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- Herausgeber: Booksell-Verlag
- Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
- Sprache: Englisch
The Greatest Works of Immanuel Kant compiles the seminal writings of one of the most influential philosophers of the Enlightenment, exploring complex themes such as metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics. Through a rigorous analytical lens, Kant's prose invites readers to engage with his critical philosophy, particularly exemplified in works like 'Critique of Pure Reason' and 'Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.' Kant's literary style marries clarity with profound depth, establishing a context that challenges the reader to contemplate the nature of human experience and rationality in a world shaped by both reason and empirical observation. Immanuel Kant, born in 1724 in Königsberg, Prussia, emerged as a pivotal figure in modern philosophy, profoundly shaping the intellectual landscape of Europe. His quest to reconcile rationalism and empiricism was likely influenced by the tumultuous political and scientific changes of his time. The Enlightenment's emphasis on reason undoubtedly informed his philosophical investigations, leading him to articulate a moral framework that continues to resonate in contemporary discourse. This collection is indispensable for scholars and general readers alike, offering a comprehensive overview of Kant's thought. Readers seeking to understand the foundations of modern philosophy will find in these works a rigorous intellectual challenge that prompts introspection and a re-evaluation of the principles governing human existence. In this enriched edition, we have carefully created added value for your reading experience: - A comprehensive Introduction outlines these selected works' unifying features, themes, or stylistic evolutions. - The Author Biography highlights personal milestones and literary influences that shape the entire body of writing. - A Historical Context section situates the works in their broader era—social currents, cultural trends, and key events that underpin their creation. - A concise Synopsis (Selection) offers an accessible overview of the included texts, helping readers navigate plotlines and main ideas without revealing critical twists. - A unified Analysis examines recurring motifs and stylistic hallmarks across the collection, tying the stories together while spotlighting the different work's strengths. - Reflection questions inspire deeper contemplation of the author's overarching message, inviting readers to draw connections among different texts and relate them to modern contexts. - Lastly, our hand‐picked Memorable Quotes distill pivotal lines and turning points, serving as touchstones for the collection's central themes.
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Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2023
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The Greatest Works of Immanuel Kant
Table of Contents
Introduction
The collection titled 'The Greatest Works of Immanuel Kant' serves as a comprehensive compendium of the philosophical oeuvre of one of the Enlightenment's most revered figures. This compilation not only encapsulates Kant's extensive writings but also seeks to provide readers with a cohesive understanding of his intellectual evolution and profound impact on Western philosophy. By gathering his most significant works under one cover, this collection lays a foundation for those who wish to explore the intricacies of Kant's thought, presenting an opportunity to reflect upon the underlying principles that shaped modern philosophical discourse.
Within this rich anthology, readers will find a diverse array of works encompassing critical philosophy, essays, and early writings. The collection features seminal texts, including the critical masterpieces 'The Critique of Pure Reason,' 'The Critique of Practical Reason,' and 'The Critique of Judgment,' alongside foundational essays like 'Perpetual Peace' and 'Dreams of a Spirit-Seer.' This assortment of philosophical treatises and essays highlights Kant’s exploration of metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics, and the implications of his revolutionary ideas on reason, morality, and knowledge.
A unifying theme throughout this collection is Kant's relentless pursuit of understanding the limits and capacities of human reason. From his metaphysical inquiries to his ethical considerations, Kant's works reflect a deep commitment to examining the frameworks through which individuals perceive the world. In particular, his emphasis on the autonomy of reason as the basis for moral and philosophical judgments articulates a vision that still resonates in contemporary philosophical debates. His ability to dissect complex notions with clarity remains a hallmark of his style, inviting readers to engage in profound reflection.
The significance of Kant's works is further illuminated by their interconnectedness; each text builds upon the ideas presented in the others, creating a rich tapestry of thought. Moreover, Kant's works delve into timeless questions concerning morality, the nature of existence, and the ideal structure of society, igniting intellectual curiosity and debate across generations. The influence of his philosophy extends beyond the realm of metaphysics and ethics, reshaping fields as diverse as political theory and aesthetics, highlighting the enduring relevance of his insights.
As readers navigate through this collection, they will encounter Kant's innovative approaches to ethical and aesthetic judgment. His exploration of moral philosophy emphasizes the importance of categorical imperatives, urging individuals to act according to principles that can be universally upheld. In his aesthetic explorations, Kant challenges preconceived ideas about beauty and artistic value, arguing for a subjective yet universal perspective on aesthetic pleasure. The interplay between these themes showcases his profound understanding of human nature and societal progress.
Furthermore, the inclusion of Kant's critical works, such as 'Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics,' bridges the gap between his pre-critical and critical philosophies, shedding light on his methodological advancements. His critiques not only dismantle prior philosophical constructs but also elaborate a systematic vision of knowledge that continues to inform epistemological inquiries. The forward-thinking nature of his arguments encourages readers to question their assumptions and expands the horizons of scientific and moral comprehension.
Kant's early writings, including 'Dreams of a Spirit-Seer' and 'Idea of a Universal History on a Cosmopolitical Plan,' provide valuable insights into the formative influences that shaped his later philosophical insights. These works reveal Kant's engagement with metaphysical questions and historical narratives, articulating a vision for humanity that transcends mere speculation. They illustrate his desire to synthesize philosophical inquiry with the pressing social issues of his time, crafting a vision of progress that aligns with Enlightenment ideals while laying the groundwork for future philosophical exploration.
In addition to Kant's profound philosophical contributions, this collection also includes critical responses to his work, notably Arthur Schopenhauer's 'Criticism of the Kantian Philosophy.' Such critiques signify the influence Kant had on subsequent philosophers while also providing a means for readers to witness the evolution of philosophical thought in reaction to his ideas. Engaging with these responses enhances the reader's understanding of Kant's reception and the enduring debates his work sparked within the philosophical community.
The variety of text types encompassed in this collection—from rigorous philosophical treatises to insightful essays—ensures that readers experience the full spectrum of Kant's intellectual pursuits. Each genre contributes a unique perspective on the central themes of knowledge and morality, facilitating a comprehensive exploration of Kant's philosophical landscape. This diversity encourages both seasoned scholars and newcomers to philosophy to engage with the texts in a manner that resonates with their own intellectual journeys.
The structured layout of this anthology allows readers to trace Kant's development as a philosopher, examining how his early explorations paved the way for his later critical works. The inclusion of the 'Three Critiques' emphasizes his systematic approach to philosophy, providing a framework for understanding the complexities of human understanding, moral imperatives, and aesthetic appreciation. This structure facilitates an educational journey through Kant's thought, allowing readers to appreciate the evolution of his ideas over time.
Moreover, each work within the collection serves to reinforce the notion that philosophy is not merely an academic pursuit but a vital tool for examining our existence. Kant’s writings encourage rigorous self-reflection and a commitment to moral integrity, which resonate powerfully in the context of contemporary ethical dilemmas. The enduring relevance of his philosophy lies in its capacity to challenge readers to consider their place within an expansive moral landscape.
As readers embark on this intellectual expedition, they will discover not only the historical context of Kant’s thought but also the personal convictions that underpin his philosophical inquiries. Kant’s profound belief in the inherent dignity and autonomy of human beings shines through his ethical frameworks, highlighting the respect he held for individual agency. This personal touch enhances the appeal of his works, reminding readers of the humanity at the heart of philosophical discourse.
Engaging with Kant's critical texts enables readers to confront fundamental questions about the nature of reality and human understanding. His insistence on the limits of reason serves as a humbling reminder that there remain mysteries in existence that elude calculation and comprehension. Such reflections invite readers to cultivate intellectual humility while striving for enlightenment through reasoned thought, fostering a deeper appreciation for the philosophical quest.
The collection also encourages an appreciation for the artistic dimensions of Kant's philosophy. His exploration of aesthetics—especially in 'The Critique of Judgment'—highlights the interconnectedness of aesthetic experience with moral philosophy. By revealing how our senses shape our ethical perceptions, Kant intertwines the domains of beauty and ethics in a manner that encourages appreciation of the arts as vehicles for moral reflection and truth.
Additionally, this anthology highlights the dynamic interplay between philosophy and politics within Kant's work. Texts such as 'Philosophy of Law; or, The Science of Right' and 'Perpetual Peace' exhibit Kant's preoccupation with justice, governance, and global citizenship. These discussions remain particularly salient today as societies navigate complex political landscapes, reinforcing the importance of philosophical inquiry in addressing contemporary challenges.
In light of the collection's breadth and depth, the reader is invited to appreciate the interplay of doctrines and categories present in Kant's philosophy. The works included are not merely isolated treatises but part of a larger dialectical process that invites ongoing exploration and debate. Each text offers a unique perspective, reinforcing the importance of engaging critically with philosophical ideas and participating in the collaborative nature of philosophical discourse.
As we conclude this introduction, we extend a heartfelt invitation to delve into 'The Greatest Works of Immanuel Kant.' Whether you are a seasoned scholar or a curious newcomer to philosophy, this collection provides an unparalleled opportunity to engage with the expansive and transformative ideas of one of history's most pivotal thinkers. We encourage you to immerse yourself in each section, allowing the richness of Kant's thought to inspire new avenues of understanding and reflection.
Author Biography
Introduction
Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) was a German philosopher from Königsberg, whose “critical” project reshaped modern thought. His three Critiques—of Pure Reason, of Practical Reason, and of Judgment—reframed questions about knowledge, morality, and aesthetics, proposing a “Copernican revolution” in philosophy: the mind contributes the form of experience. Complementary works such as the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, and the political essay Perpetual Peace broadened his reach beyond academic metaphysics. Combining insights from rationalism and empiricism, he offered rigorous arguments about autonomy, duty, taste, and law. Kant’s influence pervades ethics, epistemology, political theory, and the philosophy of science.
Education and Literary Influences
Raised in the intellectually vibrant but pietist milieu of East Prussia, Kant studied at the University of Königsberg (the Albertina), where he focused on mathematics, physics, and philosophy. After completing his studies, he worked as a family tutor in the region, then returned to Königsberg as a Privatdozent, lecturing for many years on logic, metaphysics, ethics, natural philosophy, and physical geography. His lectures were noted for clarity and discipline, and he developed a reputation as a dedicated teacher. In the early 1770s, he attained a professorship in logic and metaphysics, anchoring his entire academic career in his native city, where he taught until advanced age.
Kant’s intellectual formation drew on several currents. From the Leibniz–Wolff school, mediated by Alexander Baumgarten’s textbooks, he inherited a taste for systematic rigor. From Isaac Newton he gained a model of explanatory science, inspiring early work in cosmology and dynamics. David Hume’s skepticism, which he said awakened him from his “dogmatic slumber,” prompted the critical turn that examines the conditions of possible experience. Jean-Jacques Rousseau shaped Kant’s sensitivity to freedom, equality, and respect, which informed his moral philosophy. He also absorbed early modern debates on innate ideas, empiricism, and the limits of reason, synthesizing them into a distinctive, architectonic system.
Literary Career
Before the critical period, Kant published on natural science and taste. Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens advanced a nebular hypothesis about cosmic formation, aligning with Newtonian physics. Other texts, such as The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, and Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, explore metaphysics, moral sensibility, and the boundaries between reason and enthusiasm. These writings show a versatile author testing methods and topics while lecturing intensively. By the mid-1770s, sustained reflection led him to reframe problems of knowledge, setting the stage for his “critical” philosophy.
The Critique of Pure Reason, first published in the early 1780s and revised later that decade, is the centerpiece of Kant’s theoretical philosophy. It argues that space and time are a priori forms of sensibility and that the understanding employs categories to synthesize experience, yielding knowledge of appearances but not things in themselves. It also limits metaphysics to the conditions of possible experience and critiques traditional proofs of God and the soul’s immortality. The initial reception was mixed and often puzzled; the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics offered a concise guide. Over time, colleagues and critics recognized its ambition and originality.
Kant’s practical philosophy articulated autonomy and moral law. The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals introduced the categorical imperative—principles of universal law, humanity as an end, and the kingdom of ends—as tests for right action. The Critique of Practical Reason deepened his account of motivation, freedom, and the primacy of the moral standpoint. Later, the Metaphysics of Morals systematized duties of right and virtue, including private right, public right, and ethical obligations. These works shaped debates about deontology, rights, and the authority of reason in ethics. Stylistically, they combine austere argument with a systematic architecture that integrates law, virtue, and political institutions.
The Critique of Judgment united aesthetics and teleology, analyzing judgments of taste and the purposiveness of nature for reflective judgment. Kant’s essay “An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?” urged the public use of reason. Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason examined moral faith and ecclesial practices, drawing official scrutiny. Political writings, including Perpetual Peace and On the Common Saying: ‘This May Be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice,’ outlined republican tendencies, publicity, cosmopolitan right, and the rule of law. As his reputation grew, he remained a committed lecturer, his audience spanning students and educated townspeople.
Beliefs and Advocacy
Kant’s core commitments centered on enlightenment, autonomy, and the lawful freedom of citizens. He distinguished the public use of reason—scholarly communication addressed to the world—from the private use tied to one’s office or role, arguing that progress requires free public debate. While respectful of legitimate authority, he defended press freedom, transparency, and critique as engines of reform. He did not organize political movements; his advocacy was textual and pedagogical, developing concepts—publicity, separation of powers, constitutionalism—that would inform later liberal and republican traditions. He maintained that only under conditions of freedom can reason fulfill its vocation in science, morals, and faith.
In ethics, Kant held that rational agents possess dignity and must never be treated merely as means. His deontological approach grounded obligation in self-legislated universal law, not in outcomes or inclinations. He argued for duties to oneself and others, honesty, beneficence, and respect, while insisting that rightful external freedom be secured by public law. Internationally, he advanced cosmopolitan right and the idea of a federation of free states to reduce the likelihood of war. Perpetual Peace formulated conditions—republican constitutions, a pacific federation, and publicity—that remain reference points in discussions of international order, human rights, and global citizenship.
On religion, Kant sought to subject theological claims to moral reason, distinguishing faith’s ethical core from dogma and ecclesiastical authority. His Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason prompted censure from the Prussian authorities, and he was formally instructed to refrain from publishing on religion while a particular monarch reigned; he publicly complied. The episode underscored his view that conscience and reason must be free in the public sphere. Across pedagogy and prose, his advocacy was principled rather than partisan, emphasizing legal reform, education, and the cultivation of character over agitation, and trusting open discourse to align institutions with right.
Final Years & Legacy
In his final decade, Kant’s health declined, yet he continued refining his system. He drafted materials later known as the Opus Postumum, attempting to bridge gaps between metaphysics and natural science, though the project remained unfinished. He also published the Metaphysics of Morals and Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View toward the end of the 1790s. Kant died in Königsberg in 1804, mourned by colleagues, students, and citizens who had long attended his lectures. His passing coincided with the rise of German Idealism; figures such as Fichte and Schelling engaged, adapted, and contested his ideas in their ambitious systems.
Kant’s long-term impact is vast. His account of a priori structures, autonomy, and purposiveness set agendas for epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, and political theory. Hegel and Schopenhauer responded critically yet owed major debts; later, Neo-Kantian movements in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries revived his insights for science and culture. Debates over realism, constructivism, and normativity continue to draw on Kantian concepts. In public life, ideas about dignity, human rights, constitutionalism, and a law-governed international order echo his formulations. He remains central in curricula worldwide, a touchstone for thinking about reason’s limits and authority in modern intellectual culture.
Historical Context
Immanuel Kant, born in Königsberg, Prussia (now Kaliningrad, Russia), in 1724, emerged during the Enlightenment, a period characterized by reason, scientific inquiry, and intellectual exchange. The era’s emphasis on individual autonomy and critical examination of tradition provided fertile ground for his inquiries, which would come to exemplify the movement’s commitment to autonomous thought and universal principles.
His academic career at the University of Königsberg began in 1740, where he studied mathematics, physics, and philosophy under Johann Gottfried Teske and others. The transition from a largely theological framework toward secular approaches to knowledge marked his formative years. Encounters with the empirical skepticism of thinkers like David Hume challenged his assumptions and prompted him to explore the boundaries of human cognition. This led to the synthesis of empirical and rationalist traditions and culminated in his first major work, The Critique of Pure Reason (1781), which sought to define the conditions and limits of human experience and understanding.
In the context of Frederick the Great’s Prussia, where enlightened absolutism encouraged discourse on reason and governance, Kant developed his political reflections. His writings on international relations and legal philosophy, especially in Perpetual Peace (1795), proposed a framework for republican constitutions, mutual respect among states, and a cosmopolitan order grounded in universal principles of right and morality.
Scientific advances of his time, including developments in Newtonian mechanics and emerging biological and chemical theories, influenced his metaphysics and epistemology. Kant engaged with these paradigms in attempting to reconcile the demands of empirical rigor with the necessity of rational structures that make experience intelligible. His critical approach would become a touchstone for later debates in both philosophy and the natural sciences.
Against the social stratifications of 18th-century Europe, Kant articulated a moral philosophy based on the categorical imperative, insisting that moral agents must treat humanity, in themselves and others, always as an end and never merely as a means. This universalist ethic emphasized individual dignity and duty, reflecting broader Enlightenment concerns about human rights and laying groundwork for modern deontological ethics.
The French Revolution initially inspired his ideals of freedom and equality, prompting him to reflect on the moral foundations of political change. Although he welcomed those aspirations, he cautioned against violence and lawlessness, advocating for reform through rational legal frameworks rather than upheaval. This balanced stance underscored his belief in autonomy underpinned by moral law.
When Romanticism emphasized emotion and subjective experience later in the century, Kant maintained that judgments of aesthetics and ethics must be grounded in rational principles. In The Critique of Judgment (1790), he examined the faculty of taste, proposing that judgments of beauty and sublimity reveal a harmony between the faculties of imagination and understanding, a theory that would inform subsequent aesthetic discourse.
His later ethical works, including Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) and The Metaphysical Elements of Ethics (1785), further refined his notion of duty by distinguishing between perfect and imperfect obligations and between duties to self and others. These texts helped establish moral philosophy as a systematic, rational discipline.
Kant’s immediate circle included younger philosophers such as Johann Gottlieb Fichte, who engaged with his ideas and extended them into early German idealism. In turn, figures like Friedrich Schleiermacher and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel both built on and critiqued his concepts of noumenon and phenomenon, fueling new philosophical schools in the 19th century.
In essays such as The Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose, he envisioned historical progress toward a civil society governed by reason and law, anticipating later theories of social development. His writings on education and the faculties, notably in The Conflict of the Faculties (1798), advocated a system that cultivated critical thinking and moral autonomy, consistent with Enlightenment ideals.
As industrialization and urbanization transformed Europe after his death in 1804, philosophers revisited his strict formulations to address emerging social and economic challenges. Nonetheless, his call for universal moral principles and respect for human dignity continued to resonate across debates on justice, rights, and governance.
Kant’s essay On the Injustice of Counterfeiting Books (1797) addressed the emerging importance of intellectual property in a growing publishing world. He argued for the moral rights of authors, foreshadowing later discussions on copyright and the balance between public access and creators’ claims.
In sum, his work synthesizes the intellectual currents of his age—epistemological inquiry, moral philosophy, and aesthetic theory—into a comprehensive system that profoundly influenced subsequent philosophy, shaping modern debates on knowledge, ethics, and the role of reason in human affairs. His legacy remains central to philosophical discourse and continues to inform contemporary discussions on autonomy, justice, and the limits of understanding.
Synopsis (Selection)
Introduction: IMMANUEL KANT by Robert Adamson
This introduction provides a comprehensive overview of Kant's life, philosophical development, and the impact of his works on modern philosophy.
KANT’S INAUGURAL DISSERTATION OF 1770
This dissertation marks Kant's pivotal shift to a new perspective on metaphysics and epistemology, distinguishing between phenomena and noumena.
THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON
Kant seeks to resolve the conflict between rationalism and empiricism by examining the structure of human cognition and the limits of human understanding.
THE CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON
This work explores the foundations of moral philosophy, emphasizing the role of practical reason and the concept of duty in ethical decision-making.
THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGEMENT
Kant bridges the realms of aesthetics and teleology, exploring the faculty of judgment and its role in appreciating beauty and understanding purposiveness in nature.
Critical Works: PROLEGOMENA TO ANY FUTURE METAPHYSICS
The Prolegomena serves as an accessible introduction to Kant's critical philosophy and outlines the issues addressed in the Critique of Pure Reason.
Critical Works: FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS
This text introduces Kant's moral philosophy, establishing the groundwork for the notion of the categorical imperative as the basis for ethical action.
Critical Works: THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
Kant expands on his ethical theory by delineating a more comprehensive system of moral duties and rights.
Critical Works: PHILOSOPHY OF LAW; OR, THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT
Kant discusses the principles of legal and political philosophy, focusing on individual rights and the concept of justice within a state.
Critical Works: THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF ETHICS
This work explores the fundamental elements of Kant's ethical theory, emphasizing the role of freedom and autonomy in moral actions.
CRITICISM OF THE KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY by Arthur Schopenhauer
Schopenhauer offers a critical examination of Kant's philosophy, challenging key elements of his metaphysical and epistemological positions.
Pre-Critical Works and Essays: DREAMS OF A SPIRIT-SEER
Kant critiques the mystical and supernatural claims of Emanuel Swedenborg, foreshadowing his later philosophical developments.
Pre-Critical Works and Essays: IDEA OF A UNIVERSAL HISTORY ON A COSMOPOLITICAL PLAN
Kant outlines a philosophical vision for human history, emphasizing progress and the potential for achieving universal peace through rational development.
Pre-Critical Works and Essays: Preface to THE METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF NATURAL SCIENCE
Kant introduces his attempt to apply his critical philosophy to the natural sciences, focusing on the metaphysical underpinnings of scientific inquiry.
Pre-Critical Works and Essays: PERPETUAL PEACE: A Philosophical Essay
Kant proposes a framework for establishing lasting peace among nations based on principles of international cooperation and law.
Pre-Critical Works and Essays: OF THE INJUSTICE OF COUNTERFEITING BOOKS
This essay addresses the ethical implications and potential harms of literary counterfeiting, defending intellectual property rights.
The Greatest Works of Immanuel Kant
Introduction
IMMANUEL KANTby Robert Adamson
KANT, IMMANUEL (1724-1804), German philosopher, was born at Königsberg on the 22nd of April 1724. His grandfather was an emigrant from Scotland, and the name Cant is not uncommon in the north of Scotland, whence the family is said to have come. His father was a saddler in Königsberg, then a stronghold of Pietism, to the strong influence of which Kant was subjected in his early years. In his tenth year he was entered at the Collegium Fredericianum with the definite view of studying theology. His inclination at this time was towards classics, and he was recognized, with his school-fellow, David Ruhnken, as among the most promising classical scholars of the college. His taste for the greater Latin authors, particularly Lucretius, was never lost, and he acquired at school an unusual facility in Latin composition. With Greek authors he does not appear to have been equally familiar. During his university course, which began in 1740, Kant was principally attracted towards mathematics and physics. The lectures on classics do not seem to have satisfied him, and, though he attended courses on theology, and even preached on one or two occasions, he appears finally to have given up the intention of entering the Church. The last years of his university studies were much disturbed by poverty. His father died in 1746, and for nine years he was compelled to earn his own living as a private tutor. Although he disliked the life and was not specially qualified for it — as he used to say regarding the excellent precepts of his Pädagogik, he was never able to apply them — yet he added to his other accomplishments a grace and polish which he displayed ever afterwards to a degree somewhat unusual in a philosopher by profession.
In 1755 Kant became tutor in the family of Count Kayserling. By the kindness of a friend named Richter, he was enabled to resume his university career, and in the autumn of that year he graduated as doctor and qualified as privatdocent. For fifteen years he continued to labour in this position, his fame as writer and lecturer steadily increasing. Though twice he failed to obtain a professorship at Königsberg, he steadily refused appointments elsewhere. The only academic preferment received by him during the lengthy probation was the post of under-librarian (1766). His lectures, at first mainly upon physics, gradually expanded until nearly all descriptions of philosophy were included under them.
In 1770 he obtained the chair of logic and metaphysics at Konigsberg, and delivered as his inaugural address the dissertation De mundi sensibilis et intelligibilis forma et principiis. Eleven years later appeared the Kritik of Pure Reason, the work towards which he had been steadily advancing, and of which all his later writings are developments. In 1783 he published the Prolegomena, intended as an introduction to the Kritik, which had been found to stand in need of some explanatory comment. A second edition of the Kritik, with some modifications, appeared in 1787, after which it remained unaltered.
In spite of its frequent obscurity, its novel terminology, and its declared opposition to prevailing systems, the Kantian philosophy made rapid progress in Germany. In the course of ten or twelve years from the publication of the Kritik of Pure Reason, it was expounded in all the leading universities, and it even penetrated into the schools of the Church of Rome. Such men as J. Schulz in Königsberg, J. G. Kiesewetter in Berlin, Jakob in Halle, Born and A. L. Heydenreich in Leipzig, K. L. Reinhold and E. Schmid in Jena, Buhle in Gottingen, Tennemann in Marburg, and Snell in Giessen, with many others, made it the basis of their philosophical teaching, while theologians like Tieftrunk, Stäudlin, and Ammon eagerly applied it to Christian doctrine and morality. Young men flocked to Königsberg as to a shrine of philosophy. The Prussian Government even undertook the expense of their support. Kant was hailed by some as a second Messiah. He was consulted as an oracle on all questions of casuistry — as, for example, on the lawfulness of inoculation for the small-pox. This universal homage for a long time left Kant unaffected; it was only in his later years that he spoke of his system as the limit of philosophy, and resented all further progress. He still pursued his quiet round of lecturing and authorship, and contributed from time to time papers to the literary journals. Of these, among the most remarkable was his review of Herder's Philosophy of History, which greatly exasperated that author, and led to a violent act of retaliation some years after in his Metakritik of Pure Reason. Schiller at this period in vain sought to engage Kant upon his Horen. He remained true to the Berlin Journal, in which most of his criticisms appeared.
In 1792 Kant, in the full height of his reputation, was involved in a collision with the Government on the question of his religious doctrines. Naturally his philosophy had excited the declared opposition of all adherents of historical Christianity, since its plain tendency was towards a moral rationalism, and it could not be reconciled to the literal doctrines of the Lutheran Church. It would have been much better to permit his exposition of the philosophy of religion to enjoy the same literary rights as his earlier works, since Kant could not be interdicted without first silencing a multitude of theologians who were at least equally separated from positive Christianity. The Government, however, judged otherwise; and after the first part of his book, OnReligion within the Limits of Reason alone, had appeared in the Berlin Journal, the publication of the remainder, which treats in a more rationalizing style of the peculiarities of Christianity, was forbidden. Kant, thus shut out from Berlin, availed himself of his local privilege, and, with the sanction of the theological faculty of his own university, published the full work in Königsberg. The Government, probably influenced as much by hatred and fear of the French Revolution, of which Kant was supposed to be a partisan, as by love of orthodoxy, resented the act; and a secret cabinet order was received by him intimating the displeasure of the king, Frederick William II., and exacting a pledge not to lecture or write at all on religious subjects in future. With this mandate Kant, after a struggle, complied, and kept his engagement till 1797, when the death of the king, according to his construction of his promise, set him free. This incident, however, produced a very unfavourable effect on his spirits. He withdrew in 1794 from society; next year he gave up all his classes but one public lecture on logic or metaphysics; and in 1797, before the removal of the interdict on his theological teaching, he ceased altogether his public labours, after an academic course of forty-two years. He previously, in the same year, finished his treatises on the Metaphysics of Ethics, which, with his Anthropology, completed in 1798, were the last considerable works that he revised with his own hand. His Lectures on Logic, on Physical Geography, on Paedagogics, were edited during his lifetime by his friends and pupils. By way of asserting his right to resume theological disquisition, he also issued in 1798 his Strife of the Faculties, in which all the strongest points of his work on religion were urged afresh, and the correspondence that had passed between himself and his censors was given to the world.
From the date of his retirement from the chair Kant declined in strength, and gave tokens of intellectual decay. His memory began to fail, and a large work at which he wrought night and day, on the connexion between physics and metaphysics, was found to be only a repetition of his already published doctrines. After 1802, finding himself attacked with a weakness in the limbs attended with frequent fits of falling, he mitigated the Spartan severity of his life, and consented to receive medical advice. A constant restlessness oppressed him; his sight gave way; his conversation became an extraordinary mixture of metaphors; and it was only at intervals that gleams of his former power broke out, especially when some old chord of association was struck in natural science or physical geography. A few days before his decease, with a great effort he thanked his medical attendant for his visits in the words, “I have not yet lost my feeling for humanity.” On the 12th of February 1804 he died, having almost completed his eightieth year. His stature was small, and his appearance feeble. He was little more than five feet high; his breast was almost concave, and, like Schleiermacher, he was deformed in the right shoulder. His senses were quick and delicate; and, though of weak constitution, he escaped by strict regimen all serious illness.
His life was arranged with mechanical regularity; and, as he never married, he kept the habits of his studious youth to old age. His man-servant, who awoke him summer and winter at five o'clock, testified that he had not once failed in thirty years to respond to the call. After rising he studied for two hours, then lectured other two, and spent the rest of the forenoon, till one, at his desk. He then dined at a restaurant, which he frequently changed, to avoid the influx of strangers, who crowded to see and hear him. This was his only regular meal; and he often prolonged the conversation till late in the afternoon. He then walked out for at least an hour in all weathers, and spent the evening in lighter reading, except an hour or two devoted to the preparation of his next day's lectures, after which he retired between nine and ten to rest. In his earlier years he often spent his evenings in general society, where his knowledge and conversational talents made him the life of every party. He was especially intimate with the families of two English merchants of the name of Green and Motherby, where he found many opportunities of meeting ship-captains, and other travelled persons, and thus gratifying his passion for physical geography. This social circle included also the celebrated J. G. Hamann, the friend of Herder and Jacobi, who was thus a mediator between Kant and these philosophical adversaries.
Kant's reading was of the most extensive and miscellaneous kind. He cared comparatively little for the history of speculation, but his acquaintance with books of science, general history, travels and belles lettres was boundless. He was well versed in English literature, chiefly of the age of Queen Anne, and had read English philosophy from Locke to Hume, and the Scottish school. He was at home in Voltaire and Rousseau, but had little or no acquaintance with the French sensational philosophy. He was familiar with all German literature up to the date of his Kritik, but ceased to follow it in its great development by Goethe and Schiller. It was his habit to obtain books in sheets from his publishers Kanter and Nicolovius; and he read over for many years all the new works in their catalogue, in order to keep abreast of universal knowledge. He was fond of newspapers and works on politics; and this was the only kind of reading that could interrupt his studies in philosophy.
As a lecturer, Kant avoided altogether that rigid style in which his books were written. He sat behind a low desk, with a few jottings on slips of paper, or textbooks marked on the margin, before him, and delivered an extemporaneous address, opening up the subject by partial glimpses, and with many anecdotes or familiar illustrations, till a complete idea of it was presented. His voice was extremely weak, but sometimes rose into eloquence, and always commanded perfect silence. Though kind to his students, he refused to remit their fees, as this, he thought, would discourage independence. It was another principle that his chief exertions should be bestowed on the intermediate class of talent, as the geniuses would help themselves, and the dunces were beyond remedy.
Simple, honourable, truthful, kind-hearted and high-minded as Kant was in all moral respects, he was somewhat deficient in theregion of sentiment. He had little enthusiasm for the beauties of nature, and indeed never sailed out into the Baltic, or travelled more than 40 miles from Königsberg. Music he disregarded, and all poetry that was more than sententious prose. His ethics have been reproached with some justice as setting up too low an ideal for the female sex. Though faithful in a high degree to the duties of friendship, he could not bear to visit his friends in sickness, and after their death he repressed all allusion to their memory. His engrossing intellectual labours no doubt tended somewhat to harden his character; and in his zeal for rectitude of purpose he forgot the part which affection and sentiment must ever play in the human constitution.
On the 12th of February 1904, the hundredth anniversary of Kant's death, a Kantian society (Kantgesellschaft) was formed at Halle under the leadership of Professor H. Vaihinger to promote Kantian studies. In 1909 it had an annual membership of 191; it supports the periodical Kantstudien (founded 1896; see Bibliography, ad init.).
The Writings of Kant
No other thinker of modern times has been throughout his work so penetrated with the fundamental conceptions of physical science; no other has been able to hold with such firmness the balance between empirical and speculative ideas. Beyond all question much of the influence which the critical philosophy has exercised and continues to exercise must be ascribed to this characteristic feature in the training of its great author.
The early writings of Kant are almost without exception on questions of physical science. It was only by degrees that philosophical problems began to engage his attention, and that the main portion of his literary activity was turned towards them. The following are the most important of the works which bear directly on physical science.
1. Gedanken von der wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte (1747); an essay dealing with the famous dispute between the Cartesians and Leibnitzians regarding the expression for the amount of a force. According to the Cartesians, this quantity was directly proportional to velocity; according to their opponents, it varied with the square of the velocity. The dispute has now lost its interest, for physicists have learned to distinguish accurately the two quantities which are vaguely included under the expression amount of force, and consequently have been able to show in what each party was correct and in what it was in error. Kant's essay, with some fallacious explanations and divisions, criticizes acutely the arguments of the Leibnitzians, and concludes with an attempt to show that both modes of expression are correct when correctly limited and interpreted.
2. Whether the Earth in its Revolution has experienced some Changesince the Earliest Times (1754; ed. and trans., W. Hastie, 1900, Kant's Cosmogony; cf. Lord Kelvin in The Age of the Earth, 1897, p. 7). In this brief essay Kant throws out a notion which has since been carried out, in ignorance of Kant's priority, by Delaunay (l865) and Adams. He points out that the action of the moon in raising the waters of the earth must have a secondary effect in the slight retardation of the earth's motion, and refers to a similar cause the fact that the moon turns always the same face to the earth.
3. Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels, published anonymously in 1755 (4th ed. 1808; republished H. Ebert, 1890). In this remarkable work Kant, proceeding from the Newtonian conception of the solar system, extends his consideration to the entire sidereal system, points out how the whole may be mechanically regarded, and throws out the important speculation which has since received the title of the nebular hypothesis. In some details, such e.g. as the regarding of the motion of the entire solar system as portion of the general cosmical mechanism, he had predecessors, among others Thomas Wright of Durham, but the work as a whole contains a wonderfully acute anticipation of much that was afterwards carried out by Herschel and Laplace. The hypothesis of the original nebular condition of the system, with the consequent explanation of the great phenomena of planetary formations and movements of the satellites and rings, is unquestionably to be assigned to Kant. (On this question see discussion in W. Hastie's Kant's Cosmogony, as above.)
4. Meditationum quarundam de igne succincta delineatio (1755): an inaugural dissertation, containing little beyond the notion that bodies operate on one another through the medium of a uniformly diffused, elastic and subtle matter (ether) which is the underlying substance of heat and light. Both heat and light are regarded as vibrations of this diffused ether.
5. On the Causes of Earthquakes (1755); Description of the Earthquakeof 1755 (1756); Consideration of some Recently ExperiencedEarthquakes (1756).
6. Explanatory Remarks on the Theory of the Winds (1756). In this brief tract, Kant, apparently in entire ignorance of the explanation given in 1735 by Hadley, points out how the varying velocity of rotation of the successive zones of the earth's surface furnishes a key to the phenomena of periodic winds. His theory is in almost entire agreement with that now received. See the parallel statements from Kant's tract and Dove's essay on the influence of the rotation of the earth on the flow of its atmosphere (1835), given in Zöllner's work, Ueber die Natur der Cometen, pp. 477-482.
7. On the Different Races of Men (1775); Determination of theNotion of a Human Race (1785); Conjectural Beginning of HumanHistory (1786): three tracts containing some points of interest as regards the empirical grounds for Kant's doctrine of teleology. Reference will be made to them in the notice of the Kritik ofJudgment.
8. On the Volcanoes in the Moon (1785); On the Influence of the Moonon the Weather (1794). The second of these contains a remarkable discussion of the relation between the centre of the moon's figure and its centre of gravity. From the difference between these Kant is led to conjecture that the climatic conditions of the side of the moon turned from us must be altogether unlike those of the face presented to us. His views have been restated by Hansen.
9. Lectures on Physical Geography (1822): published from notes of Kant's lectures, with the approval of the author.
Consideration of these works is sufficient to show that Kant's mastery of the science of his time was complete and thorough, and that his philosophy is to be dealt with as having throughout a reference to general scientific conceptions. For more detailed treatment of his importance in science, reference may be made to Zöllner's essay on “Kant and his Merits on Natural Science” contained in the work on the Nature of Comets (pp. 426-484); to Dietrich, Kant and Newton, Schultze, Kant and Darwin; Reuschle's careful analysis of the scientific works in the Deutsche Vierteljahrs-Schrift (1868); W. Hastie's introduction to Kant's Cosmogony (1900), which summarizes criticism to that date; and articles in Kant-Studien (1896 foll.).
The notice of the philosophical writings of Kant need not be more than bibliographical, as in the account of his philosophy it will be necessary to consider at some length the successive stages in the development of his thought. Arranged chronologically these works are as follows: —
1755. Principiorum primorum cognitionis metaphysicae novaedilucidatio.
1756. Metaphysicae cum geometria junctae usus in philosophianaturali, cujus specimen I. continet monadologiam physicam.
1762. Die falsche Spitzfindigkeit der vier syltogistischen Figuren, “The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures” (trans. T. K. Abbott, Kant's Introduction to Logic and his Essay on the MistakenSubtilty of the Figures, 1885).
1763. Versuch den Begriff der negativen Grössen in die Weltweisheiteinzuführen, “Attempt to introduce the Notion of Negative Quantities into Philosophy.”
1763. Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration desDaseins Gottes, “The only possible Foundation for a Demonstration of the Existence of God.”
1764. Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen (Riga, 1771; Konigsberg, 1776).
1764. Untersuchung über die Deutlichkeit der Grundsätze der natürlichenTheologie und Moral, “Essay on the Evidence (Clearness) of the Fundamental Propositions of Natural Theology and Ethics.”
1766. Träume eines Geistersehers, erläutert durch Träume derMetaphysik, “Dreams of a Ghost-seer (or Clairvoyant), explained by the Dreams of Metaphysic” (Eng. trans. E. F. Goerwitz, with introd. by F. Sewall, 1900).
1768. Von dem ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes der Gegenden imRaum, “Foundation for the Distinction of Positions in Space.”
The above may all be regarded as belonging to the precritical period of Kant's development. The following introduce the notions and principles characteristic of the critical philosophy.
1770. De mundi sensibilis et intelligibilis forma et principiis.
1781. Kritik der reinen Vernunft, “Kritik of Pure Reason” (revised ed. 1787; ed. Vaihinger, 1881 foll, and B. Erdmann, 1900; Eng. trans., F. Max Müller, 1896, 2nd ed. 1907, and J. M. D. Meiklejohn, 1854).
1783. Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik die alsWissenschaft wird auftreten können, “Prolegomena to all Future Metaphysic which may present itself as Science” (ed. B. Erdmann, 1878; Eng. trans. J. P. Mahaffy and J. H. Bernard, 2nd ed. 1889; Belfort Bax, 1883 and Paul Carus, 1902; and cf. M. Apel, Kommentar zu Kants Prolegomena, 1908).
1784. Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte im weltbürgerlicherAbsicht, “Notion of a Universal History in a Cosmopolitan Sense.” With this may be coupled the review of Herder in 1785.
1785. Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, “Foundations of the Metaphysic of Ethics” (see T. K. Abbott, Fundamental Principlesof the Metaphysic of Ethics, 3rd ed. 1907).
1786. Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft, “Metaphysical Elements of Natural Science” (ed. A. Höfler, 1900; trans. Belfort Bax, Prolegomena and Metaphysical Foundations, 1883).
1788. Ueber den Gebrauch teleologischer Prinzipien in derPhilosophie, “On the Employment of Teleological Principles in Philosophy.”
1788. Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, “Kritik of Practical Reason” (trans. T. K. Abbott, ed. 1898).
1790. Kritik der Urtheilskraft, “Kritik of Judgment” (trans. with notes J. H. Bernard, 1892).
1790. Ueber eine Entdeckung, nach der alle neue Kritik der reinenVernunft durch eine ältere entbehrlich gemacht werden soll, “On a Discovery by which all the recent Critique of Pure Reason is superseded by a more ancient” (i.e. by Leibnitz's philosophy).
1791. Ueber die wirklichen Fortschritte der Metaphysik seit Leibnitzund Wolff, “On the Real Advances of Metaphysics since Leibnitz and Wolff”; and Ueber das Misslingen aller philosophischen Versuchein der Theodicee.
1793. Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, “Religion within the Bounds of Reason only” (Eng. trans. J. W. Semple, 1838).
1794. Ueber Philosophie überhaupt, “On Philosophy generally,” and Das Ende aller Dinge.
1795. Zum ewigen Frieden (Eng. trans., M. Campbell Smith, 1903).
1797. Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre (trans. W. Hastie), and Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre.
1798. Der Streit der Facultäten, “Contest of the Faculties.”
1798. Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht.
The Kantian Philosophy.
Historians are accustomed to divide the general current of speculation into epochs or periods marked by the dominance of some single philosophic conception with its systematic evolution. Perhaps in no case is the character of an epoch more clearly apparent than in that of the critical philosophy. The great work of Kant absolutely closed the lines of speculation along which the philosophical literature of the 18th century had proceeded, and substituted for them a new and more comprehensive method of regarding the essential problems of thought, a method which has prescribed the course of philosophic speculation in the present age. The critical system has thus a two-fold aspect. It takes up into itself what had characterized the previous efforts of modern thought, shows the imperfect nature of the fundamental notions therein employed, and offers a new solution of the problems to which these notions had been applied. It opens up a new series of questions upon which subsequent philosophic reflection has been directed, and gives to them the form, under which it is possible that they should be fruitfully regarded. A work of this kind is essentially epoch-making.
In any complete account of the Kantian system it is therefore necessary that there should be constant reference, on the one hand, to the peculiar character of the preceding 18th-century philosophy, and, on the other hand, to the problems left for renewed treatment to more modern thought. Fortunately the development of the Kantian system itself furnishes such treatment as is necessary of the former reference. For the critical philosophy was a work of slow growth. In the early writings of Kant we are able to trace with great definiteness the successive stages through which he passed from the notions of the preceding philosophy to the new and comprehensive method which gives its special character to the critical work. Scarcely any great mind, it has been said with justice, ever matured so slowly. In the early essays we find the principles of the current philosophies, those of Leibnitz and English empiricism, applied in various directions to those problems which serve as tests of their truth and completeness; we note the appearance of the difficulties or contradictions which manifest the one-sidedness or imperfection of the principle applied; and we can trace the gradual growth of the new conceptions which were destined, in the completed system, to take the place of the earlier method. To understand the Kantian work it is indispensable to trace the history of its growth in the mind of its author.
Of the two preceding stages of modern philosophy, only the second, that of Locke and Leibnitz, seems to have influenced practically the course of Kant's speculation. With the Cartesian movement as a whole he shows little acquaintance and no sympathy, and his own philosophic conception is never brought into relation with the systematic treatment of metaphysical problems characteristic of the Cartesian method. The fundamental question for philosophic reflection presented itself to him in the form which it had assumed in the hands of Locke and his successors in England, of Leibnitz and the Leibnitzian school in Germany. The transition from the Cartesian movement to this second stage of modern thought had doubtless been natural and indeed necessary. Nevertheless the full bearings of the philosophic question were somewhat obscured by the comparatively limited fashion in which it was then regarded. The tendency towards what may be technically called subjectivism, a tendency which differentiates the modern from the ancient method of speculation, is expressed in Locke and Leibnitz in a definite and peculiar fashion. However widely the two systems differ in details, they are at one in a certain fundamental conception which dominates the whole course of their philosophic construction. They are throughout individualist, i.e. they accept as given fact the existence of the concrete thinking subject, and endeavour to show how this subject, as an individual conscious being, is related to the wider universe of which he forms part. In dealing with such a problem, there are evidently two lines along which investigation may proceed. It may be asked how the individual mind comes to know himself and the system of things with which he is connected, how the varied contents of his experience are to be accounted for, and what certainty attaches to his subjective consciousness of things. Regarded from the individualist point of view, this line of inquiry becomes purely psychological, and the answer may be presented as it was presented by Locke, in the fashion of a natural history of the growth of conscious experience in the mind of the subject. Or, it may be further asked how is the individual really connected with the system of things apparently disclosed to him in conscious experience? what is the precise significance of the existence which he ascribes both to himself and to the objects of experience? what is the nature of the relation between himself as one part of the system, and the system as a whole? This second inquiry is specifically metaphysical in bearing and the kind of answer furnished to it by Leibnitz on the one hand by Berkeley on the other, is in fact prescribed or determined beforehand by the fundamental conception of the individualist method with which both begin their investigations. So soon as we make clear to ourselves the essential nature of this method, we are able to discern the specific difficulties or perplexities arising in the attempt to carry it out systematically, and thus to note with precision the special problems presented to Kant at the outset of his philosophic reflections.
Consider, first, the application of the method on its psychological side, as it appears in Locke. Starting with the assumption of conscious experience as the content or filling-in of the individual mind, Locke proceeds to explain its genesis and nature by reference to the real universe of things and its mechanical operation upon the mind. The result of the interaction of mind, i.e. the individual mind, and the system of things, is conscious experience, consisting of ideas, which may be variously compounded, divided, compared, or dealt with by the subjective faculties or powers with which the entity, Mind, is supposed to be endowed. Matter of fact and matter of knowledge are thus at a stroke dissevered. The very notion of relation between mind and things leads at once to the counter notion of the absolute restriction of mind to its own subjective nature. That Locke was unable to reconcile these opposed notions is not surprising; that the difficulties and obscurities of the Essay arise from the impossibility of reconciling them is evident on the slightest consideration of the main positions of that work. Of these difficulties the philosophies of Berkeley and Hume are systematic treatments, In Berkeley we find the resolute determination to accept only the one notion, that of mind as restricted to its own conscious experience, and to attempt by this means to explain the nature of the external reality to which obscure reference is made. Any success in the attempt is due only to the fact that Berkeley introduces alongside of his individualist notion a totally new conception, that of mind itself as not in the same way one of the matters of conscious experience, but as capable of reflection upon the whole of experience and of reference to the supreme mind as the ground of all reality. It is only in Hume that we have definitely and completely the evolution of the individualist notion as groundwork of a theory of knowledge; and it is in his writings, therefore, that we may expect to find the fundamental difficulty of that notion clearly apparent. It is not a little remarkable that we should find in Hume, not only the sceptical dissolution of all fixity of cognition, which is the inevitable result of the individualist method, but also the clearest consciousness of the very root of the difficulty. The systematic application of the doctrine that conscious experience consists only of isolated objects of knowledge, impressions or ideas, leads Hume to distinguish between truths reached by analysis and truths which involve real connexion of the objects of knowledge. The first he is willing to accept without further inquiry, though it is an error to suppose, as Kant seems to have supposed, that he regarded mathematical propositions as coming under this head; with respect to the second, he finds himself, and confesses that he finds himself, hopelessly at fault. No real connexions between isolated objects of experience are perceived by us. No single matter of fact necessarily implies the existence of any other. In short, if the difficulty be put in its ultimate form, no existence thought as a distinct individual can transcend itself, or imply relation to any other existence. If the parts of conscious experience are regarded as so many distinct things, there is no possibility of connecting them other than contingently, if at all. If the individual mind be really thought as individual, it is impossible to explain how it should have knowledge or consciousness at all. “In short,” says Hume, “there are two principles which I cannot render consistent, nor is it in my power to renounce either of them, viz. that all our distinct perceptionsare distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any realconnexion among distinct existences. Did our perceptions either inhere in something simple or individual, or did the mind perceive some real connexion among them, there would be no difficulty in the case” (App. to Treatise of Human Nature).
Thus, on the one hand, the individualist conception, when carried out to its full extent, leads to the total negation of all real cognition. If the real system of things, to which conscious experience has reference, be regarded as standing in casual relation to this experience there is no conceivable ground for the extension to reality of the notions which somehow are involved in thought. The same result is apparent, on the other hand, when we consider the theory of knowledge implied in the Leibnitzian individualism. The metaphysical conception of the monads, each of which is the universe in nuce, presents insuperable difficulties when the connexion or interdependence of the monads is in question, and these difficulties obtrude themselves when the attempt is made to work put a consistent doctrine of cognition. For the whole mass of cognisable fact, the mundus intelligibilis, is contained impliciter in each monad, and the several modes of apprehension can only be regarded as so many stages in the developing consciousness of the monad. Sense and understanding, real connexion of facts and analysis of notions, are not, therefore, distinct in kind, but differ only in degree. The same fundamental axioms, the logical principles of identity and sufficient reason, are applicable in explanation of all given propositions. It is true that Leibnitz himself did not work out any complete doctrine of knowledge, but in the hands of his successors the theory took definite shape in the principle that the whole work of cognition is in essence analytical. The process of analysis might be complete or incomplete. For finite intelligences there was an inevitable incompleteness so far as knowledge of matters of fact was concerned. In respect to them, the final result was found in a series of irreducible notions or categories, the prima possibilia, the analysis and elucidation of which was specifically the business of philosophy or metaphysics.
It will be observed that, in the Leibnitzian as in the empirical individualism, the fundamental notion is still that of the abstract separation of the thinking subject from the materials of conscious experience. From this separation arise all the difficulties in the effort to develop the notion systematically, and in tracing the history of Kant's philosophical progress we are able to discern the gradual perception on his part that here was to be found the ultimate cause of the perplexities which became apparent in considering the subordinate doctrines of the system. The successive essays which have already been enumerated as composing Kant's precritical work are not to be regarded as so many imperfect sketches of the doctrines of the Kritik, nor are we to look in them for anticipations of the critical view. They are essentially tentative, and exhibit with unusual clearness the manner in which the difficulties of a received theory force on a wider and more comprehensive view. There can be no doubt that some of the special features of the Kritik are to be found in these precritical essays, e.g. the doctrine of the Aesthetik is certainly foreshadowed in the Dissertation of 1770; the Kritik, however, is no patchwork, and what appears in the Dissertation takes an altogether new form when it is wrought into the more comprehensive conception of the later treatise.
The particular problem which gave the occasion to the first of the precritical writings is, in an imperfect or particular fashion, the fundamental question to which the Kritik is an answer. What is the nature of the distinction between knowledge gained by analysis of notions and knowledge of matters of fact? Kant seems never to have been satisfied with the Wolffian identification of logical axioms and of the principle of sufficient reason. The tract on the FalseSubtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures, in which the view of thought or reason as analytic is clearly expressed, closes with the significant division of judgments into those which rest upon the logical axioms of identity and contradiction and those for which no logical ground can be shown. Such immediate or indemonstrable judgments, it is said, abound in our experience. They are, in fact, as Kant presently perceived, the foundations for all judgments regarding real existence. It was impossible that the question regarding their nature and legitimacy and their distinction from analytic judgments should not present itself to him. The three tracts belonging to the years 1763-1764 bring forward in the sharpest fashion the essential opposition between the two classes of judgments. In the Essay on NegativeQuantities
