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- Herausgeber: Booksell-Verlag
- Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
- Sprache: Englisch
In "The Ethics of Immanuel Kant," the reader is invited into the intricate moral philosophy that has profoundly influenced modern ethical discussions. Kant meticulously delineates his deontological ethics, emphasizing the significance of duty, autonomous will, and the categorical imperative. His literary style is marked by rigorous argumentation and a meticulous structure, reflecting his Enlightenment context where reason was revered as the foundation of human morality. Kant's work invites a critical examination of morality beyond mere consequentialism, asserting that moral laws must be universalizable and act as the guiding force in human actions. Immanuel Kant, a pivotal figure in Western philosophy, developed his ethical theory during a time of societal upheaval and intellectual ferment at the onset of the modern age. His educational background in mathematics and logic profoundly shaped his philosophical inquiries. Kant grappled with the implications of free will, rationality, and the nature of human existence, leading him to this seminal work that seeks to establish an ethical framework grounded in reason, rather than empirical consequences. Readers seeking to engage with fundamental questions of morality and human conduct will find "The Ethics of Immanuel Kant" essential. Its enduring relevance offers profound insights into ethical reasoning applicable not only in philosophical discourse but also in contemporary moral dilemmas. This text serves as a cornerstone for anyone wishing to explore the interplay between freedom, duty, and ethical imperatives, making it a vital addition to the library of any serious student of philosophy. In this enriched edition, we have carefully created added value for your reading experience: - A comprehensive Introduction outlines these selected works' unifying features, themes, or stylistic evolutions. - The Author Biography highlights personal milestones and literary influences that shape the entire body of writing. - A Historical Context section situates the works in their broader era—social currents, cultural trends, and key events that underpin their creation. - A concise Synopsis (Selection) offers an accessible overview of the included texts, helping readers navigate plotlines and main ideas without revealing critical twists. - A unified Analysis examines recurring motifs and stylistic hallmarks across the collection, tying the stories together while spotlighting the different work's strengths. - Reflection questions inspire deeper contemplation of the author's overarching message, inviting readers to draw connections among different texts and relate them to modern contexts. - Lastly, our hand‐picked Memorable Quotes distill pivotal lines and turning points, serving as touchstones for the collection's central themes.
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Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2024
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The Ethics of Immanuel Kant
Table of Contents
Introduction
This collection, 'The Ethics of Immanuel Kant: Metaphysics of Morals - Philosophy of Law & The Doctrine of Virtue + Perpetual Peace + The Critique of Practical Reason: Theory of Moral Reasoning,' serves as an ambitious encapsulation of Kant's ethical philosophy. By assembling foundational texts, it aims to offer readers a holistic understanding of Kant's moral framework, bridging his theories of ethics, law, and peace. Each work stands as a distinct yet interconnected exploration of Kant's moral philosophy, inviting readers to engage with the core tenets that define his ethical landscape.
The collection features a diverse array of text types, primarily comprising essays that delve into moral philosophy, legal theory, and ethical reasoning. Included are seminal texts like 'The Metaphysics of Morals' and 'Perpetual Peace,' alongside 'The Critique of Practical Reason,' which collectively emphasize the theoretical underpinnings of Kantian ethics. This eclectic mixture enriches the philosophical dialogue surrounding moral imperatives, social justice, and the nature of human virtue, making the collection both comprehensive and varied in scholarly approach.
A unifying theme in this collection is the concept of duty, which serves as the cornerstone of Kant's ethical framework. Each text methodically explores the moral law and the categorical imperative, emphasizing the necessity of universality and rationality in ethical dialogue. Furthermore, issues surrounding autonomy, moral obligation, and justice resonate throughout the texts, reflecting Kant's insistence on the dignity inherent to all rational beings. Such thematic cohesion contributes to the enduring relevance of Kant's thought in contemporary moral discussions.
Stylistically, Kant’s writing conveys a blend of rigorous argumentation and nuanced exploration of moral concepts. He employs a formal yet accessible tone that articulates complex ideas without sacrificing clarity. His hallmark precision in language invites thoughtful engagement, challenging readers to grapple with intricate ethical dilemmas. This commitment to clarity, coupled with an unwavering pursuit of philosophical depth, underscores why these works continue to be significant in both academic and practical contexts.
In 'The Metaphysics of Morals,' readers encounter Kant's systematic approach to ethical theory, which meticulously delineates duties and rights within moral contexts. This foundational text serves as a springboard for understanding Kant's broader philosophical contributions, particularly in its categorization of duties—both perfect and imperfect. It provides vital insights into individual responsibilities while exploring their implications for social order and the rule of law, making it an essential read for those interested in moral philosophy and legal ethics.
Kant's 'Philosophy of Law' elaborates upon the relationship between morality and societal structures. By articulating the science of right, this work examines how laws are derived from moral principles and how they shape the social fabric. Readers will find Kant's exploration of justice and legal obligation particularly compelling, as he engineers a systematic relationship between ethical obligations and the structures governing human interaction. This text is critical for understanding the essential role law plays in realizing ethical ideals.
In 'The Critique of Practical Reason,' Kant delves deeper into the mechanics of moral reasoning, asserting the necessity of practical reason in ethical deliberation. This text invites readers to explore the foundations of moral judgments and the implications of rationality on human actions. By dissecting concepts such as freedom and moral law, Kant enriches the discourse on what it means to act justly, providing indispensable insights for those who seek to comprehend the interplay between reason and ethics.
'Perpetual Peace' stands as a landmark essay that extends Kant’s ethical philosophy into the realm of political theory. In this work, Kant envisions a sustainable framework for international relations founded upon ethical principles. His exploration of peace not only reflects his moral imperatives but also articulates a future whereby humanity can transcend conflict through mutual respect and rational dialogue. This prophetic vision invites profound reflection on contemporary global issues, making it particularly relevant in today's geopolitical climate.
The 'Metaphysical Elements of Ethics' serves as another crucial contribution that elaborates on the foundations of moral judgments. Kant’s focus on the metaphysical aspects of ethics opens a meaningful discourse around the nature of moral law and its relation to human freedom. This text is especially significant for those steeped in philosophical inquiry, as it offers a deeper understanding of the underpinnings of moral thought, setting a rigorous philosophical context for ethical discussion.
Together, these works frame a comprehensive study of ethics that traverses various applications of Kantian thought. The ethical implications extend beyond purely theoretical boundaries, influencing fields ranging from law to politics, and even education. Kant's bridge from abstract moral principles to their practical implications ensures that the collection remains relevant for a broad audience eager to engage with moral philosophy in diverse contexts.
Kant's influence is evident in contemporary discussions on moral philosophy and ethics, as scholars and practitioners continually reference his ideas. This collection encapsulates his enduring significance, which not only reflects the historical backdrop of the Enlightenment but also resonates with ongoing societal challenges in understanding morality. Through careful examination of these texts, readers are equipped with a robust framework for grappling with age-old questions about right and wrong.
The interplay between individual autonomy and moral duty is another critical discourse that courses through these writings. Kant’s insistence on the value of rational agents as lawgivers unto themselves highlights their pivotal role in ethical considerations. This conversation around self-governance and moral responsibility is indispensable for understanding both personal ethics and societal obligations, confirming the relevance of this collection in contemporary ethical debates.
In gathering these works, the collection not only provides a comprehensive overview of Kant's philosophical achievements but also serves as an invitation to reflect introspectively on the nature of morality itself. Readers are encouraged to engage critically with each chapter, developing their understanding of ethical reasoning and moral philosophy. Such engagement facilitates a deeper appreciation of the complexity inherent in Kantian thought and its implications for today's world.
Moreover, this collection serves as a scholarly resource, positioning Kant’s works in dialog with modern philosophical discourse. It champions a renewed exploration of ethical inquiry, inspiring students, educators, and scholars alike to revisit Kantian ideas in light of contemporary moral challenges. The academic rigor and clarity found within these texts position them as essential reading for anyone wishing to engage with philosophy.
Kant's philosophy distinguishes itself not merely through its complexity but also through its capacity to inspire action. The ethical imperatives laid out in these writings provoke readers to consider their roles as individuals within society. By emphasizing the importance of moral agency, the collection calls upon readers to reflect on their duties and responsibilities, extending the relevance of Kant's ideas into practical applications that can transform personal and societal ethics.
As readers journey through the collection, they are invited to appreciate the evolution of Kant's thought across different texts. This evolution illustrates his persistent engagement with ethical dilemmas that continue to challenge humanity. Each work provides a unique lens through which to view Kant's philosophical contributions, emphasizing the innovation in his approach while grounding moral reasoning in the nuances of human existence.
In conclusion, 'The Ethics of Immanuel Kant' invites you to dive into a rich tapestry of philosophical inquiry, where moral reasoning, law, and the pursuit of peace intersect. Each text serves a vital purpose within this framework and contributes to a deeper understanding of Kant's ethical legacy. We warmly encourage readers to explore all sections of this comprehensive single-author collection, as the journey through Kantian ethics promises to enrich both the mind and the soul.
Author Biography
Introduction
Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) was a German philosopher from Königsberg whose critical philosophy reshaped modern thought. His major works include Critique of Pure Reason, Critique of Practical Reason, and Critique of the Power of Judgment, along with influential texts such as Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, and Perpetual Peace. Kant proposed a Copernican revolution in philosophy, arguing that the mind actively structures experience and grounding morality in the autonomy of rational agents. His ideas transformed metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, and political theory, and they continue to anchor debates across the humanities and social sciences.
Education and Literary Influences
Raised in the Prussian city of Königsberg, Kant pursued higher education at the University of Königsberg, where he studied philosophy, mathematics, and the natural sciences. A decisive academic influence was the rationalist and Newtonian-oriented thinker Martin Knutzen, who introduced Kant to the rigor of Leibniz-Wolff metaphysics and the explanatory power of Newtonian physics. After his studies, Kant supported himself as a private tutor and lecturer, developing a reputation for clear exposition and methodical habits. These years grounded his lifelong commitment to systematic inquiry, careful argumentation, and engagement with contemporary science as a partner to philosophical reflection.
Kant’s mature outlook took shape through sustained dialogue with earlier and contemporary thinkers. David Hume’s skeptical analysis of causation famously, in Kant’s words, awakened him from his ‘dogmatic slumber,’ prompting the search for the a priori conditions of experience. Jean-Jacques Rousseau deepened Kant’s concern for human dignity and moral autonomy. He also drew on the legacy of Leibniz and Wolff, while respecting the empirical successes of Newtonian science. This composite inheritance—rationalist architecture disciplined by empiricist critique and scientific method—set the stage for Kant’s critical project: to delimit reason’s legitimate claims while securing the grounds of knowledge, morality, and judgment.
Literary Career
Before the Critiques, Kant wrote on cosmology, metaphysics, and aesthetics in an accessible register. Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens advanced a nebular hypothesis for the origin of planetary systems. He published Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime and Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, testing the boundaries between sentiment, superstition, and reason. Other writings probed earthquakes and related natural phenomena, as well as the question of proving God’s existence. His 1770 inaugural dissertation marked his appointment as professor of logic and metaphysics in Königsberg and signaled a transition to the critical period, followed by a decade of concentrated preparation.
The Critique of Pure Reason sought to resolve conflicts between dogmatic metaphysics and skeptical empiricism by analyzing the mind’s contributions to experience. Distinguishing phenomena from things in themselves, Kant argued that space, time, and the categories are forms through which we organize appearances, making synthetic a priori knowledge possible in mathematics and natural science. The work’s difficulty challenged readers, and early responses were mixed. Kant clarified and defended its theses in the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, emphasizing a methodological revolution: rather than conforming cognition to objects, we must examine how objects conform to the conditions of possible experience.
Kant then articulated his moral philosophy. The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals introduced the categorical imperative, requiring that maxims be fit for universal law and that persons be treated as ends in themselves. The Critique of Practical Reason developed a doctrine of autonomy, freedom, and the moral law, while the later Metaphysics of Morals systematized duties of right and virtue. His ethics placed intention and principle at the center of moral assessment, challenging consequentialist approaches. Though sometimes criticized for rigorism, his account of dignity and respect profoundly shaped debates in moral philosophy, jurisprudence, and human rights theory.
The Critique of the Power of Judgment forged connections between nature and freedom through an analysis of aesthetic and teleological judgment. Kant explored the experience of the beautiful and the sublime, the role of disinterested pleasure, and the idea of purposiveness without purpose. He also addressed reflective judgment in biology, proposing that living beings invite teleological descriptions even as science seeks mechanical explanations. This third Critique completed the architectonic of his system, offering a bridge between theoretical knowledge and practical reason and opening new vistas in aesthetics, art criticism, and the philosophy of life and organism.
Beyond the Critiques, Kant wrote widely on history, politics, and anthropology. Essays such as Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim and An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment? advanced themes of progress, publicity, and the public use of reason. Perpetual Peace elaborated conditions for a lawful international order grounded in republican constitutions and cosmopolitan right. Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View synthesized observations about human character and culture for reflective citizens. As a teacher in Königsberg, Kant became a celebrated lecturer, known for clarity and discipline, while his prose remained dense but architecturally exacting.
Beliefs and Advocacy
Kant’s convictions aligned with the Enlightenment’s call to think for oneself while obeying legitimate laws. He defended the autonomy of reason, the equal dignity of persons, and the necessity of publicity for accountable governance. His political philosophy envisioned a federation of republican states and cosmopolitan norms restraining war and protecting hospitality across borders. He argued for freedom of the press and the public use of reason as engines of reform, while insisting that reform proceed legally rather than by violent upheaval. These commitments shaped his philosophical system and the civic tone of his essays on history and politics.
In religion, Kant advocated a moral interpretation of faith within the limits of reason. Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason examined the symbolic value of doctrine and the ethical community it can sustain, while rejecting dogmatism and speculative theology. His positions drew official scrutiny in the 1790s, and he agreed to refrain from further writing on religion under the reigning monarch, resuming discussion only after the political context changed. Throughout, he balanced civic obedience with intellectual independence, modeling a conception of academic freedom in which truthfulness, duty, and respect for law guide the scholar’s public responsibilities.
Final Years & Legacy
Kant’s later years were marked by declining health and steady, disciplined work on projects he could not fully complete, notably the manuscripts known as the Opus Postumum. He gradually withdrew from teaching and public lectures, focusing on revision and consolidation of his system. Friends and former students continued to visit, and his reputation was secure across German-speaking universities. He died in Königsberg in 1804. Contemporary notices emphasized his integrity, modest life, and transformative influence on philosophy, recognizing that the critical project had reoriented metaphysics, ethics, and aesthetics for subsequent generations of scholars.
Kant’s legacy radiated through nineteenth- and twentieth-century thought. Early post-Kantian idealists developed, critiqued, and transformed his system, while later Neo-Kantian movements renewed his epistemology and value theory. His impact reaches phenomenology, analytic philosophy, philosophy of science, legal theory, international relations, and contemporary ethics. Debates over autonomy, dignity, human rights, and the limits of reason still engage Kantian frameworks, and reinterpretations continue in light of new sciences of mind and culture. In academic and public discourse alike, Kant remains a touchstone for rigorous argument, moral seriousness, and the aspiration to unite freedom with rational law.
Historical Context
Immanuel Kant was born in 1724 in Königsberg, then part of the Kingdom of Prussia, during the Enlightenment—a period that championed human reason, individual autonomy and scientific inquiry. Thinkers of this era questioned inherited authorities and sought to replace dogma with critical examination, an orientation that Kant carried into his early moral investigations and later legal writings.
The intellectual climate of the eighteenth century—shaped by debates between rationalists and empiricists—profoundly influenced his approach. René Descartes’s emphasis on clear and distinct ideas and David Hume’s skepticism about causation and moral judgment prompted Kant to reconsider how pure reason and sensory experience interact. He addressed these concerns first in his critique of theoretical reason and subsequently laid the foundation for ethics and legal philosophy in his works on practical reason and the first principles of virtue.
Although Kant spent almost his entire life in East Prussia, the political and cultural atmosphere under Frederick the Great provided him with examples of centralized authority and evolving notions of citizenship. These real‐world conditions informed the section on rights in his later “Metaphysics of Morals,” where he articulated a republican model grounded in individual freedom and the rule of law.
The rise of more unified states and the gradual decline of feudal structures also entered his reflections on justice and human rights. He argued that legitimate political authority must rest on consent and legal equality, insights he applied both in his systematic account of right and in his essay on perpetual peace, where he envisaged a federation of free states governed by universal law.
Revolutionary developments in America and France lent urgency to his cosmopolitan vision. Observing calls for liberty and equality abroad, he reinforced the idea that moral agents have duties transcending national borders and that lasting peace depends on mutual respect and shared legal frameworks.
Although the Industrial Revolution was only beginning to transform economies and societies toward the end of his life, Kant did not directly address industrialization. Still, his insistence on treating every person as an end in themselves offers a standard for judging any social or economic change by its impact on human dignity and autonomy.
Contemporary advances in natural science—most notably the achievements of Newtonian physics and the rigor of mathematical proof—encouraged him to seek comparable certainty in philosophy. He thus established a critical method designed to delimit reason’s capacities and to secure a firm basis for ethical principles.
Central to his moral theory is the idea that a good will acts in accordance with a universalizable law—what he called the categorical imperative—which provides an objective test for moral action and has since shaped Western ethical thought.
Kant’s work set the stage for the next generation of German thinkers. Johann Gottlieb Fichte built on his critical philosophy to develop a philosophy of self‐consciousness; Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel each responded in turn, giving rise to the movement known as German Idealism and extending debates about subjectivity and agency.
A cornerstone of his project was the conviction that moral duties must derive from reason itself rather than from theology. In his account of practical philosophy, he insisted that secular ethics grounded in autonomy could replace doctrines based on divine command.
His essay on perpetual peace, published amid the upheavals triggered by the French Revolutionary wars, proposed practical measures—such as constitutional republics, international agreements and hospitality toward foreigners—to reduce conflict and foster cooperation among nations.
Although he did not write on early feminist movements, later theorists have drawn on his concept of intrinsic dignity to argue for equal moral consideration regardless of gender. His view that rational beings possess unconditional worth has informed modern discussions of equality and human rights.
As Romantic critiques of pure reason arose, he acknowledged the role of inclination and feeling within a system governed by duty, illustrating in his analysis of virtue how emotion and rational law can coexist without compromising moral autonomy.
While he rarely examined commerce in detail, his insistence that people never be used merely as means anticipates ethical critiques of reducing human relations to market transactions, influencing later debates about social responsibility and civic virtue.
In subsequent centuries, existentialist and pragmatist philosophers have challenged the universal applicability of his moral formula in complex situations. Nonetheless, his attempt to construct a coherent, duty‐based framework has remained a touchstone for debates in moral and legal philosophy.
Kant’s legacy endures across disciplines—from moral psychology and political theory to global ethics—where his insistence on reasoned principles continues to inform contemporary reflections on rights, duties and the conditions for peaceful coexistence.
Synopsis (Selection)
Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals
Kant outlines his foundational ethical theory, emphasizing the importance of duty, the categorical imperative, and the principles governing moral action based on reason.
The Metaphysics of Morals
This work is divided into two parts, the 'Doctrine of Right' and the 'Doctrine of Virtue,' and elaborates on Kant's ideas regarding justice, legal structures, ethical duties, and the cultivation of moral virtues.
Philosophy of Law (The Science of Right)
Kant discusses the concept of law as a system of rights, exploring the relationship between individual freedom and the requirements of social order and justice.
The Metaphysical Elements of Ethics
This text expands on the principles of ethics by providing a deeper understanding of moral duties, virtues, and the implications of ethical behavior within societal contexts.
The Critique of Practical Reason: Theory of Moral Reasoning
Kant examines the nature of practical reason, establishing it as the faculty that guides moral judgment, and defends the autonomy of moral decision-making in accordance with rational principles.
Perpetual Peace (A Philosophical Essay)
In this essay, Kant proposes a framework for achieving lasting peace through international cooperation, outlining the moral and political prerequisites for establishing a global federation of free states.
The Ethics of Immanuel Kant: Metaphysics of Morals - Philosophy of Law & The Doctrine of Virtue + Perpetual Peace + The Critique of Practical Reason: Theory of Moral Reasoning
Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals
Table of Contents
Preface
Ancient Greek philosophy was divided into three sciences: physics, ethics, and logic. This division is perfectly suitable to the nature of the thing; and the only improvement that can be made in it is to add the principle on which it is based, so that we may both satisfy ourselves of its completeness, and also be able to determine correctly the necessary subdivisions.
All rational knowledge is either material or formal: the former considers some object, the latter is concerned only with the form of the understanding and of the reason itself, and with the universal laws of thought in general without distinction of its objects. Formal philosophy is called logic. Material philosophy, however, has to do with determinate objects and the laws to which they are subject, is again twofold; for these laws are either laws of nature or of freedom. The science of the former is physics, that of the latter, ethics; they are also called natural philosophy and moral philosophy respectively.
Logic cannot have any empirical part; that is, a part in which the universal and necessary laws of thought should rest on grounds taken from experience; otherwise it would not be logic, i.e., a canon for the understanding or the reason, valid for all thought, and capable of demonstration. Natural and moral philosophy, on the contrary, can each have their empirical part, since the former has to determine the laws of nature as an object of experience; the latter the laws of the human will, so far as it is affected by nature: the former, however, being laws according to which everything does happen; the latter, laws according to which everything ought to happen. Ethics, however, must also consider the conditions under which what ought to happen frequently does not.
We may call all philosophy empirical, so far as it is based on grounds of experience: on the other hand, that which delivers its doctrines from a priori principles alone we may call pure philosophy. When the latter is merely formal it is logic; if it is restricted to definite objects of the understanding it is metaphysic.
In this way there arises the idea of a twofold metaphysic — a metaphysic of nature and a metaphysic of morals. Physics will thus have an empirical and also a rational part. It is the same with Ethics; but here the empirical part might have the special name of practical anthropology, the name morality being appropriated to the rational part.
All trades, arts, and handiworks have gained by division of labour, namely, when, instead of one man doing everything, each confines himself to a certain kind of work distinct from others in the treatment it requires, so as to be able to perform it with greater facility and in the greatest perfection. Where the different kinds of work are not distinguished and divided, where everyone is a jack-of-all-trades, there manufactures remain still in the greatest barbarism. It might deserve to be considered whether pure philosophy in all its parts does not require a man specially devoted to it, and whether it would not be better for the whole business of science if those who, to please the tastes of the public, are wont to blend the rational and empirical elements together, mixed in all sorts of proportions unknown to themselves, and who call themselves independent thinkers, giving the name of minute philosophers to those who apply themselves to the rational part only — if these, I say, were warned not to carry on two employments together which differ widely in the treatment they demand, for each of which perhaps a special talent is required, and the combination of which in one person only produces bunglers. But I only ask here whether the nature of science does not require that we should always carefully separate the empirical from the rational part, and prefix to Physics proper (or empirical physics) a metaphysic of nature, and to practical anthropology a metaphysic of morals, which must be carefully cleared of everything empirical, so that we may know how much can be accomplished by pure reason in both cases, and from what sources it draws this its a priori teaching, and that whether the latter inquiry is conducted by all moralists (whose name is legion), or only by some who feel a calling thereto.
As my concern here is with moral philosophy, I limit the question suggested to this: Whether it is not of the utmost necessity to construct a pure thing which is only empirical and which belongs to anthropology? For that such a philosophy must be possible is evident from the common idea of duty and of the moral laws. Everyone must admit that if a law is to have moral force, i.e., to be the basis of an obligation, it must carry with it absolute necessity; that, for example, the precept, "Thou shalt not lie," is not valid for men alone, as if other rational beings had no need to observe it; and so with all the other moral laws properly so called; that, therefore, the basis of obligation must not be sought in the nature of man, or in the circumstances in the world in which he is placed, but a priori simply in the conception of pure reason; and although any other precept which is founded on principles of mere experience may be in certain respects universal, yet in as far as it rests even in the least degree on an empirical basis, perhaps only as to a motive, such a precept, while it may be a practical rule, can never be called a moral law.
Thus not only are moral laws with their principles essentially distinguished from every other kind of practical knowledge in which there is anything empirical, but all moral philosophy rests wholly on its pure part. When applied to man, it does not borrow the least thing from the knowledge of man himself (anthropology), but gives laws a priori to him as a rational being. No doubt these laws require a judgement sharpened by experience, in order on the one hand to distinguish in what cases they are applicable, and on the other to procure for them access to the will of the man and effectual influence on conduct; since man is acted on by so many inclinations that, though capable of the idea of a practical pure reason, he is not so easily able to make it effective in concreto in his life.
A metaphysic of morals is therefore indispensably necessary, not merely for speculative reasons, in order to investigate the sources of the practical principles which are to be found a priori in our reason, but also because morals themselves are liable to all sorts of corruption, as long as we are without that clue and supreme canon by which to estimate them correctly. For in order that an action should be morally good, it is not enough that it conform to the moral law, but it must also be done for the sake of the law, otherwise that conformity is only very contingent and uncertain; since a principle which is not moral, although it may now and then produce actions conformable to the law, will also often produce actions which contradict it. Now it is only a pure philosophy that we can look for the moral law in its purity and genuineness (and, in a practical matter, this is of the utmost consequence): we must, therefore, begin with pure philosophy (metaphysic), and without it there cannot be any moral philosophy at all. That which mingles these pure principles with the empirical does not deserve the name of philosophy (for what distinguishes philosophy from common rational knowledge is that it treats in separate sciences what the latter only comprehends confusedly); much less does it deserve that of moral philosophy, since by this confusion it even spoils the purity of morals themselves, and counteracts its own end.
Let it not be thought, however, that what is here demanded is already extant in the propaedeutic prefixed by the celebrated Wolf to his moral philosophy, namely, his so-called general practical philosophy, and that, therefore, we have not to strike into an entirely new field. Just because it was to be a general practical philosophy, it has not taken into consideration a will of any particular kind — say one which should be determined solely from a priori principles without any empirical motives, and which we might call a pure will, but volition in general, with all the actions and conditions which belong to it in this general signification. By this it is distinguished from a metaphysic of morals, just as general logic, which treats of the acts and canons of thought in general, is distinguished from transcendental philosophy, which treats of the particular acts and canons of pure thought, i.e., that whose cognitions are altogether a priori. For the metaphysic of morals has to examine the idea and the principles of a possible pure will, and not the acts and conditions of human volition generally, which for the most part are drawn from psychology. It is true that moral laws and duty are spoken of in the general moral philosophy (contrary indeed to all fitness). But this is no objection, for in this respect also the authors of that science remain true to their idea of it; they do not distinguish the motives which are prescribed as such by reason alone altogether a priori, and which are properly moral, from the empirical motives which the understanding raises to general conceptions merely by comparison of experiences; but, without noticing the difference of their sources, and looking on them all as homogeneous, they consider only their greater or less amount. It is in this way they frame their notion of obligation, which, though anything but moral, is all that can be attained in a philosophy which passes no judgement at all on the origin of all possible practical concepts, whether they are a priori, or only a posteriori.
Intending to publish hereafter a metaphysic of morals, I issue in the first instance these fundamental principles. Indeed there is properly no other foundation for it than the critical examination of a pure practical Reason; just as that of metaphysics is the critical examination of the pure speculative reason, already published. But in the first place the former is not so absolutely necessary as the latter, because in moral concerns human reason can easily be brought to a high degree of correctness and completeness, even in the commonest understanding, while on the contrary in its theoretic but pure use it is wholly dialectical; and in the second place if the critique of a pure practical reason is to be complete, it must be possible at the same time to show its identity with the speculative reason in a common principle, for it can ultimately be only one and the same reason which has to be distinguished merely in its application. I could not, however, bring it to such completeness here, without introducing considerations of a wholly different kind, which would be perplexing to the reader. On this account I have adopted the title of Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals instead of that of a Critical Examination of the pure practical reason.
But in the third place, since a metaphysic of morals, in spite of the discouraging title, is yet capable of being presented in popular form, and one adapted to the common understanding, I find it useful to separate from it this preliminary treatise on its fundamental principles, in order that I may not hereafter have need to introduce these necessarily subtle discussions into a book of a more simple character.
The present treatise is, however, nothing more than the investigation and establishment of the supreme principle of morality, and this alone constitutes a study complete in itself and one which ought to be kept apart from every other moral investigation. No doubt my conclusions on this weighty question, which has hitherto been very unsatisfactorily examined, would receive much light from the application of the same principle to the whole system, and would be greatly confirmed by the adequacy which it exhibits throughout; but I must forego this advantage, which indeed would be after all more gratifying than useful, since the easy applicability of a principle and its apparent adequacy give no very certain proof of its soundness, but rather inspire a certain partiality, which prevents us from examining and estimating it strictly in itself and without regard to consequences.
I have adopted in this work the method which I think most suitable, proceeding analytically from common knowledge to the determination of its ultimate principle, and again descending synthetically from the examination of this principle and its sources to the common knowledge in which we find it employed. The division will, therefore, be as follows:
First section. Transition from the common rational knowledge of morality to the philosophical.
Second section. Transition from popular moral philosophy to the metaphysic of morals.
Third section. Final step from the metaphysic of morals to the critique of the pure practical reason.
First Section Transition from the Common Rational Knowledge of Morality to the Philosophical
Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good, without qualification, except a good will. Intelligence, wit, judgement, and the other talents of the mind, however they may be named, or courage, resolution, perseverance, as qualities of temperament, are undoubtedly good and desirable in many respects; but these gifts of nature may also become extremely bad and mischievous if the will which is to make use of them, and which, therefore, constitutes what is called character, is not good. It is the same with the gifts of fortune. Power, riches, honour, even health, and the general well-being and contentment with one's condition which is called happiness, inspire pride, and often presumption, if there is not a good will to correct the influence of these on the mind, and with this also to rectify the whole principle of acting and adapt it to its end. The sight of a being who is not adorned with a single feature of a pure and good will, enjoying unbroken prosperity, can never give pleasure to an impartial rational spectator. Thus a good will appears to constitute the indispensable condition even of being worthy of happiness.
There are even some qualities which are of service to this good will itself and may facilitate its action, yet which have no intrinsic unconditional value, but always presuppose a good will, and this qualifies the esteem that we justly have for them and does not permit us to regard them as absolutely good. Moderation in the affections and passions, self-control, and calm deliberation are not only good in many respects, but even seem to constitute part of the intrinsic worth of the person; but they are far from deserving to be called good without qualification, although they have been so unconditionally praised by the ancients. For without the principles of a good will, they may become extremely bad, and the coolness of a villain not only makes him far more dangerous, but also directly makes him more abominable in our eyes than he would have been without it.
A good will is good not because of what it performs or effects, not by its aptness for the attainment of some proposed end, but simply by virtue of the volition; that is, it is good in itself, and considered by itself is to be esteemed much higher than all that can be brought about by it in favour of any inclination, nay even of the sum total of all inclinations. Even if it should happen that, owing to special disfavour of fortune, or the niggardly provision of a step-motherly nature, this will should wholly lack power to accomplish its purpose, if with its greatest efforts it should yet achieve nothing, and there should remain only the good will (not, to be sure, a mere wish, but the summoning of all means in our power), then, like a jewel, it would still shine by its own light, as a thing which has its whole value in itself. Its usefulness or fruitfulness can neither add nor take away anything from this value. It would be, as it were, only the setting to enable us to handle it the more conveniently in common commerce, or to attract to it the attention of those who are not yet connoisseurs, but not to recommend it to true connoisseurs, or to determine its value.
There is, however, something so strange in this idea of the absolute value of the mere will, in which no account is taken of its utility, that notwithstanding the thorough assent of even common reason to the idea, yet a suspicion must arise that it may perhaps really be the product of mere high-flown fancy, and that we may have misunderstood the purpose of nature in assigning reason as the governor of our will. Therefore we will examine this idea from this point of view.
In the physical constitution of an organized being, that is, a being adapted suitably to the purposes of life, we assume it as a fundamental principle that no organ for any purpose will be found but what is also the fittest and best adapted for that purpose. Now in a being which has reason and a will, if the proper object of nature were its conservation, its welfare, in a word, its happiness, then nature would have hit upon a very bad arrangement in selecting the reason of the creature to carry out this purpose. For all the actions which the creature has to perform with a view to this purpose, and the whole rule of its conduct, would be far more surely prescribed to it by instinct, and that end would have been attained thereby much more certainly than it ever can be by reason. Should reason have been communicated to this favoured creature over and above, it must only have served it to contemplate the happy constitution of its nature, to admire it, to congratulate itself thereon, and to feel thankful for it to the beneficent cause, but not that it should subject its desires to that weak and delusive guidance and meddle bunglingly with the purpose of nature. In a word, nature would have taken care that reason should not break forth into practical exercise, nor have the presumption, with its weak insight, to think out for itself the plan of happiness, and of the means of attaining it. Nature would not only have taken on herself the choice of the ends, but also of the means, and with wise foresight would have entrusted both to instinct.
And, in fact, we find that the more a cultivated reason applies itself with deliberate purpose to the enjoyment of life and happiness, so much the more does the man fail of true satisfaction. And from this circumstance there arises in many, if they are candid enough to confess it, a certain degree of misology, that is, hatred of reason, especially in the case of those who are most experienced in the use of it, because after calculating all the advantages they derive, I do not say from the invention of all the arts of common luxury, but even from the sciences (which seem to them to be after all only a luxury of the understanding), they find that they have, in fact, only brought more trouble on their shoulders, rather than gained in happiness; and they end by envying, rather than despising, the more common stamp of men who keep closer to the guidance of mere instinct and do not allow their reason much influence on their conduct. And this we must admit, that the judgement of those who would very much lower the lofty eulogies of the advantages which reason gives us in regard to the happiness and satisfaction of life, or who would even reduce them below zero, is by no means morose or ungrateful to the goodness with which the world is governed, but that there lies at the root of these judgements the idea that our existence has a different and far nobler end, for which, and not for happiness, reason is properly intended, and which must, therefore, be regarded as the supreme condition to which the private ends of man must, for the most part, be postponed.
For as reason is not competent to guide the will with certainty in regard to its objects and the satisfaction of all our wants (which it to some extent even multiplies), this being an end to which an implanted instinct would have led with much greater certainty; and since, nevertheless, reason is imparted to us as a practical faculty, i.e., as one which is to have influence on the will, therefore, admitting that nature generally in the distribution of her capacities has adapted the means to the end, its true destination must be to produce a will, not merely good as a means to something else, but good in itself, for which reason was absolutely necessary. This will then, though not indeed the sole and complete good, must be the supreme good and the condition of every other, even of the desire of happiness. Under these circumstances, there is nothing inconsistent with the wisdom of nature in the fact that the cultivation of the reason, which is requisite for the first and unconditional purpose, does in many ways interfere, at least in this life, with the attainment of the second, which is always conditional, namely, happiness. Nay, it may even reduce it to nothing, without nature thereby failing of her purpose. For reason recognizes the establishment of a good will as its highest practical destination, and in attaining this purpose is capable only of a satisfaction of its own proper kind, namely that from the attainment of an end, which end again is determined by reason only, notwithstanding that this may involve many a disappointment to the ends of inclination.
We have then to develop the notion of a will which deserves to be highly esteemed for itself and is good without a view to anything further, a notion which exists already in the sound natural understanding, requiring rather to be cleared up than to be taught, and which in estimating the value of our actions always takes the first place and constitutes the condition of all the rest. In order to do this, we will take the notion of duty, which includes that of a good will, although implying certain subjective restrictions and hindrances. These, however, far from concealing it, or rendering it unrecognizable, rather bring it out by contrast and make it shine forth so much the brighter.
I omit here all actions which are already recognized as inconsistent with duty, although they may be useful for this or that purpose, for with these the question whether they are done from duty cannot arise at all, since they even conflict with it. I also set aside those actions which really conform to duty, but to which men have no direct inclination, performing them because they are impelled thereto by some other inclination. For in this case we can readily distinguish whether the action which agrees with duty is done from duty, or from a selfish view. It is much harder to make this distinction when the action accords with duty and the subject has besides a direct inclination to it. For example, it is always a matter of duty that a dealer should not over charge an inexperienced purchaser; and wherever there is much commerce the prudent tradesman does not overcharge, but keeps a fixed price for everyone, so that a child buys of him as well as any other. Men are thus honestly served; but this is not enough to make us believe that the tradesman has so acted from duty and from principles of honesty: his own advantage required it; it is out of the question in this case to suppose that he might besides have a direct inclination in favour of the buyers, so that, as it were, from love he should give no advantage to one over another. Accordingly the action was done neither from duty nor from direct inclination, but merely with a selfish view.
On the other hand, it is a duty to maintain one's life; and, in addition, everyone has also a direct inclination to do so. But on this account the anxious care which most men take for it has no intrinsic worth, and their maxim has no moral import. They preserve their life as duty requires, no doubt, but not because duty requires. On the other hand, if adversity and hopeless sorrow have completely taken away the relish for life; if the unfortunate one, strong in mind, indignant at his fate rather than desponding or dejected, wishes for death, and yet preserves his life without loving it — not from inclination or fear, but from duty — then his maxim has a moral worth.
To be beneficent when we can is a duty; and besides this, there are many minds so sympathetically constituted that, without any other motive of vanity or self-interest, they find a pleasure in spreading joy around them and can take delight in the satisfaction of others so far as it is their own work. But I maintain that in such a case an action of this kind, however proper, however amiable it may be, has nevertheless no true moral worth, but is on a level with other inclinations, e.g., the inclination to honour, which, if it is happily directed to that which is in fact of public utility and accordant with duty and consequently honourable, deserves praise and encouragement, but not esteem. For the maxim lacks the moral import, namely, that such actions be done from duty, not from inclination. Put the case that the mind of that philanthropist were clouded by sorrow of his own, extinguishing all sympathy with the lot of others, and that, while he still has the power to benefit others in distress, he is not touched by their trouble because he is absorbed with his own; and now suppose that he tears himself out of this dead insensibility, and performs the action without any inclination to it, but simply from duty, then first has his action its genuine moral worth. Further still; if nature has put little sympathy in the heart of this or that man; if he, supposed to be an upright man, is by temperament cold and indifferent to the sufferings of others, perhaps because in respect of his own he is provided with the special gift of patience and fortitude and supposes, or even requires, that others should have the same — and such a man would certainly not be the meanest product of nature — but if nature had not specially framed him for a philanthropist, would he not still find in himself a source from whence to give himself a far higher worth than that of a good-natured temperament could be? Unquestionably. It is just in this that the moral worth of the character is brought out which is incomparably the highest of all, namely, that he is beneficent, not from inclination, but from duty.
To secure one's own happiness is a duty, at least indirectly; for discontent with one's condition, under a pressure of many anxieties and amidst unsatisfied wants, might easily become a great temptation to transgression of duty. But here again, without looking to duty, all men have already the strongest and most intimate inclination to happiness, because it is just in this idea that all inclinations are combined in one total. But the precept of happiness is often of such a sort that it greatly interferes with some inclinations, and yet a man cannot form any definite and certain conception of the sum of satisfaction of all of them which is called happiness. It is not then to be wondered at that a single inclination, definite both as to what it promises and as to the time within which it can be gratified, is often able to overcome such a fluctuating idea, and that a gouty patient, for instance, can choose to enjoy what he likes, and to suffer what he may, since, according to his calculation, on this occasion at least, he has not sacrificed the enjoyment of the present moment to a possibly mistaken expectation of a happiness which is supposed to be found in health. But even in this case, if the general desire for happiness did not influence his will, and supposing that in his particular case health was not a necessary element in this calculation, there yet remains in this, as in all other cases, this law, namely, that he should promote his happiness not from inclination but from duty, and by this would his conduct first acquire true moral worth.
It is in this manner, undoubtedly, that we are to understand those passages of Scripture also in which we are commanded to love our neighbour, even our enemy. For love, as an affection, cannot be commanded, but beneficence for duty's sake may; even though we are not impelled to it by any inclination — nay, are even repelled by a natural and unconquerable aversion. This is practical love and not pathological — a love which is seated in the will, and not in the propensions of sense — in principles of action and not of tender sympathy; and it is this love alone which can be commanded.
The second proposition is: That an action done from duty derives its moral worth, not from the purpose which is to be attained by it, but from the maxim by which it is determined, and therefore does not depend on the realization of the object of the action, but merely on the principle of volition by which the action has taken place, without regard to any object of desire. It is clear from what precedes that the purposes which we may have in view in our actions, or their effects regarded as ends and springs of the will, cannot give to actions any unconditional or moral worth. In what, then, can their worth lie, if it is not to consist in the will and in reference to its expected effect? It cannot lie anywhere but in the principle of the will without regard to the ends which can be attained by the action. For the will stands between its a priori principle, which is formal, and its a posteriori spring, which is material, as between two roads, and as it must be determined by something, it that it must be determined by the formal principle of volition when an action is done from duty, in which case every material principle has been withdrawn from it.
The third proposition, which is a consequence of the two preceding, I would express thus Duty is the necessity of acting from respect for the law.[1q] I may have inclination for an object as the effect of my proposed action, but I cannot have respect for it, just for this reason, that it is an effect and not an energy of will. Similarly I cannot have respect for inclination, whether my own or another's; I can at most, if my own, approve it; if another's, sometimes even love it; i.e., look on it as favourable to my own interest. It is only what is connected with my will as a principle, by no means as an effect — what does not subserve my inclination, but overpowers it, or at least in case of choice excludes it from its calculation — in other words, simply the law of itself, which can be an object of respect, and hence a command. Now an action done from duty must wholly exclude the influence of inclination and with it every object of the will, so that nothing remains which can determine the will except objectively the law, and subjectively pure respect for this practical law, and consequently the maxim1 that I should follow this law even to the thwarting of all my inclinations.
Thus the moral worth of an action does not lie in the effect expected from it, nor in any principle of action which requires to borrow its motive from this expected effect. For all these effects — agreeableness of one's condition and even the promotion of the happiness of others — could have been also brought about by other causes, so that for this there would have been no need of the will of a rational being; whereas it is in this alone that the supreme and unconditional good can be found. The pre-eminent good which we call moral can therefore consist in nothing else than the conception of law in itself, which certainly is only possible in a rational being, in so far as this conception, and not the expected effect, determines the will. This is a good which is already present in the person who acts accordingly, and we have not to wait for it to appear first in the result.2
But what sort of law can that be, the conception of which must determine the will, even without paying any regard to the effect expected from it, in order that this will may be called good absolutely and without qualification? As I have deprived the will of every impulse which could arise to it from obedience to any law, there remains nothing but the universal conformity of its actions to law in general, which alone is to serve the will as a principle, i.e., I am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law. Here, now, it is the simple conformity to law in general, without assuming any particular law applicable to certain actions, that serves the will as its principle and must so serve it, if duty is not to be a vain delusion and a chimerical notion. The common reason of men in its practical judgements perfectly coincides with this and always has in view the principle here suggested. Let the question be, for example: May I when in distress make a promise with the intention not to keep it? I readily distinguish here between the two significations which the question may have: Whether it is prudent, or whether it is right, to make a false promise? The former may undoubtedly be the case. I see clearly indeed that it is not enough to extricate myself from a present difficulty by means of this subterfuge, but it must be well considered whether there may not hereafter spring from this lie much greater inconvenience than that from which I now free myself, and as, with all my supposed cunning, the consequences cannot be so easily foreseen but that credit once lost may be much more injurious to me than any mischief which I seek to avoid at present, it should be considered whether it would not be more prudent to act herein according to a universal maxim and to make it a habit to promise nothing except with the intention of keeping it. But it is soon clear to me that such a maxim will still only be based on the fear of consequences. Now it is a wholly different thing to be truthful from duty and to be so from apprehension of injurious consequences. In the first case, the very notion of the action already implies a law for me; in the second case, I must first look about elsewhere to see what results may be combined with it which would affect myself. For to deviate from the principle of duty is beyond all doubt wicked; but to be unfaithful to my maxim of prudence may often be very advantageous to me, although to abide by it is certainly safer. The shortest way, however, and an unerring one, to discover the answer to this question whether a lying promise is consistent with duty, is to ask myself, "Should I be content that my maxim (to extricate myself from difficulty by a false promise) should hold good as a universal law, for myself as well as for others? And should I be able to say to myself, "Every one may make a deceitful promise when he finds himself in a difficulty from which he cannot otherwise extricate himself?" Then I presently become aware that while I can will the lie, I can by no means will that lying should be a universal law. For with such a law there would be no promises at all, since it would be in vain to allege my intention in regard to my future actions to those who would not believe this allegation, or if they over hastily did so would pay me back in my own coin. Hence my maxim, as soon as it should be made a universal law, would necessarily destroy itself.
I do not, therefore, need any far-reaching penetration to discern what I have to do in order that my will may be morally good. Inexperienced in the course of the world, incapable of being prepared for all its contingencies, I only ask myself: Canst thou also will that thy maxim should be a universal law? If not, then it must be rejected, and that not because of a disadvantage accruing from it to myself or even to others, but because it cannot enter as a principle into a possible universal legislation, and reason extorts from me immediate respect for such legislation. I do not indeed as yet discern on what this respect is based (this the philosopher may inquire), but at least I understand this, that it is an estimation of the worth which far outweighs all worth of what is recommended by inclination, and that the necessity of acting from pure respect for the practical law is what constitutes duty, to which every other motive must give place, because it is the condition of a will being good in itself, and the worth of such a will is above everything.
