Russian Cultural Diplomacy under Putin E-Book

• Herausgeber: ibidem
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Serie: Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society
• Sprache: Englisch
• Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2023

Seitenzahl: 296

Beschreibung

This book breaks into the black box of Russian cultural diplomacy’s ideological underpinnings and modi operandi. Relying on publicly accessible sources such as annual reports, news from official websites, social media posts, and other pertinent materials, the contributors examine the three most significant state-affiliated or full-fledged state institutions operating in this field. Their organization and management, budget and financial details, links to oligarchs, the government and other institutions, most important activities, as well as overall geographical presence are analyzed. The discourses of these organizations during the Russia-Ukraine War, including after 24 February 2022, are given special attention. The collection discloses how the Kremlin’s foreign propaganda institutions support the Russian authoritarian regime and its expansionist policies.

Leseprobe

ibidem Press, Stuttgart

Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

Introduction

Rossotrudnichestvo The Unbearable Harshness of Soft Power

“The Russian flag will be flown wherever Russian is spoken” The “Russkiy Mir” Foundation

First Roubles, Then Guns The Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund

Conclusions Russian Cultural Diplomacy after 2022

Bibliography

List of Tables

Table 1. Predecessors of Rossotrudnichestvo

Table 2. Host countries for foreign offices of Rossotrudnichestvo

Table 3. Core values of the “Russian world” according to A. Gromyko

Table 4. Social networks of the “Russkiy Mir” Foundation

Table 5. Number of Centres, Cabinets and friendly organisations of the “Russkiy Mir” Foundation per 1 million population (as of March 2022)

Table 6. Russian Centres that were closed down after the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine

Table 7. Distribution of grants provided by the “Russkiy Mir” Foundation by areas of activity

List of Figures

Figure 1. Publicly funded cultural diplomacy institutions in Western countries and Russia

Figure 2. Rossotrudnichestvo’s offices abroad (as of April 2023)

Figure 3. Frequency of mentions of the word “compatriot” on Russkiy Dom Telegram channel within a week, 2021–2022.

Figure 4. Countries with organisations of Russian compatriots and Rossotrudnichestvo offices (as of April 2023)

Figure 5. Frequency of publications at Russkiy Dom Telegram channel, 2021–2022

Figure 6. Revenues of the “Russkiy Mir” Foundation, 2013–2021

Figure 7. Expenditures of the “Russkiy Mir” Foundation, 2013–2021

Figure 8. “Russkiy Mir” website attendance in February-April 2022

Figure 9. “Russkiy Mir” website attendance in February-April 2023

Figure 10. Distribution of “Russkiy Mir” website visitors by Country

Figure 11. Distribution of “Russkiy Mir” website visitors by Source, February 2022

Figure 12. Distribution of “Russkiy Mir” website visitors by Source, March 2023

Figure 13. Key geographical clusters of the “Russkiy Mir” Foundation's network (as of March 2022)

Figure 14. The number of Centres and Cabinets of the “Russkiy Mir” Foundation in different countries of the world (as of March 2022)

Figure 15. The number of Centres, Cabinets, and friendly organisations of the “Russkiy Mir” Foundation in different countries of the world (as of March 2022)

Figure 16. Annual amounts of funds allocated as grants by the “Russkiy Mir” Foundation, 2016-2020

Introduction

Nadiia Koval, Denys Tereshchenko

In June 2022, the La Scala Theatre in Milan announced that its new season should begin in December 2022 with the Russian XIXth century “Boris Godunov” opera by Modest Mussorgsky. The decision sparked protests from Ukrainian community in Italy and the Consul General of Ukraine in Milan has urged the theatre to reconsider, citing the full-scale Russian aggression that raged for four months now and the role of the Russian culture in supporting Russian political aims. Still, the theatre stuck to its decision, differentiating bloodthirsty Russian regime and allegedly benign universal Russian culture, and reminding that it has already severed ties with pro-Putin conductor Valery Gergiev, provided humanitarian aid to the refugees, and employed some Ukrainian artists, albeit together with the Russian ones, in this opera. Moreover, the premiere on December 7 was visited by the president of the European Commission Ursula von der Leien, prime minister of Italy Giorgia Melloni and the president of Italy Sergio Mattarella, all of whom emphasized that while they resolutely support Ukraine, they harbour no bad feelings against Russian culture and Russian people. That decision raised high hopes in Russian elites that had just began to feel first consequences of cultural isolation. The head of key Russian soft power institution, Rossotrudnichestvo, Evgeny Primakov Jr., referred to the La Scala case with a conjecture “we are seeing very cautious positive signals that this psychosis will wind down” (Laru 2022). And the spokesperson of the Russian MFA, Mariya Zakharova, has noted that this decision “testifies to the cultural sovereignty, wisdom and far-sightedness of Italians” and “lays the foundation for the continuation of fruitful exchanges between our countries in the cultural and humanitarian sphere.”1

On the second year of the invasion, the question of the role of culture in the war remains contentious. Is Russian culture a repository of values that upholds the regime and its policies while preserving and spreading colonial attitudes to other peoples? Or is it a universal good that benefits all humanity and transcends war and conflict? We do not seek to answer such lofty questions in this book; rather, we focus on a narrower and far more practical topic: Russia's intended political and war-related instrumentalization of its culture, as seen through the lens of analysing the key institutions involved in cultural and public diplomacy.

Russia’s proactive use of soft power and the network of soft power institutions have been repeatedly addressed by scholars and analysts, first and foremost in the context of hybrid information warfare tools (Meister 2016; Surowiec 2017, 21–27; Horbulin 2017). Most of these publications attempt to grasp the phenomenon as a comprehensive and multifaceted system that contains many different actors and strategies, thus providing a rather general overview of the major players (Van Herpen 2015). The situation is very similar with narrower, thematic studies, like those that try to show how think tanks spread propaganda (Smagliy, 2018) or more geographically focused studies of Russian “soft power” in specific countries (Foxall, 2015) or of their proxy agents or local collaborators (Lutsevych, 2016, Vendil Pallin, and Oxenstierna, 2017), where institutional analysis is more of a background to the main research questions. Most of the research, even with separate sections on one or a few major Russian soft-power organisations, tends to focus on a generalised analysis of their structure and goals, history and background, funding, etc. For instance, there is an important tradition of research on the Russkiy Mir ideology and its ideologues, but far fewer studies are available on the key organisations established to promote it (Van Herpen 2015; Laruelle 2015; Lutsevych 2016; Smagliy 2018; Suslov 2018; Popovic, Jenne, and Medzihorsky 2020). Thus, what was still missing and what inspired us to start this book project was the need for an in-depth approach to key Russian soft-power organisations, especially after Russia’s war against Ukraine has entered its most bloody phase and these soft-power organisations became fully aligned with Russian state war propaganda and its coverage for international audiences.

This book covers Russia’s three most important “soft power” organisations: the Russian MFA-dependent state agency, Rossotrudnichestvo, and two government-organised non-governmental organizations, the “Russkiy Mir” Foundation and the Gorchakov Fund. While the initial idea was to research Russian cultural diplomacy and its political instrumentalization, we decided to widen our scope to the more general topic of “soft power.” The reason is that in the Russian language and political tradition, there is a clear preference to include cultural diplomacy in “international humanitarian cooperation,” which covers a whole number of different fields related to establishing relations with the citizens of foreign countries directly, be it cultural diplomacy, public diplomacy, or even humanitarian assistance. In other words, both in theory and in practice, from the typical Russian vantage point, cultural diplomacy is only one manifestation of the broader policy of influence operations aimed at the outside world. Limiting our research to cultural diplomacy sensu stricto would have omitted the essential parts of the aims and activities of the respective organisations and would have produced a rather distorted picture of Russian efforts in this direction.

This research first originated as a series of policy papers conducted by the Ukrainian Institute in 2022 (Koval et al. 2022; Masiyenko et al. 2022; Tereshchenko and Koval 2022). In this series, we studied Rossotrudnichestvo, the “Russkiy Mir” Foundation, and the Gorchakov Fund in detail. In particular, we focused on their history, structure, and purpose; their exact place within the Russian authoritarian regime; the ideological underpinnings of their activities; their principal activities, projects, and target audiences. All the papers were enlarged and re-edited for this book into three chapters: we updated them with the most recent developments as of spring 2023. We added the introduction and the conclusion chapters, tackling the current state and the perspectives of Russian cultural and public diplomacy development after the war.

All the Russian soft power institutions under scrutiny were established or comprehensively reformed in the late 2000s. The colour revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine provided the impetus for change. Following the regime shifts in the neighbouring states, Russia decided that soft power was crucial to furthering its political goals and eventually sought to develop its means of influence through the institutionalisation and investment of additional financial resources into respective institutions. Rossotrudnichestvo, having the most extended institutional history and the most expansive geography, also covers the broadest portfolio, including cultural diplomacy, humanitarian assistance, and cooperation with compatriots, which is unparalleled with any Western cultural diplomacy institutions but remains characteristic for the Russian understanding of “international humanitarian cooperation.” The “Russkiy Mir” Foundation concentrates on promoting the Russian language and culture abroad, nurturing ties and cooperation with foreign universities and libraries, often focusing on provincial cities typically not covered by the Rossotrudnichestvo representations. As for the Gorchakov Fund, it specialises in direct support and promotion of Russian foreign policy visions in the foreign expert and academic community, mainly aiming at its younger cohort. Moreover, since the latter two institutions, in addition to organising their own projects, function as funds, they tend to directly finance foreign entities by providing (micro)grants. Finally, they extensively cooperate with the state media and boast an impressive social media presence, including, in the case of the “Russkiy Mir” Foundation, a whole set of own media designed for Russian speakers worldwide.

We scrutinise the most significant, most visible, and even system-forming players in the field of Russian soft-power institutions responsible for creating constellations of lesser players around themselves. Thus, a whole array of other state and private players fall outside the scope of this research. In order to have a broader and more representative depiction of Russian cultural diplomacy, this should be further researched, and here we will only use this introduction to outline the field and its internal complexities. To mark the prospective itineraries, we try to name and categorise all the partners involved in projects or the governance of the key institutions in the respective chapters. In addition, some researchers have already attempted to map the links and role-sharing between different players, which could be elaborated upon (see, for instance, Smagliy 2018).

A paradoxical situation in Russia's cultural and public diplomacy field is that it is simultaneously very hierarchical and highly dispersed. This provides soft power institutions with notable flexibility but does not deprive the regime of the opportunity for thorough oversight and control. A significant drawback of this organisational approach is the lack of order and the coexistence of often overlapping functions and initiatives.

The vertical organisation has two different dimensions. The first is the ever-tightening state control over each emanation of soft power, inspired by the personal interest of Vladimir Putin, as would be typical of personalistic authoritarian regimes. As of 2023, Putin personally appoints and dismisses the head and deputy heads of Rossotrudnichestvo and the heads of the “Russkiy Mir” Foundation’s governing bodies, appoints his close collaborators from the Presidential Administration to the key posts in all three organisations, and attempts to execute direct control through creating his own institutions, like the Presidential Fund of Cultural Initiatives or the Presidential Grant Fund, both of which at least partially finance cultural diplomacy-related and highly political events.2

Besides, on the governmental level, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs hosts at least three different departments dealing with soft power (in addition to Rossotrudnichestvo, a separate agency under the auspices of the MFA). The latest such department was founded in 2022 to coordinate the cultural policy, a role it still shares with other institutions. The MFA and the Ministry of Education are cofounders of the “independent” “Russkiy Mir” Foundation, whereas Minister Lavrov heads the Board of Trustees of the Gorchakov Fund, effectively controlling the organisation.

Still, the all-encompassing description of “international humanitarian cooperation” implies all-government involvement. As Rossotrudnichestvo’s functionaries describe it, the key players of Russian soft power encompass the Ministry of Science and Higher Education, which develops academic diplomacy and accommodates foreign students in Russian universities; the Ministry of Education, responsible for supporting the schools and Russian language learning abroad, including spreading the manuals and organising training for foreign teachers, building brand new schools on Russian programmes, Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Emergency Situations, in addition to death and destruction, also provide humanitarian assistance, including that related to the Russian language and schooling, Ministry of Culture controls and operates sizeable portions of cultural events abroad, for instance, “Russian seasons” in different countries and “Roskino” (Russian cinema) events (Polikanov 2023). The Ministry of Economic Development and the Ministry of Finance have an essential say in providing actual funds for the organisations and particular projects and financing Russian participation in multilateral international projects or organisations. The Ministry of Internal Affairs has a voice in the compatriots’ resettlement, the Ministry of Digitalization supports translation and book publishing, and so on (Ibid.). Such an overlapping of multiple ministries and other state entities, starting from the Presidential Administration and Security Council, indicates not only the importance but also numerous organisational hurdles, so there is a visible trend towards centralization either through presidential or MFA vertical control, through creating state-level programmes, “International development assistance” and “Support and promotion of Russian language abroad,” and the Federal Project “Russia as an attractive country for education and work,” fusing some organisations, etc. At least three other state-created funds cover the related questions, “Fund for Support and Protection of the Rights of Compatriots Living Abroad,”3 as well as the Presidential Grant Foundation and the Presidential Foundation for Cultural Initiatives, which were mentioned above. In addition, the will to control all the humanitarian initiatives led to the situation where, for instance, the director of the Foreign Intelligence Service, Sergey Naryshkin, chairs the Russian Historical Society and the Minister of Defence, Sergey Shoigu, leads the Russian Geographical Society.

However, when considered horizontally, the three institutions are the primary nodes of the state-controlled ecosystem of organisations devoted to expanding Russia's influence abroad. These include universities and their departments, research centres and think tanks, oligarch-sponsored foundations, GONGOs, state media broadcasting abroad, state culture-related institutions (e.g., libraries, museums), religious organisations (first and foremost, the Russian Orthodox Church), etc. Their leadership, members, and individual representatives serve on one another's supervisory, trustee, and executive boards, conduct multiple joint activities, post on each other's websites, and coordinate activities in general. Still, as an ultimate solution, after another change of the Rossotrudnichestvo management in 2020, the idea of reforming Russia's soft power by establishing a single state corporation that would consolidate all resources and operate projects of influence on foreign audiences was voiced (Atasuntsev, Galimova, and Khimshiashvili 2020). This corporation will likely be based on Rossotrudnichestvo since its operations are more diverse, and its infrastructure is more developed than those of Russia's other state soft power institutions.

Finally, the utmost importance of “humanitarian policy abroad” for Russian foreign policy is underlined by its growing presence in strategic documents. Thus, the first foreign policy strategy document publicised since the start of the all-out invasion on February 24, 2022, was the Concept for Russia's Humanitarian Policy Abroad, adopted on September 5, 2022. It directly defines culture to be the instrument of foreign policy:

Russian culture is an essential, integral part of global culture. As an instrument of “soft power,” it contributes to strengthening Russia's international standing, forming its objective perception abroad, and neutralising anti-Russian sentiments of political and ideological origin. International cultural and humanitarian cooperation is required to foster favourable conditions for implementing foreign policy tasks and simultaneously contribute to establishing a constructive dialogue and overcoming disagreements with foreign partners.4

While summarising already proven strategies and activities in the field rather than introducing innovations, this concept underlines, inter alia, that a distinct culture makes Russia a separate civilization based on conservative values whose mission is to support all the conservative countries worldwide against Western (neo)liberalism and its values. It importantly introduces the Russkiy Mir ideology as a reference point and the source of foundational values in Russian culture. It keeps the traditional focus of Russia’s “humanitarian policy” on the CIS and former USSR but extends geographical interest well into the Global South, especially Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America.5

In a similar vein, Russia’s new Foreign Policy Concept, adopted on March 31, 2023, further reinforces the classical foreign policy doctrine of Putin’s regime, promoting multipolarity and further curbing Western influence wherever possible, seeking new partners in the East, starting with China, India, and Iran, and strengthening itself through the reintegration of the former Soviet republics. It also underlines the cultural and even civilizational uniqueness of Russia, claiming it to be a country-civilization with a natural, cultural, and value-defined sphere of influence:

More than a thousand years of independent statehood, the cultural legacies of bygone eras, strong historical ties to traditional European culture and other cultures of Eurasia, and the capacity developed over many centuries to ensure the peaceful coexistence of various peoples, ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups on a common territory determine Russia's unique position as a distinctive state-civilization, a vast Eurasian and Euro-Pacific power that united the Russian people and other peoples who comprise the Russian world’s cultural and civilizational community.6

The Russkiy Mir ideology is vital in building and consolidating this “country-civilization” as a foreign policy goal. While we will discuss the Russkiy Mir ideology in more detail in the respective chapter about the “Russkiy Mir” Foundation, it is important to note that this revanchist conservative ideology is designed with the purpose of symbolically re-integrating the former Soviet space as a specific Russian civilization through supporting and promoting the Russian language, Orthodoxy, and a set of conservative social and political values. Remarkably, there is an innate contradiction between the nativist and exclusivist ideology of the Russian world idea and the multinational nature of the Russian Federation itself, coupled with the incredible heterogeneity of all those considered to be part of the Russian world beyond the Russian borders. According to the Concept for Russia’s Humanitarian Policy Abroad, adopted on September 5, 2022:

The primary objectives of multilateral humanitarian cooperation with the CIS member states are the formation of a single cultural, educational, and informational space; the preservation of centuries-old cultural ties with the peoples of these states; the comprehensive development of such relations; the search for new effective forms of cooperation; and the strengthening of the historically established positions of the Russian language in these states. The objectives of the humanitarian policy of the Russian Federation abroad are: …protection, preservation, and promotion of traditions and ideals inherent in the Russian world.7

Considering all the features mentioned, it is no surprise that all three organisations have supported the Russian war against Ukraine. The extreme case is Rossotrudnichestvo, implicated in many war-related activities. First, it provides, facilitates, and promotes extensive “humanitarian aid” from the Rossotrudnichestvo and its partners, including the Ministry of Defence, to the Ukrainians residing in the occupied territories or those evacuated or deported to Russia. Second, it produces and spreads war-related narratives as to the reasons, responsibility, and war crimes, driving parallels with the WWII/Great Patriotic War, promoting war symbolics, organising manifestations and rallies in support of Russia, organising and disseminating supportive videos from celebrities and ordinary citizens in foreign countries, and finally investing enormous resources into combating “Russophobia” and “Russia cancelling,” first and foremost in the sphere of culture. Likewise, the “Russkiy Mir” Foundation is actively involved in streamlining and supporting the russification of the occupied regions, primarily through school education. It also extensively promotes war-related narratives through the Foundation’s media and by the Foundation leader, Vyacheslav Nikonov, personally. The Gorchakov Fund keeps a comparatively low profile in war promotion but follows the key narratives and approaches.

An important role of Russian soft power organisations in Russian foreign policy theory and practise up to spreading propaganda and subversion was first noticed back in 2016, when Rossotrudnichestvo and the “Russkiy Mir” Foundation, together with the multilingual Russia Today (RT) TV platform and the Sputnik multimedia service, were identified as Kremlin-funded instruments of disinformation and propaganda in a resolution passed by the European Parliament on November 23, 2016. After the start of the full-scale war in February 2022, the cultural diplomacy institutions' involvement in the war effort became so apparent that all three organisations and their leaders were sanctioned.8 Specifically, in July 2022, the Rossotrudnichestvo was sanctioned by the EU as “the main state agency projecting the Kremlin’s soft power and hybrid influence,” “an umbrella organisation for a network of Russian compatriots and agents of influence, and it funds various public diplomacy and propaganda projects, consolidating the activities of pro-Russian players and disseminating the Kremlin’s narratives, including historical revisionism,” “and the Foundation has been used as an important influence tool by the Kremlin that is strongly promoting a Russia centric-agenda in the post-USSR states, rejecting Ukraine's legitimacy as a sovereign nation, and advocating for its unification with Russia.” […] “The ‘Russkiy Mir’ Foundation has disseminated pro-Kremlin and anti-Ukrainian propaganda and justified Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against Ukraine” (EU Council Regulation 2022/1269 of 21.07.2022). There are also personal sanctions against Evgeny Primakov Jr., Vyacheslav Nikonov, and Dmitry Syty, a former Wagner PVC combatant, who established a Rossotrudnichestvo representational office, Russkiy Dom, in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

All in all, given the role that Russia's soft-power organisations and culture instrumentalization as a foreign policy instrument have been playing in promoting and facilitating the war and the attempts to absorb the captured Ukrainian territories while trying in parallel to speculate on culture as being a reconciliatory, universal phenomenon beyond borders and politics, it is necessary to study what these organisations are and how they act to ensure an adequate response. We hope this study will contribute to a better understanding of culture's political use and abuse, especially in a war situation.

1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. “Brifing oficial'nogo predstavitelja MID Rossii M.V.Zaharovoj” [Briefing of M.V. Zakharova, the official representative of the MFA of Russia}. Moscow, November 30, 2022. https://mid.ru/tv/?id=1841096&lang=ru#11

2 For instance, Russian Presidential Fund of Cultural Initiatives spent over a billion roubles on cultural initiatives for promotion of the war against Ukraine. See Sirena (2022a, 2022b).

3 Sanctioned by Ukraine for its support for the war. War & Sanctions. n. d. “Non-profit organization ‘Fund for Support and Protection of the Rights of Compatriots Living Abroad.” https://sanctions.nazk.gov.ua/en/sanction-company/4344/.

4 Russian Federation. President. Ukaz [Decree] #611 “Ob utverzhdenii Kontseptsii gumanitarnoi politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii za rubezhom” [On approving the Concept of Humanitarian Policy of the Russian Federation]. Adopted 5 September 2022. http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/ru/G3CkAuMhZXio8AzNaweT3wTGTaEA16OU.pdf.

5 Priority countries from the 2022 Concept of Russian Humanitarian Policy Abroad include CIS states, Moldova, Baltic states, and unilaterally recognized occupied territories of Georgia and Ukraine (“Republic of Abkhazia,” “Republic of South Ossetia,” “Donetsk People’s Republic,” “Luhansk People’s Republic”). Second, these are East-Asian countries: China, India, Japan, Vietnam, Laos, Mongolia. Also, Middle East and Maghreb Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iran, Afghanistan, Palestinian state. Finally, Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, Cuba, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile.

6 Russian Federation. President. “Kontseptsiia vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii” [Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation]. Approved on 31 March 2023. https://www.mid.ru/ru/detail-material-page/1860586/

7 Russian Federation. President. Ukaz [Decree] #611 “Ob utverzhdenii Kontseptsii gumanitarnoi politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii za rubezhom” [On approving the Concept of Humanitarian Policy of the Russian Federation]. Adopted 5 September 2022. http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/ru/G3CkAuMhZXio8AzNaweT3wTGTaEA16OU.pdf.

8 Rossotrudnichestvo, “Russkiy Mir” Foundation and Gorchakov Fund are sanctioned by the EU, Canada, Switzerland, and Ukraine. Voina & sanktsiii [War & Sanctions]. n. d. “Fond podderzhki publichnoi diplomatii imeni A.M.Gorchakova” [The Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund]. https://sanctions.nazk.gov.ua/ru/sanction-company/6079/. Voina & sanktsiii [War & Sanctions]. n. d. “Fond ‘Russkiy Mir’” [‘Russkiy Mir’ Foundation]. https://sanctions.nazk.gov.ua/ru/sanction-company/6080/. Voina & sanktsiii [War & Sanctions]. n. d. “Federal’noe agentstvo po delam Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv, sootechestvennikov, prozhyvaiushchikh za rubezhom, i po mezhdunarodnomu gumanitarnomu sotrudnichestvu (Rossotrudnichestvo)” [Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation]. https://sanctions.nazk.gov.ua/ru/sanction-company/3977/. Ukraine, President, Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrainy #726/2022 ‘Pro rishennia Rady natsionalnoi bezpeky i oborony Ukrainy vid 19 zhovtnia 2022 roku “Pro zastosuvannia ta vnesennia zmin do personalnykh spetsialnykh ekonomichnykh ta inshykh obmezhuvalnykh zakhodiv (sanktsiy).”’ Issued 19 October 2022. https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/7262022-44481.

RossotrudnichestvoThe Unbearable Harshness of Soft Power

Nadiia Koval, Maryna Irysova, Serhiy Tytiuk, Denys Tereshchenko

Introduction

For Russian leaders, soft power is not about attraction; it instead refers to non-military instruments for manipulating, undermining, and weakening opponents, a supplement to Moscow’s military power.

—Stefan Meister, Isolation and Propaganda. The Roots and Instruments of Russia’s Disinformation Campaign

Rossotrudnichestvo, or, in its full name, the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent State Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation, is an unusual case of a government agency that embraces multiple functions that in the West are typically distributed among numerous institutions. The analysis of its declared objectives, audiences, projects, and topics points to a comparison with internationally recognised cultural diplomacy institutions, such as the British Council, Goethe-Institut, or Institut français, and with international development agencies, such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)1 or the German Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ).

The first area Rossotrudnichestvo covers is “shaping an objective perception of contemporary Russia, its role and place in global history among the international community” (Rossotrudnichestvo 2021, 4). It is formally similar to the objectives of most cultural diplomacy institutions worldwide. However, as we will demonstrate in this chapter, it seeks to influence countries through cultural events in a way that creates a favourable ground for Russia’s expansionist policy and ideological visions, which in the most extreme cases turns into the use of soft power to justify or relativise the use of hard power.

The second area is “strengthening the humanitarian influence of Russia in the world.”2 It reveals Russia’s aspiration to present itself as a global donor of humanitarian assistance and expand its influence in certain regions through international development aid, providing economic and financial assistance to developing countries. This is a nationally mandated field of foreign policy work guided by Russia’s Policy Concept for international development aid and supervised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.3 Providing humanitarian assistance is also a way for Rossotrudnichestvo to avoid the limitations of traditional cultural diplomacy and to find more modern and effective ways to project the country’s power and influence. Thus, Yevgeny Primakov Jr., Head of Rossotrudnichestvo, claimed in 2019:

“Russia’s investment in humanitarian policy should pay off. It should promote our companies in new markets, keep our companies busy and bring them contracts, guarantee that the recipient countries pay their debt, and ensure that the lands surrounding our borders are secure and will never become a base for open or covert aggression.” (Novyie izvestiia 2019)

The third area of Rossotrudnichestvo is the loosely defined work with the audience that Russia refers to as “compatriots,” primarily ethnic Russians or Russian speakers in the countries of the former Soviet Union and beyond. This work comprises meeting their informational and cultural needs, assisting in their resettlement to Russia, reinforcing Russian identity, and supporting Russia’s political objectives, such as protecting the monuments and cemeteries abroad that are significant to Russia (Zakem, Saunders, and Antoun 2015, 39).

Such a combination of work areas is uncommon for soft power institutions in Western countries, but it is deeply related to the history and changing priorities of the organisation (see the section below). In addition, they often overlap with the activities of other bigger or lesser Russian organisations working in a similar direction. For instance, the “Russkiy Mir” (“Russian World”) Foundation, another Russian cultural diplomacy institution, also engages in promoting the Russian language, organising cultural events abroad and providing (micro)grants projects thematically related to Russia or Russian culture. Both Rossotrudnichestvo and “Russkiy Mir” Foundation pay significant attention to the needs of “compatriots” in their activities.

In addition to working in the three mentioned areas, Rossotrudnichestvo has a slew of other organisational, functional, operational, and ethical differences from its Western equivalents. Rossotrudnichestvo, along with a number of other Russian organisations, was identified as a Kremlin-funded instrument of disinformation and propaganda in a resolution passed by the European Parliament on November 23, 2016,4 and sanctioned by several countries in 2022.5 On top of that, and long before that, Rossotrudnichestvo and its foreign offices have a long legacy of accusations of espionage, provocations, and other scandals, including instances in the United States,6 the Czech Republic,7 and Ukraine.

This chapter aims to develop a comprehensive institutional profile of Rossotrudnichestvo, outlining its areas of operations and target audiences and the scope and nature of its influence in Russia’s information war. By looking at the propaganda element of Rossotrudnichestvo’s operations, this research focuses specifically on Rossotrudnichestvo’s information policy and influence campaigns since the beginning of the full-scale war against Ukraine on February 24, 2022. This research examined the official website of Rossotrudnichestvo and its social media accounts, in addition to the official documents governing Rossotrudnichestvo’s operations, such as decrees, resolutions, and other documents. It also uses secondary sources, i.e., relevant policy papers and media reports by Ukrainian and foreign authors.

1. Noms de Plume: Predecessors of Rossotrudnichestvo

Rossotrudnichestvo was officially founded on September 6, 2008, by Decree No. 1315 of the President of the Russian Federation, Dmitriy Medvedev. In contrast to other agencies established within the same period to promote Russia’s cultural influence abroad, Rossotrudnichestvo did not begin from scratch. Its predecessor agencies are nearly a century old. Each of the previous iterations of Rossotrudnichestvo was established and restructured amidst historical transformations and challenges posed to the international image of the Soviet Union and later Russia. Although they had different legal statuses (some were founded as civic organisations or associations), they were government-controlled and promoted pro-Soviet and pro-Russian propaganda (Svystovych 2011; Ditkovska 2014).

The first predecessor of Rossotrudnichestvo was the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS), established in 1925. The primary objective of VOKS was to whitewash the image of the Soviet Union and the Bolshevik government following the Civil War and its early years in power. This essentially state-run agency was in charge of organising cultural events with representatives of the Soviet Union abroad and bringing regime sympathisers to the Soviet Union.

It was rebranded for the first time in 1958 as part of the effort to combat the detrimental effect that Stalin’s regime had on the international image of the Soviet Union. While VOKS primarily targeted Western countries, the Soviet Union has sought to expand its global influence since the beginning of the Cold War. Consequently, VOKS became the Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (SRTD). It began establishing contacts with countries in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America that were friendly to the Soviet Union. Until 1991, the SRTD oversaw 98 societies and associations of friendship with the peoples of foreign countries and 600,000 students enrolled in Russian language courses abroad.8

After the Soviet Union collapsed and the Cold War ended, Russia inherited a vast network of cultural and research centres in 41 countries. The first female astronaut, Valentina Tereshkova, led the organisation from 1987 until 2004. The SRTD was transformed into the Russian Agency for International Cooperation and Development in 1992, and in 1994, its name was changed to the Russian Centre for International Science and Culture Cooperation (RosZarubezhCentr). These changes were likely not reflected in the SRTD’s work for a long time. RosZarubezhCentr expanded its operations in 2002, when it was resubordinated from the Government of Russia to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Eleonora Mitrofanova, a former Russian envoy to UNESCO, chaired it in 2004. Under Mitrofanova, RosZarubezhCentr shifted to prioritising work in the Baltic States and CIS countries, particularly with civic organisations (both organisations of “compatriots,” and local organisations). It also analysed and collected data about the Russian diaspora in the post-Soviet space.9

Notably, the predecessors of Rossotrudnichestvo, starting with VOKS, served to mask the intelligence work with a facade of cultural propaganda and the establishment of international cultural contacts.10 The intelligence function was an integral part of all successors of VOKS, and many of their employees were KGB or FSB agents or Soviet and Russian foreign intelligence. According to the Dossier Center, at least 17 out of RosZarubezhCentr’s 546 employees between 1994 and 2008 were agents of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (Dosie 2021).

Table 1. Predecessors of Rossotrudnichestvo

Title

Years

Subordination

Declared goals

All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS)

1925 – 1958

(established in the early years of the Soviet Union’s existence)

Held the status of a civic organisation

Establishing and fostering academic and cultural ties between institutions, civic organisations and individuals engaged in culture and arts from the Soviet Union and foreign countries.

Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (SRTD)

1958 – 1992

(Cold War period)

Officially an international all-union association (Tereshkova 1991)—association of civic organisations, including societies, associations, friendship committees, and republican associations for cultural relations with foreign countries, their industry sections). Funded by the state

Assisting the autonomous republics, oblasts, krais and cities of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic to establish commercial and cultural ties with foreign countries, thereby facilitating the receipt of humanitarian aid from abroad.

Russian Agency for International Cooperation and Development

1992 – 1994

(first years after the USSR disintegration)

It was a federal state agency subordinated to the Government of RF (i.e., belonging to its executive branch).11 As the SRTD's successor, the Russian Agency for International Cooperation and Development received the SRTD's facilities and other assets.

Implementing state policy in international financial and investment cooperation and coordinating advisory, technical, humanitarian and cultural cooperation with foreign governmental and non-governmental organisations.12

Russian Centre for International Science and Culture Cooperation under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (RosZarubezhCentr)

1994 – 2008

The successor of the Russian Agency for International Cooperation and Development. Received the premises and other property of the SRTD.

From 1994 to 2002, RosZarubezhCentr was a state agency subordinated to the Government of the Russian Federation.13 It has been under Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs since 2002.

Humanitarian, cultural, research and technical, and information relations of Russia with foreign countries through the established network of Russian research and cultural centres abroad. Assistance to Russian and foreign NGOs in fostering these relations.

Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent State Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo)

2008 – till now

(revision of Russia’s foreign policy doctrine, incorporation of soft power into its foreign policy strategy)

The successor of RosZarubezhCentr. A central federal state agency of the government’s executive branch. Reports to the President of Russia and operates under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia.14

Providing state services and managing public property in developing Russia’s international relations with CIS and other countries. Providing international humanitarian cooperation and international development aid.

RosZarubezhCentr was reformed into Rossotrudnichestvo in 2008 because of Russia’s realisation that it needed to reconsider its approach to the use of soft power and re-evaluate its weight in light of the 2003-2004 colour revolutions in Eastern Europe and the deterioration of attitudes toward Russia in the aftermath of its 2008 attack on Georgia. By the mid-2010s, Russia had a considerably lower soft power ranking than the United States, Canada, EU countries, Japan, China, and India. This period, however, witnessed the strengthening of Russia’s economy, political modernisation and other transformations that may have contributed to making Russia more attractive internationally and restoring its influence in the post-Soviet space (Iliuk 2016).