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- Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
- Kategorie: Wissenschaft und neue Technologien
- Sprache: Englisch
Establishes sound safety management principles and focuses on the revised Z10.0 safety standard, the new 45001 safety standard, and serious injury prevention Filled with updated chapters and information throughout, this book covers the provisions of ANSI/ASSP Z10.0-2019, the American standard for Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems. It expands in detail on the principles for advanced safety management, the content of the revised Z10.0 standard, and the newly adopted international standard, ISO 45001. It also emphasizes the need to reduce the occurrence of serious injuries, illnesses, and fatalities. Advanced Safety Management: Focusing on Z10.0, 45001 and Serious Injury Prevention, Third Edition expands on the material in previous editions and includes several new chapters emphasizing culture, systems design, and incident investigations. Beginning with an overview of ANSI/ASSP Z10.0-2019 and ANSI/ASSP/ISO 45001-2018, it goes on to offer chapters on: Essentials for the Practice of Safety; Human Error Avoidance; Hazards Analyses and Risk Assessments; Three- and Four-Dimensional Risk Scoring Systems; Safety Design Reviews; The Procurement Process; Audit Requirements; The Management Oversight and Risk Tree (MORT); and more. * Expands in detail on the principles for advanced safety management, the content of the revised ANSI/ASSP Z10.0. standard and the newly adopted international standard, ISO 45001 * New chapters cover the Significance of An Organization's Culture; Fundamental Concepts; and Systems/Macro Thinking * Places emphasis on the more prominent risk-based approach in the practice of safety * Provides methods to align safety, operational, and financial goals, along with quality and environmental standards * Explains the concepts of risk reduction, waste reduction, environmental impact deduction, and Prevention through Design (PtD) Advanced Safety Management is an important book for safety professionals, industrial hygienist, plant managers, OSHA and EPA advocates, students majoring in safety or industrial hygiene, and union leaders.
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Seitenzahl: 896
Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2020
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Table of Contents
COVER
PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION
PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTERS
CHAPTER 1: AN OVERVIEW OF ANSI/ASSP Z10.0-2019 AND ANSI/ASSP/ISO 45001-2018
SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES
HISTORY, DEVELOPMENT, AND CONSENSUS
COMPATIBILITY AND HARMONIZATION
THE CONTINUAL IMPROVEMENT PROCESS: THE PDCA CONCEPT
A MAJOR THEME
RELATING THIS MAJOR THEME TO SERIOUS INJURY PREVENTION
Z10.0 AND 45001 ARE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM STANDARDS
FOREWORDS AND INTRODUCTIONS FOR Z10.0 AND 45001
WORD USAGE—REQUIREMENTS, RECOMMENDED PRACTICES, PERMISSIONS, AND POSSIBILITIES
COMPOSITES OF INTRODUCTIONS FOR Z10.0 AND 45001
COMPOSITES FOR Z10.0 AND 45001: 1.0 THROUGH 3.0—SCOPE, PURPOSE, AND APPLICATION, REFERENCES, DEFINITIONS, AND TERMS AND CONDITIONS
COMPOSITE: 4.0 STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS: CONTEXT OF THE ORGANIZATION IN Z10.0: 4. CONTEXT OF THE ORGANIZATION IN 45001
COMPOSITE: 5.0 MANAGEMENT LEADERSHIP & EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION IN Z10.0: 5. LEADERSHIP AND WORKER PARTICIPATION IN 45001
COMPOSITE: 6.0 PLANNING IN Z10.0: 6. PLANNING IN 45001
COMPOSITE: 7.0 SUPPORT IN Z10.0:7. SUPPORT IN 45001
COMPOSITE: 8.0 IMPLEMENTATION AND OPERATION IN Z10.0: 8. OPERATION IN 45001
8.4 HIERARCHY OF CONTROLS IN Z10.0: 8.1 ELIMINATING HAZARDS AND REDUCING OH&S RISKS IN 45001
8.5 DESIGN REVIEW AND MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE IN Z10.0: 8.1.3. MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE IN 45001
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS IN Z10.0: EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE IN 45001
9.0 EVALUATION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION IN Z10.0: 9. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION IN 45001
10. MANAGEMENT REVIEW IN Z10.0: 10. IMPROVEMENT IN 45001
ANNEXES, BIBLIOGRAPHIES, AND GUIDANCE MANUALS (NOT A PART OF THE STANDARDS)
OBSERVATIONS ON THE STANDARDS, INCLUDING SIGNIFICANT PROVISIONS THAT ARE MISSING
CONCLUSION
REFERENCES
FURTHER READING
CHAPTER 2: ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE, MANAGEMENT LEADERSHIP, AND WORKER PARTICIPATION
A SYSTEM OF EXPECTED PERFORMANCE
ROLES OF SAFETY PROFESSIONALS WITH RESPECT TO THE SAFETY CULTURE
ABSOLUTES FOR MANAGEMENT TO ATTAIN SUPERIOR RESULTS
SOLVING AN IMMEDIATE HAZARD/RISK PROBLEM MAY BE ONLY A PART OF THE FIX: A CULTURE CHANGE MAY ALSO BE NEEDED
POSITIVE SAFETY CULTURE DEFINED
EVIDENCE OF THE CULTURE IN PLACE
HOW AN ORGANIZATION'S POSITIVE SAFETY CULTURE IS CREATED
CHARACTERISTICS OF A POSITIVE SAFETY CULTURE
CHARACTERISTICS OF A NEGATIVE SAFETY CULTURE
SEVERAL SAFETY CULTURES MAY EXIST AT THE SAME TIME
SAFETY CULTURE AND SAFETY CLIMATE
EVALUATING THE CULTURE OR THE CLIMATE IN PLACE
A VERY UNUSUAL SURVEY INSTRUMENT
PROPOSING AN INTERNAL ANALYSIS OF THE SAFETY CULTURE
A SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM SURVEY GUIDE
MANAGEMENT LEADERSHIP AND WORKER PARTICIPATION AS IN Z10.0 AND 45001
Z10.0
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND WORKER PARTICIPATION
A CASE STUDY
CONCLUSION
REFERENCES
CHAPTER 3: SAFETY PROFESSIONALS AS CULTURE CHANGE AGENTS
WHAT DOES THE TERM “OVERARCHING” MEAN?
WHAT IS A CHANGE AGENT?
CHARACTERISTICS OF A CHANGE AGENT
SOLVING A HAZARD/RISK PROBLEM MAY BE ONLY A PART OF THE FIX: A CULTURE CHANGE MAY ALSO BE NEEDED
SIGNIFICANCE OF MANAGEMENT LEADERSHIP: POSITIVE CULTURE DEFINED
THE ROLE OF SAFETY PROFESSIONALS WITH RESPECT TO A POSITIVE SAFETY CULTURE
THE ROLE OF SAFETY PROFESSIONALS WITH RESPECT TO A NEGATIVE SAFETY CULTURE
THE CONCEPT OF DRIFT
EXAMPLES OF SAFETY PROFESSIONALS BEING INVOLVED AS CULTURE CHANGE AGENTS
OPPORTUNITIES AND CAPABILITIES
SELECTED RESOURCES ON SAFETY PROFESSIONALS AS CULTURE CHANGE AGENTS
WHY CULTURE CHANGE INITIATIVES FAIL
A BASIC GUIDE
A BASIC GUIDE FOR ACHIEVING A CULTURE CHANGE
CONCLUSION
REFERENCES
FURTHER READING
CHAPTER 4: ESSENTIALS FOR THE PRACTICE OF SAFETY
ON ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE
ON HAZARDS, RISKS, AND DEFICIENCIES IN MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS—THE BASICS
RISK ASSESSMENT
DEFINING THE PRACTICE OF SAFETY
HIERARCHY OF CONTROLS
CONCERNING LEADERSHIP AND TRAINING
HUMAN ERRORS—UNSAFE ACTS: REVISED VIEWS
PREVENTION THROUGH DESIGN
SETTING PRIORITIES AND UTILIZING RESOURCES EFFECTIVELY
ON INCIDENT CAUSATION
PERFORMANCE MEASURES
ON SAFETY AUDITS
CONCLUSION
REFERENCES
FURTHER READING
CHAPTER 5: A PRIMER ON SYSTEMS/MACRO THINKING
WHAT IS SYSTEMS THINKING?
COMPLEX SYSTEMS AND SELF-ORGANIZATION
PROMOTING SYSTEMS/MACRO THINKING: REQUIREMENTS FOR
COMMENTS ON THE STATUS QUO
THE FOCUS MUST CHANGE
SYSTEMS OR MACRO THINKING
SIGNIFICANCE OF AN ORGANIZATION'S CULTURE
RELATING MACRO THINKING TO A MODEL FOR A BALANCED SOCIO-TECHNICAL OPERATION
INCIDENT INVESTIGATION AND CAUSATION
CONCLUSION
REFERENCES
FURTHER READING
CHAPTER 6: A SOCIO-TECHNICAL MODEL FOR AN OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
DEFINING A SOCIO-TECHNICAL SYSTEM AND MACRO THINKING
EMPHASIZING THE WHOLE AND INTERDEPENDENCE
SIGNIFICANCE OF AN ORGANIZATION'S CULTURE
CHARACTERISTICS OF A POSITIVE SAFETY CULTURE
EVIDENCE OF THE CULTURE IN PLACE
MANAGEMENT COMMITMENT OR NONCOMMITMENT TO SAFETY
SAFETY POLICIES, STANDARDS, PROCEDURES, AND THE ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEM
ON RISK ASSESSMENTS
PREVENTION THROUGH DESIGN
PROVIDING ADEQUATE RESOURCES: COMPETENCY AND ADEQUACY OF STAFF
OPERATING PROCEDURES: ORGANIZATION OF WORK
TRAINING AND MOTIVATION
MAINTENANCE FOR SYSTEM INTEGRITY
MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE/PREJOB PLANNING: PRESTARTUP REVIEW
PROCUREMENT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH SUPPLIERS
EMERGENCY PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT
RISK-RELATED PROCESSES
CONTRACTORS—ON PREMISES
CONFORMANCE/COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE
PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT
CONCLUSION
REFERENCES
FURTHER READING
CHAPTER 7: INNOVATIONS IN SERIOUS INJURY, ILLNESS, AND FATALITY PREVENTION
EMPLOYEE INJURIES HAVE DECREASED
FATALITY HISTORY
IMPLICATIONS
ACTIONS TO BE CONSIDERED BY SAFETY PROFESSIONALS
SAFETY PROFESSIONALS REVIEWING THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH THEIR PRACTICE IS BASED
ACTIVITIES IN WHICH SERIOUS INJURIES AND FATALITIES OCCUR
OBTAINING INTEREST IN FATALITY PREVENTION
AN EVALUATION OF THE CULTURE IN PLACE
CHANGES IN AN ORGANIZATION'S CULTURE WILL BE NECESSARY
CONVINCING MANAGEMENT THAT HAVING GOOD OSHA STATISTICS MAY BE DECEIVING
ON HEINRICH'S PRINCIPLES: FOCUSING ON UNSAFE ACTS AND INCIDENT FREQUENCY
CONSIDERATION OF UNSAFE ACTS—HUMAN ERRORS: A DIFFERENT APPROACH
BARRIERS DEFINED
ALL ENGINEERS ARE ALSO SAFETY ENGINEERS
RISK ASSESSMENTS: VALUE AND TRENDING
PREVENTION THROUGH DESIGN
MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE/PRE-JOB PLANNING
INCIDENT INVESTIGATION AND ANALYSIS
CONCLUSION
REFERENCES
FURTHER READING
CHAPTER 8: HUMAN ERROR AVOIDANCE
HUMAN ERROR AND ERGONOMICS
ORGANIZATIONAL TRANSITION
DEFINING HUMAN ERROR AND HUMAN ERROR REDUCTION
A REVIEW OF SELECTED LITERATURE
THE CONCEPT OF DRIFT
CONCLUSION
REFERENCES
FURTHER READING
CHAPTER 9: ON HAZARDS ANALYSES AND RISK ASSESSMENTS
DEFINING HAZARD, HAZARD ANALYSIS, RISK, AND RISK ASSESSMENT
MAKING A HAZARD ANALYSIS/RISK ASSESSMENT
DESCRIPTIONS: PROBABILITY AND SEVERITY
EXAMPLES OF RISK ASSESSMENT MATRICES
RISK ASSESSMENT
ON ACCEPTABLE RISK
MANAGEMENT DECISION LEVELS
DESCRIPTIONS OF HAZARDS ANALYSES AND RISK ASSESSMENT TECHNIQUES
ADDITIONAL RESOURCES
CONCLUSION
REFERENCES
FURTHER READING
ADDENDUM A – 1
ADDENDUM A – 2
ADDENDUM B
ADDENDUM C
CHAPTER 10: THREE- AND FOUR-DIMENSIONAL RISK SCORING SYSTEMS
TRANSITIONS IN RISK ASSESSMENT
A NEED FOR CAUTION AND PERCEPTIVE EVALUATION
THREE- AND FOUR-DIMENSIONAL NUMERICAL RISK SCORING SYSTEMS
NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA)
A THREE-DIMENSIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT SYSTEM—HEAVY EQUIPMENT BUILDERS
THE WILLIAM T. FINE SYSTEM: A THREE-DIMENSIONAL NUMERICAL RISK SCORING MODEL
A FOUR-DIMENSIONAL NUMERICAL RISK SCORING SYSTEM
A MODEL OF THREE-DIMENSIONAL NUMERICAL RISK SCORING SYSTEM
DEFINITIONS
THE RISK SCORE FORMULA
GRADATION AND SCORING DEVELOPMENT
WHAT THE DESCRIPTIVE WORDS MEAN
CONCLUSION
REFERENCES
ADDENDUM A: FMEA FORM
ADDENDUM B: MATHEMATICAL EVALUATIONS FOR CONTROLLING HAZARDS
CHAPTER 11: HIERARCHIES OF CONTROL
HIERARCHIES OF CONTROL IN 45001 AND Z10.0
THE LOGIC OF TAKING ACTION IN THE DESCENDING ORDER GIVEN
APPLICATION OF THE HIERARCHY: EFFECTIVENESS OF ELEMENTS
ON VARIATIONS IN HIERARCHIES OF CONTROL
AT THE NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL
DIRECTIVE: THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
MIL-STD-882E-2012
ADDITIONAL GOALS TO BE CONSIDERED
ATTACHING THE HIERARCHY OF CONTROLS TO A PROBLEM-SOLVING TECHNIQUE
ON PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND ANALYSIS
EXPLORING ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS
DECIDING AND TAKING ACTION
MEASURING FOR EFFECTIVENESS
CONCLUSION
REFERENCES
FURTHER READING
CHAPTER 12: SAFETY DESIGN REVIEWS
DESIGN AND 45001
DESIGN REVIEW REQUIREMENTS IN Z10.0 (8.5)
SAFETY THROUGH DESIGN/PREVENTION THROUGH DESIGN
NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL
NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH
THE SAFETY DESIGN REVIEW PROCESS
EMPHASIZING CONSIDERATION OF THE WORK METHODS IN THE DESIGN PROCESS
HOW SOME SAFETY PROFESSIONALS ARE ENGAGED IN THE DESIGN PROCESS
A GOOD PLACE TO START: ERGONOMICS
A SAFETY DESIGN REVIEW AND OPERATIONS REQUIREMENTS GUIDE
REQUIREMENTS: EQUIPMENT AND PROCESS DESIGN SAFETY REVIEWS
EQUIPMENT ACCEPTANCE - SAFETY REVIEW FORMS
PRELIMINARY SAFETY DESIGN REVIEW FORMS
GENERAL DESIGN SAFETY CHECKLIST
GENERAL DESIGN SAFETY CHECKLIST
CONCLUSION
REFERENCES
CHAPTER 13: PREVENTION THROUGH DESIGN
SUPPORTING APPLICATION OF PREVENTION THROUGH DESIGN CONCEPTS
HISTORY
A REVIEW OF ACTIVITIES AT NIOSH ON PREVENTION THROUGH DESIGN
HIGHLIGHTS OF ANSI/ASSE Z590.3
GOALS TO BE ACHIEVED
GETTING INVOLVED
PATIENCE AND UNDERSTANDING
KEY POINTS
EXAMPLES
CONCLUSION
REFERENCES
FURTHER READING
CHAPTER 14: MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE
MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE IN 45001
MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE AS IN Z10.0
STUDIES THAT SUPPORT HAVING A MOC SYSTEM IN PLACE
PURPOSE OF A MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE SYSTEM
APPLICATION CONSIDERATIONS
OSHA MOC REQUIREMENTS
EXPERIENCE OF OTHERS IMPLIES OPPORTUNITY
THE MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE PROCESS
RESPONSIBILITY LEVELS
ACTIVITIES FOR WHICH THE MOC PROCESS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED
MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE REQUEST FORM
IMPLEMENTING THE MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE PROCESS
RISK ASSESSMENTS
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF TRAINING
DOCUMENTATION
ON THE MOC EXAMPLES
CONCLUSION
REFERENCES
ADDENDUM A: MOC EXAMPLE 1
ADDENDUM B: MOC EXAMPLE 2
ADDENDUM C: MOC EXAMPLE 3
ADDENDUM D: MOC EXAMPLE 4
ADDENDUM E: MOC EXAMPLE 5
ADDENDUM F: MOC EXAMPLE 6
CHAPTER 15: THE PROCUREMENT PROCESS
PROCUREMENT REQUIREMENTS IN 45001 AND Z10.0
WHY EMPHASIZE HAVING SAFETY-RELATED SPECIFICATIONS IN PROCUREMENT DOCUMENTS?
NEED FOR A CULTURE CHANGE
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROCUREMENT PROVISIONS
PRE-WORK NECESSARY FOR PROCUREMENT APPLICATIONS
AVAILABLE HEALTH AND SAFETY PURCHASING SPECIFICATIONS
OPPORTUNITIES IN ERGONOMICS
GENERAL DESIGN AND PURCHASING GUIDELINES
CONCLUSION
REFERENCES
FURTHER READING
ADDENDUM A: GENERAL DESIGN AND PURCHASING GUIDELINES
ADDENDUM B: UNIVERSITY OF WOLLONGONG
CHAPTER 16: EVALUATION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION
MONITORING, MEASUREMENT, AND ASSESSMENT IN Z10.0 AND MONITORING, MEASUREMENT, ANALYSIS, AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION IN 45001
INCIDENT INVESTIGATION
AUDITS IN Z10.0: INTERNAL AUDITS IN 45001
CORRECTIVE ACTION IN Z10.0
MANAGEMENT REVIEW IN 45001—SECTION 9.3
FEEDBACK AND ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING IN Z10.0
CONCLUSION
REFERENCES
FURTHER READING
CHAPTER 17: MANAGEMENT REVIEW/IMPROVEMENT
CLAUSE 10—IMPROVEMENT—AS IN 45001
CLAUSE 10 – MANAGEMENT REVIEW IN Z10.0
PLAN-DO-CHECK-ACT
REFERENCES
FURTHER READING
CHAPTER 18: AUDIT REQUIREMENTS
THE PRINCIPLE PURPOSE OF A SAFETY AUDIT: TO IMPROVE THE SAFETY CULTURE
SIGNIFICANCE OF OBSERVED HAZARDOUS SITUATIONS
REASONABLE MANAGEMENT EXPECTATIONS: THE EXIT INTERVIEW
EVALUATIONS OF AUDITORS BY THOSE AUDITED
AUDITOR COMPETENCY
ONE SIZE DOES NOT FIT ALL
GUIDELINES FOR AN AUDIT SYSTEM
CONCLUSION
REFERENCE
FURTHER READING
ADDENDUM A: OSHA'S VPP SITE-BASED PARTICIPATION SITE WORKSHEET
CHAPTER 19: INCIDENT INVESTIGATION
9.2 INCIDENT INVESTIGATION IN Z10.0
COMMENTS REFLECTING ON THIS AUTHOR'S RESEARCH
RESULTS OF RESEARCH
CONTINUED FOCUS ON WORKER UNSAFE ACTS AS CAUSAL FACTORS
THE POSITION IN WHICH SUPERVISORS ARE PLACED
CULTURAL IMPLICATIONS THAT ENCOURAGE GOOD INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
CULTURAL IMPLICATIONS THAT MAY IMPEDE GOOD INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
HAVING COMPASSION FOR SUPERVISORS
ON THE WAY TO IMPROVEMENT: START WITH A SELF-EVALUATION OF ONE'S OWN BELIEFS AND THE CULTURE
TEAMS
OTHER SUBJECTS TO BE REVIEWED
THE 5 WHY PROBLEM SOLVING TECHNIQUE
WHAT THIS CHAPTER IS NOT
INCIDENT INVESTIGATION RESOURCES
CONCLUSION
REFERENCES
FURTHER READING
ADDENDUM A: A REFERENCE FOR THE SELECTION OF CAUSAL FACTORS AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR INCIDENT INVESTIGATION PROCEDURES AND REPORTS
CHAPTER 20: INCIDENT CAUSATION MODELS
REQUIREMENTS FOR CAUSATION MODELS
SAFETY PROFESSIONALS—YOU HAVE ADOPTED A CAUSATION MODEL
THE HEINRICHEAN CAUSATION MODEL
ON CATEGORIES OF CAUSATION MODELS
BARRIERS AND CONTROLS AND CAUSATION MODELS
SELECTED RESOURCES ON CAUSATION MODELS
SUGGESTED CAUSATION MODELS FOR CONSIDERATION BY SAFETY PROFESSIONALS
CONCLUSION
REFERENCES
FURTHER READING
CHAPTER 21: THE FIVE WHY PROBLEM-SOLVING TECHNIQUE
FOR WHAT IS THE FIVE WHY TECHNIQUE TO BE USED AND WHEN?
PROCEDURES FOR USE OF THE FIVE WHY TECHNIQUE
TRAINING
OPPOSITION
CULTURE CHANGE NECESSARY
FIVE EXAMPLES OF APPLICATIONS OF THE FIVE WHY TECHNIQUE
OBSERVATIONS
CONCLUSION
RESOURCES
CHAPTER 22: MORT—THE MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT AND RISK TREE
UNUSUAL ASPECTS
OTHER REASONS WHY MORT IS AN EDUCATIONAL RESOURCE
A REVISION OF MORT
DEFINING BARRIERS AND CONTROLS
THE MAIN BRANCHES OF MORT
LOSSES AND ASSUMED RISKS
SPECIFIC & MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHTS & OMISSIONS
DEFICIENCIES IN MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
CONTROLS AND BARRIERS
CONTROL OF WORK AND PROCESSES
CONCLUSION
REFERENCES
CHAPTER 23: JAMES REASON'S SWISS CHEESE MODEL
HOW EXTENSIVE IS THE USE OF THE SWISS CHEESE MODEL?
REASON'S SWISS CHEESE MODEL: ORIGIN AND DEPICTION
WHAT IS A BARRIER?
HOW ACCIDENTS HAPPEN
TO WHAT TYPES OF OPERATIONS DOES REASON'S THINKING APPLY?
REASON'S OBSERVATIONS ON CHANGING VIEWS ABOUT ACTIVE FAILURES
PREVENTION THROUGH DESIGN IMPLICATIONS
CONCLUSION
REFERENCES
FURTHER READING
CHAPTER 24: ON SYSTEM SAFETY
RELATING THE GENERALIST PRACTICE OF SAFETY TO SYSTEM SAFETY
AFFECTING THE DESIGN AND REDESIGN PROCESSES
DEFINING SYSTEM SAFETY
THE SYSTEM SAFETY IDEA
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND ANALYSIS AND RISK ASSESSMENT TECHNIQUES
RISK ASSESSMENT MATRICES
THE HIERARCHY OF CONTROLS
A SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT PRESENTATION FOR A HIERARCHY OF CONTROLS
WHY SYSTEM SAFETY CONCEPTS HAVE NOT BEEN WIDELY ADOPTED
PROMOTING THE USE OF SYSTEM SAFETY CONCEPTS
RECOMMENDED READING
CONCLUSION
REFERENCES
FURTHER READING
CHAPTER 25: ACHIEVING ACCEPTABLE RISK LEVELS: THE OPERATIONAL GOAL
FUNDAMENTAL PREMISE
PROGRESSION WITH RESPECT TO USE OF THE TERM ACCEPTABLE RISK
WITH RESPECT TO THE FOREGOING CITATIONS
SUMMARY TO THIS POINT
THE NATURE AND SOURCE OF RISK
A ZERO RISK LEVEL IS NOT ATTAINABLE
OPPOSITION TO IMPOSED RISKS
MINIMUM RISK AS AN INADEQUATE SUBSTITUTE FOR ACCEPTABLE RISK
CONSIDERATIONS IN DEFINING ACCEPTABLE RISK
THE ALARP PRINCIPLE
RISK ASSESSMENT MATRICES
DEFINING ACCEPTABLE RISK
THE STATE OF THE ART IN RISK ASSESSMENT
CONCLUSION
REFERENCES
FURTHER READING
INDEX
END USER LICENSE AGREEMENT
List of Tables
Chapter 5
TABLE 5.1 Percentages–Unsafe Acts
Chapter 7
TABLE 7.1 Private Industry: Trending—Percent of Days-Away-from-Work Cases
TABLE 7.2 U.S. Number of Fatalities and Fatality Rates
TABLE 7.3 Manufacturing Year. Number of Fatalities, and Rates
Chapter 9
TABLE 9.1 Example A: Probability Descriptions
TABLE 9.2 Example B: Probability Descriptions
TABLE 9.3 Example C: Probability Descriptions
TABLE 9.4 Example A: Severity Descriptions for Multiple Harm and Damage Categ...
TABLE 9.5 Example B: Severity Descriptions for Multiple Harm and Damage Categori...
TABLE 9.6 Example C: Severity Descriptions for Multiple Harm and Damage Categ...
TABLE 9.7 Risk Assessment Matrix
TABLE 9.8 Risk Assessment Matrix: Alpha Risk Level Indicators: Probability Th...
TABLE 9.9 Risk Assessment Matrix, Including Probability and Severity Codes
Chapter 10
TABLE 10.1 NSC Severity Descriptions and Point Values
TABLE 10.2 NSC Probability Descriptions and Point Values
TABLE 10.3 NSC Exposure Descriptions and Point Values
TABLE 10.4 SEMATACH Scoring Table for Severity Ranking—Customer Related
TABLE 10.5 SEMATECH Scoring Table for Severity Ranking—ES&H Definitions
TABLE 10.6 SEMATECT Scoring Table for Occurrence Ranking Criteria
TABLE 10.7 SEMATECH Scoring Table for Detection Ranking Criteria
TABLE 10.8 Severity Scale—S
TABLE 10.9 Frequency Scale—F
TABLE 10.10 Vulnerability Scale—V
TABLE 10.11 Likelihood of Occurrence (LO) and the Scores
TABLE 10.12 Frequency of Exposures to the Hazards (FE) and the Scores
TABLE 10.13 Degree of Possible Harm and the Scores
TABLE 10.14 Number of Persons Exposed and the Scores
TABLE 10.15 Risk Level
TABLE 10.16 Usage of a Four-Dimensional Risk Scoring System
TABLE 10.17 Descriptive Words and Ratings
TABLE 10.18 Incident Probability
TABLE 10.19 Severity of Consequences
TABLE 10.20 Frequency of Exposure
TABLE 10.21 Risk Categories, Score Levels, and Action or Risk Acceptance Leve...
TABLE 10.22 The Risk Scoring System
TABLE 10.23 Example of How the Risk Scoring System is Applied
Chapter 11
TABLE 11.1 Problem-Solving Methodology
Chapter 12
TABLE 12.1 Topics to Be Considered: Preliminary Design Safety Review
List of Illustrations
Chapter 1
FIGURE 1.1 Comparison—Z10.0 and 45001.
FIGURE 1.2 Depiction of original Plan–Do–Check–Act system.
FIGURE 1.3 Replacement for PDCA as in Z10.0.
FIGURE 1.4 Relationship between PDCA and the framework in this document.
Chapter 3
FIGURE 3.1 A socio-technical model for an operational risk management system...
Chapter 4
FIGURE 4.1 Hierarchy of controls.
Chapter 5
FIGURE 5.1 Macro/micro thinking.
FIGURE 5.2 A primer on systems.
Chapter 6
FIGURE 6.1 A socio-technical model for an operational risk management system...
Chapter 9
FIGURE 9.1 Risk assessment matrix: numerical gradings.
Chapter 11
FIGURE 11.1 The Safety Decision Hierarchy.
Chapter 12
FIGURE 12.1 Safety design reviews.
Chapter 13
FIGURE 13.1 Prevention through design—depicted.
FIGURE 13.2 Risk reduction hierarchy of controls.
Chapter 15b
FIGURE 15.1 Procurement process.
Chapter 22
FIGURE 22.1 The Main Branches of the Management Oversight and Risk Tree (MOR...
Chapter 23
FIGURE 23.1 A variation of Reason's Swiss Cheese Model.
FIGURE 23.2 A Socio-Technical Model for an Operational Risk Management Syste...
Chapter 24
FIGURE 24.1 ALARP
Chapter 25
FIGURE 25.1 ALARP
FIGURE 25.2 Risk Assessment Matrix
Guide
Cover
Table of Contents
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ADVANCED SAFETY MANAGEMENT
Focusing on Z10.0, 45001, and Serious Injury Prevention
Third Edition
FRED A. MANUELE, CSP, PEPresidentHazards Limited
This edition first published 2020© 2020 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Manuele, Fred A., author. | American National Standards Institute.
Title: Advanced safety management focusing on Z10.0, 45001 and serious injury prevention / Fred A Manuele.
Description: Third edition. | Hoboken, NJ : Wiley, 2020. | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2019052191 (print) | LCCN 2019052192 (ebook) | ISBN 9781119605416 (hardback) | ISBN 9781119605447 (adobe pdf) | ISBN 9781119605409 (epub)
Subjects: MESH: Safety Management–standards | Wounds and Injuries–prevention & control | Occupational Health | Risk Management–standards | United States
Classification: LCC RA645.T73 (print) | LCC RA645.T73 (ebook) | NLM WA 485 | DDC 363.11–dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019052191
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019052192
Cover Design: WileyCover Image: © MisterStock/Shutterstock
To my family.
PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION
Significant developments concerning the practice of safety compelled the writing of this third edition. In 2018, an international standard for occupational health and safety management systems was approved by the International Organization for Standardization. It is known as 45001.
A third version of the American standard for occupational risk management was approved by the American National Standards Institute in 2019. It is known as Z10.0.
Updating of the second edition of this book was necessary to include comments on both the new international standard and the substantial extensions made in Z10.0. Chapter 1 provides an overview of 45001 and Z10.0. There are many similarities and differences in the two standards. When it was feasible, composites are given of the requirements of the standards.
But it was necessary to comment on individual Clauses in the standards when their contents were not similar. Also, statements are made on the subjects pertaining to good risk management that are not included in either standard.
Interest in further reducing serious injuries, illnesses, and fatalities is now more prominent. A good number of safety professionals have recognized that while occupational injury frequency has been notably reduced, the reductions have been greater for incidents that result in lesser severe injuries than in more serious injuries. So, serious injuries and illnesses loom larger in the remaining total.
This author continues to propose that major innovations in the content and focus of occupational risk management systems will be necessary to achieve additional reductions of incidents that result in serious consequences. That idea has achieved more acceptance in recent years. Speeches, seminars, and workshops on the subject are more frequently given.
Major extensions have been made in the chapter titled “Innovations in Serious Injury, Illness, and Fatality Prevention” and in other relative chapters.
For example, immediately following the chapter giving an overview of 45001 and Z10, there is a chapter titled “Organizational Culture, Management Leadership, and Worker Participation”. This chapter commences with these statements:
Safety is culture driven. Everything that occurs or doesn't occur that relates to safety is a reflection of an organization's culture. Over time, every organization develops a culture, positive or negative, although it may not realize that it has one.
That is the most important chapter in the book. Throughout this third edition, more is made of the significance of an organization's culture concerning the quality of a safety management system. A risk-based approach is taken.
Revisions to update and extend content have been made in all the chapters in the second edition that are a part of this third edition. These are the new chapters.
Essentials for the Practice of Safety
A Primer on Systems/Macro Thinking
Incident Causation Models
The Five Why Problem Solving Technique
MORT—The Management Oversight and Risk Tree
James Reason's Swiss Cheese Model
As was the case for previous editions, the principle purposes of this book continue to be providing guidance to managements, safety professionals, educators, and students on the:
Content of effective operational risk management systems.
Requirements of Z10.0, and now 45001, and
Reduction of incidents that result in serious consequences.
This book is used in several university safety degree programs. Input was sought from professors and experienced safety professionals on subjects for which expansion would be appropriate or which should also be addressed.
FRED A. MANUELE, CSP, PEPresident, Hazards Limited2019
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION
This book focuses on Z10, which is the national standard for Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems, and on serious injury and fatality prevention. Impetus for an updated version of the first edition derived from two developments.
A revised version of Z10 was approved by the American National Standards Institute in June 2012. And comment and guidance for the revisions and extensions would be beneficial.
While the rates for serious occupational injuries and fatalities continued to drop significantly over past decades, it is now recognized that the rates have plateaued in recent years. This author proposes that major and somewhat shocking innovations in the content and focus of occupational risk management systems will be necessary to achieve additional progress.
The principle purpose of this book continues to be providing guidance to managements, safety professionals, educators, and students on having operational risk management systems that meet the requirements of Z10 and to be informative on reducing the occurrence of accidents that result in serious injuries and fatalities.
This book is used in several university level safety degree programs. Input was sought from professors, and experienced safety professionals who use the book as a reference, on subjects that should be expanded or also addressed.
Additional emphasis is given to the most important section in Z10—Management Leadership and Employee Involvement, with particular reference to contributions that employees can make.
A new provision was added to Z10 on Risk Assessment. Its importance is stressed.
This author proposes that risk assessments be established as the core of an Operational Risk Management System as a separately identified element following soon after the first element. Comments are made in several chapters on hazard identification and analysis and risk assessment techniques.
A significant departure from typical safety management systems is presented in the chapter on “Innovations in Serious Injury and Fatality Prevention” in the form of a Socio-Technical Model for an Operational Risk Management System. This model stresses: The significance of the organizational culture established at the board of directors and senior management levels with respect to attaining and maintaining acceptable risk levels; Providing adequate resources; Risk assessments, prioritization, and management; Prevention through Design; Maintenance for system integrity; and Management of change. It is made clear that there is a notable connection between improving management systems to meet the provisions of Z10 and avoiding serious injuries and fatalities.
Avoidance of human error is given expanded attention.
New chapters have been researched and written. Their titles are:
Macro Thinking—The Socio-Technical Model
Safety Professionals as Culture Change Agents
Prevention through Design
A Primer on System Safety
Chapters on “Management of Change” and “The Procurement Process” have been revised and expanded considerably.
Soon after approval was given by the American National Standards Institute for the revision of Z10, the Secretariat was transferred to the American Society of Safety Engineer (ASSE). Additional promotion has been given to Z10 by ASSE as the state-of-art occupational safety management system. Interest shown in the standard by safety professionals is impressive. Z10 has achieved recognition as a sound base from which to develop innovations in existing safety management systems.
For a huge percent of organizations, adopting the provision in Z10 will achieve major improvements in their occupational health and safety management systems and serve to reduce the potential for accidents that may result in serious injury or fatality.
FRED A. MANUELE, CSP, PE2014
PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION
The principle purpose of this book is to provide guidance to managements, safety professionals, educators, and students concerning two major, interrelated developments impacting on the occupational safety and health discipline. They are the:
Issuance, for the first time in the United States, of a national consensus standard for occupational safety and health management systems.
Emerging awareness that traditional systems to manage safety do not adequately address serious injury prevention.
On July 25, 2005, the American National Standards Institute approved a new standard titled Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems. Its designation is ANSI/AIHA Z10-2005. This standard is a state-of-the-art, best practices guide. Over time, Z10 will revolutionize the practice of safety.
The chapter titled “An Overview of ANSI/AIHA Z10-2005” comments on all the provisions in the standard. The chapter on “Serious Injury Prevention” gives substance to the position that adopting a different mindset is necessary to reduce serious injury potential. Other chapters give implementation guidance with respect to the standard's principal provisions and to serious injury prevention.
Recognition of the significance of Z10 has been demonstrated. Its provisions are frequently cited as representing highly effective safety and health management practices. The sales record for Z10 is impressive. Safety professionals are quietly making gap analyses, comparing existing safety and health management systems to the provisions of Z10.
Even though the standard sets forth minimum requirements, very few organizations have safety and health management systems in place that meet all the provisions of the standard. The provisions for which shortcomings will often exist, and for which emphasis is given in this book, pertain to:
Risk assessment and prioritization
Applying a prescribed hierarchy of controls to achieve acceptable risk levels
Safety design reviews
Including safety requirements in procurement and contracting papers
Management of change systems.
As ANSI standards are applied, they acquire a “quasi-official” status as the minimum requirements for the subjects to which they pertain. As Z10 attains that stature, it will become the benchmark, the minimum, against which the adequacy of safety and health management systems will be measured.
The chapter on “Serious Injury Prevention” clearly demonstrates that while occupational injury and illness incident frequency is down considerably, incidents resulting in serious injuries are not down proportionally. The case is made that typical safety and health management systems do not adequately address serious injury prevention. Thus, major conceptual changes are necessary in the practice of safety to reduce serious injury potential. That premise permeates every chapter in this book.
Safety and health professionals are advised to examine and reorient the principles on which their practices are based to achieve the significant changes necessary in the advice they give. Guidance to achieve those changes is provided.
Why use the word “Advanced” in the title of this book? If managements adopt the provisions in Z10 and give proper emphasis to the prevention of serious injuries, they will have occupational health and safety management systems as they should be, rather than as they are. There is a strong relationship between improving management systems to meet the provisions of Z10, a state-of-the-art standard, and minimizing serious injuries.
FRED A. MANUELE, CSP, PE2008
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
To recognize by name all who have contributed to my education, and thence to this book, would require a lengthy list. But, particularly, I must express my sincere thanks and gratitude to the people who gave of their time in past years and critiqued individual essays, and to the people who made written contributions to individual chapters.
INTRODUCTION
This book comments on the provisions of ANSI/ASSP Z10.0-2019, the American standard for Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems, and ANSI/ASSP/ISO 45001-2018—the international standard titled Occupational health and safety management systems—Requirements with guidance for use. It also includes several chapters that relate to the standards and also to serious injury, illness, and fatality prevention. An abstract is provided in this Introduction for each chapter.
In accord with a suggestion made by a professor who uses my books in his classes, an attempt was made to have each chapter be a stand-alone essay. Partial success with respect to that suggestion has been achieved. Although doing so requires some repetition, the reader benefits by not having to refer to other chapters while perusing the subject at hand.
CHAPTERS
1. AN OVERVIEW OF ANSI/ASSP Z10.0-2019 AND ANSI/ASSP/ISO 45001-2018
ANSI/ASSP Z10.0-2019 is titled Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems and ANSI/ASSP/ISO 45001-2018 is titled Occupational health and safety management systems—Requirements with guidance for use.
A third edition of Z10.0 was approved in August 2019. Major changes were made in relation to the content of previous editions. The 45001 standard is a new international standard that was approved in 2018.
While the titles are similar and some of the names for Clauses in the standards are close to the same, the standards have significant differences. They are highlighted. Initial discussions in this chapter pertain to the history and development of the standards; compatibility and ease of harmonization with other ISO standards; continual improvement processes—PDCA; relationship to serious injury prevention; and the standards being management systems-oriented and not specification-oriented.
Then, comments are made on all of the Clauses and sections in these standards. Also, a section in this chapter comments on the subjects for which provisions are not included.
2. ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE, MANAGEMENT LEADERSHIP, AND EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION
It is highly probable that this chapter is the most important in the book. Much more is made of the significance of an organization's culture than previously. Safety is culture-driven, and management creates the culture. As top management makes decisions directing the organization, the outcomes of those decisions establish its safety culture.
While numerous articles have appeared in safety-related literature about an organization's culture, it seems that almost all of them have been directed to what senior management is to do. This chapter assists safety professionals in understanding that almost everything that occurs or doesn't occur with respect to the practice of safety is a reflection of an organization's culture—positive or negative.
Safety professionals will surely agree that top management leadership and effective employee participation are crucial for success. An organization's continual improvement processes cannot be achieved without the provision of adequate resources and sincere top management direction.
As management provides direction and leadership, assumes responsibility for the OH&S management system, ensures effective employee participation, and creates the organization's culture, the purpose of the standards must be kept in mind—to reduce the risk of occupational injuries, illnesses, and fatalities.
In both 45001 and Z10.0, the requirements for management leadership and worker participation are extensive. A verbatim copy of the management requirements as in Z10.0 is included in this chapter. Workers are to
have meaningful involvement in the structure, operation, and pursuit of the objectives of the occupational risk management system;
identify tasks, hazards and risks, and possible control measures; and
participate in planning, evaluation, implementation of control measures for risk reduction.
3. SAFETY PROFESSIONALS AS CULTURE CHANGE AGENTS
This chapter promotes the idea that the overarching role of a safety professional is that of a culture change agent. A case is made that actions taken to eliminate or control a hazard/risk situation are not complete if they do not address the relative deficiencies in management systems or processes.
The deficiency can be corrected only if there is a modification in an organization's culture—a modification in the way things get done; and a modification in the system of expected performance.
Thus, the primary role for a safety professional is that of a culture change agent. This is the definition of a change agent: A change agent is a person who serves as a catalyst to bring about organizational change: They assess the present, are controllably dissatisfied with it; contemplate a future that should be; and take action to achieve the culture changes necessary to achieve the desired future.
Examples are given for the involvement of safety professionals as culture change agents in hazards/risks situations.
4. ESSENTIALS FOR THE PRACTICE OF SAFETY
For the practice of safety to be recognized as a profession, it must have a sound theoretical and practical base which, if applied, will be effective in hazard avoidance, elimination, and control, in achieving acceptable risk levels and reducing harmful and damaging incidents. Safety practitioners give advice to management based on a variety of premises. They can't all be right.
This chapter presents logical and sound concepts that this author believes are the bases for the practice of safety. They pertain to his experience. It is not suggested that they are complete. Other safety professionals may have different views.
5. A PRIMER ON SYSTEMS/MACRO THINKING
“Systems thinking” is a term now used more often by some safety professionals. Occasionally, the term is found in safety-related literature. Promoting systems/macro thinking should be encouraged. Doing so is progressive and commendable.
This chapter comments on the various definitions of systems thinking; explores complexity, to which some writers on system thinking refer; describes the status quo in the practice of safety; promotes the use of the terms “macro thinking” and “micro thinking”; encourages recognition of the enormity of the culture change necessary in some organizations to adopt systems/macro thinking concepts; and connects systems/macro thinking to having a socio-technical balance in operations.
Also, encouragement is given to the use of the Five Why Problem-Solving Technique in the early stages of applying systems/macro concepts.
6. A SOCIO-TECHNICAL MODEL FOR AN OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
It was said in Chapter 2 that safety is culture-driven, and management creates the culture. As top management makes decisions directing the organization, the outcomes of those decisions establish its safety culture.
This chapter presents a model that emphasizes the significance of an organization's culture and management direction and involvement. Comments are made on how the culture affects what becomes an organization's policies, standards, and processes.
Mention of system thinking and a taking a holistic, socio-technical approach in hazard and risk control appears more often in safety-related literature. This is powerful stuff, and needed. It is proposed that for superior risk management (and productivity) can be achieved only if there is a balance in the social aspects and the technical aspects of operations.
This chapter uses the term “macro thinking” principally rather that system thinking because macro implies taking a much larger view. Descriptions are given for all of the individual aspects of the socio-technical model to validate their existence.
7. INNOVATIONS IN SERIOUS INJURY, ILLNESS, AND FATALITY PREVENTION
Preventing occupational incidents and illnesses that have serious results has now become a subject that speakers address in conferences, authors write about, and for which some safety professionals seek information.
While incident frequency has been substantially reduced, the greater part of the reduction has been for incidents resulting in lesser severity. Also, statistics indicate that the incident rate for fatalities, and possibly serious injuries, has plateaued.
This chapter sets forth the actions that can be taken to achieve additional reductions in severity. First, though, illustrative statistical and supportive data is presented.
This author's recent research requires the conclusion that major innovations in safety management systems will be necessary to further reduce serious injuries, illnesses, and fatalities. These are the actions presented and discussed for consideration by safety professionals.
Study the principles on which their practice is based to determine what is sound and not sound. Ask—is it time to recognize evolving principles and practices?
Develop meaningful and convincing data on the activities in which serious injuries, illnesses, and fatalities have occurred in your operations and for the industry of which it is a part.
Evaluate the culture in place.
Recognize that for most of the revisions to be made that a culture change will be necessary.
Convince management that having good OSHA type incidence rates may not provide assurance that barriers and controls are adequate to prevent serious injuries and fatalities.
Educate management on the inappropriateness of Heinrich's principle indicating that 88% of occupational accidents are caused by employee unsafe acts.
Persuade decision-makers that focusing on reducing incident frequency may not result in an equivalent reduction in serious injuries.
Be aware of the changes in approach that have taken place in some circles with respect to addressing human errors
/
unsafe acts and determine how they might affect what you do.
Appreciate the importance of barriers in safety management.
Encourage all engineers to recognize that they are also safety engineers and that they should be adept in making risk assessments both in original designs and in alterations.
Promote defining potential problems through making risk assessments.
Recognize the beneficial impact of applying prevention through design principles.
Encourage the effective application of a Management of Change system.
Analyze the incident investigation system in place and propose improvements as necessary.
Understand that
tweaking existing systems will not achieve the substantial improvements desired
.
8. HUMAN ERROR AVOIDANCE
Many injuries, illnesses, and fatalities result from avoidable human errors. Organizational, cultural, technical, and management systems deficiencies often lead to those errors. Although focusing on the management decision making that may be the source of human errors was proposed many years ago, doing so is infrequently within the work of safety professionals.
Fortunately, a renewed interest has emerged on being able to explain why human errors occur in the occupational setting. Safety professionals will be more effective as they give counsel on injury and illness prevention if they are aware of the reality of human error causal factors.
This chapter brings attention to human errors that derive from: management decisions that result in unacceptable risk levels; extremes of cost reduction; safety management systems deficiencies; design and engineering decisions; overly stressing work methods; and error-provocative operations.
Comments are made on current thinking that proposes that if you want to know why human errors occur, inquiry should be made into the decision-making that resulted in the design of the workplace and the work methods.
9. ON HAZARDS ANALYSES AND RISK ASSESSMENTS
The intent here is to provide sufficient knowledge of hazards analysis and risk assessment methods to serve most of a safety and health professional's needs. This chapter explores what a hazard analysis is; discusses how a hazard analysis is extended into a risk assessment; outlines the steps to be followed in conducting a hazard analysis and a risk assessment; includes descriptions of several commonly used risk assessment techniques; and gives examples of risk assessment matrices.
10. THREE- AND FOUR-DIMENSIONAL RISK SCORING SYSTEMS
For risk assessments, the practice—broadly—is to establish qualitative risk levels by considering only two dimensions. They are probability of event occurrence, and the severity of harm or damage that could result. However, systems now in use may be three or four dimensional. This chapter reviews several such systems.
A three-dimensional numerical risk scoring system developed by this author to serve the needs of those who prefer to have numbers in their risk assessment systems is presented.
11. HIERARCHIES OF CONTROLS
A hierarchy is a system of persons or things ranked one above the other. Hierarchies of control in Z10.0 and 45001 provide a systematic way of thinking, considering steps in a ranked and sequential order; and an effective way for decision-makers to eliminate or reduce hazards and the risks that derive from them.
Acknowledging the premise—that risk reduction measures should be considered and taken in a prescribed order—represents an important step in the evolution of the practice of safety. A major premise in applying a hierarchy of controls is that the outcome of the actions taken is to be an acceptable risk level.
Requirements in the hierarchies of control in the 45001 and Z10.0 standards are close to the same, but not quite. This is the hierarchy shown in Z10.0: Elimination; Substitution of less-hazardous materials, processes, operations, or equipment; Engineering controls; Warnings; Administrative controls, and Personal protective equipment.
In 45001, the hierarchy is the same, with one important difference: It does not include a Warnings element. In this chapter, comments are made on all of the elements in the Z10.0 standard, giving examples.
12. SAFETY DESIGN REVIEWS
Design Review and Management of Change requirements are addressed jointly in Z10.0. Although the subjects are interrelated, each has its own importance and uniqueness. Guidance on the management of change concept is provided in Chapter 14.
There is no specifically designated section in 45001 titled design, or design requirements or design review. But the standard includes comments similar to the following: management is to have in place processes to identify hazards arising from product and service design and from the design of the work areas.
To do as Z10.0 implies, systems must be in place to avoid, eliminate, reduce, or control hazards and the risks that derive from them: as early as possible and as often as needed in every aspect of the design and redesign processes; and in all phases of operations.
This chapter includes a review of safety through design concepts; comments on how some safety professionals are engaged in the design process; a composite of safety through design procedures in place; A Safety Design Review and Operations Requirements Guide; and a general design safety checklist.
13. PREVENTION THROUGH DESIGN
Several provisions in Z10.0 and 45001 relate to prevention through design concepts. They are Risk Assessments; Design Requirements; Hierarchy of Controls; and Procurement.
Fortunately, an American National Standard exists that provides guidance on the subject. Its designation is ANSI/ASSE Z590.3—2011(R2016) and its title is Prevention through Design: Guidelines for Addressing Occupational Hazards and Risks in Design and Redesign Processes.
This chapter gives a history of the safety through design/prevention through design movement and comments extensively on the continuing activities at the National Institute of Safety and Health on prevention through design; Presents highlights of Z590.3, emphasizing the applicability of the provisions of the standard to all hazards-based initiatives; and encourages safety professionals to become involved in prevention through design for job satisfaction and to be perceived as providing additional value.
14. MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE
Because of this author's belief that management of change should be an important element in an occupational risk management system, a plea is made that readers give particular attention to the requirements for this subject as in Z10.0 and 45001. They both require that management of change processes be in place for the new and the revised. This chapter
Makes the case that having an effective Management of Change System (MOC) in place as a distinct element in a safety and health management system will reduce the potential for injuries, environmental damage, and other forms of damage at all levels of severity.
Cites statistics in support of having effective MOC systems.
Defines the purpose and methodology of a management of change system.
Outlines management of change procedures, keeping in mind the staffing limitations at other than large locations and their need to avoid burdensome paper work.
Provides guidelines on how to initiate and utilize a MOC system.
Emphasizes the significance of communication and training.
Includes examples of six management of change systems in place and provides access to four other real-world MOC systems.
In accord with the emphasis given here to management of change, the requirements in 45001 and Z10.0 are duplicated in their entirety.
15. THE PROCUREMENT PROCESS
Both the Z10.0 and 45001 standards require that what is purchased conforms to the organization's occupational health and safety management system. In reality, the purpose of the procurement process is to avoid bringing hazards and their accompanying risks into the workplace.
To assist safety professionals as they give advice on implementing those provisions, this chapter duplicates the procurement requirements of the standards; comments on prevalent purchasing practices; establishes the significance of the procurement processes; discusses the prework necessary to include safety specifications in the procurement process; provides some resources; comments on available occupational health and safety purchasing specifications; and gives examples of design specifications that become purchasing specifications.
16. EVALUATION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION
In Z10.0, Clause 9.0 contains specific provisions to achieve both a performance evaluation and to establish corrective action mechanisms as is said in its first two bulleted items as follows:
This section defines requirements for processes to
Evaluate the performance of the OHSMS through Monitoring, Measurement, and Assessment, Incident Investigation, and Audits and
Take corrective action when nonconformances, system deficiencies, hazards, and incidents that are not being controlled to an acceptable of risk are found in the OHSMS.
In 45001, the purpose principally of Clause 9 is for performance evaluation. But as is noted in this chapter, the outputs of a management review are to include opportunities for continual improvement; any needed changes to the OH&S management system; and actions if needed.
Having processes for taking corrective action are a requirement of Clause 10 in 45001, the title of which is Improvement.
After introductory material is provided in both chapters, these captions appear: Monitoring, measurement, and assessment in Z10.0 and Monitoring, measurement, analysis and performance evaluation in 45001. Each of the elements required for those subjects are addressed, such as Audits (see Chapter 18); Incident investigation (see Chapter 19).
17. MANAGEMENT REVIEW/IMPROVEMENT
In Z10.0, the title for Clause10.0 is Management Review. Comparable provisions for management reviews in 45001 are in its Clause 9—which is titled Performance evaluation.
In 45001, the title for Clause 10 is Improvement. Provisions for improvement appear throughout Z10.0, but specifically in its Clause 9.0, which is titled Evaluation and Corrective Action. First, the entirety of the requirements of Clause 10 as in 45001 is duplicated. There is a peculiarity in Clause 10 in that incidents are in the same category as nonconformities. It could be argued that incidents are nonconformities. Nevertheless, the requirements of organizations in 45001 when incidents or nonconformities occur are very much the same as for the investigation of worker incidents.
Requirements of Clause 10 in Z10.0 are also duplicated. An emphasis is given to the leadership aspects in the management review.
18. AUDIT REQUIREMENTS
As is the case with every aspect of an organization's endeavors, making periodic reviews of progress with respect to stated goals is good business practice. Stated goals, in this instance, would be to have processes in place that meet the requirements of 45001 or Z10.0.
Internal audit requirements in 45001 are at 9.2 within Clause 9—Performance evaluation. In Z10.0, they are at 9.3 within Clause 9.0—Evaluation and Corrective Action. A composite of their requirements follows.
An organization shall periodically have audits made of its health and safety management system to determine whether the requirements of this standard are implemented and maintained.
To assist safety professionals in crafting or recrafting safety and health audit systems to meet the requirements of Z10.0 or 45001, this chapter establishes the purpose of an audit; discusses the implications of observed hazardous situations; explores management's expectations with respect to audits; establishes that safety auditors are also being audited during the audit process; comments on auditor qualifications; discusses the need to have safety and health management system audit guides relate to the hazards and risks in the operations at the location being audited; provides information and resources for the development of suitable audit guides.
It is made clear that the Principle Purpose of a Safety Audit: To Improve the Safety Culture.
19. INCIDENT INVESTIGATION
Incident investigation in 45001 is addressed in Clause 10 Improvement. Within Clause 10, Section 10.2 is titled Incident, nonconformity, and corrective action. Duplication of the entirety of Clause 10 as in 45001 appears in Chapter 17.
In this chapter, all of the requirements for incident investigation as in Z10.0 are shown, expectations of management on incident investigation in Z10.0 are pretty much the same as the requirements in 45001.
Comments on this author's research on incident investigation are a large part of this chapter. An introduction to those comments was given in Chapter 7, Innovations in Serious Injury, Illness, and Fatality Prevention.
20. INCIDENT CAUSATION MODELS
As safety professionals participate in determining causal and contributing factors for an incident, they are applying their adopted causation model. Their models relate to what they have learned and their beliefs concerning how accidents happen. For effectiveness, an organization must have adopted a causation model that gets to the reality of risk-based causal factors. Stellar performance in incident investigation cannot be achieved otherwise.
Unfortunately, there are too many causation models. This chapter defines the requirements for a causation model; establishes that a safety professional who gives counsel on incident investigations has an adopted causation model; gives causation model categories; comments on several causation models; emphasizes the transition taking place whereby safety professionals are encouraged to explore the management system shortcomings that are the sources of human errors (unsafe acts); comments on the significance of inadequacies in barriers and controls as causal factors; and gives resources related to causal factors.
Recommendations are made for safety professionals to acquire knowledge of The Five Why Problem-Solving Technique; MORT—The Management Oversight and Risk Tree; and James Reason's Swiss Cheese Model.
21. THE FIVE WHY PROBLEM-SOLVING TECHNIQUE
This author has noted that the quality of incident investigations, even in some very large organizations, is significantly less than stellar. Yet incident investigation is a vital element within an operational risk management system. For a first step forward to improve on incident investigation, I promote adoption of the five why problem-solving technique, with emphasis.
