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- Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
- Kategorie: Wissenschaft und neue Technologien
- Sprache: Englisch
Is the goal of a transition to clean energy at all realistic? If so, how could it be accomplished? Climate change poses a formidable challenge for twenty-first-century governments. Unless they can move to a clean energy system built on efficiency, renewables, electrification, and possibly complementary technologies like nuclear energy and carbon capture and storage, it will be all but impossible to avoid the worst impacts of climate change. In this book, Daniel Fiorino provides a comprehensive introduction to the politics and policies of a clean energy transition and how it may unfold nationally and globally. Across its nine chapters, he explores the current energy landscape and the different pathways and pitfalls on the road to decarbonization. All scenarios for decarbonizing, he argues, rely on aggressive efficiency, the rapid scale-up of renewables, and the electrification of most of what is left. Yet this transition has to be accelerated and done effectively. There is little time left for second chances if we are to decarbonize later this century. The Clean Energy Transition will be an indispensable resource for students of energy politics, environmental studies, and public policy, as well as anyone interested in the energy issues of the day.
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Seitenzahl: 523
Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2022
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Table of Contents
Cover
Title Page
Copyright Page
Dedication
Preface
List of Figures, Tables, and Boxes
Figures
Tables
Boxes
1 The Energy Landscape
The Clean Energy Transition
The Latest But Different Energy Transition
The Global Energy System
Energy basics
Global energy system highlights
The big energy picture
Making Sense of Energy: Key Concepts
Carbon lock-in
Capacity factors
Energy returned on energy invested (EROEI)
Levelized cost of energy (LCOE)
Five Themes for the Energy Transition
Clean energy is not optional
Government must play a role
This is a social as well as technology transition
Scale is the operative word
All reasonable options should be on the table
A Punctuated Equilibrium Framework for the Energy Transition
The Rest of the Book
Final Points
Guide to Further Reading
Notes
2 Why Clean Energy Matters
The Climate, Health, and Economic Costs of Fossil Fuels
The True Costs of Fossil Fuels Through the Life Cycle
The Climate Case for Clean Energy
The basics of climate change
Trends and emission projections
Impacts of a changing climate
Fossil Fuels and Air Pollution
The Social Cost of Carbon
From Burden Sharing to Opportunity Sharing
Clean energy and jobs
Energy security
Renewable Energy Benefits: Measuring the Economics
Can Clean Energy Lead to Fairer, More Equitable Societies?
Guide to Further Reading
Notes
3 Getting the Carbon Out: Pathways to Decarbonization
What is Decarbonization?
The Easy, Harder, and Really Hard Parts of Decarbonizing
A Technical Possibility? 100% Wind, Water, and Solar (WWS)
Aggressive But Possible? IRENA’s REmap
The International Energy Agency’s
Net Zero by 2050
Selected Country Pathways
Decarbonizing Latin America
A Zero Carbon Action Plan (ZCAP) for the United States
Deep decarbonization for India
Lessons from the Decarbonization Scenarios
Guide to Further Reading
Notes
4 The Invisible Resource: Energy Efficiency
Energy Efficiency 101: What We Need to Know
The International Energy Outlook
What may be possible
Is degrowth the answer?
Shouldn’t Efficiency Be a No-Brainer?
The Costs of Energy Efficiency
Energy efficiency and the costs of carbon abatement
The levelized costs of energy efficiency
Why Government Policy Is Important
Which Countries are Leading on Energy Efficiency?
Policies for Energy Efficiency
Energy Efficiency and Decarbonization
Guide to Further Reading
Notes
5 Endless Flows: Renewable Energy
The Basics of Renewable Energy
Solar Energy
Wind Energy
Hydropower
Geothermal Energy
Ocean Energy
Energy from Biomass
The Environmental Impacts
Constraints on Wind and Solar Deployment
Coping with variability
Moving energy to where it is used
Assessing National Progress on Renewables
Technology Opportunities and Growth Potential
Two Country Illustrations
Denmark: gone with the wind
Japan: getting back on track
Renewables and Decarbonization
Guide to Further Reading
Notes
6 Electrify Everything
Electrify Everything, But Rely on Variable Sources
Electricity and the Energy System
Can Renewables Produce Electricity Reliably and at Scale?
Integrating High Levels of Renewables
Enhancing flexibility
Storing electricity
Managing demand
The Smart Grid: Technology Helps
Electric Vehicles and the Clean Energy Transition
The basics of electric vehicles
Prospects for electric vehicles
Are electric vehicles that much better?
The Harder Stuff: Decarbonizing When Electricity Is Not an Option
Freight, aviation, and ocean shipping
Heavy industry: a big lift
Access to Electricity, Sustainable Energy, and Development
Electrify Everything, But How?
Guide to Further Reading
Notes
7 Hard Choices and an Opportunity: Nuclear, Carbon Capture, and Green Hydrogen
What About Nuclear Energy?
The global nuclear industry
The Future of Nuclear Energy
Carbon Capture and Storage
The basics of carbon capture and storage
Does CCS make sense?
Negative emissions: bioenergy with CCS
Hydrogen and Clean Energy
Chemical storage
Low-carbon mobility
Industrial heating and feedstock
Beyond Renewables?
Guide to Further Reading
Notes
8 Accelerating the Energy Transition
Public Policy and Clean Energy
Putting Clean Energy Policies in Context
Stage of development
The role of government
Policy Tools for Clean Energy
Mandates: tell them what to do
Financial tools: change their economic calculations
Market creation and stimulation
Information disclosure: guide their choices
Lessons from California, Denmark, Spain, and Kenya
Explaining Clean Energy Policy Adoption
Policies for Accelerating the Clean Energy Transition
Policy learning is essential
Solutions vary for countries and regions
All the parts have to be coordinated
Stable and diverse policies help
Policies should be just and equitable
Public Policy, Government, and the Energy Transition
Guide to Further Reading
Notes
9 The Clean Energy Future
Technology Innovation and the Energy Transition
Stages in clean energy innovation
The state of clean energy technology
The Social Aspects of the Energy Transition
The just transition: enhancing justice and equity
Energy democracy: transforming politics with technology
The Politics of an Energy Transition
Reaching clean energy lock-in
Framing the issues
Keeping Options on the Table
Pessimism or Optimism?
An optimistic view
A pessimistic view
Guide to Further Reading
Notes
Glossary
Index
End User License Agreement
List of Tables
Chapter 1
Table 1.1: Global Share of Total Energy Supply, 1973 and 2019 (%)
Table 1.2: Sources of Global Electricity Generation, 1973 and 2019 (%)
Table 1.3: Energy Intensity of Economies, by Income Group, 1990 to 2015 (kWh/$)
Table 1.4: Emission Profiles of Selected Countries, 2018
Chapter 2
Table 2.1: Summary of Social Costs of Fossil Fuels Throughout Their Life Cycle
Table 2.2: Main Greenhouse Gases and Their Global Warming Potential (GWP)
Table 2.3: Avoided Premature Deaths from Accelerated Reductions by 2100 (in thousands)
Table 2.4: Clean Energy and Climate Action: Ten Benefits for Most Countries
Chapter 3
Table 3.1: Electricity Mix (2050) in Five Latin American Countries in the DDPP
Table 3.2: Summary of Decarbonization Pillars in the Next Four Chapters
Chapter 4
Table 4.1: Selected Indicators from the ACEEE
International Energy Efficiency Scorecard
Table 4.2: Top Five Countries in the ACEEE
Scorecard
, by Category
Chapter 5
Table 5.1: LCOE and Capacity Factors for Renewables, 2010–2020
Table 5.2: Environmental Impacts of Renewable Energy Sources
Table 5.3: Percentage of Electricity Generated by Wind and Solar (first half of 2021)
Chapter 6
Table 6.1: Benefits of a Smart Grid
Chapter 7
Table 7.1: Nuclear Fleets, Generation Share, and Reactors Under Construction, 2019
Table 7.2: Summary of the Three Complementary Technologies
Chapter 8
Table 8.1: Carbon Pricing Programs in 2021 (Country or Subnational Jurisdiction)
Table 8.2: Summary of Clean Energy Policy Tools
Table 8.3: Country Clusters and Clean Energy Progress
Chapter 9
Table 9.1: Technology Development/Deployment: Electricity Generation
Table 9.2: Technology Development/Deployment: Systems Integration, Transport, Industry
List of Illustrations
Chapter 1
Figure 1.1: Share of Total Energy in Europe Since 1800
Chapter 2
Figure 2.1: Relationship of Global CO2 Concentrations to Temperature
Chapter 3
Figure 3.1: Levels of Emission Cuts Needed to Meet the Paris Agreement
Figure 3.2: Summary of Energy Mix and Benefits of the 100% WWS Scenario
Figure 3.3:Comparison of
Reference Case
and
REmap
Figure 3.4: Clean Energy Investment in IEA’s Net Zero Scenario
Chapter 4
Figure 4.1: Energy Productivity in Selected Countries, 1990–2015
Figure 4.2: Carbon Cost of Abatement Curve for Mitigation Options
Figure 4.3: Costs Per Kilowatt-hour of Efficiency Relative to Supply Options
Chapter 5
Figure 5.1: Cost Declines in Wind (Onshore/Offshore) and Solar (PV/CSP)
Chapter 6
Figure 6.1: Relationship of Global Electricity Consumption and GDP Per Capita
Figure 6.2: Daily Load Curve for a Hot Day in California in 1999
Figure 6.3: Annual Load Curve for the United Kingdom in 2015
Figure 6.4: Global Electric Vehicle Stock by Region, 2010–2020
Chapter 7
Figure 7.1: Cumulative CO2 Emissions Avoided by Global Nuclear Power, 1971–2018
Guide
Cover
Table of Contents
Begin Reading
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The Clean Energy Transition
Policies and Politics for a Zero-Carbon World
Daniel J. Fiorino
polity
Copyright Page
Copyright © Daniel J. Fiorino 2022
The right of Daniel J. Fiorino to be identified as Author of this Work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
First published in 2022 by Polity Press
Polity Press
65 Bridge Street
Cambridge CB2 1UR, UK
Polity Press
111 River Street
Hoboken, NJ 07030, USA
All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purpose of criticism and review, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.
ISBN-13: 978-1-5095-4486-8
ISBN-13: 978-1-5095-4487-5 (pb)
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
Library of Congress Control Number: 2022932838
by Fakenham Prepress Solutions, Fakenham, Norfolk NR21 8NL
The publisher has used its best endeavours to ensure that the URLs for external websites referred to in this book are correct and active at the time of going to press. However, the publisher has no responsibility for the websites and can make no guarantee that a site will remain live or that the content is or will remain appropriate.
Every effort has been made to trace all copyright holders, but if any have been overlooked the publisher will be pleased to include any necessary credits in any subsequent reprint or edition.
For further information on Polity, visit our website: politybooks.com
Dedication
For
Matt and Lauren
Jake and Kelly
Andrew and Cam
Preface
The future of the planet and thus of humanity is tied inextricably to how we produce, use, and rely on energy. Compelling evidence of the effects of climate change is the most obvious sign of this link. The summer of 2021 brought massive floods in Germany and China, searing heat waves in the northwestern United States, an economically costly early frost in France, raging wildfires in Siberia, and damaging drought in much of the world. The longer it takes to cut energy and other emissions, the worse the impacts of a changing climate will be, and the harder it will become to change the emissions trajectory.
A changing climate is just the starting point for considering the effects of the current global energy system. Air pollution from fossil fuels is a leading threat to human health, a cause of illness and premature deaths, and a drag on prosperity. A fossil-fuel-based global energy system causes untold devastation to ecosystems around the world, from leaking pipelines and oil spills to the abandoned coal mines that dot rural landscapes. Moreover, the energy system as it developed over the last two centuries has concentrated economic and political power in ways that undermine social and political equity and stability.
The world now is engaged in the early stages of a transition to a cleaner energy system. This is by no means the first energy transition in history. There have been multiple such transitions: from a reliance on human and animal muscle and primitive wind, water, and solar technologies, to the unfolding of a coal-enabled industrial revolution, to the emergence of the nuclear industry in the mid-twentieth century. Yet this latest transition is the most consequential, because so much depends on it. The need for the move to clean energy, defined here as getting carbon out of the global system, is unassailable.
The transition to a decarbonized world is underway, but is not moving fast enough. It needs to be accelerated by committed governments, using well-designed, thoughtful policies. Action by individual governments is not enough. It helps, of course, if China and the United States, together responsible for some 40% of climate-related emissions, join forces with the European Union and other advanced economies in a concerted effort to clean up the global energy system. Even then, most emissions growth between now and mid-century – our decarbonization timetable – will occur not only in China but also elsewhere in southeastern Asia, and eventually in Africa and other parts of the world. It is not only the affluent countries that need to mobilize, but also those seeking affluence. And there is a compelling interest in having the developed countries support clean energy in developing ones.
In the last decade, the challenge has been defined more sharply – and more realistically – as one of net-zero carbon or carbon neutrality. This is the idea that we need to balance the books: to offset any remaining emissions later in this century with enhanced natural and technological means of removing carbon from emissions and even (after the fact) from the atmosphere. But reaching the elusive goal of carbon neutrality will require a fundamental transformation of the global energy system.
The transition to clean energy, then, has to happen globally, and it will not be easy. Energy is so much a part of modern life that it affects how people around the world work, play, move, invest, and survive. As we think about the climate change crisis and the other harms arising from the current energy system, it is tempting to aim for too much, too fast, without thinking it through carefully. The transition to clean energy is complicated, full of uncertainty, and has many moving parts. As with any complex endeavor, it helps to understand the obstacles as well as the opportunities.
A quote attributed to the organizational theorist, writer, and management professor Robert Anthony is apt: “Moving fast is not the same as going somewhere.” The current energy transition is so complex, and so much depends on it, that it has to be informed, intentional, and well designed. If our goal is getting carbon out of the global energy system sometime later this century – the goal much of the world has committed to – then there are limited opportunities for do-overs. It is tempting to want to eliminate fossil fuels by 2030, ban all oil and diesel cars by 2032, shut down all nuclear power plants, or make hydrogen the fuel for all international transport within a few decades. But those things are not going to happen, nor should they if a clean energy transition is going to be fair, durable, and successful in achieving its purpose.
The purpose of this book is to inform readers on the challenges and opportunities of a clean energy transition, present the case for a clean energy world, lay out and assess options for getting there, and offer advice on policies for accelerating the process. Many choices are left for the reader to consider: Does nuclear power have a role? How fast should we move? Should we invest in carbon removal technologies or just in renewables? Is electric mobility the economic wave of the future? What is the role of energy efficiency in the transition? How do we balance an electricity grid nearly totally dependent on variable renewables like wind and solar, and supply renewable power to all users?
My goal is to present the key issues and concepts, assess the paths to decarbonizing, lay out the leading policy options, offer perspectives on the available technologies, and shed light on the economic, environmental, health, social, and political issues associated with the clean energy transition.
From an economic and technological perspective, a transition to a far cleaner energy system sometime later this century is entirely feasible. The challenge is the politics. Albert Einstein reputedly once said that “Politics is more complicated than physics.” Although political scientists, including myself, might challenge that statement on a personal level, its relevance to clean energy is incontestable. The economic and technology aspects of the clean energy transition are difficult, but the politics are indeed complicated.
Like any policy field, that of energy involves terms and concepts that will be new to most readers. To some degree, it means learning a new policy language. To help the reader, the book includes a glossary of several key energy terms as a guide to this new language. When a term is first used, it is marked in bold in the text. An emboldened term is thus a cue to refer to the glossary for a brief description.
Many people have helped in this project. I received valuable research assistance as well as sound advice in the early stages from Carley Weted, Sabina Blanco Vecchi, and José Sáenz Crespo. They not only provided background research but also offered advice on priority issues and the overall approach. Michele Aquino provided later research support and handled the permissions for materials used in the book. Michael Kraft offered valuable, detailed advice on the manuscript, for which I am very grateful. I also want to thank Tony Rosenbaum and the three reviewers for Polity Press for their comments and suggestions.
I also owe thanks to my undergraduate students on the ‘Energy Politics and Policy’ course at American University for helping me think through the case for, and the makeup of, the clean energy transition.
At Polity, thanks go to Louise Knight for helping to develop the idea for the book and its approach, and to Inès Boxman for her advice and support throughout the project. Tim Clark provided expert, skillful copy editing, for which I am very grateful, and Rachel Moore guided the book through the production process.
This book is dedicated to Matt and Lauren, Jake and Kelly, and Andrew and Cam. They will see the effects of the clean energy transition as well as the harm should the transition move too slowly. Thanks finally, and as always, to Beth Ann Rabinovich for creating a positive environment for writing about these and so many other issues.
List of Figures, Tables, and Boxes
Figures
Figure 1.1: Share of Total Energy in Europe Since 1800
Figure 2.1: Relationship of Global CO2 Concentrations to Temperature
Figure 3.1: Levels of Emission Cuts Needed to Meet the Paris Agreement
Figure 3.2: Summary of Energy Mix and Benefits of the 100% WWS Scenario
Figure 3.3: Comparison of Reference Case and REmap
Figure 3.4: Clean Energy Investment in IEA’s Net Zero Scenario
Figure 4.1: Energy Productivity in Selected Countries, 1990–2015
Figure 4.2: Carbon Cost of Abatement Curve for Mitigation Options
Figure 4.3: Costs Per Kilowatt-hour for Efficiency Relative to Supply Options
Figure 5.1: Cost Declines in Wind (Onshore/Offshore) and Solar (PV/CSP)
Figure 6.1: Relationship of Global Electricity Consumption and GDP Per Capita
Figure 6.2: Daily Load Curve for a Hot Day in California in 1999
Figure 6.3: Annual Load Curve for the United Kingdom in 2015
Figure 6.4:Global Electric Vehicle Stock by Region, 2010–2020
Figure 7.1: Cumulative CO2 Emissions Avoided by Global Nuclear Power, 1971–2018
Tables
Table 1.1: Global Share of Total Energy Supply, 1973 and 2019
Table 1.2: Sources of Global Electricity Generation, 1973 and 2019
Table 1.3: Energy Intensity of Economies, by Income Group, 1990 to 2015
Table 1.4: Emission Profiles of Selected Countries, 2018
Table 2.1: Summary of Social Costs of Fossil Fuels Throughout Their Life Cycle
Table 2.2: Main Greenhouse Gases and Their Global Warming Potential
Table 2.3: Avoided Premature Deaths from Accelerated Reductions by 2100
Table 2.4: Clean Energy and Climate Action: Ten Benefits for Most Countries
Table 3.1: Electricity Mix (2050) in Five Latin American Countries in the DDPP
Table 3.2: Summary of Decarbonization Pillars in the Next Four Chapters
Table 4.1: Selected Indicators from the ACEEE International Energy Efficiency Scorecard
Table 4.2: Top Five Countries in the ACEEE Scorecard, by Category
Table 5.1: LCOE and Capacity Factors for Renewables, 2010–2020
Table 5.2: Environmental Impacts of Renewable Energy Sources
Table 5.3: Percentage of Electricity Generated by Wind and Solar (first half of 2021)
Table 6.1: Benefits of a Smart Grid
Table 7.1: Nuclear Fleets, Generation Share, and Reactors Under Construction, 2019
Table 7.2:Summary of the Three Complementary Technologies
Table 8.1: Carbon Pricing Programs in 2021 (Country or Subnational Jurisdiction)
Table 8.2: Summary of Clean Energy Policy Tools
Table 8.3: Country Clusters and Clean Energy Progress
Table 9.1: Technology Development/Deployment: Electricity Generation
Table 9.2: Technology Development/Deployment: Systems Integration, Transport, Industry
Boxes
Box 1.1: The Levelized Cost of Electricity (LCOE)
Box 4.1: Combined Heat and Power (CHP)
Box 6.1: District Heating and Cooling
Box 6.2: Heat Pumps
Box 9.1: Energy Cooperatives
Box 9.2: Energy Democracy: Policies, Outcomes, and Illustrations
1The Energy Landscape
In September 2020, Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, announced the European Green Deal, committing the European Union to reducing carbon emissions by “at least 55%” by 2030. By 2050, Europe plans to be the world’s first “climate-neutral continent” in the fight against the existential threat of climate change. Failing to act, the announcement stated, will not only exacerbate climate change, it could lead to over 400,000 deaths from air pollution and 90,000 from heat waves annually. “The longer we wait,” the EC warned, “the harder it becomes to reach low-temperature targets and the more expensive the necessary efforts will become.”1
That same month, President Xi Jinping of China announced that the country with the largest climate-related emissions in the world aimed to be “carbon neutral” within the next forty years.2 Over the next decade, China would begin reducing emissions, which would begin to fall “steeply” after 2035, with carbon neutrality achieved by 2060 (when remaining emissions will be balanced out by carbon removal). This is ambitious for a country that in 2020 was generating two-thirds of its electricity from coal plants and had another 200 such plants planned or under construction. According to one projection, however, even in 2060 fossil fuels (coal, natural gas, and oil) would still make up 16% of the energy system, which would be rendered carbon neutral by carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology and natural sinks like forests.3 Many experts thought this was doable, but that it would require a doubling of electricity generation with renewables and a major expansion in solar, wind, and nuclear power. One model foresaw an electricity mix for China of 28% nuclear, 21% wind, 17% solar, 14% hydropower, 8% biomass, and the rest from coal and gas using CCS.
Europe and China are not alone in this quest to get carbon out of their economies. According to the World Resources Institute (WRI), by the close of the 26th Conference of the Parties held in Glasgow, Scotland, in November 2021, seventy-four countries had adopted a national net-zero target as policy, although well over half of them had yet to enshrine it in law.4 Even the United States belatedly got in on the act. President Joe Biden announced a goal of using only renewables for electricity by 2035 and achieving carbon neutrality by 2050.5 Many US states, including California, New York, and Washington, have set mid-century net-zero carbon targets in law.6 Of course, setting a goal is not the same as meeting it, and emissions have to start falling well before 2050.
Why are so many countries promising to get rid of carbon? Could clean energy sources alone – wind, sun, water, biomass, geothermal, and nuclear – do what coal, oil, and natural gas have been doing for well over a century? Is the goal of decarbonizing the global energy system this century at all realistic? And why are so many countries wanting to achieve that goal?
The why part of this commitment is straightforward: The planet is warming due to the accumulation of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. There is now a global consensus that the world is on its way to suffering harsh and unmanageable effects from this warming, including perhaps runaway climate change that would prove to be more disruptive and harmful than anything that has occurred in human history. At the same time, the range of clean energy technology options has expanded, with wind and solar prices falling and their capacities growing. The focus of this movement is on energy. Much also has to happen, of course, in agriculture, forestry, land use, and elsewhere – but global energy accounts for most emissions. If a transition to clean (zero or low-carbon) energy is not achieved, the battle to stabilize the climate will be lost.
If the why of this transition is clear, the questions of whether it will occur and how are less so. If the goal is to eliminate carbon emissions sometime in mid-century, or get them so low that remaining emissions can be offset by technological or natural means of carbon removal (hence the carbon neutrality), then this is a tall order, given that fossil fuels have made up over 80% of global energy for decades. Although countries are making progress on cleaning up their electricity sectors, nearly all of transport and much of industry still rely on fossil fuels. The outlines of a transition have taken shape, as we will see in this book, but the specifics are open to debate.
The Clean Energy Transition
The global transition to clean energy must occur because the energy system accounts for three-fourths of the greenhouse gas emissions that cause climate change. It also is the leading cause of health-damaging air pollution and many forms of ecological degradation. The transition will occur because it now is underway, and the forces driving it are compelling. The question is whether it will occur fast enough and in ways that meet social and economic goals.
It is not currently happening fast enough. Over four-fifths of the global energy system relies on fossil fuels like coal, oil, and natural gas. This has changed only marginally in decades, despite the threat of climate change. Moving to clean energy will require greater use of renewable sources – solar, onshore and offshore wind, geothermal, beneficial biomass, tidal, and wave – as well as major improvements in the efficiency and use of distributed sources like community or residential solar. It also means applying the fruits of modern technology to every aspect of the energy system: production and generation, distribution networks, storage, mobility, transport, industry processes, and electricity grids. All this will involve changing product designs, service delivery, business models, land-use practices, economic policy, and consumer behavior.
Because the transition is underway, there is room for optimism. Because there is so far to go, there is just as much room for pessimism. Indeed, energy offers a good news/bad news story. First, the good news:
Between 2018 and 2050, capacities for generating electricity with solar photovoltaic (PV) sources could increase by a factor of twenty, while onshore wind may grow ten-fold.
7
The
energy intensity
(i.e. the energy needed to produce a dollar of economic output) of the global economy has improved by an average of 1.7% annually over the last two decades and is forecast to get even better over the next thirty years, with an average gain of 2.3% each year.
8
Solar PV and wind sources could be producing 62% of the world’s electricity by 2050.
9
The costs of generating electricity from floating offshore wind platforms may fall by nearly 40% between 2019 and 2050.
10
The International Energy Agency (IEA) believes that “All the technologies needed to achieve the necessary deep cuts in global emissions by 2030 already exist.”
11
Then there is the bad news:
By 2050, the world is likely to see population growth of 23% and average per capita income gains of 63%. Both types of increase have historically led to higher energy use.
12
Although good news for developing countries, this is bad news for the climate, health, and the environment.
Despite the rapid growth of wind and solar, the International Renewable Energy Agency reports that “Energy-related CO2 emissions have risen by 1% per year over the last decade.”
13
This was pre-pandemic, through 2019, but those growth rates will return.
Despite the recent progress in renewables, the world is not on track to meet the goals set out in the 2015 Paris Agreement (discussed in
Chapter 3
).
14
To decarbonize global energy by 2050, annual investment should average
at least
$3.2 trillion a year to 2050; the recent average (2014 to 2018) was $1.8 trillion.
15
Vehicles have become more efficient, but gains “have largely been offset by trends toward larger vehicles.”
16
The Latest But Different Energy Transition
Energy is essential to the world as we know it. Prosperity only became possible almost two centuries ago because people learned to harness forces other than human or animal muscle for work.17 Until the early 1800s and the dawn of the industrial revolution, humans relied on wood as their primary energy source, supplemented by wind and water. Early technologies like the steam engine, combined with the availability of coal as a fuel source, changed all that. Great Britain became the first industrial nation because it had coal, technical ingenuity, and an economy suited to applying energy to industry. The transition from wood to coal constituted an early energy transition. Since then, there have been transitions to oil, natural gas, nuclear, and now modern renewables like wind and solar. The long-term trends making up major European energy transitions are given in Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1:Share of Total Energy in Europe Since 1800
Source: Roger Fouquet, “Historical Energy Transitions, Speed, Prices, and System Transformation,” Energy Research and Social Science 22 (2016).
For 200 years, energy transitions resulted from considerations of efficiency, cost, convenience, and need. Coal is a dense source of energy and is available in much of the world. Indeed, economic growth through the nineteenth century correlates nicely with coal’s availability. Oil is energy-dense and portable, making it a hands-on choice for mobility – virtually all global transport is powered by oil. An early by-product of oil production, natural gas, became a heating and cooking fuel once pipeline technology enabled long-distance transmission. More recently, natural gas has edged out coal for generating electricity in many countries. Historically, countries used fossil fuels as a platform for achieving economic growth and more prosperous lifestyles. This must change.
The history of energy is one of transitions. Well into the 1800s, fuel for doing work beyond what human and animal muscle could do came from wood. When the revolutionaries and mutinous troops stormed the Bastille to start the French Revolution in 1789, coal was a novelty and oil a distant prospect. Thomas Jefferson likely wrote the Declaration of Independence using a lamp powered with whale oil. Coal largely replaced wood in the early to mid-1800s as the industrial revolution unfolded, first in England, then in Europe and North America. With their high energy density and portability, oil and other liquid fuels enabled major transport changes in the 1900s.
Coal, oil, and natural gas dominated the twentieth-century energy landscape. Major events in the history of that century are linked to energy production and use. Stokers were almost certainly busy filling the Titanic’s twenty-nine triple-furnace boilers with coal on the night of April 15, 1912, when it collided with an iceberg in the North Atlantic Ocean. What is seen as the start of mass production – the manufacture of Henry Ford’s Model T from 1908 to 1927 – cemented oil’s status as the fuel of choice for automobiles. Nuclear technology grew out of work on the atomic bomb during World War II, and smart electrical grid technologies are grounded in semiconductor design and production.
Roger Fouquet has written that energy transitions “depend on a series of actors and forces creating a new path.”18 They result from interactions between technology, perceived needs, human ingenuity, and events. The dominant energy industries in any era tend to lock-in and resist change, but new ones emerge to challenge the incumbent fuels and technologies. This is a slow and uncertain process. Vaclav Smil, a foremost expert on energy transitions, describes them as “prolonged affairs that take decades to accomplish.” They “encompass the time that elapses between an introduction of a new primary energy source … and its rise to claiming a substantial share (20 percent to 30 percent) of the market.”19 Even when governments push a transition, it does not happen overnight.
The world has now embarked on another energy transition. Unlike those of the past, this one is driven not just by economics, convenience, or new technologies. It is distinctive in being driven by worries over the social and environmental effects of energy production and use. Public opinion in most of the world is coalescing on the role fossil fuels play in climate change. But these climate worries are reinforced by other longstanding concerns. Fossil fuels are bad for human health. Burning them releases harmful pollutants like nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxide, mercury, and fine particles that cause illness and premature death. Fossil fuels damage the environment by polluting water and land with acids, producing waste that ends up in rivers and lakes, and causing oil spills, among other harms.
Political and social concerns also shape the current transition. For critics, energy concentrates economic and political power in socially harmful, inequitable ways.20 Until recently, oil companies were among the most prominent global corporations. The fossil fuel industry exercises an outsized influence in countries with fossil fuel resources, like the United States and Australia. Fossil fuels sustain authoritarian regimes in such places as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Russia. At a deeper level, there are concerns about the centralization of political and economic power in relation to energy systems. The growth of electricity grids in the last century and the reliance on technologically complex, capital-intensive coal and nuclear power plants are part of what is driving this concern.
This chapter begins our look at the global energy system. As already suggested, there are grounds for both optimism and pessimism. From a technology and economic perspective, we can be hopeful. Many clean energy technologies already exist; others are in sight and can be realized with the right research, investment, incentives, and policy designs. The hard part is agreeing on the need for change, coordinating all the choices and actions that will be necessary, treating affected groups fairly, and taking the long view. As Albert Einstein said at a Princeton conference in 1946: “Politics is more difficult than physics.”
The next section gives an overview of the global energy system. Obviously, this is a big topic, but the limited goal here is to provide a foundation for discussing decarbonization. Following that we take a look at concepts that are critical to understanding decarbonization and the forms it may take. Too often, clean energy debates reflect wishful thinking on one side and doom and gloom on the other. Clarifying the key concepts involved will provide a basis for defining a realistic path to a decarbonized global energy system. The last part of the chapter previews the book.
The Global Energy System
The concept of a system refers to a collection of interrelated parts that form a functioning whole in terms of both structure and process. Systems exhibit a number of features. They are self-organizing to varying degrees in balancing external pressures with internal structure and processes to maintain equilibrium. They are resilient to the extent they maintain equilibrium despite these external pressures. Well-functioning systems adapt to pressures from the environment. Systems are or should be dynamic, regularly adapting to change as they strive to maintain their core structure and processes.
Thinking of global energy as a system helps to make sense of it. This system is complex and global. It has many parts: oil producers in Saudi Arabia; refineries in Texas; solar module factories in China; wind turbine firms in Denmark; public policymakers in California or Germany; farmers charging phones in Kenya; villagers cooking in India – the list goes on. The energy system is embedded in economic and social systems. It adapts to changes in demand and supply, government policy, new technologies, consumption patterns, the availability of fuels, and much more.
The energy system is made up of combined natural and social forces. Most energy comes from nature in one way or another: from fossil fuels, sun, wind, biomass, waves, and tides. The system adapts to pressures that are unpredictable, some coming as “shocks.” Indeed, we speak of the 1970s oil embargo, when Saudi Arabia cut off oil exports to protest US support for Israel, as oil shocks. As with any shock, different parts of the energy system responded in contrasting ways: France turned to nuclear; Denmark began its transition to wind; Sweden later adopted a stringent carbon tax.21 The United States responded similarly at first, but later reverted back to the fossil-fuel-driven status quo.
As the history of energy transitions shows, the global energy system has adapted over time. Government policy has influenced past energy transitions, providing subsidies, building infrastructure, promoting technologies, structuring investment incentives, regulating sources, and taxing energy. One theme of this book is that this transition requires a more active and intentional government role.
Energy basics
Learning about any policy field involves learning a language. This is true for energy. Some terms are so central to the clean energy transition that they are worth presenting and defining here. For example, primary energy comes from natural sources, from either stocks (coal, natural gas) or flows (wind or solar). Primary energy needs to be converted before it can be used. Crude oil is refined into gas or diesel; coal or wind are used in power plants to generate electricity. Two key terms are “total primary energy supply” and “total energy consumption.” The latter is always smaller because of the losses incurred in converting and distributing primary energy. The heart of the challenge is matching supply with demand. The path to a transition lies in developing cleaner supplies while controlling or reducing consumption.
Electricity is “energy harnessed from the configuration or movement of electrons.”22 When we use electricity, we are using energy held temporarily by electrons. It converts primary energy from coal, natural gas, water, or wind into a usable form. It is not primary energy; it is a carrier of energy. Electricity makes up some 20% of global energy consumption. A goal of the transition is to electrify energy uses that depend on fossil fuels in transport, industry, and buildings. Electrification enables the use of clean technologies like wind and solar. Hydrogen is another energy carrier; as with electricity, primary energy is needed to produce it. Yet hydrogen does things electricity cannot (see Chapter 7).
Energy may be used more or less efficiently. Given likely economic and population growth, another central goal of the transition is to use less energy to produce a unit of economic output. The less the energy intensity of an economy, the more the return on each unit of energy used. The correlate of intensity is productivity: lower energy intensity equals higher productivity. Economic growth nearly always leads to more energy use but, at the same time, to declining intensity. In the US, intensity has fallen about 2% annually since 1974. In the same period, consumption grew by about a third. It would have grown far more without the fall in intensity. The same pattern occurs elsewhere.
One way to look at energy is through the United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The relevant goal is SDG7, on “affordable and clean energy.” Its three targets are to ensure “universal access to affordable, reliable, and modern energy services … increase substantially the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix … [and] double the rate of improvement in energy efficiency.”23 Electricity access is vital for overcoming poverty. In this respect, the goal is to increase access especially to electricity. This is improving. The number of people lacking access fell from 1.2 billion in 2010 to 789 million in 2018, with notable gains in India, Bangladesh, and Kenya. Ideally, people gain access to clean energy that is healthier, more climate-friendly, and accessible when they lack connections to bulk grids.
Global energy system highlights
Despite signs that an energy transition is underway, the last half century has seen little progress in getting the carbon out. In 1973, according to the IEA, 87% of the total global energy supply came from fossil fuels: coal, oil, and natural gas. In 2019, the comparable share was 81%. Fossil fuels had fallen only 6% in five decades.24 Electricity generation is better. This is where the energy transition starts. In 1973, again based on IEA data, fossil fuels accounted for just over 76% of electricity generation; by 2019, this was down to 64%.25 This is progress but it is hardly a roaring start to an energy transition. Tables 1.1 and 1.2 list the sources of total energy and just of electricity in 1973 and 2019.
Table 1.1:Global Share of Total Energy Supply, 1973 and 2019 (%)
Source
1973
2019
Coal
24.7%
26.8%
Oil
46.2
30.9
Natural Gas
16.1
23.2
Nuclear
0.9
5.0
Hydro
1.8
2.5
Biofuels/Waste
10.2
9.4
Other
0.1
2.2
Source: IEA,
Key World Energy Statistics, 2021
, p. 6.
Table 1.2:Sources of Global Electricity Generation, 1973 and 2019 (%)
Source
1973
2019
Coal
38.9%
36.7%
Natural Gas
12.1
23.6
Oil
24.8
2.8
Nuclear
3.3
10.4
Hydro
20.9
15.7
Non-Hydro Renewables & Waste
0.6
10.8
Total (Terawatt-Hours/TWh)
6131 TWh
26,936 TWh
Source: IEA,
Key World Energy Statistics, 2021
, p. 30.
The amount of energy delivered as electricity more than quadrupled between 1973 and 2019, from about 6,000 terawatt-hours (trillions of watts/TWh) to nearly 27,000. This trend will continue. Indeed, it must do so if wind and solar electricity is being used to decarbonize transport and industry.
Essential for understanding the energy system overall, and avenues for decarbonizing in particular, are regional changes in supply. In 1973, members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (the OECD, a group of thirty-eight developed countries with relatively high living standards) accounted for 62% of the global energy supply; China made up a mere 7% and the rest of non-OECD Asia just over 5%. In 2019, China’s share had passed 23%, and the rest of non-OECD Asia was approaching 14%. Meanwhile, Africa, a next potential economic growth area, increased from a 3.3 to 5.9% share. The OECD share had fallen to 37% by 2019.26 Energy supplies in OECD countries will be stable in the coming decades, but the expected rapid growth in Asia and eventually much of Africa will challenge clean energy ambitions. Fast-growing economies have big energy appetites.
A look at the dirtiest energy source – coal – gives a sense of the economics and politics of the energy transition. In 1973, OECD countries accounted for well over one-half (56%) of global coal production. China and the rest of non-OECD Asia were under 18%. In 2019, China made up half (49.7%) of coal production and the rest of non-OECD Asia another 19.6%. OECD countries had fallen to one-fifth. Among the other countries with large coal production shares are India (10% of world production), Indonesia (8%), the US (8%), and Australia (6%).27 The largest coal-exporting countries – including Indonesia, Australia, Russia, South Africa, and the US – have economic reasons for resisting clean energy policies and investments. The same holds for oil producers and exporters. The US (17%), Russia (12%), Saudi Arabia (12%), and Canada (6%) produce nearly half the world’s oil. The largest exporters are Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iraq, Canada, and Nigeria. Among the major importers are China, the US, India, South Korea, and Japan.28
As Table 1.1 shows, coal rose slightly in its share of the total energy supply, and natural gas even more. Oil declined in supply share, largely because it is used less to produce electricity. Hydro grew; biofuels fell slightly. The “other” category reflects wind and solar growth. Still, even with their rapid growth rates, modern renewables are a small fraction of energy. Meanwhile, energy supplies over the 1973–2019 period more than doubled. The growth in clean energy was overwhelmed by higher energy use as a result of more manufacturing and more prosperous lifestyles.
The US Energy Information Administration (EIA), part of the Department of Energy, makes an annual assessment of energy trends and prospects for the next several decades. Especially useful is its Reference case, which incorporates likely trends, planned infrastructure change, incremental technology gains, and projected costs into 2050. It does not account for unanticipated events, like changes in international agreements, disruptive events, technology breakthroughs, or unannounced law and policy changes. For the period 2020–50, it projected a most likely global economic growth rate of 2.8%. The rate will vary by stage of development. In the OECD countries, the likely growth rate is 1.7% (a range of 1.2–2.2%), while in non-OECD countries it is 3.6% (a range of 2.6–4.6%).29
Even with gains in energy intensity, this growth will burden the climate and threaten public health. The EIA projects that global energy use will grow by nearly half by 2050, “driven by non-OECD growth and population.”30 Indeed, GDP is projected to nearly double in OECD and almost quadruple in non-OECD countries. Population is expected to remain level in the OECD but to increase outside of it. In the energy mix, the EIA expects coal and nuclear to remain flat, oil and natural gas to grow, and renewables to nearly double to become 30% of the total, driven by wind and solar.31
Per capita energy consumption varies greatly across countries. This mostly reflects the size of an economy and its wealth, but not entirely. Generally, richer countries like the US or Japan use far more energy per capita than poor ones in Asia or Africa. Yet countries at similar wealth levels also vary. Among high-income countries, the US in 2019 used 288 gigajoules per capita, Canada 380, and Australia 254. Germany’s per capita use was 157 and the United Kingdom’s 116. China was 99 per capita, Vietnam 43, India 25, and Bangladesh 11.32 As economies grow, they use more energy, but at varying rates. This has to change if the world is going to decarbonize.
The good news is that as energy use increases, energy intensity improves. Lower intensity means that an economy or sector (chemicals, auto, iron and steel) generates more economic value per unit of energy use. Economies become more energy efficient as they develop and technologies improve. In 1990, the world economy needed the equivalent of 2.11 kWh hours of electricity to produce a US dollar of output; by 2015 this had fallen to 1.43 kWh. Energy intensity improves even with advanced growth. High-income economies like the US and EU stood at 1.82 per kWh in 1990 but had fallen to 1.28 by 2015. Low-income countries improved at the same rate (30%), although starting higher, and middle-income countries at a higher rate (see Table 1.3).33 Still, to decarbonize, absolute energy use and not just intensity must fall. Given the expected economic growth rates, global energy intensity has to improve at roughly double the rate of recent years to come close to decarbonizing.
Table 1.3:Energy Intensity of Economies, by Income Group, 1990 to 2015 (kWh/$)
Income Group
1990 Energy Intensity
2015 Energy Intensity
% Improvement
Low Income
3.35
2.46
30%
Middle Income
2.56
1.54
40%
High Income
1.82
1.28
30%
World
2.11
1.43
32%
Source:
Our World in Data
, “Energy Intensity of Economies, 1990 to 2015” (World Bank data).
Another way to define the landscape, especially given a decarbonization goal, is by source of emissions. According to the WRI’s ClimateWatch, global greenhouse gas emissions in 2018 (including land use changes and forestry) were just under 49 gigatons (billion tons) of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e), some 50% above the 1990 figure – not a good trend.34 Energy accounted for three-fourths (76%) of this. Among countries, the top ten accounted for over 60% of CO2e emissions (for the purposes of this book the EU is counted as one “country”). China was 24% of the total; the US was 12%; India and the EU each were some 7%; and Russia was 4%.35 If these countries are not part of the global decarbonization process it will not succeed. If we exclude the effects of changes in land use and forestry (LUCF), global emissions amount to just under 47 gigatons, of which a similar percentage (77%) are energy-related. Excluding LUCF, global emissions per capita in 2018 were 6.26 tons; global emissions of all greenhouse gases per million dollars of GDP amounted to about 550 tons.
Countries vary considerably in emissions per capita and per unit of economic activity. Table 1.4 compares selected countries at various stages of economic growth. For each, it lists the total 2018 emissions, the energy-related percentage, and those per capita and per million dollars of GDP. Countries vary in the proportion of emissions that are energy-related. The percentage of energy-related emissions is lower for countries earlier in their growth process, such as India (72%), Nigeria (63%), and Kenya (35%). As they grow, the share of energy-related emissions will increase, especially if they rely on fossil fuels. As noted in the table, these emissions numbers exclude the effects of land use changes and forestry (LUCF).
Table 1.4:Emission Profiles of Selected Countries, 2018
Country
Greenhouse Gas Emissions (CO2e gigatons)
% Related to Energy
Per Capita Emissions (tons)
Tons/Million $ GDP
China
12.36
83%
8.87
889.2
United States
6.24
84%
18.84
292.7
India
3.37
72%
2.50
1243.9
EU
3.57
81%
7.98
223.4
Russia
2.54
90%
17.60
1523.4
Indonesia
.970
62%
3.62
930.3
Japan
1.19
92%
9.38
239.5
United Kingdom
0.452
81%
6.80
127.5
Nigeria
0.311
63%
1.59
784.1
Kenya
0.079
35%
1.53
898
Sweden
0.046
78%
4.56
83.5
Note: Emissions totals exclude land use change and forestry (LUCF) to present a country’s direct impact on global emissions.Source: Based on data from WRI,
Climate Watch
,
https://www.climatewatchdata.org./ghg-emissions?source=CAIT
.
Countries also vary in emissions per capita, from a high on this list of over 18 tons in the US, to a mid-range for Japan and the EU, to lows for India and Nigeria. With expected economic growth in coming decades, the last column in Table 1.4 is notable. Although the mature economies (US, Japan, the EU) have high per capita emissions, they are low per unit of GDP. Their economies are less carbon-intensive than in early-growth countries. Still, with economic growth, emissions will grow, and that is a problem. Sweden is impressive, with low emissions per capita and per unit of GDP. Sweden shows that affluence is not incompatible with mitigation; it is no surprise that Sweden ranked at the top of the 2020 Climate Change Performance Index.
Another way to look at countries is in terms of their cumulative emissions over time.36 Between 1751 and 2017, the world emitted over 1.5 trillion tons of CO2. The US accounted for 25% of that, followed by China at nearly 13%. Together, the EU-28 are responsible for 22% of historical emissions. The South American and African continents account for 3% each. India – the expected rapid-growth economy in the coming decades – is likewise so far responsible for a mere 3% of cumulative emissions.
The coming decades will have to be different from the last five. True, decarbonization did not even emerge on global agendas until the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Even since 1990, however, fossil fuel shares have fallen only slightly. By late in the century, fossil fuels will have to have fallen at least to 20% and ideally to under 10% of total energy, with any residual emissions offset by enhanced natural or technological carbon removal. Otherwise, there is little chance of reaching the holy grail of carbon neutrality.
The big energy picture
As Jonathan Harris and Brian Roach put it in their text on natural resource economics: “The period of intensive fossil fuel use that began with coal in the eighteenth century was a one-time, unrepeatable bonanza – the rapid exploitation of a limited stock of high-quality resources, with increasingly negative effects on planetary ecosystems.”37 The planet will endure, but the ability of humans to live a comfortable, safe, and meaningful life is under threat. To summarize the issues raised so far:
The global energy system accounts for some three-fourths of climate-harmful emissions and must be a priority in the fight against climate change.
38
The trajectory of rising emissions has slowed but not changed (excepting the 2020 pandemic year, which bought the world some time but did not alter the trajectory).
Poor countries face different issues. They need to expand electricity access to enable growth and improve the quality of life, ideally with renewables.
Per capita consumption and emissions vary among countries. But energy use and associated emissions rise with economic growth, despite better energy intensity.
Early industrializers (US, Europe, Japan) accounted for most emissions until now, but emerging, rapid-growth countries (China, India, Indonesia, Vietnam, Nigeria) will add the largest share of energy-related emissions for the rest of this century.
Energy intensity gets better as economies mature; this must translate into absolute cuts in energy use and cleaner sources, leading to far lower
carbon intensity
.
Energy’s future is in electricity and eventually green hydrogen; electricity’s future is in wind and solar with support from complementary technologies like nuclear or carbon capture and storage.
Transport, buildings, and heavy industry are the most difficult sectors in terms of energy use. Nothing is easy in the path to clean energy, but these are the toughest nuts to crack.
One reason the world is having a hard time getting off fossil fuels is the tremendous appetite for energy. Fossil fuels made prosperity possible. Since 1960, the global economy has grown, with exceptions, at a rate of about 2–6% a year.39 The global population in 2021 was 7.5 billion, and will exceed 9 billion by the 2050s. Politically and economically, reliable energy is not optional. A second reason is carbon lock-in – the extensive investment of technology, physical capital, and social familiarity in current energy systems, along with the political power of the fossil fuel industries. Third is the complexity of the transition. For example, the rapidly falling costs of solar photovoltaic systems are but one piece in a complicated puzzle. Grids have to be designed and managed to integrate variable renewables; transport has to be electrified; surplus wind and solar energy has to be stored. Energy systems are complicated, their parts interdependent.
The clean energy transition is often oversimplified. We hear calls for 100% renewables or for shutting down coal and nuclear plants without an appreciation of just what that involves. A transition built on false premises or unrealistic expectations is one that almost certainly will fail.
Making Sense of Energy: Key Concepts
The energy landscape offers several concepts for defining choices, comparing and evaluating alternatives, and proposing solutions. They are a starting point for making sense of the paths to clean energy.
Energy systems involve lots of physical infrastructure, depend heavily on accumulated past choices, and are embedded in economic and social systems. In describing energy systems as complex, we mean not just that they are technically intricate (try explaining light-water nuclear reactors or chemically based energy storage) but also that they involve an interdependence among their various parts. Wind and sun help only if their power can be converted into useful energy and distributed to users. To get the full benefit of electric vehicles (EVs), they need to be charged by electricity generated from renewables. Energy systems are intricate spiderwebs; touching one part affects many others.
The reliance on physical infrastructure is obvious to anyone who has seen electricity substations or gas stations on busy roads, or the huge cooling towers at coal-fired and nuclear power plants. These physical structures represent huge financial investments. The effects of past choices, what social scientists call path dependence, are apparent. Decisions on nuclear technology made in the 1950s shaped the design of the more than ninety reactors operating today in the US.40 The increase in average global temperatures that is occurring was influenced by carbon dioxide released since the start of the industrial revolution and from Henry Ford’s Model T. Greenhouse gases emitted and carbon sinks lost today will have effects for generations. We need to look forward as well as backward.
As for energy systems being embedded in social and economic systems, think of how a world without modern energy would look. It would be poorer, to be sure. High-income countries use lots of energy.41 A result mainly of fossil fuels, emissions move almost in lock-step with GDP. Studies have found that “energy indices are highly correlated with a higher standard of living,”42 and that “indices of human social well-being are well correlated with indices of energy availability.”43 The link between economic growth and CO2 emissions can be broken – a break known as decoupling – but growth as it has occurred to this point has almost always involved higher emissions due to the use of more fossil fuels.
Carbon lock-in
Our look at the key terms begins with
