New Perspectives on the Politics and Culture of Early Modern Scotland E-Book

• Herausgeber: John Donald
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch
• Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2021

Seitenzahl: 906

Beschreibung

This collection of essays on early modern Scotland offers 'new perspectives' on aspects of Scottish history from 1560 to 1800. Some essays challenge accepted interpretations; others explore subjects and sources that have previously not attracted the attention of historians; all represent new research on Scottish history from the Reformation to the Enlightenment. They indicate renewed interest in an age crucial to the development of modern Scotland. Contents: Rex Stoicus – George Buchanan, James VI and the Scottish Polity, Scotland, Antichrist and the Invention of Great Britain. Scottish Gaeldom, 1638–1651: The Vernacular Response to the Covenanting Dynamic. The Military and Ministers as Agents of Presbyterian Imperialism in England and Ireland, 1640–1648. Sackcloth for the Sinner or Punishment for the Crime? Church and Secular Courts in Cromwellian Scotland. York in Edinburgh: James VII and the Patronage of Learning in Scotland, 1679–1688. The Polite Academy and the Presbyterians, 1720–1770. Moderates, Managers and Popular Politics in mid-18th century Edinburgh: The Drysdale 'Bustle' of the 1760s. Paradigms and Politics: Manners, Morals and the Rise of Henry Dundas, 1770–1784. Rethinking Das Adam Smith Problem. Childhood and Society in 18th Century Scotland. The Heavenly City of the 18th Century Moderate Divines.

Leseprobe

New Perspectiveson the Politics and Cultureof Early Modern Scotland

New Perspectiveson the Politics and Cultureof Early Modern Scotland

Edited byJOHN DWYER, ROGER A. MASONAND ALEXANDER MURDOCH

This eBook was published in Great Britain in 2021 by John Donald,

an imprint of Birlinn Ltd

Birlinn Ltd

West Newington House

10 Newington Road

Edinburgh

EH9 1QS

www.birlinn.co.uk

Copyright © The Editors and Contributors

eBook ISBN 9781788854150

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available on request from the British Library

Typeset by Hewer Text Ltd, Edinburgh

Contents

List of Abbreviations

Contributors

Introduction

1. Rex Stoicus: George Buchanan, James VI and the Scottish Polity

Roger A. Mason

2. Scotland, Antichrist and the Invention of Great Britain

Arthur H. Williamson

3. Scottish Gaeldom, 1638–1651: The Vernacular Response to the Covenanting Dynamic

Allan I. Macinnes

4. The Military and Ministers as Agents of Presbyterian Imperialism in England and Ireland, 1640–1648

Edward M. Furgol

5. Sackcloth for the Sinner or Punishment for the Crime? Church and Secular Courts in Cromwellian Scotland

Lesley M. Smith

6. York in Edinburgh: James VII and the Patronage of Learning in Scotland, 1679–1688

Hugh Ouston

7. The Polite Academy and the Presbyterians, 1720–1770

Peter Jones

8. Moderates, Managers and Popular Politics in Mid-Eighteenth Century Edinburgh: The Drysdale ‘Bustle’ of the 1760s

Richard B. Sher

9. Paradigms and Politics: Manners, Morals and the Rise of Henry Dundas, 1770–1784

John Dwyer and Alexander Murdoch

10. Rethinking Das Adam Smith Problem

Richard Teichgraeber III

11. Childhood and Society in Eighteenth-Century Scotland

Craig Beveridge

12. The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Moderate Divines

John Dwyer

Index

List of Abbreviations

APS

Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland,

ed. T. Thomson and C. Innes (Edinburgh, 1814–44)

BL

British Library

Bodl.

Bodleian Library, Oxford

CSP, Scot.

Calendar of State Papers Relating to Scotland and Mary Queen of Scots 1547–1603,

ed. J. Bain

et al.

(Edinburgh, 1898–1970)

EUL

Edinburgh University Library

HMC

Historical Manuscripts Commission

NLS

National Library of Scotland

PRO

Public Record Office

RPC

Register of the Privy Council of Scotland,

ed. J. H. Burton

et al.

(Edinburgh, 1877– )

RSCH

Records of the Scottish Church History Society

SGS

Scottish Gaelic Studies

SHR

Scottish Historical Review

SCJ

Senator of the College of Justice

SRO

Scottish Record Office

TGSI

Transactions of the Gaelic Society of Inverness

Contributors

Roger A. Mason is the Glenfiddich Research Fellow in Scottish History at St. Andrews University.

Dr. Arthur H. Williamson is Assistant Dean of the Graduate School of Arts and Science at New York University, New York City. His first book, Scottish National Consciousness in the Age of James VI, was published in 1979.

Allan I. Macinnes lectures in the Department of Scottish History at Glasgow University.

Edward M. Furgol is completing a doctoral thesis for Oxford University and has tutored in the Department of Scottish History at Edinburgh University.

Dr. Lesley M. Smith co-edited The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century (1978), and now works for the Social Science Research Council.

Hugh Ouston is completing a doctoral thesis for Oxford University. He teaches history at North Berwick High School.

Peter Jones is an Assistant Keeper in the Department of Manuscripts at the British Library.

Dr. Richard B. Sher is special lecturer in history and humanities at New Jersey Institute of Technology and author of a forthcoming book on the Moderate Literati of Edinburgh and the Scottish Enlightenment.

Dr. Alexander Murdoch is the author of ‘The People Above’: Politics and Administration in Mid-Eighteenth-Century Scotland (1980).

Dr. Richard Teichgraeber III lectures in the Department of History at Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana.

Craig Beveridge was a research student in the Department of History at Edinburgh University from 1974 to 1977.

John Dwyer teaches at North Island College in British Columbia. He is completing a doctoral thesis for Edinburgh University.

Introduction

IT is a curious, extraordinarily important, but largely neglected fact of life for contemporary Scots that they have at their disposal two separate sets of historical referents, two distinct interpretations of their past or, in short, two histories. That is, in reviewing their historical experience and locating and identifying themselves in terms of their relationship with the past, they confront a situation that at once colours and is coloured by their understanding of themselves both as Scots and as members of a wider British community. Generally speaking, for example, as Scots, they are familiar (though seldom terribly so) with a range of ‘facts’ and points of reference associated with the historical experience of a homogeneous but no longer politically autonomous Scottish community. Equally, however, as Britons, they are also familiar (often to a slightly greater degree) with the historical experience of a composite and still politically dynamic British state. On the face of it, of course, this need not present any real dilemma: after all, identification with a province, locality, town or street does not necessarily preclude or invalidate identification with a greater, more all-encompassing whole. Looked at more closely, however, the efforts of Scots to be both Scottish and British inevitably does generate strains and tensions. For, all things considered, it takes immense ingenuity (or considerable indifference) to maintain the histories of Britain and Scotland, as they are currently interpreted, in double harness.

The problem is rooted in the concept of ‘Britain’ itself The pious hope that after the parliamentary union the idea of being English or Scottish would give way to the idea of being British has remained just that — a pious hope. The English, for better or for worse, have steadfastly refused to be anything other than English and, for most of them, the distinction between English and British remains little more than an irritating semantic quibble. The Scots, on the other hand, both before and since 1707, have maintained the distinction as a significant matter of principle and still persist (at least when it suits them) in differentiating between their Scottish and British personae. What they have signally failed to do, however, is to endow the latter with a credible history distinguishable from (but combining) specifically Scottish and specifically English experience. A British history in this sense, if it has ever been written, has never enjoyed widespread appeal in Scotland, far less in England. Moreover, it is undoubtedly the case that, owing to the nature and location of British political and cultural institutions, the continuities of English historical experience have a far more tangible existence in the present than do those of Scottish experience. Willy-nilly, therefore, when the Scots (or, for that matter, anyone else) invoke British history, they are appealing essentially to the continuities of English experience rather than to a common perspective arising from a shared or combined historical identity. As Britons, in other words, the Scots tend merely to avail themselves of (and, indeed, to exalt) the continuities and points of reference of an alien and, qua Scots, potentially antithetical historical experience.

The dominance of what might be called this ‘Anglo-British’ historical perspective should occasion neither surprise nor outrage. After all, England is indisputably the more powerful partner in the British relationship and in 1707 Scotland was absorbed into her political institutions rather than vice versa. Moreover, as was suggested above, many of these institutions still exist and their massive continuity (the proud boast of Englishmen for generations) inevitably generates a relationship between the present and the past which can afford to ignore Scotland altogether and which the Scots — saving their insistence on the label ‘British’ — have for the most part willingly (or at least passively) accepted. What is perhaps more surprising is that the Scots still retain any sense of being Scottish at all and that they are still vaguely aware of historical referents distinct from those associated with Anglo-British experience. This intriguing phenomenon deserves more thorough investigation from historians, but space permits here only some brief comments on its form and implications.

On a popular level, Scottish historical consciousness manifests itself most notably in a sentimental attachment to such tragic figures as Mary Queen of Scots and Charles Edward Stuart. Suitably romanticized, these ‘tartan’ heroes sustain both a prolific publishing and a flourishing tourist industry. At the same time, however, they serve a crucial (if paradoxical) function in validating, not the continuity of a distinctively Scottish historical identity, but the primacy of the dominant Anglo-British historical perspective. For, far from disrupting the powerful continuities of ‘British’ experience, their splendidly unsuccessful efforts to change the course of history serve rather to confirm those continuities while, simultaneously, underwriting the discontinuity and ultimate demise of a distinct and on-going Scottish tradition. In other words, nostalgic reverence for such glorious failures lends the Scots a comforting but, in terms of the present, anaesthetized and quite irrelevant sense of historical identity. They can be Scots, therefore, without denying that they are also Britons. Indeed, one is tempted to argue, in proclaiming their Scottishness in this way, they are confirming that they are in fact (and first and foremost) Anglo-British!

Scottish nationalists, perhaps vaguely aware of these implications, have never much cared for either Mary Stuart or Bonnie Prince Charlie. More importantly, however, professional historians of Scotland have seldom allowed them entirely to dominate their historical interests. Quite correctly, they have continued to write and rewrite Scottish history without undue regard to popular taste. If there was, in the past, a tendency to interpret it as a pale reflection of English experience (on the assumption that, apart from in church matters, what was important in English history must also have been important in Scottish history), there has, in more recent times, been a greater willingness to abandon the norms of an inappropriate historiographical tradition and to seek to understand Scottish history in terms of its own inner dynamic. This, of course, is by no means indicative of the emergence of a nationalist historiography in any overtly political sense. On the contrary, it is simply a rather belated recognition of what the facts themselves suggest — that Scottish historical experience, although similar to and often influenced by that of England, is emphatically not identical to it. Nevertheless, given the failure of attempts to write a truly ‘British’ history, the establishment of the continuities (however weak and tenuous) of a specifically Scottish experience will inevitably highlight points of tension where these referents of autonomy conflict with the dominant Anglo-British historical perspective. Just as inevitably, therefore, it creates what amounts to a political dilemma for those exposed to the conflicting demands and pressures exerted by essentially incompatible interpretations of the past.

It would be quite wrong to think, however, that such tensions and the accompanying dilemma have only become apparent in recent times. On the contrary, they are evident in Scottish history from the very earliest times. Just as Scotland’s relationship with England has simultaneously both helped to mould and threatened to destroy the Scottish identity, so the Scots have at different times and subject to different pressures toyed with competing and mutually exclusive interpretations of their past. Broadly speaking, these have fallen into the three categories mentioned above: firstly, they have sought to establish securely the continuities of an independent historical perspective and to explain the development of their unique community in its own terms; secondly, they have at times abandoned (or been forced to renounce) their own history as a distinct and meaningful continuum and viewed it rather as a subset of English experience; and thirdly, they have attempted to fashion a British history that would at once incorporate and supersede specifically Scottish and English experience. But, if all of these avenues have at one time or another been tentatively explored, none has as yet proved wholly successful in capturing the popular imagination. Is it, then, an over-dramatization (or simply an over-valuation of the significance of a sense of history) to argue that the future of Scotland and consequently of the British state depends on which perception of the past ultimately holds sway?

Quite fortuitously — although, on reflection, perhaps not unexpectedly — the essays in this volume both illustrate and explore the roots and implications of these tensions. The element of chance must be stressed at the outset, however, for the volume was not conceived as a set of studies on any particular theme, least of all that outlined above. Rather, it was designed to provide a forum for new writing by young scholars studying the social, political and cultural history of Scotland in the early modern period. It was felt desirable that the considerable quantity of original and important research currently being pursued on the period from the Reformation to the onset of industrialization at the end of the eighteenth century be presented in a more convenient and accessible form than in scattered and highly specialized academic journals. In this way, it was hoped to make both fellow historians and the general public more aware of the many new insights and perspectives being explored by what is, in effect, a new generation of Scottish historians. This, the editors feel, is justification enough both for the volume’s title and for the wide-ranging nature of its contents. Despite the obvious diversity of subject-matter and approach, however, the majority of contributions do also either confront directly or make more oblique comments on the manifold implications of Scotland’s historically ambivalent relationship with England. By way of introducing them, therefore, it seems both reasonable and convenient to touch upon their relevance to this all-important subject.

Arthur Williamson’s study of the emergence or ‘invention’ of the concept of Great Britain in sixteenth century Scotland is an obvious point of departure. As he convincingly demonstrates, the Reformation and the subsequent union of the newly protestantized kingdoms under a single sovereign added a powerful fillip to the development of a British imperialist ideology. Rooted in biblical commentary and preached with apocalyptic fervour, the idea of a British empire led on a protestant crusade by James VI and I gained a powerful hold of men’s minds. It did not, however, go unchallenged: Englishmen were reluctant to extend their conception of themselves as an elect nation to embrace the Scots, while the latter were themselves often reluctant to accept the loss of autonomy implicit in imperialist ideology. Indeed, these inherent tensions, as well as the more practical problem of governing the two kingdoms in tandem, were eventually to erupt in the Covenanting Revolution of the late 1630s and 1640s and end in the enforced union of the 1650s.

Various aspects of this revolutionary era are discussed in the three essays by Edward Furgol, Lesley Smith and Allan Macinnes. As Edward Furgol shows, for example, the impulse towards empire was far from dead in Scotland and the desire to impose a uniform presbyterian system throughout the British Isles was one which the Scots were prepared to pursue with the sword as well as through the pen and the pulpit. But, if it proved relatively successful in Northern Ireland, it was almost a total failure in the north of England and, in the long term, the product of that failure was Cromwell’s occupation of the defeated kingdom throughout the 1650s. One aspect of this (perhaps the most successful of all attempts to fashion a uniform British state) is examined by Lesley Smith. As she makes clear, however, at least in the sphere of legal administration, Cromwell’s success was based on his willingness to use and to adapt the existing structure of ecclesiastical courts rather than on uprooting and replacing them with a uniform but alien system. If a similar pragmatism had been displayed towards the western seaboard of Scotland, it might have escaped a great deal of the social and economic dislocation examined by Allan Macinnes. In the event, however, just as James VI’s move to London increased the leverage he could exert to ‘civilize’ the Highlands and Islands, so the covenanters’ British commitments led them to impose such demands on the Gaels that their ancient, if decaying, civilization was irreparably damaged. Having drawn the clan chiefs irrevocably into the mainstream of Lowland Scottish and ultimately English politics and economic life, they left the clansmen bemused and alienated by the collapse of their traditional way of life.

In their different ways, therefore, all these essays are concerned with the tensions (both ideological and social) attendant upon Scotland’s ambiguous ‘British’ commitments and relationships. This being the case, they inevitably also touch upon what was distinctive about Scottish culture and society during this period. As regards political culture, however, this is perhaps more fully brought out in Roger Mason’s analysis of the thought of George Buchanan. Here it is shown how the application of humanist ideals to the under-developed polity of sixteenth century Scotland gave rise to a conception of politics founded on moral criteria rather than (as was increasingly the case in England) on institutions such as parliament and the courts of law. Despite his radicalism, moreover, Buchanan was not an isolated figure: he was part of a European humanist tradition in which Scotland as a whole participated and which survived throughout the seventeenth century. It is identifiable, for example, among the professional intelligentsia of the Restoration period discussed by Hugh Ouston. These men, royalists and episcopalians, were conscious of a cultural tradition rooted in humanist values that stretched back to the reign of James VI. As Ouston shows, however, they were also dependent on the patronage of an absentee, catholic monarch, and they did not survive the Revolution of 1688–9, far less the parliamentary union of 1707. Nevertheless, many of the humanist values and attitudes they upheld did survive and, arguably, the loss of parliament as a focus for Scottish political life helped to reinvigorate a political tradition that elevated moral integrity above institutional autonomy. Certainly, as we shall see, such ‘civic humanist’ pre-occupations are evident, not only among the great thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment, but also in the discourse of the eighteenth century social elite at large.

This in itself suggests that, if 1707 marks a watershed in Scottish history, it most emphatically does not signify its end. As the remaining essays amply demonstrate, there is more to eighteenth century Scotland than the failure of Jacobitism and Scotland’s gradual absorption into a uniform British state. For, no matter how hard the Scots tried to be ‘North British’, the indifference of England and the practical problems of governing a community neither fully autonomous nor fully incorporated, ensured the survival of peculiarly Scottish modes of thought and action. In the political sphere, for example, the distinct concerns of the semi-autonomous Scottish administration are well brought out in both Richard Sher’s analysis of the important but neglected furore of the 1760s known as the ‘Drysdale Bustle’ and in the examination of the career of Henry Dundas — Scotland’s political manager in the later eighteenth century — undertaken by John Dwyer and Alexander Murdoch. Both these essays shed light, not only on how Scottish political life was controlled and manipulated by a close-knit and powerful social elite, but also on how political actors responded to the distinctive ideological currents generated by Scotland’s ambiguous political status.

As was suggested, the dominant ideology was that of civic humanism with its characteristic accent on virtue or personal moral worth threatened by the corrupting influences of commerce, wealth and luxury. It was an age-old theme, but one which assumed remarkable resonance when, as in post-union Scotland, the social elite embarked on an ambitious programme of ‘improvement’ and economic regeneration. As Sher, but particularly Dwyer and Murdoch, make clear, the civic humanist idiom was a potent mode of political discourse by the second half of the eighteenth century. Indeed, the latter go so far as to suggest that Dundas’s rise to power was intimately connected with its widespread use among the landed classes. Landowners, however, were not the only ones pre-occupied with preserving virtue in an apparently rapacious commercial environment — so too were the intellectuals. Richard Teichgraeber, for example, shows how Adam Smith attempted to transform the traditional humanistic concept of virtue so that it might remain applicable within the ‘society of strangers’ that he believed was generated by modern commercial relations. Clearly, both Scottish social and intellectual leaders were acutely conscious of the tensions and potential conflicts between commerce and virtue and saw it as their major task to monitor and safeguard the latter during the period of economic transition which they hoped would render Scotland as rich and prosperous as her southern partner.

Small wonder, then, that education figured so largely in their thinking. Not only could it mould the virtuous personality and fit the individual for intercourse in civil society, but thereby it could also provide a safeguard against the corrupting influences of modern commercial life. As Craig Beveridge documents, the eighteenth century ‘moralizing elite’ saw even early childhood as a unique stage in the growth of personality that could be manipulated towards educational goals. Although this development was partial and uneven, it was clearly connected with the perceived moral vulnerability of children in a modern commercial environment. In Smith’s ‘society of strangers’, the child had to be protected and adolescence extended. From a different perspective, Peter Jones is able to show how a similar change of attitudes also occurred within the universities. Like the English dissenting academies, the eighteenth century Scottish universities broke the traditional scholastic educational mould in order to cater for and develop an enlightened, ‘polite’ citizenry. Both in theory and in practice, their curricular reforms clearly demonstrate how the Scots viewed a liberal education as a spur to civic virtue and an antidote to social corruption. As long as the elite remained virtuous, the Scottish community could safely reap the economic benefits of the union with England.

In order to carry out their plans, however, ‘enlightened’ Scots had to reckon with and combat an entrenched heritage of Calvinist assumption and prejudice. Until the eighteenth century, formal schooling was controlled by the Kirk, and its goals — largely vocational and theological — had little in common with those of the new ‘moralizing elite’. Both Beveridge and Jones shed light on this confrontation, but John Dwyer’s study of the sermons of eighteenth century ‘moderate’ divines perhaps reveals the difference between these ‘practical moralists’ and their theologically minded predecessors at its starkest. It was, he argues, the singular function of the moderate preachers to refocus one of the most important vehicles of early modern education and social control — the public sermon — on practical moral concerns. Through their weekly preaching, ‘enlightened’ ministers sought to equip men to live a virtuous life in this world rather than to dwell on the felicities of a life hereafter. Furthermore, Dwyer is able to show that these practical moralists were familiar with aspects of the more abstract moral theorizing of Adam Smith. Without a doubt, the close-knit Scottish social and intellectual elite was at one in its pursuit of civic virtue in the eighteenth century. However attained, and whatever precise form it took, it was deemed essential to the survival and well-being of the Scottish community.

As a whole, therefore, these essays on Scotland in its era of ‘improvement’ and ‘enlightenment’ examine the impact of ideas and cultural trends of European currency on the localized context of a semi-autonomous and relatively underdeveloped community. Like those on the pre-union period, they demonstrate the distinctive elements in Scottish culture and society within a wider British and, indeed, continental framework. That the editors have chosen to highlight this theme, however, should not deter the reader from judging each essay on its own terms or from quite different perspectives. In conclusion, it should perhaps be emphasized once again that they were not written around any preconceived plan, but are self-contained pieces of work whose individual worth lies in their contribution to various and particular areas of study and research. Inevitably, as individual papers, they contain much more of interest than it is possible to indicate within the confines of a brief introduction. Collectively, however, it is hoped they illustrate both the enormous potential of Scottish history as a future field of study and the lively interest which is currently being taken in it. In this regard, it is perhaps not irrelevant to point out that less than half the contributors can claim to be Scottish by either birth or upbringing. It would seem that interest in Scotland and Scottish history is by no means confined to Scotland. Indeed, it sometimes appears as if the Scots will be the very last to become conscious of the riches of their past and its relevance to the present. This volume was conceived as a contribution to a greater awareness and understanding of both.

Acknowledgements

The editors would like to thank all the contributors for their constant co-operation as this volume took shape; Rick Sher for generous additional editorial assistance; and John Tuckwell of the publishers for his patient guidance throughout its production. Richard Teichgraeber’s essay is reprinted here by kind permission of the Journal of British Studies.

1

Rex Stoicus: George Buchanan, James VI and the Scottish Polity*

Roger A. Mason

THE political thought of George Buchanan has almost invariably been studied solely from the standpoint of its radical content. Such a perspective is perhaps inevitable and is certainly not unjustifiable. After all, Buchanan wrote both his brief tract De Jure Regni apud Scotos Dialogus (published in 1579) and his much longer historical work, the Rerum Scoticarum Historia (published in 1582), to justify the revolutionary upheavals that occurred in Scotland in the 1560s. Moreover, as an apologist for resistance and tyrannicide and an advocate of elective, limited monarchy, Buchanan was a major contributor to the development of a radical political ideology in sixteenth century Europe. As such he fully deserves the attention bestowed upon him by modern historians. Nevertheless, an over-exclusive concern with Buchanan the revolutionary monarchomach, the herald of popular sovereignty and modern constitutionalism, has obscured as much of his thought as it has illuminated.1 Indeed, the tendency of modern historians to concentrate on the nature and sources of his more radical ideas has led both to distorted characterizations of his theory as a whole and to misleading assumptions about its location in the main streams of early modern political thought.2 The purpose of the present essay, therefore, is to provide a detailed exposition of Buchanan’s thinking from a slightly different perspective than that normally adopted. More specifically, it is intended to approach Buchanan’s works firstly from the standpoint of their author’s humanist background,3 and secondly from that of the Scottish political culture of which their titles purport them to be an analysis and description. In important respects these apparently disparate perspectives intersect in the person of Buchanan’s most illustrious pupil, James VI. Before going on to discuss the texts in detail, therefore, Buchanan’s relations with the young king will repay further investigation.

I

The event that prompted the composition of the Dialogue — the deposition of Mary Queen of Scots in 1567 — also brought to the throne Mary’s year-old son James VI. For at least a generation thereafter the young king was the focus of intense concern among the European protestant communities. As the titular head of one reformed kingdom and the possible successor to another, it was essential, both to the embattled continental protestants and to those more securely entrenched in Britain, that he be brought up a ‘godly prince’ prepared to uphold and defend the ‘true religion’. Consequently, the education of the young prince was a matter of serious import both at home and abroad. It was, moreover, a task for which Buchanan seemed particularly well suited. After all, not only was he (at least after 1560) an undoubted Calvinist, but he was also a pedagogue of considerable repute and a humanist of international standing.

Born in 1506, prior to 1560 Buchanan spent most of his life on the continent.4 Like many of his countrymen, after studying for several years at St. Andrews University, he made his way to Paris to complete his education. Arriving there in the mid-1520s, he graduated MA in 1528 and subsequently held teaching posts at the humanist colleges of Ste Barbe in Paris (1528–31) and Guyenne in Bordeaux (1539–42), acting between times as private tutor to such dignitaries as Gilbert Kennedy, third earl of Cassillis (1532–39) and Timoléon de Cessé, son of the Maréchal de Brissac (1556–60). If, however, the space devoted to them in his brief autobiography is significant, the years spent in Portugal between 1547 and 1552 were the most memorable of Buchanan’s life.5 Persuaded to assist his friend and colleague André de Gouvea in his efforts to establish a humanist College of Arts at the University of Coimbra, Buchanan spent much of his stay in Portugal, charged with heresy, as a guest of the Lisbon Inquisition. An Erasmian catholic with strongly anti-clerical prejudices and liberal theological views, Buchanan was perhaps fortunate to escape heavy punishment.6 As it was, after almost two years of captivity and interrogation, he was released and allowed to return to Paris. The taint of heresy, however, did nothing to lessen Buchanan’s growing literary reputation. By the 1550s he was firmly established in humanist circles as a Latin poet of unparalleled distinction — poetarum nostri seculi facile princeps — and was moving with ease and freedom in French intellectual circles. Nevertheless, sometime in the later 1550s, in circumstances that remain obscure, Buchanan not only rejected catholicism but also his adopted homeland, France. By early 1562 he was back in Scotland where he quickly became associated with the aristocratic leaders of the recently triumphant reforming party, while simultaneously playing a prominent role as a lay member of the General Assembly of the infant Kirk. By 1567, with the help of his patron, the Earl of Moray, Buchanan was Moderator of the Assembly and high in the councils of the rebel nobility. With the overthrow of Mary in the same year, there was no one better suited, by either past training or current reputation, not only to assume the role of ideologue for the rebel cause but also to supervise the education of the infant king.

For twelve years, therefore, between 1570 and his death in 1582, Buchanan presided over the formal schooling of the king.7 During those same years he prepared the De Fure Regni, the History of Scotland and the politically significant play Baptistes for publication.8 While there is no clear evidence that the two activities were strictly related, it does seem probable that the one would have exerted some influence on the other. Certainly, all three of these works bear dedications to James VI which clearly suggest that, if they were primarily designed to justify rebellion, they were also seen by Buchanan as manuals of political guidance and instruction for his pupil. In the dedication to the Baptistes, for example, he wrote that the play

may seem of particular interest to you as it clearly displays the torments and miseries of tyrants even when they seem to flourish the most. This I consider not only useful but also necessary for you to understand, so that you may begin at once to dislike that which you must always avoid.9

In the same way, just as the Baptistes provided a model of tyranny to eschew, Buchanan thought his History contained many examples of kingship worthy of emulation. In dedicating it to James he commented on the ill-health which had kept him from his charge and hoped the deficiency could be supplied ‘by sending to you faithful monitors from history, whose counsel may be useful in your deliberations, and their virtues patterns for imitation in active life’.10 A similar, if more forthright, message is conveyed by the De Fure Regni: Buchanan hoped it would prove a constant reminder to James of his duties towards his subjects and avowed that it was meant, not just as a monitor, but as ‘a bold and assertive critic’.11 Clearly Buchanan took his responsibilities with some seriousness. James was not only to be taught his classical letters, but also the manifold duties of his kingly office. In this respect, it is perhaps not insignificant that in his correspondence Buchanan referred to the De Fure Regni simply as ‘De Regno’, a phrase which may legitimately be translated as ‘On Kingship’.12 The content of the work, moreover, amply bears out the appositeness of the simplified title. As will become clear, the Dialogue is not only structured in terms of a debate over the distinction between a true king and a tyrant, but has at its core an imposing (albeit conventional) portrait of an ideal prince. For all its radical implications, Buchanan’s political philosophy consists of an extended commentary on the nature and function of kingship.

Despite the importunate advice of his Calvinist correspondents, however, Buchanan’s conception of kingship owes little to the post-reformation ideal of a godly prince.13 Remarkably secular and defined in austere moral terms, Buchanan’s model was not biblical, but humanistic and classical. At least in outline, moreover, the portraits of vicious tyrants and virtuous kings — central to the Dialogue and abounding in the History — are far from original either to Buchanan himself or to humanists generally. On the contrary, they conform to conceptual patterns long established in the western political tradition. From the time of Charlemagne, for example, the wise and prudent prince, eschewing flattery and welcoming good counsel, respecting the law and ruling for the common good — a characterization that itself derives from patristic and ultimately pagan sources — was a constant motif in French political literature and one of which Buchanan could not but be aware.14 Although found in works of almost every type, the locus classicus of such descriptions was the genre of specula principum, mirrors of princes, manuals of personal instruction for kings which almost invariably adhere to a conventional typology of princely vice and virtue. Again originating in the pagan world, in the Ad Nicloclem of Isocrates and Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, the standard characteristics of the ideal prince were duplicated ia innumerable specula throughout the classical and middle ages, culminating, although not ending, in such humanist works as the Institutio Principis Christiani of Erasmus.15 In the fifteenth and sixteenth centiuries, moreover, during a period of monarchical consolidation and princely flamboyance, works in the speculum genre proliferated. Among the humanists of quattrocento Italy and subsequently among those of sixteenth century northern Europe, the speculum became a favoured vehicle of instruction and the figure of the ideal prince, already familiar, became ubiquitous.16 Designed, as the specula were, to instruct the prince in the art of government, to instil in him correct moral principles and to encourage him to be a pattern of virtue for his subjects to imitate, many of them inevitably appeared in the library of James VI.17 One such, indeed, was presented to James by his tutor himself and as an example both of the speculum genre and of the kind of political literature Buchanan thought suitable for his pupil is worth brief investigation.

In the catalogue of the royal library the work is described as the ‘Institution of a prince par Synesius en francoys’, a French edition of an oration delivered by Synesius, Bishop of Ptolemais, to the Emperor Arcadius in 399.18 Written in a lofty moral tone and outlining the virtues and attributes of an ideal prince, it reiterates many of the essential characteristics of the speculum genre both past and future. Good rule, Synesius assumes, depends on the personal moral bearing of the prince himself who must, therefore, guard against the vicious caprice of unrestrained desires and appetites by subjecting his base passions to the rule of reason. He must reign with prudence and justice, instituting a regime founded on temperance and emphasizing the military virtues of simplicity and frugality. Finally, he must rule according to law, eschewing the importunities of flatterers and sycophants, and seeking the advice of faithful and honest counsellors. If he so acts, ruling with wisdom and piety and displaying all the kingly virtues, the people will love and emulate him and the strength and prosperity of the empire will be assured. In this general description there is nothing that did not find a place in the humanist specula of the sixteenth century or, as we shall see, in Buchanan’s own political philosophy as expounded in the 1570s. In his discussion of the nature of kingship Buchanan was employing long-established categories and conventional characterizations that had assumed renewed significance in the humanist milieu in which he spent his early and middle years.19

As was suggested above, however, portraits of the ideal prince were never confined to the formal specula alone. Among humanists in particular, any form of literature, be it pohtical treatise, history or poetry, was capable of conveying the same didactic message. Consequently, it comes as no surprise to find that Buchanan’s play Baptistes, a work which his biographer considered ‘but the poetical draft of his famous tract De Fure Regni apud Scotos’,20 in portraying the characteristic features of a tyrant, by implication outlines the physiognomy of an ideal ruler. Many of the attributes of kingship and tyranny analysed in Buchanan’s later works are foreshadowed in the Baptistes and for that reason it deserves closer scrutiny than it is usually accorded. First written around 1540, during Buchanan’s sojourn at Guyenne, the play relates the last days of John the Baptist in a series of dialogues modelled on classical drama. Buchanan’s biographer construed the Baptist’s struggle against accumulated Jewish tradition as deliberately analogous to the attacks of contemporary reformers on catholicism.21 Such an interpretation may be misleading, however, overstressing the religious intent of the play at the expense of its simple political message. Before the Inquisition, Buchanan stated that it was inspired by Henry VIII’s tyrannical persecution of Sir Thomas More and, whether this particular identification of the characters is correct or not,22 it is certainly tyranny which is held up for inspection and implicit denunciation as the drama unfolds. The Baptist is the central figure only in so far as he is an innocent victim of royal tyranny; the play’s main focus is the weak-willed and vacillating Herod, his scheming counsellor the high priest Malchus, and his evil wife Herodias. When the play was put into English in 1642, the translator accurately entitled it Tyrannical-Government Anatomised: or, A Discourse Concerning Evil Counsellors.23

It is Herodias who gives fullest expression to the essential attributes of tyranny as conventionally perceived. Firstly, she puts the personal interests of the ruler above the common good of the subjects:

Let him that on his head once puts a Crowne, put from him all degrees of Common Duty; let him judge all things honest that conduce to a King’s benefit, and hold no fact to be unseemly, that he shall affect for his own safety (25).

Secondly, she advocates rule by force and fear:

Now shall we vindicate our royal dignity in future times to be of none derided, now I’ll force the stubborne people to speake well of Kings or learne it to their grief, and make them hold that all their Kings commands they gladly must beare and obey though never so unjust (25).

Neither this epitome of the tyrant nor its implied antithesis — the just and loving prince ruling for the common good — is in any way original. The characterization of the tyrant, deriving from the fifth book of Aristotle’s Politics, is repeated time and again in the specula principum to offset the more elevating portraits of the ideal prince.24 Conceived exclusively in terms of personal character traits, kingship and tyranny were invariably defined in accordance with the moral predilections of the prince himself — in terms, that is, of his propensity to virtue or to vice. Even the law was harnessed to this mode of thought and consistently construed as a means of moderating royal licence and maintaining the prince in the paths of virtue. Good laws, as Buchanan wrote in the Dialogue, ‘remind a good prince of his duties and restrain a bad one’ (36). Many years earlier, in a passage at the dramatic climax of the Baptistes, he had implied the same sentiment. Herod’s daughter has pleased her father with her dancing and, offered whatever she wishes as a boon, requests the baptist’s head. Whereupon the following dialogue ensues:

Herod: Thou demand’st a gift that ill becomes a Virgin.

Daughter: To destroy an enemy is no uncomly deed.

Herod: Is therefore he an enemy and worthy of a Kings wrath?

Daughter: He’s worthy of such wrath who by his deeds deserves it.

Herod: What redresse may I then purchase for the people’s hate?

Daughter: The people must obey and Kings command.

Herod: ’Tis a Kings duty just things to command.

Daughter: Kings by commanding, may make those things just which were before unjust.

Herod: But Kings commands, the Law doth moderate.

Daughter: If that be right, which pleases Princes, then they rule the Lawes, not the Lawes them.

Herod: Then for a King, a Tyrant the people will divulge me (24).

The ruler’s subjection to law — be it divine, natural or positive — was a central tenet of classical and medieval political thought. The virtuous prince conformed his actions to the law, and conformity to the law was what distinguished the true ‘virtuous’ king from the evil ‘vicious’ tyrant. As we shall see, neither this nor the other attributes of tyranny and kingship evident in the passage were lost on Buchanan — they form the backbone of his later political writings. Patently, the central elements of Buchanan’s political philosophy were present at an early date, absorbed in the humanist milieu in which he spent much of his life, and owing not a little to their conventional definition in an established mode of political thought.

Like the good humanist he undoubtedly was, Buchanan vowed in the Dialogue to ‘express not so much my own opinion as that of the ancients’ (8). The claim is not illegitimate and, leaving aside the many classical poets whom he cites, Buchanan’s debt to Plato and particularly Aristotle among the Greeks, and Cicero and Seneca among the Romans, is plainly obvious in the Dialogue. Nevertheless, the conceptual categories guiding the articulation of his thought, although themselves ultimately deriving from classical sources, were a common inheritance from the middle ages that had assumed particular resonance in the humanist circles in which Buchanan’s early intellectual development took place. That he should adhere to the same conception of kingship and law in his later writings as he did in the Baptistes, despite both the intervening political turmoil and a change in his confessional allegiance, is not entirely surprising. Even if his position as regards the young King James was not a determining factor in the crystallization of his thought, Buchanan was already over sixty when his major works were written and few men radically reorientate their thought at that stage in life. Moreover, the ethical conception of politics to which he adhered was one peculiarly relevant to the under-developed political culture he sought to describe. To make this clear, however, a more thorough examination of Buchanan’s principal works is necessary.

II

The De Fure Regni is not a well structured work, certainly belying Buchanan’s claim to have discussed his subject ‘in an orderly and well-digested manner’.25 As often as not, for example, the conclusion of a particular argument not only does not become apparent until a later stage in the text but also emerges in a slightly different guise. Moreover, the dialogue form in which the work is cast allows Buchanan — whether by chance or design — to substitute for rigorous logic the meek acquiescence in untested assumptions of his spiritless interlocutor, Thomas Maitland. Consequently, central arguments in the Dialogue hinge on presuppositions, in particular about human nature and the fonction of law, which receive neither extensive discussion nor clear definition in the text. Essential as they are to an understanding of Buchanan’s conception of kingship, the reader is nonetheless obliged to piece together his meaning firom scattered and imprecise obiter dicta. A systematic exposition of the text as it stands, therefore, would be both repetitious and convoluted and will not be attempted here. Instead, at the risk of slightly distorting Buchanan’s thought and of endowing it with a precision and coherence it does not possess, the following analysis will attempt to outline his theory without undue regard to the structure of the Dialogue, explicating obscurities in his arguments with relevant quotations and references from wherever they occur in the text. These can be further supplemented, albeit with great caution, by recourse to his most likely sources, in particular Aristotle and Cicero, whom he frequently cites and to whom he owed a considerable debt. Finally, the important arguments from and allusions to Scottish history which occur in the Dialogue can be compared with Buchanan’s own History, a work intimately related in theme and spirit to the De Fure Regni which will thereafter be subjected to more detailed analysis.

Beginning, then, with the Dialogue, it is immediately apparent that, unlike many of his classical authorities and contemporary colleagues, Buchanan is not interested in the relative merits of the various forms of government classified by Aristotle. From the very outset it is clear that neither aristocracy nor democracy are to be discussed, but only monarchy and its degenerate form, tyranny. Maitland, newly returned from France, tells Buchanan of the outraged reaction there to the murder of Darnley and the subsequent deposition of Mary. Buchanan, assuming Mary’s complicity in the murder, argues in return that one cannot disapprove of the crime without approving of the punishment meted out to the criminal. Maitland replies, however, that the European monarchies see things in a rather different light, viewing the deposition as a slight upon monarchical government; while the people, although generally approving of the humbling of tyrants, are confused over what precisely constitutes tyranny. In order to define it more clearly, therefore, Buchanan proposes to set up tyranny and kingship as opposites and, by explaining ‘the origin and reasons for the creation of kings’, by contraries, reveal what constitutes a tyrant (1–7).

Accordingly, therefore, Buchanan goes on to discuss, in terms reminiscent of Aristotle but strikingly similar to Cicero, the beginnings of human society and the origins of government. With Cicero, he rejects out of hand the assertion that human association is the product simply of utility or expediency, maintaining rather that the force that first brought men together was a natural impulse (vis naturae) implanted in all men which makes them shun the solitary life and seek companionship in society (9–10).26 Pressed by Maitland to clarify his conception of this natural force, Buchanan calls it ‘a light divinely infused in our minds’, a light which he further identifies with the law of nature, the ability to distinguish base from worthy things (turpia ab honestis), and finally, with wisdom (sapientia) (10–1). This said, he feels able to conclude that it was neither orators nor lawyers who were the authors of human society but God himself, and that, ‘following Cicero’s opinion, I think nothing on earth is more pleasing to God, than associations of men under the law which are known as states (civitates)’ (11).27

If neither Buchanan’s attempted clarifications seem terribly helpful nor the conclusions he thereupon draws immediately warrantable, his language suggests that a glance at Cicero may provide some illumination. In the De Legibus, for example, Cicero, drawing on Plato and Aristotle, makes a similar identification of nature, natural law and reason, all of which are said to partake of, and function in accordance with, the divine mind. He thence goes on to argue, as did the Stoics, that wisdom or right reason — reason, that is, in accord with nature — is the essence of moral worth in the individual and of justice and law in the state.28 Buchanan appears to be making a similar case, although his statements have even less substantial argument behind them than do those of Cicero. He does assert at this point, however, that ‘nature never says one thing and wisdom another’, while a little later in the Dialogue, presumably with reference to this passage, he tells us that, ‘as has already been proved, the voice of God and of nature is the same’ (11, 30). Although not wholly explicit in these quotations, in the context of his thought as a whole, it is safe to assume that Buchanan, like Cicero, understood God to have created the universe according to rational principles and to have endowed man himself with reason sufficient for the comprehension of those laws of nature by which he should govern both his own conduct and that of the political community in which he is naturally disposed to live. The significance of this identification of nature, reason and law — and its presumed association with virtue — will shortly become apparent.

Having established, at least to his own satisfaction, the origins of society and the state, Buchanan proceeds to an examination of the reasons for the creation of kings. Employing the age-old analogy between the human body and the body-politic, he argues that the latter is as susceptible to disease and ill-health as the former and, therefore, equally in need of the services of a physician (11–2). In the state, he continues, this task is performed by the ruler whose principal function, as with the physician, is to maintain harmony (temperamentum) among the members of the body-politic or, more prosaically, to administer justice in the state (13–4). Maitland, however, demurs at Buchanan’s attribution to justice of the task of maintaining concord and harmony when ‘by its very name and declared character, temperance (temperantia) seems to claim these functions in its own right’ (14). But Buchanan retorts that it matters little to which of the two precedence is given, for all such virtues — by which he presumably means the cardinal virtues — are so interdependent that ‘there appears to be one single function for all, that is, the restraint of inordinate passions (cupiditatum moderatio)’ (14–5). For Buchanan, it would seem, justice, ambiguously identified with temperance, is not so much a matter of administration as the state of equilibrium achieved when the members of the body-politic are acting in harmony. How this is to be brought about will only emerge when he comes to discuss the attributes of the ideal king.

But how, first of all, is the ruler to be chosen? By the law of nature, Maitland tells us, all men are equal, so a ruler can only be legitimately established with the people’s consent (15). But the art of government requires special skills, particularly that prudence or practical wisdom (prudentia) ‘from which, as from a fountain, all laws that are useful for the conservation of human society must proceed and be derived’ (18). A man possessed of the utmost prudence would be ‘a king by nature, not by election’ to whom unlimited power might safely be entrusted. Such paragons, however, are rare and the people are generally obliged to make do with lesser men who, only approximating to the ideal, may not be sufficiently strong to resist the pressures of their own affections. To ensure, therefore, that the less prudent king does not act capriciously, the law is set up as ‘his colleague, or rather as a restraint on his appetites (moderatrix libidinum)’ (18). This prompts Maitland rather ingenuously to inquire if Buchanan does not think that royal power ought to be unlimited. To which the latter gives an emphatically negative reply:

Not at all, for I remember he is not only a king, but also a man, erring in many things through ignorance, sinning in many cases wilfully, and doing many things under constraint. He is, indeed, an animal, easily adjusting to every breath of favour and ill-will, a natural vice which his office as magistrate usually only increases … Wherefore the most prudent men have recommended that the law be associated with him, to show him the way when he is ignorant and to lead him back to the way when he wanders from it (18–9).

There is certainly in such a theory of the origins of political authority many a springboard to a radical political ideology. But implicit also in Buchanan’s language are fundamental assumptions about human nature and the function of law which require more detailed investigation than they are generally accorded.

The king cannot be set free of the law, Buchanan tells us later in the De Fure Regni, because ‘within a man two most savage monsters, lust and rage (cupiditas & iracundia), wage perpetual war with reason (ratio)’ (32). This basic presupposition about man’s nature, never discussed at any length in his writings and never defined with any precision, is nonetheless the keystone of his political philosophy. The closest Buchanan approaches to a definition of it occurs in a passage towards the end of the Dialogue. There Maitland is led to remark that ‘there is no monster more violent and more pestilential than man when … he has once degenerated into a beast’, prompting Buchanan to reply that

You would say this much more emphatically, if you considered how many-faceted an animal man may be and out of what a variety of monsters he is made … It would be an infinite task to describe the nature of each one, but certainly two most noisome monsters, anger and lust (ira & libido), are clearly apparent in man’ And what else do laws do, or strive after, but that these monsters be subjected to reason (ratio)? And when they do not comply with reason, may not the laws restrain them with the fetters of their sanctions? Whoever, therefore, loosens these bonds from a king, or anyone else, does not merely release a single man, but lets loose against reason two exceptionally cruel monsters and arms them to break down the barriers of the law. Aristotle seems to have said well and truly that he who obeys the law obeys God and the law, he who obeys the king, obeys a man and a beast (84).29

The language of this passage and the citation of Aristotle clearly indicate that Buchanan is drawing directly (albeit crudely) on the psychological theory of the ancient world. That is, he is describing man’s nature in terms of the classical distinction between reason and the passions in the human soul. This language, however, is not merely descriptive of psychological faculties, it is also, indeed for Buchanan primarily, an ethical vocabulary in which the passions are uniformly vicious and reason (or prudence or wisdom30) the essence of virtue. With his king-centred conception of politics, moreover, Buchanan invariably sees the conflict between reason and the passions, virtue and vice, being waged most significantly in the soul of the ruler. For Buchanan, therefore, the right functioning of the body-politic depends on the moral predilections of its head, and underlying both the Dialogue and the History is the fear that the passions of the ruler will overcome reason and unleash the moral anarchy — the tyranny — that inevitably accompanies the unrestrained indulgence of a ruler’s sensual instincts. Hence both the significance of law and of its identification with reason and virtue. Unlike the weak and vacillating ruler, the law is ‘deaf to threats and to entreaties, maintaining one unswerving course’ (20). It is, as Aristotle tells us in the sentence immediately following that cited by Buchanan, ‘wisdom without desire’31 — reason free of human passion — and to it Buchanan would have the ruler conform both his speech and actions, bearing out the Ciceronian maxim that ‘the king should be the law speaking, the law a dumb king’ (19–20).32 Only the ideal ruler possessed of perfect reason or prudence — ‘steadfast against hatred, love, anger, envy and the other perturbations of the mind’ (31) — can be said in any sense to be unbound by the law. For, indeed, such a paragon of princely virtue would himself be the law, both ‘unto himself and unto others, expressing in his life what is commanded by the laws’ (29).

There is nothing at all unusual in Buchanan’s use of this ‘psycho-ethical’ language or in his application of it to political theory. It was a common device in the specula principum and was further popularized by sixteenth century humanists who exploited the antithesis of reason and the passions (as did Buchanan) to emphasize the significance of education in the attainment of virtue. Ultimately, the distinction derives from Plato and Aristotle, but it was developed as a central tenet of Stoic philosophy and, despite his reference to Aristotle, it is with Stoicism that Buchanan seems to have associated the doctrine. For Buchanan’s ideal king, the prudent ruler impervious to the demands of his passions, is Rex Stoicus, the Stoic King. This conception, furthermore, he explicitly associates with the Roman Stoic, Seneca. Twice in the Dialogue when discussing the ideal ruler Buchanan refers Maitland to Seneca’s tragedy Thyestes, on both occasions saying that therein is portrayed a model of the perfect prince (23, 47). Moreover, the particular lines he had in mind are appended as a tailpiece to the Dialogue under the heading Rex Stoicus ex Seneca (104). Put briefly, Seneca’s portrait merely emphasizes that the true king is incorruptible and self-sufficient, unmoved by either riches or honour, ambition or the favour of the mob. It hardly matches the expectations generated by Buchanan’s encomiastic references. But Seneca’s tragedies as a whole could hardly be bettered as examples of the dire and vicious consequences following upon the unbridled indulgence of man’s sensual appetites. The lesson was apparently not lost on Buchanan who presented young King James with a volume of ‘Senecae Tragoediae’ to complement his copy of Synesius.33 Presumably he wished to impress upon James that only the Stoic King, ruthlessly subjecting his passions to the rule of reason, could be a virtuous individual and a worthy ruler.

In the light of this concept of a Stoic King, it is interesting that Buchanan himself was dubbed ‘a stoik philosopher’ by a Scottish contemporary.34 Now, while there are no grounds for believing that Buchanan was a Stoic in any formal philosophical sense, there is equally no doubt that he was deeply impregnated, as were many contemporary humanists, with Stoic ethics as interpreted and popularized in late republican and early imperial Rome.35 If, for example, Seneca provided Buchanan with a Stoic King, Cicero — the most influential source of neo-Stoic ideas — provided him with much else besides. As has been suggested, his identification of nature, reason and virtue — itself an important Stoic doctrine — if ultimately attributable to Aristotle, was almost certainly mediated through the works of Cicero. A similar process may well have occurred in relation to the theory of the passions. Buchanan’s debt to Cicero was not only considerable but also explicit. In the first twenty-five pages of the De Fure Regni, he quotes directly from De Republica, De Officiis and De Legibus, in all three of which a simplified version of the Stoic theory of the passions is expressed. If Buchanan’s version is still further simplified, his language imprecise and his conceptualization crude,36 it is nevertheless only in the light of this theory that his conception of kingship and law becomes wholly comprehensible.

III

Given, then, that the Stoic King will almost certainly remain an ideal, that the people will have perforce to choose a ruler who merely approximates to it, and that the latter must, therefore, be subjected to the law, the question now arises as to where the power to promulgate law resides. To Buchanan, it is self-evident that the person whose appetites the law is designed to curb cannot be permitted to control the processes by which it is established and administered. Consequently, he immediately proceeds to divest the ruler of almost all judicial and legislative powers (31f). The administration of the law is to be left entirely in the hands of lawyers and judges; the king is to take no decisions as regards future contingencies without the advice and consent of his cotmcil; and the creation of law is to be the preserve of the people, or rather, ‘as is roughly our custom, selected men from all estates (ordines) should meet with the king in coxmcil’, and whatever they decide should thereafter ‘be submitted to the judgement of the people (id ad populi iudicium deferretur)’