Pickett’s Charge and the Charge of the Light Brigade E-Book

• Herausgeber: Charles River Editors
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 190

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2025

Beschreibung

Despite the fact that the Civil War began over 150 years ago, it remains one of the most widely discussed topics in America today, with Americans arguing over its causes, reenacting its famous battles, and debating which general was better than others. Americans continue to be fascinated by the Civil War icons who made the difference between victory and defeat in the war's great battles.

The most famous attack of the Civil War was also one of its most fateful and fatal. Pickett’s Charge, the climactic assault on the final day of the Battle of Gettysburg, has become the American version of the Charge of the Light Brigade, and it is one of the most famous events of the entire Civil War.

Having been unable to break the Army of the Potomac’s lines on the left and right flank during Day 2 of the Battle of Gettysburg, Confederate Army of Northern Virginia commander Robert E. Lee decided to make a thrust at the center of the Union’s line with about 15,000 men spread out over three divisions. The charge required marching across an open field for about a mile, with the Union artillery holding high ground on all sides of the incoming Confederates.

Though it is now known as Pickett’s Charge, named after division commander George Pickett, the assignment for the charge was given to General James Longstreet, whose 1st Corps included Pickett’s division. Longstreet had serious misgivings about Lee’s plan and tried futilely to talk him out of it. Longstreet later wrote that he said to his commander, “General Lee, I have been a soldier all my life.  It is my opinion that no fifteen thousand men ever arrayed for battle can take that position.”

Aware of the insanity of sending 15,000 men hurtling into all the Union artillery, Lee planned to use the Confederate artillery to try to knock out the Union artillery ahead of time. Although old friend William Pendleton was the artillery chief, the artillery cannonade would be supervised by Edward Porter Alexander, Longstreet’s chief artillerist, who would have to give the go-ahead to the charging infantry because they were falling under Longstreet’s command. Alexander later noted that Longstreet was so disturbed and dejected about ordering the attack that at one point he tried to make Alexander order the infantry forward, essentially doing Longstreet’s dirty work for him.

Unfortunately for Porter Alexander and the Confederates, the sheer number of cannons belched so much smoke that they had trouble gauging how effective the shells were. As it turned out, most of the artillery was overshooting the target, landing in the rear of the Union line. Reluctant to order the charge, Longstreet commanded Porter Alexander to order the timing for the charge. As Longstreet and Alexander anticipated, the charge was an utter disaster, incurring a nearly 50% casualty rate and failing to break the Union line.

The Charge of the Light Brigade is the most famous British cavalry charge in history, possibly also eclipsing the renown of any other mounted attack conducted by the armed forces of other nations in the general imagination. This cavalry action is certainly remembered far more vividly than the 1854 Battle of Balaclava during which it occurred, and even the wider Crimean War that led to the battle.

Of course, the prominence of the Charge in popular and historical memory is due primarily to Alfred, Lord Tennyson's poem describing the events of that distant late October afternoon. The bearded Poet Laureate crafted a powerful, gripping poetic narrative that fixed the encounter firmly in both the popular imagination and in the English literary oeuvre. Millions of people who know nothing else of the Crimean War between Great Britain and the Russian Empire are familiar with Tennyson's memorable verses.

Leseprobe

Pickett’s Charge and the Charge of the Light Brigade: The History and Legacy of the 19th Century’s Most Famous Doomed Assaults

By Charles River Editors

The Union Line facing Pickett’s Charge, Gettysburg National Battlefield

About Charles River Editors

Charles River Editors was founded by Harvard and MIT alumni to provide superior editing and original writing services, with the expertise to create digital content for publishers across a vast range of subject matter. In addition to providing original digital content for third party publishers, Charles River Editors republishes civilization’s greatest literary works, bringing them to a new generation via ebooks.

Introduction

Pickett’s Charge

Despite the fact that the Civil War began over 150 years ago, it remains one of the most widely discussed topics in America today, with Americans arguing over its causes, reenacting its famous battles, and debating which general was better than others. Americans continue to be fascinated by the Civil War icons who made the difference between victory and defeat in the war's great battles.

The most famous attack of the Civil War was also one of its most fateful and fatal. Pickett’s Charge, the climactic assault on the final day of the Battle of Gettysburg, has become the American version of the Charge of the Light Brigade, and it is one of the most famous events of the entire Civil War.

Having been unable to break the Army of the Potomac’s lines on the left and right flank during Day 2 of the Battle of Gettysburg, Confederate Army of Northern Virginia commander Robert E. Lee decided to make a thrust at the center of the Union’s line with about 15,000 men spread out over three divisions. The charge required marching across an open field for about a mile, with the Union artillery holding high ground on all sides of the incoming Confederates.

Though it is now known as Pickett’s Charge, named after division commander George Pickett, the assignment for the charge was given to General James Longstreet, whose 1st Corps included Pickett’s division. Longstreet had serious misgivings about Lee’s plan and tried futilely to talk him out of it. Longstreet later wrote that he said to his commander, “General Lee, I have been a soldier all my life. It is my opinion that no fifteen thousand men ever arrayed for battle can take that position.”

Aware of the insanity of sending 15,000 men hurtling into all the Union artillery, Lee planned to use the Confederate artillery to try to knock out the Union artillery ahead of time. Although old friend William Pendleton was the artillery chief, the artillery cannonade would be supervised by Edward Porter Alexander, Longstreet’s chief artillerist, who would have to give the go-ahead to the charging infantry because they were falling under Longstreet’s command. Alexander later noted that Longstreet was so disturbed and dejected about ordering the attack that at one point he tried to make Alexander order the infantry forward, essentially doing Longstreet’s dirty work for him.

Unfortunately for Porter Alexander and the Confederates, the sheer number of cannons belched so much smoke that they had trouble gauging how effective the shells were. As it turned out, most of the artillery was overshooting the target, landing in the rear of the Union line. Reluctant to order the charge, Longstreet commanded Porter Alexander to order the timing for the charge. As Longstreet and Alexander anticipated, the charge was an utter disaster, incurring a nearly 50% casualty rate and failing to break the Union line.

The Charge of the Light Brigade

Richard Caton Woodville’s painting of the Charge of the Light Brigade

“’Forward, the Light Brigade!’

Was there a man dismay'd?

Not tho' the soldier knew

Someone had blunder'd:

Theirs not to make reply,

Theirs not to reason why,

Theirs but to do and die:

Into the valley of Death

Rode the six hundred.” – Lord Tennyson, “The Charge of the Light Brigade”

The Charge of the Light Brigade is the most famous British cavalry charge in history, possibly also eclipsing the renown of any other mounted attack conducted by the armed forces of other nations in the general imagination. This cavalry action is certainly remembered far more vividly than the 1854 Battle of Balaclava during which it occurred, and even the wider Crimean War that led to the battle.

Of course, the prominence of the Charge in popular and historical memory is due primarily to Alfred, Lord Tennyson's poem describing the events of that distant late October afternoon. The bearded Poet Laureate crafted a powerful, gripping poetic narrative that fixed the encounter firmly in both the popular imagination and in the English literary oeuvre. Millions of people who know nothing else of the Crimean War between Great Britain and the Russian Empire are familiar with Tennyson's memorable verses:

“Half a league, half a league,

Half a league onward,

All in the valley of Death,

Rode the six hundred.

‘Forward the Light Brigade!

‘Charge for the guns!’ he said:

Into the valley of Death

Rode the six hundred.”

Tennyson's work is a magnificent achievement of verbal art, filled with the violent energy of battle and providing a glimpse of the living men who carried out the desperate action more than a century and a half ago. Filled with the thunder of artillery and the hurtling momentum of lancers and hussars flinging themselves upon the enemy, Tennyson's poem is simultaneously a triumphant celebration of the Light Brigade's valor and a lament for their futile sacrifice in the teeth of concentrated Russian cannon salvos.

At the same time, however, his words also created a narrative about the combat which has obscured much contrary evidence, replacing fact with legend and completely obscuring the true significance of the Charge of the Light Brigade. Indeed, its perception by historians and depiction in history books has been massively influenced by the sheer artistic power of Tennyson's poem. Sober historians have unwitting cherry-picked the existing original documents to support Tennyson's "version" of the events while disregarding much contrary evidence that provides a very different perspective of the Light Brigade's attack.

In fact, a closer examination of source materials casts the Charge of the Light Brigade in a very different light than the widely accepted version of men so highly disciplined and obedient that they obeyed a suicidal order without question. So unquestioningly obedient were the British cavalrymen, the legend declares, that they were willing to charge into a cannon's mouth and die rather than raise a voice of protest against the imbecility of their incompetent officers. This mix of doomed courage and absolute, unfaltering compliance with the orders of their superiors, however idiotic, had given the Light Brigade and the British soldier in general a character of tragic heroism. This acquiescence to authority is often extended to Lord Cardigan, the unit's commander, as well.

Once the order had been given by the overall commander Lord Raglan, Tennyson’s poem would have readers believe Cardigan then chose an incorrect objective and pursued it with dogged obedience to what he thought were his orders. The Light Brigade obeyed him in turn, and the result was an attack whose deterministic momentum could not be halted even when certain individuals realized it was an error and sought to halt or redirect it.

Powerful as this vision of buffoonish commanders leading soldiers infused with ant-like obedience may be in the world of poetry, considerable documentation still exists which at least partially refutes such an interpretation. These documents, recently revisited by a handful of historians, greatly diminish the role of upper-echelon mistakes in causing the Charge. They restore agency and initiative to the ordinary British soldiers, highlighting them as fierce, independent-minded, and energetic actors in their own right, who very nearly changed the outcome of the entire Battle of Balaclava with their skill, courage, and daring.

Ironically, it is possible to argue that the Charge of the Light Brigade was an attack mostly initiated by the rank and file, and that it was largely successful. The actual blunder was the failure of other commanders to support the charge by sending in infantry in its wake, which could potentially have led to the complete rout of the Russian forces. Instead, the British commanders did nothing to exploit the breakthrough created by the initiative, skill, and ferocity of the ordinary cavalryman, squandering the opportunity they had been offered.

Ultimately, these men were to seize on Tennyson's version of events because it portrayed them as responsible for a relatively small blunder (the needless sacrifice of a few hundred men, which still underlined the martial pride of British courage) rather than a colossal one (throwing away a chance to soundly defeat the entire Russian army, thus permitting the battle to end as a bloody, pointless stalemate).

Pickett’s Charge and the Charge of the Light Brigade: The History and Legacy of the 19th Century’s Most Famous Doomed Assaults profiles the history, context, and command decisions that all culminated in the two famous charges. It also includes analysis of what went right and wrong, as well as what the major participants wrote about the charges. Along with maps and pictures of important people and places, you will learn about Pickett’s Charge and the Charge of the Light Brigade like you never have before.

Pickett’s Charge and the Charge of the Light Brigade: The History and Legacy of the 19th Century’s Most Famous Doomed Assaults

About Charles River Editors

Introduction

The Charge of the Light Brigade

The Origins of the Crimean War

The Siege of Sevastopol

Prelude to Battle

The Thin Red Line and the Heavy Brigade

The Charge of the Light Brigade Begins

The High Water Mark of the Charge

The Retreat of the Light Brigade

Reasons for the Light Brigade's Combat Success

The Significance of the Charge of the Light Brigade

Lord Tennyson’s “The Charge of the Light Brigade”

Pickett’s Charge

The Chancellorsville Campaign

Lee Invades Pennsylvania

July 1, 1863

July 2, 1863

The Plan for Pickett’s Charge

The High Water Mark of the Confederacy

Controversy over Lee’s Retreat

Who’s to Blame?

Online Resources

Further Reading about Pickett’s Charge

Further Reading about the Charge of the Light Brigade

The Charge of the Light Brigade

The Origins of the Crimean War

Understanding the Charge of the Light Brigade requires it to be placed in the context of the larger conflict that served as its stage. In fact, a unique combination of factors led to the British cavalry launching itself furiously against the Russian artillery and the Cossack cavalry lurking beyond on October 25th, 1854, and the conditions of the Crimean War created a set of stresses and difficulties which prompted the British cavalry to respond in a specific manner to developments on the Balaclava battlefield.

The purported cause of the Crimean War lay in fatal skirmishes between Orthodox and Catholic monks in Jerusalem, which Czar Nicholas I blamed on the Ottoman Empire extending insufficient protection to Eastern Orthodox pilgrims. There is no doubt that the Orthodox did suffer greater casualties in this bizarre religious vendetta, but the waning of Ottoman Turkish power and Russian ambitions towards expansion into the Black Sea region and the Eastern Mediterranean were likely the chief motivating force behind the Czar's aggression.

Czar Nicholas I

In a discussion with Sir George H. Seymour, the British ambassador to Russia, Czar Nicholas revealed his obsession with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Speaking to the envoy on January 9, 1853, the Czar referred to Turkey as "the bear" and stated that the "bear dies... the bear is dying... you may give him musk but even musk will not long keep him alive." (Temperley, 1936, 272). This phrase was later erroneously interpolated by the newspapers of the era into the famous description of the Ottoman Empire as "the sick man of Europe."

Czar Nicholas I clearly wished for this to be the case, and he further stated that he wanted no resurgent "Byzantine Empire" in the form of a powerful Greek state in Turkey's place. As with Vladimir Putin's invasion of the Crimea and eastern Ukraine a century and a half later, Russia's foreign policy was predicated on the imperative of fomenting weakness, instability, and fragmentation among its neighbors. This strategy was (and still is) designed to remove potential obstacles to Russian imperialism and to provide suitable pretexts for intervention in other nearby countries when desired by the rulers of the Muscovite state.

Ultimately, the Czar launched an attack on the Turks, allegedly due to the killing of Orthodox pilgrims in the Holy Land but actually to further Russian aggrandizement in the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean regions. The Russians defeated the Ottomans decisively at the naval battle of Sinope, while sending land forces into Moldova, then a Turkish possession. France, Great Britain, and the Kingdom of Sardinia felt their trading interests threatened by this maneuver, and they also feared Russian expansion in the direction of western Europe. Accordingly, the British and French intervened to save the Ottoman Empire from dismemberment by Russia, leading to the start of the Crimean War in 1854.

This conflict was quite controversial with the British public, but it did succeed in its chief objective of preventing Russian destruction of the Turkish realm at that time. It is one of the bizarre ironies of history that the Ottoman Empire would survive until the end of World War I, when the very British army that had preserved it two and a half generations earlier proved to be the instrument of its final destruction.

The Siege of Sevastopol

The location of Sevastopol in the Crimea

In a counterstroke to the Czar's aggression, a coalition army of British, French, and Turkish soldiers landed in Crimea and, after defeating the Russian forces at the Battle of the Alma, moved to besiege the port city of Sevastopol. This decision was bitterly mocked by the late British novelist George MacDonald Fraser in his novel Flashman at the Charge, in which he wrote, “It struck me then, and still does, that attacking Sevastopol would be rather like an enemy of England investing Penzance, and then shouting towards London, ‘There, you insolent bastard, that'll teach you!’ But because it was said to be a great base, and The Times was full of it, an assault on Sevastopol became the talk of the hour.” (Fraser, 1986, 28).

In this passage, Fraser echoed the current common belief that the Crimean War was an exercise in absurdity at all levels, including strategic planning. However, while ample incompetence was displayed throughout the conflict, the siege of Sevastopol was one case where the criticism appears unfair. The Crimean War has become a sort of theatrical and allegorical performance rather than history in the popular mind, and while aspects of the Charge of the Light Brigade have metamorphosed into patriotic myths, the cartoonish incompetence of the British government and army has also become mythologized, creating a huge mass of emotionally-charged exaggerations on a slender foundation of historical reality. The reality is that the alliance of Britain, France, Sardinia, and the Turks did not seek the wholesale defeat of Russia. Rather, it was attempting to force the Russians to abandon two threatening objectives: the destruction of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of a powerful Russian naval presence in the Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean.

Since Sevastopol was the main Russian port in the region, striking at it was actually a shrewd, robust strategic decision on the part of the Allied command. The acuity of the Allies' strategic thinking is again underlined by the renewed Russian aggression in the region in 2014. Vladimir Putin's imperial ambitions led him to seize the Crimea and the port of Sevastopol in particular, by using direct annexation and open military force rather than the disguised Russian soldiers used elsewhere in Ukraine to create plausible deniability. Precisely 160 years later, Sevastopol is still considered the key strategic position for regional naval dominance by the Russian military and civil leadership.

Franz Roubaud’s painting depicting the siege

Though attacking Sevastopol was a sound strategic decision in terms of the Crimean War's objectives, the actual execution left much to be desired, even as the siege interested foreign observers like American engineer George McClellan, who witnessed the siege and was heavily influenced by it when pressing his own campaigns during the American Civil War. The forces sent were too small to launch an all-out attack on Sevastopol and seize it outright, which led to investing the fortress instead for a protracted siege. This circumstance had fatal consequences for the Allied army because forcing the men to remain in one place led to massive outbreaks of disease. Germs eventually wiped out a major percentage of the expeditionary force amid almost inconceivable scenes of human misery and suffering.

In addition to damage inflicted by appalling pre-modern hygiene conditions and poorly organized supply deliveries, the Russians made multiple attempts to break the encirclement of Sevastopol. One of these efforts led to the Battle of Balaclava, during which the Charge of the Light Brigade was the day's last and most spectacular action. Balaclava was the site of the harbor the British used to resupply their besieging force, while the French used the much more practical Kamiesch. According to Frances "Fanny" Duberly, the wife of a British officer who kept a diary of the campaign, “[A]t morning, the Simla came to tow us to our anchorage just outside Balaklava harbour. This anchorage is a wonderful place; the water is extremely deep, and the rocks which bound the coast exceed in ruggedness and boldness of outline any that I ever saw before. The harbour appears completely land-locked. Through a fissure in the cliffs you can just see a number of masts; but how they got in, or will get out, appears a mystery; they have the appearance of having been hoisted over the cliffs, and dropped into a lake on the other side.” (Duberly, 2007, 73-74).

Its picturesque aspects aside, Balaclava harbor was a rather poor choice as a supply point. It was vulnerable to storms from the south, as well as possible attack by Russian vessels. Additionally, the route from the harbor to the siegeworks around Sevastopol was poorly developed. The British commissariat was supposed to supply enormous quantities of preserved food, but ultimately, most of this would end up piling up on the beach and rot due to lack of adequate transport arrangements between the harbor and the siegeworks. Thousands of British soldiers would eventually starve to death despite the fact incredible quantities of food were stockpiled only a few miles distant.

However, these dismal failures still lay in the future when Fanny Duberly arrived. At that point, supplies were flowing through Balaclava to the besieging force at Sevastopol. The Russian commanders judged that the best way to defeat the Allied force entirely was not to engage it head-on but to strike at Balaclava, seizing the harbor and cutting off supplies. Their plan, if successful, would have had the effect of isolating the force investing Sevastopol, thus compelling its retreat or surrender. Naturally, the Allied forces perceived this risk and deployed to protect their supply lines, setting the stage for the Battle of Balaclava on October 25th, 1854. British soldiers formed the backbone of this defense, but Turkish and French units were also present on the field. Interestingly, though relatively few in numbers in the field, both the French and the Turks would have an important effect on the development of the Light Brigade's role in the day's events.

An 1855 picture of the port of Balaclava

Prelude to Battle

The Russian commander, General Pavel Liprandi (a Russian of Italian descent) later proved himself a smooth liar and spinner of reassuring fantasies in reporting to the Imperial court about the battle, but he had a fairly realistic grasp of the relative positions of the two armies. He perceived that Balaclava was both a tactically crucial point whose seizure might enable him to establish a chokehold on British supply lines and also a relatively weak point with only around 4,000 men defending it. Both of these reasons led him to choose Balaclava as the spot for his first thrust in the effort to relieve Sevastopol.

Liprandi

Initially, he did not have enough troops on hand to feel confident of success in attacking the British position, and the earlier Battle of the Alma had proven that British infantry firepower was devastating against the poorly trained and poorly armed Russian forces, even when the latter enjoyed vast numerical superiority and were fighting from prepared positions. The Russians had been soundly crushed fighting a defensive action against inferior numbers, so Liprandi evidently felt he needed many more men if he were to have a chance of success during the even riskier process of mounting an offensive battle.

As a result, the timing of the Battle of Balaclava was determined by the speed with which General Liprandi received his reinforcements. The heavy cavalry of Prince Menshikov continued to probe the British lines throughout October, gathering intelligence and keeping the enemy occupied. The reinforcements Liprandi had requested arrived in the third week of October, and the Russian general felt ready to make his attack on the morning of October 25th, 1854.

Menshikov

Liprandi was under pressure since the bombardment of Sevastopol was proceeding and the British might launch an assault at any time, and a significant event on October 17th might have helped to speed up the Russian general's decision to attack even more. On that date, the Allies opened a cannonade on Sevastopol with 120 guns, a massive outpouring of shells which had a startling effect within a few hours of its commencement and was destined to show how the dilatory and hesitant British command wasted opportunity after opportunity during the Crimean War. Part of the British bombardment fell on the Malikoff Redoubt, a portion of the Sevastopol defenses that housed a gigantic ammunition dump and powder magazine. Fanny Duberly recounted what happened next in her journal, referring to the Malikoff Redoubt as the "Redan" (a French term for a salient earthwork facing the enemy): “At ten minutes past three a magnificent sight presented itself – a huge explosion in the Mud Fort (Redan), the smoke of which ascended to the eye of heaven, and then gathering, fell slowly and mournfully down to earth…round me, cheers burst from every throat – All down the line one deafening shout.” (Kelly, 2007, 86).