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- Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
- Kategorie: Wissenschaft und neue Technologien
- Sprache: Englisch
Delivering Safety Excellence Discover how to overcome a culture of inadequately addressing risk and thereby achieve safe working practices from a leader in the field Delivering Safety Excellence: Engagement Culture At Every Level provides an in-depth and practical overview of how to energize frontline employees, supervisors, managers, and leaders to overcome and solve regularly occurring safety concerns. The book teaches readers how to resolve dysfunctional safety cultures by engaging employees at all levels. This cross functional engagement culture regularly builds safe and effective working practices that eliminate regulatory, financial, and personal risk shortfalls while encouraging profitability and efficiency. The distinguished author shows how culture improvement processes and models can be utilized to improve the performance all across an organization. The material is presented in dialogue format using case studies to highlight the relationship between the concepts discussed and their application in the real world. You'll discover how to implement real solutions in industries of all types and in organizations of all sizes using practical and concrete strategies tested by the author in regions and varying cultures around the world. Readers will also benefit from the inclusion of: * A thorough introduction to rapidly resolving the many common deficiencies in safety culture, including scarce regulatory and cultural materials and a lack of support, trust, and credibility for safety officers * Practical discussions of how urgency can obstruct a consistent culture of safety, performance, and prudence * Explorations of behavior-based safety, the injury plateau, the Occupational Health and Safety Act, and a dynamic model of safety weaknesses that lead to injuries Perfect for safety officers at all levels of organizations of any size, Delivering Safety Excellence: Engagement Culture At Every Level will also earn a place in the libraries of executives, managers, leaders, supervisors, and employees who seek a one-stop reference for how to build a safe and profitable company.
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Table of Contents
Cover
Title Page
Copyright
Acknowledgements
Author Biography
List of Figures
Preface
Prologue
Note
Introduction
Part I
1 The Funeral
Notes
2 No Support for Safety
3 The Tyranny of the Urgent
4 No Pay for Safety
Note
5 Weak Culture Miseries
6 Injury Plateau
Limitations of Safety Observation Sampling
Note
7 A Brief Safety History
8 Beyond Accident Reaction
Note
Part II
9 Safety Culture Beginnings
Notes
10 More Safety Culture
10.1 Background for Culture Improvement
10.2 Human Interaction Realities
11 Active Resistance
12 Zero Injuries
13 How Long?
13.1 POP Statement
13.2 Action Item Matrix (AIM)
13.3 Workers' Compensation Carrier Claim Processing Procedure
14 World‐Class Safety
Note
15 Watch Out
15.1 Setting Priorities
15.2 Management Reluctance to Be Involved
15.3 Regulatory Audits
15.4 Team Inclusiveness
15.5 The Importance of Good Data and a Solid Improvement Process
15.6 The Need for a Challenging Time Line
15.7 Urgency Followed by Complacency
15.8 Series or Parallel Problem Attack Process
15.9 The Importance of Viable Metrics
Note
Part III
16 Moving Forward to Safety Culture Excellence
Note
17 The Critical Safety Steering Team
18 The RIW Process
18.1 Rapid Improvement Workshop Teams
18.2 Delivering a Better Safety Performance
19 Fundamentals That Are a Result of Developing a Culture of Safety Excellence
Note
20 Communication and Recognition
20.1 Encouraging Positive Behavior
Notes
21 Hazard Recognition Is Different than Hazard Control
21.1 The Common Threads
21.2 Overestimating Personal Capabilities
21.3 Complacency – Familiarity with the Task
21.4 Safety Warnings – the Severity of the Outcome
21.5 Voluntary Actions and Being in Control of Them
21.6 Personal Experience with an Outcome
21.7 Cost of Noncompliance
21.8 Overconfidence in the Equipment
21.9 Overconfidence in Protection and Rescue
21.10 Potential Profit and Gain from Action
21.11 Role Models Accepting Risk
Note
22 The Trap of Complacency
Epilogue
A The History of the Continuous Excellence Performance (CEP)/Zero Incident Performance (ZIP) Process
B The Railroad Study by Petersen and Bailey
Using Behavioral Techniques to Improve Safety Program Effectiveness
B.1 MR Study of Safety Program Effectiveness
B.2 Railroad I
B.3 Railroad II
B.4 Railroad III
B.5 Railroad IV
Appendix 1: Sample – Chart Used for Analysis on One of the Study Railroads
Appendix 2: Sample – Chart Used for Analysis on One of the Study Railroads
Appendix 3: Sample – Chart Used for Analysis on One of the Study Railroads
Appendix 4: Sample – Chart Used for Analysis on One of the Study Railroads
Appendix 5: Sample – Chart Used for Analysis on One of the Study Railroads
Appendix 6: Total Response – 20 Categories – 4 Railroads
Appendix 7: Comparison of Positive Responses by Category – 4 Railroads
Appendix 8: Comparison of Training Results – 4 Railroads
Appendix 9: Positive Recognition Training Outline
Appendix 10: Assessment Questions Used by Supervisors
Appendix 11: Analysis of Responses to Pilot Survey Questionnaires for Railroads I and II. Source: Based on American association of railroads
C The Charter Document
C.1 Process and Objectives (Outcomes)
C.2 Scope and Authority
C.3 Roles and Responsibilities
C.4 Team Member Representation
C.5 Team Safety Department Representative
C.6 Voting and Quorum
C.7 Team Member Service
C.8 Team Leader Service
C.9 Selection of Team Leader
C.10 Meeting Frequency
C.11 Recordkeeping
C.12 Communication
C.13 Team Learning Plan
C.14 Annual Review of POP Statement (Purpose Objective Process) and Team Charter
C.15 Measurables
C.16 Effective Team Norms
C.17 Steering Team Member Training
C.18 Continuous Improvement Team Management
C.19 Continuous Improvement Topics
Index
End User License Agreement
List of Tables
Appendix B
Table B.1 Twenty category summary of safety program differences.
List of Illustrations
Chapter 1
Figure 1.1 Work on the job site.
Chapter 2
Figure 2.1 Action item matrix.
Chapter 3
Figure 3.1 The ROI matrix.
Chapter 7
Figure 7.1 Heinrich accident pyramid.
Figure 7.2 Enhanced accident pyramid.
Figure 7.3 Safety management categories.
Figure 7.4 Building a safety culture.
Chapter 8
Figure 8.1 Accident reaction cycle.
Chapter 9
Figure 9.1 Six criteria for safety excellence.
Chapter 10
Figure 10.1 Six levels of safety.
Figure 10.2 Results by category.
Chapter 11
Figure 11.1 Four required business standards.
Figure 11.2 The comfort zone concept with respect to operating within busine...
Figure 11.3 The buffer zone concept with respect to operating within busines...
Figure 11.4 Amount of flexibility for a teenager with respect to family stan...
Figure 11.5 Safety regulations fit well inside safety culture standard limit...
Chapter 12
Figure 12.1 Safety journey.
Chapter 13
Figure 13.1 Recordable injury frequency chart.
Figure 13.2 Purpose Outcomes Process.
Figure 13.3 POP statement: CI inspection team.
Figure 13.4 Action item matrix.
Figure 13.5 Workers' compensation carrier claim processing procedure.
Figure 13.6 AIM team tracking.
Figure 13.7 The classic requirements for having a fire.
Figure 13.8 Requirements for having a culture of operational excellence.
Chapter 14
Figure 14.1 Accountability: World‐class vs. traditional.
Chapter 15
Figure 15.1 Past to future recordable incident rate.
Figure 15.2 Lagging indicators.
Chapter 16
Figure 16.1 Why injuries happen.
Figure 16.2 A process to achieve safety culture excellence.
Chapter 18
Figure 18.1 Four Ws for forming a team.
Figure 18.2 Rapid improvement workshop.
Figure 18.3 Tools used by CI teams.
Chapter 19
Figure 19.1 Accountability model.
Figure 19.2 Accountability measurement model.
Chapter 20
Figure 20.1 Safe behavior recognition.
Chapter 21
Figure 21.1 Perception and tolerance model.
Chapter 22
Figure 22.1 Lagging indicators.
Appendix B
Figure B.1 Summary of injuries per million man‐hours worked in Industry show...
Figure B.2 Differences in approaches to safety programming. In practice, mos...
Figure B.3 Initial study group photo.
Figure B.4 Discussion group on human behavioral factors.
Figure B.5 Pilot survey questions discussion.
Figure B.6 Minnesota graduate students.
Figure B.7 The percentage of unsafe acts observed in the “baseline” period b...
Guide
Cover Page
Table of Contents
Begin Reading
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Delivering Safety Excellence
Engagement Culture at Every Level
Michael M. Williamsen, PhD
Cobden, IL, USA
cultureoddysey.com
This edition first published 2021© 2021 John Wiley & Sons Inc.
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Acknowledgements
Katy Crane, an original owner of CoreMedia developed a friendship with Dr. Dan Petersen which led to my joining CoreMedia with her when they needed a replacement for then retiring Dr. Dan. Katy also started the drive to focus on safety culture and thus was one of the pioneers in this important field of safety performance excellence.
Tim Crane, my former partner and close and intense friend in CoreMedia. Because of Tim's leadership CoreMedia had the vision of beginning a safety culture consulting business unit. He also continued to fund the effort as well as push innovation and IT solutions for this new venture even in times of severe business uncertainty and cash flow struggles.
Brad Cosgrove was the CoreMedia, and later global manufacturing company, graphics technician. His innovation, skill, and perseverance kept us on the forward edge of graphics excellence.
David Crouch was one of my former managers at the global manufacturing company. David went through a similar effort to write his first book. His guidance and encouragement to my efforts were of great value to me.
Andy Schneider was the corporate global manager of safety for the entire worldwide company. Over the years Andy did an incredible job of working with the company's more than 500 worldwide manufacturing sites to reduce injuries. As the organization plateaued at a RIF of about 1, Andy searched for a company to buy that concentrated on safety culture excellence. Thank you, Andy, for bringing our small team on board and challenging and supporting our unique safety culture approach worldwide.
Aaron Janisko was a safety manger leader who has spent untold hours with me discussing and developing safety excellence under very difficult circumstances. Aaron is one of many such caring, engaged, intense safety professionals our team and I have had the pleasure of working with over the years. They have helped our process, and we in turn have helped their performance. It has been an incredible journey for all of us.
Dave Fennell is a recently retired Exxon Mobile Imperial Oil safety manager in Alberta Canada. Dave was one of the first safety professionals to embrace Dr. Dan Petersen's cultural approach to achieving safety excellence. Dave has been a good friend and a safety culture innovator for as long as I can remember. The risk tolerance material is all his.
Erik Williamsen, my son, did all the OCR (Optical Character Recognition) software conversion for Dr. Charles Bailey's Railroad Study booklet. The only surviving copy I could find of this embryonic safety culture work was a photocopy of the original book. It was barely legible, yet Erik spent hours doing the conversions of the text and excel graphics materials which now appear in the appendix of this book.
Mark Mays, a close friend from our days when our family lived in Colorado. Mark has deep interest and academic course work in creative writing along with an interest in writing a book. During a ski trip in Colorado, blizzard conditions snowed us in for three days giving us the time and venue to outline this book. Mark's ongoing critiques of my many drafts were of significant importance to my being able to finish this work.
John Busch, has had a broad professional career in teaching, research, and government service, including being the Chairman of Engineering at LeTourneau University in Longview, Texas. Dr. Busch edited my doctoral dissertation and thus insured its first pass acceptance with no changes by the dissertation committee of Columbia Southern University in Orange Coast, Alabama. John more recently spent many hours helping me with the final editing polishes necessary to get this book accepted by the publisher, John Wiley and Sons.
Raelee Williamsen, my wife of 50+ years and her brother Tom, who lives with us on our small farm, keep the television and radio on until 10 p.m. most nights. In turn, this provides the necessary incentive for me to move out to my man cave office in the barn and do the many hours of work necessary to complete this book.
Domino, our cat who walks around the farm with me in the dark after my day is done. I get solace from this furry friend.
Author Biography
Michael M. Williamsen has a BS in chemical engineering from the University of California, Berkeley; MBA from California State University Hayward, California; and PhD in business – dissertation topic: “How to Accomplish Organizational Turnarounds” – from Columbia Southern University, Orange Coast, Alabama. Certified Safety Professional (CSP). Since graduating from Cal, Dr. Williamsen has worked as a turnaround specialist with a number of small, medium, and large organizations throughout the world that were in trouble in one or more of their functionalities. Over the years the many experiences have helped him to originate and document a cadre of materials which have proven to be effective in developing a culture of interactive engaged employees and managers. The result is a vigorous culture in which the frontline people relentlessly solve their own problems by themselves with their own resources. In addition, these problem solvers have effectively taught and passed on the attitudes and skills learned within their companies and beyond.
List of Figures
Figure 1.1
Work on the job site.
Figure 2.1
Action item matrix.
Figure 3.1
The ROI matrix.
Figure 7.1
Heinrich accident pyramid.
Figure 7.2
Enhanced accident pyramid.
Figure 7.3
Safety management categories.
Figure 7.4
Building a safety culture.
Figure 8.1
Accident reaction cycle.
Figure 9.1
Six criteria for safety excellence.
Figure 10.1
Six levels of safety.
Figure 10.2
Results by category.
Figure 11.1
Four required business standards.
Figure 11.2
The comfort zone concept with respect to operating within business standards.
Figure 11.3
The buffer zone concept with respect to operating within business standards.
Figure 11.4
Amount of flexibility for a teenager with respect to family standards for behaviors.
Figure 11.5
Safety regulations fit well inside safety culture standard limits.
Figure 12.1
Safety journey.
Figure 13.1
Recordable injury frequency chart.
Figure 13.2
Purpose Outcomes Process.
Figure 13.3
POP statement: CI inspection team.
Figure 13.4
Action item matrix.
Figure 13.5
Workers' compensation carrier claim processing procedure.
Figure 13.6
AIM team tracking.
Figure 13.7
The classic requirements for having a fire.
Figure 13.8
Requirements for having a culture of operational excellence.
Figure 14.1
Accountability: World‐class vs. traditional.
Figure 15.1
Past to future recordable incident rate.
Figure 15.2
Lagging indicators.
Figure 16.1
Why injuries happen.
Figure 16.2
A process to achieve safety culture excellence.
Figure 18.1
Four Ws for forming a team.
Figure 18.2
Rapid improvement workshop.
Figure 18.3
Tools used by CI teams.
Figure 19.1
Accountability model.
Figure 19.2
Accountability measurement model.
Figure 20.1
Safe behavior recognition.
Figure 21.1
Perception and tolerance model.
Figure 22.1
Lagging indicators.
Figure B.1
Summary of injuries per million man‐hours worked in Industry showing continued rise despite implementation of the OSHAct In 1970. Source: Based on National safety council.
Figure B.2
Differences in approaches to safety programming. In practice, most safety programs contain elements of more than one approach. Assumption tested was that movement by a company toward a behavior‐based approach would enhance safety program effectiveness.
Figure B.3
Initial study group photo.
Figure B.4
Discussion group on human behavioral factors.
Figure B.5
Pilot survey questions discussion.
Figure B.6
Minnesota graduate students.
Figure B.7
The percentage of unsafe acts observed in the “baseline” period before training began ranged anywhere from 25 to 38% (left bar). The chart graphically illustrates the effect produced by positive reinforcement training on the experimental (E) divisions. Little change can be seen after six months on the control (C) divisions whose supervisors received no training.
Preface
The book teaches the use of in‐depth, practical processes that enable frontline function people solve day‐to‐day weaknesses and dysfunctional culture problems in an organization. The author and his associates have tested and proven these culture improvement models and approaches in multiple industries worldwide. In the book's text each of the culture improvement processes and models are analyzed and worked through to conclusion. The solution is presented in dialogue format using case study snippets discussed between the author as the senior consultant and the organization's employees and leadership involved with the troubling issue that faces them. The case study snippets are from the author and his staff's actual experiences that have occurred in a spectrum of industries and organizations across the United States, Canada, Mexico, South America, Europe, Africa, Middle East, Australia, and India.
This book is different from others written about culture improvement. Every chapter has documented examples of challenging real world problems solved by actual frontline employees using simple effective tools that engage other employees in their group. These real examples are like the majority of workplace problems facing frontline employees on a regular day‐to‐day basis.
As you read this book you will encounter colloquial words and phrases with which you may not be familiar. There is a Glossary of definitions for these terms available to you by going online to this book's landing page in wiley.com.
Prologue
A while back a friend sent in the following thought‐provoking question: “Do you see a reduced need for safety professionals in the future while considering the huge ongoing tech advances in the industry that could greatly affect the need and actions of present and future safety professionals? Examples include: robotics, drones, automation, employees using smart phones to capture hazards and send in reports, wearable devices that monitor a worker's health conditions and physical exertion, etc. With this tsunami of change, consider how technology is disrupting so many fields and causing job losses, e.g. trucking in the future with driverless trucks, delivery drones replacing drivers, robotic welding replacing welders, etc., how might this affect future safety professionals?”
One thing we can always count on in life is change. And with change comes transformation. Consider how the safety profession began in earnest with the Triangle Shirtwaist factory disaster back in 1911 (see Chapter 1). At that point in time there were no laws, or standards, or safety professionals. Then in the 1970s all the regulations and bureaucracies associated with OSHA caused another huge change in what safety was and how it is practiced. In the meantime, we have seen the rise and fall of behavior‐based safety (BBS) and then the initiation of safety accountabilities and safety culture. Through it all we have transformed the way we work in order to protect others. And now our future seems to include many changes through the tech innovations mentioned and many more.
These changes bring to mind Moore's Law: Technically, Moore's law is the observation that the number of transistors in a dense integrated circuit doubles approximately every two years. The observation is named after Gordon Moore, the co‐founder of Fairchild Semiconductor and Intel, whose 1965 paper described a doubling every year in the number of components per integrated circuit, and projected this rate of growth would continue for at least another decade. Since then, the term Moore's Law has been applied to other industries as an intentional generalization to describe the significant technology explosions occurring in many fields in addition to integrated circuits. These significant advances/changes will likewise require associated advances in the development and application of robust techniques for improving safety. Although we are no longer producing nearly as many (of what some would consider) obsolete technology products, there is always the need for the fundamentals of safety: such as regulations, PPE (Personal Protective Equipment), and the like including the continued development and application of safety fundamentals.
Newer technologies bring new challenges to other associated cultures such as human relations, training, industrial safety, and much more. The generational changes that come with a Moore's Law society also affect how we live and what we do as the older generations are continually replaced by younger generations. There are, and will be, foundational safety challenges that must continually be addressed. There will also be all kinds of new challenging safety issues with: electronic and chemical processing, nanotechnology, healthcare, robotic utilization, drone usage, biological safety, security enforcement, etc. The continuing tech upheaval does, and will, change what goes on in the field. As we look to the future, safety professionals, if they want to continue to protect employees, will need to adjust to the changes impacting our frontline production and society. A part of this future will be the need for safety documentation and accountability, and safety culture excellence which may very well be something challenging for younger generations to grasp. This newer generation has many people who have had far less practical experience than the older generations who grew up in a more “mechanical,” hands on culture, which taught them the importance of personal safety, sometimes through the “school of hard knocks” and associated “ouch factors.”
The need for safety professionals will still be an integral part of our world's future and a part of many ongoing transformations. Just as our profession has transformed from 1911 to now, it will continue to transform with technological advancements. Different skill sets, technical knowledge, and cultural approaches will continuously be required. There will be a new kind of safety professional required to meet the demands of an ever safer future with technology implementation. This is just like the truth that there have been huge changes in the skill sets, talents, and abilities of safety professionals now compared to when our profession was launched more than 100 years ago. Fortunately for this next generation of safety professionals, we all stand on the shoulders of those who have gone before us; we do not have to reinvent what they did. Looking back at the last 100+ years of our safety profession accomplishments this has always been the case. The safety profession will not go away, but we will have to significantly adjust and transform to the tsunami of technological change.1
How to go about this required transformation is the object of this book.
Much of the story line is anecdotal. However, it is also all based on real people and real happenings the author has experienced during his career of culture turnarounds for troubled organizations. The models contained in this book are meant to be thought provoking. There is underlying research behind them, but mostly they are the result of practical experiences of working with people who then begin to engage their own talents to identify the difficulties surrounding day‐to‐day life on and off the job and create needed improvements. There are some quotes from famous people including Albert Einstein, H.W. Heinrich, and Dr. Dan Petersen. However, they are not footnoted as this is a practical application book, not a text book. The author's objective has been to provide easily understandable visuals and context which will inspire hourly and salaried leaders to engage in and improve a culture that fixes problems and does not rely solely on fundamental initiatives which plateau way too soon (level 1 and level 2 tools explained later in this book, see Chapter 10). The author hopes this practical approach provides the inspiration, thought‐provocative material, and tools for you to go beyond a reactive condition solution mindset and into personal accountabilities and responsibilities. This different kind of safety tool set will assist you and your fellow workers to apply the efforts necessary to achieve a zero incident/zero at risk activity safety culture mindset and its resultant performance. The reader is encouraged to dig deeper into the works of these and other respected people. Indeed, all the material in this book has been presented at numerous global conferences, and thus is documented on the Web. As is common to professions, this same material has then been modified (and sometimes improved) by others. As you see items of interest to you, e.g. training, look at the reference provided and then expand your search to get a look at the greater depth that exists and is constantly changing. The information is out there and in this book, all you have to do is let it in as it applies to your individual interests and needs.
May you both enjoy and benefit from this work.
Sincerely, “The Doc”
Note
1
Industrial Safety & Hygiene News, September, 2017, Vol 51, No. 9, p. 88.
Introduction
While I (the author, Mike Williamsen, PhD) was growing up my Papa was an hourly welder in the shipyards. At the end of each day he was bone tired and sometimes injured. I remember his wrist surgery, back surgery and a day when he went to an eye doctor who used a magnet to remove some weld slag from his eye. I never remember him complaining and yet his work‐related difficulties made an impression on me. My mom and Papa lived through The Depression together. They never went to college, but both had the superb work ethic they needed to survive the many difficulties of their era. After I got a degree in chemical engineering from the University of California, I went to work in a petroleum refinery and then in an agricultural chemical facility. One of the important lessons I learned in the field of chemical engineering was the approach of focusing on Unit Operations. In both the classes and laboratories we focused on an individual unit operation, e.g. heating, pumping, distillation, etc., and then tried to optimize all the steps used in that process/unit operation. The unit operation analogy in safety could be something like how to be safe while working at heights, painting, lifting, handling hazardous chemicals, etc.
During my second job after graduation I discovered my interest lay in management rather than research or design. My wife agreed for me to go back to school and get an MBA thus better preparing me to go into the management ranks. My post MBA industrial life became one of turnaround work for the various organizations and industries who employed me. In one industry I was in charge of manufacturing engineering for a Fortune 20 company. In this role I was enjoying the endless challenges of working with plant and headquarters personnel as our small Continuous Improvement (CI/kaizen) teams significantly improved uptime and productivity for the 40 facilities I supported across the United States. In this role I made sure each small team used the unit operations approach of focusing on a single process such as: baking, frying, drive trains, logistics, and the like, and optimizing each step used in that particular process.
Suddenly one Tuesday my boss, Tom, told me about a fatality which had just occurred at one of the facilities. As two senior vice presidents were about to enter the plant, a lady violated a cardinal safety rule and entered an operating crane bay. While focused on her clean up tasks, the crane cycled and crushed this 38‐year‐old mother of three young children. The entire corporation was shocked. As they looked into their records they confirmed an even more shocking history of fatalities, dismemberments, and other serious injuries, which in the past had seemingly been accepted as injuries being an inevitable part of the manufacturing culture. Management prided themselves in being number one in their industry with respect to cost, quality, and customer service, and yet we were in the bottom third of our industry worldwide when it came to injury statistics. A decision had been made at the top that safety would become a measurable, compensable metric for management along with all the traditional measures of cost, quality, and customer service. That decision included that the safety metric must be brought up to world‐class performance just like the others which were tracked. At issue was the fact that over the years upper management continually emphasized the company was a fun place to work. If this were so, the killing and maiming of employees must stop. After all, it was the frontline employees who produced the product which paid all of our salaries. With that crescendo, it had been decided I was to be in charge of safety for the corporation (of course in addition to my regular manufacturing engineering duties and at no additional pay). There were no restrictions on me or what it cost to accomplish this strategic goal of becoming world class in safety performance, though no one could define what world class was.
What a challenge: 10 000 manufacturing employees, 40 facilities strung across the United States, no safety staff anywhere, and only a reactive approach to the latest injury, no matter how serious it might be. I remember thinking “What am I doing in this role? I am an engineering manager, not a safety guy!” As I talked this over with my Papa one night, I distinctly got the vision I was embarking on a journey to save and improve the quality of lives of the likes of him and my mom. And I was all in!
The next steps included a series of jobs to practice all the background learnings I had absorbed, and then I met up with a small family owned company in Oregon, CoreMedia Training Solutions. And the safety journey to a “culture of correct” (developing an organization that lived a sustainable safety excellence commitment) shifted into high gear. As this safety culture engagement excellence process matured, another organization desired to use our tools in developing safety culture engagement excellence on a global scale. That far larger company purchased our very small family owned company and we became employees of a global Fortune 50 heavy industry manufacturer. This sequence of events brings to mind a recent YouTube video on the consequences of how our small, personal acts of kindness and engagement can have far‐reaching effects on others whom we never knew our interactions affected. This message was presented as a metaphor about a person dropping a pebble into a pond and then watching the ceaseless ripples go out, with unknown impact into the unknown surroundings.
As I think about the number of people who have dropped pebbles into my pond, I am amazed how I was affected way beyond what was originally intended by the person dropping the pebble. Early on was a boss I worked for while attending graduate school. I was at a decision point to scrap a long planned graduation vacation with my wife, or go directly into the workforce and make money. I calculated all the financial ramifications and going to work looked very tempting. John, my boss at the time, then talked to me about a metaphorical high paying career of endlessly cracking eggs while sitting in a corner. He contrasted this high paying, mind‐numbing job with seeking out what would deliver a lesser paying career in a field, which would bring personal satisfaction and not just more money. The vacation my wife and I took brought a personal experience and bonding that the extra money could never have delivered. The lesson in the trade off of more money versus a more satisfying personal life experience for the two of us and for our children has replayed (rippled) itself numerous times over the years.
Years later, Dr. Dan Petersen dropped his pebbles in my pond about the importance of culture and accountabilities in developing excellent safety performance for an organization. About the same time, other people in my life dropped some more pebbles in my pond related to creative problem‐solving, continuous improvement, team excellence, and action item matrices. These ripples combined and resulted in the development of a safety culture excellence process that the Fortune 50 heavy industry manufacturer now uses worldwide, which, in turn, has helped to eliminate tens of thousands of serious injuries.
As a result of these people going out of their way to cause caring ripples in my life, I have had numerous opportunities to drop pebbles on how to deliver safety culture performance excellence with safety personnel and associated executives across our planet. Not surprisingly, the desire to help other people, as influential people have helped me, has provided many benefits for my many acquaintances. In turn, they have delivered on their personal desires to spread ripples of learning, way beyond mere safety‐related issues, to many other people.
There are numerous others who have sent both pleasurable and painful ripples into my life. Getting to the point then, what pebbles can you drop into the huge pond of life, which will ripple out over time, to improve the lives of the masses of known, unknown and unseen others? That is the purpose of this book you are about to read (and I hope both enjoy and benefit from).
Part I
1The Funeral
Aaron is physically sick to his stomach as he attends the funeral of a 37 year employee who fell to his death at work on the weekend. As he stands just behind the tearful widow, Aaron and his fellow employees are equally in tears. This was their close friend who was known for a good work ethic, reliability and friendship. Aaron, the organization's new safety manager, could see it coming with a Recordable Injury Frequency (RIF)1of >10 for more than a decade, and yet the company leadership just kept doing the same thing and hoping for different results. Aaron's day only gets worse as he feels the guilt of living in a sick culture of denial that has now taken the life of a good friend.
Do you ever experience something that is wrong, something that you try to hide? To some extent we all do! Personally, an experience such as this brings to mind recently working in a third‐world country with a “challenged” work environment, while also traveling with family members after the work assignment. There were many excellent sights, people, sounds, and events wherever the vacation travels took us. And yet we experienced multiple troubles as well. While viewing a raging, dangerous river in a remote village the guide, Dalmiro, related that this was the location of a significant international extreme kayak event each year. Dalmiro then revealed that besides the boulders there was an added, hidden danger; the village of 10 000 or so people had no wastewater treatment and all the raw sewage was also a “secret” part of the raging river!
This “secret” comment brought to mind the story of a family member and her childhood obstinacy about eating certain foods. She hated hamburgers and refused to eat them. Her parents would “park” her at the table until she finished her meal. However, acting like the child she was, she crossed her arms and pouted. When her parents left the table, she would toss the meat behind the refrigerator and after a while call out to say she was done. All were happy as long as the subterfuge continued. One day her father cleaned behind the fridge, and the deception came to an end.
Unfortunately many people in the safety profession have experienced organizations which have hidden the ugly, rotten, stinking truth about their culture of employee injuries. The subterfuge works for a while and then……
Give some thought to your personal and organizational circumstances. In the long run there is no escape from reality. You cannot hide the truth because untruths will eventually be revealed. Let us be ethical in all we do; you shall know the truth and the truth shall set you free. The upper management approach of Aaron's organization of hiding injuries was living in denial. Their solution to injuries was to send injured workers to Employee Relations (ER) for a multi‐month review to see if punishment was warranted. This was truly counterproductive in many ways. Rather than focusing on what we all can do to eliminate a similar event from happening in the future, there were no reports of lessons learned, or issues resolved by searching out and identifying the actual blame. Additionally, the union and management both came to the same tragedy enabling conclusion – which was a lack of support for safety, and a lip service only approach to an understaffed safety department, eliminates trust and credibility. This denial approach only adds to the problem culture which continues to deliver the next series of painful injuries. Additionally, even if things do improve, beware, the lack of trust legacy hangs on for years. Our hourly and salaried people do not forget or forgive easily. Aaron has noticed that when there is an injury or mistake, there is always a contingent of the employees, at all levels, who immediately go back to the old paradigm of blame and shame. This included the ER function which was comfortable with the search for blame, and the potential for punishment. Change does not come easily.
The classic control, passive aggressive, old school challenges normally exist in these situations, and in other departments as well. Aaron's solution needs to not become angry, vindictive, or to go behind management's back. Rather, Aaron will have to persevere in upholding his values and his responsibility to do the right things that are effective in helping to resolve the safety and interpersonal issues. A part of this approach will require him to carry on a dialogue with the new incoming chief executive officer (CEO) and his staff. Aaron must use this method if he is to get them to support his desired approach to develop root cause solutions and a subsequent culture that includes a sustainable safety excellence commitment dedicated to significantly reducing injuries and associated incidents. It is no surprise that about 90% of these injuries happen in the operations group. As a result, Aaron will need to develop a solid adult‐to‐adult relationship with the operations hourly and salaried leadership personnel. Considering the history of the company, making such a turnaround in relationship excellence will not come easily. You will need slow and steady perseverance, Aaron.
After the funeral, Aaron is back at work and pulls out a report written by “the Doc,” a consultant he hired to interview more than 100 hourly and salaried personnel in Aaron's organization of more than 1000 employees. The report refers to honest one‐on‐one input from the whole range of hourly through salaried employees who discussed their organization's safety and morale truths with the Doc. The employees did not rip and tear during the process, but they were brutally honest in their confidential comments. Aaron hurts as he reads and digests these painfully honest and ugly facts that he and others shared as inputs about their sick safety culture.
Aaron sits at his desk head in hand with disturbing thoughts going through his brain that: nothing is good, just another day/set of injuries to read and evaluate with no support for himself being the safety manager. Aaron is the leader of a small safety department which has a ½ administrative assistant time allocation, one safety resource up from the ranks, and two safety trainers, one of whom is on the ropes for his poor performance in other departments that got him transferred (hidden) to safety.
What kind of day lies ahead? Good = no injuries, or bad = one or more injuries. Aaron is up from the ranks. He knows the people requiring his injury investigations, and it mentally and physically pains him to do so. The company has been in business for more than 70 years and is one of the top 25 in the North American continent when measured by sales volume. For these same 25 entities they are 12th in size, but number 24 in injury rate with only an independent offshore business operation being worse.
As typical to industry, management gets paid on results for cost, customer service, and uptime. The company has had no fatalities or disabling injuries for quite a few years. As a result, the just retired CEO left a weak safety department and associated weak safety culture. They are complacent and multiple years behind what industry leaders are doing to prevent injuries. The safety Recordable Injury Frequency (RIF) has been greater than 10 for more than a decade. The former CEO's legacy approach for an injury was: a quick injury investigation; a secret report sent to Employee Relations (ER); followed by a secret and protracted/lengthy analysis as to what kind of punishment should be given to the injured employee as a result of any perceived negligence.
Aaron remembers a recent safety article that used the phrase Paradigm Paralysis. The focus of the article was a complaint about the tendency we all have of using old (and outdated) approaches to solve current problems. As Aaron reads the blog article he reminisces about a war hero acquaintance, Tom, talking about his career in the armed forces. Tom's observation referenced military leadership's oft‐used approach of employing the same tactics for the next war that they used in the last war. Tom's conclusion was that this approach just does not lead to optimum performance, in war – or in safety.
Our safety profession history began in 1911 with a disastrous, multiple life‐ending tragedy at a New York garment manufacturing sweat shop (Triangle Shirtwaist Factory fire). Over the ensuing years “we” have experienced all kinds of research, regulations, techniques, technologies, leadership, education, training, and the like. Much of this information (but not all) has moved us to better downstream indicator safety performance.
Talking with past generation safety people, there is often a great reluctance to try new safety concepts that are outside of their experience comfort zones, ergo, Paradigm Paralysis. Certainly, the foundational approaches which have been developed in the past 100 years still apply. And yet, this decade's safety performance plateau is not satisfactory. We must relentlessly pursue better techniques and tools to eliminate the possibility/probability of injuries/incidents.
Our current war on injuries and incidents is being fought by a new generation with new cultures, different workplaces, and a myriad of other differences from what the older generations experienced. We must be open to considering and trying new approaches which can help us win the important safety battles that face us now and in the future. And yet government and some industry safety bureaucracies seem to often stick to the use of regulations followed by punishment as the predominate model with respect to safety improvement. In truth, a very conservative approach is influenced/hindered by the “standard practice” approach that is greatly influenced (hamstrung) by the litigious nature of society, i.e. not trying something out of the ordinary in order to minimize lawsuits! Such, “Standard Practice” cultures built on conservative tradition can be VERY difficult to change.
Since the 1970s' Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) became law, OSHA has tried a number of approaches in an effort to improve safety in the United States:
The regulations have set a foundational standard that has definite merit.
The punishment by legal fines structure got some corporate attention, but it has led to a negotiating game which does not have its focus on improving safety, merely negotiating cost.
Unannounced on‐site inspections have had little to no discernible impact on personnel safety rates. It appears that OSHA inspectors, with little in‐depth knowledge of a company's real hazards, lack credibility and instead often deliver derision.
The Voluntary Protection Program (VPP)
2
system had merit, as it focused on assisting those who were seemingly serious, to improve their regulations compliance.
The shame and blame approach only seems to anger the guilty, while adding glee to the segment that revels in a seeming punishment to corporate entities.
Untold billions of dollars spent on OSHA have resulted in minimal improvement in personnel safety numbers. The plateau in safety performance is not improving with a “trouble equals government/business leadership punishment” model. A number of safety professionals and managers committed to safety excellence, who have experiences in various industries in multiple countries and cultures, have settled on a better working model. This approach is more along the lines of a safety culture where “trouble equals value added assistance.” Subsequently, if the leadership cannot improve performance when given such assistance, their poor performance leads to a change in leadership.
Details from such innovative accountability‐based safety cultures are revealed in a significant number of large global companies. These organizations have done far better in safety performance by definitely employing manufacturing fundamentals while also improving their safety culture. They have discovered the need to go beyond the “one trick pony regs (regulations) and punishment models.” An easily available search approach would reveal the industries, cultures, and locals which need focused assistance. They are likely the same ones that traditional approach only leaders think are in need of more of some kind of punishment. “High injury rate plateau organizations indicate the beatings will stop when the safety performance improves” model, is not effective in the long run.
OSHA birthed the value‐added regulations fundamentals by copying (and adjusting) the policies, processes, and procedures of companies which were successful in safety. The models that successful companies have used in improving their day‐to‐day safety performance work for the laggards as well. Across the board, engaged safety leadership which goes beyond the necessary strong regulations base drives a safety culture of excellence. It is time to try a similar approach for improving safety cultures by copying and adjusting what has been shown to work and applying this model to those company cultures that are in need of value‐added assistance.
