The Environmental Impact of COVID-19 E-Book
101,99 €
Mehr erfahren.
- Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
- Kategorie: Wissenschaft und neue Technologien
- Sprache: Englisch
THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF COVID-19 Discover the wider environmental effects of the COVID-19 pandemic with this up to date resource from leading voices in the field The Environmental Impact of COVID-19 delivers an insightful analysis of various environmental aspects of the COVID-19 pandemic that have caused global concern. The book discusses the transmission of COVID-19 in the environment, the pandemic's environmental impact, risk mitigation and management, management of COVID-related waste, and the environmental implications of the virus. It also considers the socio-economic implications of COVID-19's spread, including the effects of international lockdowns on different strata of society and various industries, including the biomedical industry, the environmental industry, and the pharmaceutical industry. An entire section of the text is devoted to a discussion about the waste generated due to COVID-19 and the effect of that waste on different environmental bodies. Another is dedicated to the impact of COVID-19 on the environment in the short- and long-term, including its effect on climate and climate change. Readers will also benefit from the inclusion of: * A thorough introduction to the transmission of COVID-19 in the environment, including its viability in different environmental media and the effect of environmental factors in its transmission * An evaluation and analysis of COVID-19, including traditional analytical techniques and sampling for COVID-19 and modern sensor-based techniques for identification * An exploration of the socio-economic implications of COVID-19, including its effect on a variety of industries * A treatment of the environmental impact of COVID-19 in the context of risk mitigation and management Perfect for academics and industry professionals whose work requires them to understand the wider environmental implications of the SARS-Cov-2 pandemic, The Environmental Impact of COVID-19 will also earn a place in the libraries of private sector professionals working on products and services that aim to reduce the environmental impact of the coronavirus.
Sie lesen das E-Book in den Legimi-Apps auf:
Seitenzahl: 601
Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2023
Ähnliche
Table of Contents
Cover
Table of Contents
Title Page
Copyright Page
Foreword
1 COVID‐19: A Pandemic ‐ Introduction
1.1 Introduction: Sources and Chemical Activities of COVID‐19
References
2 Viability of COVID‐19 in Different Environmental Surfaces
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Transmission of COVID‐19
2.3 Survival of COVID‐19 on Different Environmental Surfaces
2.4 Disinfection of the Surfaces as an Efficient Weapon Against Coronaviruses
2.5 Conclusion
References
3 Influence of Environmental Factors in Transmission of COVID‐19
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Temperature, Humidity, and Transmission of COVID‐19
3.3 Precipitation and Its Effects on COVID‐19 Transmission
3.4 Food Industry and COVID‐19 Transmission
3.5 Water and Sewage as a Medium for COVID‐19 Transmission
3.6 COVID‐19 Transmission via Air
3.7 Transmission of COVID‐19 Through Insects
3.8 Personal Hygiene Amidst COVID‐19 Transmission
3.9 Prevalence of SARS‐CoV‐2
3.10 Disinfection of Surfaces – SARS‐CoV‐2
3.11 Conclusion
References
4 Models and Strategies for Controlling the Transmission of COVID‐19
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Routes for the Transmission of COVID‐19
4.3 Models for the Transmission of COVID‐19
4.4 Strategies for the Transmission Control of COVID‐19
4.5 Conclusions
References
5 Traditional Analytical Techniques and Sampling of COVID‐19
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Sample Collection from Patients
5.3 Conclusion
References
6 Modern Sensor‐Based Techniques for Identification of COVID‐19
6.1 Introduction: Current Diagnosis for COVID‐19
6.2 Newer and Emerging Technologies
6.3 Conclusion
References
7 Advanced Digital Tools for Tracing and Analysis of COVID‐19
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Developments in Digital Strategies for COVID‐19
7.3 Artificial Intelligence in Curbing COVID‐19
7.4 Conclusion
References
8 Challenges and Preventive Interventions in COVID‐19 Transmission through Domestic Chemistry Hygiene: A Critical Assessment
8.1 Introduction
8.2 Bioaerosolization: Ground for Transmission of SARS‐CoV‐2
8.3 Fomites: Role in the Transmission of COVID‐19
8.4 Vulnerable Places for COVID‐19
8.5 Exposure to SARS‐CoV‐2 in Aerosolized Wastewater and Dynamic from the Sanitary Plumbing System
8.6 Scientific and Technological Solution for the Hygiene of Toilet Area to Curb COVID‐19 and Other Infections
8.7 Conclusive Remarks and Prospects for Future Research
Acknowledgments
Conflict of Interest
References
9 Industries and COVID‐19
9.1 Introduction
9.2 Renewable and Green Energy Industries
9.3 Agriculture Industry
9.4 Petroleum and Oil Industry
9.5 Manufacturing Industry
9.6 Education
9.7 Health Care Industry
9.8 Pharmaceutical Industry
9.9 Hospitality
9.10 Tourism
9.11 Air Travel
9.12 Real Estate and Housing Industry
9.13 Sports Industry
9.14 Information Technology, Media, Research and Development
9.15 Food Sector
9.16 Conclusion
References
10 Ramifications of Coronavirus on the Environment
10.1 Introduction
10.2 Footprints of Coronavirus Pandemic on the Surroundings (Mother Nature)
10.3 Increase in Hospital Wastes
10.4 COVID‐19 Declined Global Warming
10.5 Poor Management of Waste
10.6 Reset of Nature
10.7 Soil Contamination
10.8 Destruction of Arable Land
10.9 Increased Poaching Activity
10.10 COVID‐19 Resulted in the Loss of a Great Number of People
10.11 Negligence of Environmental Sanitation
10.12 Decrease of Municipal Wastewater Particles
10.13 Future Implications
References
11 Management of Risks Associated with COVID‐19
11.1 Introduction
11.2 Types
11.3 Origin
11.4 Structure
11.5 Risk Associated with COVID‐19
11.6 Risk Management and Mitigation
11.7 Conclusion and Future Perspectives
References
12 Case Studies: COVID‐19 and the Environment
12.1 Introduction
12.2 COVID‐19 and Its Impact on the Environment – A Case Study of China
12.3 Environmental Impact of Particulate Matter in Italy Due to COVID‐19
12.4 Impact Upon the Atmospheric Environment of the Southeast Asia Region
12.5 Impact of COVID‐19 Lockdown on PM
10
, SO
2
, and NO
2
Concentrations in Salé City, Morocco
12.6 Correlation of Pandemic‐Induced Lockdown and Stone Quarrying and Crushing – An Indian Perspective
12.7 Temperature vs. COVID‐19 Transmission – Brazil
12.8 Correlation of COVID‐19 and Air Quality in Spain
12.9 Weather Impacts COVID‐19 Transmission – A Case Study of Turkey
12.10 COVID‐19 vs. Ambient Temperature – A Perspective of Canada
12.11 Conclusion
References
13 Effect of Waste Generated Due to COVID‐19
13.1 Introduction
13.2 Impact of COVID‐19 on Waste Production
13.3 Classification of Waste Generated Due to the COVID‐19 Pandemic
13.4 Reduction in Waste Recycling
13.5 Environmental Impacts of COVID‐19
13.6 Management of the Generated Waste Due to the COVID‐19 Pandemic
13.7 Technical Approaches to Waste Management for the Post‐COVID‐19 World
13.8 Conclusion
References
14 Strategies for Effective Waste Management for COVID‐19
14.1 Introduction
14.2 Composition of Wastes Corresponding to the COVID‐19 Pandemic
14.3 Solid Waste
14.4 Biomedical Wastes
14.5 A Global Perspective Upon COVID‐19 Waste Management
14.6 Conclusion
References
15 Environmental Policies and Strategies for COVID‐19
15.1 Introduction
15.2 Linking Policy with the Environment
15.3 Challenges of Creating Environmental Policy for COVID‐19 and Subsequent Pandemics
15.4 Environmental Strategies for COVID‐19
15.5 Conclusion
References
16 Environmental Implications of Pandemic on Climate
16.1 Introduction
16.2 Cast Study 1: Megacities of India (Jain and Sharma 2020)
16.3 Results and Analysis
16.4 Cast Study 2: Selected Cities of Rajasthan, India
16.5 Result and Analysis
16.6 Special Area of Study: Bhiwadi
16.7 Conclusion
References
17 COVID‐19 Pandemic: A Blessing in Disguise
17.1 Introduction: A “Make or Break” Perspective
17.2 How Coronavirus Is Shaping Sustainable Development
17.3 Reverting to Dirty Fuels
17.4 Consequences of the Pandemic on Fragile States
17.5 Energy Security
17.6 Conclusion
References
Index
End User License Agreement
List of Tables
Chapter 2
Table 2.1 Survival of coronavirus on difference environmental surfaces.
Chapter 3
Table 3.1 Prevalence of coronaviruses on different surfaces.
Table 3.2 Suspension test – inactivation of coronaviruses by different disi...
Table 3.3 Carrier test – inactivation of coronaviruses by different disinfe...
Table 3.4 Kinetics of SARS‐CoV‐2 and SARS‐CoV‐1 neutralization by the means...
Chapter 6
Table 6.1 Definition of ASSURED diagnostics.
Chapter 7
Table 7.1 Nations and their initiatives in digital technologies for contact...
Chapter 11
Table 11.1 Certain features of different coronavirus.
Table 11.2 Genetic association of SARS‐CoV‐2 with other bat coronaviruses....
Chapter 15
Table 15.1 Response of established environmental policies to COVID‐19.
Chapter 16
Table 16.1 Values of air pollutants as per the NAAQS standards and the WHO ...
List of Illustrations
Chapter 1
Figure 1.1 A schematic diagram showing SARS‐CoV‐2 transmission through diffe...
Figure 1.2 Clinical manifestations of infection with SARS‐CoV‐2 in humans.
Figure 1.3 A schematic chart showing the treatment options for COVID‐19.
Chapter 2
Figure 2.1 Survival of COVID‐19 on different environmental media.
Chapter 3
Figure 3.1 Transmission of COVID‐19 accounting to different environmental fa...
Chapter 4
Figure 4.1 The proposed various routes for the transmission of COVID‐19.
Chapter 6
Figure 6.1 Emerging diagnostic methods for the detection of COVID‐19.
Figure 6.2 A schematic depicting the working of Aptamer‐based detection of t...
Figure 6.3 Novel diagnostic technologies for COVID‐19 detection. (a) Localiz...
Chapter 7
Figure 7.1 Digital tools for tracing and analysis of COVID‐19.
Figure 7.2 Steps of conventional contact tracing.
Figure 7.3 Artificial Intelligence (AI) in curbing of COVID‐19.
Chapter 8
Figure 8.1 Major areas of concern in a toilet acting as a medium of spread....
Figure 8.2 Various antimicrobial surfaces resistant to microbes: (a) Photoac...
Figure 8.3 Schematic diagram representing interventions that can be employed...
Chapter 9
Figure 9.1 A schematic diagram listing out the industries impacted by the CO...
Chapter 10
Figure 10.1 A summary of the ramification of coronavirus on the environment....
Figure 10.2 Releasing of the biomedical waste into the environment.
Figure 10.3 The destruction of arable land during COVID‐19.
Figure 10.4 The types of biomedical waste.
Chapter 11
Figure 11.1 SARS‐CoV‐2 – organization of genome.
Figure 11.2 Structure of SARS‐CoV‐2.
Chapter 13
Figure 13.1 Classification of waste generated due to the COVID‐19 pandemic....
Figure 13.2 Different environmental impacts of COVID‐19.
Chapter 14
Figure 14.1 Types of COVID‐19 wastes.
Figure 14.2 Food waste management strategies.
Figure 14.3 Point sources of plastic wastes.
Figure 14.4 International organizations and their perspectives on mitigating...
Chapter 15
Figure 15.1 Timeline of the development of the global environmental policy....
Chapter 17
Figure 17.1 A schematic diagram showing reduction in major energy sources le...
Figure 17.2 A schematic showing the emerging themes for sustainable developm...
Figure 17.3 A schematic diagram showing the implications of COVID‐19 on the ...
Figure 17.4 A schematic diagram depicting the need for sustainable efforts f...
Guide
Cover Page
Title Page
Copyright Page
Foreword
Table of Contents
Begin Reading
Index
WILEY END USER LICENSE AGREEMENT
Pages
iii
iv
xiii
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
The Environmental Impact of COVID‐19
Edited by
Deepak Rawtani
National Forensic Sciences Univ.
Gujarat
India
Chaudhery Mustansar Hussain
New Jersey Inst. of Technology
U.S.A
This edition first published 2024© 2024 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, except as permitted by law. Advice on how to obtain permission to reuse material from this title is available at http://www.wiley.com/go/permissions.
The right of Deepak Rawtani and Chaudhery Mustansar Hussain to be identified as the authors of this work has been asserted in accordance with law.
Registered OfficesJohn Wiley & Sons, Inc., 111 River Street, Hoboken, NJ 07030, USAJohn Wiley & Sons Ltd, The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, PO19 8SQ, UK
For details of our global editorial offices, customer services, and more information about Wiley products visit us at www.wiley.com.
Wiley also publishes its books in a variety of electronic formats and by print‐on‐demand. Some content that appears in standard print versions of this book may not be available in other formats.
Trademarks: Wiley and the Wiley logo are trademarks or registered trademarks of John Wiley & Sons, Inc. and/or its affiliates in the United States and other countries and may not be used without written permission. All other trademarks are the property of their respective owners. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. is not associated with any product or vendor mentioned in this book.
Limit of Liability/Disclaimer of WarrantyWhile the publisher and authors have used their best efforts in preparing this work, they make no representations or warranties with respect to the accuracy or completeness of the contents of this work and specifically disclaim all warranties, including without limitation any implied warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. No warranty may be created or extended by sales representatives, written sales materials or promotional statements for this work. This work is sold with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering professional services. The advice and strategies contained herein may not be suitable for your situation. You should consult with a specialist where appropriate. The fact that an organization, website, or product is referred to in this work as a citation and/or potential source of further information does not mean that the publisher and authors endorse the information or services the organization, website, or product may provide or recommendations it may make. Further, readers should be aware that websites listed in this work may have changed or disappeared between when this work was written and when it is read. Neither the publisher nor authors shall be liable for any loss of profit or any other commercial damages, including but not limited to special, incidental, consequential, or other damages.
Library of Congress Cataloging‐in‐Publication DataNames: Rawtani, Deepak, editor. | Hussain, Chaudhery Mustansar, editor.Title: The environmental impact of COVID‐19 / Deepak Rawtani, Chaudhery Mustansar Hussain.Description: Hoboken, NJ : Wiley, 2024. | Includes index.Identifiers: LCCN 2022055656 (print) | LCCN 2022055657 (ebook) | ISBN 9781119777373 (cloth) | ISBN 9781119777380 (adobe pdf) | ISBN 9781119777397 (epub)Subjects: LCSH: COVID‐19 (Disease)–Environmental aspects.Classification: LCC RA644.C67 E595 2023(print) | LCC RA644.C67(ebook) | DDC 614.5/924144–dc23/eng/20221202LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022055656LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022055657
Cover image: © Andrii Vodolazhskyi/ShutterstockCover design by Wiley
Foreword
“All outstanding work, in art as well as in science, results from immense zeal applied to a great idea” this quote by “Santiago Ramón y Cajal” aptly defines the cadence of the editors with their artwork titled “The Environmental Impact of COVID‐19”. This book is a complete guide to the influence of the pandemic COVID‐19 that changed the world and its impact on the environment.
The book is smartly divided into 18 chapters ranging from topics like environmental factors, Viability, and strategies for curbing COVID‐19, to traditional, modern, and digital techniques for analysis of COVID. Apart from the topics mentioned earlier, this book also sheds light on case studies of COVID‐19 and its impact on the environment, waste management strategies and implications on pandemic on climate change.
The challenges in the environmental management of COVID are both problematic and fascinating. People are working on them with enthusiasm, tenacity, and dedication to develop new methods to manage and mitigate pandemic level threats and provide novel solutions to keep up with dynamic threats. In this new age of interdependence and globalization, it is necessary for practitioners, students and professionals to have state of the art know how about factors influencing the environment concerning COVID‐19.
This book provides very useful information and guidance in handling various environment‐related issues with regard to COVID‐19.
Dr. J.M. Vyas
(Vice Chancellor)
National Forensic Sciences University
1COVID‐19: A Pandemic ‐ Introduction
Pratik Kulkarni1, Tejas Barot1, Piyush Rao1, Aayush Dey1, and Deepak Rawtani2
1 School of Doctoral Studies & Research (SDSR), National Forensic Sciences University (Ministry of Home affairs, GOI), Gandhinagar, Gujarat, India
2 School of Pharmacy, National Forensic Sciences University (Ministry of Home affairs, GOI), Gandhinagar, Gujarat, India
1.1 Introduction: Sources and Chemical Activities of COVID‐19
Coronavirus or COVID‐19 is an infectious disease caused by a novel virus known as extreme coronavirus‐2 respiratory syndrome (SARS‐CoV‐2). It began to spread as a disease from Wuhan, the capital of the province of Hubei in China, in December 2019. It has since spread worldwide, contributing to an ongoing pandemic, as announced by the WHO on 11 March 2020 (Hui et al. 2020; Hui and Zumla 2019; Tang et al. 2020b). With more than 9 months under the pandemic, more than 70 million people have been tested positive for infection and more than a million deaths and counting worldwide. Its primary source was identified in the respiratory tract of patients in Wuhan undergoing treatment for pneumonia, which was then identified as the new SARS‐CoV‐2 virus.
The original source of the virus is still unknown, but the first cases were related to the Huanan Seafood Market in Wuhan. There are also some wild animals known to be sold on the market, including birds, marmots, bats, and snakes. It was shown that market samples were positive for the novel virus, but the animal was not specified (Astuti 2020; Guo et al. 2020; Tian et al. 2020). However, recent reports have suggested that bats could be the potential host of the virus as they shared96 % homology of the entire genome‐wide sequence with the bat CoV. From the genetic analysis, a region of RNA‐dependent RNA polymerase (RdRP) gene in SARS‐CoV‐2 was confirmed to be similar to a region of RdRP found in bat coronavirus RaTG13 with an astounding 96% homology of the genome sequence. Of more than 100 strains sequenced till the end of March, a 99.9% sequence match was observed but since then several changes in the genome have been discovered, which show a high probability of sequence diversity in the virus. Pangolin CoV genomes have also been found to have an 85.5–92.4 % homology with SARS‐CoV‐2, indicating that SARS‐CoV‐2 could be a potential intermediate host. How the virus transmits from either bats or pangolins needs to be studied more for a better confirmation (Harapan et al. 2020; Shereen et al. 2020; Udugama et al. 2020; ul Qamar et al. 2020).
1.1.1 Sources and Transmission
Currently, the source of transmission is known to be from human to human through respiratory droplets. Yet, not the only probable source of transmission is the respiratory tract. As a source of transmission, close contact has also been confirmed (Figure 1.1). For example, the virus can be transmitted by direct or indirect contact with the mucous membranes of the eye, mouth, or nose (Hui and Zumla 2019; Hui et al. 2020; Tang et al. 2020b). In a closed environment with relatively high aerosol concentrations, the possibility of aerosol transmission also exists (Astuti 2020). Some gastrointestinal symptoms have also been reported including diarrhea, nausea, and vomiting. All populations are vulnerable to the virus. Mostly elderlies and people with a weak immune function or underlying diseases are likely to become severely affected by the virus. Additionally, pregnant women and new‐born babies infected with the virus can develop severe pneumonia. This group of patients should therefore be considered to be of primary importance in preventing and managing SARS‐CoV‐2 attacks (Astuti 2020; ul Qamar et al. 2020).
Figure 1.1 A schematic diagram showing SARS‐CoV‐2 transmission through different routes.
1.1.2 Structure of SARS‐CoV‐2
The virus is recognized as a non‐segmented, enveloped, positive‐sense RNA virus that is part of the subfamily of sarbecovirus, orthocoronavirinae, widely distributed in humans and other mammals. SARS‐CoV‐2 is about 60–140 nm in diameter and contains single‐stranded RNA with 30,000 nucleotides in length (Wu et al. 2020). It is characterized by a distinct crown‐like spikes on its outer surface, and its genome has 27 encoded proteins which also includes RdRP and 4 structural proteins with different functions namely Spike surface glycoprotein (S), which is involved in the coding for proteins that form receptor‐binding spikes that help the virus to infect cells by binding to the receptors via embrane fusion (Sexton et al. 2016; Tang et al. 2020a; Wrapp et al. 2020). This binding also determines its host tropism and transmission capabilities. The other three proteins – Nucleocapsid protein (N), Small envelope protein (E), and Matrix protein (M) – are more conserved than the S protein and are essential for proper virus functioning. These proteins are involved in the encapsulation of RNA and/or proteins into protein assemblies, envelope formation, budding, and pathogenesis (Bauch and Orabyet al. 2013; Lim et al. 2016; Neuman et al. 2011; Schoeman and Fielding 2019).
SARS‐CoV‐2 is considered to have a long transmission period as its mean incubation time is estimated within three to seven days. It has also been reported that asymptomatic patients of the virus could be effective carriers during their incubation period (Udugama et al. 2020). This property is different from other SARS‐CoV as most of those cases are transmitted via agents known as “superspreaders” and those who cannot infect others during their incubation period. These data thus support the current WHO guidelines of a 14‐day quarantine period for active monitoring (Udugama et al. 2020; Yi et al. 2020).
1.1.3 Common Symptoms, Immune Reaction to the Virus, and Mechanism of Entry
Fatigue, fever, dry cough, dyspnea, and myalgia are key manifestations of the disease. Nasal congestion, sore throat, runny nose, headache, vomiting, and diarrhea are some less common symptoms (Figure 1.2). Patients termed under severe category often have dyspnea and/or hypoxia after a week of onset which is followed by septic shock, acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS), metabolic acidosis which is difficult to correct, and coagulation dysfunction that develops rapidly. Patients with mild fatigue, low fever, and absence of pneumonia can be considered asymptomatic but can still spread the virus between humans (Udugama et al. 2020; Zhou et al. 2020).
Figure 1.2 Clinical manifestations of infection with SARS‐CoV‐2 in humans.
Invasion of the virus into the host cell triggers an immune response which the innate immune system encounters through antigen presenting cells (APC), e.g. macrophages, dendritic cells (Chen et al. 2020; Guo et al. 2020; Huang et al. 2020). This APCs have specific receptors known as Pattern Recognition Receptors (PRR) located in several regions in the host cells like plasma and endosomal membranes, lysosomes, cytosol, and endocytolysosomes. Now, recognition of pathogen‐associated molecular patterns (PAMP) comprising viral structural components including nucleic acid, carbohydrate moieties, glycoproteins induces cascade signaling to produce immune cell effectors which trigger a different biological response following protein activation. For instance, Toll‐like receptor 4 (TLR‐4) might induce the protein spikes of CoV to produce proinflammatory cytokines like IFN‐α, IFN‐γ, IL‐1β, IL‐6, TNF‐α, TGFβ and chemokines like CCL2,3,5, CXCL8,9,10. Their excessive release from the cells of the immune effector leads to hyperinflammation, resulting in ARDS eventually (Chen et al. 2010, 2020; Cheung et al. 2005; Huang et al. 2020; Li et al. 2020a, 2020c; Rabi et al. 2020).
Various studies have shown that SARS‐CoV‐2 host cell entry is regulated by its interaction with the angiotensin‐converting enzyme 2 (ACE‐2) (Zhou et al. 2020). A critical finding stated that in comparison to SARS‐CoV, SARS‐CoV‐2 spikes bind to the ACE‐2 enzyme with 10–20 times higher affinity, thereby making it easier to spread among the humans. Therefore, upon entry into the respiratory epithelial cells, the virus replicates quickly, along with triggering a strong immune response characterized by cytokine storm syndromes known as hypercytokinaemia. This group of disorders is characterized by an uncontrollable increase in cytokine production, which leads to ARDS and ultimately leading to multiple organ failure. Studies have revealed that many patients succumbed to multiple organ failure indicating a substantial decrease in T‐cell population, whereas surviving T‐cell population being functionally exhausted, indicated decreased immunity in the patients with secondary infections, worsening the respiratory failure even further (Li et al. 2020b).
1.1.3.1 Immuno‐evasion of Coronaviruses
Viruses including the novel SARS‐CoV‐2 have several ways to avoid the immune defense mechanisms to survive and infect the host cells (Janeway et al. 2008; Li et al. 2020a). The state of the cell before and after the entry of the virus is very crucial in determining the immune evasion potential of the virus.
The virus can form double vesicles outside the cells to evade recognition processes which acts as shields of cytosolic PRRs to dsRNA as intermediate products (Li et al. 2020). Apart from double vesicle formation, blocking INF is also a part of virus immune evasion. A non‐structural protein group termed as nsp1 from SARS‐CoV acts as INF‐I suppressors via inactivating host translational machinery, RNA and inhibiting STAT1 phosphorylation. At an early stage, failure of INF‐I leads to initiation of viral replication and subsequent dissemination, thus increasing the severity of disease (Prompetchara et al. 2020; Totura and Baric 2012). SARS‐CoV lack a 5’ cap in its structure making it easier for the immune system to recognize it. However, SARS‐CoV‐2 has developed a host mimicking property by using two nonstructural proteins, namely nsp 14, which is a protein‐forming cap followed by a nsp 16 modification. This mechanism makes viral RNA similar to host cell RNA and prevents recognition of any PRR (Chen et al. 2009; Daffis et al. 2010; Totura and Baric 2012).
1.1.3.2 World at Loss due to COVID‐19
COVID‐19 has become a pandemic of a major scale which has impacted the lifestyle of all the nations globally. The pandemic has contributed to significant socioeconomic instability, resulting in the largest global recession in history. All social meeting events, including sports, religious, political, and cultural meetings, have been postponed or cancelled with one‐third of the global population being under lockdown (Evans 2020; Nicas 2020; Nicola et al. 2020). Also, schools, universities, and colleges have been closed until further notice in more than 197 countries (Nicola et al. 2020). Moreover, misinformation related to the virus and its spread has caused incidents of discrimination and xenophobia against Chinese people. On the contrary, there has been a significant decrease in environmental pollution and carbon emissions due to travel bans in most nations and the closure of heavy industries (Brief 2020; Sui 2020; UNESCO 2020).
Impact on political systems has been prominent as it caused suspensions of legislative meetings, rescheduling of elections due to fear of virus spread, and isolation or deaths of multiple political leaders (Evans 2020). The pandemic has affected the educational systems of all schools, colleges, and universities worldwide, leading to near closure. According to UNESCO monitoring, more than 192 countries have implemented national closures. Some countries have applied for local closures and collectively this has impacted more than 90% of world’s student population (Chen et al. 2020). Apart from impacting students, teachers, and their families, the pandemic has also caused far‐reaching socioeconomic consequences. The pandemic has shed light on various social and economic issues, including student debt, food insecurity, disability and digital learning services, and access to housing and the internet. This has affected the disadvantaged children and their families the most due to problems like interrupted learning, childcare problems, nutritional problems, and economic burden on the families of the children who cannot work. In response to curb this, UNESCO has suggested distance learning program via open educational applications and facilities to provide remote learning to the students (Boseley 2020; Chen et al. 2020; Strumpf 2020).
Owing to the pandemic, worries have moved from supply‐side manufacturing problems to a downturn in enterprises in the services sector from a socioeconomic perspective. Owing to panic purchasing and shortages of food and other supermarket products, supply shortages have been affected a lot. Shortage of face masks and common drugs was also seen due to panic buying and insufficient supply of the stocks (Bachman 2020; Strumpf 2020). The technology industry has also warned about the delays in delivery of electronic goods. Global stock markets saw the largest fall in the history since the 2008 financial crisis and lead to crash of the stock markets. Global conferences and events across sports, fashion, and technology industries have been postponed or cancelled due to the pandemic (Wilson and Campus 2020). There is also an approximate monetary effect on the travel and trade market, which is expected to be in the billions and is still growing. The International Labor Organization reported an approximate loss of 30 million jobs, compared to 25 million during the 2008 financial crisis. On 18 March, the WHO published a study on mental health and psychosocial problems and discussed advice on various social considerations during the outbreak.
The sectors of performing arts and cultural heritage have had a profound effect on their organizational activities as well as on people who are working, autonomous, or both. Organizations have continued to preserve their publicly supported missions in order to provide communities with the requisite access to cultural heritage and to maintain public safety and promote artists worldwide. There has been a striking impact on the environment and the climate due to the pandemic as well. A significant drop in air pollution due to imposing of travel ban has been observed globally. Approximately 25% reduction has been witnessed in carbon emissions in China. However, this has also affected the environmental diplomacy efforts worldwide, thereby postponing of the United Nations Climate Change Conference. Its impact is also presumed to be seen in an economic fallout leading to a lesser investment in green energy and renewable technologies (Jin et al. 2020; National UNESCO 2020).
1.1.3.3 Incubation Period
The incubation period of the infection is 2–14 days, with an average incubation period of 3–7 days, indicating a long duration of transmission. The latency period of the virus is estimated to be consistent with other known human viruses, for instance, non‐SARS human CoVs, SARS CoV, and Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS)‐CoV, which has a range of 2–5 transmission for non‐human CoV and 2‐ to 14‐day transmission rate for SARS and MERS‐CoV, along with a mean rate of 3, 5, and 5.7 days, respectively (Assiri et al. 2013; Lessler et al. 2009). Asymptomatic patients with COVID‐19 are reported to transmit the virus at a similar effectiveness during their incubation period which increases its transmission at a much faster rate (Quilty et al. 2020; Rothe et al. 2020). This behavior of SARS‐CoV‐2 is different from SARS‐CoV, as the latter is caused mostly due to “superspreaders” and they do not infect the susceptible persons during their incubation period (Lipsitch et al. 2003). Therefore, with this data available, the current period as recommended by WHO is of 14 days, for active monitoring of the patients (Udugama et al. 2020; Yi et al. 2020).
1.1.3.4 SARS‐CoV‐2 and Basic Reproduction Number (R0)
To evaluate the transmissibility of SARS‐CoV‐2, a basic reproduction number is available, expressed as R nought (R0) and is defined as the average number of infections (secondary) spread by an active SARS‐CoV‐2 patient. As per reports, an R0 value >1 indicates an exponential spread of the virus and can cause an epidemic or pandemic. The R0 of this virus has been reported to be in the range of 1.4–6.49 (mean: 3.28), which is significantly higher than the SARS‐CoV range of R0 2–5 (Liu et al. 2020).
1.1.3.5 Pathological Characteristics
Biopsy reports from the very first patient infected and died from the infection have revealed pathological characteristics of the virus similar to ARDS. Pneumocyte desquamation and hyaline membrane formation were evident from histological analysis of lung tissue, indicating ARDS. Also, the lung tissues were found to be infiltrated by interstitial mononuclear activity. Moreover, the intra‐alveolar spaces were found to have giant multinucleated cells with enlarged atypical pneumocytes having large nuclei and a prominent nucleolus with amphophilic granular cytoplasm which suggested changes of viral cytopathic nature (Xu et al. 2020). These pathological features are similar to that of SARS‐CoV and MERS‐CoV infected patients (Ding et al. 2003; Ng et al. 2014). Hence, understanding the pathology of the virus and its comparison with its familial counterparts could help physicians develop a timely strategy for their treatment and reduce their mortality rate.
1.1.3.6 Case Definitions
The case definitions are currently based on the provisional guidance documents provided by the WHO (Chatterjee et al. 2020; WHO 2020a). An acute respiratory infection called SARI is an example of a history of fever with a measured temperature of >38°C and cough, an initiation of infection within a 10‐day period, and hospitalization is required.
For SARS‐CoV‐2 infection, surveillance case descriptions include a person with SARI and no other etiology with one of the following:
travel history in the last 14 days to Wuhan, Hubei Province, China; and
a healthcare worker (HCW) looking after an SARI patient and patients of uncertain etiology.
In addition, patients with acute respiratory disease and one of the following conditions:
direct contact with an infected individual or a possible case within 14 days of the onset of SARS‐CoV‐2; and
visited or operated within 14 days before the onset of symptoms in a healthcare facility where positive cases of infection have been identified.
There remains the elusiveness of a delicate and precise concept of community‐based oversight. The referral metrics and their impact‐based results have yet to be determined. Concerns regarding the current outbreak, such as the need to quarantine children, the minimum quarantine time, and its impact on mental and socioeconomic costs, also need to be addressed.
1.1.3.7 Prevention of Transmission
Respiratory droplets and physical contact are the chief sources of SARS‐CoV‐2 transmission. Hence, precautionary measures are of prime importance and standard methods include hand hygiene, using personal protective equipment (PPE) kits, and respiratory etiquettes. Use of alcohol‐based hand rubs, having 60–80% alcohol, is recommended currently as a part of hand hygiene. A proper hand wash with soap and water following the correct steps have proved to suffice. For hand drying, the use of cloth towels must be avoided and disposable tissue paper has been recommended. A PPE kit comprises medical grade face masks or particulate respirators, face shields, goggles, gloves, gowns, and shoe covers (Chang et al. 2020, Chatterjee et al. 2020). Face or procedure masks along with a head strap should be sufficient for droplet and contact‐based transmission. When entering the patient's room, utmost care must be taken and the kits must be worn before entering and removed only after leaving it. For those in group settings and who are symptomatic, it is mandatory. Due to an increased risk of exposure, it is mandatory for patients in home care environments, suspected cases of moderate respiratory symptoms with COVID‐19, and even HCWs to always wear medical masks, along with observing hand hygiene and proper disposal (Chang et al. 2020). National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH)‐certified N‐95 masks and EU standard FFP2 or equivalent are examples of particulate respirators which must be compulsorily used by the HCWs in aerosol‐generating procedures (AGPs). In addition to wearing long‐sleeved, waterproof, sterile gowns made of non‐absorbent materials, face shields or goggles must also be worn when performing AGPs. Waterproof aprons, where gowns are not appropriate, should be sufficient. Latex, powder‐free gloves must be used when handling infectious materials from the patient. In order to follow the respiratory and cough labels, the nose and mouth must be covered while sneezing and coughing through disposable tissue paper, not a cotton cloth. Flexing the elbow to cover the nose and mouth must be done if nothing is available, followed by appropriate hand hygiene. Most importantly, symptomatic patients should not be allowed to congregate in public places and crowded areas while in the community settings. Self‐deferral and containment must be encouraged using the Information, education, and communication (IEC) messages, especially for the symptomatic patients. For patients advised for home care, a well‐ventilated room must be arranged and for those in the healthcare settings, a negative pressure room must be arranged (Chang et al. 2020, Chatterjee et al. 2020).
1.1.3.8 Quarantine
WHO has stated that, “The International Health Regulations (IHR) being an international legal instrument binds 194 countries worldwide, including all the WHO member States. They aim to assist the international community in preventing and responding to acute public health risks with the potential to cross borders and threaten people globally, according to the official statement” (WHO 2020b). In order to establish procedures that must be followed by the WHO to maintain global public health security, the IHR is also defined as “the rights and obligations of nations to report public health events” (WHO 2020b). The Department of Health and Family Welfare around the world has issued travel restrictions and additional advice from time to time, taking into account the rise in cases, in line with the outlined IHR principles. Travelling by all means (air, ship, etc.) was regulated and open only for rescue missions such as “Vande Bharat Mission” of India and for supply of necessary goods like medical equipment and food around the world. Currently, many countries like India, the United States, the United Kingdom have gradually started to and fro travel of foreign nationals and travelers. However, tourists are still exempted from travelling to other countries (MOHFW 2019). Upon returning to any country, a mandatory 14‐day quarantine period has been established for everyone, except under medical emergencies (MOHFW 2019). The impact of such travel ban is yet to be seen on the economy and other sectors; however, it is estimated to be a loss in millions of dollars (Chinazzi et al. 2020). Until the pandemic outbreak is staunched, such bans may only provide a symbolic shield. Moreover, imposition of such travel bans has also raised many ethical concerns (Habibi et al. 2020). In an example, a cruise named Diamond Princess, docked off from Yokohama in Japan, was subjected to quarantine for a period two weeks, after a tourist tested positive after disembarking at Hong Kong (Dooley and Rich 2020; The Japan Times 2020). Out of 3700 passengers and aboard, 705 were tested positive for the virus. At one point, this incident became the second largest site of outbreak outside China. The worldwide imposition of lockdown has been viewed as a drastic measure of public health (Habibi et al. 2020; Sands et al. 2016). The benefits of such a decision continue to be addressed, but it is not appropriate to underplay the long‐term adverse effects induced by it (Stone 2020). This has inevitably led to economic, social, and psychological stress on the whole population and has a certain detrimental effect on long‐term health (Poletto et al. 2014). Such government‐led interventions remain debatable and coercive in terms of top‐down quarantine approaches; population‐controlled and civil society‐controlled self‐quarantine and monitoring could establish more sustainable and implementable approaches in a pandemic of this scale (Li et al. 2020).
1.1.3.9 Global Response by WHO
WHO and the Global Research Collaboration for Infectious Disease Preparedness held a meeting at its headquarters in Geneva on 11 and 12 February 2020 to bring together research funders and leading scientists around the world to evaluate current information on the novel coronavirus disease, identify weaknesses, and develop a collaborative effort to fund the priority‐based research needed (WHO 2020c).
Following this, a Global Surveillance for COVID‐19 infection in humans was established by WHO, and 16 laboratories globally were selected for referral testing on confirmatory basis. For laboratory diagnosis, interim guidance documents have been prepared by the WHO (WHO 2020d, 2020e). Home care for suspected patients with the infection and practice of hand and face hygiene at healthcare settings, clinical management, risk communication and engagement with the community, preventing further infection, and global surveillance are also included in the documents (WHO 2020f, 2020g). Moreover, an online course has also been developed by the WHO to educate people and HCWs regarding the emerging respiratory viruses including the novel coronavirus. Also, a commodity package has been established for a quick set‐up of emergency isolation and quarantine facilities, which includes a list of essential biomedical equipment (WHO 2020h, 2020i). As per reports, the SARS outbreak back in 2003 was originated from mutation in coronavirus spread from small carnivorous animals sold at the live market in Guangdong, China. Mask palm civets, Chinese ferret badgers, and racoon dogs were the likely sources (Bell et al. 2004; Cyranoski and Abbott 2003; Guan et al. 2003). Likewise, for the 2012 MERS‐CoV outbreak, dramedy camels were found to be the virus sources (Azhar et al. 2014).
Assuming that the increase in COVID‐19 cases could be due to exposure to the live animal market, WHO has since prohibited its business with immediate effect from 21 January 2020. Thus, the importance of adopting the One Health Framework in prevention against deadly pathogens is indicated by such spill over events (Chatterjee et al. 2016; McKenzie et al. 2016). As evident during previous outbreaks, Nipah and Ebola virus diseases, HCWs are always at a risk of contacting the infection and may contribute to the disease morbidity and mortality (Arunkumar et al. 2019; Evans et al. 2015; Hewlett and Hewlett 2005; Kumar et al. 2019; Pallivalappil et al. 2020). Transmission from an asymptomatic patient has always been a major concern. For example, before the onset of fever, more than 10 HCWs were infected by a patient undergoing surgery (WHO 2020j). In several early case examples of hospital‐associated transmission, 40 HCWs and 17 hospitalized patients were infected with the novel virus and represented a total of 29% and 12% of all the cases, respectively (Wang et al. 2020).
Mental health issues have also been a substantial threat during such infections which includes generalized anxiety disorders, depression, and poor sleep (Huang et al. 2020; Zhu et al. 2020). There have also been increasing reports of stigma surrounding people of Asian origin globally (CDC et al. 2020). In order to prevent such stigmas, a guide has been developed by WHO by collaborating with the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and United Nations Children’s Fund. In addition, during the second meeting of the IHR Emergency Committee, a statement was issued highlighting the caution of the member states against creating any policies that promote stigma and discrimination in accordance with the principles of the IHR set out in Article 3.
1.1.4 Treatments
Currently there is no treatment available for the disease, and there are many potential antiviral drug therapies along with some other combinations which have proven effectiveness against the viral infection. Individuals suspected and confirmed as positive for the infection are recommended to be treated in hospitals or at home under specific isolation and protective settings. Suspected patients can be isolated and treated in a private room, and similarly, the confirmed ones can be treated in the same ward. However, critical cases need to be transferred to the intensive care unit as quickly as possible.
1.1.4.1 General Treatment Strategies for COVID‐19
These include bed rest and supportive consultation, maintaining a stable constant inner environment such as providing water electrolytes, ensuring sufficient energy intake, and monitoring vital health signs for instance heart rate, pulse, blood pressure, respiratory rate, and oxygen saturation (Figure 1.3).
1.1.4.2 Antiviral Therapy
Being a member of the type 1 IFN family, Interferon‐alpha (IFN α) plays an important role in host resistance to viral infection. As demonstrated by some in vitro experiments, IFN α promotes both innate and adaptive immune responses by suppressing viral infection by inhibiting its replication (Ströher et al. 2004; Zorzitto et al. 2006). Protection from the SARS‐CoV‐2 virus has also been shown in cynomolgus monkeys after treatment with IFN α (Haagmans et al. 2004). Furthermore, synthetic recombinant IFN α showed its therapeutic benefits for patients in a pilot clinical trial (Loutfy et al. 2003). IFN α should therefore be considered as a potential drug candidate for therapy with COVID‐19.
1.1.4.3 COVID‐19 Convalescent Plasma for Prophylaxis
Convalescent plasma (CP) is well known as a treatment option for infectious diseases, including severe viral infections of the lower respiratory tract (Mair‐Jenkins et al. 2015). Generation of neutralizing antibodies may be possible from recovered SARS‐CoV‐2 patients (Nie et al. 2020; Ou et al. 2020) that could have applications in preventing SARS‐CoV‐2 infection in patients with underlying conditions and high‐risk individuals. Monoclonal antibodies have been shown to be protective during hospitalization for other respiratory viruses in specific high‐risk patients (Feltes et al. 2003; The IMpact‐RSV Study Group 1998). Also, animal models have suggested a prophylactic utility against SARS‐CoV‐1 (ter Meulen et al. 2004). However, there are some risks with the use of CP such as acute lung injury during transfusion or a hypothetical risk of antibody‐dependent enhancement of the viral infection (ADE). ADE from viral infection can occur in several other diseases and, due to the presence of certain antibodies, is characterized by disease enhancement (Casadevall and Pirofski 2020). Clinical trials from SARS‐CoV‐2 recovered patients have been ongoing as of now (Shoham 2020).
Figure 1.3 A schematic chart showing the treatment options for COVID‐19.
1.1.4.4 FDA‐Approved Drug/Agents for Emergency Use Authorization (EUA)
As of now, there is no specific drug/vaccine treatment available for combatting the viral spread. Recently, the use of widely studied potential candidate hydroxychloroquine has been stopped with immediate effect as it lacks efficacy against the virus. The following combinations have been recently given approval by the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for emergency use with proven clinical benefits:
Currently, a combination of drugs Casirivimab and Imdevimab have been approved for EUA. These two agents are recombinant human IgG1 monoclonal antibodies that act by targeting the receptor‐binding domain of the spike protein of SARS‐CoV‐2. This combination has been approved for the treatment of mild‐to‐moderate COVID‐19 in adults and pediatric patients (aged 12 years and older with a weight of at least 40 kg) with positive results for direct testing. The combination has also been recommended for those at high risk for progressing to severe infection by the virus and/or hospitalization.
Another recently approved combination therapy consists of Baricitinib (Olumiant) along with Remdesivir (Veklury). This combination has been recommended for the treatment of suspected or laboratory‐confirmed COVID‐19 patients in hospitalized adults and pediatric patients of 2 years of age or older for emergency use by healthcare providers; and requires O2 supplementation, invasive mechanical ventilation, or oxygenation of the extracorporeal membrane (ECMO).
REGIOCIT has also been approved by the FDA on the basis of scientific evidence to be used as a substitute for suspected or known COVID‐19 adult patients in critical care settings receiving continuous renal replacement therapy (CRRT) and for whom Regional Citrate Anticoagulation (RCA) is appropriate. This replacement solution is composed of citrate for RCA of the extracorporeal circuit and is intended for a continuous use with venovenous hemofiltration (CVVH) and continuous venovenous hemodiafiltration (CVVHDF) modalities (FDA et al. 2020).
1.1.4.5 Vaccines
Several groups are working on potential COVID‐19 vaccines, with some backed by the non‐profit Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI). Currently, >50 projects around the globe are centered on developing a vaccine for COVID‐19 treatment. Till now, more than five candidate vaccines have been undergoing human clinical trials. Reports suggest the availability of the vaccine by January 2021, while some also suggest it to be available by Summer or Fall 2021 (Radcliffe 2020).
Some notable projects are from BioNTech/Fosun Pharma/Pfizer, Moderna, and the University of Oxford in England (in partnership with AstraZeneca, USA) where the FDA has given the approval for Phase 3 clinical trials after initial success in preventing the infection and has also indicated the safety of the vaccines. Moderna has developed an mRNA‐based vaccine and the University of Oxford has developed a vaccine based on the modified virus that can trigger immune responses (Radcliffe 2020). Very recently, the vaccine developed by BioNTech/Fosun Pharma/Pfizer was approved by the UK government to roll out first doses to the volunteers and have started shipping it to other countries around the globe. With an effectivity of >95% by Pfizer and Moderna and some other companies, it remains to be seen how the demands for the vaccine are met and how fast they are distributed efficiently given their specific conditions for storage under deep freeze and so on.
Another potential vaccine candidate is from Inovio, which has been working on a DNA‐based vaccine for MERS, allowing the company to develop a COVID‐19 vaccine quickly. A Phase 3 trial has already started. Advances in genetic sequencing and other technological developments have increased the speed for vaccine development. However, experts suggest that widespread use of the vaccine will not be possible for at least another year for completing a Phase 3 trial successfully that takes around 12–18 months (Radcliffe 2020).
1.1.5 Conclusion
In conclusion, the COVID‐19 pandemic has impacted the world as we know in every possible way and its overall implications in all the sectors need to be carefully addressed in order to prevent another pandemic of this scale. With almost 10 months in pandemic, there is no perfect treatment available yet, for its prevention and control. As of now, practicing the safety and prevention guidelines as laid down by the governmental authorities remains mainstay for its control. Also, as the vaccine development is under an emerging stage, it remains to be seen how it changes the dynamics of the spread of this novel virus. This chapter discussed all the introductory parameters regarding the outbreak of SARS‐CoV‐2 virus and laid a brief emphasis on its control and prevention. The upcoming chapters will deal more with the diagnosis and the imminent socioeconomic and environmental impact of the pandemic and the collective efforts needed to prevent it in the distant future.
References
Arunkumar, G., Chandni, R., Mourya, D.T. et al. (2019). Outbreak investigation of Nipah virus disease in Kerala, India, 2018.
The Journal of infectious diseases
219 (12): 1867–1878.
Assiri, A., Al‐Tawfiq, J.A., Al‐Rabeeah, A.A. et al. (2013). Epidemiological, demographic, and clinical characteristics of 47 cases of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus disease from Saudi Arabia: a descriptive study.
The Lancet infectious diseases
13 (9): 752–761.
Astuti, I. (2020). Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS‐CoV‐2): an overview of viral structure and host response.
Diabetes & Metabolic Syndrome: Clinical Research & Reviews
14 (2): 407–412.
Azhar, E.I., El‐Kafrawy, S.A., Farraj, S.A. et al. (2014). Evidence for camel‐to‐human transmission of MERS coronavirus.
New England Journal of Medicine
370 (26): 2499–2505.
Bachman, D. (2020). The economic impact of COVID‐19 (novel coronavirus). Deloitte Insights (accessed 28).
Bauch, C.T. and Oraby, T. (2013). Assessing the pandemic potential of MERS‐CoV.
The Lancet
382 (9893): 662–664.
Bell, D., Roberton, S., and Hunter, P.R. (2004). Animal origins of SARS coronavirus: possible links with the international trade in small carnivores.
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences
359 (1447): 1107–1114.
Boseley, S., 2020. WHO warns of global shortage of face masks and protective suits.
The Guardian
, 7.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/07/who‐warns‐global‐shortage‐face‐masks‐protective‐suits‐coronavirus
.
Brief, C. (2020). Analysis: Coronavirus temporarily reduced China’s CO
2
emissions by a quarter. Retrieved April, 27, p. 2020.
Casadevall, A. and Pirofski, L.A. (2020). The convalescent sera option for containing COVID‐19.
The Journal of clinical investigation
130 (4): 1545–1548.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2020). Reducing stigma.
www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019‐ncov/about/related‐stigma.html
(accessed 13 December 2020).
Chang, D., Xu, H., Rebaza, A. et al. (2020). Protecting health‐care workers from subclinical coronavirus infection.
The Lancet Respiratory Medicine
8 (3): e13.
Chatterjee, P., Kakkar, M., and Chaturvedi, S. (2016). Integrating one health in national health policies of developing countries: India’s lost opportunities.
Infectious diseases of poverty
5 (1): 1–5.
Chatterjee, P., Nagi, N., Agarwal, A. et al. (2020). The 2019 novel coronavirus disease (COVID‐19) pandemic: a review of the current evidence.
Indian Journal of Medical Research
151 (2): 147.
Chen, Y., Cai, H., Xiang, N. et al. (2009). Functional screen reveals SARS coronavirus nonstructural protein nsp14 as a novel cap N7 methyltransferase.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
106 (9): 3484–3489.
Chen, J., Lau, Y.F., Lamirande, E.W. et al. (2010). Cellular immune responses to severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS‐CoV) infection in senescent BALB/c mice: CD4+ T cells are important in control of SARS‐CoV infection.
Journal of virology
84 (3): 1289–1301.
Chen, N., Zhou, M., Dong, X. et al. (2020). Epidemiological and clinical characteristics of 99 cases of 2019 novel coronavirus pneumonia in Wuhan, China: a descriptive study.
The Lancet
395 (10223): 507–513.
Cheung, C.Y., Poon, L.L., Ng, I.H. et al. (2005). Cytokine responses in severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus‐infected macrophages in vitro: possible relevance to pathogenesis.
Journal of virology
79 (12): 7819–7826.
Chinazzi, M., Davis, J.T., Ajelli, M. et al. (2020). The effect of travel restrictions on the spread of the 2019 novel coronavirus (COVID‐19) outbreak.
Science
368 (6489): 395–400.
Cyranoski, D. and Abbott, A., 2003. Virus detectives seek source of SARS in China's wild animals 423, 463.
Daffis, S., Szretter, K.J., Schriewer, J. et al. (2010). 2′‐O methylation of the viral mRNA cap evades host restriction by IFIT family members.
Nature
468 (7322): 452–456.
Ding, Y., Wang, H., Shen, H. et al. (2003). The clinical pathology of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS): a report from China.
The Journal of Pathology: A Journal of the Pathological Society of Great Britain and Ireland
200 (3): 282–289.
Dooley, B. and Rich, M. (2020). Cruise ship’s coronavirus outbreak leaves crew nowhere to hide. The New York Times.
www.nytimes.com/2020/02/10/business/coronavirus‐japan‐cruise‐ship.html
(accessed 13 December 2020).
Evans, O. (2020). Socio‐economic impacts of novel coronavirus: The policy solutions.
BizEcons Quarterly
7: 3–12.
Evans, D.K., Goldstein, M., and Popova, A. (2015). Health‐care worker mortality and the legacy of the Ebola epidemic.
The Lancet Global Health
3 (8): e439–e440.
Feltes, T.F., Cabalka, A.K., Meissner, H.C. et al. (2003). Palivizumab prophylaxis reduces hospitalization due to respiratory syncytial virus in young children with hemodynamically significant congenital heart disease.
The Journal of pediatrics
143 (4): 532–540.
Guan, Y., Zheng, B.J., He, Y.Q. et al. (2003). Isolation and characterization of viruses related to the SARS coronavirus from animals in southern China.
Science
302 (5643): 276–278.
Guo, Y.R., Cao, Q.D., Hong, Z.S. et al. (2020). The origin, transmission and clinical therapies on coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19) outbreak–an update on the status.
Military Medical Research
7 (1): 1–10.
Haagmans, B.L., Kuiken, T., Martina, B.E. et al. (2004). Pegylated interferon‐α protects type 1 pneumocytes against SARS coronavirus infection in macaques.
Nature medicine
10 (3): 290–293.
Habibi, R., Burci, G.L., de Campos, T.C. et al. (2020). Do not violate the International Health Regulations during the COVID‐19 outbreak.
The Lancet
395 (10225): 664–666.
Harapan, H., Itoh, N., Yufika, A. et al. (2020). Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19): a literature review.
Journal of Infection and Public Health
13 (5): 667–673.
Hewlett, B.L. and Hewlett, B.S. (2005). Providing care and facing death: nursing during Ebola outbreaks in central Africa.
Journal of Transcultural Nursing
16 (4): 289–297.
https://gisanddata.maps.arcgis.com/apps/opsdashboard/index.html#/bda7594740fd40299423467b48e9ecf6
(accessed 13 December 2020).
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/coronavirus‐covid‐19‐maintaining‐educational‐provision/guidance‐for‐schools‐colleges‐and‐local‐authorities‐on‐maintaining‐educational‐provision
(accessed 13 December 2020).
https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases‐conditions/coronavirus/symptoms‐causes/syc‐20479963
(accessed 13 December 2020).
https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/
(accessed 13 December 2020).
Huang, C., Wang, Y., Li, X. et al. (2020). Clinical features of patients infected with 2019 novel coronavirus in Wuhan, China.
The Lancet
395 (10223): 497–506.
Hui, D.S. and Zumla, A. (2019). Severe acute respiratory syndrome: historical, epidemiologic, and clinical features.
Infectious Disease Clinics
33 (4): 869–889.
Hui, D.S., Azhar, E.I., Madani, T.A. et al. (2020). The continuing 2019‐nCoV epidemic threat of novel coronaviruses to global health—the latest 2019 novel coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan, China.
International Journal of Infectious Diseases
91: 264.
IMpact‐RSV Study Group* (1998). Palivizumab, a humanized respiratory syncytial virus monoclonal antibody, reduces hospitalization from respiratory syncytial virus infection in high‐risk infants.
Pediatrics
102 (3): 531–537.
Janeway, C., Murphy, K.P., Travers, P., and Walport, M. (2008).
Janeway's Immuno biology
. Routledge Taylor and Francis Group.
Jin, Y.H., Cai, L., Cheng, Z.S. et al. (2020). A rapid advice guideline for the diagnosis and treatment of 2019 novel coronavirus (2019‐nCoV) infected pneumonia (standard version).
Military Medical Research
7 (1): 4.
Kumar, C.G., Sugunan, A.P., Yadav, P. et al. (2019). Infections among contacts of patients with Nipah virus, India.
Emerging infectious diseases
25 (5): 1007.
Lessler, J., Reich, N.G., Brookmeyer, R. et al. (2009). Incubation periods of acute respiratory viral infections: a systematic review.
The Lancet infectious diseases
9 (5): 291–300.
Li, G., Fan, Y., Lai, Y. et al. (2020a). Coronavirus infections and immune responses.
Journal of medical virology
92 (4): 424–432.
Li, H., Liu, S.M., Yu, X.H. et al. (2020b). Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19): current status and future perspective.
International Journal of Antimicrobial Agents
55: 105951.
Li, X., Geng, M., Peng, Y. et al. (2020c). Molecular immune pathogenesis and diagnosis of COVID‐19.
Journal of Pharmaceutical Analysis.
10.
Lipsitch, M., Cohen, T., Cooper, B. et al. (2003). Transmission dynamics and control of severe acute respiratory syndrome.
Science
300 (5627): 1966–1970.
Liu, Y., Gayle, A.A., Wilder‐Smith, A., and Rocklöv, J. (2020). The reproductive number of COVID‐19 is higher compared to SARS coronavirus.
Journal of Travel Medicine
27 (2):
https://doi.org/10.1093/jtm/taaa021
.
Loutfy, M.R., Blatt, L.M., Siminovitch, K.A. et al. (2003). Interferon alfacon‐1 plus corticosteroids in severe acute respiratory syndrome: a preliminary study.
Jama
290 (24): 3222–3228.
Mair‐Jenkins, J., Saavedra‐Campos, M., Baillie, J.K. et al. (2015). The effectiveness of convalescent plasma and hyperimmune immunoglobulin for the treatment of severe acute respiratory infections of viral etiology: a systematic review and exploratory meta‐analysis.
The Journal of infectious diseases
211 (1): 80–90.
McKenzie, J.S., Dahal, R., Kakkar, M. et al. (2016). One Health research and training and government support for One Health in South Asia.
Infection ecology & epidemiology
6 (1): 33842.
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Government of India (2019). Revised travel advisory.
www.mohfw.gov.in
(accessed 13 December 2020).
Neuman, B.W., Kiss, G., Kunding, A.H. et al. (2011). A structural analysis of M protein in coronavirus assembly and morphology.
Journal of structural biology
174 (1): 11–22.
Ng, D.L., Al Hosani, F., Keating, M.K. et al. (2014). Ultrastructural findings of a fatal case of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus infection in the United Arab Emirates.
The American journal of pathology
186 (3): 652–658.
Ng, D.L., Al Hosani, F., Keating, M.K. et al. (2016). Clinicopathologic, immunohistochemical, and ultrastructural. Findings of a fatal case of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus infection in the United Arab Emirates.
The American Journal of Pathology
186 (3): 652–658. doi: 10.1016/j.ajpath.2015.10.024. PMID: 26857507; PMCID: PMC7093852.
Nicas, J. (2020). He has 17,700 bottles of hand sanitizer and nowhere to sell them.
The New York Times
. March, 14.
Nicola, M., Alsafi, Z., Sohrabi, C. et al. (2020). The socio‐economic implications of the coronavirus and COVID‐19 pandemic: a review.
International Journal of Surgery.
78: 185–193.
Nie, J., Li, Q., Wu, J. et al. (2020). Establishment and validation of a pseudovirus neutralization assay for SARS‐CoV‐2.
Emerging microbes & infections
9 (1): 680–686.
Ou, X., Liu, Y., Lei, X. et al. (2020). Characterization of spike glycoprotein of SARS‐CoV‐2 on virus entry and its immune cross‐reactivity with SARS‐CoV.
Nature communications
11 (1): 1–12.
Pallivalappil, B., Ali, A., Thulaseedharan, N.K. et al. (2020). Dissecting an outbreak: a clinico‐epidemiological study of Nipah virus infection in Kerala, India, 2018.
Journal of Global Infectious Diseases
12 (1): 21.
Poletto, C., Gomes, M.F., Piontti, A.P. et al. (2014). Assessing the impact of travel restrictions on international spread of the 2014 West African Ebola epidemic.
Eurosurveillance
19 (42): 20936.
Prompetchara, E., Ketloy, C., and Palaga, T. (2020). Immune responses in COVID‐19 and potential vaccines: Lessons learned from SARS and MERS epidemic.
Asian Pac J Allergy Immunol
38 (1): 1–9.
