On The Soul - Aristotle E-Book

Aristotle

• Herausgeber: Lebooks Editora
• Kategorie: Bildung
• Sprache: Englisch
• Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2024

Beschreibung

Aristotle (384 BC–322 BC) was an important Greek philosopher, one of the most influential thinkers in Western culture, having been a disciple of the philosopher Plato. Aristotle developed a comprehensive philosophical system in which he pondered practically all existing subjects, such as geometry, physics, metaphysics, botany, zoology, astronomy, medicine, psychology, ethics, drama, poetry, rhetoric, mathematics, and logic. "On the Soul" (in Latin, De Anima) is a text by the Greek philosopher Aristotle of Stagira, composed of three books, and there are no doubts about the authenticity of the work. In "On the Soul," Aristotle's objective is to analyze the main problems concerning the soul, which is the vital principle of every living being. Book I consists of an introduction and contextualization of the theme; Book II presents analyses on the relationship between soul and body, the faculties of the soul, nutrition, and sensation; in Book III, Aristotle discusses imagination and thought, as well as the relations between sensation and intellect. It is also in this treatise, specifically in Book III, that the philosopher presents his influential theory of active intellect and passive intellect.

Leseprobe

Aristotle

ON THE SOUL

Original Title:

“Περὶ ψυχῆς”

Contents

INTRODUCTION

BOOK 1

BOOK 2

BOOK 3

INTRODUCTION

Aristotle

(384 B.C – 322 B.C)

About the author

Aristotle was an important Greek philosopher, one of the most influential thinkers in Western culture. He was a disciple of the philosopher Plato. He developed a philosophical system in which he addressed and pondered on virtually all existing subjects, such as geometry, physics, metaphysics, botany, zoology, astronomy, medicine, psychology, ethics, drama, poetry, rhetoric, mathematics, and primarily logic.

Aristotle and Plato

Aristotle was born in Stagira, a colony of Ionian origin in Macedonia, Greece, in the year 384 BC. Son of Nicomachus, physician to King Amyntas III, he received a solid education in Natural Sciences. At the age of 17, he went to Athens to study at Plato's "Academy." With his prodigious intelligence, he soon became the favorite disciple of the master, who remarked, "My Academy consists of two parts: the body of the students and the mind of Aristotle."

Aristotle was critical enough to go beyond the master. He demonstrated his great capacity as a thinker by writing a series of works in which he deepened, and often modified, Plato's doctrines. Aristotle's theory, in general, is a refutation of his master's. While Plato favored the existence of the world of ideas and the sensible world, Aristotle argued that we could acquire knowledge in the very world we live in.

When Plato died in 347 BC, Aristotle had spent twenty years at the Academy, initially as a student and later as a teacher, and hoped to be the natural successor to his master's leadership of the school. However, he was rejected for being considered a foreigner. Disappointed, he left Athens and went to Atarneus in Asia Minor, where he became a state advisor to his former colleague, the political philosopher Hermias. He married Pythias, Hermias' adopted daughter, but clashed with his colleague's thirst for wealth, in contrast to his ideals of justice. When the Persians invaded the country and crucified its ruler, once again Aristotle found himself without a homeland.

Alexander the Great

Back in Macedonia in 343 BC, when King Philip II of Macedonia called him to tutor his son Alexander. The king wanted his successor to be a refined philosopher. Aristotle remained with Alexander for four years. The soldier went on to conquer the world, and the philosopher became his friend and continued to impart wisdom to him.

The Lyceum

Returning to Athens in 335 BC, Aristotle decided to found his own school, which he called the "Lyceum," located in the gymnasium of the temple dedicated to the god Apollo Lyceus. In addition to technical courses for disciples, he taught public lectures for the general populace. Aristotle's wisdom has come down to us through some writings, which represent in themselves an entire encyclopedia, as they contain practically the beginnings of all our modern arts and sciences.

Aristotle was the father of Logic: he taught all who came after him to think clearly. He was the founder of Biology: he taught the world how to observe and correctly classify living beings. He was the organizer of Psychology: he showed humanity how to study the soul scientifically. He was the master of Ethics: he demonstrated how it is possible to love and hate rationally. He was a teacher of Politics: he taught rulers to govern with justice. And he gave rise to Rhetoric: he was the first to demonstrate the art of writing efficiently.

Philosophy

Aristotle's philosophy encompasses the nature of God (Metaphysics), of man (Ethics), and of the State (Politics). For Aristotle, God is not the creator but the mover of the Universe, or still, the unmoved mover of the world. Except for God, any and every other source of movement in the world, be it a person, a thing, or a thought, is a moved mover. Thus, the plow moves the earth, the hand moves the plow, the brain moves the hand. Therefore, the cause of all movement is the result of another movement.

For Aristotle, if to be happy it is necessary to do good to others, then man is a social being and, more precisely, a political being. Indeed, it is up to the State to "ensure the well-being and happiness of its subjects." He considered dictatorship the worst form of government: "it is a regime that subordinates the interests of all to the ambitions of one." "The most desirable form of government is the one that allows each man to exercise his best abilities and live his days most pleasantly."

Death

Aristotle's end was tragic. When the king of Macedonia, Alexander the Great, died, a great outburst of hatred erupted in Athens, not only against the conqueror but against all his admirers and friends. One of Alexander's best friends was Aristotle. He was about to be arrested when he managed to escape in time. He left Athens, saying that he would not give the city the opportunity to commit a second crime against philosophy. Shortly after the self-imposed exile, he fell ill. Disillusioned with the ingratitude of the Athenians, he decided to end his life by drinking, like Socrates, a cup of hemlock.

Aristotle died in 322 BC, in Chalcis, Euboea. In his will, he ordered the liberation of his slaves. Perhaps this was the first emancipation decree in history.

About the work

"On the Soul" (in Latin, De Anima) is a text by the Greek philosopher Aristotle of Stagira, composed of three books, and there are no doubts about the authenticity of the work. In "On the Soul," Aristotle's objective is to analyze the main problems concerning the soul, which is the vital principle of every living being.

Book I consists of an introduction and contextualization of the theme; Book II presents analyses on the relationship between soul and body, the faculties of the soul, nutrition, and sensation; in Book III, Aristotle discusses imagination and thought, as well as the relations between sensation and intellect.

According to the philosopher: "Considering knowledge to be among the most beautiful and valuable things, some more arduous than others, either because of their greater rigor or because they relate to more beautiful and noble things, we have decided, due to these two very causes, to consider all investigation concerning the soul as fundamentally important."

It is also in this treatise, specifically in Book III, that the philosopher presents his influential theory of active intellect and passive intellect.

From Greek thought to modernity, it is possible to see many Western thinkers who have strived to define the Soul and even classify it according to its characteristics and attributes. Aristotle himself, in the second part of Book I of the cited work, lists several Western philosophers, pointing out contradictions and trying, based on what has already been said on the subject, to construct his arguments. In contrast to Eastern understanding, a considerable portion of Westerners used to classify entities as constituting distinct souls (one for each being); despite this convergence, Book I of the analyzed work also enumerates differences, separating Westerners into three groups: (a) those who defined the Soul based on movement, (b) those who defined it based on the potentiality of knowledge and the distinction between animate and inanimate beings, and (c) those who judged the Soul as a massless entity that infuses matter.

These attempts basically pursue the same objective, which can be summarized by the Delphic maxim: "Know thyself." All these thinkers realized that there seems to be something universally responsible for life, for propelling movement, and for the aggregation and disaggregation of matter into various forms, for otherwise beings would not exist, and everything would be amorphous. The word "animation" derives from "Anima," which is the Soul; this "spark of life," due to its universal and therefore metaphysical character, cannot be demonstrated mathematically and cannot be reproduced experimentally at will like any natural phenomenon, that is, it cannot be assessed with absolute certainty.

Even amidst these enormous incongruences, philosophers did not give up on addressing the subject. Aristotle asserted, even in the face of these complications, that it is possible to say some things about the Soul and, moreover, with a good level of certainty; according to him, reflecting on animate beings is necessary, it is a common principle, and the results arising from this Metaphysical construction can contribute to a better understanding of the life surrounding man and also of himself, thus making the Delphic assertion valid.

ON THE SOUL

BOOK 1

Chapter 1

Holding as we do that, while knowledge of any kind is a thing to be honored and prized, one kind of it may, either by reason of its greater exactness or of a higher dignity and greater wonderfulness in its objects, be more honorable and precious than another, on both accounts we should naturally be led to place in the front rank the study of the soul. The knowledge of the soul admittedly contributes greatly to the advance of truth in general, and, above all, to our understanding of Nature, for the soul is in some sense the principle of animal life. Our aim is to grasp and understand, first its essential nature, and secondly its properties; of these some are taught to be affections proper to the soul itself, while others are considered to attach to the animal owing to the presence within it of soul.

To attain any assured knowledge about the soul is one of the most difficult things in the world. As the form of question which here presents itself, viz. the question ‘What is it?’, recurs in other fields, it might be supposed that there was some single method of inquiry applicable to all objects whose essential nature (as we are endeavoring to ascertain there is for derived properties the single method of demonstration); in that case what we should have to seek for would be this unique method. But if there is no such single and general method for solving the question of essence, our task becomes still more difficult; in the case of each different subject we shall have to determine the appropriate process of investigation. If to this there be a clear answer, e.g. that the process is demonstration or division, or some known method, difficulties and hesitations still beset us-with what facts shall we begin the inquiry? For the facts which form the starting-points in different subjects must be different, as e.g. in the case of numbers and surfaces.

First, no doubt, it is necessary to determine in which of the summa genera soul lies, what it is; is it ‘a this-somewhat, ‘a substance, or is it a quale or a quantum, or some other of the remaining kinds of predicates which we have distinguished? Further, does soul belong to the class of potential existents, or is it not rather an actuality? Our answer to this question is of the greatest importance.

We must consider also whether soul is divisible or is without parts, and whether it is everywhere homogeneous or not; and if not homogeneous, whether its various forms are different specifically or generically: up to the present time those who have discussed and investigated soul seem to have confined themselves to the human soul. We must be careful not to ignore the question whether soul can be defined in a single unambiguous formula, as is the case with animal, or whether we must not give a separate formula for each of it, as we do for horse, dog, man, god (in the latter case the ‘universal’ animal-and so too every other ‘common predicate’-being treated either as nothing at all or as a later product). Further, if what exists is not a plurality of souls, but a plurality of parts of one soul, which ought we to investigate first, the whole soul or its parts? (It is also a difficult problem to decide which of these parts are in nature distinct from one another.) Again, which ought we to investigate first, these parts or their functions, mind or thinking, the faculty or the act of sensation, and so on? If the investigation of the functions precedes that of the parts, the further question suggests itself: ought we not before either to consider the correlative objects, e.g. of sense or thought? It seems not only useful for the discovery of the causes of the derived properties of substances to be acquainted with the essential nature of those substances (as in mathematics it is useful for the understanding of the property of the equality of the interior angles of a triangle to two right angles to know the essential nature of the straight and the curved or of the line and the plane) but also conversely, for the knowledge of the essential nature of a substance is largely promoted by an acquaintance with its properties: for, when we are able to give an account conformable to experience of all or most of the properties of a substance, we shall be in the most favorable position to say something worth saying about the essential nature of that subject; in all demonstration a definition of the essence is required as a starting-point, so that definitions which do not enable us to discover the derived properties, or which fail to facilitate even a conjecture about them, must obviously, one and all, be dialectical and futile.

A further problem presented by the affections of soul is this: are they all affections of the complex of body and soul, or is there any one among them peculiar to the soul by itself? To determine this is indispensable but difficult. If we consider the majority of them, there seems to be no case in which the soul can act or be acted upon without involving the body; e.g. anger, courage, appetite, and sensation generally. Thinking seems the most probable exception; but if this too proves to be a form of imagination or to be impossible without imagination, it too requires a body as a condition of its existence. If there is any way of acting or being acted upon proper to soul, soul will be capable of separate existence; if there is none, its separate existence is impossible. In the latter case, it will be like what is straight, which has many properties arising from the straightness in it, e.g. that of touching a bronze sphere at a point, though straightness divorced from the other constituents of the straight thing cannot touch it in this way; it cannot be so divorced at all, since it is always found in a body. It therefore seems that all the affections of soul involve a body-passion, gentleness, fear, pity, courage, joy, loving, and hating; in all these there is a concurrent affection of the body. In support of this we may point to the fact that, while sometimes on the occasion of violent and striking occurrences there is no excitement or fear felt, on others faint and feeble stimulations produce these emotions, viz. when the body is already in a state of tension resembling its condition when we are angry. Here is a still clearer case: in the absence of any external cause of terror we find ourselves experiencing the feelings of a man in terror. From all this it is obvious that the affections of soul are enmattered formulable essences.

Consequently, their definitions ought to correspond, e.g. anger should be defined as a certain mode of movement of such and such a body (or part or faculty of a body) by this or that cause and for this or that end. That is precisely why the study of the soul must fall within the science of Nature, at least so far as in its affections it manifests this double character. Hence a physicist would define an affection of soul differently from a dialectician; the latter would define e.g. anger as the appetite for returning pain for pain, or something like that, while the former would define it as a boiling of the blood or warm substance surround the heart. The latter assigns the material conditions, the former the form or formulable essence; for what he states is the formulable essence of the fact, though for its actual existence there must be embodiment of it in a material such as is described by the other. Thus the essence of a house is assigned in such a formula as ‘a shelter against destruction by wind, rain, and heat’; the physicist would describe it as ‘stones, bricks, and timbers’; but there is a third possible description which would say that it was that form in that material with that purpose or end. Which, then, among these is entitled to be regarded as the genuine physicist? The one who confines himself to the material, or the one who restricts himself to the formulable essence alone? Is it not rather the one who combines both in a single formula? If this is so, how are we to characterize the other two? Must we not say that there is no type of thinker who concerns himself with those qualities or attributes of the material which are in fact inseparable from the material, and without attempting even in thought to separate them?

The physicist is he who concerns himself with all the properties active and passive of bodies or materials thus or thus defined; attributes not considered as being of this character he leaves to others, in certain cases it may be to a specialist, e.g. a carpenter or a physician, in others (a) where they are inseparable in fact, but are separable from any particular kind of body by an effort of abstraction, to the mathematician, (b) where they are separate both in fact and in thought from body altogether, to the First Philosopher or metaphysician. But we must return from this digression, and repeat that the affections of soul are inseparable from the material substratum of animal life, to which we have seen that such affections, e.g. passion and fear, attach, and have not the same mode of being as a line or a plane.

Chapter 2

For our study of soul, it is necessary, while formulating the problems of which in our further advance we are to find the solutions, to call into council the views of those of our predecessors who have declared any opinion on this subject, in order that we may profit by whatever is sound in their suggestions and avoid their errors.

The starting-point of our inquiry is an exposition of those characteristics which have chiefly been held to belong to soul in its very nature. Two characteristic marks have above all others been recognized as distinguishing that which has soul in it from that which has not-movement and sensation.

It may be said that these two are what our predecessors have fixed upon as characteristic of soul.

Some say that what originates movement is both pre-eminently and primarily soul; believing that what is not itself moved cannot originate movement in another, they arrived at the view that soul belongs to the class of things in movement. This is what led Democritus to say that soul is a sort of fire or hot substance; his ‘forms’ or atoms are infinite in number; those which are spherical he calls fire and soul, and compares them to the motes in the air which we see in shafts of light coming through windows; the mixture of seeds of all sorts he calls the elements of the whole of Nature (Leucippus gives a similar account); the spherical atoms are identified with soul because atoms of that shape are most adapted to permeate everywhere, and to set all the others moving by being themselves in movement. This implies the view that soul is identical with what produces movement in animals. That is why, further, they regard respiration as the characteristic mark of life; as the environment compresses the bodies of animals, and tends to extrude those atoms which impart movement to them, because they themselves are never at rest, there must be a reinforcement of these by similar atoms coming in from without in the act of respiration; for they prevent the extrusion of those which are already within by counteracting the compressing and consolidating force of the environment; and animals continue to live only so long as they are able to maintain this resistance.