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- Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
- Kategorie: Wissenschaft und neue Technologien
- Sprache: Englisch
Cyberspace is one of the major bases of the economic development of industrialized societies and developing. The dependence of modern society in this technological area is also one of its vulnerabilities. Cyberspace allows new power policy and strategy, broadens the scope of the actors of the conflict by offering to both state and non-state new weapons, new ways of offensive and defensive operations. This book deals with the concept of "information war", covering its development over the last two decades and seeks to answer the following questions: is the control of the information space really possible remains or she a utopia? What power would confer such control, what are the benefits?
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Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2016
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Table of Contents
Cover
Title
Copyright
Introduction
1 The United States
1.1. Information warfare in the 1990s
1.2. Information warfare in the 2000s
1.3. Information warfare in the 2010s
1.4. Important concepts and reflections
2 China
2.1. Significant publications
2.2. Strategic and doctrinal thinking about information warfare. Genesis
2.3. Recent policies and strategies on information and cyber security
2.4. Reflections
3 Russia
3.1. Military doctrines and national security strategies
3.2. Information warfare in practice
3.3. Comments
4 Concepts and Theories: Discussions
4.1. Doctrines
4.2. Information warfare: definitions, models
4.3. Information warfare or data warfare?
Conclusion
Index
End User License Agreement
List of Tables
1 The United States
Table 1.1.
Distinction between integrated control enablers (ICE) and information operations (IO)
Table 1.2.
Components of information operations and their referential doctrinal documents
Table 1.3.
Military and non-military definitions of cyber warfare
Table 1.4.
Authors and concepts
2 China
Table 2.1.
Offensive and defensive components of information warfare. From Wang Pufeng, 2007
Table 2.2.
Characteristics of information warfare. Reconstructed from Wang Baocun and Li Fei, 1997
40
Table 2.3.
China as a target for cyberthreats
Table 2.4.
Overview: China’s strategies, the role of cyberspace and information
3 Russia
Table 3.1.
Overview of discourse on Russian information warfare (2015)
Table 3.2.
A few Russian reference documents
Table 3.3.
Main concepts and their definition proposed by the Russian ministry of defense
Table 3.4.
Russian definitions of information warfare/information war
Table 3.5.
Techniques of reflexive control, according to Maria Snegovaya, 2015
140
4 Concepts and Theories: Discussions
Table 4.1.
Military Doctrines 2010–2015
44
. Some examples of uses of notions associated with “data”, “information” and “cyber”
Table 4.2.
Main concepts in a number of military doctrines (2009–2015)
Table 4.3.
Definitions of the “information environment”
Table 4.4.
Information warfare operations in the information environment
Table 4.5.
Selection of definitions of “information warfare”
Table 4.6.
Information warfare 3.0 and WMEs, from Michael Raska, 2013
88
Table 4.7.
Components of information warfare. Reconstructed from Megan Burns, 1999
90
Table 4.8.
Comparison of the definitions of a number of key concepts, from Keir Giles, William Hagestad (2013)
103
Table 4.9.
The three layers of the information environment and the actions of information warfare on each of the layers. From Blaise Cronin and Holly Crawford, 1999
104
Table 4.10.
Definitions of the term “data”
Table 4.11.
A number of concepts associated with that of “data” and their definitions
Table 4.12.
Various attacks on databases
Table 4.13.
Data visualization tools
191
Table 4.14.
The three categories of data and the rules pertaining to them. The texts cited above are extracted from Aaron Boyd, 2015
215
Table 4.15.
Data in the United States’ defense strategies
Table 4.16.
Definitions of the expression “data warfare”
List of Illustrations
Introduction
Figure I.1.
Google Trends. Evolution in number of searches for the term “Information Warfare”
1
Figure I.2.
Google Trends. Evoluttion in number of searches for the term “Information Operations”
2
4 Concepts and Theories: Discussions
Figure 4.1.
Information space as defined in JP 3–13
Figure 4.2.
Three layers of cyberspace
Figure 4.3.
Cyberspace in the form of a three-dimensional system
Figure 4.4.
The three components of cyberspace, as they fit in to the information environment
Figure 4.5.
Interactions between the various layers of cyberspace
Figure 4.6.
Cyber attack and cyberspace matrix/grid
Figure 4.7.
Most important of all: the effect that A can have on B
Figure 4.8.
Actions taken on one layer may have impacts on the other layers, or be combined with actions on the other layers of cyberspace
Figure 4.9.
On each layer, the actions may be limited by a variety of factors: certain parts of these layers may be inaccessible, or may not be the best bath to take to produce effects
Figure 4.10.
Context – attack – consequences – reactions cycle
Figure 4.11.
Information warfare, as described by Rianne van Vuuren, 2015
93
Figure 4.12.
Data categories, actions, roles, protection
Figure 4.13.
The host of suurveillance proograms (mass data coollection) deployed by the NSA and GCHQ (© Daniel Ventre 2015). For a color version of the figure, see www.iste.co.uk/ventre/warfare.zip
Figure 4.14.
The CYBELS–MAP application developed by Thales. Graphical representations of exchanges between networks – e.g. a business network and the outside world. Each dot represents a machine or an IP address. © THALES. For a color version of the figure, see www.iste.co.uk/ventre/warfare.zip
Figure 4.15.
Visualization of cyber attacks, confirming or giving the impression of a conflict between China and the United States. Source: screenshot from the application Digital Attack Map.M 7 July 2015. For a color version of the figure, see www.iste.co.uk/ventre/warfare.zip
Figuree 4.16.
Screenshot from Digital Attack Map, 1 March 2015. For a color version of the figure, see www.iste.co.uk/ventre/warfare.zip
Figure 4.17.
Screenshot from Digital Attack Map, 26 December 2014. For a color version of the figure, see www.iste.co.uk/ventre/warfare.zip
Figure 4.18.
Screenshot from the online application Norse, 7 July 2015. For a color version of the figure, see www.iste.co.uk/ventre/warfare.zip
Figure 4.19.
Screenshot from the online application Norse.7 July 2015. For a color version of the figure, see www.iste.co.uk/ventre/warfare.zip
Figure 4.20.
Data–information–intelligence relationship. From a diagram published in JP–02 (2013).
210
The Canadian Air Force doctrine from 2012
211
adds a further stage – understanding – to construct a cognitive hierarchy linking data, information, intelligence and understanding. Data, which are always at the base of the pyramid, becomes knowledge after a set of treatment processes
Figure 4.21.
The information environment, as defined by JP 3–13 in November 2014
Guide
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Information Warfare
Revised and Updated 2nd Edition
Daniel Ventre
First published 2016 in Great Britain and the United States by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Apart from any fair dealing for the purposes of research or private study, or criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, this publication may only be reproduced, stored or transmitted, in any form or by any means, with the prior permission in writing of the publishers, or in the case of reprographic reproduction in accordance with the terms and licenses issued by the CLA. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside these terms should be sent to the publishers at the undermentioned address:
ISTE Ltd
27-37 St George’s Road
London SW19 4EU
UK
www.iste.co.uk
John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
111 River Street
Hoboken, NJ 07030
USA
www.wiley.com
© ISTE Ltd 2016
The rights of Daniel Ventre to be identified as the author of this work have been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
Library of Congress Control Number: 2015959669
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library
ISBN 978-1-84821-660-0
Introduction
The issue of information warfare was at the heart of the debate about the revolution in military matters, from the turn of the 1980s to the 1990s. It was not so much a question of doubt as to the actual relevance of the concept (the importance of information in warfare has been well known for centuries), as a redefinition of the way in which military strategy was to be viewed, in light of a radical technological and societal transformation, and how that information was now to be produced and used in these contexts.
The concept of “information warfare” appears to be used less nowadays than it once was, but it is by no means obsolete.
Figure I.1.Google Trends. Evolution in number of searches for the term “Information Warfare”1
Figure I.2.Google Trends. Evoluttion in number of searches for the term “Information Operations”2
Certainly, the Defensee Departmennt officially removed thhe term froom its vocabbulary in 20006. However,, whilst the UUS Army optts to use other formulations, information warfare is still the subject of theorizing, expansion, description and analysis. The concept is still used in the military world, including ini the United States3. Numerous publications ((books, reports and articles) have been devoted to information warfare in recent years, which is indicative of the interest it continues too arouse and its relevannce in strateggic debates ((Roland Heickerö, 20 104; Wang Rong-Hui, Jin Li-Ya, Yuan Yi, 20105; J. Martins et al., 20126; William Hutchinson, Mathew Warren, 20127; K. Prislan, I. Bernik, 20128; Alan Chong, 20129; He Su-Hong, Chen Lei, 201210; Brett van Niekerk, Manoj S. Maharaj, 201111; Roland Heickerö and Martin Peterson, 201212; Derek S. Reveron, 201213; Khurshid Khan, 201214; Monika Chansoria, 201215; Richard A. Poisel, 201316; Daniel Gold, 201317; Isaac R. Porche III et al., 201318; William Hagestad, 201319; Alan Chong, 201320; Michael Raska, 201321; Danny Bradbury, 201322; Stephen Blank, 201323; Tim Stevens, 201324; V.I. Kuznetsov et al., 201325; Zhanshan Ma, 201326; Andrew Jones, Gerald L. Kovacich, 201427; Larry Wortzel, 201428; Dean A. Nowowiejski, 201429; Michael Raska, 201430; Luciano Floridi and Mariarosaria Taddeo, 201431; N.V. Lapotina, 201432; Haroro J. Ingram, 201433; Timothy Thomas, 201434; Thomas S. Hyslip, 201535; M.N. Sirohi, 201536; Patrick Molenda, 201537; M. Jaitner, P.A. Mattsson, 201538). All these publications deal with the concept in its civil and military dimensions, using approaches taken from strategic studies, political science, information sciences, computing/telecoms, and judicial, ethical and philosophical thinking. They set out to explain the profound changes that have come about in the modern field of battle, because of the evolution of the information space – its continuous and accelerated expansion over the past two decades. A number of these works are based on observations of national strategies in regard to information warfare (the conflict between North and South Korea, Russia, China, etc.).
Information warfare – though military doctrine today rather favors the concept of “information operations” – is demonstrably an essential component in modern conflicts. This is attested by recent events such as Russia’s annexation of Crimea or Daesh’s growing influence on the international scene, and the efforts made by certain states to counter terrorist propaganda. Both State- and non-State actors in conflicts are constantly investing in the informational sphere, placing their actions of communication, influence, propaganda, their psychological operations, at the heart of their strategies. Today, “information warfare” and “cyber” overlap. In addition, it is on this “cyber” aspect of information warfare which we focus in this book. The questions and issues are identical to those that were present in the 1990s: how best to take advantage of information and of information technologies, to gain an edge over the adversary, the enemy or the competitor. The starting point for our study in the first edition of this book (2007 in French; 2009 for the English-language equivalent) was the Gulf War (1991), reflecting how important a milestone that war was in the history of conflicts. It allowed the Americans to demonstrate astonishing might and military efficiency, and marked the beginning of a new era of conflict where information, computer systems and networks would play a major role in the organization and manifestation of that power. Numerous countries then launched a process of reflection to restructure and reorganize their forces. Although the American power could not be rivaled, it nonetheless served as a model, which at least provides the key conceptual elements. It was during the 1990s that the majority of the key concepts which are employed today in conflict strategies – and especially cyberconflict strategies – were lain down, formulated and defined: network-centric warfare (NCW), netwar, information warfare (IW), cyber warfare and big data, to cite just a few. The concept of “information warfare” has met with varying degrees of success from one State to another, and has even been officially withdrawn from the lexicon used by the US Defense Department. However, in today’s world, where the strategies employed include concepts such as the influence of the media and social networks in the organization of armies and in the conducting of conflicts; where they include concepts such as psychological warfare in combination with the use of the media, propaganda, influence; where States at war or experiencing periods of revolt or insurrection impose censorship and cut off Internet access; where intelligence agencies trawl cyberspace in search of strategic information, or collect vast masses of data to be processed, analyzed, made to “talk” and support the missions of security and national defense; everyone is involved in the quest for information mastery. When these activities take place in the context of armed conflicts, between different States or within a State, we speak of information warfare.
Recent years have seen a drastic increase in armed conflicts (i.e. wars, though theoreticians, politicians or strategists often refuse to use that term), all of which have confirmed the importance of the role of information – especially information travelling through cyberspace: examples include the Russo–Georgian conflict in 2008, the Arab Spring wave of revolutions in 2010–2011, the war in Libya, in Syria, the expansion of Islamic State-controlled territory, the Russian–Ukrainian conflict, etc.
This second edition of the book focuses on three states: the USA (Chapter 1), China (Chapter 2) and Russia (Chapter 3), and offers a detailed analysis of the evolution of the theories, concepts and doctrines employed in those countries (Chapter 4). In this book, which is intended to be a modest contribution to the strategic study of modern conflict, we discuss the following questions:
– Today, do the terms “information warfare”, “information operations” and “cyberoperations” all denote the same reality?
– Do states perceive and talk about the same threats today as they did 20 years ago?
– Do the actors, principles and logics of information warfare still remain the same?
1
Data harvested on 13 July 2015.
2
Data harvested on 13 July 2015.
3
Isaac R. Porchee III,
et al.
,
Reddefining Informmation Warfare Boundaries forr an Army in a Wireless Worrld
, Rand Corporation, Unitedd States, p. 178, 2013,
htttp://www.rand.oorg/content/damm/rand/pubs/moonographs/MG1100/MG1113//RAND_MG1113.pdf
.
4
Roland Heickeerö, “Emerginng cyber threaats and Russiann views on infformation waarfare and infoormation operaations”,
Swedissh Defence Reesearch Agencycy
, p. 70, March 2010,
httpp://www.foi.se/RReportFiles/foirr_2970.pdf
.
5
Wang Rong-HHui, Jin Li-Ya,, Yuan Yi, “Thinking about equipment support for information warfare”,
Journal of Academy of Armored Force Enginerinng
, China
,
vol. 24, no. 4, pp. 20–24, August 2010.
6
J. Martins
et al.
, “Information Security Model to Miilitary Organizations in Environment of Information warfare”,
Proceedings of the 11th European Coonference on Information Warfare and Security
, Laval, France, Academic PPublishing International Limited, United Kingdom, pp. 186–93, 2012.
7
William Hutchinson, Matthew Warren,
Information warfare
, Routledge, May 2012, p. 224, 2012.
8
K. Prislan, I. Bernik, “From Traditional Local to Global Cyberspace – Slovenian Perspectives on Information warfare”,
Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Information warfare and Security
, Seattle, USA, Academic Publishing Limited, UK, pp. 237–44, 2012.
9
Alan Chong, “Singapore’s Encounter with Information Warfare: filtering electronic globalization and military enhancements”, in Daniel Ventre (ed.),
Cyber Conflict: Competing National Perspectives
, Wiley, 2012.
10
He Su-Hong, Chen Lei, “Research on complex network topology model based information warfare system”,
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Fuzzy Systems and Knowledge Discovery
, Sichuan, China, Piscataway Publishing, pp. 2228–2231, 2012.
11
Brett van Niekerk, Manoj S. Maharaj, “The Information Warfare Life Cycle Model”,
South African Journal of Information Management
, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 97– 105, March 2011.
12
Roland Heickerö and Martin Peterson,
The Dark Sides of the Internet: On Cyber Threats and Information warfare
, Peter Lang GmbH, Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften, p. 170, November 2012.
13
Derek S. Reveron, “Persistent enemies and cyberwar: rivalry relations in an age of information warfare”,
Cyberspace and National Security: Threats, Opportunities, and Power in a Virtual World
, pp. 139–157, Washington: Georgetown University Press, p. 19, 2012.
14
Khurshid Khan, “Understanding information warfare and its relevance to Pakistan”,
Strategic Studies
, vol. 32/33, no. 4/1, pp. 138–159, Winter 2012/Spring 2013.
15
Monika Chansoria, “Defying borders in future conflict is East Asia: Chinese capabilities in the realm of information warfare and cyberspace”,
The Journal of East Asian Affairs
, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 105–127, 2012.
16
Richard A. Poisel,
Information Warfare and Electronic Warfare Systems
, Artech House Electronic Warfare Library, p. 414, 2013.
17
Daniel Gold,
Information Warfare on an Evolving Battlefield
, Montezuma Publishing, p. 122, January 2013.
18
Isaac R. Porche III,
Redefining Information Warfare Boundaries for an Army in a Wireless World
, Rand Corporation, USA, p. 176, 2013.
19
William Hagestad,
Chinese Information Warfare Doctrine Development 1994 – 2014
, Red Dragon Rising Publishing, p. 382, November 2013.
20
Alan Chong, “Information Warfare? The case for an Asian perspective on Information Operations”,
Armed Forces & Society
, Singapore, 2013.
21
Michael Raska, “Information Warfare 3.0: weapons of mass effectiveness”,
The Nation
, 3 July 2013,
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/Information-warfare-3-0-Weapons-of-mass-effectiven-30209538.html
.
22
Danny Bradbury, “Information warfare: a battle waged in public”,
Computer Fraud & Security
, pp. 15–18, June 2013.
23
Stephen Blank, “Russian information warfare as domestic counterinsurgency”,
American Foreign Policy Interests
, vol. 35, no. 1, pp. 31–44, Jan/Feb. 2013.
24
Tim Stevens, “Information warfare: a response to Taddeo”,
Philosophy & Technology
, vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 221–225, June 2013.
25
V.I. Kuznetsov, “Electronic warfare and information warfare: how they compare”,
Military Thought
, vol. 22, no. 1, pp.1–9, 2013.
26
Zhanshan Ma, “First passage time and first passage percolation models for analysing network resilience and effective strategies in strategic information warfare research: a brief survey and perspective”,
International Journal of Information and Computer Security
, Inderscience Enterprises, Switzerland, vol.5, no.4, pp. 334–58, 2013.
27
Andrew Jones, Gerald L. Kovacich,
Global Information Warfare: The New Digital Battlefield
, Second Edition, Auerbach Publications, 2nd edition, p. 384, October 2015.
28
Larry Wortzel,
The Chinese People’s Liberation Army and Information Warfare
, CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, p. 80, March 2014,
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1191.pdf
.
29
Dean A. Nowowiejski,
Concepts of Information Warfare in Practice: General George S. Patton and the Third Army Information Service
, Aug.-Dec. 1944, Pickle Partners Publishing, September 2014, p. 48.
30
Michael Raska, Rethinking information and cyber warfare: global perspectives & strategic insights, Conference Report, Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore, p. 30, 3 March 2014,
http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/ER140527_Rethinking_Information.pdf
.
31
Luciano Floridi and Mariarosaria Taddeo,
The Ethics of Information Warfare
, Springer, p. 211, March 2014.
32
N.V. Lapotina, “The modern information culture and information warfare”,
Scientific and Technical Information Processing
, vol. 14, no.3, pp. 155–158, July 2014.
33
Haroro J. Ingram, “Three traits of the Islamic State’s Information Warfare”,
RUSI Journal: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies
, vol. 159 no. 6, pp. 4–11, p. 8, Dec 2014.
34
Timothy Thomas, “Russia’s information warfare strategy: can the Nation cope in future conflicts?”,
Journal of Slavic Military Studies
; vol. 27, no. 1, pp. 101–130, Jan-Mar 2014.
35
Thomas S. Hyslip,
Bit Wars: Cyber Crime, Hacking & Information Warfare
(Volume 2), CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, p. 98, June 2015.
36
M.N. Sirohi,
Cyber Terrorism and Information Warfare
, Alpha Editions, p. 306, May 2015.
37
Patrick Molenda, “Silence on the Net”,
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings
, vol. 141, no. 347, pp. 34–39, May 2015.
38
M. Jaitner, P.A. Mattsson, “Russian Information Warfare of 2014”,
Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Architectures in Cyberspace (CyCon)
, Tallinn, Estonia, pp. 39–52, 2015.
1The United States
The United States proved the undeniable power of their military with Desert Storm in 1991. Since then, their modern military and combat styles have served as examples to the rest of the world. Of course, the impressive volume of troops deployed to conquer Iraq explained, in part, their victory against an inadequate military. But what people have retained is the new face of war: information is now at the forefront and its “digital” nature clearly provides a new power to its users. Not only could the planet watch the launching of operations in real time, but optimized use of information and communication technologies to help troops, and the coordination and preparation of operations and the carrying out of attacks proved to be, if not the key to victory, at least a major player in not losing. The lessons drawn from this victory raised several questions: was this a new type of war? Should we call it “information age warfare” or “information warfare”? This first chapter is naturally dedicated to the United States, since they have been used as a reference and as an object of observation for the rest of the world. They have also put forward a series of doctrinal texts and innovative concepts in the last 25 years.
1.1. Information warfare in the 1990s
1.1.1. Points of view from security experts
In 1994, in his book Information Warfare Winn Schwartau, security expert and author of many reference publications in the field of information technologies, defined three categories of information warfare:
– personal information warfare (called Class 1 information warfare), created through attacks against data involving individuals and privacy: disclosure, corruption and intercepting of personal and confidential data (medical, banking and communications data). These attacks aimed at recreating or modifying the electronic picture of an individual by illicit means, or simply by using available open-source information, can often be simply carried out through technical solutions for standard catalog or Internet sales;
– commercial information warfare (called Class 2 information warfare) occurs through industrial espionage, broadcasting false information about competitors over the Internet. The new international order is filled with tens of thousands of ex-spies looking for work where they can offer their expertise;
– global information warfare (called Class 3 information warfare) aimed at industries, political spheres of influence, global economic forces, countries, critical and sensitive national information systems. The objective is to disrupt a country by damaging systems including energy, communications and transport. It is the act of using technology against technology, of secrets and stealing secrets, turning information against its owner, of prohibiting an enemy from using its own technologies and information. It is the ultimate form of conflict in cyberspace occurring through the global network. This class of information warfare generates chaos.
According to Winn Schwartau1, real information warfare uses information and information systems as a weapon against its targets: information and information systems. This definition eliminates kinetic weapons (for example bombs and bullets). Information warfare can attack people, organizations or countries (or spheres of influence) via a wide range of techniques, such as breach of confidentiality, attacks against integrity, psychological operations and misinformation.
Information warfare is therefore not limited to the military sphere: it can be carried out against civil infrastructures, constituting a new facet of war where the target can be the national economic security of an enemy. On the other hand, methods for carrying out a war are not a military monopoly. A small group of antagonists can launch an information warfare offensive remotely, while comfortably seated in front of a computer and completely anonymous. A group of hackers could choose to declare war against a country, independently from any control of State power.
For Al Campen2, U.S. Air Force Colonel, one of the main criteria for defining information warfare is what is different from the past; this difference involves dependence on a vulnerable technology (information technology). Al Campen3 limits the field of information warfare to information (data) in its digital form and to the software and hardware responsible for its creation, modification, storage, processing and distribution. From this point of view, psychological operations4 consisting of scattering leaflets over populations are not information warfare operations; public broadcasting and electronic manipulation of television images, however, are part of information warfare. The physical destruction of telecommunications devices is not information warfare, but disrupting or paralyzing communication with the help of a virus is.
For James F. Dunningan5, information warfare is attacking and defending the capability of transmitting information6.
For Fred Cohen, information technology security expert and inventor of the concept of the “computer virus”7, information warfare is a conflict in which information or information technology is the weapon, target, objective or method8.
Martin C. Libicki9 defines information warfare as a series of activities triggered by the need to modify information flows going to the other party, while protecting our own; such activities include physical attack, radio-electronic attack, attacks on systems and sensors, cryptography, attacks against computers, and psychological operations. His definition is not limited to military information warfare. In 1995, Libicki wondered about the nature of this new concept: was it a new form of war, a new art, or the revisited version of an older form of war? A new form of conflict that would exist because of the global information infrastructure, or an old form that would find new life with the information age? Is information warfare a field by itself? In order to attempt to define the parameters of this concept, Libicki identifies seven major components:
– command and control warfare (C2);
– intelligence warfare;
– electronic warfare;
– psychological operations;
– hacker warfare (software attacks against information systems);
– economic information warfare (through the control of commercial information);
– cyber warfare (i.e. virtual battles).
Some aspects of information warfare are as old as time: attempting to strike at the head of the enemy (C2 war), carrying out all sorts of deceptions (deceiving, abusing and misleading the enemy), and psychological operations. On the other hand, hacker warfare and cyber warfare are completely new methods linked to the revolution of information and communications technologies.
For Larry Merritt10, technical director for the Air Force Information Warfare Center (AFIWC), information warfare includes all actions undertaken to exploit or affect the capacity of an adversary to acquire a realistic image of the battlefield or to operate the command and control of his or her troops. Information warfare also includes actions undertaken for the protection of our own capabilities; electronic warfare, computer network attacks, intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance are all defensive actions.
The concept of “information warfare” creates multiple approaches which can be very different. The reason is in the nature of the terms making up the expression: what is “warfare”, what is “information”? The problem in defining the semantic parameters has led to the different points of view on information warfare.
Regardless of the approach, information warfare seems closely linked to our new social and technical structure, to the strong dependence now linking our exchanges (our social, economic, cultural and political transactions) to information technologies. Information warfare could be a type of battle for the control of the digital space involving the whole of society. Information and information systems can be used to attack and conquer the enemy. Some would prefer to call it “information age warfare” to define the capacity to control and use the information battlefield, which then becomes an additional factor in the war, in the same way that the capacity to control air and space did in conventional wars in the industrial age.
The major point that seems to define the debate on information warfare is framed by the following questions: can the war be carried out only in the world of information? Are wars, as fought by man since the beginning of time with their streams of increasingly lethal weapons and bloody battles, on the verge of disappearing? Will information technologies revolutionize societies to the point of revolutionizing the way we fight wars, i.e. imposing our political will on others only through battles in the information sphere? Or will they only be a new complementary method? Should we call it “information warfare” or “information age warfare”?
The information space, understood as a space of violence, conflict and battle completely replacing the more traditional fields of conflicts, is one of the major ideas in the development of the “information warfare” concept: “Information technology is the most relevant basis for modern warfare. It has become conceivable to fight a war solely with information, which is expressed by the term ‘information warfare’ […]. Information warfare could be defined as comprising all the means of accomplishing and securing information dominance so as to support politico-military strategies by manipulating adversary information and information systems and simultaneously securing and protecting one’s own information and information systems, and increasing their efficiency”11.
1.1.1.1. Official military documents
It is impossible to list all the publications, reports, commentaries, analyses, opinions and notices published and expressed by experts of all fields on the subject since the beginning of the 1990s.
But in order to gain the best possible understanding of what the United States means by “information warfare“, it is necessary to understand military doctrines which have endeavored to provide the definitions of key concepts, while keeping in mind the pragmatic needs of defense. The idea is not to theorize but to provide the military with guidelines and precise frameworks for their organization, strategies, operations and tactics.
The text that formally launched the concept of information warfare is a classified guideline of the Department of Defense (DOD), from 199212. Subsequent evolutions, however, enhanced the concept before it finally found its place within the different American military doctrines.
In an instruction from January 199513, the Navy defined information warfare as an action taken to support the national security strategy14 in order to reach and maintain a decisive advantage, by attacking the information infrastructure of the enemy, by using, paralyzing or influencing opposite information systems while protecting friendly information systems. For the American Navy, the term “information warfare” means that ICTs are a force multiplier authorizing more efficient operations: more efficient electronic warfare, better cryptology. The military can carry out the same operations as before but in a better way. ICTs provide improvement compared to the past. This improvement attracts more attention than the idea of radical transformation of ideologies, objectives or targets.
The Air Force document called “The Foundation of Information Warfare”15 makes a distinction between information age warfare and information warfare: the former uses computerized weapons and the latter uses information as a weapon, an independent field.
The Army, Navy and Air Force do not share a common doctrine. This trend will be more obvious in the coming years.
1.1.2. US Air Force Doctrine: AFDD 2-5 (1998)
In August of 1998, the US Air Force published its doctrine on information operations (Air Force Doctrine Document – AFDD 2-5 –Information Operations16). Examining the content of this document with a comparative analysis of the official doctrine of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) (JP 3-13)17 published the same year is interesting, as will be seen in section 1.1.3.
How is information warfare defined in this doctrine from the US Air Force? What are its components? Which concepts must be compared with the concept of information warfare?
1.1.2.1. Superiority of information
Superiority of information is the degree of dominance in the field of information providing friendly forces the possibility of collecting, controlling, using and defending information without actual opposition.18
Superiority of information, as considered by the Air Force, is a state of relative advantage, and not a capacity as presented in JP 3-13.
1.1.2.2. Information operations
This term groups actions taken to conquer, use, defend or attack information and information systems, including “information-in-warfare” and “information warfare” simultaneously. Information-in-warfare means conquering (acquiring) information and using it. Information warfare means attacking and defending.
1.1.2.3. Information warfare
Information warfare is made up of information operations carried out to defend our own information and our own information systems, or to attack and affect the information and information systems of an enemy. The definition introduces concepts that will not be found in the (JCS) approach (JP 3-13): the concept of counter-information and its two subsets of offensive counter-information and defensive counter-information. Counter-information establishes the desired level of control over functions of information, enabling friendly forces to operate at a given moment and place, without prohibitive interference from the adversary.
Offensive counter-information group offensive operations in information warfare, carried out to control the information environment by paralyzing, deteriorating, interrupting, destroying or attempting to deceive information and information systems include:
– psychological operations (the definition adopted is the same as the one subsequently published in the JP 3-13 document);
– electronic warfare (the definition adopted is the same as the one published in the JP 3-13 document);
– military deception;
– physical attacks (the definition adopted is the same as the one in JP 3-13);
– information attack: an action taken to manipulate or destroy enemy information systems without visibly changing the physical entity in which they reside. This means attacking the content without leaving a visible trace on the outside. The closest term is CNA (Computer Network Attacks)
19
in JP 3-13. The JP 3-13 document includes computer destruction.
Defensive counter-information group activities carried out to protect and defend friendly information and information systems include:
– information assurance;
– operations security;
– counter-intelligence;
– psychological counter-operations;
– counter-deception;
– electronic protection.
1.1.3. The doctrine of the Joint Chiefs of Staff committee: JP 3-13 (1998)
Information warfare is also defined in a publication from the JCS on October 9, 1998, called Joint Pub 3-13 “Joint Doctrine for Information Operations (IO)”20. The JCS text was published after the Air Force document. This detail is important because the JCS publication is intended, theoretically at least, to apply to all departments. Since the “Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization” Law21 of 1986, each department must ensure the compliance of its doctrine and procedures with the common doctrine established by the JCS. Information operations doctrines, however, were developed concurrently.
The JCS publication provides the doctrinal basis for the conduct of information operations during joint operations.
1.1.3.1. Superiority of information
Acquiring “superiority of information” means being able to collect, process and distribute an uninterrupted flow of information, while using or blocking the possibilities of an opponent to do the same.
Document JP 3-13 defines superiority of information as absolute perfection, with the idea of “uninterrupted flow of information” for friendly forces, banning this flow to the enemy. The U.S. Air Force is not seeking such an absolute, considering instead that operations in the field of information cannot be perfect. It prefers to speak of “relative advantage”: opponents will try to disrupt information operations, but Air Force superiority of information will ensure that these attempts are unsuccessful.
The components of superiority of information are also different, and the common components are structured differently. For JP 3-13, there are three components: information systems, relevant information and information operations. The Air Force only has one component for superiority of information: information operations.
1.1.3.2. Information operations
Information operations are the actions taken to affect the information and information systems of the enemy, while defending our own information and information systems. There are two main sub-divisions in information operations: offensive information operations (gain) and defensive information operations (exploitation)22. Remember that for the Air Force, the two subdivisions of information operations are information warfare and information-in-warfare.
For JP 3-13, the expression “offensive information operations” means actions aimed at affecting adversary decision-makers in reaching or promoting specific objectives. For the Air Force, offensive activities of information warfare are carried out to control the information environment.
The objective of offensive information operations, which can be carried out in a wide range of military operation situations, at all levels of warfare (strategic, operational and tactical) and that can have an even greater impact when carried out in times of peace or at the beginning of a conflict, is to affect enemy decision-makers or to reach specific goals. Offensive activities include, among others:
– operations security;
– military deception (deceive, trick, and set the enemy up to act against his or her own interests);
– psychological operations;
– electronic warfare;
– physical attack, destruction;
– special information operations;
– computer attacks.
Defensive information operations integrate and coordinate policies, procedures, operations, resources and technologies for the defense and protection of information and information systems. They must ensure necessary protection and defense of information and information systems that joint forces depend on to carry out their operations and reach their objectives. They consist of:
– information assurance (IA);
– operations security;
– physical security;
– counter-deception;
– counter-propaganda;
– counter-intelligence;
– electronic warfare;
– special information operations.
Defensive and offensive operations are complementary and support each other. Offensive operations can support defensive operations through four processes:
– protecting the information environment;
– detecting attacks;
– restoration capabilities;
– responding to attacks.
Because of their relationship, it is important that all offensive and defensive operations components are integrated. If, theoretically, defensive and offensive are separate, in reality they must be designed and taken as inseparable.
The report also identifies “special information operations”, a category of information operations that requires detailed examination and a process of approval because of their sensitivity, their effect or impact potential, their security needs or risks to the national security of the United States.
1.1.3.3. Information warfare
The superiority of information diagram, according to JP 3-13, does not include information warfare, which is only defined as the series of operations carried out during a crisis or conflict to reach or promote specific objectives over one or more specific adversaries23. Information warfare therefore is a subset of information operations: simply operations conducted in times of crisis or conflict. In times of peace, we could not speak of information warfare. But the doctrine does not define the notions of “crisis” and “conflict” either.
This definition is quite different from the Air Force’s definition.
In both approaches, information warfare is an information operation. But even though JP 3-13 separates information warfare and information operations according to the time space in which they occur, the Air Force considers that we are constantly in a state of information warfare because the defensive side is always engaged. This approach (from the US Air Force) may seem more relevant considering the situation after over ten years. The United States (and many other nations) are the subject of permanent attacks launched against their information space (targeting the Pentagon and sensitive infrastructures of the country through massive and coordinated distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks in increasing intensity since 2005), imposing a state of permanent defense, a cyber security and cyberdefense strategy applied to all levels of the grid, i.e. to civilian and military information infrastructures. This defense must be engaged despite the absence of specificly known enemies, in a period where peace, crisis and conflict are mixed without clear temporal boundaries.
Information operations cover peace and returning to peaceful periods because of their presumed deterrant character, which should also apply to adversaries in times of crisis, making them hesitate in initiating actions. The ultimate objective of information operations remains to affect enemies or potential enemies, so that they put a stop to actions threatening the American national security interests. The 1998 text obviously did not take into account the terrorist threat. The question still remains today: can information operations be efficient enough to dissuade or intimidate any type of adversary? The dissuasive character seems implausible. The main quality of the information space is to provide any type of attacker with the ways to bypass security and defense methods. No nation, military or police force has been able to implement totally dissuasive measures against determined players. The main reason resides in the operation of networks ensuring invisibility and thus impunity to all who want to become attackers. In 2009, it seems that the computer weapon as bypass weapon, and certainly not as a weapon of dissuasion, was an accepted fact.
1.1.4. Components of information warfare
It is necessary at this point to explain in more detail the fundamental concepts discussed previously, particularly those called components of information warfare that we invariably find in the different doctrines which are formulated in the United States, but also all over the world. They are psychological operations (PSYOPS), electronic warfare, military deception, operations security (OPSEC), information assurance (IA) and computer network attacks (CNA).
1.1.4.1. Psychological operations
The sub-title of this section could be “The importance of psychology in battles between individuals or groups of individuals”. PSYOPS emerged way before the digital age and will probably outlive it. They can be summarized as the use of communication to influence behavior.
Communication is the process by which an individual influences another person, involving the spectrum of human actions (speaking, writing, etc.). Theories of communication (particularly those of Melvin L. Defleur for whom communication is the group of methods making it possible to exert social control, allocate roles and coordinate efforts) provide more detail. Communication is a tool for relations, not only between individuals, but also for individuals with their historical perspectives. Communication consists of:
– controlling the media to control received and broadcast information; filtering real information, real but partially presented information (scaling of facts), creating and broadcasting false information. The presence of the media in the field during conflicts, or close to a conflict, makes it possible for PSYOPS to take action contributing to the success of military operations, as long as the media can be controlled;
– manipulating minds through information;
– using the emotional impact of words, images, speeches or sounds;
– launching “positive propaganda” operations intended for our own camp, and “intoxication” operations aimed at the enemy.
PSYOPS by misinformation, intoxication, deception, banning and propaganda24 are incredibly important in a period of conflict because they contribute to the success of military operations, help in dominating the opponent, are used to attempt to dissuade the enemy from pursuing the fight, get him to surrender weapons and to surrender himself, help in preserving the morale of our own troops, and also help in getting and maintaining support from the population and national and international public opinion.
PSYOPS also attempt to reach thoughts, opinions, beliefs and emotions in order to influence behaviors, attitudes and affect national interests.
PSYOPS operation applications have led to the idea of the “noosphere”, a field in which dominance of ideas, instead of dominance over land or populations, would be predominant.
The implementation of PSYOPS presumes a deep knowledge of theories of communication and information, psychology of individuals, their behaviors and cultures. Nobody can pretend to really understand the direct or indirect impacts of these operations today.
1.1.4.2. Electronic warfare
Electronic warfare priorities are denial of service (jamming, mimicry, physical attack), deception (that can be directed at automated systems or people) and exploitation (intercepting/listening, obtaining any information with operational value from the enemy’s use of his or her electronic systems).
The goal of electronic warfare is to control the electromagnetic spectrum.
The American doctrine25 defines electronic warfare as any military action using directed electromagnetic energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. The three main subdivisions of electronic warfare are:
– electronic attack aimed at attacking people, equipment and installations with the purpose of eroding, neutralizing and destroying enemy combat capabilities by jamming, electromagnetic deception, the use of lasers and particle beam weapons. Attacking communications can reach different objectives: access contents, detect and destroy system nodes, jam communications to disrupt the adversary, destroy the opponent’s equipment with the help of high power microwaves and send instructions instead of enemy commands (deception). Deception is one of the major tools of electronic attacks. Deceiving the enemy by manipulating his or her perception in such a way that the relevance of his or her judgment and capability of acquiring targets is reduced. Physical destruction is another important facet of electronic attack. Destruction or neutralization by jamming sensors and opposite communications is called soft kill; physical destruction is a hard kill;
– electronic protection includes systems designed to be resistant to jamming by any kind of attack. Cryptography (also called Comsec – Communications Security) is an element of electronic warfare;
– the objective of electronic warfare support is to search, intercept, identify and locate sources of electromagnetic energy in order to recognize immediate threats. Electronic support provides necessary intelligence and the identification of threats for efficient attack and protection. Electronic support includes SIGINT (signals intelligence) which is made up of Comint (communications intelligence, a collection of enemy communications such as the contents of messages and traffic data) and ELINT (electronic intelligence, which captures enemy radar signals and other non-communicating electromagnetic energy sources). Before attacking the communications of an enemy, their network of communications must be mapped out; this is the role of SIGINT that will consist of extracting information from signal masses and from network traffic. Reception equipment today is able to pick up almost all signals transmitted, locate transmitters with precision and feed databases with the signals collected. Data collected must be analyzed. We must especially be able to select the traffic because trying to collect, process and analyze everything is not practical.
Electronic weapon systems are made up of sensors (radars, infrared, and sonars), communication lines (transporting data from sensors to command and control (C2) centers) and output devices (lasers, jammers, EMP).
These systems are part of the composition of C2 networks which transmit and receive data, voice and images. Communications must be secure between army commanders and political leaders, for example, so that messages and orders are not corrupted, intercepted or blocked. There are many methods threatening this security: cryptanalysis, sabotage, subversion of personnel, robbery of material, deception, jamming (such as jamming signals transmitted from a plane to the missile it just launched), physical destruction of networks and communication equipment, interception of unsecured communications (particularly if the communication uses methods such as public or radio telecommunication networks which can be the subject of interception), intercepting orders and replacing them with others, or using voice morphing techniques to substitute commands.
With the help of this series of methods, the military develops attack and defense strategies, which are generally a mix of possibilities.
1.1.4.3. Military deception
“Deception” is a series of measures designed to “deceive the enemy by manipulating, deteriorating or falsifying evidence to trigger a reaction that is detrimental to his interests”26.
For the American military, deception is aimed at enemy decision-makers, by affecting their information collection and analysis process and with dissemination systems. This deception requires an in-depth knowledge of the enemy and his or her decision-making processes. Anticipation is one of the keys. Command must imagine the way in which they think the enemy would act at critical times in the battle. These desired actions become the objective of deception operations. Military deception focuses on the desired behavior, and not only on deceiving the mind. Camp B must get Camp A command to form an inappropriate opinion of the capabilities and intentions of the troops in Camp B, so that they make decisions contrary to their interests. Military deception operations depend on intelligence operations to identify the correct targets of the deception. We must be able to create a credible story and evaluate the efficiency of the deception plan and, to have the best chance of success for such an operation, a very small number of people may need to be kept informed, to reduce the risk of an information leak. But this type of operation may also have a disruptive effect among our own camp27.
1.1.4.4. Operations security
Operations security (OPSEC) is a methodology intended to keep an adversary from accessing “critical” information involving his or her camp and allies, i.e. information necessary to correctly evaluate the capabilities and intentions of the target.
The concept of OPSEC can be analyzed in the light of the doctrine in the official document titled “Operations Security – Joint Publication 3-13.3”, from 29 June 2006, which modifies the previous text from 24 January 1997, referenced 3-5428.
This new doctrinal text establishes the rules that the American military must follow in their activities and operations. It is divided into three major chapters discussing general aspects (definitions, context), OPSEC processes and OPSEC planning, consecutively. Appendices help in the practical understanding of the illustrated concepts.
The proposed definition highlights the main characteristic of OPSECs being one of the information operations. It is a process that:
– identifies critical information in order to determine whether allied actions can be observed by enemy intelligence systems;
– determines if the information obtained by adversaries could be interpreted in such a way that would be useful to them;
– executes selected measures eliminating or reducing the possibility for the enemy to use critical allied information
29
.
Security programs protect classified information. OPSEC identifies, controls and protects generally non-classified information that is associated with, or can be linked to, sensitive operations or activities.
On our side, we have:
– classified information, protected by security programs;
– non-classified information but which can be linked to sensitive activities or operations, then qualified as “critical” and thus must be identified and protected by OPSEC;
– “indicators”, which are a class of information associated with an activity in a significant way;
– a military that is visible to the public and enemy intelligence, in times of peace, training, drills or operations. Non-classified information, when correlated with other non-classified information, can become classified or reveal a sensitive operation.
And in the enemy camp, we find information intelligence, acquisition and exploitation systems that we have to protect against.
The OPSEC process consists of five distinct actions:
– the identification of critical information, i.e. information that is crucial to the enemy, making it possible to categorize information to only protect what is qualified as “vital”;
– the analysis of threats via intelligence, counter-intelligence and open information research and analysis to identify probable enemies. We must find the answer to the following questions: who is the enemy? What goals does the enemy have? What actions could the enemy take? What information does the enemy already have? What intelligence capabilities does the enemy have?
– the analysis of vulnerabilities via the investigation of each aspect of a planned operation to identify OPSEC indicators that could reveal critical information. The objective of OPSEC is to reduce the vulnerability of American or coalition forces with regard to the exploitation of critical information by the enemy. OPSEC applies to all military activities during operations. The following questions must be answered: which indicators of critical information that are unknown by the enemy will be created by allied activities? Which indicators can the enemy collect? Which indicators will the enemy be able to use against allied forces?
– the evaluation of risk by the analysis of vulnerabilities identified in the previous phase, and identification of possible OPSEC measures for each vulnerability. Possible measures include secrecy,concealment, camouflage, deception, intentional diversion in relation to habits, and direct strikes against enemy intelligence systems. Technical measures (see Appendix C) consist of not giving operations information in unsecure email messages, preparing for CNAs, placing vital operational information on disk, using cryptography to protect someone’s voice, data and video communications, controlling radio communication transmissions, using systems with low probability of interception and secure phone lines. Finally, we need to monitor the possible interaction of OPSEC measures; measuring OPSEC may create an indicator (concealing equipment that was not protected before may reveal the preparation of military action);
– the application of appropriate OPSEC measures by command, who must determine if the gain in security exceeds cost in resources. Then, during their execution, the enemy’s reaction must be observed to determine its efficiency.
The range of the spectrum involved by OPSEC implies a large number of players: army commands, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency (NSA), the OPSEC interagency and different DoD agencies.
The major problem lies in how to delimit the moving perimeter of “critical information”. Information will become “critical” according to context; one piece of information that is ordinary today can become critical because of the emergence of new events. Yesterday’s ally can become today’s enemy, for example. Information can be critical according to the context in which it is used, whether for counter-terrorism, hostilities, military intervention or diplomatic negotiations. Anything that is the product of the armed forces could be perceived as potentially critical. This is revealed by the bans or restrictions on military personnel being able to freely express themselves through newsgroups, chatrooms or other discussion tools and information sharing.
Annex A from JP 3-13 draws the limits of this perimeter by listing examples of “critical” information; information involving military capacities, target selection, logistic capacities, intentions, active forces and reserves, and timing of operations.
1.1.4.5. Information assurance (IA)
This concept groups the measures that protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their availability, their integrity, their capacity to be authenticated, their confidentiality and their non repudiation. These measures include the restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection and methods of reaction30.
For the military31, “IA” is an information operation that protects and defends information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality and non repudiation. This security presumes the restoration of information systems with the incorporation of methods of protection, detection and reaction.
IA consists of the protection and defense of information and information systems against unauthorized access and modification of stored, processed and transmitted information, and against denial of service for authorized users. IA also includes the measures necessary to detect, describe and counter such threats. IA is made up of computer security and communications security, also called INFOSEC32.
“Communication security” (COMSEC) is protection resulting from all measures taken to ban access to valuable information for unauthorized people or mislead unauthorized people in their interpretation resulting from the possession and study of information33. Communication security includes security by cryptography, security of transmissions and physical security of communication and information methods.
1.1.4.6. Computer network attacks
Definitions are provided in the doctrinal text JP 3-13, pages I-9 to I-11, GL-4 to GL-10.
Document JP 3-13 from 1998 defines computer network attacks (CNAs) as operations intended to disrupt, prohibit access to, deteriorate, destroy and steal information contained in computers, carried by computer networks, or targeting computers and networks. CNAs include all forms of attacks carried out against or by computers and computer networks.
The method of attack characterizing CNAs is data flow. An electronic attack such as the use of electromagnetic forces does not fall under the CNA category but is part of electronic attacks. For example, jamming a radar is an electronic attack, not a CNA. Propagating a computer virus is a CNA, not an electronic attack. There are many ways to develop such a computer attack: access to systems, controlling systems, destruction and distortion of data (through viruses, worms and Trojan horses), and data interception.
We also speak of cyberwar to describe these forms of aggression.
