General Edward Porter Alexander at Antietam: Account of the Maryland Campaign from His Memoirs E-Book
Edward Porter Alexander
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- Herausgeber: Krill Press
- Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
- Sprache: Englisch
- Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2015
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GENERAL EDWARD PORTER ALEXANDER AT ANTIETAM: ACCOUNT OF THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN FROM HIS MEMOIRS
Edward Porter Alexander
FIREWORK PRESS
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Copyright © 2015 by Edward Porter Alexander
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
Chapter 12: Boonsboro or South Mountain, and Harper’s Ferry
Chapter 13: Sharpsburg or Antietam
General Edward Porter Alexander at Antietam: Account of the Maryland Campaign from His Memoirs
By
Edward Porter Alexander
General Edward Porter Alexander at Antietam: Account of the Maryland Campaign from His Memoirs
Published by Firework Press
New York City, NY
First published 1904
Copyright © Firework Press, 2015
All rights reserved
Except in the United States of America, this book is sold subject to the condition that it shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, re-sold, hired out, or otherwise circulated without the publisher’s prior consent in any form of binding or cover other than that in which it is published and without a similar condition including this condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser.
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INTRODUCTION
IN THE NARRATIVE OF THE Civil War, Edward Porter Alexander has loomed larger in death than in life. Just 25 years old when the war broke out, Porter Alexander had already served as an engineer and officer in the U.S. Army, but the native Georgian resigned his commission in May 1861 and joined the Confederacy after his home state seceded.
Porter Alexander spent 1861 as an intelligence officer, and he served as part of a signal guard, but he soon became chief of ordnance for Joseph Johnston’s army near Richmond. Half a year later, Johnston would be injured during the Peninsula Campaign at the Battle of Seven Pines, after which he was replaced by Robert E. Lee. Over the course of 1862, Porter Alexander took on more roles in the Army of Northern Virginia’s artillery branch, particularly under Longstreet’s 1st Corps.
Though he had served with distinction during the Civil War, it was Porter Alexander’s memoirs that have kept his name alive today. Though many prominent officers on both sides wrote memoirs, Porter Alexander’s were among the most insightful and often considered by historians as the most evenhanded. With a sense of humor and a good narrative, Porter Alexander skillfully narrates the war, his service, and he isn’t afraid to criticize officers, including Lee, when he thought they had made mistakes. As a result, historians continue to rely heavily on his memoirs as a source for Civil War history.
This account of the Maryland Campaign that culminated with the battle of Antietam comes from Alexander’s memoirs, Military Memoirs of a Confederate: A Critical Narrative.
CHAPTER 12: BOONSBORO OR SOUTH MOUNTAIN, AND HARPER’S FERRY
Choice of moves.
— INTERIOR LINES. — POLICY of invasion. — across the Potomac. — affairs in Washington. — McClellan succeeds Pope. — Lee’s Proclamation. — organizations and strength. — Harper’s Ferry garrison. — orders no. 191. — the army Scatters. — the lost order. — Lee warned. — battle of Boonsboro or South Mountain. — Longstreet Arrives. — the retreat. — Crampton’s Gap. — Franklin attacks. — Jackson before Harper’s Ferry. — preparations for assault. — bombardment and surrender. — borrowed wagons. — paroles and colors. — casualties.
The enemy having taken refuge within lines impregnable to assault, Lee had no alternative but to take the offensive elsewhere. He could not afford to sit down before Washington and await the enemy’s pleasure.
There were two openings for offensive operations, each with some chances of success. The safest would have been to withdraw behind the Rappahannock, where he might occupy a strong line with one-half of his forces, under Jackson, while the other half, under himself and Longstreet, was sent by railroad to Chattanooga via Bristol. At the time, in Tennessee, the Confederates were conducting two campaigns aimed at Louisville; the design being to drive the Federals from Kentucky. Kirby Smith, with an army of about 15,000, from Knoxville, had opened the road through Cumberland Gap, and on Aug. 30 had won a victory over a Federal force at Richmond, Ky., and on Sept. 2 had occupied Lexington. Bragg, with about 30,000 men, from Chattanooga had moved northward up the Sequatchie Valley, and, crossing the Cumberland Mountains, was, on Sept. 5, at Sparta, Tenn., turning the Federal position at Murfreesboro, where Buell was in command with about 50,000 men.
Such a movement by Lee would have been utilizing our ‘Interior Lines,’ the one game in which the Confederacy had an advantage over the Federals. On a small scale it had been [221] played both at Bull Run and in the Richmond campaign; the troops from the valley in both cases leaving the Federal armies opposite them, and quickly doubling on the point of attack.
Opportunities to do the same upon a larger scale were repeatedly offered between the Confederate armies before Richmond and those about Chattanooga. One had already occurred in the summer just passed. On May 30, Beauregard had evacuated Corinth with 52,000 men, and withdrawn to Tupelo, Miss. He was not followed, and the Federal army under Halleck of 100,000, was dispersed in different directions from Arkansas to Cumberland Gap. Beauregard was allowed two months of idleness and rest. It would have been possible to bring 20,000 of his veterans to Richmond by the 26th of June to reenforce Lee for the Seven Days Campaign. With their assistance McClellan should have been destroyed. Then the Western troops could have returned, and, if necessary, carried large reenforcements with them. Now a second opportunity was offered for similar strategy. Others were offered later, as we shall see, whenever one of the Confederate armies, from any cause, was free from the prospect of an early attack by its opponent.
On this occasion, the joint campaign of Bragg and Smith in Kentucky, and the Maryland campaign, both failed. Had we utilized our interior lines, one of them at the least should have been made sure. It was hoped, indeed, when the campaigns were entered upon, that the Southern sympathies of the Marylanders and Kentuckians would cut real figures in the struggle by bringing thousands of recruits to the Confederates, but this hope proved vain in both cases. There had been already enough observation of the war to destroy its romance, and to make the most careless realize what a grave step one would take who shouldered a musket under the Starry Cross. Many sympathized with our cause, and wished us well. But few were willing to abandon homes and take sides before we had shown ourselves able to remain in their States for at least a few weeks.
And this, in the case of Maryland, wasutterly out of the question for the simple reason that there was no railroad communication possible; and no army large enough to meet the Federal army, could support and supply itself by wagon-trains from Staunton, [222] nearly 150 miles away, for any length of time. Whenever, therefore, we crossed the Potomac going northward, we were as certain to have to recross it coming southward, in a few weeks, as a stone thrown upward is certain to come down.
In a letter to President Davis, on Sept. 2, Lee gave as reasons for the invasion of Maryland that it would relieve the Confederacy from the presence of hostile armies on her soil; and that the position of the army would be favorable for reaping the fruits of a victory, if one could be gained. Mr. Davis approved, and the campaign was made; but no victory was gained, nor is it easy to see where and how the chances of pursuit would have [223] been improved, had it been. Apparently Kentucky might have offered more favorable ones.
After a rest of a day, on Sept. 4, with Jackson in the lead, the army was put in motion for the fords of the Potomac, near Leesburg. With the reenforcements which had joined, Lee had now about 55,000 men, all in fine spirits and with their cartridge boxes full, but otherwise not in the best condition. The different divisions were still only associated, not formed, into corps, and in the matter of shoes, clothing, and food the army was, upon the whole, probably worse off during this brief campaign than it had ever been before or ever was again. About one-half of the small-arms were still the old smooth-bore muskets of short range, and our rifled cannon ammunition was always inferior in quality. The lack of shoes was deplorable, and barefooted men with bleeding feet were no uncommon sight. Of clothing, our supply was so poor that it seemed no wonder the Marylanders held aloof from our shabby ranks. For rations, we were indebted mostly to the fields of roasting ears, and to the apple orchards. Such diet does not compare with bacon and hardtack for long marches, and, before the campaign was over, the straggling from all causes assumed great proportions. Brigades were often reduced nearly to the size of regiments, and regiments to the size of companies. On Sept. 5 the army began to cross the Potomac, and on Sept. 7 the advance reached Frederick.
It is now to tell of events in Washington City. There was great alarm when Pope, with the combined armies of Virginia and the Potomac, fell back within the fortifications, almost in a state of rout. Col. Kelton of Halleck’s staff, sent to find out the actual state of affairs, reported that there were 30,000 stragglers upon the roads. It was said that the money from the Treasury was being shipped to New York, and that an armed naval vessel, with steam up, was kept near at hand in the Potomac. Pope, making a virtue of necessity, applied to be relieved from command. There was no formal order relieving him until Sept. 5, when he was sent to the Northwest, where there were some Indian disturbances; but he was deprived of his army on Sept. 2, when McClellan was assigned to the defense of Washington, and the command of all the troops [224] engaged in it. As this included the whole of both armies, Pope was left without a man. Yet neither Lincoln nor Halleck had confidence in McClellan, and there was great reluctance to use him. Only the day before he had been instructed that he ‘had nothing to do with the troops engaged in active operations under Gen. Pope, but that his command was limited to the immediate garrison of Washington.’ At that time Pope himself had already been adjudged incompetent, and the decision would surely have been made to place Stevens in command had he been alive.
But the death of Stevens, and the disorderly retreat of Pope’s forces within the fortifications, had demoralized the government. McClellan alone was supposed to have the confidence of the army. It was the day of his triumph, and one of humiliation to both Lincoln and Halleck.
Yet McClellan was out of place. He would have been an excellent chief of staff, but was unfit for the command of an army. He was as utterly without audacity, as Lee was full of it. His one fine quality was his ability to organize and discipline. He constructed a superb machine, which, being once constructed, would fight a battle with skill and courage if only let alone. McClellan, during the Seven Days, let it alone, absenting himself as if by instinct. Never but at the battle of Sharpsburg was he present on any field, and his presence, by keeping Porter’s corps out of the action, made a drawn fight of what would otherwise have been a Federal victory, as will duly appear.
