Ethics
EthicsPART I. CONCERNING GOD.PART II.PART III.PART IV:PART V:Copyright
Ethics
Baruch Spinoza
PART I. CONCERNING GOD.
DEFINITIONS.I. By that which is self—caused, I mean that of which the
essence involves existence, or that of which the nature is only
conceivable as existent.II. A thing is called finite after its kind, when it can be
limited by another thing of the same nature; for instance, a body
is called finite because we always conceive another greater body.
So, also, a thought is limited by another thought, but a body is
not limited by thought, nor a thought by body.III. By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is
conceived through itself: in other words, that of which a
conception can be formed independently of any other
conception.IV. By attribute, I mean that which the intellect perceives
as constituting the essence of substance.V. By mode, I mean the modifications[1] of substance, or that
which exists in, and is conceived through, something other than
itself.[1] "Affectiones"VI. By God, I mean a being absolutely infinite—that is, a
substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each
expresses eternal and infinite essentiality.Explanation—I say absolutely infinite, not infinite after its
kind: for, of a thing infinite only after its kind, infinite
attributes may be denied; but that which is absolutely infinite,
contains in its essence whatever expresses reality, and involves no
negation.VII. That thing is called free, which exists solely by the
necessity of its own nature, and of which the action is determined
by itself alone. On the other hand, that thing is necessary, or
rather constrained, which is determined by something external to
itself to a fixed and definite method of existence or
action.VIII. By eternity, I mean existence itself, in so far as it
is conceived necessarily to follow solely from the definition of
that which is eternal.Explanation—Existence of this kind is conceived as an eternal
truth, like the essence of a thing, and, therefore, cannot be
explained by means of continuance or time, though continuance may
be conceived without a beginning or end.AXIOMS.I. Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in
something else.II. That which cannot be conceived through anything else must
be conceived through itself.III. From a given definite cause an effect necessarily
follows; and, on the other hand, if no definite cause be granted,
it is impossible that an effect can follow.IV. The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the
knowledge of a cause.V. Things which have nothing in common cannot be understood,
the one by means of the other; the conception of one does not
involve the conception of the other.VI. A true idea must correspond with its ideate or
object.VII. If a thing can be conceived as non—existing, its essence
does not involve existence.PROPOSITIONS.PROP. I. Substance is by nature prior to its
modifications.Proof.—This is clear from Deff. iii. and v.PROP. II. Two substances, whose attributes are different,
have nothing in common.Proof.—Also evident from Def. iii. For each must exist in
itself, and be conceived through itself; in other words, the
conception of one does not imply the conception of the
other.PROP. III. Things which have nothing in common cannot be one
the cause of the other.Proof.—If they have nothing in common, it follows that one
cannot be apprehended by means of the other (Ax. v.), and,
therefore, one cannot be the cause of the other (Ax. iv.).
Q.E.D.PROP. IV. Two or more distinct things are distinguished one
from the other, either by the difference of the attributes of the
substances, or by the difference of their
modifications.Proof.—Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in
something else (Ax. i.),—that is (by Deff. iii. and v.), nothing is
granted in addition to the understanding, except substance and its
modifications. Nothing is, therefore, given besides the
understanding, by which several things may be distinguished one
from the other, except the substances, or, in other words (see Ax.
iv.), their attributes and modifications. Q.E.D.PROP. V. There cannot exist in the universe two or more
substances having the same nature or attribute.Proof.—If several distinct substances be granted, they must
be distinguished one from the other, either by the difference of
their attributes, or by the difference of their modifications
(Prop. iv.). If only by the difference of their attributes, it will
be granted that there cannot be more than one with an identical
attribute. If by the difference of their modifications—as substance
is naturally prior to its modifications (Prop. i.),—it follows that
setting the modifications aside, and considering substance in
itself, that is truly, (Deff. iii. and vi.), there cannot be
conceived one substance different from another,—that is (by Prop.
iv.), there cannot be granted several substances, but one substance
only. Q.E.D.PROP. VI. One substance cannot be produced by another
substance.Proof.—It is impossible that there should be in the universe
two substances with an identical attribute, i.e. which have
anything common to them both (Prop. ii.), and, therefore (Prop.
iii.), one cannot be the cause of the other, neither can one be
produced by the other. Q.E.D.Corollary.—Hence it follows that a substance cannot be
produced by anything external to itself. For in the universe
nothing is granted, save substances and their modifications (as
appears from Ax. i. and Deff. iii. and v.). Now (by the last Prop.)
substance cannot be produced by another substance, therefore it
cannot be produced by anything external to itself. Q.E.D. This is
shown still more readily by the absurdity of the contradictory.
For, if substance be produced by an external cause, the knowledge
of it would depend on the knowledge of its cause (Ax. iv.), and (by
Def. iii.) it would itself not be substance.PROP. VII. Existence belongs to the nature of
substances.Proof.—Substance cannot be produced by anything external
(Corollary, Prop vi.), it must, therefore, be its own cause—that
is, its essence necessarily involves existence, or existence
belongs to its nature.PROP. VIII. Every substance is necessarily
infinite.Proof.—There can only be one substance with an identical
attribute, and existence follows from its nature (Prop. vii.); its
nature, therefore, involves existence, either as finite or
infinite. It does not exist as finite, for (by Def. ii.) it would
then be limited by something else of the same kind, which would
also necessarily exist (Prop. vii.); and there would be two
substances with an identical attribute, which is absurd (Prop. v.).
It therefore exists as infinite. Q.E.D.Note I.—As finite existence involves a partial negation, and
infinite existence is the absolute affirmation of the given nature,
it follows (solely from Prop. vii.) that every substance is
necessarily infinite.Note II.—No doubt it will be difficult for those who think
about things loosely, and have not been accustomed to know them by
their primary causes, to comprehend the demonstration of Prop.
vii.: for such persons make no distinction between the
modifications of substances and the substances themselves, and are
ignorant of the manner in which things are produced; hence they may
attribute to substances the beginning which they observe in natural
objects. Those who are ignorant of true causes, make complete
confusion—think that trees might talk just as well as men—that men
might be formed from stones as well as from seed; and imagine that
any form might be changed into any other. So, also, those who
confuse the two natures, divine and human, readily attribute human
passions to the deity, especially so long as they do not know how
passions originate in the mind. But, if people would consider the
nature of substance, they would have no doubt about the truth of
Prop. vii. In fact, this proposition would be a universal axiom,
and accounted a truism. For, by substance, would be understood that
which is in itself, and is conceived through itself—that is,
something of which the conception requires not the conception of
anything else; whereas modifications exist in something external to
themselves, and a conception of them is formed by means of a
conception of the thing in which they exist. Therefore, we may have
true ideas of non—existent modifications; for, although they may
have no actual existence apart from the conceiving intellect, yet
their essence is so involved in something external to themselves
that they may through it be conceived. Whereas the only truth
substances can have, external to the intellect, must consist in
their existence, because they are conceived through themselves.
Therefore, for a person to say that he has a clear and
distinct—that is, a true—idea of a substance, but that he is not
sure whether such substance exists, would be the same as if he said
that he had a true idea, but was not sure whether or no it was
false (a little consideration will make this plain); or if anyone
affirmed that substance is created, it would be the same as saying
that a false idea was true—in short, the height of absurdity. It
must, then, necessarily be admitted that the existence of substance
as its essence is an eternal truth. And we can hence conclude by
another process of reasoning—that there is but one such substance.
I think that this may profitably be done at once; and, in order to
proceed regularly with the demonstration, we must
premise:——1. The true definition of a thing neither involves nor
expresses anything beyond the nature of the thing defined. From
this it follows that——2. No definition implies or expresses a certain number of
individuals, inasmuch as it expresses nothing beyond the nature of
the thing defined. For instance, the definition of a triangle
expresses nothing beyond the actual nature of a triangle: it does
not imply any fixed number of triangles.3. There is necessarily for each individual existent thing a
cause why it should exist.4. This cause of existence must either be contained in the
nature and definition of the thing defined, or must be postulated
apart from such definition.It therefore follows that, if a given number of individual
things exist in nature, there must be some cause for the existence
of exactly that number, neither more nor less. For example, if
twenty men exist in the universe (for simplicity's sake, I will
suppose them existing simultaneously, and to have had no
predecessors), and we want to account for the existence of these
twenty men, it will not be enough to show the cause of human
existence in general; we must also show why there are exactly
twenty men, neither more nor less: for a cause must be assigned for
the existence of each individual. Now this cause cannot be
contained in the actual nature of man, for the true definition of
man does not involve any consideration of the number twenty.
Consequently, the cause for the existence of these twenty men, and,
consequently, of each of them, must necessarily be sought
externally to each individual. Hence we may lay down the absolute
rule, that everything which may consist of several individuals must
have an external cause. And, as it has been shown already that
existence appertains to the nature of substance, existence must
necessarily be included in its definition; and from its definition
alone existence must be deducible. But from its definition (as we
have shown, notes ii., iii.), we cannot infer the existence of
several substances; therefore it follows that there is only one
substance of the same nature. Q.E.D.PROP. IX. The more reality or being a thing has, the greater
the number of its attributes (Def. iv.).PROP. X. Each particular attribute of the one substance must
be conceived through itself.Proof.—An attribute is that which the intellect perceives of
substance, as constituting its essence (Def. iv.), and, therefore,
must be conceived through itself (Def. iii.). Q.E.D.Note—It is thus evident that, though two attributes are, in
fact, conceived as distinct—that is, one without the help of the
other—yet we cannot, therefore, conclude that they constitute two
entities, or two different substances. For it is the nature of
substance that each of its attributes is conceived through itself,
inasmuch as all the attributes it has have always existed
simultaneously in it, and none could be produced by any other; but
each expresses the reality or being of substance. It is, then, far
from an absurdity to ascribe several attributes to one substance:
for nothing in nature is more clear than that each and every entity
must be conceived under some attribute, and that its reality or
being is in proportion to the number of its attributes expressing
necessity or eternity and infinity. Consequently it is abundantly
clear, that an absolutely infinite being must necessarily be
defined as consisting in infinite attributes, each of which
expresses a certain eternal and infinite essence.If anyone now ask, by what sign shall he be able to
distinguish different substances, let him read the following
propositions, which show that there is but one substance in the
universe, and that it is absolutely infinite, wherefore such a sign
would be sought in vain.PROP. XI. God, or substance, consisting of infinite
attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite
essentiality, necessarily exists.Proof.—If this be denied, conceive, if possible, that God
does not exist: then his essence does not involve existence. But
this (Prop. vii.) is absurd. Therefore God necessarily
exists.Another proof.—Of everything whatsoever a cause or reason
must be assigned, either for its existence, or for its
non—existence—e.g. if a triangle exist, a reason or cause must be
granted for its existence; if, on the contrary, it does not exist,
a cause must also be granted, which prevents it from existing, or
annuls its existence. This reason or cause must either be contained
in the nature of the thing in question, or be external to it. For
instance, the reason for the non—existence of a square circle is
indicated in its nature, namely, because it would involve a
contradiction. On the other hand, the existence of substance
follows also solely from its nature, inasmuch as its nature
involves existence. (See Prop. vii.)But the reason for the existence of a triangle or a circle
does not follow from the nature of those figures, but from the
order of universal nature in extension. From the latter it must
follow, either that a triangle necessarily exists, or that it is
impossible that it should exist. So much is self—evident. It
follows therefrom that a thing necessarily exists, if no cause or
reason be granted which prevents its existence.If, then, no cause or reason can be given, which prevents the
existence of God, or which destroys his existence, we must
certainly conclude that he necessarily does exist. If such a reason
or cause should be given, it must either be drawn from the very
nature of God, or be external to him—that is, drawn from another
substance of another nature. For if it were of the same nature,
God, by that very fact, would be admitted to exist. But substance
of another nature could have nothing in common with God (by Prop.
ii.), and therefore would be unable either to cause or to destroy
his existence.As, then, a reason or cause which would annul the divine
existence cannot be drawn from anything external to the divine
nature, such cause must perforce, if God does not exist, be drawn
from God's own nature, which would involve a contradiction. To make
such an affirmation about a being absolutely infinite and supremely
perfect is absurd; therefore, neither in the nature of God, nor
externally to his nature, can a cause or reason be assigned which
would annul his existence. Therefore, God necessarily exists.
Q.E.D.Another proof.—The potentiality of non—existence is a
negation of power, and contrariwise the potentiality of existence
is a power, as is obvious. If, then, that which necessarily exists
is nothing but finite beings, such finite beings are more powerful
than a being absolutely infinite, which is obviously absurd;
therefore, either nothing exists, or else a being absolutely
infinite necessarily exists also. Now we exist either in ourselves,
or in something else which necessarily exists (see Axiom. i. and
Prop. vii.). Therefore a being absolutely infinite—in other words,
God (Def. vi.)—necessarily exists. Q.E.D.Note.—In this last proof, I have purposely shown God's
existence à posteriori, so that the proof might be more easily
followed, not because, from the same premises, God's existence does
not follow à priori. For, as the potentiality of existence is a
power, it follows that, in proportion as reality increases in the
nature of a thing, so also will it increase its strength for
existence. Therefore a being absolutely infinite, such as God, has
from himself an absolutely infinite power of existence, and hence
he does absolutely exist. Perhaps there will be many who will be
unable to see the force of this proof, inasmuch as they are
accustomed only to consider those things which flow from external
causes. Of such things, they see that those which quickly come to
pass—that is, quickly come into existence—quickly also disappear;
whereas they regard as more difficult of accomplishment—that is,
not so easily brought into existence—those things which they
conceive as more complicated.However, to do away with this misconception, I need not here
show the measure of truth in the proverb, "What comes quickly, goes
quickly," nor discuss whether, from the point of view of universal
nature, all things are equally easy, or otherwise: I need only
remark that I am not here speaking of things, which come to pass
through causes external to themselves, but only of substances which
(by Prop. vi.) cannot be produced by any external cause. Things
which are produced by external causes, whether they consist of many
parts or few, owe whatsoever perfection or reality they possess
solely to the efficacy of their external cause; and therefore their
existence arises solely from the perfection of their external
cause, not from their own. Contrariwise, whatsoever perfection is
possessed by substance is due to no external cause; wherefore the
existence of substance must arise solely from its own nature, which
is nothing else but its essence. Thus, the perfection of a thing
does not annul its existence, but, on the contrary, asserts it.
Imperfection, on the other hand, does annul it; therefore we cannot
be more certain of the existence of anything, than of the existence
of a being absolutely infinite or perfect—that is, of God. For
inasmuch as his essence excludes all imperfection, and involves
absolute perfection, all cause for doubt concerning his existence
is done away, and the utmost certainty on the question is given.
This, I think, will be evident to every moderately attentive
reader.PROP. XII. No attribute of substance can be conceived from
which it would follow that substance can be divided.Proof.—The parts into which substance as thus conceived would
be divided either will retain the nature of substance, or they will
not. If the former, then (by Prop. viii.) each part will
necessarily be infinite, and (by Prop. vi.) self—caused, and (by
Prop. v.) will perforce consist of a different attribute, so that,
in that case, several substances could be formed out of one
substance, which (by Prop. vi.) is absurd. Moreover, the parts (by
Prop. ii.) would have nothing in common with their whole, and the
whole (by Def. iv. and Prop. x.) could both exist and be conceived
without its parts, which everyone will admit to be absurd. If we
adopt the second alternative—namely, that the parts will not retain
the nature of substance—then, if the whole substance were divided
into equal parts, it would lose the nature of substance, and would
cease to exist, which (by Prop. vii.) is absurd.PROP. XIII. Substance absolutely infinite is
indivisible.Proof.—If it could be divided, the parts into which it was
divided would either retain the nature of absolutely infinite
substance, or they would not. If the former, we should have several
substances of the same nature, which (by Prop. v.) is absurd. If
the latter, then (by Prop. vii.) substance absolutely infinite
could cease to exist, which (by Prop. xi.) is also
absurd.Corollary.—It follows, that no substance, and consequently no
extended substance, in so far as it is substance, is
divisible.Note.—The indivisibility of substance may be more easily
understood as follows. The nature of substance can only be
conceived as infinite, and by a part of substance, nothing else can
be understood than finite substance, which (by Prop. viii) involves
a manifest contradiction.PROP. XIV. Besides God no substance can be granted or
conceived.Proof.—As God is a being absolutely infinite, of whom no
attribute that expresses the essence of substance can be denied (by
Def. vi.), and he necessarily exists (by Prop. xi.); if any
substance besides God were granted, it would have to be explained
by some attribute of God, and thus two substances with the same
attribute would exist, which (by Prop. v.) is absurd; therefore,
besides God no substance can be granted, or, consequently, be
conceived. If it could be conceived, it would necessarily have to
be conceived as existent; but this (by the first part of this
proof) is absurd. Therefore, besides God no substance can be
granted or conceived. Q.E.D.Corollary I.—Clearly, therefore: 1. God is one, that is (by
Def. vi.) only one substance can be granted in the universe, and
that substance is absolutely infinite, as we have already indicated
(in the note to Prop. x.).Corollary II.—It follows: 2. That extension and thought are
either attributes of God or (by Ax. i.) accidents (affectiones) of
the attributes of God.PROP. XV. Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing
can be, or be conceived.Proof.—Besides God, no substance is granted or can be
conceived (by Prop. xiv.), that is (by Def. iii.) nothing which is
in itself and is conceived through itself. But modes (by Def. v.)
can neither be, nor be conceived without substance; wherefore they
can only be in the divine nature, and can only through it be
conceived. But substances and modes form the sum total of existence
(by Ax. i.), therefore, without God nothing can be, or be
conceived. Q.E.D.Note.—Some assert that God, like a man, consists of body and
mind, and is susceptible of passions. How far such persons have
strayed from the truth is sufficiently evident from what has been
said. But these I pass over. For all who have in anywise reflected
on the divine nature deny that God has a body. Of this they find
excellent proof in the fact that we understand by body a definite
quantity, so long, so broad, so deep, bounded by a certain shape,
and it is the height of absurdity to predicate such a thing of God,
a being absolutely infinite. But meanwhile by other reasons with
which they try to prove their point, they show that they think
corporeal or extended substance wholly apart from the divine
nature, and say it was created by God. Wherefrom the divine nature
can have been created, they are wholly ignorant; thus they clearly
show, that they do not know the meaning of their own words. I
myself have proved sufficiently clearly, at any rate in my own
judgment (Coroll. Prop. vi, and note 2, Prop. viii.), that no
substance can be produced or created by anything other than itself.
Further, I showed (in Prop. xiv.), that besides God no substance
can be granted or conceived. Hence we drew the conclusion that
extended substance is one of the infinite attributes of God.
However, in order to explain more fully, I will refute the
arguments of my adversaries, which all start from the following
points:——Extended substance, in so far as it is substance, consists,
as they think, in parts, wherefore they deny that it can be
infinite, or consequently, that it can appertain to God. This they
illustrate with many examples, of which I will take one or two. If
extended substance, they say, is infinite, let it be conceived to
be divided into two parts; each part will then be either finite or
infinite. If the former, then infinite substance is composed of two
finite parts, which is absurd. If the latter, then one infinite
will be twice as large as another infinite, which is also
absurd.Further, if an infinite line be measured out in foot lengths,
it will consist of an infinite number of such parts; it would
equally consist of an infinite number of parts, if each part
measured only an inch: therefore, one infinity would be twelve
times as great as the other.Lastly, if from a single point there be conceived to be drawn
two diverging lines which at first are at a definite distance
apart, but are produced to infinity, it is certain that the
distance between the two lines will be continually increased, until
at length it changes from definite to indefinable. As these
absurdities follow, it is said, from considering quantity as
infinite, the conclusion is drawn, that extended substance must
necessarily be finite, and, consequently, cannot appertain to the
nature of God.The second argument is also drawn from God's supreme
perfection. God, it is said, inasmuch as he is a supremely perfect
being, cannot be passive; but extended substance, insofar as it is
divisible, is passive. It follows, therefore, that extended
substance does not appertain to the essence of God.Such are the arguments I find on the subject in writers, who
by them try to prove that extended substance is unworthy of the
divine nature, and cannot possibly appertain thereto. However, I
think an attentive reader will see that I have already answered
their propositions; for all their arguments are founded on the
hypothesis that extended substance is composed of parts, and such a
hypothesis I have shown (Prop. xii., and Coroll. Prop. xiii.) to be
absurd. Moreover, anyone who reflects will see that all these
absurdities (if absurdities they be, which I am not now
discussing), from which it is sought to extract the conclusion that
extended substance is finite, do not at all follow from the notion
of an infinite quantity, but merely from the notion that an
infinite quantity is measurable, and composed of finite parts
therefore, the only fair conclusion to be drawn is that: infinite
quantity is not measurable, and cannot be composed of finite parts.
This is exactly what we have already proved (in Prop. xii.).
Wherefore the weapon which they aimed at us has in reality recoiled
upon themselves. If, from this absurdity of theirs, they persist in
drawing the conclusion that extended substance must be finite, they
will in good sooth be acting like a man who asserts that circles
have the properties of squares, and, finding himself thereby landed
in absurdities, proceeds to deny that circles have any center, from
which all lines drawn to the circumference are equal. For, taking
extended substance, which can only be conceived as infinite, one,
and indivisible (Props. viii., v., xii.) they assert, in order to
prove that it is finite, that it is composed of finite parts, and
that it can be multiplied and divided.So, also, others, after asserting that a line is composed of
points, can produce many arguments to prove that a line cannot be
infinitely divided. Assuredly it is not less absurd to assert that
extended substance is made up of bodies or parts, than it would be
to assert that a solid is made up of surfaces, a surface of lines,
and a line of points. This must be admitted by all who know clear
reason to be infallible, and most of all by those who deny the
possibility of a vacuum. For if extended substance could be so
divided that its parts were really separate, why should not one
part admit of being destroyed, the others remaining joined together
as before? And why should all be so fitted into one another as to
leave no vacuum? Surely in the case of things, which are really
distinct one from the other, one can exist without the other, and
can remain in its original condition. As, then, there does not
exist a vacuum in nature (of which anon), but all parts are bound
to come together to prevent it, it follows from this that the parts
cannot really be distinguished, and that extended substance in so
far as it is substance cannot be divided.If anyone asks me the further question, Why are we naturally
so prone to divide quantity? I answer, that quantity is conceived
by us in two ways; in the abstract and superficially, as we imagine
it; or as substance, as we conceive it solely by the intellect. If,
then, we regard quantity as it is represented in our imagination,
which we often and more easily do, we shall find that it is finite,
divisible, and compounded of parts; but if we regard it as it is
represented in our intellect, and conceive it as substance, which
it is very difficult to do, we shall then, as I have sufficiently
proved, find that it is infinite, one, and indivisible. This will
be plain enough to all who make a distinction between the intellect
and the imagination, especially if it be remembered, that matter is
everywhere the same, that its parts are not distinguishable, except
in so far as we conceive matter as diversely modified, whence its
parts are distinguished, not really, but modally. For instance,
water, in so far as it is water, we conceive to be divided, and its
parts to be separated one from the other; but not in so far as it
is extended substance; from this point of view it is neither
separated nor divisible. Further, water, in so far as it is water,
is produced and corrupted; but, in so far as it is substance, it is
neither produced nor corrupted.I think I have now answered the second argument; it is, in
fact, founded on the same assumption as the first—namely, that
matter, in so far as it is substance, is divisible, and composed of
parts. Even if it were so, I do not know why it should be
considered unworthy of the divine nature, inasmuch as besides God
(by Prop. xiv.) no substance can be granted, wherefrom it could
receive its modifications. All things, I repeat, are in God, and
all things which come to pass, come to pass solely through the laws
of the infinite nature of God, and follow (as I will shortly show)
from the necessity of his essence. Wherefore it can in nowise be
said, that God is passive in respect to anything other than
himself, or that extended substance is unworthy of the Divine
nature, even if it be supposed divisible, so long as it is granted
to be infinite and eternal. But enough of this for the
present.PROP. XVI. From the necessity of the divine nature must
follow an infinite number of things in infinite ways—that is, all
things which can fall within the sphere of infinite
intellect.Proof.—This proposition will be clear to everyone, who
remembers that from the given definition of any thing the intellect
infers several properties, which really necessarily follow
therefrom (that is, from the actual essence of the thing defined);
and it infers more properties in proportion as the definition of
the thing expresses more reality, that is, in proportion as the
essence of the thing defined involves more reality. Now, as the
divine nature has absolutely infinite attributes (by Def. vi.), of
which each expresses infinite essence after its kind, it follows
that from the necessity of its nature an infinite number of things
(that is, everything which can fall within the sphere of an
infinite intellect) must necessarily follow. Q.E.D.Corollary I.—Hence it follows, that God is the efficient
cause of all that can fall within the sphere of an infinite
intellect.Corollary II.—It also follows that God is a cause in himself,
and not through an accident of his nature.Corollary III.—It follows, thirdly, that God is the
absolutely first cause.PROP. XVII. God acts solely by the laws of his own nature,
and is not constrained by anyone.Proof.—We have just shown (in Prop. xvi.), that solely from
the necessity of the divine nature, or, what is the same thing,
solely from the laws of his nature, an infinite number of things
absolutely follow in an infinite number of ways; and we proved (in
Prop. xv.), that without God nothing can be nor be conceived but
that all things are in God. Wherefore nothing can exist; outside
himself, whereby he can be conditioned or constrained to act.
Wherefore God acts solely by the laws of his own nature, and is not
constrained by anyone. Q.E.D.Corollary I.—It follows: 1. That there can be no cause which,
either extrinsically or intrinsically, besides the perfection of
his own nature, moves God to act.Corollary II.—It follows: 2. That God is the sole free cause.
For God alone exists by the sole necessity of his nature (by Prop.
xi. and Prop. xiv., Coroll. i.), and acts by the sole necessity of
his own nature, wherefore God is (by Def. vii.) the sole free
cause. Q.E.D.Note.—Others think that God is a free cause, because he can,
as they think, bring it about, that those things which we have said
follow from his nature—that is, which are in his power, should not
come to pass, or should not be produced by him. But this is the
same as if they said, that God could bring it about, that it should
follow from the nature of a triangle that its three interior angles
should not be equal to two right angles; or that from a given cause
no effect should follow, which is absurd.Moreover, I will show below, without the aid of this
proposition, that neither intellect nor will appertain to God's
nature. I know that there are many who think that they can show,
that supreme intellect and free will do appertain to God's nature;
for they say they know of nothing more perfect, which they can
attribute to God, than that which is the highest perfection in
ourselves. Further, although they conceive God as actually
supremely intelligent, they yet do not believe that he can bring
into existence everything which he actually understands, for they
think that they would thus destroy God's power. If, they contend,
God had created everything which is in his intellect, he would not
be able to create anything more, and this, they think, would clash
with God's omnipotence; therefore, they prefer to asset that God is
indifferent to all things, and that he creates nothing except that
which he has decided, by some absolute exercise of will, to create.
However, I think I have shown sufficiently clearly (by Prop. xvi.),
that from God's supreme power, or infinite nature, an infinite
number of things—that is, all things have necessarily flowed forth
in an infinite number of ways, or always flow from the same
necessity; in the same way as from the nature of a triangle it
follows from eternity and for eternity, that its three interior
angles are equal to two right angles. Wherefore the omnipotence of
God has been displayed from all eternity, and will for all eternity
remain in the same state of activity. This manner of treating the
question attributes to God an omnipotence, in my opinion, far more
perfect. For, otherwise, we are compelled to confess that God
understands an infinite number of creatable things, which he will
never be able to create, for, if he created all that he
understands, he would, according to this showing, exhaust his
omnipotence, and render himself imperfect. Wherefore, in order to
establish that God is perfect, we should be reduced to establishing
at the same time, that he cannot bring to pass everything over
which his power extends; this seems to be a hypothesis most absurd,
and most repugnant to God's omnipotence.Further (to say a word here concerning the intellect and the
will which we attribute to God), if intellect and will appertain to
the eternal essence of God, we must take these words in some
significance quite different from those they usually bear. For
intellect and will, which should constitute the essence of God,
would perforce be as far apart as the poles from the human
intellect and will, in fact, would have nothing in common with them
but the name; there would be about as much correspondence between
the two as there is between the Dog, the heavenly constellation,
and a dog, an animal that barks. This I will prove as follows. If
intellect belongs to the divine nature, it cannot be in nature, as
ours is generally thought to be, posterior to, or simultaneous with
the things understood, inasmuch as God is prior to all things by
reason of his causality (Prop. xvi., Coroll. i.). On the contrary,
the truth and formal essence of things is as it is, because it
exists by representation as such in the intellect of God. Wherefore
the intellect of God, in so far as it is conceived to constitute
God's essence, is, in reality, the cause of things, both of their
essence and of their existence. This seems to have been recognized
by those who have asserted, that God's intellect, God's will, and
God's power, are one and the same. As, therefore, God's intellect
is the sole cause of things, namely, both of their essence and
existence, it must necessarily differ from them in respect to its
essence, and in respect to its existence. For a cause differs from
a thing it causes, precisely in the quality which the latter gains
from the former.For example, a man is the cause of another man's existence,
but not of his essence (for the latter is an eternal truth), and,
therefore, the two men may be entirely similar in essence, but must
be different in existence; and hence if the existence of one of
them cease, the existence of the other will not necessarily cease
also; but if the essence of one could be destroyed, and be made
false, the essence of the other would be destroyed also. Wherefore,
a thing which is the cause both of the essence and of the existence
of a given effect, must differ from such effect both in respect to
its essence, and also in respect to its existence. Now the
intellect of God is the cause both of the essence and the existence
of our intellect; therefore, the intellect of God in so far as it
is conceived to constitute the divine essence, differs from our
intellect both in respect to essence and in respect to existence,
nor can it in anywise agree therewith save in name, as we said
before. The reasoning would be identical in the case of the will,
as anyone can easily see.PROP. XVIII. God is the indwelling and not the transient
cause of all things.Proof.—All things which are, are in God, and must be
conceived through God (by Prop. xv.), therefore (by Prop. xvi.,
Coroll. i.) God is the cause of those things which are in him. This
is our first point. Further, besides God there can be no substance
(by Prop. xiv.), that is nothing in itself external to God. This is
our second point. God, therefore, is the indwelling and not the
transient cause of all things. Q.E.D.PROP. XIX. God, and all the attributes of God, are
eternal.Proof.—God (by Def. vi.) is substance, which (by Prop. xi.)
necessarily exists, that is (by Prop. vii.) existence appertains to
its nature, or (what is the same thing) follows from its
definition; therefore, God is eternal (by Def. viii.). Further, by
the attributes of God we must understand that which (by Def. iv.)
expresses the essence of the divine substance—in other words, that
which appertains to substance: that, I say, should be involved in
the attributes of substance. Now eternity appertains to the nature
of substance (as I have already shown in Prop. vii.); therefore,
eternity must appertain to each of the attributes, and thus all are
eternal. Q.E.D.Note.—This proposition is also evident from the manner in
which (in Prop. xi.) I demonstrated the existence of God; it is
evident, I repeat, from that proof, that the existence of God, like
his essence, is an eternal truth. Further (in Prop. xix. of my
"Principles of the Cartesian Philosophy"), I have proved the
eternity of God, in another manner, which I need not here
repeat.PROP. XX. The existence of God and his essence are one and
the same.Proof.—God (by the last Prop.) and all his attributes are
eternal, that is (by Def. viii.) each of his attributes expresses
existence. Therefore the same attributes of God which explain his
eternal essence, explain at the same time his eternal existence—in
other words, that which constitutes God's essence constitutes at
the same time his existence. Wherefore God's existence and God's
essence are one and the same. Q.E.D.Coroll. I.—Hence it follows that God's existence, like his
essence, is an eternal truth.Coroll. II—Secondly, it follows that God, and all the
attributes of God, are unchangeable. For if they could be changed
in respect to existence, they must also be able to be changed in
respect to essence—that is, obviously, be changed from true to
false, which is absurd.PROP. XXI. All things which follow from the absolute nature
of any attribute of God must always exist and be infinite, or, in
other words, are eternal and infinite through the said
attribute.Proof.—Conceive, if it be possible (supposing the proposition
to be denied), that something in some attribute of God can follow
from the absolute nature of the said attribute, and that at the
same time it is finite, and has a conditioned existence or
duration; for instance, the idea of God expressed in the attribute
thought. Now thought, in so far as it is supposed to be an
attribute of God, is necessarily (by Prop. xi.) in its nature
infinite. But, in so far as it possesses the idea of God, it is
supposed finite. It cannot, however, be conceived as finite, unless
it be limited by thought (by Def. ii.); but it is not limited by
thought itself, in so far as it has constituted the idea of God
(for so far it is supposed to be finite); therefore, it is limited
by thought, in so far as it has not constituted the idea of God,
which nevertheless (by Prop. xi.) must necessarily
exist.We have now granted, therefore, thought not constituting the
idea of God, and, accordingly, the idea of God does not naturally
follow from its nature in so far as it is absolute thought (for it
is conceived as constituting, and also as not constituting, the
idea of God), which is against our hypothesis. Wherefore, if the
idea of God expressed in the attribute thought, or, indeed,
anything else in any attribute of God (for we may take any example,
as the proof is of universal application) follows from the
necessity of the absolute nature of the said attribute, the said
thing must necessarily be infinite, which was our first
point.Furthermore, a thing which thus follows from the necessity of
the nature of any attribute cannot have a limited duration. For if
it can, suppose a thing, which follows from the necessity of the
nature of some attribute, to exist in some attribute of God, for
instance, the idea of God expressed in the attribute thought, and
let it be supposed at some time not to have existed, or to be about
not to exist.Now thought being an attribute of God, must necessarily exist
unchanged (by Prop. xi., and Prop. xx., Coroll. ii.); and beyond
the limits of the duration of the idea of God (supposing the latter
at some time not to have existed, or not to be going to exist)
thought would perforce have existed without the idea of God, which
is contrary to our hypothesis, for we supposed that, thought being
given, the idea of God necessarily flowed therefrom. Therefore the
idea of God expressed in thought, or anything which necessarily
follows from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, cannot
have a limited duration, but through the said attribute is eternal,
which is our second point. Bear in mind that the same proposition
may be affirmed of anything, which in any attribute necessarily
follows from God's absolute nature.PROP. XXII. Whatsoever follows from any attribute of God, in
so far as it is modified by a modification, which exists
necessarily and as infinite, through the said attribute, must also
exist necessarily and as infinite.Proof.—The proof of this proposition is similar to that of
the preceding one.PROP. XXIII. Every mode, which exists both necessarily and as
infinite, must necessarily follow either from the absolute nature
of some attribute of God, or from an attribute modified by a
modification which exists necessarily, and as
infinite.Proof.—A mode exists in something else, through which it must
be conceived (Def. v.), that is (Prop. xv.), it exists solely in
God, and solely through God can be conceived. If therefore a mode
is conceived as necessarily existing and infinite, it must
necessarily be inferred or perceived through some attribute of God,
in so far as such attribute is conceived as expressing the infinity
and necessity of existence, in other words (Def. viii.) eternity;
that is, in so far as it is considered absolutely. A mode,
therefore, which necessarily exists as infinite, must follow from
the absolute nature of some attribute of God, either immediately
(Prop. xxi.) or through the means of some modification, which
follows from the absolute nature of the said attribute; that is (by
Prop. xxii.), which exists necessarily and as
infinite.PROP. XXIV. The essence of things produced by God does not
involve existence.Proof.—This proposition is evident from Def. i. For that of
which the nature (considered in itself) involves existence is
self—caused, and exists by the sole necessity of its own
nature.Corollary.—Hence it follows that God is not only the cause of
things coming into existence, but also of their continuing in
existence, that is, in scholastic phraseology, God is cause of the
being of things (essendi rerum). For whether things exist, or do
not exist, whenever we contemplate their essence, we see that it
involves neither existence nor duration; consequently, it cannot be
the cause of either the one or the other. God must be the sole
cause, inasmuch as to him alone does existence appertain. (Prop.
xiv. Coroll. i.) Q.E.D.PROP. XXV. God is the efficient cause not only of the
existence of things, but also of their essence.Proof.—If this be denied, then God is not the cause of the
essence of things; and therefore the essence of things can (by Ax.
iv.) be conceived without God. This (by Prop. xv.) is absurd.
Therefore, God is the cause of the essence of things.
Q.E.D.Note.—This proposition follows more clearly from Prop. xvi.
For it is evident thereby that, given the divine nature, the
essence of things must be inferred from it, no less than their
existence—in a word, God must be called the cause of all things, in
the same sense as he is called the cause of himself. This will be
made still clearer by the following corollary.Corollary.—Individual things are nothing but modifications of
the attributes of God, or modes by which the attributes of God are
expressed in a fixed and definite manner. The proof appears from
Prop. xv. and Def. v.PROP. XXVI. A thing which is conditioned to act in a
particular manner, has necessarily been thus conditioned by God;
and that which has not been conditioned by God cannot condition
itself to act.Proof.—That by which things are said to be conditioned to act
in a particular manner is necessarily something positive (this is
obvious); therefore both of its essence and of its existence God by
the necessity of his nature is the efficient cause (Props. xxv. and
xvi.); this is our first point. Our second point is plainly to be
inferred therefrom. For if a thing, which has not been conditioned
by God, could condition itself, the first part of our proof would
be false, and this, as we have shown is absurd.PROP. XXVII. A thing, which has been conditioned by God to
act in a particular way, cannot render itself
unconditioned.Proof.—This proposition is evident from the third
axiom.PROP. XXVIII. Every individual thing, or everything which is
finite and has a conditioned existence, cannot exist or be
conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned for existence and
action by a cause other than itself, which also is finite, and has
a conditioned existence; and likewise this cause cannot in its turn
exist, or be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned for
existence and action by another cause, which also is finite, and
has a conditioned existence, and so on to infinity.Proof.—Whatsoever is conditioned to exist and act, has been
thus conditioned by God (by Prop. xxvi. and Prop. xxiv.,
Coroll.).But that which is finite, and has a conditioned existence,
cannot be produced by the absolute nature of any attribute of God;
for whatsoever follows from the absolute nature of any attribute of
God is infinite and eternal (by Prop. xxi.). It must, therefore,
follow from some attribute of God, in so far as the said attribute
is considered as in some way modified; for substance and modes make
up the sum total of existence (by Ax. i. and Def. iii., v.), while
modes are merely modifications of the attributes of God. But from
God, or from any of his attributes, in so far as the latter is
modified by a modification infinite and eternal, a conditioned
thing cannot follow. Wherefore it must follow from, or be
conditioned for, existence and action by God or one of his
attributes, in so far as the latter are modified by some
modification which is finite, and has a conditioned existence. This
is our first point. Again, this cause or this modification (for the
reason by which we established the first part of this proof) must
in its turn be conditioned by another cause, which also is finite,
and has a conditioned existence, and, again, this last by another
(for the same reason); and so on (for the same reason) to infinity.
Q.E.D.Note.—As certain things must be produced immediately by God,
namely those things which necessarily follow from his absolute
nature, through the means of these primary attributes, which,
nevertheless, can neither exist nor be conceived without God, it
follows:—1. That God is absolutely the proximate cause of those
things immediately produced by him. I say absolutely, not after his
kind, as is usually stated. For the effects of God cannot either
exist or be conceived without a cause (Prop. xv. and Prop. xxiv.
Coroll.). 2. That God cannot properly be styled the remote cause of
individual things, except for the sake of distinguishing these from
what he immediately produces, or rather from what follows from his
absolute nature. For, by a remote cause, we understand a cause
which is in no way conjoined to the effect. But all things which
are, are in God, and so depend on God, that without him they can
neither be nor be conceived.PROP. XXIX. Nothing in the universe is contingent, but all
things are conditioned to exist and operate in a particular manner
by the necessity of the divine nature.Proof.—Whatsoever is, is in God (Prop. xv.). But God cannot
be called a thing contingent. For (by Prop. xi.) he exists
necessarily, and not contingently. Further, the modes of the divine
nature follow therefrom necessarily, and not contingently (Prop.
xvi.); and they thus follow, whether we consider the divine nature
absolutely, or whether we consider it as in any way conditioned to
act (Prop. xxvii.). Further, God is not only the cause of these
modes, in so far as they simply exist (by Prop. xxiv, Coroll.), but
also in so far as they are considered as conditioned for operating
in a particular manner (Prop. xxvi.). If they be not conditioned by
God (Prop. xxvi.), it is impossible, and not contingent, that they
should condition themselves; contrariwise, if they be conditioned
by God, it is impossible, and not contingent, that they should
render themselves unconditioned. Wherefore all things are
conditioned by the necessity of the divine nature, not only to
exist, but also to exist and operate in a particular manner, and
there is nothing that is contingent. Q.E.D.Note.—Before going any further, I wish here to explain, what
we should understand by nature viewed as active (natura naturans),
and nature viewed as passive (natura naturata). I say to explain,
or rather call attention to it, for I think that, from what has
been said, it is sufficiently clear, that by nature viewed as
active we should understand that which is in itself, and is
conceived through itself, or those attributes of substance, which
express eternal and infinite essence, in other words (Prop. xiv.,
Coroll. i., and Prop. xvii., Coroll. ii) God, in so far as he is
considered as a free cause.By nature viewed as passive I understand all that which
follows from the necessity of the nature of God, or of any of the
attributes of God, that is, all the modes of the attributes of God,
in so far as they are considered as things which are in God, and
which without God cannot exist or be conceived.