A New Eastern Question? Great Powers and the Post-Yugoslav States E-Book

• Herausgeber: ibidem
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Serie: Balkan Politics and Society
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 667

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2022

Beschreibung

This compilation of essays by scholars from the region, Western Europe, and the US, explores the intersection of international politics in the post-Yugoslav states with a focus on the influence and impact of the European Union, the United States, Russia, China, and Turkey. The implications of external actors’ policy in the region for its Euro-Atlantic integration, its security, and stability are examined and discussed. In assessing the importance of the post-Yugoslav states for the EU and US and the current trend of disengagement by these two democratic actors in the region, answers are revealed regarding the question whether we are seeing a new Eastern Question emerging in the post-Yugoslav states. Likewise, when looking at the role of Russia, China, and Turkey in the region—and in contrast to European and US policies—, it becomes obvious to what extent the region, once again, is becoming the playground of Great Power games and wider geopolitical strategic interests. The analytical time frame covers the period 1991–2018. The changes in the foreign policies of great powers are explored as they relate to the institutional set-up of the region. For instance, do the changes affect the EU’s hegemony in the region? Do Russia, China, and Turkey actively contribute to changing the rules of the game in the region—be it the accession process or regional cooperation?

Leseprobe

ibidem Press, Stuttgart

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Working on a book about the Great Powers in the post-Yugoslav states is like studying a moving target. Throughout the research for this book, and the different revisions of the chapters, new issues emerged and changed the perspective. Most notably, the coronavirus pandemic resulted in a new pandemic diplomacy, which led to important changes across the region, for example in the relationship between Serbia and China. The authors, and we as the editors, tried to keep up with these developments as much as possible. The final chapters for this book were completed in early 2021, so any later developments will not have been considered.

We are grateful to our contributors for their hard work, their fantastic engagement with the topic and their willingness to listen to our feedback and further develop their papers. We believe that the result is a comprehensive book, which provides an important academic source of information about the role of the EU, the USA, Russia, Turkey and China in the post-Yugoslav states.

Two people deserve a special recognition for their contribution to this book. Elisabeth Neugebauer helped in designing the layout, writing the index and providing the final edits for all chapters. Her eagle eyes made sure that all chapters follow the same standard and that the contents of the book are also presented in a professional, standardised and comprehensive format. Chloe Doherty provided some last-minute spell-checking, and we are really grateful for her support and willingness to read the whole manuscript in a short period of time. We would also like to thank Daan Smeekens for some final editorial support.

We are grateful to Valerie Lange and Jakob Horstmann at Ibidem publishers for their continued support for this project. This book took longer than we initially envisaged, but their faith in the project and their patience with us when we requested another extension is remarkable. We very much hope that the finished project lives up to their high standards.

Soeren Keil would like to thank his co-editor for the joyful and interesting cooperation, and for many excellent discussions on the Balkans, German Politics and good beer. He would also like to thank his former colleagues at Canterbury Christ Church University (UK) for their support, in particular Professor David Bates, Dr Sarah Lieberman and Dr Paul Anderson. His new colleagues at the Institute of Federalism are a permanent inspiration, full of motivation, and remind him how much he enjoys working in academia. He would like to thank in particular Thea Bächler, Bernhard Altermatt, Professor Eva Maria Belser and Yvonne Heiter-Steiner. In addition, he would like to thank a number of personal and academic friends that have contributed to his thoughts and ideas over the years. Dr Timofey Agarin, Dr Elisabeth Alber, Professor Jelena Džankić, and Professor Jens Woelk have been wonderful colleagues, sources of inspiration, fantastic co-authors and great friends. He is also eternally grateful to Claire Parker for all the support and love given throughout this project.

Bernhard Stahl would like to express his gratitude to his supportive and stimulating team at the University of Passau. Furthermore, he would like to pass the bouquet back to the co-editor recalling the fabulous common understanding, be it regarding innovative ideas or difficult management decisions. His thanks go to those conference hosts and panel organisers who liked the research idea and provided opportunities to meet and develop the book (e.g., the CEEISA Ljubljana 2016 and the CEEISA-ISA Conference in Belgrade 2019). In particular, we are grateful to Professor Ulf Brunnbauer from the Leibniz Institute for East and Southeast European Studies (IOS, University of Regensburg)for hosting our research group when the research project ‘took off’ at a workshop in December 2017. Moreover, our thanks go to the Bavarian Research Alliance (Bayerische Forschungsallianz) as well as the Friedrich Ebert Foundation Regensburg—first and foremost Harald Zintl—who funded the workshop. Jan von Schmettow helped us organise the workshop and collected the main ideas discussed during our two days in Regensburg.

Finishing a book like this is always very labour-intensive and time-consuming. We would therefore like to thank our families for their support of our work and for enabling us to dedicate the time needed to complete projects such as this one to a high standard. This book is dedicated to our daughters, Malindi Parker and Charlotte Reinhardt.

Fribourg and Passau, August 2021

Contents

Acknowledgements

Notes on Contributors

List of Abbreviations

Introduction: A New Eastern Question?

Part I Great Power Perspectives

Yugoslavia—from Vardar to Triglav No more

The European Union and the Post-Yugoslav States—From Negligence to Dominance and Back?

The Reluctant, Intermittent Interventionist: US Foreign Policy in the Former Yugoslavia 1991—to date

A Playfield of Distancing: Russia’s Policy towards the Post-Yugoslav States

The Past is important but the Future matters—China and the post-Yugoslav States

Turkey’s Foreign Policy towards the Post-Yugoslav States: Regional Contender or Ally for the European Union?

Part II The Perspective of the Post-Yugoslav States

From Integration to Plurilateralism? Slovenia and the Great Powers

Croatia: Exploring Relations with non-EU Powers from Comfort of EU-Membership

Rediscovering an Old Playbook: Serbia and the Great Powers

Dependence, Independence, Interdependence: Montenegro’s Foreign Policy from 1991 to 2020

In Search of a Big Brother: Great Powers and Foreign Policy in North Macedonia

When Internal Complexity Reflects External Challenges: The Great Powers and Bosnia and Herzegovina

Kosovo: A Great Powers’ European and Balkan Projection

Concluding Remarks—The Potential and Pitfalls of a New Eastern Question

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Ana Bojinović Fenko, PhD, is Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences and Researcher at the Centre of International Relations, Ljubljana. Her research focus is comparative analysis of foreign policy, EU External Action and international (inter-)regionalism, whereby she studies regions of post-Yugoslav space/Western Balkans and the Mediterranean. Her recent publications include an article “Never let a good crisis go to waste”: strengthening EU actorness amid increased competition of external actors in the Western Balkans” (co-authored with Jure Požgan & Faris Kočan in Theory and practice, 2020) and a book chapter “Chips off the old block: Europeanisation of the foreign policies of Western Balkan states” (co-authored with Bernhard Stahl in the edited book The Europeanisation of the Western Balkans: a failure of EU conditionality? eds: Džankić, Keil & Kmezić with Springer Nature).

Adnan Huskić is the country representative of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom in Bosnia, lecturer at the Sarajevo School of Science and Technology and the first Chair of Christian Schwarz Schilling Professorship. His most recent works includes contribution to Thirty Years of Political Campaigning in Central and Eastern Europe (Palgrave) 2020, The Western Balkans in the World (Routledge) 2019 and The Foreign Policies of Post-Yugoslav States: From Yugoslavia to Europe (Palgrave) 2014.

Bernhard Stahl has been Professor of International Politics at the University of Passau (GER) since 2010. He holds a Diploma in Economics and a master degree in European Studies. After having achieved his PhD and Habilitation from the University of Trier (GER)—the latter with a study on French foreign policy and the Kosovo war—he spent some years in Serbia on behalf of the German Economic Cooperation. His research interests cover comparative foreign policies in Europe, in particular with regard to South-Eastern Europe, and identity theory.

Bojan Baća is a Re:constitution Research Fellow at the Max Weber Institute of Sociology at Heidelberg University and a Social Science Fellow at the Art, Science and Business Program at the Akademie Schloss Solitude. He received his PhD in Sociology from York University in 2018. His scholarly work on the post-socialist region was published in journals such as Antipode, International Political Sociology and Europe-Asia Studies, as well as in the edited volumes Activist Citizenship in Southeast Europe, Resistances: Between Theories and the Field, Changing Youth Values in Southeast Europe: Beyond Ethnicity, When Students Protest: Universities in the Global North, and The Democratic Potential of Emerging Social Movements in Southeastern Europe. He is a recipient of the 2020 Danubius Young Scientist Award.

Cvete Koneska, DPhil is the Head of Analysis at S-RM Intelligence and Risk in London. She works with governments, businesses and investors, providing them with analysis and advice on geo-political, policy and security risks and trends across the world. Her academic research focuses on ethnopolitics and post-conflict reforms in the Balkans and European integration of the Western Balkans. Her research has been published in several academic journals.

Faris Kočan, PhD, is a research fellow and Teaching Assistant at the University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences. In his PhD dissertation, he tackled questions regarding ontological security and securitisation of identities in the context of Europeanisation, focusing on the case of Republika Srpska. Before becoming Young Researcher, Faris Kočan worked in a H2020 project RePAST—Revisiting the Past, Anticipating the Future, where he was focusing on the troubled past of Bosnia-Herzegovina within the field of arts and culture, history, media, politics and European integration.

Gëzim Krasniqi, PhD, is Lecturer in Nationalism and Political Sociology at the University of Edinburgh in the UK. He has a broad interdisciplinary interest in nationalism, ethnic conflict, contested states and citizenship, often with empirical focus on South East Europe. He is co-editor of Uneven Citizenship: Minorities and Migrants in the Post-Yugoslav Space (Routledge, 2015) and author of several journal articles and book chapters.

Jakob R. Avguštin, PhD, works in the Academic Services Office at the University of East Anglia, UK where he recently also completed an MSc in Computing Sciences. He is Editor-at-Large at E-International Relations and his main research focuses on the use of military force in international relations, particularly when authorised by the UN Security Council. His publications include Realism in Practice: An Appraisal (co-editor), and articles in Sociology of Diplomacy: Initial Reading and Acta Diplomatica. He recently edited the collection The United Nations: Friend or Foe of Self-Determination? where he also contributed with an article The United Nations and Self-Determination in the Case of East Timor. Jakob is currently working on analysis of the Global Peace Index and on an examination of general debate speeches at the UN General Assembly. 

Kenneth Morrison is Professor of Modern Southeast European History at De Montfort University, Leicester, UK. He is the author of five books focusing on the modern history of the Western Balkans, including Nationalism, Identity and Statehood in Post-Yugoslav Montenegro (Bloomsbury, 2018) and, with Elizabeth Roberts, The Sandžak: A History (Hurst & Co., 2013). Kenneth was the Specialist Adviser to the House of Lords International Relations Committee for their “UK and the Future of the Western Balkans” inquiry.

Kurt Bassuener, PhD recently received his Doctorate in International Relations at the University of St. Andrews for his dissertation, Peace Cartels: Internationally Brokered Power-Sharing and Perpetual Oligarchy in Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedonia. A policy analyst and advocate since 1997, he is co-founder and senior associate of the Democratization Policy Council, a Berlin-based think-tank. He also served as strategy analyst at the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Recent publications include Primed Receptors: Synergies between Western Balkan Political Elites and Chinese Economic Actors and State Media, in Sudosteuropa, 2020 and Pushing on an Open Door: Foreign Authoritarian Influence in the Western Balkans (IFDS/NED Working Paper, 2019).

Maxim Samorukov is a fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center and deputy editor of Carnegie.ru. Before joining Carnegie in 2015, Samorukov worked for the independent news website Slon.ru for five years as an editor and international columnist, covering topics including Russian foreign policy, Central and Eastern Europe and its relations with Russia, Balkans, and the challenges of transitioning to democracy. His recent publications include: China’s Relations with Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova: Less Than Meets the Eye (co-authored with Temur Umarov, Carnegie Moscow Center, 2020), The Kremlin and the Protests in Belarus: What’s Russia’s Next Move? (Institut für Sicherheitspolitik, 2020), A Spoiler in the Balkans? Russia and the Final Resolution of the Kosovo Conflict (Carnegie Moscow Center, 2019). 

Mladen Mladenov is a PhD student at the University of Passau. His research is focused on Serbian foreign policy and Europeanisation in SEE countries.

Nikica Kolar is a Research Assistant at the Institute for Development and International Relations in Zagreb. He received his master’s degree in political science in 2018 at the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Zagreb in the field of political theory and is currently a PhD candidate at the same Faculty. Nikica is engaged in the study of political theory, international relations, status of refugees and Croatian domestic and foreign policy.

Nina Pejič is a Junior Researcher at the Centre of International Relations, University of Ljubljana focused on studying the perspectives on the rise of China in political and economic realm. She is in function as the Head of the Research Unit at East Asia Resource Library (EARL), and a Secretary-General at the Slovene-Chinese Business Council at the Chamber of Commerce in Slovenia.

Saša Istenič Kotar is an Assistant Professor of Sinology at the University of Ljubljana and also serves as the Director of the Taiwan Study Center and an Executive Board Member of the East Asia Resource Library (EARL). Her research interests include Chinese politics, Taiwan-China relations, EU-China relations, East Asian security and diplomacy. Her latest publication is one of the first books on Taiwan published in Slovene (TAJVAN: biser v neizprosni geopolitični realnosti, 2021).

Senada Šelo Šabić works as a Senior Scientific Associate in the Institute for Development and International Relations in Zagreb. Her research interests include Croatian foreign policy, Southeast Europe, EU affairs, and migration. She holds a PhD in political science from the European University Institute in Florence and two Masters degrees—in international relations from the University of Zagreb and in peace studies from the University of Notre Dame, USA. Senada Šelo Šabić is editor-in-chief of the Croatian International Relations Review.

Soeren Keil, PhD is the Academic Head of the International Research and Consulting Center of the Institute of Federalism, University of Fribourg, Switzerland. His research focuses on the use of territorial autonomy as a tool of conflict resolution, the political systems of the Western Balkan states and the process of EU enlargement. His recent publications include: The Europeanisation of the Western Balkans—A Failure of EU Conditionality? (Palgrave 2019, co-edited with Jelena Dzankic and Marko Kmezic) and Power-Sharing in Europe—Past Practice, Present Cases and Future Directions with Palgrave, co-edited with Allison McCulloch (2021).

Zeynep Arkan Tuncel, PhD is Associate Professor of International Relations and the current director of Centre for Research on EU Studies at Hacettepe University, Turkey. She holds an MA in European Studies from the University of Exeter and a Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Kent at Canterbury. Her research focuses on EU foreign and security policy, hybrid threats, the role of identity in international politics, and discourse analysis.

Zlatko Šabič is a Professor of International Relations at the University of Ljubljana, and the Director-General of the East Asia Resource Library (EARL), member of the University’s Network of Research and Infrastructural Center (MRIC). Recently his research projects have touched upon Europe–East Asia relations, the Western Balkans, Central Europe, and international parliamentary relations and diplomacy. Currently he works on a book project related to parliamentary diplomacy in East Asia.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKK Alliance for the Future of Kosovo

AKP Justice and Development Party—Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi

ANP Annual National Program

BAF Balkan Air Force

BFSU Beijing Foreign Studies University

BiH Bosnia and Herzegovina

BISU Beijing University of International Studies

BRI Belt and Road Initiative

CASS Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

CCP Chinese Communist Party

CEEC Central and Eastern European Countries

CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy

CGTN China Global Television Network

CICIR China’s Institute of Contemporary International Relations

CIDCA China International Development Cooperation Agency

CIIS China’s Institute of International Studies

COVID-19 Coronavirus disease SARS CoV-2

CRI China Radio International

CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

DPS Democratic Party of Socialists

DS Democratic Party Serbia

EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development

EC European Community

ES English School

EU European Union

EUFOR EU’s Operation Althea

EULEX EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo

EUPM Police Mission in Bosnia

FDI Foreign direct investment

FRG Federal Republic of Germany

FRY Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

FYROM Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia

HDZ Croatian Democratic Union

HR High Representative

ICJ International Court of Justice

ICTR International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

IDPs Internally displaced people

IFIs International financial institutions

IFOR NATO Implementation Force

IMF International Monetary Fund

IPAP Individual Partnership Action Plan

IR International Relations

ISAF International Security Assistance Force

KAP Kombinat aluminijuma in Podgorica

KFOR Kosovo Force

KLA Kosovo Liberation Army

LDK Democratic League of Kosovo

LNG Liquefied natural gas

LSGs Leading small groups and commissions

MAP Membership Action Plan

MCC Millennium Challenge Corporation

MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MOFCOM Ministry of Commerce

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NIS Naftna Industrija Srbije

NISMA Social Democratic Initiative

NPC National People’s Congress

OBOR One Belt One Road

OHR Office of the High Representative

OIC Organization of Islamic Countries

OSA Bosnian Intelligence Agency

OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PBSC Politburo’s Standing Committee

PDK Democratic Party of Kosovo

PfP Partnership for Peace

PIC Peace Implementation Council

PKK Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan

PLA State Council and the People’s Liberation Army

PRC People’s Republic of China

R2P Responsibility to protect

ROC Republic of China

RS Republic Srpska

RSCT Regional Security Complex Theory

RZD Russian Rail Monopoly

SAA Stabilization and Association Agreement

SAP Stabilization and Association Process

SDA Party of Democratic Action

SDSM Social Democratic Union of Macedonia

SEE South and Eastern Europe

SFOR NATO’s Stabilization Force

SFRY Social Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

SKCG League of Communists of Montenegro

SNS Serbian Progressive Party

SNSD Alliance of Independent Social Democrats

SOE British Special Operations Executive

SPS Socialist Party of Serbia

TCM Traditional Chinese medicine

TİKA Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency

TRT Turkey’s state-run Radio and Television Corporation

UAE United Arab Emirates

UK United Kingdom

UN United Nations

UNCRO United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation

UNMIBH United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina

UNMIK UN Mission in Kosovo

UNMOP United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka

UNPREDEP UN’s Preventive Deployment Force

UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force

UNPSG United Nations Civilian Police Support Group

UNSC UN Security Council

US United States

USSR Soviet Union

VC Venice Commission

VMRO-DPMNE Centre-right party of Macedonia

VV Self-Determination Movement

WEU Western European Union

WTO World Trade Organization

WWI World War I

WWII World War II

YNA Yugoslav People’s Army

YTB Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities

INTRODUCTION: A NEW EASTERN QUESTION?

Bernhard Stahl and Soeren Keil

“I really believe the ‘Eastern Question’ that has haunted Europe for a century and which I thought the Crimean War had adjourned for half another will fall my lot to encounter—dare I say to settle.” (Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield)1

Map 1: Post-Yugoslav Countries and their Neighbor States

Source: https://www.d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car=69052&lang=de

There is an increase in the scholarly literature arguing that we are observing the emergence of a new geopolitical battleground between different great powers in the post-Yugoslav states (Bieber and Tzifakis, 2020, AIES, 2020, van Meurs, 2014). For the countries of the former Yugoslavia, such an interaction is nothing new, after all, it is here that WWI started with the assassination of the Austro-Hungarian Arch-Duke in June 1914. Further, during WWII, resistance against the Nazi occupation of the territory was overshadowed by an internal conflict between Royalist-Western allied forces and Partisans, which received most of their support from the Soviet Union, thereby mirroring the growing global conflict that would characterize the Cold War period. The post-Yugoslav states, so the argument, has often been a miniature version of wider global developments and conflicts. This area with its historic diversity, its history of conflict and cooperation, has been engaging with regional, great and superpowers for a long time, so contemporary developments need to be seen in this context.

We argue that the newly emerging ‘Eastern Question’ in the post-Yugoslav states is characterized by a number of important developments. First, the dominance of the Euro-Atlantic alliance and the integration of the region’s countries into Euro-Atlantic structures has come to a halt, thereby substantially reducing the influence of the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) in the post-Yugoslav states. Second, new actors have emerged and grown in importance. Some, such as Russia and Turkey, have been involved in the region for a while, but have recently become more prominent and more openly opposed (and sometimes hostile) towards EU and US interests in the region. Others, such as China or the Gulf countries, have recently emerged as important actors, focusing on trade and cultural exchange, but also promoting distinct political priorities in their engagement with the post-Yugoslav states. Third, the countries in the region are changing and have changed in the last 15 years. Democratization has been faltering in the majority of countries in the region (with the exception of North Macedonia), while renewed authoritarian tendencies are visible in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and even in Slovenia and Croatia, which are already members of the EU (Bieber, 2020). These new internal dynamics in the countries of the former Yugoslavia affect their foreign policy—European integration is becoming harder to achieve, while the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership is becoming more contested in countries such as Bosnia, but also in Montenegro, which already joined the alliance in 2017.

This book, in line with our assumption about historical continuity and foreign policy analysis framework, utilizes the theoretical framework of the English School (ES) in International Relations. In doing so, we aim to provide a theoretical discussion that helps understand the most recent developments across the region as outlined above. The authors of the following chapters, country experts and the bringing together of multiple disciplines were all given guiding questions and a clear structure to follow to ensure internal coherence and opportunities for cross-country comparisons. We are aware that we are studying a ‘moving target’; in the process of finalizing this book, we have seen political change in a number of post-Yugoslav states, including the historical defeat of the Democratic Party of Socialist (DPS) in parliamentary elections in Montenegro and the coming to power of new political actors through Vetëvendosje and Prime Minister Albin Kurti in Kosovo. We have also observed democratic decline in Slovenia, which has been hailed as a success story in post-Communist transition in the past, as well as continued political crisis in Bosnia.

This chapter will continue by providing the analytical and theoretical framework of this extensive study. The ES allows us to focus on historical continuities and change, order and justice in the international system and a wider discussion on foreign policy change amongst great powers towards the post-Yugoslav states and amongst the post-Yugoslav states towards the great powers. In the first part, the theoretical framework of the English School in International Relations will be presented. This will provide a guide for the reader on how to assess and look at the region and its states’ engagement with the great powers. Due to the theory’s proneness to historical patterns, the chapter also comprises a reconstruction of historical patterns of great power intervention. What is more, the introduction will provide the theoretical and methodological guide for each chapter in this volume—a framework which all authors have been asked to follow. By outlining the reasoning behind this conceptual choice (and the important historical perspective in the English School literature), we will highlight how the engagement of the great powers with the post-Yugoslav states can be framed in a historical perspective, specifically assessing continuities and changes—and, most important for our purposes, current developments.

Theoretical Arguments

Our book seeks to examine regional change. This change may have occurred over the last 30 years manifesting in changing foreign policies, changing power constellations and/or changing conflicts. All of these may originate—our first assumption—in the so-called second or third image of international relations (Waltz, 1959) i.e., change will be attributed to the international system as well as the respective societies (not so much to individual leaders). Hence, a flexible conception is needed to be able to grasp such trends and to assess the political outcomes. This is why we opt for the English School in this book. While we are aware of the weaknesses of the theory—acknowledging the so-called Second debate in IR2—we appreciate its strengths: historical arguments, normative claims of order and justice and indicators for historical change (i.e., “primary institutions”). In the following, we will sketch the ES’ dealing with regions before we present our conceptual framework.

The English School is a loose network of scholars from the Commonwealth with its heyday in the 1960s and 1970s but which has started to thrive again in recent years (cf. Suganami, 2011). In the first decades of ES research, regional aspects did not play any role because the theory’s progression focused on general and global aspects such as the evolution of the international society, its features and its possible transformation (Stivachtis, 2015, p. 69). In recent years, however, many ES studies on specific world regions were published (e.g., Stivachtis and Habegger, 2011; Buzan, 2009; Pourchot, 2014; Quayle, 2013; Pella, 2014), while particular takes on EU conditionality and enlargement (Diez and Whitman, 2002; Diez et al., 2014) complemented the picture. The Balkans, though, still represent a research gap in this regard. It only occurs in the research on Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT), which is close to the ES that one chapter is devoted to in “The Balkans and Turkey” (Buzan and Waever, 2003, pp. 377–396). We start our endeavour where this chapter ends and have asked for changes ever since. By doing so, we will dig into those characteristics of ES and RSCT which will be applied in our study.

A key feature of the ES is the centrality of the state: international relations is about “the politics of states with regard to their external aspects” (Devlen et al., 2005, p. 180). Of course, states are different in terms of power and influence (Buzan, 2004, pp. 63–66). While “regional powers '“owe superior political and military means in relation to their neighbours, “great powers’” capabilities allow them to generate impact beyond their region. Great powers do not possess capabilities in all sectors or issue areas, but they are treated by others “on the basis of system level calculations about the present and future distribution of power” (Buzan and Waever, 2003, p. 35). Only “super powers” act on a global scale owing “first class military-political capabilities” (ibid., p. 34). For our study, Turkey qualifies as a regional power while it looks debatable whether we treat Serbia and Croatia as possible regional powers. EU actorness is taken as given in our study (Niemann and Bretherton, 2013), considering its fit to well-established actorness criteria, be it authority, autonomy, recognition (Jupille and Caporaso, 1998), or presence and capability (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006, p. 24). Hence, the EU well qualifies for great power status together with Russia and China. The US should be regarded as the sole superpower.

The second characteristic of the ES is the importance of history for their arguments. Because political science stems from law and history studies, the ES subscribes to this tradition. The broad structural argument is that (political) history swings between three poles called “empire”, “hegemony” and “anarchy” (Buzan and Little, 2009). On a global scale, the system of states might be located somewhere between hegemony (Cold War, US) and anarchy with a recent trend to the latter. Regionally, the situation might look different. Admittedly, the regional aspect is not well elaborated in the ES’s writings (Buzan, 2014, p. 57f.) Yet, for our purpose, we borrow some insights from the complementary RSCT (Buzan and Waever, 2003). For RSCT, a region is a construct, not an essentialist entity, and it is shaped by the distribution of power and historical patterns of enmity/amity. Furthermore, there are security threats which are interdependent in the region (and not a mere extension of global threats such as terrorism, Covid etc). Two cores in the region stand out: One is the conflict constellation of Serbs, Croats and Bosnians, and a second one comprises North-Macedonia3, Albania, Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey (Buzan and Waever, 2003, p. 382). Buzan and Waever (2003, pp. 377–379, p. 391) make the argument that the Balkans were oscillating between being a proper regional security complex (in the 1990s, see below) or being a “sub-complex”, as part of the European security complex (1999–2007, see below). Following the insight that “security dynamics have a strong territoriality” (Buzan and Waever, 2003, p. 29), we tend to treat the Balkans or Southeastern Europe (SEE) as comprising the Post-Yugoslav states4, and the “Western Balkans” as a security complex which is “a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot reasonably be considered apart from one another” (Buzan, 2009, p. 160). By doing so, we already take a stance claiming that the West’s first attempt to make the region a ‘sub-complex’ of the EU has failed by admitting that no further enlargements will take place in the decade after Croatia’s. What the EU’s second serve will be like and what it will mean to the region is part of our elaboration to come.

In SEE, the EU’s position has been so dominant that we posit it between empire and hegemony, again with a recent trend to the latter. Our studies will be apt to demonstrate how change takes place in regional security complexes, i.e., how the EU’s impact as a benevolent empire transforms to a mere hegemonic status under the impression of external great powers becoming more active. This is the result of the EU’s growing scepticism towards further enlargement as a whole, as well as the growing hesitance in the post-Yugoslav states to engage in deep-rooted Europeanization reforms as the carrot of eventual EU membership moves further away.

A third feature of the ES is its devotion to institutions. Over time, the international system has become an international society, a key term of the theory:

A society of states (or: international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in a sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions (Bull, 1977, p. 13).

The international society serves two functions. One is to maintain “order”, i.e., the pluralist argument to contribute to the states’ existence and survival while mitigating conflicts at the same time (Hurrell, 2007, pp. 3–4). The other function aims to foster justice, i.e., the solidarist argument to take care of the individuals in the international society (Joergensen, 2010, p. 111). Of course, the EU accession principles can be easily interpreted in this vein. Does the EU apply EU conditionality in a strict way contributing to humanitarian law and paying tribute to the rule of law (‘justice’)? Or does it ease the conditions—maybe even pervert them (Stahl, 2011a)—to go for quicker accessions aiming at stability (‘order’)?

The more content the states are with the world they live in, the more “legitimate” and stable the international society becomes (Watson, 2009, p. 315). Each state, though, faces the challenge to maintain a maximum of flexibility on the one hand (raison d’état) and to support the international society which tends to limit its freedom of foreign policy on the other. For our foreign policy perspective purpose, Watson’s analytical term “raison de système” (2009, p. 14) looks promising in this regard, as it alludes to “the belief that it pays to make the system work”, i.e., the extent to which the countries involved support or undermine the international society prevalent in the region. How far do the countries under study oppose or support the raison de système—the status quo—in the region? In other words, do they lend the EU legitimacy or rather seek to subvert its actions?

As a kind of dual structure with regard to the three-pole structure introduced above, some patterns have been evolving in the course of history, which are held legitimate by the states (Buzan, 2014, p. 16f.). Such “deep relatively durable social practices” (ibid.) are called “primary institutions”.

Primary institutions since the Westphalian treaties are—following Bull (1977, p. 74):

war

balance of power

great power management

international law

diplomacy

Over time, ES scholars have put some more primary institutions on the table, also proposing a hierarchy of institutions (e.g., master institutions—derivatives—principles; Buzan, 2004, pp. 167–190). For practical reasons, we do not follow this road but add ‘nationalism’, ‘sovereignty’ and ‘territoriality’ to the above list because of its obvious relevance for the history of the region (cf. Buzan, 2014, p. 17f). For sure, primary institutions undergo change, which make them useful indicators for the analysis of state constellations. This is evident in the case of the EU, which can be regarded as a regional international society comprising common institutions and sharing a common set of rules (Riemer and Stivachtis, 2002, p. 30). Inside the EU, some scholars argue, the primary institutions have been changing profoundly:

Consequently, the five core institutions of international order identified by Bull (balance of power, international law, diplomacy, war and great powers) have been modified or replaced. The new institutions of the European order are identified as the pooling of sovereignty, the acquis communautaire, multi-managerialism, pacific democracy, member state coalitions and multiperspectivity” (Diez et al., 2011, p. 134).

In this vein, enlargement can be conceived as a transformation of primary institutions from Bull’s primary institutions to Diez et al’s.

Admittedly, primary institutions are hard to separate from each other analytically because they cannot serve as separate variables explaining different policy outcomes. Rather, some institutions are intertwined—such as sovereignty, territoriality and international law. Yet primary institutions cannot be changed by one state alone—for instance, not even the most powerful state, the United States, would be able to ruin international law. States’ behaviour, though, contributes to the strength/weakness and importance of the primary institutions in the region: Is diplomacy and international law (primarily fostered and upheld by the EU) undermined by the states which increasingly prefer great power management (offered by Russia, the US, and Turkey)? Do we see changes within the setup of primary institutions? For instance, how is sovereignty and territoriality in the Kosovo question interlinked with the balance of power, great power management and diplomacy? It shall be noted, though, that changes may occur in and of primary institutions (Buzan, 2004, p. 182). For example, by the end of the Bosnian wars, the primary institution ‘war’ changed from asymmetrical to symmetrical warfare, while ‘diplomacy’ and ‘great power management’ increasingly supplanted ‘war’. Changes in and between primary institutions will enable us to evaluate the overall political situation in the Balkans, as ideal-types for a “political situation” may serve the ES’ interstate societies model (ibid., p. 190, p. 159) reaching from confederative over convergent, cooperative, coexistent to power political and even asocial relations.

Figure 1: The English School interstate societies model

Source: Buzan (2004, p. 159), simplified version.

In contrast to the primary ones, “secondary institutions” are those which are called “International Organisations” or “International Regimes” in common IR literature. The United Nations (UN), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Bank, but also the non-proliferation regime are famous examples. They are “state-made” and deliberately designed to serve specific purposes such as the “Stability Pact for SEE” or the “Stabilisation and Association Agreements” for the countries willing to accede to the EU. Our studies ask, which secondary institutions serve as the most preferred arena for the countries under study? Do we see changes here?

Before we enter a brief historical reconstruction to denote the historical patterns in play, let us formulate our working thesis for the book:

Since 2006–7, great and regional powers beyond the US and the EU have been engaging more actively with the region. This corresponds to the weakness of the EU and overall foreign policy re-orientations of the great and regional powers. As a result, the region is changing …

moving from interstate relations of convergence to coexistence (see figure 1);

becoming less solidarist (justice) but more pluralist (order);

increasing the risk of becoming a great power regional security complex again (probably without becoming an “overlay” e.g., a battlefield of great powers as in WWI (Buzan and Waever, 2003, pp. 59–63) where security changes in the region are instrumental to great and regional power calculations;

becoming less of a European sub-complex and more of a separate regional security complex again.

In short, the dynamics in the region highlight the importance of order (and increasing disorder) in the international system and also demonstrate wider global changes in international politics, particularly in the shift away from US dominance and a unipolar system to one characterized by multiple poles and competing conceptions of global order. Competition over economic and political influence in the post-Yugoslav states, therefore, also offers a unique perspective of wider trends in a territory which for decades has been seen to be deeply embedded within the Euro-Atlantic sphere of dominance.

Historical Patterns

The politics of the Balkan international community reflects a pattern as follows5: Treated as a ‘playfield of the great powers’ (before 1947), the success of the Socialist Yugoslavia enabled a politics of neglect (1948–1991). The Yugoslavia wars drew the international community into the conflicts (1991–1998) before the international community committed massive resources to the region (1999–2007). The (failed) Kosovo negotiations marked the change to the current stage, which is characterized by the dwindling impact of the US, the weakening pull of the EU, the turn in Russian foreign policy, the new Ottoman phase by Turkey, and the growing importance of China in the region.

The Balkans as a Playfield of Great Power Politics (before 1947)

The Balkans as a playfield of great power politics was a very impactful and momentous period in history because important territorial decisions were made that would shape the problems of belonging and neighborhood for the following century. Between the 14th and 20th centuries, the region was the spoils of war and annexation by two empires, the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg monarchy. However, by the end of the 18th century at the latest, the Ottoman Empire was in a phase of decline, primarily resulting from the national uprisings of the 19th century, in which Greeks and Serbs, for example, fought for their independence or de facto autonomy. In terms of the ES, the primary institution ‘nationalism’ challenged the great power overlay. As much as the public in the West welcomed the national uprisings, the elites worried about the region’s stability and possible gains influenced by the respective great power rivals. In the aftermath of the Crimean War, the major European powers sought to establish a lasting order in the Balkans at the Congress of Berlin (1878). However, the goal was not a permanent stabilisation regarding the potential for conflict on the ground; rather, the great power management meant that they were concerned that others should not profit from the decline of the Ottoman Empire. The positions of the German Empire, Great Britain and France were characterised more by disinterest in the region, while Italy and Russia were intent on gaining influence (Geiss, 1982, p. 37ff). Austria-Hungary even took advantage of the general indifference and annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was, as the events of 1914 were to show, a fatal move. When the Ottoman Empire was distracted militarily in North Africa, Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece took advantage of the Empire’s weakness and overran the Ottoman troops in the First Balkan War (1912–13). An important cornerstone—probably underestimated in the literature to this day—is the Great Power Conferences of 1912/13, which took place after the end of the Balkan Wars and were intended to distribute the bankruptcy assets of the Ottoman Empire. As is traditional at post-war conferences, there was a fundamental tension between “the reality on the ground”, i.e., the conquests of the anti-Ottoman alliance and the ideas of justice, self-determination and—still dominant at the time—zones of influence that prevailed among the great powers not involved in the war. Theoretically speaking, the primary institutions sovereignty, territoriality and diplomacy were interlinked characterizing great power management. At the Ambassadors’ Conference in London in 1912, Austria-Hungary succeeded in organizing the reorganization of the Balkans without involving the small and middle powers and the Ottoman Empire (Boeckh, 1996, pp. 40–45). It was not only during the war that the region remained a playfield of the great powers.

The foundation of the “Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes” from the bankruptcy estate of the Danube monarchy after 1918 was ill-fated from the beginning. The disputes between Croats and Serbs over the structure and form of the new state could only be patched up in a makeshift way, and modernisation and democratization failed early (Banac, 1984, p. 414). WWII not only repeated the horrors of WWI, but it also surpassed them. It is commonly known that the Balkan region became an unfortunate victim of the great powers’ projections of power politics. Two aperçus from WWII illustrate this: Hitler’s attack on Yugoslavia in 1941 followed the sheer exuberance of the Italian attack on Greece and was owed to simple military-strategic considerations of denying Britain a critical bridgehead in Greece. Yugoslavia’s militarily ludicrous resistance to the Wehrmacht, in turn, stemmed from a coup in Belgrade co-initiated by the British intelligence service SIS, which was merely intended to buy more time for the British invasion forces for Greece (Hinsley, 1979, p. 368ff.). The secondary theatre of war, Yugoslavia, had to pay for this with a heavy toll of blood: More than one million inhabitants lost their lives because of the war (Calic, 2010, p. 169). Both WWI and WWII had a devastating impact on the region in the truest sense of the word. First, this was due to the changing course of the war, for example, in WWI. Second, the World Wars promoted conflict dynamics in the region and deepened the rifts between the ethnic groups whose elites had aligned themselves with one or the other warring party. Each period of occupation thus created new conflicts and traumas between the ethnic groups. Third, the division into different occupation zones during WWII and the horrific occupation by the Axis powers contributed to the further fragmentation of the region and thus to the disparity of historical experience (‘divided past’). Moreover, the fierce Yugoslav civil war between Chetniks and Communist partisans during and after WWII added another cleavage to the region. Put simply, the World Wars increased the region’s identity complexes. Burdened with these complexes, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia emerged.

The Policy of Neglect (1947–91)

Yugoslavia broke away from Moscow in 1947 and embarked on a “third way” between East and West. The system of states in the Balkans now seemed stabilized, the zones of influence defined by the Cold War. Since the Suez crisis in 1956, the ambitions of the great powers France and Great Britain in the region were also substantially reduced. Put theoretically, the region became an unstructured security complex. As fragile and “frozen” as Yugoslavia’s internal social situation remained, it managed its foreign policy with great success (Boeckh, 2014). Tito acted as the leader of the non-aligned movement and was a master at securing international recognition for his country. The visible result was lucrative credit arrangements and trade agreements with East and West, which allowed the economic experiment of Yugoslavia to live beyond its means for a long time. The growing number of tourists in the 1970s and 1980s further helped Yugoslavia’s perception as a thriving, peaceful society. The Yugoslav prosperity and freedom of travel concealed the fact that the democratization of society was still lacking and that the Tito regime cracked down on opposition members with unforgiving harshness (such as the contract killings abroad). At the same time, the ethnic conflicts in the country itself continued to smoulder. Belgrade’s policy towards Kosovo was that of a classic colonial power in occupied land: modern achievements such as infrastructure, medicine and educational institutions were supposed to provide sufficient incentives to bind non-Serbs to the state. At the same time, however, all important positions of power in the state were occupied by Serbs, which made the inequality of the ethnic groups obvious and, at the same time, cemented them. Nationalism turned out to be a powerful force. Not only had it driven the Serbs to rise against the Ottomans, but it also pushed the Kosovo Albanians against Serb rule. The 1981 riots in Kosovo showed the dissatisfaction with the prevailing conditions in Yugoslavia and the lack of identification with the federation, but the West did not take note of this. Thus, 20 years later, Western analysts and politicians were to advocate in unison for extensive autonomy for the province, regardless of the fact that such autonomy had already existed in 1981 but had been perceived as unsatisfactory by the Kosovar elites.

The West took little notice of the problematic developments of the 1980s (failure of the federation, increase in economic problems and nationalist tendencies, weakening of the Communist Party’s binding force, Milošević’s rise to power) and were happy to stick to the glorified image of Yugoslavia as a peaceful holiday paradise and successful multiculturalist project (Ramet, 1992; Silber and Little, 1996). The international community’s increased suffering from excessive demands in the aftermath of the epochal year 1989: German unification, the turmoil in Eastern Europe, the Iraqi attack on Kuwait, the Tiananmen Square massacre, the permanent crisis surrounding the world trade order and the attempted coup d’état in Moscow made the drifting apart of Yugoslavia’s constituent republics fade into the background. In theoretical terms, the region was meant to be “sealed off”, constructing a distinct region beyond Europe marked by “Balkanization” (Buzan and Waever, 2003, p. 387; Todorova, 2009). It was only nolens volens that the international community was drawn into the conflicts surrounding the break-up of Yugoslavia.

Drawing in—Involvement (1991–98)

As James Gow (1997) put it, the foreign policy behaviour of the Western powers in the run-up to the Yugoslav wars was marked by wishful thinking and pusillanimous realism. Intervention politics was risk-averse, based on containment, superseded by domestic politics and characterized by a short shadow of the future. Initially, the West stuck to a (unrealistic) status quo orientation hoping that the situation would not deteriorate: The Yugoslav federation was to be preserved (1990–91). Linked to this was the assumption of a neutral mediating position. The West developed proposals for ceasefires and peace agreements without actively taking sides. It was Germany’s withdrawal from the international community’s position of non-recognition of Slovenia and Croatia—one month after the fall of Vukovar—that changed international dynamics. Although the community was now forced to take a position in favor of the two northern republics, this had no consequences regarding the overall pattern. On the contrary, Germany regretted its advance and withdrew from active conflict resolution in the Bosnian wars (Maull and Stahl, 2002, p. 101). The third pattern of behavior established in the Yugoslav wars was humanitarian aid. As Lene Hansen (2006) has convincingly argued, humanitarian aid to the civilian population complemented the neutral mediator position as well as the status quo orientation which make up the “Balkanization discourse”. The West helped the civilian population without directly intervening or taking sides in the war itself. On the one hand, this policy had the facet of UN blue helmets on the ground (United Kingdom, France and The Netherlands), and on the other hand, it was characterised by Germany’s willingness to take in thousands of civil war refugees.

These three patterns of behavior—neutral mediation, active negotiation, humanitarian aid (and development cooperation)—failed in the Croatian war, the Bosnian wars and the Kosovo war. However, they remain decisive for European policy in the Balkans because they are—identity-wise—consensual in the societies of the large member states (Harnisch and Stahl, 2009, p. 276). Analytically speaking, the perseverance of the Balkanization discourse corresponds to the idea of SEE being a separate regional security complex whose conflicts and patterns are not part of the European project. It was only the complete failure of this policy that forced the EU to change course, trying to export the European model to the region—and making it a sub-complex of Europe.

In the course of 1994, with the entry of the USA into the conflict, a new pattern of behaviour emerged that increasingly overlapped with the previous ones: Forced diplomacy. As early as 1992 and 1993, the G. H. Bush and Clinton administrations had announced a possible change in their foreign policy with their famous “Christmas-warnings”: any escalation of violence in Kosovo would be met with airstrikes against Serbian targets. But these warnings were bluffs in the sense that neither the Bush nor the Clinton administration ever intended to carry out their threat (Daalder and O’Hanlon, 2000, pp. 29–30). After all, the threat and implementation of targeted airstrikes and the accompanying de facto partisanship in favor of the militarily inferior side of the Bosniaks and Croats had succeeded in ending the fighting in Bosnia. The successful intervention under US leadership in Bosnia laid the foundation for the “Kosovo intervention consensus” of the West in the Kosovo crisis. The predominantly non-violent resistance of the Albanians—personified by Ibrahim Rugova—had not brought about any improvement in their situation after several years, and so in the mid-1990s, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was formed, which drew attention to itself with terrorist attacks against the Serbian state authorities and civilian population (Sundhaussen, 2000, pp. 83–86). Between 1995 and 1997, it seemed as if EU foreign policy was repeating its mistakes of 1990 to 1992. The conflict was perceived by the member states primarily as a conflict of interests, not of identity. The wishful thinking for a quick end to the conflict and the selective perception of Milošević’s willingness to compromise continued to be features of Western policy (Maull and Stahl, 2002, pp. 99–102). In Kosovo, however, violence intensified: From April to September 1998, Serb units destroyed more than 300 villages (Malcolm, 2006, p. 147). On 23 September 1998, the United Nations Security Council (thus including China and Russia) passed Resolution 1199, referring to Chapter VII, demanding an immediate cessation of all hostilities, the withdrawal of Serbian special forces and the start of constructive talks between the conflicted parties. The resolution named Serbia as the situation’s main perpetrator for the first time, and NATO threatened the Yugoslav leadership with airstrikes. Yugoslav President Milošević reacted to NATO’s increased threat potential and declared his willingness to make concessions in the so-called Holbrooke-Milošević Agreement on 13 October. However, Milošević was very slow in implementing some points of the agreement and failed to implement others at all. To make matters worse, the KLA did not feel bound by the agreement and took advantage of the passivity of the Serbian troops to launch attacks (Judah, 2002, p. 189). In December, both the KLA attacks and the repression and expulsions in Kosovo increased again. Then, in mid-January, the news startled the Western media that 45 Albanian civilians had been killed in Reçak/Račak—most probably by Serbian units. This massacre seemingly marks a turning point in the international assessment of the Kosovo conflict because from then on, even the previously hesitant states of France, Germany and Italy were ready to leave their neutral position. The last chance for a peaceful settlement was the Rambouillet Conference between the Serbian government and the negotiating delegation of the Kosovo Albanians, which began on February 6, 1999. Central problems in the negotiations were the future status of Kosovo, the military presence on the ground and its relationship to Yugoslav sovereignty, as well as the disagreement of the contact group, especially on the question of how much flexibility should be shown on the sensitive points (Joetze, 2001, p. 66).

However, the negotiations were overshadowed by neverending news about displacements and excessive violence in Kosovo. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), about 230,000 Albanians had been expelled from their homes by mid-March 1999, 60,000 of them since December 1998, and another 30,000 after the end of the negotiations in Rambouillet (Krause, 2000, p. 410). But the very emotional opening speech of the French president, in which he recalled the overcoming of the Franco-German arch-enmity and urgently appealed to the parties in conflict to find “the courage to make peace”, went unheard (cited in Judah, 2002, p. 202). Under enormous Western pressure, only the Albanian delegation accepted the agreement on the political framework and the civilian and military implementation for the pacification of Kosovo on March 18. However, the discord that arose during the conference between the formal negotiators France and Great Britain on the one hand and the USA on the other, strengthened the Serbian government in its rejectionist stance (Swoboda and Stahl, 2009, p. 67f.). Thus, the Serbian delegation stuck to its dismissive attitude, demanded fundamental renegotiations on the political part and refused any discussion on implementation. The international community felt compelled to act, not least because of the increasingly urgent refugee problem. NATO—including Turkey—began bombing Serbia as well as Serbian units in Kosovo. Only after Milošević gave up—after assurances of a UN-led mission for Kosovo with Russian participation—did the Alliance stop the attacks after more than 70 days. NATO’s bombing campaign, however, led to a feeling of marginalisation in Moscow (Williams and Golenkova, 2001, pp. 217–8), which paved the way for Russia’s intransigence in the Kosovo negotiations a couple of years later. With the occupation of Kosovo by multinational peacekeeping forces, the region entered a new phase, and “the last American war in Europe” (Weymouth and Henig, 2001) ended.

The Phase of Responsibility (1999–2007)

The end of the Kosovo War marks the significant take-over of responsibility by Euro-Atlantic actors. The nolens volens involvement was now succeeded by a proactive policy. In theoretical terms, the region moved from being a separate regional security complex to a sub-complex within Europe (Buzan and Waever, 2003, p. 395). Kosovo was declared a UN protectorate administered by different international organizations (OSCE, EU, UN) and substantial troop deployments for NATOS’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) including Russia, Turkey, the US and European powers. Turkey, for instance, committed herself to the “friends of Kosovo” group and helped to initiate the Southeast-European brigade (Babuna, 2000, p. 311). The Turkish minority in Kosovo cheered the country’s engagement with KFOR 90 years after the Ottomans had left the region in the Balkan war (ibid., p. 316).

The international community’s proactive conflict resolution was demonstrated when riots started in North-Macedonia in 2001 (Ahlbrecht, 2003). The Albanian minority in North-Macedonia was another remnant of the great power conferences of London and Paris mentioned above. North-Macedonia was used by the KLA as a retreat, and many refugees from the Kosovo war found a safe haven in North-Macedonia. In January and February 2001, the Macedonian Liberation Army killed Macedonian soldiers and occupied the village of Tanusevci with some 100,000 people fleeing from the spreading Albanian violence—the country was on the brink of civil war. The EU intervened in the crisis by “speaking softly while carrying a big carrot”. Cooperation from the EU’s High Representative, Javier Solana, the Commission, the OSCE and NATO to pull together solved the problem (Stahl, 2011b, pp. 151–155). On August 13, 2001, all conflict parties signed the Ohrid Agreement, which foresaw a revision of the Macedonian constitution granting more rights to the Albanian minority—a perfect example of successful norm projection (Björkdahl, 2005, p. 212). That same month, NATO launched operation “Essential Harvest”, sending approximately 3,500 NATO troops to disarm ethnic Albanian groups and destroy their weapons. As the fighting ebbed, the crisis was solved. The EU flanked the post-conflict management by setting up a military operation in North-Macedonia (Concordia) followed by an EU police Mission (Proxima). Regrettably, this very proactive and successful conflict resolution could not blossom due to Greece’s blockade of the enlargement process.6

The responsibility phase was characterized by the EU’s aim to make the transformation of the region a top-priority goal of its foreign policy. The Thessaloniki summit in 2003 defined the region as part of Europe’s fate and promised membership in the EU. Because this required enormous efforts from the ‘pre-ins’, the union offered a wide range of incentives and assistance.7 In a theoretical vein, order in the sub-complex should have prevailed by the mutual recognition of sovereignty, renouncing territorial claims and abstaining from violent means. With the help of the EU’s transformative power, diplomacy and justice should have gained ground by including principles of international law in the accession negotiations (cooperation with ICTY requirement). The Thessaloniki promise to the region was trustworthy as it was followed by the Big Bang in 2004 when ten Central and East European (CEE) states acceded to the union—among them, the former republic of Yugoslavia. At the same time, EU integration was paralleled by the offer to join NATO which was apt—on the one hand—to solve territorial security threats for the Balkan states and—on the other—extended the transatlantic alliance to SEE. Several countries joined NATO in this period, Slovenia already in 2004, Croatia in 2009, Montenegro in 2017 and North Macedonia in 2020. All in all, interstate relations were destined to leave the asocial state of war behind and to arrive at the confederate state of union membership by the end of the day. The growing importance of externally-incentivized but regionally managed initiatives such as the Stability Pact and its successor the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) also highlight this mix of integration—internally through regional cooperation and integration by initiatives such as the EU-sponsored Berlin-process, which focuses on economic cooperation and external integration through NATO and EU membership. The extensive network of European engagement is also visible through processes such as the visa liberalization procedure, which enables citizens of all post-Yugoslav states (with the exception of Kosovo) to travel to the Schengen area in the EU without an entry visa and to stay for up to 90 days.

Yet, this solidarist perspective came under severe strain in the Kosovo status negotiations (2004–2007) when the minimum conditions for maintaining order in the region could not be met. After the Kosovo war, the EU fell back to its consensual standard pattern, which led to the policy failures in the Yugoslav wars: neutral mediation, active negotiation and humanitarian aid (and development cooperation), complemented by pusillanimous realism and wishful thinking. To retard the Kosovo status question due to its proper disunity and the wishful thinking of Serbia’s future democratic development, the EU and the international community subscribed to a “Standards before Status” strategy. They invested in Kosovo’s statebuilding while denying the option of independence (Papadimitriou, Petrov and Greicevci, 2007). Yet, the Kosovar élite undermined this strategy from the start (Hajrullahu, 2007, p. 207) and initiated a pogrom against Serbs and other minorities in Kosovo. In the March 2004 riots, 19 people were killed, hundreds of Serbs expelled and dozens of churches burned. KFOR could neither prevent nor stop the violence. When the Serb government—now aware of the vulnerable Serb minority—proposed Kosovo’s division or ‘cantonisation’, the EU rejected the idea on the basis of the protectorate’s impartiality (Judah, 2004, pp. 20–22). Once more, the EU’s reactive wishful thinking had failed while the KLA’s strategy of violence paid off: The status negotiation started with the EU actors completely divided on the issue (Toschev/Cheikameghuyaz, 2005, p. 281). The negotiations were burdened by a biased chief negotiator (Ker-Lindsey, 2009, p. 27), the fallback option of unilateral independence prompted by the US—G.W. Bush’s Tirana speech in June 2007 (NYT 10.06.2007) being a late indicator—and the promised Russian veto for any unilateral independence in the Security Council. Against this backdrop, the international community’s incentives for Serbia (participating in NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme, visa liberalization, relaunching the negotiations on a Stabilization and Association Agreement) all ran empty. So, the status negotiations eventually failed in December 2007. When Kosovo declared its independence the following year, the EU had to declare itself ‘status-neutral’ as five member states objected to recognizing Kosovo. In ES terms: Unrealistic claims of territoriality and sovereignty, bad diplomacy and dissonant great power management in combination with surging nationalism in Serbia, Kosovo but also in some EU member states resulted in a disastrous outcome of politics—the EU’s window of opportunity started to close.

The Weakening Pull of European Integration (after 2007)

After Kosovo’s independence, the EU successes in enlargement policy became rare. Even Croatia’s accession did not go smoothly considering the unresolved conflict with Slovenia on the Piran Bay which was imported into the Union (Šelo Šabić , 2014, pp. 79–80). Montenegro, which joined NATO in 2017, is a candidate country for EU integration together with Serbia (in 2012), but the negotiations have been slow. Bosnia also has applied for candidate status but looks unable to go for any necessary constitutional reform. Kosovo, meanwhile, signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU in 2014 (implemented in 2016) but remains a contested state.

The slow EU integration process of all post-Yugoslav states, except Slovenia and Croatia, and the palpable pre-occupation of the EU with other problems—Brexit, the refugee crisis, the rise of populist and anti-democratic governments in Poland and Hungary and the ongoing fallout from the Eurocrisis—have opened space for other external actors to seek influence in the region. At the same time, the US administration is perceived as scaling back engagement within the post-Yugoslav states, distracted by other international flashpoints (such as the Middle East and North Korea) and domestic divisions.