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- Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
- Kategorie: Wissenschaft und neue Technologien
- Sprache: Englisch
One of the major challenges facing the world today is the interaction between demographic change and development. Demographic Dynamics and Development reviews the dominant demographic theory, demographic transition, and then presents a thorough investigation covering aging, fertility, contraception, nuptiality, mortality and migration, which are all aspects that drive these changes. Each chapter combines the latest empirical data with theoretical reflections on the implications for development. This book thus offers an overview of worldwide demographic data, studied with a view towards development. In doing so, it provides researchers and specialists with clear information through in-depth case studies, focusing on a country, a region or a particularly important scientific sub-theme.
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Seitenzahl: 458
Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2022
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Table of Contents
Cover
Title Page
Copyright
Introduction Demographic Dynamics
I.1. What are demographic dynamics?
I.2. The world population, now a useless concept?
I.3. The double Malthusian progression
I.4. Outine of the book
I.5. References
1 The Demographic Transition
1.1. Introduction
1.2. Genesis of the demographic transition
1.3. World population changes and trends (2019–2100)
1.4. The demographic transition in the world
1.5. The demographic transition in Latin America and the Caribbean
1.6. Conclusion
1.7. References
2 Demographic Dividend and Dependency Ratios
2.1. Introduction
2.2. The dependency ratios, main indicators of the potential of a first demographic dividend
2.3. Sub-Saharan Africa in search of a demographic dividend
2.4. Conclusion
2.5. References
3 From the Demographic Dividend to Generational Economics
3.1. Introduction: transition and demographic dividend, generational economics
3.2. Data and method for calculating the demographic dividend
3.3. Results and discussion
3.4. Conclusion
3.5. Appendix: country and survey year for consumption and income profiles
3.6. References
4 Fertility and Nuptiality
4.1. Introduction: the decline of fertility in the world
4.2. The sociodemography of fertility
4.3. The sociodemography of precocious nuptiality
4.4. Conclusion
4.5. References
5 Contraception and Reproductive Rights
5.1. Introduction: population and the Sustainable Development Goals
5.2. Socially embedded preferences for childbearing
5.3. Trends in contraceptive use and unmet need for family planning
5.4. Reproductive rights, fertility intentions and socially embedded preferences
5.5. The relationship between fertility, contraception and abortion
5.6. Conclusion: the role of national policies in Bangladesh and Pakistan
5.7. References
6 Mortality and Health, the Factors Involved in Population Dynamics
6.1. Introduction
6.2. Mortality around the world: deep inequalities
6.3. Children’s and female mortality
6.4. Conclusion
6.5. References
7 Dynamics of Migration History in Western Europe
7.1. Introduction
7.2. Migrations in preindustrial times (1650–1750)
7.3. Migration in the age of early industry (1750–1815)
7.4. Migration in an age of urbanization and industrialization (1815–1914)
7.5. European migration in the 20th century
7.6. References
8 Current International Migrations
8.1. Introduction
8.2. Migration flows and migration stocks
8.3. Emigration of HQ workforce from developing countries
8.4. Theoretical perspectives
8.5. Conclusion: HQ emigration, a growth engine for human capital?
8.6. References
9 Aging
9.1. Introduction
9.2. The aging of the world population: a demographic revolution
9.3. A strong heterogeneity in aging and its consequences
9.4. Responding to population aging: three case studies
9.5. Conclusion
9.6. References
Conclusion: Complex Relationships Between Demographic Dynamics and Development
C.1. Main lessons drawn from the chapters
C.2. Avoiding two pitfalls
C.3. References
List of Authors
Index
End User License Agreement
List of Illustrations
Introduction Demographic Dynamics
Figure I.1.
Annual growth rate of major groups (2015–2020 average, in %)
Figure I.2. Annual growth rate of countries in Southern Africa and Southern Asia...
Chapter 1
Figure 1.1. Female life expectancy at birth per 5-year periods, 1950–2020. LAC (...
Figure 1.2. Total fertility rate in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC): 1960–...
Chapter 2
Figure 2.1. Policies impacting, respectively, the demographic dependency ratio (...
Chapter 3
Figure 3.1.
Africa’s economic lifecycle compared to that of Asian countries
Figure 3.2.
Lifecycle deficit (LCD) in Africa and in East Asia
Figure 3.3. Evolution of the economic support ratio in African countries, 1950–2...
Figure 3.4. Evolution of the support ratio growth per African sub-region, 1975–2...
Chapter 4
Figure 4.1. Percentage of fertility decline by continent and income level (1950–...
Figure 4.2.
Percentage of fertility decline in some countries (1950–2020)
Figure 4.3.
Declines in infant mortality and fertility (1960–1980)
Figure 4.4.
Sanitary conditions in Africa
Figure 4.5.
Educational conditions in Africa
Figure 4.6.
The process of land saturation
Figure 4.7.
Modernization theory
Figure 4.8.
Child labor
Chapter 5
Figure 5.1. Trends in total population by region, estimates and projections 1950...
Figure 5.2. Trends in total fertility rate by region, estimates and projections ...
Figure 5.3. Conformist preferences for childbearing (reproduced from Dasgupta an...
Figure 5.4. Trends in the availability of survey data on contraceptive use by su...
Figure 5.5. Prevalence of modern contraceptive use among women aged 15–49 by reg...
Figure 5.6. Estimates of the proportion of women of reproductive age using contr...
Figure 5.7. Total fertility rate compared to modern contraceptive prevalence amo...
Figure 5.8. Family planning indicators among married or in-union women in Bangla...
Chapter 6
Figure 6.1. The evolution of life expectancy at birth depending on development l...
Figure 6.2.
Evolution of life expectancy at birth by major world region
Figure 6.3.
Evolution of life expectancy at birth in Africa
Figure 6.4. Life expectancy at birth in 2018, depending on economic development ...
Figure 6.5.
Life expectancy at birth in 2018 by continent
Figure 6.6.
Life expectancy at birth in Africa and in Asia
Figure 6.7. Infant and child mortality rate in 1990 and 2015 (per 1,000 live bir...
Figure 6.8.
Maternal Mortality Report (deaths per 100,000 live births)
Chapter 8
Figure 8.1. Distribution of migratory movements between “North” and “South” coun...
Figure 8.2. The 15 most numerous migrant populations from a country of origin to...
Chapter 9
Figure 9.1. Evolution of the proportion of people aged 65+ (world population 195...
Figure 9.2. Evolution of the proportion of people aged 65+ and under 5 (world po...
Figure 9.3.
Evolution of life expectancy at birth (world population 1950–2100)
Figure 9.4. Evolution of the dependency ratio (65 years+/20–64 years) (world pop...
Figure 9.5. Period of time required for the 60+ population to increase from 10% ...
Figure 9.6. Proportion of pension recipients among those having reached the lega...
Figure 9.7. Activity rate of the population aged 65+ (various African countries ...
List of Tables
Introduction Demographic Dynamics
Table I.1. Population (2020, in millions) and annual growth rate in the major gr...
Table I.2. Annual growth rate per country in certain sub-regions (2015–2020 aver...
Table I.3.
Chapter titles and in-depth case studies
Chapter 1
Table 1.1. Estimates and projections of the population of the world’s geographic...
Table 1.2. Groups of countries per demographic transition and population in 2019...
Table 1.3. Life expectancy at birth and infant mortality in Latin America and th...
Table 1.4. Latin American and Caribbean countries according to mortality and fer...
Chapter 2
Table 2.1.
Comparison DDR with EDR, 2016
Table 2.2.
DDR, EDR and SDR in selected countries, 2016
Table 2.3.
DDR in selected countries 2015–2055
Table 2.4.
U19 population in South Korea 1960–2010
Table 2.5.
EDR in selected countries 2015–2055
Table 2.6.
SDR in selected countries 2015–2055
Chapter 3
Table 3.1. Specific weight–age in relation with labor income and consumption in ...
Table 3.2. Estimated duration for the demographic window of opportunity in Afric...
Table 3.3. Extent of the demographic window of opportunity in some African count...
Table 3.4.
Country and survey year for consumption and income profiles
Chapter 4
Table 4.1.
Number of children of women by continent and income level (1950–2020)
Table 4.2.
Number of children per woman in some countries (1950–2020)
Table 4.3.
Evolution of fertility and % of Muslims in various countries
Chapter 5
Table 5.1. Estimates and projections of the number and proportion of women of re...
Chapter 7
Table 7.1.
Population in Northwestern Europe, 1750–1800 (in millions)
Table 7.2. Estimated population growth in Western Europe, 1800–1910 (in millions...
Chapter 8
Table 8.1. Number of international migrants by continent of origin and destinati...
Table 8.2. Number of migrants (millions) in destination countries as a percentag...
Table 8.3. Migration stocks in the world and in developed countries 1990–2015. M...
Table 8.4.
Top 30 countries of origin of highly skilled migrants toward the OECD
Table 8.5.
Emigration rate and number of HQ migrants in the OECD
Chapter 9
Table 9.1.
World population median age evolution (1975–2100)
Table 9.2. World population growth by age range expressed in thousands (2020–205...
Table 9.3.
Population aged 65+ by region and level of development (2000–2050)
Table 9.4.
Median age of the population (large regional sets 2000–2050)
Table 9.5.
Increase in the population aged 85+ (large regional sets 2000–2050)
Table 9.6. Life expectancy at birth and at age 65 (large regional sets 2000–2050...
Guide
Cover
Table of Contents
Title Page
Copyright
Introduction Demographic Dynamics
Begin Reading
Conclusion: Complex Relationships Between Demographic Dynamics and Development
List of Authors
Index
End User License Agreement
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SCIENCES
Geography and Demography, Field Director – Denise Pumain
Demography, Subject Head – Brigitte Baccaïni
Demographic Dynamics and Development
Coordinated by
Yves Charbit
First published 2022 in Great Britain and the United States by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Apart from any fair dealing for the purposes of research or private study, or criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, this publication may only be reproduced, stored or transmitted, in any form or by any means, with the prior permission in writing of the publishers, or in the case of reprographic reproduction in accordance with the terms and licenses issued by the CLA. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside these terms should be sent to the publishers at the undermentioned address:
ISTE Ltd27-37 St George’s RoadLondon SW19 4EUUK
www.iste.co.uk
John Wiley & Sons, Inc.111 River StreetHoboken, NJ 07030USA
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© ISTE Ltd 2022
The rights of Yves Charbit to be identified as the author of this work have been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
Library of Congress Control Number: 2021947914
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library
ISBN 978-1-78945-050-7
ERC code:
LS8 Ecology, Evolution and Environmental Biology
LS8_3 Population biology, population dynamics, population genetics
SH1 Individuals, Markets and Organisations
SH1_3 Development economics, health economics, education economics
SH3 The Social World, Diversity, Population
SH3_8 Population dynamics; households, family and fertility
1The Demographic Transition
Maria Eugenia COSIO ZAVALA
El Colegio de México, Mexico, and Paris Nanterre University, France
1.1. Introduction
The demographic transition refers to the passage from a regime of high mortality and high fertility to a regime with low mortality and reduced fertility. In-depth work1 has brought to light a large heterogeneity of contexts and variation in stages, such as the demographic situation at the start of the transition, the anteriority of the decline in mortality or fertility, medical progress, urbanization, the pace of the main demographic changes (mortality, nuptiality, fertility and migrations) and the period when the transition has been completed. We cannot, therefore, speak of a single model of demographic transition, but of a great diversity which can be explained by economic, social, cultural and institutional factors, across time and space.
Demographic transitions began in European countries in the 18th century, and afterward spread widely to countries populated by European emigrants, such as Australia, New Zealand, the United States, Canada, Argentina and Uruguay. From the mid-20th century onwards, they reached the majority of Asian and Latin American countries, and later Southeast Asia, the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa. Demographic transitions were at first related to the “modernization” of economies and societies, but this explanation has proven insufficient. Many authors have highlighted other dimensions, such as spoken language, religion, education, family models, the value of children, social interactions, intergenerational relationships, and social, racial and gender inequalities.
The concepts developed offer an extremely rich field of study for the history of the world’s population, spanning more than three centuries. Indeed, far from a single model of demographic transition – which would be a replica of the evolutions of European countries – temporalities, as well as the variety of demographic changes along the 20th and 21st centuries in developing countries, show a plurality of models.
In this chapter, we will successively analyze the genesis of the demographic transition model and its generalization, the current trends in population growth, as well as the demographic transitions around the world, particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean. The main results of the chapter should provide an in-depth understanding of the relationship between population and development.
1.2. Genesis of the demographic transition
The earliest reference to the consequences of a decline in birth and death rates was first described as a “demographic revolution” by Rabinowicz in 1929 (Adeev 2011, p. 9). Landry chose this reference as the title for his famous work (Landry 1982). Notestein introduced the term “transitional growth” as a reference to the moment when mortality declined, provoking strong population growth, followed by a decline in fertility2 (Notestein 1945, p. 46). For Notestein, the demographic transition was associated with modernization, urbanization and industrialization; the development of education and public health; increased living standards; fertility control and the adoption of new values (Notestein 1945, p. 57). Davis would in turn publish an article called The World Demographic Transition in 1945. According to Chesnais, the original theory of demographic transition, in its European (Landry) or North American (Davis, Notestein) versions, was achieved by 1953 (Chesnais 1986b, p. 1061).
Demographers agree to evoke the “passage from a demographic situation characterized by high mortality and high fertility with a ‘high’ quasi-equilibrium to a situation of low mortality and low fertility with a ‘low’ quasi-equilibrium” (Meslé et al. 2011, p. 482) and significant population growth between the two phases. The first demographic transition took place as early as the 18th century, in north-western Europe, when the fight against major epidemics and infant mortality spread toward the whole continent (Meslé and Vallin 1995). In turn, fertility fell from a level of more than five children per woman to about two children per woman. The case of France is an exception, since the reduction in fertility began in the mid-18th century, whereas in other European countries, it started in 1870 (Vallin 2003). It should be noted that, on average3, the European population multiplied by four in 150 years (Chesnais 1986a; Vallin 2003, pp. 28–30).
By analyzing 67 countries between 1720 and 1984, Chesnais wanted to show that the demographic transition is a general theory, “reduced to a few central empirically testable propositions and [which] can be enriched on certain points that the history of facts deems essential for the understanding of the mechanisms at work” (Chesnais 1986b, p. 1061). He further mentions:
[T]hree paradigms, which can be drawn from the founding texts: the principle of antecedence in the decrease in mortality; the two-phase reproductive transition module (limitation of marriages, and consequent limitation of births); and the influence of the access to modern economic growth (in the sense of Kuznets) on the triggering of the secular decline in fertility. (Chesnais 1986b, p. 1061)
In addition, he stresses:
[T]he insufficiencies of the original theory and therefore the necessary amendments [which] concern, for their part, three aspects: the concept of pre- and post-transitional balance, the absence of international openness and the exclusive focus on fertility, considered as a dependent variable. (Chesnais 1986b, p. 1061)
He mentions the role of international migrations in controlling strong population growth (like the massive flows from Europe to the Americas in the 19th century) and the differences in periods and in the speed of national transitions, across time and space (Chesnais 1986b, p. 1061).
Since the publication of Chesnais’ book (Chesnais 1986a), empirical observations have called into question these postulates: in Europe fertility may have declined at the same time or before mortality (Coale and Cotts Watkins 1986; Vallin 2003). However, in Africa, Asia and Latin America, the differences are even greater in the timing and speed of demographic changes, as well as in the underlying factors (Guzmán et al. 2006; Attané and Barbieri 2009; Koba et al. 2019). In Latin America, the three-phase reproductive transition pattern did not occur in the same form, in that order, or at the same speed (Cosio Zavala 2011).
Below, we will present the various changes in world population, which have been determined by the history of demographic transitions.
1.3. World population changes and trends (2019–2100)
According to the United Nations Population Division, the world population is expected to continue to grow for several decades (United Nations 2019a)4. The population might increase from 7.7 billion inhabitants in 2019 to 9.7 billion in 2050 and 10.9 billion by 2100 (medium-variant projection). Between 2019 and 2050, projections predict a near doubling of the population in Africa, whereas the European population might decrease during this period (Table 1.1). Leridon confirms the likelihood of the population exceeding 9 billion by 2050, “unless one considers catastrophes of unprecedented magnitude at a global scale” (Leridon 2020)5.
On the basis of the theory of demographic transition, the perspectives of the United Nations foresee a reduction and a convergence in mortality and fertility levels6: by 2060, fertility might reach 1.75 children per woman in developed countries and 2.15 children per woman in developing countries (United Nations 2019a, Fert/4). Table 1.2 shows the populations of different regions in the world, between 2019 and 2100, classified into six groups, according to the stages of their demographic transitions. We consider the demographic transition to be complete when life expectancy is over 70 years old (average for both sexes) and when fertility is equal to or lower than 2.1 children per woman.
Table 1.1.Estimates and projections of the population of the world’s geographic regions in 2019, 2050 and 2100 (thousands of inhabitants)
(source: Population Prospects 2019; United Nations 2019a)
Region
Population
2019
2051
2100
Africa
1,308,064
2,489,275
4,280,127
Asia
4,601,371
5 290,263
4,719,907
Europe
747,183
710,486
629,563
North America
366,601
425,200
490,889
Latin America and the Caribbean
648,121
762,432
679,993
Oceania
42,128
57,376
74,916
Total
7 713,468
9,735,034
10,875,394
The composition of the six demographic transition groups is as follows:
– For 2019, group 1 brought together the countries of Europe, North America and Oceania (1.1 billion inhabitants), which completed their demographic transition before 1970. In 2019, they represented 14% of the world population. The European population is expected to decline (with the exception of Northern Europe) and that of North America and Oceania is expected to increase. This first group could reach a total of 1.2 billion inhabitants by 2100, with low growth between 2019 and 2100, around 10% (according to estimates and medium-variant) (United Nations 2019a).
– Group 2 brings together countries whose demographic transition was completed at the end of 20th century. Japan joined this group in 1970, the Republic of Korea in 1985, China in 1990 and the Democratic Republic of Korea in 1995. These East Asian countries had nearly 1.7 billion inhabitants in 2019 (21% of world population). By adding all the countries whose fertility is lower than or equal to 2.1 children per woman – such as Chile, Brazil, Colombia and Uruguay, many small island countries, a large part of the Middle East’s countries, Bangladesh, Iran and Sri Lanka – there are a total of 2.4 billion inhabitants (31% of the world population). However, this population should decrease to approximately 2 billion inhabitants by 2100 (18% of the world population). The population of East Asia, including China, might start to decline in 2050, reaching 1.2 billion people in 2100, half a billion less than in 2019 (according to estimates and medium-variant) (United Nations 2019a).
– Group 3 includes countries that will have completed their fertility transition by 2030. During the second half of the 20th century, they experienced a sharp decline in mortality, a rapid reduction in fertility as well as exceptional population growth. In 2019, these countries narrowly exceeded those of the second group, with 2.5 billion inhabitants (33% of the world population). These are large countries in Southern Asia (India) and countries in Southeast Asia (except Cambodia, Laos and the Philippines). The majority of Latin American and Caribbean countries are in group 3 (except Bolivia, Guatemala, Haiti, Panama and Paraguay). In Africa, this group brings together a few North African countries (Libya and Tunisia) as well as small island countries (Mauritius, Reunion and Cape Verde). By 2100, this set of populations will have grown to 2.1 billion, a fifth instead of a third of the world population (according to estimates and medium-variant) (United Nations 2019a).
– For group 4, the fertility transition will be completed in around 2050. These are Pakistan, Cambodia, Laos and the Philippines in Asia; Algeria and Morocco in North Africa; some Latin American countries (Bolivia, Guatemala, Haiti, Panama and Paraguay) and some sub-Saharan African countries (Botswana, small island countries and South Africa). Group 4 had around 550 million inhabitants in 2019 (7% of the world population), and will count 860 million by 2100, 8% of the world population (according to estimates and medium-variant) (United Nations 2019a).
– Group 5 consists of countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Nigeria, Chad, Togo and Senegal), which will be close to completing their fertility transition by 2100 (between 2.1 and 2.3 children per woman). In 2019, this group brought together approximately 557 million inhabitants (7% of the world population). By the end of the projections, its population will have multiplied more than three times (nearly 1.7 billion inhabitants in 2100), that is to say, 15% of the world population (according to estimates and medium-variant) (United Nations 2019a).
– Finally, group 6 includes countries where fertility will be higher than 2.4 children per woman by 2100. There are not many countries in this group, but its population growth will be extremely high. This group includes Angola, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Mauritania, Niger, Somalia, Tanzania and Zambia. It includes 187 million inhabitants in 2019 (2.4% of the world population), and will count 931 million by 2100, that is to say, 8.6% of the world population (according to estimates and medium-variant) (United Nations 2019a).
In summary, in a few decades, based on past and current demographic trends, global demographic change has been radical and a complete geopolitical redistribution is underway, according to the United Nations’ medium-variant (United Nations 2019a).
Table 1.2.Groups of countries per demographic transition and population in 2019, 2030 and 2100 (in billions of inhabitants)
(source: World Population Prospects 2019 (estimates and medium-variant); United Nations 2019a)
Complete demographic transition by 2019
Complete demographic transition by 2030
Complete demographic transition between 2030 and 2100
Group 1
1.1 billion Europe, North America, Oceania
1.2 billion
Group 2
2.4 billion Japan, China, Republic of Korea, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Chile, Brazil, Colombia, Uruguay, Western Asia, Bangladesh, Iran, Sri Lanka
2 billion
Group 3
2.5 billion
India, Southeast Asia
7
, Latin America
8
, Libya, Tunisia, Mauritius, Réunion Island, Cape Verde
2.1 billion
Group 4
0.550 billion
0.860 billion Pakistan, Cambodia, Laos, Philippines, Algeria, Morocco, Bolivia, Guatemala, Haiti, Panama, Paraguay, Botswana, South Africa
Group 5
0.557 billion
1.7 billion Sub-Saharan Africa
9
Group 6
0.187 billion
0.931 billion
Note: The definition of a complete demographic transition considers a life expectancy of over 70 years and a total fertility lower than 2.1 children per woman. We only counted the most populated countries in 2019.
If we add to the main countries that completed their demographic transition in 2019 (groups 1 and 2), those of the third group (ending in 2030), this set comprises 78% of 2019’s world population (6.1 billion). But this will significantly decrease: by 2100, it will bring together 5.3 billion inhabitants, or 48% of the world population (estimates and medium-variant) (United Nations 2019a). Indeed, the countries which are currently completing their demographic transition will experience a modest population growth, with an older age structure.
However, the population of the main countries where the demographic transition is still “awaiting completion” (groups 4, 5 and 6), which reached 1.3 billion and 16% of the world’s population in 2019, will rise to 3.5 billion inhabitants by 2100 and its proportion will double (32%). Its population growth will be high due to the gap between the decline in mortality and the decline in birth rates, and a young age structure.
1.4. The demographic transition in the world
The demographic transition started in the mid-18th century in Europe, prompting two centuries of extraordinary progress reducing the mortality rate, because of the control of epidemics and famine. In France, between 1780 and 1840, life expectancy rose from under 30 to over 40 years of age, and from 1880 to 1940, from 43 to almost 60 years. Infant mortality also fell sharply. Advances in mortality did not take place in all European countries at the same time, or at the same pace. They were interrupted by wars (War of 1870, First World War) and the flu of 1918. Medical discoveries, in particular those of Pasteur on the microbial origin of infectious diseases, health progress and a rise in the standard of living, significantly contributed to reducing epidemics and food shortage (Vallin 2003, pp. 9–14). In addition, the increase in life expectancy continued to soar, reaching over 80 years between 2015–2020 (in Australia, Canada, South Korea, Europe, Japan, Singapore, etc.). In 2019, at a global level, life expectancy for both sexes was 72.3 years: in developed countries, it was 79.2 years, and 72 years in developing countries (United Nations 2019a, Table A.28).
After 1870, the decline in fertility in Europe started later than that of mortality, falling from almost five children to around two or three children per woman on the eve of the Second World War. Only France started limiting births in the mid-18th century, more than a century before other European countries (Festy 1979). The gap between the dates of the beginning of the decline in mortality and that in fertility was responsible for a strong population growth. Thus, the population of England and Wales increased from 6.5 million in 1750 to 42 million in the early 1940s (Vallin 2003, p. 27).
In the mid-20th century, the demographic transition spread to Asia and Latin America, with mortality declining after 1950, followed by fertility circa 1970 (Chesnais 1986a). The decrease in mortality was further accelerated by the effectiveness of health policies resulting from previous experiences in developed countries (Omran 1971). For four decades, between 1940 and 1990, the birth rate greatly exceeded the crude death rate, leading to strong population growth, higher than 2% per year. This figure had never been reached in Europe or in Japan (Chesnais 2002, p. 458). Finally, during the second half of the 20th century, the decline in fertility became widespread. Contrary to what happened in Europe, “the explosion of the Third World” (Vallin 2003, p. 60) resulted in the implementation of birth control policies, thus rapidly reducing fertility. As Vallin wrote, “there are few cases when one can say that the introduction of a birth control program is the main factor underlying a desired reduction in fertility” (Vallin 2011, p. 344). But he rightly emphasized that access is made easier, for couples and for women who wish to limit their births, when such programs exist (Vallin 2011, p. 344).
1.4.1. The factors which can explain demographic transitions
To explain the decline in mortality in Europe since the end of the 18th century, Abdel Omran (1971) proposed the theory of epidemiological transition, or the passage from an old mortality regime (the “age of pestilence and famine”), through a transition period of a “decline in pandemics”, to finally reach the last age of “degenerative” and “societal” diseases (Omran 1998). Then appeared the more general concept of “health transition” (Meslé and Vallin 2002). During this period, medical advances for reducing infectious and cardiovascular diseases were accompanied by the development of food, agriculture and education, as well as an improvement in the living standards, the establishment of a sanitation infrastructure (drinking water, sewers) and the development of health systems. But, within these dimensions, inequalities have widened, because the entire population does not have equal access to them (Meslé et al. 2011, p. 484).
In Europe, the delays in the age for marriage10 accompanied the secular decline in fertility, in the absence of effective contraception methods for couples. In 1840, Festy made a distinction between countries with late marriages, over the age of 27 – Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden), Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland – and countries with early marriages, under the age of 26 – Finland, Great Britain, Germany, Austria, Southern Europe (Spain, Italy and Portugal) and North America (Festy 1979, p. 28). He showed the complex relationship between late marriage, low fertility, breastfeeding habits and differences in fecundity between the rich and the poor in 1870 (Festy 1979, p. 42). In addition, “intermediate fertility variables”, which are biological, social and economic as well as cultural, work together in the reduction of fertility (Davis and Blake 1956). Bongaarts calculated that they could be reduced to four determining variables, which alone explain the majority of changes in fertility: the age of the first union, the duration of breastfeeding, the use of contraception methods and abortion (Bongaarts 1978). In Asian and Latin American countries, modern contraception and abortion have played a predominant role in birth limitation, because “the contraceptive revolution” reached all the regions in the world (Leridon and Toulemon 2002). In Africa, the duration of prolonged breastfeeding has a reducing effect on the number of children per couple (Tabutin and Schoumaker 2004).
Coale grouped the main macrosocial causes that explain fertility changes in the RWA model (Coale 1973):
– a first factor is the reasoned choice to give birth to a child. The advantages and disadvantages of an additional birth should be accepted by couples. This factor is called readiness (R). It determines the beginning of controlled fertility, in particular due to economic reasons;
– a second factor is the perception that low fertility is socially and economically beneficial for mothers and fathers. This factor is called willingness (W). It points to the social legitimacy of fertility control within families and a normative/cultural change in values;
– the third factor is the availability of birth control methods and their effective use. This factor is called ability (A). It depends on the diffusion of contraception methods, birth control infrastructure, and health and sanitation policies.
According to Coale, the main factors for the fertility transition to come about must simultaneously be economic, cultural and institutional. The three RWA preconditions act mutually, and if only one is lacking, the decline in fertility will not take place (Coale 1973; Lesthaeghe and Vanderhoeft 2001). As not all individuals change their behavior at the same time, and only pioneer groups adopt them, the diffusion toward the rest of the population is conveyed by means of “social interactions” (Bongaarts and Cotts Watkins 1996). But it can be slowed down or accelerated depending on the cultural, religious and linguistic standards of each region11. Bourgeois-Pichat (1976) stressed the importance of group effects: “Of course, the couple decides, but they do so according to the social criteria and cultural heritage which, although quickly driven out, paradoxically maintain their rights” (p. 1077).
