food, and Fine Chemicals (PFFC) Committee before he retired. In addition, he holds Patent 9,481,609 as a co‐inventor of the process to make Heteromorphic Lysine Feed Granules.
CCPS is delighted to dedicate this book to Ken in recognition for his past, present, and continuing support of CCPS and the global Process Safety community.
Louisa A. Nara, CCPSC
Global Technical Director, CCPS
Anil Gokhale, Ph.D
.Chief Operating Officer, CCPS
The Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) has been the world leader in developing and disseminating information on process safety management and technology since 1985. The CCPS, an industry technology alliance of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE), has published over 100 books in its process safety guidelines and process safety concepts series, and over a hundred courses, including 33 training modules through its Safety in Chemical Engineering Education (SAChE) series. CCPS is supported by the contributions and voluntary participation of more than 250 companies globally.
This book contains guidelines for companies to improve their process safety performance through the implementation of a Process Safety Knowledge Management (PSKM) system. The characteristics of a PSKM system are defined and guidelines are shared on how to set up a PSKM system to improve overall Process Safety performance. The underlying factors for success are presented which include leadership, employee involvement, and organizational culture with case studies used to illustrate key points and learnings. New perspectives on PSKM are included along with strategies to overcome difficulties in transitioning from a process safety culture based on data and information to a culture based on knowledge and wisdom. Case studies with PSKM‐related lessons learned demonstrate the principles and practices described in the book.
“A society grows great when old people plant trees whose shade they know they shall never sit in.” Greek proverb
This chapter introduces the key definitions for Process Safety Knowledge and Knowledge Management. Process Safety Knowledge Management (PSKM) is a subset of Knowledge Management focusing on building, disseminating, and sustaining Process Safety Knowledge (PSK) in an organization.
Knowledge Management has been defined by many authors over the years as collected and published by Girard and Girard [4]. One of the classic and most cited definitions of Knowledge Management is by O’Dell and Grayson [5]:
“Knowledge Management is a conscious strategy of getting the right knowledge to the right people at the right time and helping people share and put information into action in ways that strive to improve organizational performance.”
CCPS defines Process Safety Knowledge (PSK) as follows [1]:
“Knowledge related to information, which is often associated with policies, and other rule-based facts. It includes work activities to gather, organize, maintain, and provide information to other process safety elements. Process Safety Knowledge primarily consists of written documents such as hazard information, process technology information and equipment-specific information.”
Hence, Process Safety Knowledge Management (PSKM) is defined as:
“A system for capturing, organizing, maintaining, and providing the right Process Safety Knowledge to the right people at the right time to improve process safety in an organization.”
PSKM includes methodologies, tools, processes, organizational structures, and human capital management strategies used to convert data to information, information to knowledge and knowledge to wisdom.
Process Safety Knowledge Management (PSKM) systems cover the entire life cycle of Process Safety Knowledge including development, implementation, and maintenance. The knowledge management system must ensure Process Safety Knowledge is easily accessible and understandable to the people who need it, and that the knowledge shared is consistent, current, and accurate. We note that there is a special case with regards to Contractors and other outside entities which could impact this stated goal. A brief discussion is included in Section 4.5.
This book is intended to be a resource for sharing industry-leading best practices on PSKM and for providing a blueprint for developing an effective PSKM program for companies. This book is divided into three sections:
Business case for an effective PSKM program and its relationship to PSM elements (
Chapters 2
and
3
)
Setting up a successful PSKM system and sustaining it (
Chapters 4
and
5
)
Sharing case studies illustrating the importance of an adequate and effective PSKM system (
Chapter 6
)
The principles of PSKM are transferable across industries. Examples contained within this book will provide guidance on how the knowledge obtained from past incidents, and current best practices from industry leaders, can be applied to many different organizations.
Historically, the terms Process Safety Information (PSI) and Process Safety Knowledge (PSK) have been used interchangeably [6], [7]. As companies’ maturity level in Process Safety Management (PSM) improves, there is a continuing focus in the industry to transition from information to knowledge.
Before the 1990’s, the PSK resided in the organization as a core competency of chemical or process engineers. Analysis of serious process safety events such as the methyl isocyanate release at Bhopal, India in 1984 and explosions at a chemical complex at Pasadena, Texas in 1989, showed that while PSI resided within an organization, it did not consistently turn into knowledge at the operational level. Hence, the right knowledge was not available to the right people.