Theory and Practice E-Book

Jürgen Habermas

• Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch
• Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2015

Seitenzahl: 568

Beschreibung

Theory and Practice is one of Habermas's major works and is widely recognized as a classic in contemporary and social and political theory. Through a series of highly original historical studies, Habermas re-examines the relations between philosophy, science and politics. Beginning with the classical doctrine of politics as developed by Aristotle, he traces the changing constellation of theory and practice through the work of Machiavelli, More, Hobbes, Hegel and Marx. He argues that, with the development of the modern sciences, politics has become increasingly regarded as a technical discipline concerned with problems of prediction and control. Politics has thus lost its link with the practical cultivation of character, that is, with the praxis of enlightened citizens. Theory and Practices includes a major re-assessment of Marx's work and of the status of Marxism as a form of critique. In an important concluding chapter Habermas examines the role of reason and the prospects for critical theory in our modern scientific civilization.

Leseprobe

Contents

Translator’s Note on German Terms

Introduction: Some Difficulties in the Attempt to Link Theory and Praxis

1 The Classical Doctrine of Politics in Relation to Social Philosophy

2 Natural Law and Revolution

3 Hegel’s Critique of the French Revolution

4 Labor and Interaction: Remarks on Hegel’s Jena Philosophy of Mind

5 On Hegel’s Political Writings

6 Between Philosophy and Science: Marxism as Critique

7 Dogmatism, Reason, and Decision: On Theory and Praxis in our Scientific Civilization

Notes

Index

Theory and Practice is an abridgment by the author of the fourth edition of Theorie und Praxis published in 1971 by Suhrkamp Verlag to which he has added “Arbeit und Interaktion” from Technik und Wissenschaftals “Ideologie” published by Suhrkamp Verlag.

English translation © 1973 by Beacon Press

German text: Chapters 1, 2, 3, 6, and 7 © 1963 by Hermann Luchterhand Verlag GmbH; Chapter 5 © 1966 by Suhrkamp Verlag; Chapter 6 © 1968 by Suhrkamp Verlag; and Introduction © 1971 by Suhrkamp Verlag

First published 1988 by Polity Press in association with Blackwell Publishers Ltd.

Reprinted 1996, 2004, 2007

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ISBN: 978-0-7456-0387-2 (pbk)

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Translator's Note on German Terms

The difficulties which spring from the fact that crucial terms in German have a quite different range of meaning and connotation from any of the available English equivalents will not be unfamiliar to anyone who has occupied himself with German philosophy, social theory, or psychology. The glossary below is intended to recall some of the main problems that arise as a consequence and to explain the usage adopted in this translation.

Anschauung—English translations of Kant have established “intuition” as the equivalent English term, which raises the problem that this English word has connotations quite different from Kant’s intention of reference to the processes of sense perception— inner and outer—and their product. In many contexts, such as Weltanschauung, simply “view” has seemed preferable, or even, in some cases, “sense perception” or “perceiving.”

Anthropologisch, Anthropologie—the philosophical theory of man and not the science of anthropology as it has developed largely in the twentieth century.

Dezision, also Entscheidung—Dezision generally used in the context of Dezisionismus, an existentialist approach stressing the reaching of a decision rather than its content, and associated in Germany with National Socialist ideology. As the emphasis implies arriving at a pure and uncritical commitment, it seemed preferable, in various contexts, to translate Dezision as “commitment.”

Entaussern, Entäusserung—generally, to externalize, exter-nalization; but also: sich entäussern—self-alienation.

Erlebnis—there are two German words meaning “experience”: Erlebnis and the more abstract and general Erfahrung; with its root leben (live) Erlebnis therefore has the connotation of “life-experience,” an experience through which the subject has lived.

Geisteswissenschaft—the difficulty here is related to the familiar problem of translating Geist. Geisteswissenschaft, literally the mental or spiritual sciences. It has been translated variously as “humanities,” “sciences of man,” “social sciences,” etc. In Knowledge and Human Interest as “cultural sciences.”

Mündigkeit—literally “majority” in the sense “legally of age.” For Kant mankind’s “majority” is the historical goal of enlightenment (in “What Is Enlightenment?”). To preserve this developmental connotation I have generally preferred “mature autonomy.”

Naturrecht, Recht—asRecht means both “right” and “law” (in the legal sense), so Naturrecht can be translated as either “natural right” or “natural law.” I have generally preferred the latter, as in the tradition treated the association of “natural law” with “law of nature” is important. The German term, of course, does not have this connotation. So too Rechtszustand (legal order), Rechtspflege (jurisprudence), Staatsrecht (constitutional law), etc.

Objektivieren—objectivate, objectivation; “to give form in a symbolic system, that is, to make into a vehicle for communicative action. The latter may become external to the subject in the sense that others participate in it, but it is at the same time that in which the subject exists” (J. J. Shapiro in Knowledge and Human Interest, footnote 23 to chapter 2).

Praxis—the title Theorie und Praxis has been rendered Theory and Practice, as “practice” in this direct juxtaposition to “theory” clearly gives the meaning of the German word. However, in English “practice” has a different range of meaning; therefore, in other contexts “praxis” was preferred, as it seemed to me that clarity and accessibility would outweigh the danger of using a term the meaning of which is to be explored in the work itself.

Schein has a very large range of meaning—appearance, illusion, shining (as a light); generally “semblance” seemed the preferable translation.

Sozialstaat—literally “social state,” but actually the equivalent of “welfare state” in our usage.

Verhalten—behavior, conduct, comportment; the latter two equivalents have been preferred where the connection with a specific approach which “behavior” has acquired was to be avoided.

Vorstellung—usually “representation” in the English rendering of Kantian terminology; I have generally preferred the more ordinary meaning “conception.”

Willensbildung—literally “formation of the will,” but associated (a) with the concept of the general or public will, and (b) Bildung as formation, education, cultivation. “Decision making” thus represents the same process, but with a somewhat different conceptual background.

Zerstreuung—means not only “dispersal” but also “amusement,” “diversion.”

Further remarks on terminology can be found in Jeremy J. Shapiro’s “Translator’s Preface” to Habermas, Toward a Rational Society, and throughout the notes to Knowledge and Human Interest (again translated by Shapiro).

I am very much indebted to Jeremy J. Shapiro for numerous suggestions and emendations which greatly improved the clarity and accuracy of the translation. I also want to express my gratitude to Lois M. Randall, whose patience, competence, and good taste contributed so much in the editing of the text.

John Viertel

Introduction:

Some Difficulties in the Attempt to Link Theory and Praxis

In the preface to the first German edition I held out the prospect of a systematic investigation into the relationship between theory and praxis. I have not progressed much beyond this announcement of intent but this does not mean that since that time I have neglected this theme. On the contrary, my published work since then shows that the problem has in no way relaxed its hold on me. This new edition of Theory and Practice [fourth German edition] presents a welcome opportunity for me to ascertain in a retrospective view (of necessity a somewhat hasty one), where the studies I have undertaken up to this point have led me.

“Theory and Praxis”

The investigations collected in this volume, in which the orientation has been predominantly historical, were to develop the idea of a theory of society conceived with a practical intention, and to delimit its status with respect to theories of different origins. Historical materialism aims at achieving an explanation of social evolution which is so comprehensive that it embraces the interrelationships of the theory’s own origins and application. The theory specifies the conditions under which reflection on the history of our species by members of this species themselves has become objectively possible; and at the same time it names those to whom this theory is addressed, who then with its aid can gain enlightenment about their emancipatory role in the process of history. The theory occupies itself with reflection on the interrelationships of its origin and with anticipation of those of its application, and thus sees itself as a necessary catalytic moment within the social complex of life which it analyzes; and this complex it analyzes as integral interconnections of compulsions, from the viewpoint of the possible sublation—resolution and abolition —of all this.

The theory thus encompasses a dual relationship between theory and praxis. On the one hand, it investigates the constitutive historical complex of the constellation of self-interests, to which the theory still belongs across and beyond its acts of insight. On the other hand, it studies the historical interconnections of action, in which the theory, as action-oriented, can intervene. In the one case, we have a social praxis, which, as societal synthesis, makes insight possible; in the other case, a political praxis which consciously aims at overthrowing the existing system of institutions. Because of its reflection on its own origins, critique is to be distinguished from science as well as from philosophy. For the sciences focus away from their constitutive contexts and confront the domain of their subject matter with an objectivistic posture; while, obversely, philosophy has been only too conscious of its origins as something that had ontological primacy. By anticipating the context of its own application, critique differs from what Horkheimer has called “traditional theory.” Critique understands that its claims to validity can be verified only in the successful process of enlightenment, and that means: in the practical discourse of those concerned. Critique renounces the contemplative claims of theories constructed in monologic form, and in addition, discerns that all philosophy up till now, in spite of all its claims, also only presumes to have such a contemplative character.1

To be sure, these assertions are not systematically developed in this volume, but only treated in connection with the history of the problem, in which the Aristotelian distinction between praxis and techne serves as the connecting thread. As opposed to the classical doctrine of Natural Law,2 modern social philosophy can assert its claims to a competitive status: to be taken seriously from a scientific viewpoint, only at the cost of a separation from that connection with experience which practical philosophy maintains. Social philosophy, having taken on monologic form, is no longer capable of essentially relating to praxis, but merely to goal-directed purposive action guided by social-technical recommendations. Within this framework historical materialism can be understood as a theory of society conceived with a practical intent, which avoids the complementary weaknesses both of traditional politics and of modern social philosophy; it thus unites the claim to a scientific character with a theoretical structure referring to praxis. In later investigations I have sought to clarify further three aspects of the relation between theory and praxis: (1) the empirical aspect of the relationship between science, politics, and public opinion in advanced capitalistic social systems; (2) the epistemological aspect of the relation between knowledge and interest; (3) the methodological aspect of a social theory which aims at being capable of assuming the role of a critique.