A Companion to Experimental Philosophy E-Book

• Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Serie: Blackwell Companions to Philosophy
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 1726

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2016

Beschreibung

This is a comprehensive collection of essays that explores cutting-edge work in experimental philosophy, a radical new movement that applies quantitative and empirical methods to traditional topics of philosophical inquiry.

• Situates the discipline within Western philosophy and then surveys the work of experimental philosophers by sub-discipline
• Contains insights for a diverse range of fields, including linguistics, cognitive science, anthropology, economics, and psychology, as well as almost every area of professional philosophy today
• Edited by two rising scholars who take a broad and inclusive approach to the field
• Offers a complete introduction for non-specialists and students to the central approaches, findings, challenges, and controversies in experimental philosophy

Leseprobe

Table of Contents

Cover

Title Page

Notes on Contributors

Acknowledgments

Introduction

Part I: Experimental Philosophy

1 Experimental Philosophy and the Philosophical Tradition

1.1 Introduction

1.2 What Are Philosophical Intuitions?

1.3 Why Do Experimental Philosophers Want to Study Philosophical Intuitions Using the Methods of Empirical Science?

1.4 The Expertise Defense

References

2 Philosophical Criticisms of Experimental Philosophy

2.1 Introduction

2.2 “Philosophical Intuitions”

2.3 Proper Domains for the Application of Concepts

2.4 Further Questions about the Parity Defense

2.5 Acts of Judging and Evidence

2.6 Error-fragility

References

3 Experimental Philosophy Is Cognitive Science

3.1

3.2

3.3

3.4

3.5

3.6

3.7

3.8

Acknowledgment

References

4 Armchair-Friendly Experimental Philosophy

4.1 Introduction

4.2 Three Experimentalist Challenges to the Armchair

4.3 What Is Armchair Philosophy?

4.4 Rebutting the Three Experimentalist Challenges, Experimentally

4.5 Empirically Extending and Enhancing the Reach of the Armchair

4.6 Conclusion

Acknowledgment

References

5 Going Positive by Going Negative

5.1 On the Philosophical Relevance and Methodological Danger of Experimental Philosophy

5.2 The Prehistory of X-phi: Armchair Philosophy's Reliance on Armchair Psychology

5.3 Noise, Signal, and Experimental Philosophy

5.4 Going Positive By Going Negative

5.5 X-phi Tools for the (Philosophical) Masses?

References

6 Early Modern Experimental Philosophy

1

6.1 Experimental Philosophy and Experiments

6.2 Experimental Philosophy and Experimental Natural History

6.3 Experimental Philosophy and Medicine

6.4 Newtonianism and Experimental Philosophy

6.5 Experimental Philosophy in Eighteenth-Century Holland and France

6.6 Experimental Philosophy and Moral Philosophy

6.7 The Eclipse of Early Modern Experimental Philosophy

6.8 Early Modern Experimental Philosophy and Contemporary x-phi

References

7 Nietzsche and Moral Psychology

7.1 Moralities are Symptoms of the Affects

7.2 The Doctrine of Types

7.3 Epiphenomenalism

7.4 Nietzsche’s Strength Model of Self-Control

7.5 Conclusion

References

Part II: Areas of Research

A.

Free Will and Philosophy of Action

8 The Folk Concept of Intentional Action

8.1 Two Puzzles for Intentional Action: The Knobe Effect and the Skill Effect

8.2 Normative and Evaluative Considerations: A Constitutive Component of Intentional Action, or Just a Bias?

8.3 A Knobe Effect without Evaluative Considerations?

8.4 The Multiple Meanings of “Intentionally”

8.5 What Consequences for Action Theory?

Acknowledgments

References

9 Traditional and Experimental Approaches to Free Will and Moral Responsibility

9.1 Introduction

9.2 The Relevance of Experimental Studies of Responsibility Judgments

9.3 An Error Theory for Incompatibilist Intuitions

9.4 Manipulation

9.5 Variantism and Invariantism

9.6 Final Words

References

10 Free Will and Experimental Philosophy

10.1 Background

10.2 Empirical Studies

10.3 General Discussions

10.4 Conclusion

References

B.

Moral and Political Philosophy

11 Solving the Trolley Problem

References

Pushing Moral Buttons

1 Introduction

2 Experiment 1a

3 Experiment 1b

4 Experiment 2a

5 Experiment 2b

6 Discussion

Acknowledgments

Appendix: Supplementary material

References

12 The Adaptive Logic of Moral Luck

12.1 Introduction

12.2 Intention versus Outcome in Moral Judgment

12.3 Hindsight Bias

12.4 Motivated Reasoning

12.5 The Two-Process Model

12.6 The Logic of Luck: A Pedagogical Hypothesis

12.7 Testing Pedagogy: Control and Luck

12.8 Conclusion

Acknowledgments

References

13 Metaethics

13.1 Introduction

13.2 Metaethics: Motivations and Methodology

13.3 Moral Realism versus Anti-Realism

13.4 Cognitivism versus Non-Cognitivism

13.5 Moral Motivation

13.6 Conclusion

References

14 Aspects of Folk Morality

a

14.1 Metaethics and Folk Morality

14.2 The Case for Folk Objectivism

14.3 The Case for Folk Relativism

14.4 Empirical Work

14.5 Conclusion

References

15 The Behavior of Ethicists

15.1 Introduction

15.2 Moral Behavior

15.3 Relationships Between Moral Behavior and Moral Attitude

15.4 Conclusion

References

16 Experimental or Empirical Political Philosophy

16.1 Existing Work and Philosophical Methodology

16.2 Directions for Future Research

16.3 Conclusion

References

17 Ownership Rights

17.1 Which Rights Does Ownership Confer?

17.2 Specificity of Ownership Rights

17.3 The Origins of Ownership

17.4 Conclusion

References

C.

Philosophy of Mind

18 Attributions of Consciousness

18.1 The Positive Case for a Lay Concept of Phenomenal Consciousness

18.2 Alternative Explanations

18.3 The Negative Case for a Lay Concept of Phenomenal Consciousness

18.4 Alternative Explanations

18.5 Conclusion

Acknowledgments

References

19 A Unified versus Componential View of Understanding Minds

19.1 Introduction

19.2 Unified View

19.3 Componential View

19.4 Conclusion

Acknowledgments

References

20 The Group Mind

20.1 Do We Think about Group Minds?

20.2 Explicit Judgments about Group Minds

20.3 Cultural Differences in the Interpretation of Collective Behavior?

20.4 Are Groups Entity-Like

20.5 What Do the Existing Data Show?

References

21 Synesthesia as a Challenge for Representationalism

21.1 Introduction

21.2 Synesthesia as a Perceptual State

21.3 Synesthesia and Representationalism

21.4 Qualia Fest?

References

22 Naturalistic Approaches to Creativity

22.1 A Brief Characterization of Creativity

22.2 Skepticism about Explaining Creativity

22.3 Empirical Philosophy (and Relevant Scientific Research)

22.4 X-Phi: Philosophers in the Lab

22.5 Conclusion

Acknowledgments

References

D.

Epistemology

23 Knowledge Judgments in “Gettier” Cases

23.1 Thought-Experimenter Bias

23.2 First Put Your Own House in Order

23.3 Questionable Consensus

23.4 Experimental Studies of Gettier Cases

23.5 Other Applications

23.6 Conclusions

Acknowledgments

References

24 Experiments on Contextualism and Interest Relative Invariantism

24.1 Introduction

24.2 Puzzling Deployment of Epistemic Notions

24.3 Contextualism

24.4 Interest Relative Invariantism

References

25 Evaluative Effects on Knowledge Attributions

1

References

E.

Philosophy of Language

26 Reference

26.1 Reference, Intuition, and Why It All Matters

26.2 Experimental Philosophy of Reference: Beginnings

26.3 Responses to Cross-Cultural Experimental Philosophy

26.4 Kinds and Concepts

26.5 Summing up: Lessons for the Study of Reference

References

27 Experimental Pragmatics in Linguistics and Philosophy

27.1 Sentence and Context

27.2 Context in Primitive Propositions

27.3 Conversational Inferences

27.4 Conclusion

Acknowledgments

References

28 Generics and Experimental Philosophy

28.1 What Makes a Generic True?

28.2 The Cognitive Psychology of Generics

28.3 The Generics-as-Defaults Hypothesis

28.4 Generics and Social Cognition

28.5 Conclusion

References

F.

Metaphysics

29 F. MetaphysicsExperience, Metaphysics, and Cognitive Science

29.1 Moorean Facts and Manifest Evidence

29.2 Case Study: Time and Temporal Experience

29.3 Undercutting

29.4 Related Approaches

29.5 The Metaphysics Behind the Appearances

Acknowledgments

References

30 Experimental Philosophy and Causal Attribution

30.1 Graphical Causal Models and Causal Attributions

30.2 Actual Causation and Causal Structure

30.3 Modeling the Default-Deviant Distinction

30.4 Varieties of Norms and Their Influence

30.5 Causal Attributions and the Desire to Blame

30.6 Open Questions and Neglected Topics

Acknowledgments

References

31 Causal Models and Screening-Off

31.1 Philosophical Debate on Screening Off

31.2 Psychological Studies of the Screening-Off Rule

31.3 Testing Screening-Off Using a Causally Sufficient Structure

31.4 When Does Mechanistic Knowledge Mediate Causal Learning?

31.5 Conclusion

References

32 Causal Search, Causal Modeling, and the Folk

32.1 Understanding Folk Cognition

32.2 Causal Models and Causal Search

32.3 Causal Search and Modeling for Understanding the Folk

32.4 Conclusions

Acknowledgments

References

G.

Philosophy of Science

33 Experimental Philosophy of Science

33.1 Surveying Scientists’ Judgments

33.2 A Defense of Experimental Conceptual Analysis

33.3 Surveying Lay People’s Judgments

33.4 Bibliometrics and Cliometrics

33.5 Ethnographic Methods in the Philosophy of Science

33.6 Conclusion

References

34 Explanation

34.1 Introduction

34.2 Folk and Scientific Conceptions of Explanation

34.3 Defining Explanations Functionally

34.4 Formal Measures of Explanatory Power

34.5 Inference to the Best Explanation

34.6 Explanation and Discovery