Nicomachean Ethics - Aristotle E-Book

Aristotle

• Herausgeber: Lebooks Editora
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch
• Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2024

Seitenzahl: 437

Beschreibung

Nicomachean Ethics is the magnum opus of the eminent Greek philosopher Aristotle on Ethics. In it, he unveils his teleological conception of practical rationality, his vision of virtue, and his reflections on the role of habit and prudence. It is considered the most mature and representative work of Aristotelian thought. The title derives from the name of his son and also disciple, Nicomachus. It is believed that the work is the result of Nicomachus' lecture notes, published by Aristotle's disciples after Nicomachus' premature death in combat. It is an indispensable ebook in the field of philosophy and ethics.

Leseprobe

Aristotle

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

Original Title:

“Ēthika Nikomacheia”

Contents

INTRODUCTION

Book 1

Book 2

Book 3

Book 4

Book 5

Book 6

Book 7

Book 8

Book 9

Book 10

INTRODUCTION

Plato and Aristotle in The School of Athens, by Raphael Sanzio (1509)

Aristotle (Stagira, 384 BC - Chalcis, 322 BC) was a philosopher, polymath, and scientist born in the city of Stagira, in northern Ancient Greece. Alongside Plato, he is considered the father of Western philosophy. His ideas have had an enormous influence on the intellectual history of the West for over two millennia.

He was a disciple of Plato and other thinkers, such as Eudoxus of Cnidus, during the twenty years he spent at the Academy in Athens. Shortly after Plato's death, Aristotle left Athens to become the tutor of Alexander the Great in the Kingdom of Macedonia for nearly 5 years. In the last stage of his life, he founded the Lyceum in Athens, where he taught until a year before his death.

Aristotle wrote about 200 works, of which only a few have been preserved (none of them intended for publication) in the Corpus Aristotelicum, covering a wide variety of topics including logic, metaphysics, philosophy of science, ethics, political philosophy, aesthetics, rhetoric, physics, astronomy, and biology. Aristotle transformed many, if not all, of the areas of knowledge he addressed. He is recognized as the founding father of logic and biology, as while there were previous reflections and writings on both subjects, it is in Aristotle's work that the first systematic investigations are found. Aristotle has also been called the father of political science, zoology, embryology, natural law, scientific method, rhetoric, psychology, realism, critique, individualism, teleology, and meteorology.

Contrary to Platonism, Aristotle developed a philosophy where experience is the source of knowledge. According to his hylomorphic theory, each sensible entity is a substance composed of matter, that which constitutes things, and form, that which organizes matter, with the latter being its essence. Every substance tends towards a final cause directed by its nature (teleology). According to the philosopher, human beings are rational animals constituted by a body and soul, whose ultimate end is intellectual activity through the exercise of reason, a virtue (areté) proper to the soul, thus achieving well-being (eudaimonia). Ethical virtues, which are formed through habit, are the mean between two extremes or vices. Humans naturally live in communities, forming States (polis) in order to preserve the happiness of their citizens. He also defended the value of rhetoric, poetic art, and the superiority of the Greek male.

Among many other contributions, Aristotle formulated the theory of spontaneous generation, the principle of non-contradiction, and the notions of category, substance, unmoved mover, act, and potency. Some of his ideas, which were novel for the philosophy of his time, are now part of the common sense of many people. He influenced Islamic thought during the Middle Ages, as well as Christian scholasticism. His ethics, although always influential, gained renewed interest with the modern advent of virtue ethics.

Early years

Aristotle was born in 384 or 383 BC, during the first year of the XCIX Olympiad, in the city of Stagira, present-day Stavros (which is why he was nicknamed the Stagirite), not far from Mount Athos, in the Chalcidice peninsula, then part of the Kingdom of Macedonia (present-day region of Macedonia in Greece). His father, Nicomachus, belonged to the Asclepiad corporation, that is, he practiced medicine, and was the physician of King Amyntas III of Macedonia, a fact that explains his relationship with the royal court of Macedonia, which would have a significant influence on his life; and his mother, Phaestis, was from Chalcis and was also linked to the Asclepiads.

During the reign of King Archelaus I of Macedonia, as his father was the physician of King Amyntas III of Macedonia, both resided in Pella, and Aristotle could not stay there for long, as his parents died when he was still very young, and he probably moved to Atarneus. In 367 BC, when Aristotle was 17 years old, his father died, and he was taken care of by his tutor Proxenus of Atarneus, who sent him to Athens, then an important intellectual center of the Greek world, to study at Plato's Academy. He remained there for twenty years.

Period at the Academy

Low-relief of Plato teaching Aristotle, by Luca della Robbia (c. 1439).

To complete Aristotle's education, Proxenus sent him to Athens to enroll him in the Academy, as his fame and that of Plato had already spread throughout the Greek world.

Aristotle met Plato when he was 17 years old and remained at the Academy from 367 or 366 BC until 347 or 346 BC, coinciding with the moment when Plato made his second trip to Sicily. Because Aristotle attended the Academy during its period of greatest splendor, he was able to develop properly. Eudoxus exerted the first decisive influence on Aristotle since he was able to influence him in the requirement to "save the phenomena," that is, to "find a principle that would explain the facts while keeping intact their genuine way of presenting themselves." Plato himself called him "the reader" because of his desire to educate himself through writings rather than orally (as was done at the Academy).

Because Eudoxus' philosophical ideas differed from Platonic philosophy and led to aporias, Aristotle ignored them, but he did associate with Speusippus, Philip of Opus, Heraclides Ponticus, and Eurylochus. Both Speusippus and Philip of Opus were scholarchs of the Academy, Heraclides Ponticus governed it when Plato made his third trip to Sicily, Philip published the work "Laws," and Heraclides Ponticus and Eurylochus associated their names with Aristotle. During this period of youth, he wrote several dialogues and the "Protrepticus," an exhortation to philosophy very popular among the general public. None of these works has been preserved.

Aristotle probably participated in the Eleusinian Mysteries, writing about them: "Experience is learning."

Formation of his philosophy

After Plato's death in 347 BC, Aristotle left Athens. Traditional history records that Aristotle left because he was disappointed that the direction of the Academy passed to Plato's nephew, Speusippus, although this is improbable, as a Macedonian could not inherit Athenian property. It is possible that he feared Athenian sentiments against Macedonians at that time and left before Plato's death.

Aristotle moved to Atarneus and Assos, in Asia Minor, where he lived for about three years under the protection of his friend and former Academy colleague, Hermias, who was the governor of the city. When Hermias was murdered, Aristotle moved to the city of Mytilene, on the island of Lesbos, where he stayed for two years. There he continued his research with Theophrastus, a native of Lesbos, focusing on zoology and marine biology. Additionally, he married Pythias of Assos, Hermias's niece, with whom he had a daughter of the same name.

Alexander the Great and the Lyceum

Alexander the Great and Aristotle. The philosopher was his intellectual mentor and imparted his knowledge to him during his teenage years for over two years. It is considered that these teachings were decisive elements for the goals that Alexander set for himself. His nephew, Callisthenes, who was his biographer, accompanied him on the campaign against Persia. The letters between Alexander and Aristotle were recorded in the book by Pseudo-Callisthenes, "Life and Deeds of Alexander the Great."

In 343 BC, King Philip II of Macedonia summoned Aristotle to be the tutor of his 13-year-old son, who would later be known as Alexander the Great, in the town of Mieza. Aristotle then traveled to Pella, then the capital of the Macedonian empire, and taught Alexander for at least two years until he began his military career. During Aristotle's time at the Macedonian court, he also taught two other future kings: Ptolemy and Cassander.

In 335 BC, Aristotle returned to Athens and founded his own school, the Lyceum (named for being located within a precinct dedicated to the god Apollo Lyceus).

Unlike the Academy, the Lyceum was not a private school, and many of the classes were public and free. Throughout his life, Aristotle amassed a vast library and a number of followers and researchers, known as the peripatetics (itinerants), so called because of their habit of discussing while walking). Most of Aristotle's surviving works are from this period. He wrote many dialogues, of which only fragments have survived. The surviving works are in the form of treatises and were not intended, for the most part, for publication.

During this period, his wife, Pythias, died, and Aristotle began a new relationship with Herpyllis, believed to be, like him, a native of Stagira. While some suppose she was nothing more than his slave, others deduce from Aristotle's final wishes that she was a free woman and probably his wife at the time of his death. In any case, they had children together, including a son, Nicomachus, whom Aristotle named as his father and to whom he dedicated his "Nicomachean Ethics."

Although little is known of his physical appearance, Aristotle was described as bald, with short legs, small eyes, and a stutter, elegant in dress, and based on his own opinions, lacking ascetic habits. He was a practical man and a careful observer. Of high mind and good heart, dedicated to his loved ones and fair to his rivals. Diogenes Laërtius stated that he had a tendency to sarcasm and cited some expressions that testify to his easy wit

Death

When Alexander died in 323 BC, Athens likely became an uncomfortable place for Macedonians, especially those with connections to Aristotle. It is said that he declared that he "saw no reason to let Athens sin twice against philosophy" (a clear allusion to the condemnation of Socrates). Aristotle left Athens and settled in Chalcis, on the island of Euboea, where he strangely died the following year at the age of 61 or 62, in 322 BC, from a disease of the digestive organs. His will was preserved by Diogenes Laërtius.

In May 2016, during the international congress "Aristotle, 2,400 years" held at the University of Thessaloniki, Konstantinos Sismanidis, director of the excavations in the city of Stagira, announced the conclusions of his team of archaeologists regarding a building discovered in 1996 and now re-examined in light of two manuscripts that refer to the subsequent transfer of the philosopher's ashes, in a bronze urn, to his hometown. According to them, the building, found inside a later Byzantine fortress, "cannot be anything other than Aristotle's mausoleum," although they clarified that "we have no proof, but very strong indications that border on certainty."

Thought

Aristotle's thought encompasses virtually all facets of intellectual inquiry. Aristotle practiced philosophy broadly, which he would also describe as "science." The use of the term "science" has a different meaning than what the term "scientific method" covers. He distinguishes three types of philosophies, sciences, or knowledge: practical knowledge, which includes ethics and politics; productive knowledge, which means the study of the arts, including poetics; and theoretical knowledge, purely contemplative as it does not intervene in the object of study, which encompasses physics, mathematics, and metaphysics. Logic and rhetoric do not constitute substantive knowledge for Aristotle.

Nicomachean Ethics

Aristotle expounded his most relevant ethical reflections in his work "Nicomachean Ethics." This work is one of the most important treatises preserved in Western philosophy. It consists of 10 books, in which the philosopher reflects, among other things, on happiness and how it is possible to achieve it.

According to Aristotle, what makes a man happy? How can an individual attain a full life?

Let's explore the fundamental ideas of Aristotelian ethics.

The work is divided into 10 books, each addressing a different theme. In them, he expounds his reflections on the good, happiness, virtue, temperance, or intellectual virtues, among other topics.

Book I: Goodness and Happiness

In this book, the philosopher addresses what the end of human actions is. He also investigates the nature of happiness and differentiates between ethical and intellectual virtues.

Book II: Theory of Virtue

This volume elaborates more extensively on the theory of virtues and their nature. Additionally, Aristotle compares virtue with other types of knowledge.

Book III: Courage and Temperance

This book consists of three parts. In the first, Aristotle analyzes voluntary and involuntary actions of man. In the second part, the philosopher examines the virtue of courage, which he asserts lies in the mean between fear and confidence. Finally, in the third part, he discusses temperance, a virtue found between pleasure and pain.

Book IV: Various Virtues

Here Aristotle analyzes virtues different from temperance and courage. Among them are generosity, magnificence, magnanimity, and equanimity.

Book V: Justice

In this book, Aristotle refers to one of the great virtues, justice. Here, he distinguishes between types of justice: universal justice and particular justice. For Aristotle, justice is the greatest virtue.

Book VI: Intellectual Virtues

Here he delves into intellectual virtues and their nature. This book is one of the most important for understanding Aristotelian ethics. He refers to virtues such as art, science, wisdom, understanding, and prudence.

Book VII: Intemperance and Pleasure

In this book, the philosopher discusses continence and incontinence.

Book VIII: Friendship

This book represents a thorough study of friendship and its different types, as well as the relationship between friendship and politics.

Book IX: Friendship (Continuation)

In this volume, the philosopher continues to reflect on friendship. This time he emphasizes its characteristics and reciprocity. He also discusses the differences between friendship and goodness and refers to the relationship between friendship and happiness.

Book X: Pleasure and True Happiness

This is the final part of the Nicomachean Ethics. Here, Aristotle revisits the topic of happiness and pleasure. He expounds on what he believes true happiness signifies.

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NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

Book 1

1

Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim. But a certain difference is found among ends; some are activities, others are products apart from the activities that produce them. Where there are ends apart from the actions, it is the nature of the products to be better than the activities. Now, as there are many actions, arts, and sciences, their ends also are many; the end of the medical art is health, that of shipbuilding a vessel, that of strategy victory, that of economics wealth. But where such arts fall under a single capacity- as bridle-making and the other arts concerned with the equipment of horses fall under the art of riding, and this and every military action under strategy, in the same way other arts fall under yet others- in all of these the ends of the master arts are to be preferred to all the subordinate ends; for it is for the sake of the former that the latter are pursued. It makes no difference whether the activities themselves are the ends of the actions, or something else apart from the activities, as in the case of the sciences just mentioned.

2

If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its own sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this), and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for at that rate the process would go on to infinity, so that our desire would be empty and vain), clearly this must be the good and the chief good. Will not the knowledge of it, then, have a great influence on life? Shall we not, like archers who have a mark to aim at, be more likely to hit upon what is right? If so, we must try, in outline at least, to determine what it is, and of which of the sciences or capacities it is the object. It would seem to belong to the most authoritative art and that which is most truly the master art. And politics appears to be of this nature; for it is this that ordains which of the sciences should be studied in a state, and which each class of citizens should learn and up to what point they should learn them; and we see even the most highly esteemed of capacities to fall under this, e.g. strategy, economics, rhetoric; now, since politics uses the rest of the sciences, and since, again, it legislates as to what we are to do and what we are to abstain from, the end of this science must include those of the others, so that this end must be the good for man.

For even if the end is the same for a single man and for a state, that of the state seems at all events something greater and more complete whether to attain or to preserve; though it is worthwhile to attain the end merely for one man, it is finer and more godlike to attain it for a nation or for city-states. These, then, are the ends at which our inquiry aims, since it is political science, in one sense of that term.

3

Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the subject-matter admits of, for precision is not to be sought for alike in all discussions, any more than in all the products of the crafts. Now fine and just actions, which political science investigates, admit of much variety and fluctuation of opinion, so that they may be thought to exist only by convention, and not by nature. And goods also give rise to a similar fluctuation because they bring harm to many people; for before now men have been undone by reason of their wealth, and others by reason of their courage. We must be content, then, in speaking of such subjects and with such premises to indicate the truth roughly and in outline, and in speaking about things which are only for the most part true and with premises of the same kind to reach conclusions that are no better. In the same spirit, therefore, should each type of statement be received; for it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits; it is evidently equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician scientific proof.

Now each man judges well the things he knows, and of these he is a good judge. And so the man who has been educated in a subject is a good judge of that subject, and the man who has received an all-round education is a good judge in general. Hence a young man is not a proper hearer of lectures on political science; for he is inexperienced in the actions that occur in life, but its discussions start from these and are about these; and, further, since he tends to follow his passions, his study will be vain and unprofitable, because the end aimed at is not knowledge but action. And it makes no difference whether he is young in years or youthful in character; the defect does not depend on time, but on his living, and pursuing each successive object, as passion directs. For to such persons, as to the incontinent, knowledge brings no profit; but to those who desire and act in accordance with a rational principle knowledge about such matters will be of great benefit.

These remarks about the student, the sort of treatment to be expected, and the purpose of the inquiry, may be taken as our preface.

4

Let us resume our inquiry and state, in view of the fact that all knowledge and every pursuit aims at some good, what it is that we say political science aims at and what is the highest of all goods achievable by action. Verbally there is very general agreement; for both the general run of men and people of superior refinement say that it is happiness, and identify living well and doing well with being happy; but with regard to what happiness is they differ, and the many do not give the same account as the wise. For the former think it is some plain and obvious thing, like pleasure, wealth, or honor; they differ, however, from one another- and often even the same man identifies it with different things, with health when he is ill, with wealth when he is poor; but, conscious of their ignorance, they admire those who proclaim some great ideal that is above their comprehension. Now some thought that apart from these many goods there is another which is self-subsistent and causes the goodness of all these as well. To examine all the opinions that have been held were perhaps somewhat fruitless; enough to examine those that are most prevalent or that seem to be arguable.

Let us not fail to notice, however, that there is a difference between arguments from and those to the first principles. For Plato, too, was right in raising this question and asking, as he used to do, 'are we on the way from or to the first principles?' There is a difference, as there is in a racecourse between the course from the judges to the turning-point and the way back. For, while we must begin with what is known, things are objects of knowledge in two senses- some to us, some without qualification. Presumably, then, we must begin with things known to us. Hence anyone who is to listen intelligently to lectures about what is noble and just, and generally, about the subjects of political science must have been brought up in good habits. For the fact is the starting-point, and if this is sufficiently plain to him, he will not at the start need the reason as well; and the man who has been well brought up has or can easily get starting points. And as for him who neither has nor can get them, let him hear the words of Hesiod:

Far best is he who knows all things himself;

Good, he that hearkens when men counsel right;

But he who neither knows, nor lays to heart

Another's wisdom, is a useless wight.

5

Let us, however, resume our discussion from the point at which we digressed. To judge from the lives that men lead, most men, and men of the most vulgar type, seem (not without some ground) to identify the good, or happiness, with pleasure, which is the reason why they love the life of enjoyment. For there are, we may say, three prominent types of life- that just mentioned, the political, and thirdly the contemplative life. Now the mass of mankind are evidently quite slavish in their tastes, preferring a life suitable to beasts, but they get some ground for their view from the fact that many of those in high places share the tastes of Sardanapallus.

A consideration of the prominent types of life shows that people of superior refinement and of active disposition identify happiness with honor; for this is, roughly speaking, the end of the political life. But it seems too superficial to be what we are looking for, since it is thought to depend on those who bestow honor rather than on him who receives it, but the good we divine to be something proper to a man and not easily taken from him. Further, men seem to pursue honor in order that they may be assured of their goodness; at least it is by men of practical wisdom that they seek to be honored and among those who know them, and on the ground of their virtue; clearly, then, according to them, at any rate, virtue is better. And perhaps one might even suppose this to be, rather than honor, the end of the political life. But even this appears somewhat incomplete; for possession of virtue seems actually compatible with being asleep, or with lifelong inactivity, and, further, with the greatest sufferings and misfortunes; but a man who was living so no one would call happy, unless he were maintaining a thesis at all costs. But enough of this; for the subject has been sufficiently treated even in the current discussions. Third comes the contemplative life, which we shall consider later.

The life of money-making is one undertaken under compulsion, and wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is merely useful and for the sake of something else. And so one might rather take the aforenamed objects to be ends; for they are loved for themselves. But it is evident that not even these are ends; yet many arguments have been thrown away in support of them. Let us leave this subject, then.

6

We had perhaps better consider the universal good and discuss thoroughly what is meant by it, although such an inquiry is made an uphill one by the fact that the Forms have been introduced by friends of our own. Yet it would perhaps be thought to be better, indeed to be our duty, for the sake of maintaining the truth even to destroy what touches us closely, especially as we are philosophers or lovers of wisdom; for, while both are dear, piety requires us to honor truth above our friends.

The men who introduced this doctrine did not posit Ideas of classes within which they recognized priority and posteriority (which is the reason why they did not maintain the existence of an Idea embracing all numbers); but the term 'good' is used both in the category of substance and in that of quality and in that of relation, and that which is per se, i.e. substance, is prior in nature to the relative (for the latter is like an off shoot and accident of being); so that there could not be a common Idea set over all these goods. Further, since 'good' has as many senses as 'being' (for it is predicated both in the category of substance, as of God and of reason, and in quality, i.e. of the virtues, and in quantity, i.e. of that which is moderate, and in relation, i.e. of the useful, and in time, i.e. of the right opportunity, and in place, i.e. of the right locality and the like), clearly it cannot be something universally present in all cases and single; for then it could not have been predicated in all the categories but in one only. Further, since of the things answering to one Idea there is one science, there would have been one science of all the goods; but as it is there are many sciences even of the things that fall under one category, e.g. of opportunity, for opportunity in war is studied by strategics and in disease by medicine, and the moderate in food is studied by medicine and in exercise by the science of gymnastics.

And one might ask the question, what in the world they mean by 'a thing itself', is (as is the case) in 'man himself' and in a particular man the account of man is one and the same. For in so far as they are man, they will in no respect differ; and if this is so, neither will 'good itself' and particular goods, in so far as they are good. But again it will not be good any the more for being eternal, since that which lasts long is no whiter than that which perishes in a day. The Pythagoreans seem to give a more plausible account of the good, when they place the one in the column of goods; and it is they that Speusippus seems to have followed.

But let us discuss these matters elsewhere; an objection to what we have said, however, may be discerned in the fact that the Platonists have not been speaking about all goods, and that the goods that are pursued and loved for themselves are called good by reference to a single Form, while those which tend to produce or to preserve these somehow or to prevent their contraries are called so by reference to these, and in a secondary sense. Clearly, then, goods must be spoken of in two ways, and some must be good in themselves, the others by reason of these. Let us separate, then, things good in themselves from things useful, and consider whether the former are called good by reference to a single Idea. What sort of goods would one call good in themselves? Is it those that are pursued even when isolated from others, such as intelligence, sight, and certain pleasures and honors? Certainly, if we pursue these also for the sake of something else, yet one would place them among things good in themselves. Or is nothing other than the Idea of good in itself? In that case the Form will be empty. But if the things we have named are also things good in themselves, the account of the good will have to appear as something identical in them all, as that of whiteness is identical in snow and in white lead. But of honor, wisdom, and pleasure, just in respect of their goodness, the accounts are distinct and diverse. The good, therefore, is not some common element answering to one Idea.

But what then do we mean by the good? It is surely not like the things that only chance to have the same name. Are goods one, then, by being derived from one good or by all contributing to one good, or are they rather one by analogy? Certainly as sight is in the body, so is reason in the soul, and so on in other cases. But perhaps these subjects had better be dismissed for the present; for perfect precision about them would be more appropriate to another branch of philosophy. And similarly with regard to the Idea; even if there is some one good which is universally predicable of goods or is capable of separate and independent existence, clearly it could not be achieved or attained by man; but we are now seeking something attainable. Perhaps, however, some one might think it worthwhile to recognize this with a view to the goods that are attainable and achievable; for having this as a sort of pattern we shall know better the goods that are good for us, and if we know them shall attain them.

This argument has some plausibility but seems to clash with the procedure of the sciences; for all of these, though they aim at some good and seek to supply the deficiency of it, leave on one side the knowledge of the good. Yet that all the exponents of the arts should be ignorant of, and should not even seek, so great an aid is not probable. It is hard, too, to see how a weaver or a carpenter will be benefited in regard to his own craft by knowing this 'good itself', or how the man who has viewed the Idea itself will be a better doctor or general thereby. For a doctor seems not even to study health in this way, but the health of man, or perhaps rather the health of a particular man; it is individuals that he is healing. But enough of these topics.

7

Let us again return to the good we are seeking and ask what it can be. It seems different in different actions and arts; it is different in medicine, in strategy, and in the other arts likewise. What then is the good of each? Surely that for whose sake everything else is done. In medicine this is health, in strategy victory, in architecture a house, in any other sphere something else, and in every action and pursuit the end; for it is for the sake of this that all men do whatever else they do. Therefore, if there is an end for all that we do, this will be the good achievable by action, and if there are more than one, these will be the goods achievable by action.

So the argument has by a different course reached the same point; but we must try to state this even more clearly. Since there are evidently more than one end, and we choose some of these (e.g. wealth, flutes, and in general instruments) for the sake of something else, clearly not all ends are final ends; but the chief good is evidently something final. Therefore, if there is only one final end, this will be what we are seeking, and if there are more than one, the most final of these will be what we are seeking. Now we call that which is in itself worthy of pursuit more final than that which is worthy of pursuit for the sake of something else, and that which is never desirable for the sake of something else more final than the things that are desirable both in themselves and for the sake of that other thing, and therefore we call final without qualification that which is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else.

Now such a thing happiness, above all else, is held to be; for this we choose always for self and never for the sake of something else, but honor, pleasure, reason, and every virtue we choose indeed for themselves (for if nothing resulted from them we should still choose each of them), but we choose them also for the sake of happiness, judging that by means of them we shall be happy. Happiness, on the other hand, no one chooses for the sake of these, nor, in general, for anything other than itself.

From the point of view of self-sufficiency the same result seems to follow; for the final good is thought to be self-sufficient. Now by self-sufficient we do not mean that which is sufficient for a man by himself, for one who lives a solitary life, but also for parents, children, wife, and in general for his friends and fellow citizens, since man is born for citizenship. But some limit must be set to this; for if we extend our requirement to ancestors and descendants and friends' friends we are in for an infinite series. Let us examine this question, however, on another occasion; the self-sufficient we now define as that which when isolated makes life desirable and lacking in nothing; and such we think happiness to be; and further we think it most desirable of all things, without being counted as one good thing among others- if it were so counted it would clearly be made more desirable by the addition of even the least of goods; for that which is added becomes an excess of goods, and of goods the greater is always more desirable. Happiness, then, is something final and self-sufficient, and is the end of action.

Presumably, however, to say that happiness is the chief good seems a platitude, and a clearer account of what it is still desired. This might perhaps be given, if we could first ascertain the function of man. For just as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or an artist, and, in general, for all things that have a function or activity, the good and the 'well' is thought to reside in the function, so would it seem to be for man, if he has a function. Have the carpenter, then, and the tanner certain functions or activities, and has man none? Is he born without a function? Or as eye, hand, foot, and in general each of the parts evidently has a function, may one lay it down that man similarly has a function apart from all these? What then can this be? Life seems to be common even to plants, but we are seeking what is peculiar to man.

Let us exclude, therefore, the life of nutrition and growth. Next there would be a life of perception, but it also seems to be common even to the horse, the ox, and every animal. There remains, then, an active life of the element that has a rational principle; of this, one part has such a principle in the sense of being obedient to one, the other in the sense of possessing one and exercising thought. And, as 'life of the rational element' also has two meanings, we must state that life in the sense of activity is what we mean; for this seems to be the more proper sense of the term.

Now if the function of man is an activity of soul which follows or implies a rational principle, and if we say 'so-and-so-and 'a good so-and-so' have a function which is the same in kind, e.g. a lyre, and a good lyre-player, and so without qualification in all cases, eminence in respect of goodness being idded to the name of the function (for the function of a lyre-player is to play the lyre, and that of a good lyre-player is to do so well): if this is the case, and we state the function of man to be a certain kind of life, and this to be an activity or actions of the soul implying a rational principle, and the function of a good man to be the good and noble performance of these, and if any action is well performed when it is performed in accordance with the appropriate excellence: if this is the case, human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with virtue, and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and most complete.

But we must add 'in a complete life.' For one swallow does not make a summer, nor does one day; and so too one day, or a short time, does not make a man blessed and happy.

Let this serve as an outline of the good; for we must presumably first sketch it roughly, and then later fill in the details. But it would seem that anyone is capable of carrying on and articulating what has once been well outlined, and that time is a good discoverer or partner in such a work; to which facts the advances of the arts are due; for anyone can add what is lacking. And we must also remember what has been said before, and not look for precision in all things alike, but in each class of things such precision as accords with the subject-matter, and so much as is appropriate to the inquiry. For a carpenter and a geometer investigate the right angle in different ways; the former does so in so far as the right angle is useful for his work, while the latter inquires what it is or what sort of thing it is; for he is a spectator of the truth.

We must act in the same way, then, in all other matters as well, that our main task may not be subordinated to minor questions. Nor must we demand the cause in all matters alike; it is enough in some cases that the fact be well established, as in the case of the first principles; the fact is the primary thing or first principle. Now of first principles we see some by induction, some by perception, some by a certain habituation, and others too in other ways. But each set of principles we must try to investigate in the natural way, and we must take pains to state them definitely, since they have a great influence on what follows. For the beginning is thought to be more than half of the whole, and many of the questions we ask are cleared up by it.

8

We must consider it, however, in the light not only of our conclusion and our premises, but also of what is commonly said about it; for with a true view all the data harmonize, but with a false one the facts soon clash. Now goods have been divided into three classes, and some are described as external, others as relating to soul or to body; we call those that relate to soul most properly and truly goods, and psychical actions and activities we class as relating to soul. Therefore our account must be sound, at least according to this view, which is an old one and agreed on by philosophers. It is correct also in that we identify the end with certain actions and activities; for thus it falls among goods of the soul and not among external goods. Another belief which harmonizes with our account is that the happy man lives well and does well; for we have practically defined happiness as a sort of good life and good action. The characteristics that are looked for in happiness seem also, all of them, to belong to what we have defined happiness as being. For some identify happiness with virtue, some with practical wisdom, others with a kind of philosophic wisdom, others with these, or one of these, accompanied by pleasure or not without pleasure; while others include also external prosperity. Now some of these views have been held by many men and men of old, others by a few eminent persons; and it is not probable that either of these should be entirely mistaken, but rather that they should be right in at least some one respect or even in most respects.

With those who identify happiness with virtue or someone virtue our account is in harmony; for to virtue belongs virtuous activity. But it makes, perhaps, no small difference whether we place the chief good in possession or in use, in state of mind or in activity. For the state of mind may exist without producing any good result, as in a man who is asleep or in some other way quite inactive, but the activity cannot; for one who has the activity will of necessity be acting and acting well. And as in the Olympic Games it is not the most beautiful and the strongest that are crowned but those who compete (for it is some of these that are victorious), so those who act win, and rightly win, the noble and good things in life.

Their life is also in itself pleasant. For pleasure is a state of soul, and to each man that which he is said to be a lover of is pleasant; e.g. not only is a horse pleasant to the lover of horses, and a spectacle to the lover of sights, but also in the same way just acts are pleasant to the lover of justice and in general virtuous acts to the lover of virtue. Now for most men their pleasures are in conflict with one another because these are not by nature pleasant, but the lovers of what is noble find pleasant the things that are by nature pleasant; and virtuous actions are such, so that these are pleasant for such men as well as in their own nature. Their life, therefore, has no further need of pleasure as a sort of adventitious charm, but has its pleasure in itself. For, besides what we have said, the man who does not rejoice in noble actions is not even good; since no one would call a man just who did not enjoy acting justly, nor any man liberal who did not enjoy liberal actions; and similarly in all other cases. If this is so, virtuous actions must be in themselves pleasant. But they are also good and noble and have each of these attributes in the highest degree, since the good man judges well about these attributes; his judgement is such as we have described. Happiness then is the best, noblest, and most pleasant thing in the world, and these attributes are not severed as in the inscription at Delos-

Most noble is that which is justest, and best is health;

But pleasantest is it to win what we love.

For all these properties belong to the best activities; and these, or one- the best- of these, we identify with happiness.

Yet evidently, as we said, it needs the external goods as well; for it is impossible, or not easy, to do noble acts without the proper equipment. In many actions we use friends and riches and political power as instruments; and there are some things the lack of which takes the lustre from happiness, as good birth, goodly children, beauty; for the man who is very ugly in appearance or ill-born or solitary and childless is not very likely to be happy, and perhaps a man would be still less likely if he had thoroughly bad children or friends or had lost good children or friends by death. As we said, then, happiness seems to need this sort of prosperity in addition; for which reason some identify happiness with good fortune, though others identify it with virtue.

9

For this reason also the question is asked whether happiness is to be acquired by learning or by habituation or some other sort of training or comes in virtue of some divine providence or again by chance. Now if there is any gift of the gods to men, it is reasonable that happiness should be god-given, and most surely god-given of all human things inasmuch as it is the best. But this question would perhaps be more appropriate to another inquiry; happiness seems, however, even if it is not god-sent but comes as a result of virtue and some process of learning or training, to be among the most godlike things; for that which is the prize and end of virtue seems to be the best thing in the world, and something godlike and blessed.

It will also on this view be very generally shared; for all who are not maimed as regards their potentiality for virtue may win it by a certain kind of study and care. But if it is better to be happy thus than by chance, it is reasonable that the facts should be so, since everything that depends on the action of nature is by nature as good as it can be, and similarly everything that depends on art or any rational cause, and especially if it depends on the best of all causes. To entrust to chance what is greatest and most noble would be a very defective arrangement.

The answer to the question we are asking is plain also from the definition of happiness; for it has been said to be a virtuous activity of soul, of a certain kind. Of the remaining goods, some must necessarily pre-exist as conditions of happiness, and others are naturally co-operative and useful as instruments. And this will be found to agree with what we said at the outset; for we stated the end of political science to be the best end, and political science spends most of its pains on making the citizens to be of a certain character, viz. good and capable of noble acts.

It is natural, then, that we call neither ox nor horse nor any other of the animals happy; for none of them is capable of sharing in such activity. For this reason also a boy is not happy; for he is not yet capable of such acts, owing to his age; and boys who are called happy are being congratulated by reason of the hopes we have for them. For there is required, as we said, not only complete virtue but also a complete life, since many changes occur in life, and all manner of chances, and the most prosperous may fall into great misfortunes in old age, as is told of Priam in the Trojan Cycle; and one who has experienced such chances and has ended wretchedly no one calls happy.

10

Must no one at all, then, be called happy while he lives; must we, as Solon says, see the end? Even if we are to lay down this doctrine, is it also the case that a man is happy when he is dead? Or is not this quite absurd, especially for us who say that happiness is an activity? But if we do not call the dead man happy, and if Solon does not mean this, but that one can then safely call a man blessed as being at last beyond evils and misfortunes, this also affords matter for discussion; for both evil and good are thought to exist for a dead man, as much as for one who is alive but not aware of them; e.g. honors and dishonors and the good or bad fortunes of children and in general of descendants. And this also presents a problem; for though a man has lived happily up to old age and has had a death worthy of his life, many reverses may befall his descendants- some of them may be good and attain the life they deserve, while with others the opposite may be the case; and clearly too the degrees of relationship between them and their ancestors may vary indefinitely. It would be odd, then, if the dead man were to share in these changes and become at one time happy, at another wretched; while it would also be odd if the fortunes of the descendants did not for some time have some effect on the happiness of their ancestors.

But we must return to our first difficulty; for perhaps by a consideration of it our present problem might be solved. Now if we must see the end and only then call a man happy, not as being happy but as having been so before, surely this is a paradox, that when he is happy the attribute that belongs to him is not to be truly predicated of him because we do not wish to call living men happy, on account of the changes that may befall them, and because we have assumed happiness to be something permanent and by no means easily changed, while a single man may suffer many turns of fortune's wheel. For clearly if we were to keep pace with his fortunes, we should often call the same man happy and again wretched, making the happy man out to be chameleon and insecurely based. Or is this keeping pace with his fortunes quite wrong? Success or failure in life does not depend on these, but human life, as we said, needs these as mere additions, while virtuous activities or their opposites are what constitute happiness or the reverse.

The question we have now discussed confirms our definition. For no function of man has so much permanence as virtuous activities (these are thought to be more durable even than knowledge of the sciences), and of these themselves the most valuable are more durable because those who are happy spend their life most readily and most continuously in these; for this seems to be the reason why we do not forget them. The attribute in question, then, will belong to the happy man, and he will be happy throughout his life; for always, or by preference to everything else, he will be engaged in virtuous action and contemplation, and he will bear the chances of life most nobly and altogether decorously, if he is 'truly good' and 'foursquare beyond reproach'.

Now many events happen by chance, and events differing in importance; small pieces of good fortune or of its opposite clearly do not weigh down the scales of life one way or the other, but a multitude of great events if they turn out well will make life happier (for not only are they themselves such as to add beauty to life, but the way a man deals with them may be noble and good), while if they turn out ill they crush and maim happiness; for they both bring pain with them and hinder many activities. Yet even in these nobility shines through, when a man bears with resignation many great misfortunes, not through insensibility to pain but through nobility and greatness of soul.

If activities are, as we said, what gives life its character, no happy man can become miserable; for he will never do the acts that are hateful and mean. For the man who is truly good and wise, we think, bears all the chances life becomingly and always makes the best of circumstances, as a good general makes the best military use of the army at his command and a good shoemaker makes the best shoes out of the hides that are given him; and so with all other craftsmen. And if this is the case, the happy man can never become miserable; though he will not reach blessedness, if he meet with fortunes like those of Priam.