The Prince (Best Navigation, Active TOC) (A to Z Classics) E-Book

AtoZ Classics

• Herausgeber: A to Z Classics
• Kategorie: Gesellschafts- und Liebesromane
• Sprache: Englisch
• Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2017

Beschreibung

With A to Z Classics, discover or rediscover all the classics of literature.Contains Active Table of Contents (HTML)The Prince (Italian: Il Principe) is a 16th-century political treatise by the Italian diplomat and political theorist Niccolò Machiavelli. The Prince is arguably the first works of modern political philosophy. Although it is relatively short, the treatise is the most remembered of Machiavelli's works and responsible for bringing the word "Machiavellian" into usage as a pejorative. The base assumption in the treatise is that the aims of a prince — such as glory and survival — justify the use of immoral means to achieve those ends.

Leseprobe

Table des matières

The Prince

Niccolò Machiavelli

Dedication: To the Magnificent Lorenzo Di Piero De’ Medici

Chapter 1 Of the Various Kinds of Princedom, and of the Ways in Which They Are Acquired

Chapter 2 Of Hereditary Princedoms

Chapter 3 Of Mixed Princedoms

Chapter 4 Why the Kingdom of Darius, Conquered by Alexander, Did Not, on Alexander’s Death, Rebel Against His Successors

Chapter 5 How Cities or Provinces Which Before Their Acquisition Have Lived Under Their Own Laws Are To Be Governed

Chapter 6 Of New Princedoms Which a Prince Acquires With His Own Arms and by Merit

Chapter 7 Of New Princedoms Acquired By the Aid of Others and By Good Fortune

Chapter 8 Of Those Who By Their Crimes Come to Be Princes

Chapter 9 Of the Civil Princedom

Chapter 10 How the Strength of All Princedoms Should Be Measured

Chapter 11 Of Ecclesiastical Princedoms

Chapter 12 How Many Different Kinds of Soldiers There Are, and of Mercenaries

Chapter 13 Of Auxiliary, Mixed, and National Arms

Chapter 14 Of the Duty of a Prince In Respect of Military Affairs

Chapter 15 Of the Qualities In Respect of Which Men, and Most of all Princes, Are Praised or Blamed

Chapter 16 Of Liberality and Miserliness

Chapter 17 Of Cruelty and Clemency, and Whether It Is Better To Be Loved or Feared

Chapter 18 How Princes Should Keep Faith

Chapter 19 That a Prince Should Seek to Escape Contempt and Hatred

Chapter 20 Whether Fortresses, and Certain Other Expedients to Which Princes Often Have Recourse, are Profitable or Hurtful

Chapter 21 How a Prince Should Bear Himself So As to Acquire Reputation

Chapter 22 Of the Secretaries of Princes

Chapter 23 That Flatterers Should Be Shunned

Chapter 24 Why the Princes of Italy Have Lost Their States

Chapter 25 What Fortune Can Effect in Human Affairs, and How She May Be Withstood

Chapter 26 An Exhortation to Liberate Italy from the Barbarians

The Prince

Niccolò Machiavelli

(Translator: Ninian Hill Thomson)

Published: 1513Categorie(s): Non-Fiction, Human Science, Philosophy, Social science, Political science, History, History by country, United States, Other, Military

Dedication: To the Magnificent Lorenzo Di Piero De’ Medici

It is customary for such as seek a Prince’s favour, to present themselves before him with those things of theirs which they themselves most value, or in which they perceive him chiefly to delight. Accordingly, we often see horses, armour, cloth of gold, precious stones, and the like costly gifts, offered to Princes as worthy of their greatness. Desiring in like manner to approach your Magnificence with some token of my devotion, I have found among my possessions none that I so much prize and esteem as a knowledge of the actions of great men, acquired in the course of a long experience of modern affairs and a continual study of antiquity. Which knowledge most carefully and patiently pondered over and sifted by me, and now reduced into this little book, I send to your Magnificence. And though I deem the work unworthy of your greatness, yet am I bold enough to hope that your courtesy will dispose you to accept it, considering that I can offer you no better gift than the means of mastering in a very brief time, all that in the course of so many years, and at the cost of so many hardships and dangers, I have learned, and know.

This work I have not adorned or amplified with rounded periods, swelling and high-flown language, or any other of those extrinsic attractions and allurements wherewith many authors are wont to set off and grace their writings; since it is my desire that it should either pass wholly unhonoured, or that the truth of its matter and the importance of its subject should alone recommend it.

Nor would I have it thought presumption that a person of very mean and humble station should venture to discourse and lay down rules concerning the government of Princes. For as those who make maps of countries place themselves low down in the plains to study the character of mountains and elevated lands, and place themselves high up on the mountains to get a better view of the plains, so in like manner to understand the People a man should be a Prince, and to have a clear notion of Princes he should belong to the People.

Let your Magnificence, then, accept this little gift in the spirit in which I offer it; wherein, if you diligently read and study it, you will recognize my extreme desire that you should attain to that eminence which Fortune and your own merits promise you. Should you from the height of your greatness some time turn your eyes to these humble regions, you will become aware how undeservedly I have to endure the keen and unremitting malignity of Fortune.

Niccolo Machiavelli

Chapter1 Of the Various Kinds of Princedom, and of the Ways in Which They Are Acquired

All the States and Governments by which men are or ever have been ruled, have been and are either Republics or Princedoms. Princedoms are either hereditary, in which the sovereignty is derived through an ancient line of ancestors, or they are new. New Princedoms are either wholly new, as that of Milan to Francesco Sforza; or they are like limbs joined on to the hereditary possessions of the Prince who acquires them, as the Kingdom of Naples to the dominions of the King of Spain. The States thus acquired have either been used to live under a Prince or have been free; and he who acquires them does so either by his own arms or by the arms of others, and either by good fortune or by merit.

Chapter2 Of Hereditary Princedoms

Of Republics I shall not now speak, having elsewhere spoken of them at length. Here I shall treat exclusively of Princedoms, and, filling in the outline above traced out, shall proceed to examine how such States are to be governed and maintained.

I say, then, that hereditary States, accustomed to the family of their Prince, are maintained with far less difficulty than new States, since all that is required is that the Prince shall not depart from the usages of his ancestors, trusting for the rest to deal with events as they arise. So that if an hereditary Prince be of average address, he will always maintain himself in his Princedom, unless deprived of it by some extraordinary and irresistible force; and even if so deprived will recover it, should any, even the least, mishap overtake the usurper. We have in Italy an example of this in the Duke of Ferrara, who never could have withstood the attacks of the Venetians in 1484, nor those of Pope Julius in 1510, had not his authority in that State been consolidated by time. For since a Prince by birth has fewer occasions and less need to give offence, he ought to be better loved, and will naturally be popular with his subjects unless outrageous vices make him odious. Moreover, the very antiquity and continuance of his rule will efface the memories and causes which lead to innovation. For one change always leaves a dovetail into which another will fit.

Chapter3 Of Mixed Princedoms

But in new Princedoms difficulties abound. And, first, if the Princedom be not wholly new, but joined on to the ancient dominions of the Prince, so as to form with them what may be termed a mixed Princedom, changes will come from a cause common to all new States, namely, that men, thinking to better their condition, are always ready to change masters, and in this expectation will take up arms against any ruler; wherein they deceive themselves, and find afterwards by experience that they are worse off than before. This again results naturally and necessarily from the circumstance that the Prince cannot avoid giving offence to his new subjects, either in respect of the troops he quarters on them, or of some other of the numberless vexations attendant on a new acquisition. And in this way you may find that you have enemies in all those whom you have injured in seizing the Princedom, yet cannot keep the friendship of those who helped you to gain it; since you can neither reward them as they expect, nor yet, being under obligations to them, use violent remedies against them. For however strong you may be in respect of your army, it is essential that in entering a new Province you should have the good will of its inhabitants.