Introduction to Process Safety for Undergraduates and Engineers E-Book

• Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
• Kategorie: Fachliteratur
• Sprache: Englisch
• Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2016

Seitenzahl: 410

Beschreibung

* Familiarizes the student or an engineer new to process safety with the concept of process safety management * Serves as a comprehensive reference for Process Safety topics for student chemical engineers and newly graduate engineers * Acts as a reference material for either a stand-alone process safety course or as supplemental materials for existing curricula * Includes the evaluation of SACHE courses for application of process safety principles throughout the standard Ch.E. curricula in addition to, or as an alternative to, adding a new specific process safety course * Gives examples of process safety in design

Leseprobe

This book is on in a series of process safety guidelines and concept books published by the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS). Please go to www.wiley.com/go/ccps for a full list of titles in this series.

Introduction to Process Safety for Undergraduates and Engineers

CENTER FOR CHEMICAL PROCESS SAFETY of the AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CHEMICAL ENGINEERS New York, NY

Copyright © 2016 by the American Institute of Chemical Engineers, Inc. All rights reserved.

Published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Hoboken, New Jersey.

Published simultaneously in Canada.

No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, scanning, or otherwise, except as permitted under Section 107 or 108 of the 1976 United States Copyright Act, without either the prior written permission of the Publisher, or authorization through payment of the appropriate per-copy fee to the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, [phone], fax [phone], or on the web at www.copyright.com.Requests to the Publisher for permission should be addressed to the Permissions Department, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 111 River Street, Hoboken, NJ 07030, [phone], fax [phone], or online at http://www.wiley.com/go/permission.

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available.

ISBN: 978-1-118-94950-4

It is our sincere intention that the information presented in this document will lead to an even more impressive safety record for the entire industry; however, neither the American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE), its consultants, CCPS Technical Steering Committee and Subcommittee members, their employers, their employers officers and directors, warrant or represent, expressly or by implication, the correctness or accuracy of the content of the information presented in this document. As between (1) AIChE, its consultants, CCPS Technical Steering Committee and Subcommittee members, their employers, their employers officers and directors, and (2) the user of this document, the user accepts any legal liability or responsibility whatsoever for the consequence of its use or misuse.

CONTENTS

Acronyms and Abbreviations

Glossary

Acknowledgments

Preface

1 Introduction

1.1 Purpose of this Handbook

1.2 Target Audience

1.3 Process Safety - What Is It?

1.4 Organization of the Book

1.5 References

2 Process Safety Basics

2.1 Risk Based Process Safety

Pillar: Commit to Process Safety

2.2 Process Safety Culture

2.3 Compliance with Standards

2.4 Process Safety Competency

2.5 Workforce Involvement

2.6 Stakeholder Outreach

Pillar: Understand Hazards and Risks

2.7 Process Knowledge Management

2.8 Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis

Pillar: Manage Risk

2.9 Operating Procedures

2.10 Safe Work Practices

2.11 Asset Integrity and Reliability

2.12 Contractor Management

2.13 Training And Performance Assurance

2.14 Management of Change

2.15 Operational Readiness

2.16 Conduct of Operations

2.17 Emergency Management

Pillar: Learn from Experience

2.18 Incident Investigation

2.19 Measurement and Metrics

2.20 Auditing

2.21 Management Review and Continuous Improvement

2.22 Summary

2.23 References

3 The Need for Process Safety

3.1 Process Safety Culture: BP Refinery Explosion, Texas City, 2005

3.1.1 Summary

3.1.2 Detailed Description

3.1.3 Causes

3.1.4 Key Lessons

3.1.5 References and Links to Investigation Reports

3.2 Asset Integrity and Reliability: ARCO Channelview, Texas Explosion, 1990

3.2.1 Summary

3.2.2 Detailed Description

3.2.3 Causes

3.2.4 Key Lessons

3.2.5 References and Links to Investigation Reports

3.3 Process Safety Culture: NASA Space Shuttle Columbia Disaster, 2003

3.3.1 Summary

3.3.2 Detailed Description

3.3.3 Causes

3.3.4 Key Lessons

3.3.5 References and Links to Investigation Reports

3.4 Process Knowledge Management: Concept Sciences Explosion, Hanover Township PA, 1999

3.4.1 Summary

3.4.2 Detailed Description

3.4.3 Cause

3.4.4 Key Lessons

3.4.5 References and links to Investigation Reports

3.5 Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment: Esso Longford Gas Plant Explosion, 1998

3.5.1 Summary

3.5.2 Detailed Description

3.5.3 Cause

3.5.4 Key Lessons

3.5.5 References and Links to Investigation Reports

3.6 Operating Procedures: Port Neal, IA, Ammonium Nitrate Explosion, 1994

3.6.1 Summary

3.6.2 Detailed Description

3.6.3 Causes

3.6.4 Key Lessons

3.6.5 References and Links to Investigation Reports

3.7 Safe Work Practices: Piper Alpha, North Sea, UK, 1988

3.7.1 Summary

3.7.2 Detailed Description

3.7.3 Causes

3.7.4 Key Lessons

3.7.5 References and Links to Investigation Reports

3.8 Contractor Management: Partridge Raleigh Oilfield Explosion, Raleigh, MS, 2006

3.8.1 Summary

3.8.2 Detailed Description

3.8.3 Cause

3.8.4 Key Lessons

3.8.5 References and Links to Investigation Reports

3.9 Asset Integrity and Reliability: Explosion at Texaco Oil Refinery, Milford Haven, UK, 1994

3.9.1 Summary

3.9.2 Detailed Description

3.9.3 Causes

3.9.4 Key Lessons

3.9.5 References and Links to Investigation Reports

3.10 Conduct of Operations: Formosa Plastics VCM Explosion, Illiopolis, IL, 2004

3.10.1 Summary

3.10.2 Detailed Description

3.10.3 Causes

3.10.4 Key Lessons

3.10.5 References and Links to Investigation Reports

3.11 Management of Change: Flixborough Explosion, UK, 1974

3.11.1 Summary

3.11.2 Detailed Description

3.11.3 Cause

3.11.4 Key Lessons

3.11.5 References and Links to Investigation Reports

3.12 Emergency Management: Sandoz Warehouse Fire, Switzerland, 1986

3.12.1 Summary

3.12.2 Key Lessons

3.12.3 References and links to investigation reports

3.13 Conduct of Operations: Exxon Valdez, Alaska, 1989

3.13.1 Summary

3.13.2 Detailed Description

3.13.3 Causes

3.13.4 Key Lessons

3.13.5 References and Links to Investigation Reports

3.14 Compliance with Standards: Mexico City, PEMEX LPG Terminal, 1984

3.14.1 Summary

3.14.2 Detailed Description

3.14.3 Causes

3.14.4 Key Lessons

3.14.5 References and Links to Investigation Reports

3.15 Process Safety Culture: Methyl Isocyanate Release, Bhopal, India, 1984

3.15.1 Summary

3.15.2 Detailed Description

3.15.3 Key Lessons

3.15.4 References and Links to Investigation Reports

3.16 Failure to Learn, BP Macondo Well Blowout, Gulf of Mexico, 2010

3.16.1 Summary

3.16.2 Detailed Description

3.16.3 Key Lessons

3.16.4 References and Links to Investigation Reports

3.17 Summary

3.18 References

4 Process Safety for Engineering Disciplines

4.1 Introduction

4.2 Process Knowledge Management

4.3 Compliance with Standards

4.4 Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis, Management Of Change

Management of Organizational Change

4.5 Asset Integrity and Reliability

4.6 Safe Work Practices

4.7 Incident Investigation

4.8 Resources for Further Learning

4.8 Summary

4.9 References

5 Safety in Design

5.1 Process Safety Design Strategies

5.2 General Unit Operations and Their Failure Modes

5.2.1 Pumps, Compressors, Fans

5.2.2 Heat Exchange Equipment

5.2.3 Mass Transfer; Distillation, Leaching and Extraction, Absorption

5.2.4 Mechanical Separation / Solid-Fluid Separation

5.2.5 Reactors and Reactive Hazards

5.2.6 Fired Equipment

5.2.7 Storage

5.3 Petroleum Processing

5.3.1 General Process Safety Hazards in a Refinery

5.3.2 Crude Handling and Separation

5.3.3 Light Hydrocarbon Handling and Separation

5.3.4 Hydrotreating

5.3.5 Catalytic Cracking

5.3.6 Reforming

5.3.7 Alkylation

5.3.8 Coking

5.4 Transient Operating States

5.4.1 Overview

5.4.2 Example Process Safety Incidents

5.4.3 Design Considerations

5.5 References

6 Course Material

6.1 Introduction

6.2 Inherently Safer Design

6.3 Process Safety Management and Conservation of Life

6.4 Process Safety Overview and Safety in the Chemical Process Industries

6.5 Process Hazards

6.5.1 Chemical Reactivity Hazards

6.5.2 Fires and Explosions

6.5.3 Other Hazards

6.6 Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis

6.7 Emergency Relief Systems

6.8 Case Histories

6.8.1 Runaway Reactions

6.8.2 Other Case Histories

6.9 Other Modules

6.10 Summary

6.11 References

7 Process Safety in the Workplace

7.1 What to Expect

7.1.1 Formal Training

7.1.2 Interface with Operators, Craftsmen

7.2 New Skills

7.2.1 Non-Technical

7.2.2 Technical

7.3 Safety Culture

7.4 Conduct of Operations

7.4.1 Operational Discipline

7.4.2 Engineering Discipline

7.4.3 Management Discipline

7.4.4 Other Conduct of Operations Topics for the New Engineer

7.5 Summary

7.6 References

Appendix A – Example Ragagep List

Appendix B – List of CSB Videos

Appendix C – Reactive Chemicals Checklist

C.1 Chemical Reaction Hazard Identification

C.2 Reaction Process Design Considerations

C.3 Resources and Publications

Appendix D– List of Sache Courses

Appendix E – Reactivity Hazard Evaluation Tools

E.1 Screening Table and Flowchart

E.2 Reference

Index

List of links for EBook Resources

EULA

List of Tables

Chapter 2

Table 2.1

Table 2.2.

Table 2.3

Table 2.4

Table 2.5

Chapter 3

Table 3.1

Chapter 4

Table 4.1

Table 4.2

Chapter 5

Table 5.1

Table 5.2

Table 5.2

Table 5.3

Chapter 7

Table 7.1

Appendix A

Table A-1

Appendix B

Table B.1

Appendix D

Table D.1

Appendix E

Table E.1

List of Illustrations

Chapter 2

Figure 2.1. Picture of a nitroglycerine reactor in the 19th century “Alfred Nobel in Scotland”. Nobelprize.org. Nobel Media AB 2014. Web. 15 Sep 2015.

http://www.nobelprize.org/alfred_nobel/biographical/articles/dolan/

7

Figure 2.2. Continuous nitroglycerine reactor, courtesy Biazzi SA (

www.Biazzi.com)

Figure 2.3. Illustration of risk

Figure 2.4. Challenger Disaster, courtesy NASA.

Figure 2.5. Building damage and charge tank crater, Hydroxylamine explosion, courtesy CSB

Figure 2.6. Collapsed tank at Motiva refinery, courtesy CSB

Figure 2.7. Rupture in 52-inch component of line, courtesy CSB

Figure 2.8. Aerial view of the burning Monsanto plant after the 1947 Texas City Disaster, (

http://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth11883)

University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, crediting Moore Memorial Public Library, Texas City, Texas

Figure 2.9. CCPS and API Process Safety Metric Pyramid (Ref. 2.46)

Figure 2.10. Photograph of failed end of heat exchanger, (Ref. 2.33)

Chapter 3

Figure 3.1. Swiss Cheese model of incidents, Ref. 3.1

Figure 3.2. Process flow diagram of the Raffinate Column and blowdown drum, source (CCPS, 2008)

Figure 3.3. Texas City Isom Unit aftermath, courtesy CSB

Figure 3.4. Portable buildings destroyed where contractors were located, courtesy CSB

Figure 3.5. Process flow diagram of wastewater tank

Figure 3.6. Columbia breaking up, courtesy NASA

Figure 3.7. A shower of foam debris after the impact on Columbia's left wing. The event was not observed in real time, courtesy NASA

Figure 3.8. Damage to Concept Sciences Hanover Facility, courtesy Tom Volk, The Morning Call

Figure 3.9. Simplified process flow diagram of the CSI HA vacuum distillation process, courtesy CSB

Figure 3.10. Simplified schematic of absorber, (CCPS, 2008)

Figure 3.11. Simplified schematic of the gas plant (CCPS, 2008)

Figure 3.12 Neutralizer and rundown tank, source, (EPA, 1996)

Figure 3.13. AN plant area after explosion, source, (EPA 1996)

Figure 3.14. Piper Alpha platform, source (CCPS, 2008)

Figure 3.15. Schematic of Piper Alpha platform, source (CCPS, 2008)

Figure 3.16. Tanks involved in the Partridge Raleigh oilfield explosion, source (CSB, 2006)

Figure 3.17. Tank 3 lid, source (CSB, 2007)

Figure 3.18. Ref. ( CCPS, 2008) Picture courtesy of Western Mail and Echo Ltd.89 Figure 3.19. The 30 inch flare line elbow that failed and released 20 tons of vapor, source (HSE, 1994)

Figure 3.20. Smoke plumes from Formosa plant, source (CSB 2007)

Figure 3.21. Reactor building elevation view, source (CSB 2007)

Figure 3.22. Cutaway of the reactor building, source (CSB 2007)

Figure 3.23. Schematic of Flixborough piping replacement, source Report of the Court of Inquiry

Figure 3.24. The collapsed 20 inch pipe

Figure 3.25. Damage to Flixborough plant

Figure 3.26. Damage to Flixborough control room

Figure 3.27. Sandoz Warehouse firefighting efforts, source (CCPS, 2008)

Figure 3.28. Impact of Sandoz Warehouse firewater runoff, (CCPS, 2008)

Figure 3.29. Exxon Valdez tanker leaking oil, courtesy of Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council

Figure 3.30. Oiled loon onshore, courtesy of Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council

Figure 3.31. Aerial of a maxi-barge with water tanks and spill works hosing a beach, Prince William Sound, courtesy of Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council

Figure 3.32. Cleanup workers spray oiled rocks with high pressure hoses, courtesy of Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council

Figure 3.33 Layout of PEMEX LPG Terminal, source, CCPS, 2008)

Figure 3.34. PEMEX LPG Terminal prior to explosion source, CCPS, 2008

Figure 3.35. PEMEX LPG Terminal after the explosion source, CCPS, 2008

Figure 3.36. Schematic of emergency relief effluent treatment system that included a scrubber and flare tower in series, source AIChE

Figure 3.37. Photograph taken shortly after the incident. A pipe rack is shown on the left and the partially buried storage tanks (three total) for MIC are located in the center of the photo right, (source Willey 2006)

Figure 3.38. Fire on Deepwater Horizon, source (CSB, 2010)

Figure 3.39. Location of Mud-Gas separator, source (TO, 2011)

Figure 3.40. Gas release points, source (TO, 2011)

Figure 3.41. Macondo Well blowout preventer, source (CSB 2010)

Chapter 5

Figure 5.1. Damage from fire caused by mechanical seal failure

Figure 5.2. Pump explosion from running isolated

Figure 5.3. Schematic of centrifugal pump, Ref. 5.6

Figure 5.4. Single and Double Mechanical Seals, Ref. 5.7

Figure 5.5. Two-screw type PD Pump, courtesy Colfax Fluid Handling

Figure 5.6. Rotary Gear PD pump, source

http://www.tpub.com/gunners/99.htm

Figure 5.7. Example application data sheet, courtesy of OEC Fluid Handling

Figure 5.8. Ruptured pipe from reaction with heat transfer fluid

Figure 5.9. Shell and tube heat exchanger, Ref. 5.9

Figure 5.10. Cutaway drawing of a Plate-and-Frame Heat Exchanger, Ref. 5.10

Figure 5.10. Schematic of air cooled heat exchanger, Ref. 5.11

Figure 5.12. Double tube sheet, courtesy

www.wermac.org

Figure 5.13. A. Example distillation column schematic Ref. 5.11, and B. typical industrial distillation column, ©Sulzer Chemtech Ltd

Figure 5.14. Schematic of carbon bed adsorber system, Ref. 5.16

Figure 5.15. Damage to dust collector bags, Ref. 5.25

Figure 5.16. Tube sheet of dust collector, Ref. 5.25

Figure 5.17. A horizontal peeler centrifuge with a Clean-In-Place system and adischarge chute, (Ref. 5.26)

Figure 5.18. Cross sectional view of a continuous pusher centrifuge (Ref 5.26)

Figure 5.19. Schematic of baghouse, courtesy Donaldson-Torit

Figure 5.20. Dust collector explosion venting, courtesy Fike

Figure 5.21. Seveso Reactor, adapted from SACHE presentation by Ron Willey

Figure 5.22. T2 Laboratories site before and after the explosion, Ref. 5.28

Figure 5.23. T2 Laboratories blast, Ref. 5.28

Figure 5.24. Portion of 3 inch thick reactor, Ref. 5.28

Figure 5.25. Damaged heater, Example 1

Figure 5.26. Heater and adjacent column at NOVA Bayport plant, Example 2

Figure 5.27. Buncefield before the explosion and fires, Ref. 5.32

Figure 5.28. Buncefield after the explosion and fires, Ref 5.32

Figure 5.29. Molasses tank failure; before and after

Figure 5.30. 1) Pipe connections in panel 2) Chemfos 700 and Liq. Add lines

Figure 5.31. Cloud of nitric oxide and nitrogen dioxide

Figure 5.32. Tank collapsed by vacuum

Figure 5.33. Schematic diagram of UST leak detection methods, courtesy EPA, Ref. 5.36

Figure 5.34. Mounded underground tank, courtesy BNH Gas Tanks

Figure 5.35. Schematics of external (a) and internal floating (b) roof tanks, courtesy of petroplaza.com

Figure 5.36 Pressurized gas storage tank

Figure 5.37. Refinery flow diagram, Ref. 43

Figure 5.39. Atmospheric separation process flow diagram, courtesy OSHA

Figure 5.40. Hydrotreater process flow diagram, Ref. 5.43

Figure 5.41. Fluid Catalytic Cracking (FCC) process flow diagram, Ref. 41

Figure 5.42. CCR Naphtha Reformer process flow diagram, Ref. 43

Figure 5.43. HF Alkylation process flow diagram. Ref. 5.46

Figure 5.44. Process flow diagram for a delayed coker unit, Ref. 5.43

Figure 5.45. Polymer catch tank, Ref. 5.50

Chapter 7

Figure 7.1. Car Seal on a valve handle. Seal can be broken in an emergency if necessary to change the position of a valve, courtesy

Guide

Cover

Contents

Preface

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACC

American Chemistry Council

AIChE

American Institute of Chemical Engineers

API

American Petroleum Institute

ASME

American Society of Mechanical Engineers

BLEVE

Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion

BMS

Burner Management System

CEI

Chemical Exposure Index (Dow Chemical)

CFR

Code of Federal Registry

CMA

Chemical Manufacturers Association

CSB

US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board

CCPS

Center for Chemical Process Safety

CCR

Continuous Catalyst Regeneration

COO

Conduct of Operations

CPI

Chemical Process Industries

DCU

Delayed Coker Unit

DDT

Deflagration to Detonation Transition

DIERS

Design Institute for Emergency Relief Systems

ERS

Emergency Relief System

EPA

US Environmental Protection Agency

FCCU

Fluidized Catalytic Cracking Unit

F&EI

Fire and Explosion Index (Dow Chemical)

FMEA

Failure Modes and Effect Analysis

HAZMAT

Hazardous Materials

HAZOP

Hazard and Operability Study

HIRA

Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis

HTHA

High Temperature Hydrogen Attack

HSE

Health & Safety Executive (UK)

I&E

Instrument and Electrical

IDLH

Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health

ISD

Inherently Safer Design

ISO

International Organization for Standardization

ISOM

Isomerization Unit

ITPM

Inspection Testing and Preventive Maintenance

LFL

Lower Flammable Limit

LNG

Liquefied Natural Gas

LOPA

Layer of Protection Analysis

LOTO

Lock Out Tag Out

LPG

Liquefied Petroleum Gas

MAWP

Maximum Allowable Working Pressure

MCC

Motor Control Center

MIE

Minimum Ignition Energy

MOC

Management of Change

MOOC

Management of Organizational Change

MSDS

Material Safety Data Sheet

NASA

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NDT

Non Destructive Testing

NFPA

National Fire Protection Association

OCM

Organizational Change Management

OIMS

Operational Integrity Management System (ExxonMobil)

OSHA

US Occupational Safety and Health Administration

PHA

Process Hazard Analysis

PLC

Programmable Logic Controller

PRA

Probabilistic Risk Assessment

PRD

Pressure Relief Device

PRV

Pressure Relief Valve

PSB

Process Safety Beacon

PSE

Process Safety Event

PSI

Process Safety Information

PSI

Process Safety Incident

PSM

Process Safety Management

PSO

Process Safety Officer

PSSR

Pre-Startup Safety Review

QRA

Quantitative Risk Analysis

RBPS

Risk Based Process Safety

RAGAGEP

Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practice

RMP

Risk Management Plan

SACHE

Safety and Chemical Engineering Education

SCAI

Safety Controls Alarms and Interlocks

SHE

Safety, Health and Environmental (sometimes written as EHS or HSE)

SHIB

Safety Hazard Information Bulletin

SIS

Safety Instrumented Systems

SME

Subject Matter Expert

TQ

Threshold Quantity

UFL

Upper Flammable Limit

UK

United Kingdom

US

United States

UST

Underground Storage Tank

GLOSSARY

Asset integrity

A PSM program element involving work activities that help ensure that equipment is properly designed, installed in accordance with specifications, and remains fit for purpose over its life cycle. Also called asset integrity and reliability.

Atmospheric Storage Tank

A storage tank designed to operate at any pressure between ambient pressure and 0.5 psig (3.45kPa gage).

Boiling-Liquid-Expanding-Vapor Explosion (BLEVE)

A type of rapid phase transition in which a liquid contained above its atmospheric boiling point is rapidly depressurized, causing a nearly instantaneous transition from liquid to vapor with a corresponding energy release. A BLEVE of flammable material is often accompanied by a large aerosol fireball, since an external fire impinging on the vapor space of a pressure vessel is a common cause. However, it is not necessary for the liquid to be flammable to have a BLEVE occur.

Checklist Analysis

A hazard evaluation procedure using one or more pre-prepared lists of process safety considerations to prompt team discussions of whether the existing safeguards are adequate.

Chemical Process Industry

The phrase is used loosely to include facilities which manufacture, handle and use chemicals.

Combustible Dust

Any finely divided solid material that is 420 microns or smaller in diameter (material passing through a U.S. No. 40 standard sieve) and presents a fire or explosion hazard when dispersed and ignited in air or other gaseous oxidizer.

Conduct of Operations (COO)

The embodiment of an organization’s values and principles in management systems that are developed, implemented, and maintained to (1) structure operational tasks in a manner consistent with the organization's risk tolerance, (2) ensure that every task is performed deliberately and correctly, and (3) minimize variations in performance.

Explosion

A release of energy that causes a pressure discontinuity or blast wave.

Failure Mode and Effects Analysis

A hazard identification technique in which all known failure modes of components or features of a system are considered in turn, and undesired outcomes are noted.

Flammable Liquids

Any liquid that has a closed-cup flash point below 100 °F (37.8°C), as determined by the test procedures described in NFPA 30 and a Reid vapor pressure not exceeding 40 psia (2068.6 mm Hg) at 100°F (37.8 °C), as determined by ASTM D 323, Standard Method of Test for Vapor Pressure of Petroleum Products (Reid Method). Class IA liquids shall include those liquids that have flash points below 73 °F (22.8°C) and boiling points below 100 F (37.8 °C). Class IB liquids shall include those liquids that have flash points below 73°F (22.8°C) and boiling points at or above 100 °F (37.8 °C). Class IC liquids shall include those liquids that have flash points at or above 73 °F (22.8 °C), but below 100 °F (37.8 °C). (NFPA 30).

Hazard Analysis

The identification of undesired events that lead to the materialization of a hazard, the analysis of the mechanisms by which these undesired events could occur and usually the estimation of the consequences.

Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP)

A systematic qualitative technique to identify process hazards and potential operating problems using a series of guide words to study process deviations. A HAZOP is used to question every part of a process to discover what deviations from the intention of the design can occur and what their causes and consequences may be. This is done systematically by applying suitable guide words. This is a systematic detailed review technique, for both batch and continuous plants, which can be applied to new or existing processes to identify hazards

Hazard Identification

The inventorying of material, system, process and plant characteristics that can produce undesirable consequences through the occurrence of an incident.

Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis (HIRA)

A collective term that encompasses all activities involved in identifying hazards and evaluating risk at facilities, throughout their life cycle, to make certain that risks to employees, the public, or the environment are consistently controlled within the organization's risk tolerance.

Hot Work

Any operation that uses flames or can produce sparks (e.g., welding).

Incident

An event, or series of events, resulting in one or more undesirable consequences, such as harm to people, damage to the environment, or asset/business losses. Such events include fires, explosions, releases of toxic or otherwise harmful substances, and so forth.

Incident Investigation

A systematic approach for determining the causes of an incident and developing recommendations that address the causes to help prevent or mitigate future incidents. See also Root cause analysis and Apparent cause analysis.

Interlock

A protective response which is initiated by an out-of-limit process condition. Instrument which will not allow one part of a process to function unless another part is functioning. A device such as a switch that prevents a piece of equipment from operating when a hazard exists. To join two parts together in such a way that they remain rigidly attached to each other solely by physical interference. A device to prove the physical state of a required condition and to furnish that proof to the primary safety control circuit.

Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA)

An approach that analyzes one incident scenario (cause-consequence pair) at a time, using predefined values for the initiating event frequency, independent protection layer failure probabilities, and consequence severity, in order to compare a scenario risk estimate to risk criteria for determining where additional risk reduction or more detailed analysis is needed. Scenarios are identified elsewhere, typically using a scenario-based hazard evaluation procedure such as a HAZOP Study.

Lockout/Tagout

A safe work practice in which energy sources are positively blocked away from a segment of a process with a locking mechanism and visibly tagged as such to help ensure worker safety during maintenance and some operations tasks.

Management of Change (MOC)

A system to identify, review and approve all modifications to equipment, procedures, raw materials and processing conditions, other than “replacement in kind,” prior to implementation.

Management System

A formally established set of activities designed to produce specific results in a consistent manner on a sustainable basis.

Mechanical Integrity

A management system focused on ensuring that equipment is designed, installed, and maintained to perform the desired function.

Near-Miss

An unplanned sequence of events that could have caused harm or loss if conditions were different or were allowed to progress, but actually did not.

Operating Procedures

Written, step-by-step instructions and information necessary to operate equipment, compiled in one document including operating instructions, process descriptions, operating limits, chemical hazards, and safety equipment requirements.

Operational Discipline (OD)

The performance of all tasks correctly every time; Good OD results in performing the task the right way every time. Individuals demonstrate their commitment to process safety through OD. OD refers to the day-to-day activities carried out by all personnel. OD is the execution of the COO system by individuals within the organization.

Operational Readiness

A PSM program element associated with efforts to ensure that a process is ready for start-up/restart. This element applies to a variety of restart situations, ranging from restart after a brief maintenance outage to restart of a process that has been mothballed for several years.

Organizational Change

Any change in position or responsibility within an organization or any change to an organizational policy or procedure that affects process safety.

Organizational Change Management (OCM)

A method of examining proposed changes in the structure or organization of a company (or unit thereof) to determine whether they may pose a threat to employee or contractor health and safety, the environment, or the surrounding populace.

OSHA Process Safety Management (OSHA PSM)

A U.S. regulatory standard that requires use of a 14-element management system to help prevent or mitigate the effects of catastrophic releases of chemicals or energy from processes covered by the regulations 49 CFR 1910.119.

Pressure Relief Valve (PRV)

A pressure relief device which is designed to reclose and prevent the further flow of fluid after normal conditions have been restored.

Pressure Safety Valve (PSV)

See Pressure Relief Valve

Pre-Startup Safety Review (PSSR)

A systematic and thorough check of a process prior to the introduction of a highly hazardous chemical to a process. The PSSR must confirm the following: Construction and equipment are in accordance with design specifications; Safety, operating, maintenance, and emergency procedures are in place and are adequate; A process hazard analysis has been performed for new facilities and recommendations and have been resolved or implemented before startup, and modified facilities meet the management of change requirements; and training of each employee involved in operating a process has been completed.

Preventive Maintenance

Maintenance that seeks to reduce the frequency and severity of unplanned shutdowns by establishing a fixed schedule of routine inspection and repairs.

Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)

A commonly used term in the nuclear industry to describe the quantitative evaluation of risk using probability theory.

Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)

An organized effort to identify and evaluate hazards associated with processes and operations to enable their control. This review normally involves the use of qualitative techniques to identify and assess the significance of hazards. Conclusions and appropriate recommendations are developed. Occasionally, quantitative methods are used to help prioritize risk reduction.

Process Knowledge Management

A Process Safety Management (PSM) program element that includes work activities to gather, organize, maintain, and provide information to other PSM program elements. Process safety knowledge primarily consists of written documents such as hazard information, process technology information, and equipment-specific information. Process safety knowledge is the product of this PSM element.

Process Safety Culture

The common set of values, behaviors, and norms at all levels in a facility or in the wider organization that affect process safety.

Process Safety Incident/Event

An event that is potentially catastrophic, i.e., an event involving the release/loss of containment of hazardous materials that can result in large-scale health and environmental consequences.

Process Safety Information (PSI)

Physical, chemical, and toxicological information related to the chemicals, process, and equipment. It is used to document the configuration of a process, its characteristics, its limitations, and as data for process hazard analyses.

Process Safety Management (PSM)

A management system that is focused on prevention of, preparedness for, mitigation of, response to, and restoration from catastrophic releases of chemicals or energy from a process associated with a facility.

Process Safety Management Systems

Comprehensive sets of policies, procedures, and practices designed to ensure that barriers to episodic incidents are in place, in use, and effective.

Reactive Chemical

A substance that can pose a chemical reactivity hazard by readily oxidizing in air without an ignition source (spontaneously combustible or peroxide forming), initiating or promoting combustion in other materials (oxidizer), reacting with water, or self-reacting (polymerizing, decomposing or rearranging). Initiation of the reaction can be spontaneous, by energy input such as thermal or mechanical energy, or by catalytic action increasing the reaction rate.

Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practice (RAGAGEP)

A term originally used by OSHA, stems from the selection and application of appropriate engineering, operating, and maintenance knowledge when designing, operating and maintaining chemical facilities with the purpose of ensuring safety and preventing process safety incidents.

It involves the application of engineering, operating or maintenance activities derived from engineering knowledge and industry experience based upon the evaluation and analyses of appropriate internal and external standards, applicable codes, technical reports, guidance, or recommended practices or documents of a similar nature. RAGAGEP can be derived from singular or multiple sources and will vary based upon individual facility processes, materials, service, and other engineering considerations.

Responsible Care©

An initiative implemented by the Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA) in 1988 to assist in leading chemical processing industry companies in ethical ways that increasingly benefit society, the economy and the environment while adhering to ten key principles.

Risk Management Program (RMP) Rule

EPA’s accidental release prevention Rule, which requires covered facilities to prepare, submit, and implement a risk management plan.

Risk-Based Process Safety (RBPS)

The Center for Chemical Process Safety’s (CCPS) PSM system approach that uses risk-based strategies and implementation tactics that are commensurate with the risk-based need for process safety activities, availability of resources, and existing process safety culture to design, correct, and improve process safety management activities.

Safety Instrumented System (SIS)

The instrumentation, controls, and interlocks provided for safe operation of the process.

Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE)

The explosion resulting from the ignition of a cloud of flammable vapor, gas, or mist in which flame speeds accelerate to sufficiently high velocities to produce significant overpressure.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) and the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) express their appreciation and gratitude to all members of the Introduction to Process Safety for Undergraduates and Engineers and their CCPS member companies for their generous support and technical contributions in the preparation of this book.

Subcommittee Members:

Don Abrahamson

CCPS - Emeritus

Iclal Atay

New Jersey DEP

Brooke Cailleteau

LyondellBasell (Houston Refining)

Dan Crowl

Michigan Technical University

Jerry Forest

Celanese - Project Chair

Robert Forest

University of Delaware

Jeff Fox

Dow Corning

Mikelle Moore

Buckman North America

Albert Ness

CCPS – Process Safety Writer

Eric Peterson

MMI Engineering

Robin Pitblado

DNV GL

Dan Sliva

CCPS - Staff Consultant

Rob Smith

Siemens Consulting

Scott Wallace

Olin Corporation

The collective industrial experience and know-how of the subcommittee members plus these individuals makes this book especially valuable to engineers who develop and manage process safety programs and management systems, including the identification of the competencies needed to create and maintain these systems.

The book committee wishes to express their appreciation to Albert Ness and of CCPS and Arthur Baulch of the AIChE for their contributions in preparing this book for publication.

Before publication, all CCPS books are subjected to a thorough peer review process. CCPS gratefully acknowledges the thoughtful comments and suggestions of the peer reviewers. Their work enhanced the accuracy and clarity of these guidelines.

Peer Reviewers:

John Alderman

Hazard and Risk Analysis, LLC

Dan Crowl

Professor of Chemical Engineering, Michigan Technical University, Retired

Dr. Kerry M. Dooley

BASF Professor of Chemical Engineering, Louisiana State University

John Herber

CCPS Staff Consultant

Greg Hounsell

CCPS Staff Consultant

Robert W. Johnson

President, Unwin Company

Jerry Jones

CCPS Staff Consultant

Michael L. LaFond

Engineer, Hemlock Semiconductor/Dow Corning

Robert J. Lovelett

Chemical Engineering Student, University of Delaware

John Murphy

CCPS Staff Consultant

Eloise Roche

Dow Chemical

Robert Rosen

RRS Engineering

Chad Schaeffer

Chemical Engineering Student, University of Delaware

Steve Selk

Department of Homeland Security

Chris Tagoe

VP HES, Cameron

Bruce Vaughen

Principal Consultant, BakerRisk

Ron Wiley

Professor of Chemical Engineering, Northeastern University

John Zondlo

Professor of Chemical Engineering, West Virginia University

Lucy Yi

CCPS – China Section

Although the peer reviewers have provided many constructive comments and suggestions, they were not asked to endorse this book and were not shown the final manuscript before its release.

PREFACE

The Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) was created by the AIChE in 1985 after the chemical disasters in Mexico City, Mexico, and Bhopal, India. The CCPS is chartered to develop and disseminate technical information for use in the prevention of major chemical accidents. The Center is supported by more than 180 chemical process industries (CPI) sponsors who provide the necessary funding and professional guidance to its technical committees. The major product of CCPS activities has been a series of guidelines to assist those implementing various elements of a process safety and risk management system. This book is part of that series.

The AIChE has been closely involved with process safety and loss control issues in the chemical and allied industries for more than five decades. Through its strong ties with process designers, constructors, operators, safety professionals, and members of academia, AIChE has enhanced communications and fostered continuous improvement of the industry’s high safety standards. AIChE publications and symposia have become information resources for those devoted to process safety and environmental protection.

The integration of process safety into the engineering curricula is an ongoing goal of the CCPS. To this end, CCPS created the Safety and Chemical Engineering Education (SACHE) committee which develops training modules for process safety. One textbook covering the technical aspects of process safety for students already exists; however, there is no textbook covering the concepts of process safety management and the need for process safety for students. The CCPS Technical Steering Committee initiated the creation of this book to assist colleges and universities in meeting this challenge and to aid Chemical Engineering programs in meeting recent accreditation requirements for including process safety into the chemical engineering curricula.

1Introduction

1.1 Purpose of this Handbook

This book is intended to be used as a reference material for either a stand-alone process safety course or as supplemental material for existing curricula. This book is not a technical book; rather, the intent of the material is to familiarize the student or an engineer new to process safety with:

The concept of process safety management (PSM).

The 20 elements of process safety defined by the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS).

The need for process safety as illustrated by examples of major process safety incidents that have occurred.

Process safety tasks for other engineering disciplines.

Process safety concerns with some selected unit operations.

Show how various aspects of process safety have a direct tie-in to existing chemical engineering curricula.

Describe the many tasks that can be expected of an engineer new to process safety with respect to process safety in their first few years on the job.

1.2 Target Audience

This primary audience for this publication is junior to graduate level Chemical Engineering students and those entering the workforce and engineers new to process safety. However, since there are no technical pre-requisites recommended, it may also be used by other engineering disciplines at similar levels.

1.3 Process Safety - What Is It?

In the chemical, petrochemical and most other industries, you will find that all companies are required to have an occupational safety program, with a focus on personal safety (this program may be required by regulations in many countries, states and local areas. It can apply to workers in a manufacturing plant, a research laboratory or pilot plant, and even to office locations). That program is going to focus on personal safety. The focus of these programs is to prevent harm to workers from workplace accidents such as falls, cuts, sprains and strains, being struck by objects, repetitive motion injuries, and so on. They are good and in fact, very necessary programs. They are not, however, what Process Safety is about.

Process Safety is defined as “a discipline that focuses on the prevention of fires, explosions, and accidental chemical releases at chemical process facilities”. Such events don't only happen at chemical facilities, they occur in refineries, offshore drilling facilities, etc. Another definition is that process safety is about the prevention of, preparedness for, mitigation of, response to, or restoration from catastrophic releases of chemicals or energy from a process associated with a facility.

After an explosion in a BP Texas City refinery in 2005 that killed 15 people and injured over 170 others, an independent commission was created to examine the process safety mind-set, or culture, of BPs refinery operations, this commission came to be known as the Baker Panel. The Baker Panel said this about process safety:

“Process safety hazards can give rise to major accidents involving the release of potentially dangerous materials, the release of energy (such as fires and explosions), or both. Process safety incidents can have catastrophic effects and can result in multiple injuries and fatalities, as well as substantial economic, property, and environmental damage. Process safety refinery incidents can affect workers inside the refinery and members of the public who reside nearby. Process safety in a refinery involves the prevention of leaks, spills, equipment malfunctions, over-pressures, excessive temperatures, corrosion, metal fatigue, and other similar conditions. Process safety programs focus on the design and engineering of facilities, hazard assessments, management of change, inspection, testing, and maintenance of equipment, effective alarms, effective process control, procedures, training of personnel, and human factors.” (Ref 1.1)

The term “refinery” in that paragraph can be replaced by “petrochemical plant”, “chemical process facility”, “solids handling facility”, “water treatment plants”, “ammonia refrigeration plants”, “off-shore operations” or any number of terms for a plant that handles or processes flammable, combustible, toxic, or reactive materials. For the rest of this book, the term process facility or just facility will be used to mean the previously mentioned facilities and any other operation that handles or processes flammable, combustible, toxic, or reactive materials.

The quote from the Baker report states that process safety is not limited to the operation of a facility. During the basic research and process research phases, process safety programs cover the operation of pilot facilities. They also cover the selection of the chemistry and unit operations chosen to achieve the design intent of the process. During the design and engineering phase, process safety is involved in choices about what type of unit operations and equipment items to use, the facility layout, and so on. Running a facility involves, as was mentioned above, “hazard assessments, management of change, inspection, testing, and maintenance of equipment, effective alarms, effective process control, procedures, and training of personnel”. The choices made about process features during research and development and pilot work can make these activities easier or more difficult.

1.4 Organization of the Book

Chapter 2 gives a brief history of process safety and of process safety management. The evolution of process safety management principles from the initial twelve elements of process safety management developed by CCPS, and the process regulatory framework of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA) PSM regulations to the current twenty elements of the CCPS Risk Based Process Safety (RBPS) management system is discussed.

Chapter 3 describes several process safety incidents that demonstrate the need for a good PSM system. Each incident is described, and then the relevance of a few relevant RBPS elements are listed.

Chapter 4 describes the role of several engineering disciplines, Chemical, Mechanical, Civil, Instrumentation and Electrical (I&E) Engineers, and Safety Engineers with respect to how new engineers will be involved in process safety. PSM is a team effort between many disciplines.

Chapter 5 covers a few key process safety concerns with respect to some unit operations and equipment found in the chemical, biochemical and petrochemical and industries that could handle hazardous materials. Combinations of these unit operations are many and varied across the process industries. In the petrochemical industry there are several common operations that are used, and this book describes the process safety concerns of some of those operations. This chapter also introduces the concept of Inherent Safety (IS) and Inherently Safer Design (ISD). ISD focuses on eliminating or reducing hazards inherent in a process as opposed to trying to manage the hazards.

Chapter 6 lists training modules available from the Safety and Chemical Engineering Education (SACHE) Committee through the AIChE and describes the courses and their relevance to some Chemical Engineering courses. This chapter can be used as a guide for supplementing existing courses.

Chapter 7 describes process safety related duties that a new engineer can expect to encounter during the first year to two years in the process industry. For a PSM system to work well, all people involved in the process must execute their roles and responsibilities in a deliberate and structured manner to achieve a high level of human performance. This is called Conduct of Operations. Chapter 7 describes many tasks of engineers with respect to Conduct of Operations, as well as what the engineer should expect operators, maintenancde and management with respect to their roles.

1.5 References

1.1 The Report of the BP U.S. Refineries Independent Safety Review Panel, January 2007. (

http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/SP/STAGING/local_assets/assets/pdfs/Baker_panel_report.pdf

).

2Process Safety Basics

2.1 Risk Based Process Safety

In Chapter 1 you were introduced to the concept of process safety. This chapter is going to cover a brief history of process safety plus the concepts of management systems and risk based process safety, along with a description of the elements of a risk based process safety management system as proposed by the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) in 2007.

History of Process Safety. Organizations in the process industries have a long standing concern for process safety. (See the inset about the manufacture of nitroglycerine as an example.) Organizations originally had safety reviews for processes that relied on the experience and expertise of the people in the review. In the middle of the 20th century, more formal review techniques began to appear in the process industries. These included the Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) review, developed by ICI in the 1960s, Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA), Checklist and What-If reviews. These were qualitative techniques for assessing the hazards of a process.

Quantitative analysis techniques, such as Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), which had been in use by the nuclear industry, Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA), and Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) also began to be used in the process industries in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. Modeling techniques were developed for analyzing the consequences of spills and releases, explosions, and toxic exposures. The Design Institute of Emergency Relief Systems (DIERS) was established within the AIChE in 1976 to develop methods for the design of emergency relief systems to handle runaway reactions. By the mid to late 1970s, process safety was a recognized technical specialty. The American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) formed the Safety and Health Division in 1979.