General Edward Porter Alexander at Gettysburg: Account of the Battle from His Memoirs E-Book

Edward Porter Alexander

• Herausgeber: Krill Press
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch
• Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2015

Seitenzahl: 163

Beschreibung

In the narrative of the Civil War, Edward Porter Alexander has loomed larger in death than in life. Just 25 years old when the war broke out, Porter Alexander had already served as an engineer and officer in the U.S. Army, but the native Georgian resigned his commission in May 1861 and joined the Confederacy after his home state seceded. 

Though he had served with distinction during the Civil War, it was Porter Alexander's memoirs that have kept his name alive today. While many prominent officers on both sides wrote memoirs, Porter Alexander's were among the most insightful and often considered by historians as the most evenhanded. With a sense of humor and a good narrative, Porter Alexander skillfully narrated the war, his service, and what he considered the successes and faults of others, including Lee, when he thought they had made good decisions or mistakes. As a result, historians continue to rely heavily on his memoirs as a source for Civil War history. 

Porter Alexander played his biggest role at the Battle of Gettysburg. On the third day, Lee decided to make a thrust at the center of the Union’s line with about 15,000 men spread out over three divisions. Though it is now known as Pickett’s Charge, named after division commander George Pickett, the assignment for the charge was given to Longstreet, whose 1st Corps included Pickett’s division. Longstreet had serious misgivings about Lee’s plan and tried futilely to talk him out of it. Lee’s decision necessitated a heavy artillery bombardment of the Union line and attempting to knock out the Union’s own artillery before beginning the charge that would cover nearly a mile of open space from Seminary Ridge to the Union line on Cemetery Ridge. Lee tasked Porter Alexander, in charge of the 1st Corps’ guns, to conduct the artillery bombardment. What resulted was the largest sustained bombardment of the Civil War, with over 150 Confederate cannons across the line firing incessantly at the Union line for nearly 2 hours, but as Longstreet and Alexander anticipated, the charge was an utter disaster, incurring a nearly 50% casualty rate and failing to break the Union line.

Leseprobe

GENERAL EDWARD PORTER ALEXANDER AT GETTYSBURG: ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLE FROM HIS MEMOIRS

..................

Edward Porter Alexander

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

Chapter 16: Gettysburg: the First Day

Chapter 17: Gettysburg: Second Day

Chapter 18: Gettysburg: Third Day

General Edward Porter Alexander at Gettysburg: Account of the Battle from His Memoirs

By

Edward Porter Alexander

General Edward Porter Alexander at Gettysburg: Account of the Battle from His Memoirs

Published by Firework Press

New York City, NY

First published 1904

Copyright © Firework Press, 2015

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Except in the United States of America, this book is sold subject to the condition that it shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, re-sold, hired out, or otherwise circulated without the publisher’s prior consent in any form of binding or cover other than that in which it is published and without a similar condition including this condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser.

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INTRODUCTION

..................

IN THE NARRATIVE OF THE Civil War, Edward Porter Alexander has loomed larger in death than in life. Just 25 years old when the war broke out, Porter Alexander had already served as an engineer and officer in the U.S. Army, but the native Georgian resigned his commission in May 1861 and joined the Confederacy after his home state seceded.

Porter Alexander spent 1861 as an intelligence officer, and he served as part of a signal guard, but he soon became chief of ordnance for Joseph Johnston’s army near Richmond. Half a year later, Johnston would be injured during the Peninsula Campaign at the Battle of Seven Pines, after which he was replaced by Robert E. Lee. Over the course of 1862, Porter Alexander took on more roles in the Army of Northern Virginia’s artillery branch, particularly under Longstreet’s 1st Corps.

Though he participated in several battles, Porter Alexander played his biggest role at the Battle of Gettysburg. On the third day, Lee decided to make a thrust at the center of the Union’s line with about 15,000 men spread out over three divisions. Though it is now known as Pickett’s Charge, named after division commander George Pickett, the assignment for the charge was given to Longstreet, whose 1st Corps included Pickett’s division. Longstreet had serious misgivings about Lee’s plan and tried futilely to talk him out of it.

Lee’s decision necessitated a heavy artillery bombardment of the Union line and attempting to knock out the Union’s own artillery before beginning the charge that would cover nearly a mile of open space from Seminary Ridge to the Union line on Cemetery Ridge. Lee tasked Porter Alexander, in charge of the 1st Corps’ guns, to conduct the artillery bombardment. What resulted was the largest sustained bombardment of the Civil War, with over 150 Confederate cannons across the line firing incessantly at the Union line for nearly 2 hours.

Unfortunately for Porter Alexander and the Confederates, the sheer number of cannons belched so much smoke that they had trouble gauging how effective the shells were. As it turned out, most of the artillery was overshooting the target, landing in the rear of the Union line. Reluctant to order the charge, Longstreet commanded Porter Alexander to order the timing for the charge.

As Longstreet and Alexander anticipated, the charge was an utter disaster, incurring a nearly 50% casualty rate and failing to break the Union line.

CHAPTER 16: GETTYSBURG: THE FIRST DAY

..................

High tide.

— OPPORTUNITY OPEN. — SUGGESTION made. — invasion. — special feature. — feature impossible. — reorganization. — armament. — Lee moves. — Brandy Station. — Ewell in Valley. — captured property. — Hooker moves. — Lincoln suggests. — Lee in Valley. — Stuart proposes raid. — conditional consent. — Stuart’s raid. — Carlisle. — results of raid. — across the Potomac. — Hooker relieved. — Chambersburg. — return of scout. — orders. — chance encounter. — Hill to Gettysburg. — Meade’s movement. — Reynolds to Gettysburg. — battle Opens. — Archer captured. — Rodes Arrives. — Early Arrives. — Lee orders pursuit. — Ewell stops pursuit. — Lee Confers. — the enemy’s line. — best Point of attack. — Longstreet’s arrival. — Federal arrivals.

A pause of four weeks after the battle of Chancellorsville to prepare for an aggressive counter-stroke, was, perhaps, the period of highest tide in Confederate hopes among all the vicissitudes of the war. The campaign which ensued, culminating at Gettysburg, is generally accepted as the turning-point of Confederate fortunes. I think it may be held that each summer campaign in Va. marked a Confederate crisis. That is to say, that defeat in any one of them would have been followed by the collapse of its government, within less than another 12 months, while a victory would assure it only of that much of life. More than that was impossible as long as the war spirit ruled the North, and this was certainly the case in 1863.

A year later, however, there did come a period of very great Federal discouragement, due to a succession of severe losses. At the same time, there occurred a crisis in the military situation, which threatened an ignominious termination to Grant’s campaign, the greatest campaign of the war. This was saved by a brilliant piece of Federal strategy, which is to be told of in due course. In it will be found the real crisis — the story of the passing of the last hope of Confederate success. It was not [364] lost upon any field of battle, either of offence or of defence. It was a victory of strategy and not one of arms.

It was now for Lee to take the offensive — a role appealing strongly to his disposition. The defensive was to invite the enemy to accumulate his resources to the point at which their very weight would crush us. But, for a brief period, we enjoyed a choice of the field of action. It was a fatal mistake that in this choice we failed to utilize the single advantage in the game of war, which the Confederacy enjoyed.

We occupied the ‘Interior Lines,’ and could reinforce from one flank to the other, across our country, more quickly than the enemy could discover and follow our movements by roundabout routes. Only by such transfers of her armies could the South ever hope to face her adversaries with superior, or even with equal, numbers— by demanding double duty of her regiments, fighting battles with them alternately in the east and in the west. In Lee we had a leader of phenomenal ability, could this policy have been once adopted under his direction. Here in May, 1863, was presented a rare opportunity to inaugurate what might be called an ‘Army on Wheels’ within the Confederate lines, as distinguished from an Army of Invasion beyond them. The situation was this. Grant was investing Vicksburg with 60,000 men, and we were threatened with the loss of the Mississippi River, and of 30,000 men at Vicksburg under Pemberton. At Jackson, Miss., Johnston, with scarcely 24,000 men, was looking on and begging vainly for reenforcements.

At Murfreesboro, Tenn., Bragg, with about 45,000 Confederates, confronted Rosecrans with about 84,000. Neither felt strong enough for the aggressive, and the whole spring and summer passed idly. At Knoxville were about 5000 Confederates under Buckner, and there were also scattered brigades in southwest Va. and eastern N. C., from which reinforcements might be drawn. In this state of affairs, Longstreet, with Hood’s and Pickett’s divisions, arrived in Petersburg, under orders to rejoin Lee at Fredericksburg. Hooker had just been driven across the Rappahannock, and his army was soon to lose largely from the expiration of terms of service of many regiments.

Nothing aggressive was probable from him for many weeks. [365] Longstreet’s veteran divisions, about 13,000 strong, could have been placed on the cars at Petersburg and hurried out to Bragg, via Lynchburg and Knoxville. Johnston’s 25,000 from Jackson, and Buckner’s 5000 from Knoxville, could have met them. With these accessions, and with Lee in command, Rosecrans might have been defeated, and an advance made into Ky., threatening Louisville and Cincinnati. If anything could have caused Grant’s recall from Vicksburg, it would have been this. Surely the chances of success were greater, and of disaster less, than those involved in our crossing the bridgeless Potomac, into the heart of the enemy’s country, where ammunition and supplies must come by wagons from Staunton, nearly 200 miles, over roads exposed to raids of the enemy from either the east or the west. In this position, a drawn battle, or even a victory, would still leave us compelled soon to find our way back across the Potomac.

Longstreet1 tells of his having suggested to Secretary Seddon such a campaign against Rosecrans, and he also suggested it to Lee on his arrival at Fredericksburg. Mr. Seddon thought Grant could not be drawn from Vicksburg even by a Confederate advance upon the Ohio River. To this Longstreet answered that Grant was a soldier and must obey orders if popular alarm forced the government to recall him. At that time Davis was sanguine of foreign intervention, and the Emperor Napoleon was permitting a French firm to build some formidable ironclads for the Confederate navy. These might have accomplished some results, had not the issue of the Gettysburg campaign induced the Emperor to withdraw his consent to their delivery.

Lee recognized the strong features of the proposed strategy, and took a day or two to consider it. But he finally decided upon an invasion of Pa. He was averse to leaving Va. himself, and also to any division of his army. Both he and Jackson, ever since the failure of the Md. campaign, had longed to try it once more, and Jackson had had prepared during the winter and spring the remarkable map, already mentioned (p. 322), covering the whole scene of the coming campaign. In the discussion with Longstreet, it was assumed that the strategy of the [366] campaign should be such as would force the enemy to attack our army in position. Jackson had once said, and it was ever afterward an article of our steadfast faith and confidence, ‘We sometimes fail to drive the enemy from position, but they always fail to drive us.’

Lee fully appreciated the over-anxiety of the enemy for the safety of Washington, and proposed, for this occasion, a special feature, which he hoped would play upon and exaggerate these fears. Two of Pickett’s five brigades had been temporarily left,— Jenkins’s at Petersburg, and Corse’s at Hanover Junction. Lee proposed that when his column of invasion crossed the Potomac, these two brigades, reenforced by whatever could be drawn from lower Virginia and the Carolinas, should form a column commanded by Beauregard, who should come from Charleston for the purpose. This column, with some parade of its intention, should advance from Culpeper and threaten Washington. Hooker’s army would have been drawn by Lee north of the Potomac. The prestige of Beauregard’s name would doubtless exaggerate the numbers in his command, and Lee hoped that the sudden danger might lead the enemy to call troops from the West, particularly if his army could win a battle north of the Potomac. The weak feature was that Lee did not have under his own control the troops which he desired to move. Davis had, indeed, proposed to him to control all troops on the Atlantic slope; but Lee insisted even on being relieved of the department south of the James, under D. H. Hill. He did not take the War Dept. into his confidence at first, hoping to accomplish his purpose by gradual suggestion and request. The process was too slow, and the result was unfortunate. Only on June 23 from Berryville, Va., did he fully explain to the President his wishes. On the 25th, from Williamsport, he followed the matter up with two letters, urging ‘the organization of an army, even in effigy, under Beauregard, at Culpeper C. H.’ Meanwhile, some demonstrations by the enemy from the York River had excited apprehensions at Richmond, and neither Corse’s or Jenkins’s brigades were sent forward, as had been planned.

A reply was despatched on June 29, saying,— [367]

‘This is the first intimation the President has had that such a plan was ever in contemplation, and, taking all things into consideration, he cannot see how it can by any possibility be carried into effect.’

Explaining the difficulty of protecting the railroads near Richmond, the letter even suggested that Lee spare some of his own force to better protect his own communications. This caution was not excessive. The messenger carrying this letter to Lee was captured on July 2, by a raid upon our rear, and, its importance being recognized, it was hurried to Meade and delivered to him on the field of Gettysburg at 4.10 A. M. on July 4. At that hour there was some uncertainty in the Union councils as to their best policy. The facts given in the captured letter of the difficulties of the Confederates, and the impossibility of Lee’s receiving any reinforcements, doubtless increased Meade’s confidence in all his later movements. The letter was considered of such importance that the officer who brought it, Capt. Ulric Dahlgren, was complimented and promoted.

In May our army was reorganized into three corps, each comprising three divisions of infantry, generally of four brigades each, and five battalions of artillery, averaging 16 guns each. Ewell succeeded Jackson in command of the 2d corps, and A. P. Hill took command of the new 3d corps. He had been an excellent division commander, and done conspicuous fighting and marching in the previous campaigns.2 It has already been said that Stuart would have made a more active and efficient corps commander than Ewell. [368] Reorganized, the army stood as follows: —

1ST corps. Longstreet

DIVISIONS

STRENGTH

BRIGADE COMMANDER

BATTS.

guns

McLaws

7,311 Kershaw, Barksdale, Semmes, Wofford

Pickett

5,200 Garnett, Kemper, Armistead

Hood

7,720 Law, Robertson, Anderson, G. T. Benning

Arty. Battns.

1,000 Cabell, Dearing, Henry, Walton, Alexander

21

84

Totals

21,231 11 Brigades, 5 Battns. Arty.

21

84

2D corps. Ewell

Early

6,943 Hays, Smith, Hoke, Gordon

Johnson

5,564 Stuart, Walker, Nichols, Jones

Rodes

8,454 Daniel, Doles, Iverson, Ramseur, O’Neal

Arty. Battns.

1,000 Jones, Latimer, Carter, Brown, Nelson

21

84

Totals

21,961 13 Brigades, 5 Battns. Arty.

21

84

3D corps. A. P. Hill

Anderson

7,440

Wilcox, Wright, Mahone, Perry, Posey

Heth

7,500

Pettigrew, Brockenbrough, Archer, Davis

Pender

6,800

Perrin, Lane, Thomas, Scales

Arty. Battns.

1,000

Lane, Garnett, Poague, McIntosh, Pegram

20

80

Totals

22,740

13 Brigades, 5 Battns. Arty.

20

80

65,932

3 Corps, 9 Divisions, 37 Brigades, 15 Battns. Arty.

62

248

Stuart Cavalry

10,292

Hampton, Robertson, Jones, F. Lee, Jenkins, W. H. F. Lee Imboden 1 Battn. Arty.

6

24

Totals

10,292

1 Division, 7 Brigades

6

24

Aggregate

76,224

13 Corps, 10 Divisions, 44 Brigades, L6 Battns. Arty.

68

272

[369]

The figures given are the returns of the ‘Officers and men present for duty’ on May 31. No later return was made before the battle.

Similarly, for the Federal army, the table below gives the ‘Officers and men present for duty’ on June 30, the last return before the battle. To arrive at the forces actually engaged, deductions must be made from these figures in both armies for sick, guards, and details. This deduction Livermore averages at seven per cent for Infantry and Artillery and 15 per cent for Cavalry.

ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. PRESENT FOR DUTY, JUNE 30, 1863

corps STRENGTH

DIVISIONS

BRIGADES

ARTILLERY

Batts.

Guns

1st Corps

Wadsworth

Meredith, Cutler

Reynolds

Robinson

Paul, Baxter

10,355

Rowley

Biddle, Stone, Stannard

5

23

2d Corps

Caldwell

Cross, Kelley, Zook, Brook

Hancock

Gibbon

Harrow, Webb, Hall

13,056

Hays

Carroll, Smyth, Willard

5

24

3d Corps

Birney

Graham, Ward, De Trobriand

Sickles

12,630

Humphreys

Carr, Brewster, Burling

5

30

5th Corps

Barnes

Tilton, Sweitzer, Vincent

Sykes

Ayres

Day, Burbank, Weed

12,211

Crawford

McCandless, Fisher

5

26

6th Corps

Wright

Torbert, Bartlett, Russell

Sedgwick

Howe

Grant, Neill

15,710

Newton

Shaler, Eustis, Wheaton

8

48

11th Corps

Barlow

Von Gilsa, Ames

Howard

Steinwehr

Coster, Smith

10,576

Schurz

Schimmelpfennig, Krzyzanowski

5

26

12th Corps

Williams

McDougall, Lockwood, Ruger

Slocum 8,597

Geary

Candy, Cobham, Greene

4

20

2,568

Tyler

Artillery Reserve

21

110

[370]

corps STRENGTH

DIVISIONS

BRIGADES

ARTILLERY

2,580

Engineers, Provost Guard’s Escorts

100,283

7 Corps, 19 Divisions, 51 Brigades, Infantry and Artillery

58

312

Cavalry Corps Pleasonton 14,973

Buford Gregg, D. Kilpatrick

Gamble, Devin, Merritt McIntosh, Huey, Gregg, J. Farnsworth, Custer

9

50

115,256

8 Corps, 22 Divisions, 59 Brigades

67

362

The Confederate infantry by this time were about nine-tenths armed with the rifled musket, muzzle loading, mostly of calibre .58, but some of calibre .54. Their artillery was now, also, all organized into battalions, usually of four-gun batteries each. Each corps had five of these battalions. One of these served with each of the three divisions, and the remaining two constituted a corps reserve, under command of the senior artillery officer, who began to be called, and to act, as chief of artillery of the corps.

The general artillery reserve, which had been commanded by Pendleton, was broken up, on the organization of the 3d corps, and it was never reestablished. Pendleton, however, was retained as chief of artillery. It is worthy of note that this artillery organization of a few batteries with each division, and a reserve with each corps, but with no general reserve for the army, was the first of the kind ever adopted by any foreign army, and that it was subsequently copied by Prussia and Austria after 1866, and by France after 1870, and later by England. But, although our reserve under Pendleton had never found the opportunity to render much service, its being discontinued was due to our poverty of guns, not to dissatisfaction with the system. And the fine service at Gettysburg by the Federal reserve of 110 guns, under Hunt, would seem to demonstrate the advantage of such an organization in every large army.

On Wednesday, June 3, Lee began the delicate operation of [371] manoeuvring Hooker out of his position behind the Rappahannock by a movement of the 1st and 2d corps toward Culpeper. Hood and McLaws marched on the 3d, Rodes on the 4th, and Early and Johnson on the 5th. Longstreet’s reserve — the Washington Artillery with eight guns, and my own with 26— marched on the 3d. On the 5th, the enemy, having discovered that something was on foot, crossed a small force over the Rappahannock, at the old position near the mouth of Deep Run. On this, Lee ordered Ewell’s corps to halt and await developments. But on the 6th he became satisfied that nothing serious was intended, and Ewell was ordered to proceed. In the afternoon, Lee himself left Fredericksburg for Culpeper. Hill’s corps now stood alone in front of Hooker’s entire army.