A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God E-Book

Charles Sanders Peirce

• Herausgeber: Booksell-Verlag
• Kategorie: Religion und Spiritualität
• Sprache: Englisch

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2020

Beschreibung

In 'A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God,' Charles Sanders Peirce presents a philosophical inquiry into the existence of God through a unique lens of pragmatism and semiotics. Set against the backdrop of 19th-century American thought, Peirce challenges the prevailing skepticism of his time, advocating for a conception of faith that harmonizes scientific inquiry with metaphysical inquiry. This work is characterized by its meticulous attention to logical argumentation, deftly weaving together complex notions of belief, doubt, and the pragmatic implications of religious experience, offering a profound reflection on the role of faith in both personal and communal contexts. Peirce, a notable figure in the development of pragmatist philosophy, drew heavily from his background in logic and mathematics, as well as his interest in semeiotics'Äîthe study of signs and symbols. His experiences, including a blend of scientific rigor and philosophical inquiry, inform his exploration of religious belief, enabling him to articulate a robust framework for understanding faith not merely as an abstract notion but as a dynamic component of human life. This book is essential for anyone interested in philosophy of religion, as it challenges readers to reconsider the intersections of faith and reason. Peirce'Äôs profound insights encourage a dialogue that transcends traditional apologetics, making this work indispensable for scholars, students, and anyone seeking a deeper understanding of the relationship between belief and reality.

Leseprobe

Charles Sanders Peirce

A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God

Published by Good Press, 2020

[email protected]

EAN 4064066418298

Table of Contents

Cover

Titlepage

Text

I.

Table of Contents

The word "God," so "capitalised" (as we Americans say), is the definable proper name, signifying Ens necessarium[1]; in my belief Really creator of all three Universes of Experience.

Some words shall herein be capitalised when used, not as vernacular, but as terms defined. Thus an "idea" is the substance of an actual unitary thought or fancy; but "Idea," nearer Plato's idea of ἰδέα, denotes anything whose Being consists in its mere capacity for getting fully represented, regardless of any person's faculty or impotence to represent it.

"Real" is a word invented in the thirteenth century to signify having Properties, i.e. characters sufficing to identify their subject, and possessing these whether they be anywise attributed to it by any single man or group of men, or not. Thus, the substance of a dream is not Real, since it was such as it was, merely in that a dreamer so dreamed it; but the fact of the dream is Real, if it was dreamed; since if so, its date, the name of the dreamer, etc., make up a set of circumstances sufficient to distinguish it from all other events; and these belong to it, i.e. would be true if predicated of it, whether A, B, or C Actually ascertains them or not. The "Actual" is that which is met with in the past, present, or future.

An "Experience" is a brutally produced conscious effect that contributes to a habit, self-controlled, yet so satisfying, on deliberation, as to be destructible by no positive exercise of internal vigour. I use the word "self-controlled" for "controlled by the thinker's self," and not for "uncontrolled" except in its own spontaneous, i.e. automatic, self-development, as Professor J. M. Baldwin uses the word. Take for illustration the sensation undergone by a child that puts its forefinger into a flame with the acquisition of a habit of keeping all its members out of all flames. A compulsion is "Brute," whose immediate efficacy nowise consists in conformity to rule or reason.

Of the three Universes of Experience familiar to us all, the first comprises all mere Ideas, those airy nothings to which the mind of poet, pure mathematician, or another might give local habitation and a name within that mind. Their very airy-nothingness, the fact that their Being consists in mere capability of getting thought, not in anybody's Actually thinking them, saves their Reality. The second Universe is that of the Brute Actuality of things and facts. I am confident that their Being consists in reactions against Brute forces, notwithstanding objections redoubtable until they are closely and fairly examined. The third Universe comprises everything whose being consists in active power to establish connections between different objects, especially between objects in different Universes. Such is everything which is essentially a Sign—not the mere body of the Sign, which is not essentially such, but, so to speak, the Sign's Soul, which has its Being in its power of serving as intermediary between its Object and a Mind. Such, too, is a living consciousness, and such the life, the power of growth, of a plant. Such is a living constitution[2]—a daily newspaper, a great fortune, a social "movement."

An "Argument" is any process of thought reasonably tending to produce a definite belief. An "Argumentation" is an Argument proceeding upon definitely formulated premisses.

If God Really be, and be benign, then, in view of the generally conceded truth that religion, were it but proved, would be a good outweighing all others, we should naturally expect that there would be some Argument for His Reality that should be obvious to all minds, high and low alike, that should earnestly strive to find the truth of the matter; and further, that this Argument should present its conclusion, not as a proposition of metaphysical theology, but in a form directly applicable to the conduct of life, and full of nutrition for man's highest growth. What I shall refer to as the N.A.—the Neglected Argument—seems to me best to fulfil this condition, and I should not wonder if the majority of those whose own reflections have harvested belief in God must bless the radiance of the N.A. for that wealth. Its persuasiveness is no less than extraordinary; while it is not unknown to anybody. Nevertheless, of all those theologians (within my little range of reading) who, with commendable assiduity, scrape together all the sound reasons they can find or concoct to prove the first proposition of theology, few mention this one, and they most briefly. They probably share those current notions of logic which recognise no other Arguments than Argumentations.