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Beschreibung

Despite the fact that the Civil War began over 150 years ago, it remains one of the most widely discussed topics in America today, with Americans arguing over its causes, reenacting its famous battles, and debating which general was better than others. Americans continue to be fascinated by the Civil War icons who made the difference between victory and defeat in the war's great battles.


The most famous attack of the Civil War was also one of its most fateful and fatal. Pickett’s Charge, the climactic assault on the final day of the Battle of Gettysburg, has become the American version of the Charge of the Light Brigade, and it is one of the most famous events of the entire Civil War.


Having been unable to break the Army of the Potomac’s lines on the left and right flank during Day 2 of the Battle of Gettysburg, Confederate Army of Northern Virginia commander Robert E. Lee decided to make a thrust at the center of the Union’s line with about 15,000 men spread out over three divisions. The charge required marching across an open field for about a mile, with the Union artillery holding high ground on all sides of the incoming Confederates.


Though it is now known as Pickett’s Charge, named after division commander George Pickett, the assignment for the charge was given to General James Longstreet, whose 1st Corps included Pickett’s division. Longstreet had serious misgivings about Lee’s plan and tried futilely to talk him out of it. Longstreet later wrote that he said to his commander, “General Lee, I have been a soldier all my life.  It is my opinion that no fifteen thousand men ever arrayed for battle can take that position.”


Aware of the insanity of sending 15,000 men hurtling into all the Union artillery, Lee planned to use the Confederate artillery to try to knock out the Union artillery ahead of time. Although old friend William Pendleton was the artillery chief, the artillery cannonade would be supervised by Edward Porter Alexander, Longstreet’s chief artillerist, who would have to give the go-ahead to the charging infantry because they were falling under Longstreet’s command. Alexander later noted that Longstreet was so disturbed and dejected about ordering the attack that at one point he tried to make Alexander order the infantry forward, essentially doing Longstreet’s dirty work for him.


Although the Chattanooga Campaign was months long and involved several battles, it has become mostly remembered for the Battle of Missionary Ridge, one of the most remarkable and successful charges of the war. As Thomas’s men reached the base of the Missionary Ridge, they found that it had not afforded them protection from the Confederate defenders in their front. As a result, they began making impromptu charges up the hill, in defiance of Grant’s orders, since Grant had only ordered them to take the rifle pits at the base of Missionary Ridge and believed that a frontal assault on that position would be futile and fatal. As the Union soldiers stormed ahead, General Grant caught the advance from a distance and asked General Thomas why he had ordered the attack.  Thomas informed Grant that he hadn’t; his army had taken it upon itself to charge up the entire ridge. To the amazement of everyone watching, the Union soldiers scrambled up Missionary Ridge in a series of uncoordinated and disorganized attacks that somehow managed to send the Confederates into a rout, thereby lifting the siege on Chattanooga. While Pickett’s Charge, still the most famous attack of the war, was one unsuccessful charge, the Army of the Cumberland made over a dozen charges up Missionary Ridge and ultimately succeeded.

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Pickett’s Charge and Missionary Ridge: The American Civil War’s Most Famous Charges

By Charles River Editors

The Union Line facing Pickett’s Charge, Gettysburg National Battlefield

About Charles River Editors

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Introduction

Pickett’s Charge

Despite the fact that the Civil War began over 150 years ago, it remains one of the most widely discussed topics in America today, with Americans arguing over its causes, reenacting its famous battles, and debating which general was better than others. Americans continue to be fascinated by the Civil War icons who made the difference between victory and defeat in the war's great battles.

The most famous attack of the Civil War was also one of its most fateful and fatal. Pickett’s Charge, the climactic assault on the final day of the Battle of Gettysburg, has become the American version of the Charge of the Light Brigade, and it is one of the most famous events of the entire Civil War.

Having been unable to break the Army of the Potomac’s lines on the left and right flank during Day 2 of the Battle of Gettysburg, Confederate Army of Northern Virginia commander Robert E. Lee decided to make a thrust at the center of the Union’s line with about 15,000 men spread out over three divisions. The charge required marching across an open field for about a mile, with the Union artillery holding high ground on all sides of the incoming Confederates.

Though it is now known as Pickett’s Charge, named after division commander George Pickett, the assignment for the charge was given to General James Longstreet, whose 1st Corps included Pickett’s division. Longstreet had serious misgivings about Lee’s plan and tried futilely to talk him out of it. Longstreet later wrote that he said to his commander, “General Lee, I have been a soldier all my life. It is my opinion that no fifteen thousand men ever arrayed for battle can take that position.”

Aware of the insanity of sending 15,000 men hurtling into all the Union artillery, Lee planned to use the Confederate artillery to try to knock out the Union artillery ahead of time. Although old friend William Pendleton was the artillery chief, the artillery cannonade would be supervised by Edward Porter Alexander, Longstreet’s chief artillerist, who would have to give the go-ahead to the charging infantry because they were falling under Longstreet’s command. Alexander later noted that Longstreet was so disturbed and dejected about ordering the attack that at one point he tried to make Alexander order the infantry forward, essentially doing Longstreet’s dirty work for him.

Unfortunately for Porter Alexander and the Confederates, the sheer number of cannons belched so much smoke that they had trouble gauging how effective the shells were. As it turned out, most of the artillery was overshooting the target, landing in the rear of the Union line. Reluctant to order the charge, Longstreet commanded Porter Alexander to order the timing for the charge. As Longstreet and Alexander anticipated, the charge was an utter disaster, incurring a nearly 50% casualty rate and failing to break the Union line.

The Battle of Missionary Ridge (November 25, 1863)

Thure de Thulstrup’s Battle of Chattanooga shows Grant watching the Battle of Missionary Ridge

"When those fellows get started all hell can't stop them." – Union corps commander Gordon Granger during the Battle of Missionary Ridge

In late September 1863, the Confederates began laying siege to the Union Army of the Cumberland around Chattanooga in what would be their last gasp for supremacy in the West. Following the devastating Union defeat at the Battle of Chickamauga on September 20, the army and its shaken commander, General William S. Rosecrans, began digging in around the city and waiting for reinforcements to arrive. Meanwhile, the Confederate Army of Tennessee, under General Braxton Bragg, took the surrounding heights, including Missionary Ridge to the east and Lookout Mountain to the southwest, allowing them control over the vital rail and river supply lines needed by the Union forces in the city. Bragg planned to lay siege to the city and starve the Union forces into surrendering.

Having lost faith in Rosecrans after Chickamauga, Washington delegated Ulysses S. Grant with the task of lifting the siege by placing him in command of nearly the entire theater. Grant replaced Rosecrans with George H. Thomas, who had saved the army at Chickamauga, and ordered him to "hold Chattanooga at all hazards.” Thomas replied, "We will hold the town till we starve.” Meanwhile, President Lincoln detached General Hooker and two divisions from the Army of the Potomac and sent them west to reinforce the garrison at Chattanooga.

What followed were some of the most remarkable operations of the entire Civil War. Hooker and his reinforcements helped open up a vital supply line known as the “cracker line”, effectively ensuring that enough supplies could reach Knoxville. With that, preparations turned to a pitched battle between the two sides, and in a series of actions in late November, Grant sought to lift the siege and drive back Bragg’s Confederate army by attacking their positions on high ground.

Although the Chattanooga Campaign was months long and involved several battles, it has become mostly remembered for the Battle of Missionary Ridge, one of the most remarkable and successful charges of the war. As Thomas’s men reached the base of the Missionary Ridge, they found that it had not afforded them protection from the Confederate defenders in their front. As a result, they began making impromptu charges up the hill, in defiance of Grant’s orders, since Grant had only ordered them to take the rifle pits at the base of Missionary Ridge and believed that a frontal assault on that position would be futile and fatal. As the Union soldiers stormed ahead, General Grant caught the advance from a distance and asked General Thomas why he had ordered the attack. Thomas informed Grant that he hadn’t; his army had taken it upon itself to charge up the entire ridge. To the amazement of everyone watching, the Union soldiers scrambled up Missionary Ridge in a series of uncoordinated and disorganized attacks that somehow managed to send the Confederates into a rout, thereby lifting the siege on Chattanooga. While Pickett’s Charge, still the most famous attack of the war, was one unsuccessful charge, the Army of the Cumberland made over a dozen charges up Missionary Ridge and ultimately succeeded.

Pickett’s Charge and Missionary Ridge: The American Civil War’s Most Famous Charges profiles the history, context, and command decisions that all culminated in the most famous charges in American history. It also includes analysis of what went right and wrong, as well as what the major participants wrote about the charges. Along with maps and pictures of important people and places, you will learn about Pickett’s Charge and Missionary Ridge like you never have before.

Pickett’s Charge and Missionary Ridge: The American Civil War’s Most Famous Charges

About Charles River Editors

Introduction

The Chancellorsville Campaign

July 1, 1863

July 2, 1863

The Plan for Pickett’s Charge

The High Water Mark of the Confederacy

Chickamauga and the Siege of Chattanooga

Union Reorganization

Preparing for Battle

Lookout Mountain

The Battle of Missionary Ridge

The Aftermath of Missionary Ridge

Further Reading

The Chancellorsville Campaign

The Battle of Gettysburg is rightly remembered as being one of the Civil War’s pivotal events, but it has taken on such a reputation as the war’s biggest battle and crucial turning point that it is often viewed out of the context of the rest of the war. Regardless of whether some historians and others interested in the Civil War attach too much significance to it, Gettysburg was not fought in a vacuum, and the major battle that immediately preceded it had a great effect on some of the leading generals’ decisions in Pennsylvania.

At the start of 1863, Confederate general Robert E. Lee had concluded an incredibly successful year for the Confederates in the East. Having taken command in June 1862, Lee led the Army of Northern Virginia to victory over George McClellan’s Army of the Potomac in front of Richmond in the Peninsula Campaign, decisively defeated John Pope’s Army of Virginia at the Second Battle of Bull Run, fought McClellan’s Army of the Potomac to a tactical draw (but strategic defeat) in Maryland at Antietam, and inflicted a decisive defeat on Burnside’s Army of the Potomac at Fredericksburg.

Lee

However, entering 1863 the Confederacy was still struggling. The Confederate forces in the West had failed to win a major battle, suffering defeat at places like Shiloh in Tennessee and across the Mississippi River. As the war continued into 1863, the southern economy continued to deteriorate. Southern armies were suffering serious deficiencies of nearly all supplies as the Union blockade continued to be effective as stopping most international commerce with the Confederacy. Moreover, the prospect of Great Britain or France recognizing the Confederacy had been all but eliminated by Lincoln issuing the Emancipation Proclamation in the wake of Antietam.

Given the unlikelihood of forcing the North’s capitulation, the Confederacy's main hope for victory was to win some decisive victory or hope that Abraham Lincoln would lose his reelection bid in 1864, and that the new president would want to negotiate peace with the Confederacy. Understandably, this colored Confederate war strategy, and unquestionably Lee’s.

After the Confederate victory at Fredericksburg in December 1862, Lee dispatched I Corps commander James Longstreet and his corps back to the Virginia Peninsula to protect Richmond and gather food and other much-needed supplies. In May of 1863, General Lee ordered Longstreet to rejoin his Army of Northern Virginia in time for a potential battle, but Longstreet’s men would not reach Chancellorsville in time.

Longstreet

After the Fredericksburg debacle and the “Mud March” fiasco that left a Union advance literally dead in its tracks, Lincoln fired Ambrose Burnside and replaced him with “Fighting Joe” Hooker. Hooker had gotten his nickname from a clerical error in a newspaper’s description of fighting, but the nickname stuck, and Lee would later playfully refer to him as F.J. Hooker. Hooker had stood out for his zealous fighting at Antietam, and the battle may very well have turned out differently if he hadn’t been injured at the head of the I Corps. Now he was in command of a 100,000 man Army of the Potomac, and he devised a complex plan to cross the Rappahannock River with part of his force near Fredericksburg to pin down Lee while using the other bulk to turn Lee’s left, which would allow his forces to reach the Confederate rear.

Hooker’s plan initially worked perfectly, with the division of his army surprising Lee. Lee was outnumbered two to one and now had to worry about threats on two fronts. Incredibly, Lee once again decided to divide his forces in the face of the enemy, sending Stonewall Jackson to turn the Union army’s right flank while the rest of the army maintained positions near Fredericksburg. The Battle of Chancellorsville is one of the most famous of the Civil War, and the most famous part of the battle was Stonewall Jackson’s daring march across the Army of the Potomac’s flank, surprising the XI Corps with an attack on May 2, 1863. Having ignored warnings of Jackson’s march, the XI Corps was quickly routed.

The surprise was a costly success however. Jackson scouted out ahead of his lines later that night and was mistakenly fired upon by his own men, badly wounding him. Jackson’s natural replacement, A.P. Hill, was also injured. Bypassing the next most-senior infantry general in the corps, Brig. General Robert E. Rodes directed famed cavalry leader JEB Stuart to take temporary command of the II Corps, a decision Lee seconded when news reached him. Although this change in command effectively ended the flanking attack underway, Stuart proved to be a remarkably adaptive leader and very effective infantry commander, launching a successful, well-coordinated assault against the Union right flank at Chancellorsville the following day. Meanwhile, on the other flank, the Confederates evacuated from Fredericksburg but ultimately held the line. Hooker began to lose his nerve, and he was injured during the battle when a cannonball nearly killed him. Historians now believe that Hooker may have commanded part of the battle while suffering from a concussion.

Stuart

On May 4, as Hooker abandoned the high ground at Hazel Grove in favor of Fairview, Stuart showed particular acumen by immediately taking control of the position and ordering thirty pieces of artillery to bombard the Union positions, not only forcing General Hooker’s troops from Fairview (which Stuart then captured for the Confederacy), but essentially decimating the Union lines while destroying Hooker’s headquarters at Chancellor House. Of this well-played turn of events, Stuart wrote: “As the sun lifted the mist that shrouded the field, it was discovered that the ridge on the extreme right was a fine position for concentrating artillery. I immediately ordered thirty pieces to that point, and, under the happy effects of the battalion system, it was done quickly. The effect of this fire upon the enemy's batteries was superb."1 Stuart’s effective utilization of a mere 20,000 men to snatch victory from a Union force numbering over 80,000 prompted Confederate General Porter Alexander to comment, "Altogether, I do not think there was a more brilliant thing done in the war than Stuart's extricating that command from the extremely critical position in which he found it."2

From May 5-6, Hooker began the delicate process of withdrawing his army. George Meade would later privately claim in a letter to his wife, “Hooker never lost his head, nor did he ever allow himself to be influenced by me or my advice. The objection I have to Hooker is that he did not and would not listen to those around him; that he acted deliberately on his own judgment, and in doing so, committed, as I think, fatal errors. If he had lost his head, and I had been placed in command, you may rest assured a very different result would have been arrived at, whether better or worse for us cannot be told now.” Unbeknownst to Meade at the time, he would soon be given his chance.

Meade

By the end of the battle, the Army of the Potomac had once again been defeated, retreating across the river. But Lee would also lose his “right hand”. Jackson had been shot multiple times, twice in the left arm. After being painfully carried back behind the Confederate lines, Jackson had his left arm amputated, after which he was transported to Thomas C. Chandler's plantation, well behind the battle lines, to convalesce. He seemed to be recovering, and his wife and newborn daughter joined him at the plantation, but his doctors were unaware Jackson was exhibiting common symptoms that indicated oncoming pneumonia. Jackson would die on May 10, 1863.

Jackson

Chancellorsville was one of the most stunning battles of the Civil War, and not surprisingly there were some serious shakeups in its aftermath as generals pointed the fingers at each other. Hooker had a list of scapegoats, including XI Corps commander Oliver O. Howard, cavalry leader George Stoneman, and General Sedgwick of the VI Corps. Of course, just as many blamed Hooker, including II Corps commander Darius N. Couch, who was so disgusted with Hooker’s battle performance that he subsequently transferred out of the Army of the Potomac in protest and headed back to Pennsylvania to lead the state militia. This left Winfield Scott Hancock as the new commander of the II Corps.

Hancock

On May 10, 1863, as Stonewall Jackson lay dying, Meade wrote to his wife, “There is a great deal of talking in the camp, and I see the press is beginning to attack Hooker. I think these last operations have shaken the confidence of the army in Hooker's judgment, particularly among the superior officers. I have been much gratified at the frequent expression of opinion that I ought to be placed in command. Three of my seniors (Couch, Slocum and Sedgwick) have sent me word that they were willing to serve under me. Couch, I hear, told the President he would not serve any longer under Hooker, and recommended my assignment to the command. I mention all this confidentially. I do not attach any importance to it, and do not believe there is the slightest probability of my being placed in command.”

In the weeks after the battle, General Hooker had a special plan for the II Corps. Unbeknownst to Hancock at this time, in Hooker’s desire to draw General Lee out into the open and away from his entrenchments, Hooker began intentionally isolating Hancock’s corps away from the rest of the Union army whenever possible. Having taken an assessment of Lee’s troop strength and commanding style, Hooker had become convinced that it would be difficult --virtually impossible --to force Lee to take the offensive unless “good opportunity were offered.” Thus, he planned to use Hancock’s II Corps as bait.

Considering the distance Lee would have to move his troops to attack the isolated Hancock, Hooker figured he couldn’t do so with more than a small complement, and he was certain that Hancock could whip a portion of the Confederate Army under Lee’s command. As long as Hooker maintained close communication, he could bring up reinforcements at least as rapidly as the enemy, thus increasing his chances of forcing Lee into an open-field confrontation. By May 22, 1863, Lee had still not taken the bait. As the North was about to discover, Lee had a completely different plan in mind.

In the spring of 1863, General Lee discovered that McClellan had known of his plans and was able to force a battle at Antietam before all of General Lee's forces had arrived. General Lee now believed that he could successfully invade the North again, and that his defeat before was due in great measure to a stroke of bad luck. In addition, General Lee hoped to supply his army on the unscathed fields and towns of the North, while giving war ravaged northern Virginia a rest.

After Chancellorsville, Longstreet and Lee met to discuss options for the Confederate Army's summer campaign. Longstreet advocated detachment of all or part of his corps to be sent to Tennessee, citing Union Maj. General Ulysses S. Grant’s advance on Vicksburg, the critical Confederate stronghold on the Mississippi River. Longstreet argued that a reinforced army under Bragg could defeat Rosecrans and drive toward the Ohio River, compelling Grant to release his hold on Vicksburg. Lee, however, was opposed to a division of his army and instead advocated a large-scale offensive into Pennsylvania. In addition, General Lee hoped to supply his army on the unscathed fields and towns of the North, while giving war ravaged northern Virginia a rest.

Knowing that victories on Virginia soil meant little to an enemy that could simply retreat, regroup, and then return with more men and more advanced equipment, Lee set his sights on a Northern invasion, aiming to turn Northern opinion against the war and against President Lincoln. With his men already half-starved from dwindling provisions, Lee intended to confiscate food, horses, and equipment as they pushed north, and hopefully influence Northern politicians into giving up their support of the war by penetrating into Harrisburg or even Philadelphia. Given the right circumstances, Lee's army might even be able to capture either Baltimore or Philadelphia and use the city as leverage in peace negotiations.

Although the Confederate Army had won the Battle at Chancellorsville, the loss of Stonewall Jackson not only diminished the victory but caused a general malaise to befall his men, as well as General Lee. But more importantly Jackson’s death forced Lee to reorganize his army, creating three Corps out of the previous two by having A.P. Hill and Richard S. Ewell “replacing” Stonewall. Hill had been a successful division commander, but he was constantly battling bouts of sickness that left him disabled, which sure enough played a crucial role in Pickett’s Charge. Ewell had distinguished himself during the Peninsula Campaign but suffered a serious injury there that historians often credit as making him more cautious in command upon his return.

Hill

During the first weeks of summer of 1863, as JEB Stuart screened the army and completed several well-executed offensives against Union cavalry, many historians think it likely that he had already planned to remove the negative effect of the recent cavalry battle at Brandy Station by duplicating one of his now famous circumnavigating rides around the enemy army. But as Lee began his march north through the Shenandoah Valley in western Virginia, it is highly unlikely that is what he wanted or expected. Before setting out on June 22, the methodical Lee gave Stuart specific instructions as to the role he was to play in the Pennsylvania offensive: as the “Eyes of the Army”, he was to guard the mountain passes with part of his force while the Army of Northern Virginia was still south of the Potomac River, and then cross the river with the remainder of his army and screen the right flank of General Ewell's Second Corps as it moved down the Shenandoah Valley, maintaining contact with Ewell's army as it advanced towards Harrisburg.

However, instead of taking the most direct route north near the Blue Ridge Mountains, Stuart chose a much more ambitious course of action. Stuart decided to march his three best brigades (under Generals Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee, and Col. John R. Chambliss) between the Union army and Washington, north through Rockville to Westminster, and then into Pennsylvania, a route that would allow them to capture supplies along the way and wreak havoc as they skirted Washington. In the aftermath, the Washington Star would write: “The cavalry chief [Stuart] interpreted his marching orders in a way that best suited his nature, and detached his 9000 troopers from their task of screening the main army and keeping tabs on the Federals. When Lee was in Pennsylvania anxiously looking for him, Stuart crossed the Potomac above Washington and captured a fine prize of Federal supply wagons . . . .”3

But to complicate matters even more, as Stuart set out on June 25 on what was probably a glory-seeking mission, he was unaware that his intended path was blocked by columns of Union infantry that would invariably force him to veer farther east than he or Lee had anticipated. Ultimately, his decision would prevent him from linking up with Ewell as ordered and deprive Lee of his primary cavalry force as he advanced deeper and deeper into unfamiliar enemy territory. As Halsey Wigfall, part of Stuart’s forces, noted, “Stuart and his cavalry left [Lee’s] army on June 24 and did not contact [his] army again until the afternoon of July 2, the second day of the [Gettysburg] battle.”4

According to Stuart’s own account, on June 29 his men clashed briefly with two companies of Union cavalry in Westminster, Maryland, overwhelming and chasing them “a long distance on the Baltimore road,” causing a "great panic" in the city of Baltimore. On June 30, the head of Stuart's column then encountered Union Brig. General Judson Kilpatrick's cavalry as it passed through Hanover, reportedly capturing a wagon train and scattering the Union army, after which Kilpatrick's men were able to regroup and drive Stuart and his men out of town. Then after a 20 mile trek in the dark, Stuart’s exhausted men reached Dover, Pennsylvania, on the morning of July 1.

Late on the second day of the battle, Stuart finally arrived, bringing with him the caravan of captured Union supply wagons, and he was immediately reprimanded by Lee. One account describes Lee as “visibly angry” raising his hand “as if to strike the tardy cavalry commander.”5 While that does not sound like Lee’s style, Stuart has been heavily criticized ever since, and it has been speculated Lee took him to task harshly enough that Stuart offered his resignation. Lee didn’t accept it, but he would later note in his after battle report that the cavalry had not updated him as to the Army of the Potomac’s movements.

Thus, having been given great discretion in his cavalry operations before the battle, Stuart’s cavalry was too far removed from the Army of Northern Virginia to warn Lee of the Army of the Potomac’s movements. As it would turn out, Lee’s army inadvertently stumbled into Union cavalry and then the Union army at Gettysburg on the morning of July 1, 1863, walking blindly into what became the largest battle of the war.

It is believed that one of the first notices Lee got about the Army of the Potomac’s movements actually came from a spy named “Harrison”, a man who apparently worked undercover for Longstreet but of whom little is known. Harrison reported that General George G. Meade was now in command of the Union Army and was at that very moment marching north to meet Lee’s army. According to Longstreet, he and Lee were supposedly on the same page at the beginning of the campaign. “His plan or wishes announced, it became useless and improper to offer suggestions leading to a different course. All that I could ask was that the policy of the campaign should be one of defensive tactics; that we should work so as to force the enemy to attack us, in such good position as we might find in our own country, so well adapted to that purpose—which might assure us of a grand triumph. To this he readily assented as an important and material adjunct to his general plan.” Lee later claimed he "had never made any such promise, and had never thought of doing any such thing," but in his official report after the battle, Lee also noted, "It had not been intended to fight a general battle at such a distance from our base, unless attacked by the enemy.

George Pickett, who at this time was best known for finishing last in his West Point class and for his bravery in the Mexican-American War and the Peninsula Campaign of 1862, wrote home to his wife Sallie just a week before the battle to mention a humorous anecdote: