Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect
Treatise on the Emendation of the IntellectTreatise on the Emendation of the IntellectCopyright
Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect
Baruch Spinoza
Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect
*This Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect etc., which
we give you here, kind reader, in its unfinished [that is,
defective] state, was written by the author many years ago now. He
always intended to finish it. But hindered by other occupations,
and finally snatched away by death, he was unable to bring it to
the desired conclusion. But since it contains many excellent and
useful things, which--we have no doubt--will be of great benefit to
anyone sincerely seeking the truth, we did not wish to deprive you
of them. And so that you would be aware of, and find less difficult
to excuse, the many things that are still obscure, rough, and
unpolished, we wished to warn you of them. Farewell.*[1] (1) After experience had taught me that all the usual
surroundings of social life are vain and futile; seeing that none
of the objects of my fears contained in themselves anything either
good or bad, except in so far as the mind is affected by them, I
finally resolved to inquire whether there might be some real good
having power to communicate itself, which would affect the mind
singly, to the exclusion of all else: whether, in fact, there might
be anything of which the discovery and attainment would enable me
to enjoy continuous, supreme, and unending happiness.[2] (1) I say "I finally resolved," for at first sight it
seemed unwise willingly to lose hold on what was sure for the sake
of something then uncertain. (2) I could see the benefits which are
acquired through fame and riches, and that I should be obliged to
abandon the quest of such objects, if I seriously devoted myself to
the search for something different and new. (3) I perceived that if
true happiness chanced to be placed in the former I should
necessarily miss it; while if, on the other hand, it were not so
placed, and I gave them my whole attention, I should equally
fail.[3] (1) I therefore debated whether it would not be possible
to arrive at the new principle, or at any rate at a certainty
concerning its existence, without changing the conduct and usual
plan of my life; with this end in view I made many efforts, in
vain. (2) For the ordinary surroundings of life which are esteemed
by men (as their actions testify) to be the highest good, may be
classed under the three heads--Riches, Fame, and the Pleasures of
Sense: with these three the mind is so absorbed that it has little
power to reflect on any different good.[4] (1) By sensual pleasure the mind is enthralled to the
extent of quiescence, as if the supreme good were actually
attained, so that it is quite incapable of thinking of any other
object; when such pleasure has been gratified it is followed by
extreme melancholy, whereby the mind, though not enthralled, is
disturbed and dulled. (2) The pursuit of honors and riches is
likewise very absorbing, especially if such objects be sought
simply for their own sake, [a] inasmuch as they are then supposed
to constitute the highest good.[5] (1) In the case of fame the mind is still more absorbed,
for fame is conceived as always good for its own sake, and as the
ultimate end to which all actions are directed. (2) Further, the
attainment of riches and fame is not followed as in the case of
sensual pleasures by repentance, but, the more we acquire, the
greater is our delight, and, consequently, the more are we incited
to increase both the one and the other; on the other hand, if our
hopes happen to be frustrated we are plunged into the deepest
sadness. (3) Fame has the further drawback that it compels its
votaries to order their lives according to the opinions of their
fellow-men, shunning what they usually shun, and seeking what they
usually seek.[6] (1) When I saw that all these ordinary objects of desire
would be obstacles in the way of a search for something different
and new--nay, that they were so opposed thereto, that either they
or it would have to be abandoned, I was forced to inquire which
would prove the most useful to me: for, as I say, I seemed to be
willingly losing hold on a sure good for the sake of something
uncertain. (6:2) However, after I had reflected on the matter, I
came in the first place to the conclusion that by abandoning the
ordinary objects of pursuit, and betaking myself to a new quest, I
should be leaving a good, uncertain by reason of its own nature, as
may be gathered from what has been said, for the sake of a good not
uncertain in its nature (for I sought for a fixed good), but only
in the possibility of its attainment.[7] (1) Further reflection convinced me that if I could
really get to the root of the matter I should be leaving certain
evils for a certain good. (2) I thus perceived that I was in a
state of great peril, and I compelled myself to seek with all my
strength for a remedy, however uncertain it might be; as a sick man
struggling with a deadly disease, when he sees that death will
surely be upon him unless a remedy be found, is compelled to seek a
remedy with all his strength, inasmuch as his whole hope lies
therein. (7:3) All the objects pursued by the multitude not only
bring no remedy that tends to preserve our being, but even act as
hindrances, causing the death not seldom of those who possess them,
[b] and always of those who are possessed by them.[8] (1) There are many examples of men who have suffered
persecution even to death for the sake of their riches, and of men
who in pursuit of wealth have exposed themselves to so many
dangers, that they have paid away their life as a penalty for their
folly. (2) Examples are no less numerous of men, who have endured
the utmost wretchedness for the sake of gaining or preserving their
reputation. (3) Lastly, are innumerable cases of men, who have
hastened their death through over-indulgence in sensual
pleasure.[9] (1) All these evils seem to have arisen from the fact,
that happiness or unhappiness is made wholly dependent on the
quality of the object which we love. (2) When a thing is not loved,
no quarrels will arise concerning it--no sadness be felt if it
hatred, in short no disturbances of the mind. (3) All these arise
from the love of what is perishable, such as the objects already
mentioned.[10] (1) But love towards a thing eternal and infinite feeds
the mind wholly with joy, and is itself unmingled with any sadness,
wherefore it is greatly to be desired and sought for with all our
strength. (2) Yet it was not at random that I used the words, "If I
could go to the root of the matter," for, though what I have urged
was perfectly clear to my mind, I could not forthwith lay aside all
love of riches, sensual enjoyment, and fame.[11] (1) One thing was evident, namely, that while my mind
was employed with these thoughts it turned away from its former
objects of desire, and seriously considered the search for a new
principle; this state of things was a great comfort to me, for I
perceived that the evils were not such as to resist all remedies.
(11:2) Although these intervals were at first rare, and of very
short duration, yet afterwards, as the true good became more and
more discernible to me, they became more frequent and more lasting;
especially after I had recognized that the acquisition of wealth,
sensual pleasure, or fame, is only a hindrance, so long as they are
sought as ends not as means; if they be sought as means, they will
be under restraint, and, far from being hindrances, will further
not a little the end for which they are sought, as I will show in
due time.[12] (1) I will here only briefly state what I mean by true
good, and also what is the nature of the highest good. (2) In order
that this may be rightly understood, we must bear in mind that the
terms good and evil are only applied relatively, so that the same
thing may be called both good and bad according to the relations in
view, in the same way as it may be called perfect or imperfect. (3)
Nothing regarded in its own nature can be called perfect or
imperfect; especially when we are aware that all things which come
to pass, come to pass according to the eternal order and fixed laws
of nature.[13] (1) However, human weakness cannot attain to this order
in its own thoughts, but meanwhile man conceives a human character
much more stable than his own, and sees that there is no reason why
he should not himself acquire such a character. (2) Thus he is led
to seek for means which will bring him to this pitch of perfection,
and calls everything which will serve as such means a true good.
(13:3) The chief good is that he should arrive, together with other
individuals if possible, at the possession of the aforesaid
character. (4) What that character is we shall show in due time,
namely, that it is the knowledge of the union existing being the
mind and the whole of nature. [c]