A Companion to Wittgenstein E-Book

• Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Serie: Blackwell Companions to Philosophy
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 2136

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2016

Beschreibung

A COMPANION TO WITTGENSTEIN

The most comprehensive survey of Wittgenstein's thought yet compiled, this volume of fifty newly commissioned essays by leading interpreters of his philosophy is a keynote addition to the Blackwell Companions to Philosophy series. Full of penetrating insights into the life and work of the most important philosopher of the twentieth century, the collection explores the full range of Wittgenstein’s contribution to philosophy. It includes essays on his intellectual development, his work in logic and mathematics, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and action, epistemology, ethics, philosophy of religion, and much else.

As well as examining Wittgenstein’s contribution to human understanding in detail, the Companion features vital contextual analysis that traces the relationship between his ideas and those of other philosophers and schools of thought, including the Aristotelian and continental philosophical traditions. Authors also address prominent themes that remain current in today’s philosophical debates, explaining Wittgenstein’s continuing legacy alongside his historical significance. Essential reading for scholars of philosophy at all levels, A Companion to Wittgenstein combines engaging commentary with unrivaled academic authority.

Leseprobe

Table of Contents

Cover

Title Page

List of Contributors

Acknowledgments

Wittgenstein’s Published Works in Order of Composition

Lectures and Conversations

Anthologies and Collections

Works Derived from Dictations by, or Conversations with, Wittgenstein

Correspondence

Nachlass

Introduction

Ludwig Wittgenstein

References

Further Reading

Part I: Introductory

1 Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Development

1 Some Basic Features of Wittgenstein’s Work

2 The Early Work

3 Thinking about Wittgenstein’s Development

4 The Transformation

5 The Typescripts and Revisions

References

Further Reading

2 Wittgenstein’s Texts and Style

1 Internalism and Externalism about Style and Method

2 Identifying Texts and Works

3 Identifying Voices in the Text

References

Further Reading

Part II: Influences

3 Wittgenstein and Schopenhauer

1 Early and Later Wittgenstein

2 Schopenhauer’s Influence on the Early Wittgenstein

3 Schopenhauerian Perceptible Sign and Transcendent Symbol

4 Transcendent

Tractatus

Logic and Semantics

5 Transcendence of Convergent Ethical‐Aesthetic Value

6 Later Anti‐Schopenhauerian Anti‐Transcendental Antipode

References

Further Reading

4 Wittgenstein and Frege

1 Introduction

2 Wittgenstein’s Relationship with Frege

3 Frege and Wittgenstein’s Early Work

4 Frege and Wittgenstein’s Later Work

5 Conclusion

References

Further Reading

5 Wittgenstein and Russell

1 Introduction

2 Russellian Background

3 The Multiple‐Relation Theory of Judgment

4 The Narrow Direction Problem (ND)

5 The Wide Direction Problem (WD)

6 Wittgenstein’s Objection and Russell’s Paralysis

7 Direct Inspection and the MRTJ (First Problem with EI)

8 The Logical Status of the Subordinate Relation (Second Problem with EI)

9 Solution to these two Problems: OI

10 Propositional Functions

11 Wittgenstein on Logical Form

12 Conclusion

References

Further Reading

6 Wittgenstein, Hertz, and Boltzmann

1 Introduction

2 Boltzmann and Hertz

3 Wittgenstein’s Knowledge of Boltzmann and Hertz

4 Hertz and His Mechanics

5 The Picture Conception of Language

6 Wittgenstein’s Way of Reading Hertz’s Mechanics

7 Hertz’s Influence on Wittgenstein’s Conception of Philosophy

8 Boltzmann

9 Concluding Remarks

References

Further Reading

Part III: Early Philosophy

7 Logical Atomism

1 The Tractarian Logical Atomism

2 The Possibility of Complete Analysis

3 Some Recent Interpretations of the Substance Argument

4 The Substance Argument

References

Further Reading

8 The Picture Theory

1 Introduction

2 The Identity of Fact and Sense

3 The Priority of Sense (i)

4 The Priority of Sense (ii)

5 The Expression of a Sense (i)

6 The Expression of a Sense (ii)

7 The Expression of a Sense (iii)

8 Truth as the Given

References

Further Reading

9 Wittgenstein on Solipsism

1 The Impact of Schopenhauer

2 Wittgenstein on Solipsism in the

Tractatus

3 Wittgenstein on Solipsism in the “Blue Book”

4 Critique of Solipsism and the Self that Takes Responsibility for a Judgment

References

Further Reading

10 Resolute Readings of the

Tractatus

1 Introduction

2 The Original Concept of a Resolute Reading

3 Two Sorts of Criticism of “Resolute Readings”

4 Shedding the First Two Logical Features

5 Shedding the Third Logical Feature

6 Conclusion

References

Further Reading

11 Ineffability and Nonsense in the

Tractatus

1 The Orthodox Reading of the

Tractatus

2 The First Criticism and Responses

3 The Second Criticism and Responses

4 The Third Criticism and a Simple Response

5 The Fourth Criticism and Responses

6 The Resolute Reading as an Unorthodox Reading of the

Tractatus

7 The Strong and Weak Resolute Readings

8 Criticisms and Comments

References

Further Reading

12 Metaphysics

1 Metaphysics

2 The Master‐Problems of the

Tractatus

3 Ontology, Metaphysics of Symbolism, and the Truths of Logic

4 Ineffability and Expressibility

5 A Digression into Postmodernist Austerity and Resoluteness

6 From Metalogic to Grammar

7 From Metaphysics to Grammar

8 High Metaphysics Brought Low

References

Further Reading

Part IV: Philosophy and Grammar

13 Philosophy and Philosophical Method

1 Wittgenstein’s Conception of Philosophy and the Cognitivist Mainstream

2 The Early Work

3 The Later Work

References

Further Reading

14 Grammar and Grammatical Statements

1 Grammar: The Rules of Language

2 The Autonomy of Grammar

3 From Rules to Norms

4 Rules of Grammar and the Discussion of Rule‐Following

5 Grammatical Statements and Analytic Truths

6 Mathematics as Grammar

References

Further Reading

15 The Autonomy of Grammar

1 Grammar

2 The Autonomy or Arbitrariness of Grammar

3 A Sense in which Grammar is NOT Autonomous or Arbitrary

4 Concluding Remarks

References

Further Reading

16 Surveyability

1 A Letter

2 The Manuscript Version of PI §122

3 Spengler

4 Intermediate Links

5 Principles of Organization

6 PI §122

References

Further Reading

Part V: Logic and Mathematics

17 Logic and the

Tractatus

1 The Truths of Logic as Tautologies

2 That the Logical Constants Do Not Stand for Anything

3 Why Only One Logical Constant?

4 The N‐Operator and the General Form of Proposition

5 The Propositions of Logic as Tautologies and the Decision Problem

References

Further Reading

18 Wittgenstein’s Early Philosophyof Mathematics

1 Introduction

2 Mathematics, Thought, Assertoric Content:

Tractatus

3 Mathematical Propositions: Sense, Proof, Method of Checking

References

Further Reading

19 Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophyof Mathematics

1 Introduction

2 Wittgenstein’s Precept that Philosophy Leaves Everything (Including Mathematics) as it is, and his Distinction between Calculus and Prose

3 Concerns about the Distinction between Calculus and Prose

4 One Way to Meet these Concerns

5 Renewed Concerns about the Distinction between Calculus and Prose

6 An Issue about the Application of Mathematics

References

Further Reading

20 Wittgenstein and Antirealism

1 Introduction

2 Dummett’s Antirealism and Wittgenstein

3 Quietism and Anti‐Antirealism

4 Deflationism, Minimalism, and Quasi‐Realism

5 Conclusion

References

Further Reading

21 Necessity and Apriority

1 Necessity’s Dual Source

2 Color Exclusion

3 Language as Calculus

4 Conceptual Roles

5 Criteria and Symptoms

6 Measures and Language‐Games

References

Further Reading

Part VI: Language

22 Names and Ostensive Definitions

1 Ostensive Definitions of Proper Names

2 Reference and Meaning of Proper Names

3 Verbal Explanations of Proper Names

4 Ostensive Definitions of Predicates

5 Samples Belong to the Symbolism

6 Meaning and Reference of Predicates

7 The Tractarian Doctrines about Names and Naming

References

Further Reading

23 Meaning and Understanding

1 Beyond Normativity

2 The Guidance Conception of Understanding

3 Mind as Mechanism

4 Mechanism and Guidance

5 Rationality and Guidance

6 Kripke on Rationality and Guidance

References

Further Reading

24 Rules and Rule‐Following

1 A Mental Picture of a Cube Guides My Application of “Cube”

2 The Parable of the Wayward Child

3 The Rule‐Following Paradox

4 Guidance Without Mystery?

5 Critical Reception of Wittgenstein’s Investigations of the Concept of a Rule

References

Further Reading

25 Vagueness and Family Resemblance

References

Further Reading

26 Languages, Language‐Games, and Forms of Life

1 Introduction

2 Objects of Comparison

3 Languages as Involving Games

4 (Forms of) Life(‐Forms)

5 Context(ualism)

6 This Is Here

7 I Know That That’s a Tree

8 A Rose is Red in the Dark

9 Conclusion

References

Further Reading

27 Wittgenstein on Truth

1 Truth and the Picture Theory

2 The Analysis of “‘p’ is true”

3 The Metaphysics of Truth

4 The Later Wittgenstein

References

Further Reading

Part VII: Mind and Action

28 Privacy and Private Language

1 Preliminary

2 The Traditional Picture

3 The Possibility of a Private Language (PI §§239, 243)

4 The Replacement Model (PI §§244–5)

5 Two Senses of Privacy

6 Private Ownership: Numerical and Qualitative Identity (PI §253)

7 Private Ownership and Spatial Specifications of Sensations

8 Private Ownership and Temporal Specifications of Sensations

9 Dependent Particulars?

10 Epistemic Privacy: Wittgenstein’s Main Argument (PI §§246, 248)

11 Epistemic Privacy: Meaningful Uses

12 Epistemic Privacy: Lying About Inner Processes, and Logical Transformations

13 Epistemic Privacy: Reporting that One is in Pain

14 Epistemic Privacy: Grammatical Uses

15 Knowledge of Other Minds (§§281, 283f, 289f, 293f, 302, 350)

16 Private Ostensive Definition (PI §§256–8, 261, 265, 270, 293)

References

Further Reading

29 The Inner and the Outer

1 The Inner–Outer Picture

2 Avowal, Expression, and Self‐Ascription

3 The Relation between “Inner” Mental States and “Outer” Behavior

References

Further Reading

30 Wittgenstein on “I” and the Self

1

Tractatus Logico‐Philosophicus

5.6–5.641

2 The Consensus View and the

Tractatus

3

Philosophical Remarks

§§57–66

4 The Consensus View and

Philosophical Remarks

5 The “Blue Book,” pp.61–70

6 The Consensus View and the “Blue Book”

7

Philosophical Investigations

§§398–411

8 The Consensus View and

Philosophical Investigations

References

Further Reading

31 Wittgenstein on Action and the Will

References

Further Reading

32 Wittgenstein on Intentionality

1 Intentionality in the

Tractatus

2 Problems with the Picture Theory

3 Rejecting the “Pictorial Relationship”

4 Thoughts and their Objects

5 Conclusion

References

Further Reading

33 Wittgenstein on Seeing Aspects

1 Introduction

2 The Paradox

3 Gestaltism

4 Physiological Account

5 Interpretationism

6 Two Conceptions of Seeing

7 Conclusion

References

Further Reading

34 Wittgenstein on Color

1 Introduction

2 The Beginning: Before the

Tractatus

3 Tractatus Logico‐Philosophicus

4 The Middle Period

5 The Later Period

6 Remarks on Colour

Further Reading

Part VIII: Epistemology

35 Wittgenstein on Knowledge and Certainty

1 Certainty vs. Knowledge

2 The Necessary Features of Basic Certainty

3 Indubitability: Doubt and Mistake are Logically Meaningless

4 Foundational: Basic certainties are the Unfounded Foundation of Thought

5 Non‐Empirical: Basic Certainties are not Conclusions Derived from Experience

6 Grammatical: Basic Certainties are Rules of Grammar

7 Non‐Propositionality: Basic Certainties are not Propositions

8 Ineffability: Basic Certainties are Logically Ineffable

9 Enacted: Basic Certainties Can only Show Themselves in What We Say and Do

10 Conclusion: Wittgenstein’s Enactivism Meets Epistemology

References

Further Reading

36 Wittgenstein on Skepticism

1 Introductory Remarks

2 Wittgenstein on the Structure of Rational Evaluation

3 A Core Problem for the Wittgensteinian Account of the Structure of Rational Evaluation

4 Epistemic Proposals

5 Non‐Epistemic Proposals

6 Concluding Remarks

References

Further Reading

37 Wittgenstein on Causation and Induction

1 The Earlier Wittgenstein

2 The Negative Discussion (TLP 5.133–5.1362)

3 The Positive Discussion (TLP 6.32–6.3611)

4 Transitions

5 Investigations

6 On Certainty

References

Further Reading

38 Wittgenstein and Philosophy of Science

1 Wittgenstein and Logical Positivism

2 Wittgenstein and the Historical Turn in Philosophy of Science

3 Toulmin

4 Hanson

5 Kuhn

6 Feyerabend

7 Conclusion

References

Further Reading

Part IX: Ethics, Aesthetics, and Religion

39 Wittgenstein and Ethics

References

Further Reading

40 Wittgenstein and Aesthetics

1 Arts et Métiers

2 Belleville

3 Château Rouge

4 Daumesnil

5 Église d’Auteuil

6 Faidherbe Chaligny

7 Grands Boulevards

8 Hôtel de Ville

References

Further Reading

41 Wittgenstein and Anthropology

1 Intellectualism

2 Understanding Ceremonial Actions

3 Anthropological Method

4 Wittgenstein and the Anthropological Study of Ritual

References

Further Reading

42 Wittgenstein and Philosophy of Religion

1 Introduction

2 Religious Language and the

Tractatus

3 Later Developments

4 Religion Not a Rival to Science

5 Forms of Life, and the Importance of Context and Praxis

6 Wittgensteinian “Fideism,” and his Alleged “Noncognitivism”

7 Religion as a Framework of Interpretation

8 The Question of Evidence

References

Further Reading

43 Wittgenstein and Psychoanalysis

1 Introduction

2 Wittgenstein’s Connections to Freud

3 Freud in Wittgenstein’s Writing: Introductory

4 Freud in Wittgenstein’s Writing I: The Unconscious

5 Freud in Wittgenstein’s Writing II: Dreams, Jokes, and the Nature of Psychoanalytic Explanation

6 Freud in Wittgenstein’s Writing III: Psychoanalysis and the “Correct Method in Philosophy”

7 Taking the Balance: “Bawdy,” “Philosophical Froth” plus …?

References

Further Reading

Part X: Philosophical Schools and Traditions

44 Wittgenstein and the Aristotelian Tradition

1 The Legacy of Wittgenstein

2 Against Cartesian Privacy

3 Causes and Reasons

4 Intentionality

5 Aquinas and Wittgenstein as Fellow Metaphysicians

6 Was Wittgenstein a Metaphysician?

References

Further Reading

45 Wittgenstein and Kantianism

1 Introduction

2 How the World Conforms 1: Kant, Transcendental Idealism, and Empirical Realism

3 How the World Conforms 2: Wittgenstein, Transcendental Solipsism, and Pure Realism

4 How the World Conforms 3: To Forms of Life

5 The Critique of Self‐Alienated Philosophy 1: Kant’s Critical Meta‐Philosophy

6 The Critique of Self‐Alienated Philosophy 2: Wittgensteinian Analysis as Critique

7 Conclusion

References

Further Reading

46 Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle

1 Facts about the Association

2 Readings of the

Tractatus

3 Personal Interactions with Wittgenstein

4 The Influence of Wittgenstein on the Vienna Circle

5 Logic

6 Language

7 Philosophy

8 The Viennese

Tractatus

Interpretations Compared

9 Conclusion

References

Further Reading

47 Wittgenstein and Ordinary Language Philosophy

References

Further Reading

48 Wittgenstein and Pragmatism

1 The Historical Context

2 The Primacy of Practice: Meaning and Use

3 Knowledge

4 Truth

5 James and Wittgenstein on Religious Belief

6 Philosophy of Psychology

7 Conclusion: Philosophy as Method

References

Further Reading

49 Wittgenstein and Naturalism

1 Tractatus Logico‐Philosophicus

2 Philosophical Investigations

3 Natural History

4 Conclusions: Perspicuous Representations

References

Further Reading

50 Wittgenstein and Continental Philosophy

1 Heidegger and Wittgenstein: Beginning, Being, and Context

2 Derrida and Nietzsche: Iterability and Asceticism

References

Further Reading

Index

End User License Agreement

List of Illustrations

Chapter 33

Figure 1 Varieties of aspectual lighting‐up. .

Figure 2 Wire cube.

Chapter 34

Figure 1 From Wittgenstein,

Philosophical Investigations

§48.

Guide

Cover

Table of Contents

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A Companion to Foucault

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A Companion to the Philosophy of Time

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A Companion to Donald Davidson

Edited by Ernest Lepore and Kirk Ludwig

A Companion to Rawls

Edited by Jon Mandle and David Reidy

A Companion to W.V.O Quine

Edited by Gilbert Harman and Ernest Lepore

A Companion to Derrida

Edited by Zeynep Direk and Leonard Lawlor

A Companion to David Lewis

Edited by Barry Loewer and Jonathan Schaffer

A Companion to Kierkegaard

Edited by Jon Stewart

A Companion to Locke

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The Blackwell Companion to Hermeneutics

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A Companion to Ayn Rand

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The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism

Edited by Kelly James Clark

A Companion to Wittgenstein

Edited by Hans‐Johann Glock and John Hyman

A Companion to Wittgenstein

Edited by

Hans‐Johann Glock and John Hyman

This edition first published 2017© 2017 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd

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Names: Glock, Hans‐Johann, 1960– editor. | Hyman, John, editor.Title: A companion to Wittgenstein / edited by Hans‐Johann Glock and John Hyman.Description: Hoboken : Wiley, 2017. | Includes bibliographical references and index.Identifiers: LCCN 2016034790 | ISBN 9781118641163 (cloth) | ISBN 9781118641477 (epub) | ISBN 9781118641460 (PDF)Subjects: LCSH: Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889–1951.Classification: LCC B3376.W564 C633 2017 | DDC 192–dc23LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016034790

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Cover image: Ludwig Wittgenstein, 1930. © The Wittgenstein Archive

List of Contributors

Arif AhmedUniversity of Cambridge

Maria AlvarezKing’s College London

Robert L. Arrington‡Georgia State University

Anita AvramidesSt Hilda’s College, Oxford

David BakhurstQueen’s University, Kingston

Michael BeaneyKing’s College London and Humboldt University, Berlin

Hanoch Ben‐YamiCentral European University, Budapest

Stefan BrandtFriedrich‐Alexander University, Erlangen‐Nürnberg

Jason BridgesUniversity of Chicago

Silver BronzoHigher School of Economics, Moscow

Kai BüttnerIndependent Scholar

Leo K.C. CheungChinese University of Hong Kong

William ChildUniversity College, Oxford

Brian R. ClackUniversity of San Diego

James ConantUniversity of Chicago

John CottinghamUniversity of Reading

Maximilian de Gaynesford

University of Reading

David DolbyIndependent Scholar

Gary EbbsIndiana University, Bloomington

Michael N. ForsterUniversity of Bonn and University of Chicago

Pasquale FrascollaUniversity of Basilicata

Hans‐Johann GlockUniversity of Zurich

P.M.S. HackerUniversity of Kent at Canterbury and St John’s College, Oxford

Robert HannaIndependent Scholar

Edward HarcourtKeble College, Oxford

Christopher HookwayUniversity of Sheffield

John HymanThe Queen’s College, Oxford

Dale Jacquette‡University of Bern

Colin JohnstonUniversity of Stirling

Edward KanterianUniversity of Kent

Wolfgang KienzlerUniversity of Jena

Vasso KindiUniversity of Athens

Ernst Michael LangeFree University, Berlin

Eric LoomisUniversity of South Alabama

Mathieu MarionUniversity of Quebec at Montreal

Cheryl MisakUniversity of Toronto

Ray MonkUniversity of Southampton

A.W. MooreSt Hugh’s College, Oxford

Danièle Moyal‐SharrockUniversity of Hertfordshire

Stephen MulhallNew College, Oxford

Roger PouivetUniversity of Lorraine

John M. PrestonUniversity of Reading

Duncan PritchardUniversity of Edinburgh

Constantine SandisUniversity of Hertfordshire

Severin SchroederUniversity of Reading

Joachim SchulteUniversity of Zurich

David G. SternUniversity of Iowa

Graham StevensUniversity of Manchester

Chon TejedorUniversity of Hertfordshire

Thomas UebelUniversity of Manchester

Jonathan WestphalIndependent Scholar

Roger M. WhiteUniversity of Leeds

Daniel WhitingUniversity of Southampton

Notes

‡

Deceased

‡

Deceased

Acknowledgments

We have incurred several debts of gratitude during the long process of assembling and editing this Companion to Wittgenstein. First and foremost, we are grateful to the contributors, not only for their excellent work, but also for their patience while the volume was in preparation. We are also deeply indebted to Sebastian Grève. His work on the typescript was superb, not only regarding style and format, but especially regarding the content of each chapter. We are also very grateful to Javier Kalhat. As a copy‐editor for Wiley‐Blackwell he did an excellent job on a challenging typescript. We note with sadness that Robert Arrington, Frank Cioffi and Dale Jacquette passed away while the Companion was in preparation. Frank Cioffi accepted the commission to write a chapter, but was not able to complete it before he died. Robert Arrington and Dale Jacquette did complete their chapters, on “Wittgenstein and Ethics” and “Wittgenstein and Schopenhauer” respectively, and we are especially glad and privileged to have been able to include their work. Finally, we wish to thank the Faculty of Philosophy in the University of Oxford, the University of Zurich, and the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation for their generous support.

Wittgenstein’s Published Works in Order of Composition

The date of composition is specified in square brackets where appropriate.

RCL

Review of Coffey,

The Science of Logic

. 1913.

Cambridge Review

, 34, 351. Reprinted in PO.

NL

Notes on Logic

. [1913]. Edited in NB (pp. 93–107).

NM

Notes Dictated to Moore in Norway

. [1914]. Edited in NB (pp. 108–119).

NB

Notebooks 1914–16

. (1961/1979). Ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright. Trans. G.E.M. Anscombe. Second edition. Oxford: Blackwell. [German–English parallel text.] References are to dates of entries.

Tagebücher 1914–16

. (1960). Edited in

Schriften

(Vol. 1). Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. References are to dates of entries.

GT

Geheime Tagebücher, 1914–1916

. [Secret Notebooks, 1914–1916.] (1991). Ed. W. Baum. Wien: Turia + Kant. [Contains transcriptions of coded remarks which have been omitted from NB, and which are of mainly biographical relevance.]

PT

Proto‐Tractatus

. [1917]. (1971). Ed. B.F. McGuinness, T. Nyberg, G.H. von Wright. Trans. D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. [German–English parallel text.]

TLP

Tractatus Logico‐Philosophicus

. (1922). Trans. C.K. Ogden. London: Kegan Paul. [German–English parallel text.] References are to numbered sections.

Tractatus Logico‐Philosophicus

. ([1922] 1961). Trans. D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. (Original work published 1922.) References are to numbered sections.

Logisch‐Philosophische Abhandlung, Kritische Edition

. [

Tractatus Logico‐Philosophicus

, Critical Edition]. ([1922] 1989). Ed. B. McGuinness and J. Schulte. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

WV

Wörterbuch für Volksschulen

. [Dictionary for Primary Schools.] (1926/1977). Facsimile reproduction with an introduction by A. Hübner. Wien: Hölder‐Pichler‐Tempsky.

RLF

Some Remarks on Logical Form. (1929).

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society

(Supplementary Volume), 9, 162–171.

CV

Culture and Value: A Selection from the Posthumous Remains

. (1977/1998). Ed. G.H. von Wright in collaboration with H. Nyman. Revised edition of the text by A. Pichler. Trans. P. Winch. Oxford: Blackwell. [German–English parallel text.]

Vermischte Bemerkungen

. (1984). Edited in

Werkausgabe

(Vol. 8). Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

PR

Philosophical Remarks

. [1929–1930]. (1975). Ed. R. Rhees. Trans. R. Hargreaves and R. White. Oxford: Blackwell.

Philosophische Bemerkungen

. (1964). Edited in

Schriften

(Vol. 2). Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

DB

Denkbewegungen: Tagebücher 1930–1932, 1936–1937

. [Movements of Thought: Notebooks 1930–1932, 1936–1937.] (1999). Ed. I. Somavilla. Frankfurt: Fischer. Translated in PPO.

GB

Remarks on Frazer’s

Golden Bough

. [1931, 1936]. (1967). Ed. R. Rhees.

Synthese

, 17, 233–253. Complete version edited in PO.

PG

Philosophical Grammar

. [1932–1934]. (1974). Ed. R. Rhees. Trans. A.J.P. Kenny. Oxford: Blackwell.

Philosophische Grammatik

. (1969). Edited in

Schriften

(Vol. 4). Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

BT

The Big Typescript: TS 213

. [1933]. (2005). Ed. and trans. C.G. Luckhardt and M.A.E. Aue. Chichester: Wiley‐Blackwell. [German–English parallel text.] References are to the original pagination of TS 213, which is given in the margins.

BB

The Blue and Brown Books

. [1933–1935]. (1958/1969). Ed. R. Rhees. Second edition. Oxford: Blackwell.

EPB

Eine philosophische Betrachtung

. [1936]. [A philosophical Reflection.] (1970). Ed. R. Rhees. In

Schriften

(Vol. 5). Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

CE

Cause and Effect: Intuitive Awareness. [1937]. (1976). Ed. R. Rhees. Trans. P. Winch.

Philosophia

, 6, 392–430. Reprinted in PO.

RFM

Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics

. [1937–1944]. (1956/1978). Ed. G.H. von Wright, R. Rhees and G.E.M. Anscombe. Trans. G.E.M. Anscombe. Third, revised, and reset edition. Oxford: Blackwell. References are to numbered parts followed by numbered sections.

Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik

. (1973). Edited in

Schriften

(Vol. 6). Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. References are to numbered parts followed by numbered sections.

PI

Philosophical Investigations

. [1938–1945]. (1953/1958). Ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and R. Rhees. Trans. G.E.M. Anscombe. Second edition. Oxford: Blackwell. References are to numbered sections of Part I (except for footnotes), and to pages of Part II.

Philosophical Investigations

. (1953/2009). Ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and R. Rhees. Fourth, revised edition by P.M.S. Hacker and J. Schulte. Trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker and J. Schulte. Oxford: Wiley‐Blackwell. [German–English parallel text.] References are to numbered sections; references to what was formerly known as “Part II” are now to PPF.

Philosophische Untersuchungen, Kritisch‐genetische Edition

. [

Philosophical Investigations

, Critical Genetic Edition.] (2001). Ed. J. Schulte. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

PPF

Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment

. [1946–1949]. In PI (1953/2009, pp. 183–243). Ed. P.M.S. Hacker and J. Schulte. Trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker and J. Schulte. [German–English parallel text.] References are to numbered sections. [Previously known as PI “Part II.”]

RPP I

Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology

(Vol. 1). [1945–1947]. (1980). Ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright. Trans. G.E.M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell. [German–English parallel text.] References are to numbered sections.

Bemerkungen über die Philosophie der Psychologie

. (1982). Edited in

Schriften

(Vol. 7). Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. References are to numbered sections.

RPP II

Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology

(Vol. 2). [1948]. (1980). Ed. G.H. von Wright and H. Nyman. Trans. C.G. Luckhardt and M.A.E. Aue. Oxford: Blackwell. [German–English parallel text.] References are to numbered sections.

Bemerkungen über die Philosophie der Psychologie

. (1982). Edited in

Schriften

(Vol. 7). Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. References are to numbered sections.

Z

Zettel

. [1945–1948]. (1967). Ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright. Trans. G.E.M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell. [German–English parallel text.] References are to numbered sections.

Zettel

. (1984). Edited in

Werkausgabe

(Vol. 8). Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. References are to numbered sections.

LW I

Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology

(Vol 1). [1948–1949]. (1982). Ed. G.H. von Wright and H. Nyman. Trans. C.G. Luckhardt and M.A.E. Aue. Oxford: Blackwell. [German–English parallel text.] References are to numbered sections.

Letzte Schriften über die Philosophie der Psychologie

. (1984). Edited in

Werkausgabe

(Vol. 7). Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. References are to numbered sections.

LW II

Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology

(Vol. 2). [1949–1951]. (1992). Ed. G.H. von Wright and H. Nyman. Trans. C.G. Luckhardt and M.A.E. Aue. Oxford: Blackwell. [German–English parallel text.]

OC

On Certainty

. [1951]. (1969/1974). Ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright. Trans. D. Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell. [German–English parallel text.] References are to numbered sections.

Über Gewißheit

. (1984). Edited in

Werkausgabe

(Vol. 8). Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. References are to numbered sections.

ROC

Remarks on Colour

. [1951]. (1977/1980). Ed. G.E.M. Anscombe. Trans. L.L. McAlister and M. Schättle. Oxford: Blackwell. [German–English parallel text.] References are to numbered parts followed by numbered sections.

Bemerkungen über die Farben

. (1984). Edited in

Werkausgabe

(Vol. 8). Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. References are to numbered parts followed by numbered sections.

PO

Philosophical Occasions: 1912–1951

. (1993). Ed. J. Klagge and A. Nordmann. Indianapolis: Hackett. [German–English parallel texts where appropriate.] Unless otherwise specified, writings in this anthology are cited after the original paginations, which are given in brackets.

PPO

Public and Private Occasions

. (2003). Ed. J. Klagge and A. Nordmann. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. [German–English parallel texts where appropriate.] Unless otherwise specified, writings in this anthology are cited after the original paginations, which are given in brackets.

Lectures and Conversations

WVC

Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle: Conversations recorded by Friedrich Waismann

. [1929–1932]. (1979). Ed. and trans. B.F. McGuinness. Oxford: Blackwell.

Ludwig Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis

. (1967). Edited in

Schriften

(Vol. 3). Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

LE

A Lecture on Ethics. [1929]. (1965).

Philosophical Review

, 74, 3–12.

M

Wittgenstein’s Lectures in 1930–33. (1954–55).

Mind

, 63, 1–15 and 289–316; 64, 1–27 and 264. Reprinted in PO.

MWL

Wittgenstein: Lectures, Cambridge 1930–1933, From the Notes of G.E. Moore

. (2016). Ed. D. Stern, B. Rogers, and G. Citron. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. References are to the pagination of the notebooks reproduced in this edition.

LWL

Wittgenstein’s Lectures, Cambridge 1930–32, From the Notes of J. King and D. Lee

. (1980). Ed. D. Lee. Oxford: Blackwell.

AWL

Wittgenstein’s Lectures, Cambridge 1932–35, From the Notes of A. Ambrose and M. MacDonald

. (1979). Ed. A. Ambrose. Oxford: Blackwell.

LSD

The Language of Sense Data and Private Experience, Notes taken by R. Rhees of Wittgenstein’s lectures, 1936. (1984).

Philosophical Investigations

, 7, 1–45.

LPE

Wittgenstein’s Notes for Lectures on “Private Experience” and “Sense Data.” [1936]. (1968). Ed. R. Rhees.

Philosophical Review

, 77, 275–320.

LC

Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief

. [1938–1946]. (1966). Ed. C. Barrett. Oxford: Blackwell.

LFM

Wittgenstein’s Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, Cambridge 1939, From the Notes of R.G. Bosanquet, N. Malcolm, R. Rhees and Y. Smythies

. Ed. C. Diamond. Sussex: Harvester.

LFW

Lectures on Freedom of the Will, From the Notes of Y. Smithies. [1939]. Edited in PO.

NPL

Notes for the Philosophical Lecture. [1941]. Ed. D. Stern. In PO.

LPP

Wittgenstein’s Lectures on Philosophical Psychology 1946–47, Notes by P.T. Geach, K.J. Shah, and A.C. Jackson

. (1988). Ed. P.T. Geach. Sussex: Harvester.

Anthologies and Collections

Schriften. [Writings.] (1960–1982). Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Vol. 1 (1960): TLP, NB, PI; Vol. 2 (1964): PR; Vol. 3 (1967): WVC; Vol. 4 (1969): PG; Vol. 5 (1970): “The Blue Book,” EPB, Z; Vol. 6 (1973): RFM; Vol. 7 (1978): LFM; Vol. 8 (1982): RPP I, RPP II. [German text.]

Werkausgabe. [Works.] (1984). Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Vol. 1: NB, TLP, PI; Vol. 2: PR; Vol. 3: WVC; Vol. 4: PG; Vol. 5: “The Blue Book,” EPB; Vol. 6: RFM; Vol.7: RPP I, RPP II, LPP; Vol. 8: ROC, OC, Z, CV. [German text.]

The Wittgenstein Reader. (1994). Ed. A.J.P. Kenny. Oxford: Blackwell. [Selections from TLP, PG, BT, BB, RFM, PI, RPP, Z, OC, LPE, LC.]

Works Derived from Dictations by, or Conversations with, Wittgenstein

WAM

Wittgenstein – A Memoir

. (1958/1984). N. Malcolm. Second edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

PLP

The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy

. (1965). F. Waismann. Ed. R. Harré. London: Macmillan.

SDE

Some Developments in Wittgenstein’s View of Ethics. (1965). R. Rhees.

Philosophical Review

, 74, 17–26.

RR

On Continuity: Wittgenstein’s Ideas 1938. R. Rhees. In R. Rhees. (1970).

Discussions of Wittgenstein

(pp. 104–157). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

LSP

Logik, Sprache, Philosophie

. [Logic, Language, Philosophy.] (1976). Ed. G.P. Baker and B.F. McGuinness. Stuttgart: Reclam.

RW

Recollections of Wittgenstein

. (1984). Ed. R. Rhees. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

WC

Wittgenstein: Conversations 1949–1951

. (1986). O.K. Bouwsma. Ed. J.L. Craft and R.E. Hustwit. Indianapolis: Hackett.

VW

The Voices of Wittgenstein – The Vienna Circle, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Friedrich Waismann

. (2003). Ed. G.P. Baker. Trans. G.P. Baker

et al.

London: Routledge.

CRR

Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Conversations with Rush Rhees: From the Notes of Rush Rhees

. (2015). Ed. G. Citron.

Mind

, 124, 1–71.

WMC

A Discussion Between Wittgenstein and Moore on Certainty: From the Notes of Norman Malcolm

. Ed. G. Citron.

Mind

, 124, 73–84.

Correspondence

Letters are quoted by date, as specifically as possible. They are collected in the following editions:

Letters from Wittgenstein, with a Memoir

. (1967). Ed. B.F. McGuinness. Trans. L. Furtmüller. Oxford: Blackwell. [Letters to P. Engelmann.]

Letters to L. von Ficker

. (1969). Ed. G.H. von Wright and W. Methlagl. Salzburg: Müller. Translation in

Wittgenstein: Sources and Perspectives

. (1979). Ed. C.G. Luckhardt. Trans. B. Gillette. Hassocks: Harvester.

Letters to C. K. Ogden

. (1973). Ed. G.H. von Wright. Oxford: Blackwell. [With an appendix containing letters by F.P. Ramsey.]

Letters to Russell, Keynes and Moore

. (1974). Ed. G.H. von Wright. Trans. B.F. McGuinness. Oxford: Blackwell.

Briefe

. [Letters.] (1980). Ed. B.F. McGuinness and G.H. von Wright. Trans. J. Schulte. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. [Correspondence with B. Russell, G.E. Moore, J.M. Keynes, F.P. Ramsey, W. Eccles, P. Engelmann, and L. von Ficker; in German, with appended original versions of Wittgenstein’s own letters when in English.]

Ludwig Hänsel – Ludwig Wittgenstein: Eine Freundschaft. Briefe. Aufsätze. Kommentare

. [Ludwig Hänsel – Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Friendship. Letters. Essays. Commentaries.] (1994). Ed. I. Somavilla, A. Unterkircher, and C.P. Berger. Innsbruck: Haymon.

Wittgenstein in Cambridge: Letters and Documents 1911–1951

. (1995/2008). Ed. B. McGuinness. Fourth edition. Oxford: Blackwell.

Ludwig Wittgenstein: Familienbriefe

. [Ludwig Wittgenstein: Family Letters.] (1996). Ed. B. McGuinness, M.C. Ascher, and O. Pfersmann. Vienna: Hölder‐Pichler‐Tempsky.

Wittgenstein und die Musik: Briefwechsel Ludwig Wittgenstein – Rudolf Koder

. [Wittgenstein and Music: Correspondence Ludwig Wittgenstein – Rudolf Koder.] (2000). Ed. M. Alber, B. McGuinness, and M. Seekircher. Innsbruck: Haymon.

Wittgenstein: Gesamtbriefwechsel/Complete Correspondence: Innsbrucker Electronic Edition

. (2004/2011). Ed. A. Coda, G. Citron, B. Halder, A. Janik, U. Lobis, K. Mayr, B. McGuinness, M. Schorner, M. Seekircher, A. Unterkircher, and J. Wang. Charlottesville: Intelex.

http://www.nlx.com/collections/166

[Original letters in German, English, Norwegian, and Russian.]

Wittgenstein – Engelmann: Briefe, Begegnungen, Erinnerungen

. [Wittgenstein – Engelmann: Letters, Encounters, Memories.] (2006). Ed. I. Somavilla. Innsbruck: Haymon.

Er “ist eine Künstlernatur von hinreissender Genialität”: Die Korrespondenz zwischen Ludwig Wittgenstein und Moritz Schlick sowie ausgewählte Briefe von und an Friedrich Waismann, Rudolf Carnap, Frank P. Ramsey, Ludwig Hänsel und Margaret Stonborough

. [He “is a natural artist of mesmerizing ingenuity”: Correspondence between Ludwig Wittgenstein and Moritz Schlick, and selected letters exchanged with Friedrich Waismann, Rudolf Carnap, Frank P. Ramsey, Ludwig Hänsel, and Margaret Stonborough.] (2015). Ed. M. Iven.

Wittgenstein‐Studien

, 6, 83–174.

Nachlass

References to Wittgenstein’s manuscripts and typescripts are by MS or TS number, following G.H. von Wright’s catalogue. (See von Wright, Wittgenstein (1982). Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 35 ff; reprinted with an addendum in PO.) Most of the Nachlass is kept in the Library of Trinity College, Cambridge. It is also available on a microfilm produced by Cornell University, the so‐called Cornell Copy. The Nachlass has been collected in the following editions:

Wiener Ausgabe/Vienna Edition

. (1994–). Ed. M. Nedo. New York: Springer. [This is presently incomplete. The volumes so far published contain early parts of the

Nachlass

, with the original paginations. In addition to an

Introduction

and

Concordance

, it is projected to comprise 15 volumes.]

Wittgenstein’s Nachlass: The Bergen Electronic Edition

. (2000). Ed. the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [This is the most comprehensive published edition of the

Nachlass

to date. It comprises six CDs, one containing edited

Nachlass

texts and software, and five containing facsimiles.]

Wittgenstein Source Bergen Nachlass Edition

. (2015–). Ed. the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen under the direction of Alois Pichler. In

Wittgenstein Source

. (2009–). Bergen: The Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen.

http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/

[This provides open access to

Nachlass

items in the form of facsimiles and text editions in both normalized and diplomatic versions.]

Introduction

JOHN HYMAN AND HANS JOHANN GLOCK

Wittgenstein crossed the second Styx, from living memory to history, during the years since the present century began. He is recognized today as one of the most original and powerful thinkers of the twentieth century, and his work belongs to the body of literature philosophers will read and interpret afresh in each generation, for as long as the European intellectual tradition survives. The scope of his writings is much smaller than that of, say, Locke, Hume, or Kant. He wrote nothing in political philosophy or jurisprudence, very little in ethics, and the only sustained record of his philosophical ideas about religion and art consists in notes taken by students at his lectures. Wittgenstein’s intellectual focus was narrow and intense. But the influence of his thought about logic, language, mathematics, and the mind, and about philosophical enquiry itself, has been immense. Indeed, one of the deepest divisions among analytic philosophers today is between those who see a close affinity between the goals and methods of philosophy and of natural science, and those who follow Wittgenstein, and see philosophy as a discipline sui generis, “which stands above or below, but not beside the natural sciences” (TLP 4.111). Another is between those on the one hand whose intellectual genealogy leads to Wittgenstein’s early philosophy, to the work in which it was crystallized, the Tractatus Logico‐Philosophicus, and to the Vienna Circle, who were inspired by it; and those on the other hand whose ideas owe more to Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, and to the book in which it received its fullest expression, the Philosophical Investigations.

But although Wittgenstein’s influence on twentieth‐century philosophy was second to none, philosophy developed during the half century after his death, in 1951, in ways inimical to his ideas. The philosophy of mind and language was transformed, successively, by the impact of linguistics, artificial intelligence and cognitive science; metaphysics was invigorated by developments in modal logic; epistemology was dominated for 40 years by a research program quite alien to his thought; and the conception of philosophy itself that became increasingly predominant conformed to Russell’s belief that philosophy is bound to be a fruitless exercise if it is divorced from science and Quine’s view that philosophy is “continuous with” science, as opposed to Wittgenstein’s conviction that the desire to imitate science “leads philosophers into complete darkness” (BB 18).

Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy changed in the course of his career, but it always involved a sharp distinction between philosophy and science, and it was always coordinated with his conception of language.

In the “Notes on Logic,” a typescript he produced with Russell’s help in 1913, Wittgenstein argued that while natural science provides us with pictures of reality, philosophy does not. Philosophy cannot contribute to any part of science; it is “the doctrine of the logical form of scientific propositions.” By logical form Wittgenstein means the form which a proposition, i.e., a meaningful sentence, must have in common with the situation that it represents, in order to be capable of representing it at all. For example, a musical score is a spatial arrangement of marks, whereas the corresponding piece of music is a temporal arrangement of sounds. Hence they do not share a spatial or a temporal form. What they must share, if one represents the other, is their logical form. Thus Wittgenstein initially believed that philosophy has its own field of enquiry: not the natural world itself, which is the province of natural science, but the structure that a fact in the world and a logical picture of it must have in common. But the conception of language he developed while writing the Tractatus soon forced him to abandon this idea of philosophy.

The Tractatus was completed in 1918 and published in 1921. In this book, Wittgenstein argues that the logical form of a proposition is utterly different from its superficial grammatical form. Words are combined in sentences to form pictures or models of possible states of affairs in the world. All of the meaningful sentences we use in our daily lives or in scientific work are truth‐functional combinations of logically independent elementary propositions, whose only constituents are simple, unanalyzable names. Each of these names corresponds to an object, whose name it is. The syntax of a name, i.e., the ways in which it can and cannot be combined with other names to form a sentence, reflects the essential nature of the object which it names, i.e., the ways in which it can and cannot be combined with other objects to form a state of affairs. Hence, a meaningful combination of words corresponds to a possible combination of objects. If the arrangement of the simple names concealed in a sentence represents the actual arrangement of the objects that they name, then the sentence is true; if not, it is false.

It follows from these doctrines that the only meaningful use of words is to state (or mis‐state) the facts. For a fact is the existence of a state of affairs, and a state of affairs is a combination of objects. Any attempt to describe the essential nature of an object or the syntax of a name, and any attempt to expound a theory of representation – such as the attempt we made in the last paragraph to explain the doctrines presented in the Tractatus – is bound to result in nonsense. Nevertheless, what the propositions of the Tractatus attempt to say is made evident without transgressing the rules of logical syntax by the well‐formed sentences of a language. For a meaningful combination of names cannot fail to show that these names can be combined in this way. But “what expresses itself in language, we cannot express by means of language” (TLP 4.121). Hence, the Tractatus itself consists in a series of nonsensical sentences. For the same reason, the traditional aim of metaphysics, namely, to set down the essential nature of the world in a body of necessary propositions, is unattainable. For the only statement of a necessary truth that the syntax of a language will permit is a tautology: for example, “Either it is raining or it is not raining.” But a tautology says nothing, and it shows that it says nothing (TLP 4.461).

Thus, Wittgenstein was forced to abandon the idea that philosophy can explain the logical form of scientific propositions, and he adopted instead a novel conception of philosophy, which he formulated at the end of the Tractatus as follows:

The correct method in philosophy would really be to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. what belongs to natural science, i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy, and then whenever someone else tried to say something metaphysical to show him [NB: not “tell him”] that he had not given any reference to certain signs in his sentences.

(TLP 6.53)

The philosophical method that Wittgenstein recommends here, like the conception of language that underlies it, is extremely austere, and he concedes that someone who “tries to say something metaphysical” is unlikely to find it satisfying. But several remarks in the Tractatus present a more expansive picture of what he believes the purpose of philosophy must be, if it cannot expound “the doctrine of the logical form of scientific propositions.” The aim of philosophy, he claims, is “the logical clarification of thoughts”:

Philosophy is not a theory but an activity. A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations. The result of philosophy is not a number of ‘philosophical propositions’, but to make propositions clear.

(TLP 4.112)

In broad terms, Wittgenstein adhered to this conception of philosophy for the rest of his life, but what it meant in detail changed profoundly in the 1930s, because his conception of language changed. He abandoned the doctrines that a sentence is a logical picture composed of names, that the meaning of a name is the object it stands for, and that the intelligible use of language always serves the same purpose, to describe the facts. He came to believe, on the contrary, that sentences do not have a uniform logical structure, that the meaning of a word is its use in a language, and that language in general consists in a vast and heterogeneous variety of “language‐games,” which serve an indefinitely heterogeneous range of human purposes. (Language‐games are simply human activities involving speech or writing in which distinctive ranges of concepts are employed. The word “game” is there to remind us that the use of language is constrained by rules, and occurs both in the context of a specific human culture and in the larger context of human life in general.)

In spite of this transformation in his views about the nature of language, Wittgenstein continued to believe that the purpose of philosophy is to clarify the use of language, and he continued to regard philosophy as a critical activity rather than a body of doctrine. But he now argued that the clarification philosophy aims at cannot be achieved either by logical analysis or, as suggested in section 6.53 of the Tractatus, by policing the misuse of language in metaphysics. It can only be achieved by describing various language‐games – especially ones that involve mathematical, logical, linguistic, and psychological concepts – which the author of the Tractatus, and Russell, and earlier philosophers, had misunderstood. Hence, beginning in the early 1930s, a large part of Wittgenstein’s philosophy consists in exploring language that does not, he believes, conform to the model expounded in the Tractatus, i.e., language in which words are not names, and sentences are not descriptions. The aim is not simply “to make propositions clear,” but to reveal and dissipate the confusion that results when the Tractarian model of linguistic meaning is mistakenly assumed to apply – e.g., to the language we use to describe our thoughts and feelings, or to express our values. We need, he wrote, to make