Altered Self and Altered Self-Experience E-Book

• Herausgeber: Books on Demand
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 602

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2014

Beschreibung

From a theoretical point of view the experiences in which the feeling of self is temporarily or permanently altered, pose opportunities to apply, critically verify or even renew theories of the self. The altered self, from a human point of view, gains its most relevance when it is related to psychological sufferings, their comprehension, relief or treatment. For some, self-alterations are desired as in technically achieved, or drug induced suspensions of a “fixed”, „regular“, „normalized“ or „orthodox“ experience of self. Altered Self and Altered Self-Experience (ASASE) explores different conceptual and clinical notions of the altered Self and different modes of altered self-experience in order to clarify the notion of self. This book deals with questions on the self from an interdisciplinary point of view including decidedly divergent perspectives from different philosophical approaches to the Altered Self and Altered Self-Experience such as “neuro”-philosophies, philosophy of emotion, philosophy of psychiatry, phenomenology besides approaches from developmental psychology, mindfulness praxis, as well as religious studies, cinema and literature studies. ASASE is the result of a selection of research papers of the project “Cognitive Foundation of the Self” with contributions of international scholars who mainly presented and discussed their work at the international workshop "Altered Self and Altered Self Experience" organized by Alexander Gerner (CFCUL) and Jorge Gonçalves (IFILNOVA) held at the Universidade Nova de Lisboa (FCSH-UNL) at the institute of philosophy IFILNOVA on the 30th and 31st of May 2013 in Lisbon, Portugal. Authors of this volume include: Dina Mendonça, Amber Griffioen, Sara F. Bizzaro, Niccola Zippel, João Fonseca, Alexander Gerner, Michele Guerra, Iwona Janicka, Gabriel Levy, Bernardo Palmerim, Michaela Hulstyn, Vera Pereira, Jorge Gonçalves, Pablo López-Silva Pio Abreu, Georg Northoff, Inês Hipólito and Anna Ciaunica. Chapters include: Emotional Aspects of the self; Disembodiment of Self-experience: Out-of-Body Experience, Full-Body Illusion and Cinematic Experience; Altered Self-Experience in Religious Self-Experience, Intimacy, Self Reports of Drug-Experiments and Mindfulness Meditation; Gender and Altered Self-Experience; Acting Theories and the Self; Altered Self in Schizophrenia; Altered Social Selves: Autism and intersubjectivity

Leseprobe

Contents

Introduction

I Altered Self-Experience

Emotional Aspects of Altered Self-Experience

1

Dina Mendonça - Emotions and Altered Self

2

Amber Griffioen - Regaining the “Lost Self”: A Philosophical Analysis of Survivor’s Guilt

Actor’s Self

3

Sara F. Bizzaro - Acting and the Self

Gender and Altered Self-Experience

4

Iwona Janicka – Cutting the Cords - Rethinking Judith Butler’s Position on Transgender with René Girard’s Theory of Mimesis

Disembodiment of Self-experience: Out-of-Body Experience, Full-Body Illusion and Cinematic Experience

5

Alexander Gerner & Michele Guerra - On the Cinematic Self. Cinematic Experienceas “Out-of-Body” Experience?

6

Niccola Zippel - The Altered Self in Dreaming State related to the Out-Of-Body Experiences. A Phenomenological Account interfacing with Neuroscience

7

João Fonseca - Full-Body Illusions, Out-of-Body Experiences and what they reveal about the Nature of the Self: some Functional, Computational and Neurological Considerations

Altered Self-Experience in Religious Experience and Intimacy

8

Gabriel Levy - The Implications of Anomalous Monism for Intimate Selves

9

Bernardo Palmerim - Attention and Redemption of the Self in Weil and Sartre

Altered Self-Experience in Drug-Experiments and Mindfulness Meditation

10

Michaela Hulstyn - The Mutative Self and the Language of Insight in Henri Micheaux’s Mescaline Experiments

11

Vera Pereira - Mindfulness and Self-Experience: No-Self Consciousness or Empty-Self Consciousness?

II Altered Selves

What is a Mental Illness?

12

Jorge Gonçalves - How to define a Mental Disorder?

Altered Self in Schizophrenia and Depression

13

Pablo López-Silva - Self Awareness and the Self-Presenting Character of Abnormal Conscious Experience

14

José Luís Pio Abreu - Schizophrenia is the Collapse of Self-Recognition. What Self?

15

Georg Northoff - How is our Self altered in Psychiatric Disorders: Neuropsychopathological Hypotheses

Altered Social Selves? Autism and intersubjectivity

16

Inês Hipólito - On Autism and Interaction Theories of the Self

17

Anna Ciaunica - Autism: a Relational Self Impairment?

Eu sou uma anthologia

I am an anthology

[61A-27r]

Fernando Pessoa 17-12-1932

Introduction

From a theoretical point of view the experiences in which the feeling of self is temporarily or permanently altered, pose opportunities to apply, critically verify or even renew theories of the self. The altered self, from a human point of view, supposedly gains its most relevance when it is related to psychological sufferings, their comprehension, relief or treatment. However, not all altered self-experiences imply suffering or respective treatment. In eastern (and some western) philosophical traditions a „No-Self“ is considered. Techniques of a Self/ No- self include states of meditation, mindfulness or effortless attention. Moreover, for some, self-alterations are desired as in technically achieved, or drug induced suspensions of a “fixed”, „regular“, “normalized“ or “orthodox“ experience of oneself. If those normative approaches to the self in psychopathologic description actually help to elucidate the self or just risk affirming the concept of self-pathology instead of seeing the self as a vulnerable mode of self-preservation in its varieties of expressions, has to be considered. Different conceptual and clinical notions of the altered self and different modes of altered self-experience will be explored as for instance the general question of what a mental disorder could be as conceptual description of the altered self and how these different approaches to altered selves and altered self experiences help to clarify the notion of self.

This book is the result of a selection of research papers of the project “Cognitive Foundation of the Self”1, with the generous support of the Portuguese foundation FCT2 and the IFILNOVA and with contributions of international scholars who mainly presented and discussed their work at the international conference called The Altered Self and Altered Self-Experience3 held at the Universidade Nova de Lisboa (FCSH-UNL) at the institute of philosophy IFILNOVA on the 30th and 31st of May 2013, and with a special contribution of one of the consultants of this project, Georg Northoff.

If the self is a necessary condition for the possible constitution of experience and consciousness, how then does an altered self influence experience or consciousness? Is the self actually a stable or a mixed stable/changeable experience condition? How many different states of the self do we experience during our life? If we take the famous Portuguese writer Fernando Pessoa (1888-1935)- “I am an anthology”- and his 136 fictious characters (Pessoa 2013) under which fictious names he wrote, serious, we could even ask: How many (altered) selves are we? Does each one of us have only and exclusively one permanent and constantly identical (minimal) self or do we have to deal with experiential variations, functional and formal development and dynamic modifications and change of self experiences, in which for instance the existential feeling of self is altered or in which we can take perspective of the other, instead of holding on to a clear unity and continuity of being a unique and unchangeable self over time? What affects our self temporarily and what changes it permanently? Do we have to struggle on the phenomenal level with a disunity of a multiplicity of phenomenal “aspects” and therefore as well with a multitude with epistemic conceptions of the self? Is the self “simply” a “complex” but problematic pattern (Gallagher 2013)? Can a self be altered voluntarily -and thus, can we experience altered states of selves? What do permanently altered selves tell us about the problem of normativity in relation to designating selves as “ill” or “disordered”? Is there an instituted “altered” self by the knowledge discipline of psychiatry? And can we speak of altered selves for example in self-impairments and disruption of the self as described in schizophrenia or autism?

This book deals with the above mentioned questions from a decidedly interdisciplinary point of view including multiple and foremost divergent conceptual and empirically informed perspectives from philosophy, developmental psychology, mindfulness praxis, and different approaches to “neuro”-philosophies, philosophy of psychiatry, psychoanalysis, phenomenology as well as religious studies, cinema and literature studies.

The first part of ASASE is on Altered Self-Experience and the second part deals with the problems of altered self, specifically in relation to schizophrenia and autism.

I

Altered Self-Experience

Emotional Aspects of Altered Self-Experience

Recently in relation to neurobiological theories of the self Catarine Malabou (2013) outlined in her “Go Wonder: Subjectivity and affects in neurobiological times” in chapter 7 “On Neural Plasticity, trauma and the loss of affects” two meanings of brain plasticity, a positive one “in the formation process of neural connections and the fact that these connections may be transformed or altered during our lifetimes under the influence of experience and the kind of life we are leading” (Malabou 2013, 56), while a second mode of brain plasticity lies in a negative plastic power as in brain damage and self disorders. What altered affects for our Self mean, and the possibility of alteration of self-experience is given in “existential feelings of being”(Rattcliffe 2008) in which certain affect disappearance in the neurological realm make part. One could even argue that it makes part of the self to be a temporal operator of appearance and disappearance of affect and emotions. Even so that everything we used to be has drift away into infinity by time, forgetting, pain, the Self might only exists in a permanent auto-apparition or a resistance of disappearance into mere episodic occurrences of certain affects or emotions, therefore regaining a sometimes lost self-relation. How is the self then altered by basic or complex emotional patterns such as anger or guilt?

1 Dina Mendonça - Emotions and Altered Self

(New University of Lisbon, Portugal)

Dina Mendonça´s paper examines how emotions alter the self in various ways and explores the importance of recognizing different types of deepness of emotions in order to establish different ways in which emotions alter the self. Besides looking at the double notion of emotion as episode and as disposition (Goldie 2007), Mendonça concentrates on the change and the mastering of the emotional control: What does it mean to master anger: how to avoid becoming angry in the first place, how to cease being angry, how to deal with anger in others (either in episodic occurrences as well as dispositional anger). She develops the hypothesis of “Being angry as a sonar device” and that from all emotions anger is the one best suited for this to test “boundaries” of the self’s social world and of the self’s ability and power to change the social world. Thus anger is seen as a socially important emotion and as an dynamic test-ground of the self in testing and reestablishing boundaries of the self on its own right and in relation to others.

2 Amber Griffioen - Regaining the “Lost Self”: A Philosophical Analysis of Survivor’s Guilt

(University of Konstanz, Germany)

In "Regaining the “Lost Self”: A Philosophical Analysis of Survivor’s Guilt" Amber L. Griffioen analyzes the feeling of guilt that survivors of traumatic events (war, rape etc.) feel. Traditionally this guilt is interpreted as resulting from a sense of guilt (identification with the causing agent of the trauma) or out of a sense of shame. The author believes that we should not focus on any of them separately but rather jointly. She characterizes these two kinds of guilt feelings concluding that the guilt lies more connected to the action while the focus of shame is the “self”. She also analyzes the known varieties of guilt: guilt by substitution (feeling that their survival involved the death of another), guilt for transgression (for having committed certain act or being to blame for a certain omission of acting right) and guilt for its involving role (feeling that the survivor somehow caused the trauma). What Griffioen puts into perspective is a “self” that feels hurt in a) its fundamental values, b) in its autonomy as well as c) in its integrity. This self thus feels ashamed to continue to exist in a world that is no longer what it had been before the trauma. The author’s assumption then is that the feeling of guilt rehabilitates the agency of the self, restoring its independence and regaining its integrity. If the subject thinks it had some guilt in the trauma, then is becomes an agent. In this sense Griffoen’s thesis is crystal clear: it is preferable to be an agent that is guilty, a self to be blamed, than not being an agent at all, and thus being lost or having lost oneself.

Actor’s Self

3 Sara F. Bizzaro - Acting and the Self

(Instituto de Filosofia da Nova (IFLNOVA), FCSH-UNL, Portugal)

With Douglas Hoffstaedter (2007) and his book “I am a strange loop” Bizzaro conceives the self in self rehearsals as a strange loop explaining how different types of acting and their respective theories work in changing the actor’s self for a performance. In order to understand how an actor forms the character’s personality, Bizzaro analyses the acting techniques proposed by Strasberg, Stanislavski, Adler and Meisner. These authors’ present techniques of acting that go from a heavily internal emotion based acting to an external action based acting. Bizarro argues that the efficacy of all these acting methods can be understood within the framework created by Hofstadter to explain the way “selves” are represented in the brain. Analyzing how actors create other “selves” can be useful for our understanding of what the “self” is. Our abilities to play-act as children, to full fledge act as professional actors, or socially act in fulfilling our different social roles and our ability to view others as “selves”, all seem to indicate that the “self” is indeed less firm and stable than we like to think. Healthy “self” deviations can be just normal different uses of the same “self” mechanism and in the sense of Bizarro Hofstadter ‘s theory is adequate to easily explain how different types of “acting” work.

Gender and Altered Self Experience

4 Iwona Janicka - Cutting the Cords - Rethinking Judith Butler’s Position on Transgender with René Girard’s Theory of Mimesis

(University of Cambridge, UK)

Situated aspects play some role in shaping who we are. They include the kind of family structure and environment where we grew up; cultural and normative practices and narratives define our way of living. The constitution of a wide or complex self is no exception in this. An extended self includes self-concepts and self-narratives as well as gender accounts to be looked at when referring to an extended autobiographical self in which self-image and identity and thus the rational intentional make-up of selves is in question. This chapter puts the extended self theoretically shaped by psychoanalytical gender theory to test. Psychoanalytical theories of the self often make use of cultural founding narratives to explain how selves are altered and may deviate towards “strange chambers of our soul”. Freud’s Oedipus is such an cultural founding narrative of the self and Butlers approach towards the Oedipus myth and the desiring self in Girard (1986) -in a dialogue with two psychiatrists (Jean-Michel Oughourlian and Guy Lefort)- in his mimesis account in “Things hidden since the foundation of the world”, explores the self as other. Janicka theorizes about gender identity in subjective alteration. For the author the alteration is relative to social normality, traditionally considered. Starting from the theory of Judith Butler (1990, 2004), she tries to show the limits of this theory that are visible, when it comes to interpreting transgender. The limits of Judith Butler, according to the author- result from Butler’s attachment to a too narrow psychoanalytic explanatory model. This critically viewed model gives an account of heterosexual and homosexual desire but not- according to Janicka- to transgender desire. The assumptions of Butler’s model that are due to a male/female dichotomy in which no other modalities are possible is based on the assumption that desire is primary and that gender identity is formed mainly from sexual desire and that consequently in this dual proposal of gender is seated in the prohibition of homosexuality, which becomes necessary for the formation of two orthodox poles of sexual identity (male/female). Janicka proposes the model of René Girard as an alternative instead. Girard allows to understand transgender desire because it does not necessarily link sexual desire to gender identity. Girard’s starting point is not sexual desire, but imitation: There are models that are to imitate and other to not imitate, i.e., they are rivals. By imitating a model, sexuality is also imitated, for example, the boy imitating his father desiring his mother as his father does. Janicka in the following analyzes several possible combinations of gender and sexuality, trying to demonstrate that Girard’s model solves the difficulties of psychoanalytic model best.

Disembodiment of Self-experience: Out-of-Body Experience, Full-Body Illusion and Cinematic Experience

When reflecting on the what the altered state of self in Out-of Body experience can actually tell us about the self we should distinguish different fields of research that should be considered in relation to a philosophical notion of the self: Important in researching the global aspects of the self when they are experienced as altered are: (a) embodiment and the bodily foundations of self-consciousness (b) perspective change and perspective-taking (2nd, 1st or 3rd PP) in altered selves and altered self experiences: biological and ecological aspects (Fuchs 2012) are important which allow the self to distinguish between self and what is not-self or other, including aspects that define the egocentric (body-centered) spatial frame of reference-oposed to allocentric reference frames, considering a first-person perspective for possible actions in peri-personal space and its altered conditions as for instance in autoscopic experiences such as Out-of-Body experiences (Brugger, Blanke; Lenggenhagger etc.) (see: Gerner & Guerra, Zippel, Fonseca in this volume). Perspective taking can as well be seen as an essential component in the mechanisms that accounts for intersubjectivity and agency in relation to the self.

According to Mohr&Blanke (2005) autoscopic phenomena (AP) are “rare”, illusory visual experiences during which the subject e.g. has the impression of seeing a second own body in extra-personal space. AP - in their view- consist in “out-of-body experience, autoscopic hallucination, and heautoscopy”. For Brugger et al. (2006) Heautoscopy can be described as the encounter with one’s double (the reduplication of a single body and self and thus a breakdown of integrative multimodal processes that let me identify with my body), in the sense of a multimodal illusory reduplication of one’s own body and self. The phenomenon of polyopic Heautoscopy (a multiplication of body and self) according to Brugger et al (2006) “points to the multiple mappings of the body, whose disintegration may give rise to the illusory experience of multiple selves.“ Moreover, recent research has not only described phenomenologically these strange doubling, mirroring or shadowing phenomena of an altered or “disrupted” self (Mishara 2010) but has shown as well that invasive technical manipulation of the brain can even induce an “illusory shadow person” (Arzy et al 2006) for example by artificial brain stimulation of the temporal parietal junction. How these strange autoscopic phenomena could be made fruitful in understanding not only pathologic or deviated self-experience but as well the working of the self in for example cinematic experience shall interest us here. How can the REM sleep state show itself as a proper state of conscious experience in which OBE could find a foundational explanation. Is it then possible to say that we have at least three different conscious states of self (unconscious, REM conscious and full conscious)? Is the self explained well by Northoff 2013b inside a triadic concept of consciousness that takes into consideration the brain´s intrinsic spatio-temporal activities in “resting states”, either slow loops (Northoff 2013b) in which the resting state’s slow wave fluctuations supposedly in the frequency ranges between 0.001 and 4 Hz are seen as central in consciousness (He et al 2008; He and Raichle, 2009; Raichle, 2009; Northoff 2013b), or in the distinction of resting states in REM sleep to fully conscious states (40Hz), in which the neural reactivity of the resting state to external stimuli distinguishes the awake state from the REM state (Llinás et al. 1998 and Llinás 2002). Accordingly, we could propose three alternating states of the self: the “unconscious” self(?), the properly REM self and the fully conscious self. OBE´s could be explained to fall into an in- between territory of overlapping fully awake Self and an REM self.

5 Alexander Gerner & Michele Guerra - The Cinematic Self- Cinematic Experience, perspective taking and Out-of Body-Experience

(CFCUL, University of Lisbon, Portugal & University of Parma, Italy)

Theoretically and practically the self is something every one of us experiences and as such for Gerner & Guerra is subjected by alterations, mutations, and developments and in some cases even transformations. This chapter asks how can the experience of the self be altered temporarily (Altered Self-Experience) by immersion in cinematic experience including cinema, but as well VR. Gerner & Guerra focus on why the perspective (Petkova et al 2011) and its alteration matters as changes in the 1st PP realized by a) alienation (OBE) or b) appropriation (avatar identification) (see: Ganesh et al 2011) as well as the switch in between 2nd, 1st and 3rd PP in relation to the full body image and full body hallucinations, in which issues of self-identification and bi-localization and other doubling phenomena become important to understand altered self-experience. The authors ask: Why OBE’ s could be interesting to be treated as cinematic experience in itself in the sense of "cinematic experience without a screen"? They recall as well more recent phenomenological theories of cinematic subjectivity in order to wonder how and whether the movie can be endowed with subjectivity, at least a simulated or enacted form of intersubjectivity assured by the degree of immersion and self-loss of the viewer into the movie and its “extended empathy” (Fuchs 2014) towards the characters represented on the screen (without their real bodies being present), looking at the definition of empathy towards the “virtual other” in Fuchs (2014). Altered self-experiences seem to show a switch of a) The ego-centered and the b) allo-centered reference frame or simply a possible dynamics of different “centeredness” perspectives of (somatic, exosomatic or I-You somatic) self experience. As cinematic experience the authors define switches in between the body centeredness to world-centeredness in relation to what happens on the screen in the moment of suspension of disbelief. But also the extension of the body image is made possible in cinematic experience as well as empathetic perspective taking with certain characters or actions on the screen. The question “What do I experience as my body?” (see: Blanke and Metzinger 2009) leads us as well to the problem of the proper body as a screen between sensed and projected body of (identity, body image etc) unfolding layers and repetitive projections of a film that is my “own” or my “entire” or my “narrative” body, besides or superimposed on my somatic body schemata. The authors follow the question in relation to immersive experience: How can we be distracted from our somatic body and immersed into a fictional or cinematic body-the body I feel and am affected by as long as the cinematic experience lasts?

6 Niccola Zippel - The Altered Self in Dreaming State related to the Out-Of-Body Experiences. A Phenomenological Account interfacing with Neuroscience

(Sapienza University of Rome, Italy)

Zippel presents a neurophenomenological account of Out-of-Body experience related to sleep and dreaming states of consciousness. The author proposes a phenomenological reading of the alteration of the self in the out-of-body experiences during dreaming, which, based on the notion of the self as an embodied self, understands the self and the body as an indissoluble whole. The dream state represents a very peculiar condition of bodily experience: while during the NREM sleep one experiences a muscular-skeletal relaxation, in the REM sleep one lives the paralysis of her own body, to which a vivid mental process triggered by the pontogeniculo-occipital (PGO) waves corresponds. During this phase of the sleep, dreaming takes the shape of a bizarre narration that, despite its incongruity, uncertainty, and discontinuity, inserts itself in the network of neural connections already in place, and for this reason it is another way of performing personal emotions, thoughts, and associations. Precisely by the inability to move, the embodied self experiences such a rich mental performance as an alienating dimension of his/herself, since the body becomes an inactive though often invoked part of the dream (e.g. one tries to escape or to jump in dream without succeeding in doing it). On the other hand, being the motionless counterpart of the frantic activity of the dreaming mind, the body, as it were, is outside the dream events. This complex neurophysiologic situation is interesting from a phenomenological perspective, for it offers the opportunity to consider the condition of the embodied subject as regards the unaware mental process of dreaming. As a general goal, the paper aims at showing the basic features of the relationship between the dreaming self and his/her own body in the light of the most significant empirical dream’s researches findings.

But still we have to understand what notion of the self we are talking about: For example Blanke and Metzinger propose a representationalist account of Minimal Phenomenal Self in which a minimal phenomenal self would be a necessary condition for a strong and cognitive 1PP (see: Blanke & Metzinger 2009, 7) In this part the dynamics of self-location (from where from do I perceive, speak, feel) become important as well as the question how the relation between my experiential point of view of my self and the point of view of the somatic body expresses a dynamicity of the natural media of perspective and perspective-taking with my body (eye position, attentional gaze, attentional mode –focused; distracted; etc.), arms, legs, trunk, head and their positionality: From which vantage point do I experience the world?

7 João Fonseca – Full-Body Illusions, Out-of-Body Experiences and what they reveal about the Nature of the Self: some Functional, Computational and Neurological Considerations

(New University of Lisbon, Portugal)

In his neuro-computational approach João Fonseca uses autoscopic phenomena such as Full-Body-Illusions (FBIs) and Out-of-Body-Experiences (OBEs) to test his thesis for a taxonomical distinction between two kinds of Core-Self: Core-Self Simpliciter (CSS) and Cognitive Core-Self (CCS). He draws differences between a cortical proposal (Motor, Pre-Motor and Prefrontal areas) of a Core-Self and Björn Merker’s (2005, 2007) sub-cortical proposal ( Upper-brainstem complex: superior culliculus – Pariequeductal Grey Area/hypothalamus - Substancia Nigra/Basal Ganglia) to develop the notion of Core-Self in this neurophilosophical model would correspond contrastively to the notion of a narrative or auto-biographical Self in the sense of Damasio. Fonseca suggests the fragmentation of the notion of Core-Self into two sub-concepts: CCS and CSS which would correspond to the most “basic sense of selfhood”, non-extended in time whereas CCS adds cognitive complexity and a short-time dimension to the former. Fonseca supports his distinction by invoking distinct neural and computational properties to each notion in which CCS would be build up in CSS’s neural structures and computational capacities.

Altered Self-Experience in Religious Experience and Intimacy

8 Gabriel Levy - The Implications of Anomalous Monism for Intimate Selves

(Norwegian University of Science and Technology Trondheim, Norway)

The religious study scholar Gabriel Levy looks at the intimate relation of man and woman as in the narrative model of Adam and Eve and brings this religious topic together with Donald Davidson’s concept of anomalous monism in interdependence of self and other (Davidson 1970; 2001). Levy’s paper focuses on the relationship between intimacy and the self. By using one of the paradigmatic narratives about self-altering encounters of (sexual) intimacy, Adam and Eve, Levy explores the concept of intimacy in relation to intimate selves. Davidson’s anomalous monism argues that, although the first-person has a certain kind of authority in ascribing mental states to him or herself, the concept of the self is irreducible because it is grounded in intersubjectivity. Since intimacy requires a sense of ownership of the subjective self, this can lead to problems within a Davidsonian framework, in which the inter-subjective level is often prioritized. Taking the subjective level seriously from a Davidsonian perspective and from enacted mind (Kyselo & Di Paolo 2013) requires- according to Levy- a radical subjectivity that is exemplified by a personal experience of altered intimate self of the author that happened at the proper Lisbon ASASE meeting in 2013 and that he reflects upon in an narrated interlude. In this way, this chapter pursues the subject of intimate selves not just from a scientific objective but as well from a subjective and intersubjective level in which the study methodologically switches perspective from a historical case study to self-observation and back.

9 Bernardo Palmerim - Attention and Redemption of the Self in Weil and Sartre

(University of Lisbon, Portugal)

In his paper Bernardo Palmeirim addresses a classical issue of religious “conversion” (cf. greek metanoia) with Heidegger– which he names within the religious tradition with the term as “attention”. Conversion assumes a suffering, sick, divided self, and its supposed (re-) unification in religious or transcendental experience. The author compares two types of conversion. The first is given in the character Antoine Roquentin from the novel Nausea by Jean Paul Sartre and that can be seen as a model of "aesthetic conversion." The second is the “religious conversion" in Simone Weil. They have in common that the self in both conversion models turns its attention from itself to something outside by "loosing" its proper self in a religious or sublime “other” by contemplating “God” or an “artwork”. For Palmerim in religious conversion we are confronted with a moral transformation in which the world takes on a new meaning in God, while in aesthetic conversion there is no universal structure that explains its existence.

Altered Self-Experience in Drug-Experiments and Mindfulness Meditation

10 Michaela Hulstyn - The Mutative Self and the Language of Insight in Henri Micheaux’s Mescaline Experiments

(University of Stanford, USA)

Hulstyn examines the concept of a “mutative Self” in the texts of the Belgian-born poet Henri Micheaux that account for his Mescaline self-experiments in the 1950’s and 60’s.

She asks: Can narratives on drug experimentation shed light on philosophic and psychological accounts of the self? The questionable status of the self during altered states of consciousness includes the moments of individual’s existence during which he oneself is not “in its right mind,” including the time one spends asleep, drunk, or on the drug mescaline, as in the case of Henri Michaux. While terms like “mind-altering” are commonplace in discussions of drug culture, especially as related to the psychedelic 1960s, few studies of altered states have considered a connection with philosophical discussions of the self, and what self-experimentation can tell us about the nature of the self during ordinary circumstances. In this paper Hulstyn examines Michaux’s take on the process of >unselfing< - a concept developed by Joshua Landy (2012) in How to Do Things with Fictions that covers both self-transcendence and self-rupture, as described during the self-induced drug experiments that began in 1956 and were carried out through the 1960s. Michaux’s conception of the self during so-called normal states is considered using terminology from current research in psychology, philosophy and neuroscience to help understand the self-experience that Michaux describes in his work. Michaux’s take on altered states of selfhood in a synchronic sense, as described by himself in the experience of disunity in the moment, as well as the effect of the long-term experience, or diachronic sense of the self is analyzed. While doing so Hulstyn examines the implications of Michaux’s work on the development of a metaphysical vocabulary for otherworldly experience in the absence of faith in an omnipotent third party witness.

11 Vera Pereira - Mindfulness and Self-Experience: No-Self Consciousness or Empty-Self Consciousness?

(New University of Lisbon, Portugal)

Mindfulness training has been used for centuries in eastern traditions such as Buddism (Albahari 2011) and Yoga with the goal of reaching altered states of consciousness capable of changing the experience and perception of self for spiritual purposes for instance by open monitoring techniques and focused attention (Travis & Shear 2010). Recently studies have shown that even traditional focused attention techniques also become effortless with practice (Lutz et al 2008). Thus in western cultures in recent years mindfulness psychotherapeutic programs have become popular. The developmental psychologist Vera Pereira explores in her chapter phenomenological and neurophysiological data on effects of these techniques. She reviews within the field of neuroscientific studies how mindfulness meditation affects self-referential processing and how meditation influences brain plasticity. She proposes that continuous regular practice of meditation techniques can lead to the progressive de-identification with the narrative self and an identification with the minimal-self, that is experienced as “empty” or a “non-personal psychological entity”, thus proposing a certain suspension of the narrative (Schechtman 2013) or egoic (Husserl) as well as extended autobiographic self (Damasio 2010) approaches by means of the technique of mindfulness meditation.

II

Altered Selves

The second part of ASASE is on Altered self in states of permanent self alteration in general and schizophrenia, depression and autism in specific. First we will ask with Gonçalves (12) how we can actually define a mental disorder. Problems then addressed are (13) embodied aspects of the self and the self-presenting character of abnormal conscious experience with López-Silva (14) the lack of unity of the self and self-recognition (Pio Abreu) (15) the neurological “midlinestructures” explanatory hypothesis of altered selves (Northoff) related to depression and schizophrenia (16) the interaction of self and other (autism and interaction theories of Cognition(Hipólito) and the enactive approach to self-other while asking (17) Is autism a relational self disorder? (Ciaunica)

What is a Mental Illness?

12 Jorge Gonçalves - How to define a Mental Disorder?

(New University of Lisbon, Portugal)

Gonçalves wonders why certain changes of the self are classified as mental illness. He is critically reviewing, not the search for causal explanations of mental illnesses, but the mere fact of epistemically knowing how to define these altered states of self as diseases and according to this definition how disorders come to exist objectively. His idea is that mental illness is defined based on a background of social, ethical and epistemic norms (Broome & Bortolloti, 2009). We may consider them as objective only if we assume that there is progress in human reason in the sense of overcoming cultural relativism in relation to mental illness. Gonçalves responds to possible alternatives to the idea that mental illness is defined as based on social, ethical and epistemic norms. Gonçalves refers to George Graham´s (2010) conventionalist thesis that causal-mechanist factors will be always present if there is a mental disorder. Graham argues that if it is true that mental disorders depend on social values, this is not a sufficient reason for us to reject them as “illnesses” in the realistic sense of the term. An alternative is that mental illness would be a malfunction of a natural function. The prevailing thought then would be that it is possible to determine certain natural functions of the brain and injuries that impair these functions. A further alternative is considered by Gonçalves to define mental illness as the subjective experience of suffering. The author, however, tries to show that these last two alternative perspectives are insufficient to define mental illness suggesting the aforementioned solution for reconciling the context dependency and the need for objectivity in Psychiatry.

Altered Self in Schizophrenia and Depression

13 Pablo López-Silva - Self Awareness and the Self-Presenting Character of Abnormal Conscious Experience

(University of Manchester, UK)

From a first-person perspective a self/non-self distinction is given in its various sensory-motor modalities, contributing to an embodied feelings of being (Ratcliffe 2008) a self (a) sense of ownership and a (b) sense of agency for one’s actions (Gallagher 2000, 2012; Rochat 2011). For Zahavi there is a “first personal givenness”(Zahavi 2003) of experience in the sense of Nagel´s (1974) famous “what does it feel like” (to be a bat) to be a self or what it feels like. The feeling of being present and if a self can be directly given or presented, and how this idea of self “presence” is conceived is another field of controversy (c) “identification” with a body and its actions as a whole (phenomenally experienced as belonging to me thus also called ‘mineness’).

The paper of López-Silva critically reviews phenomenological views- especially of Zahavi- that assume that minimal forms of self-awareness are an integral element inherent in all experiences. What is often called the sense of “mineness” of experience or sometimes is refered to in the debate on the “Immunity of Error to Misidentification” - IEM (Shoemaker 1984) - relative to the first person pronoun is called the self-presenting claim (SPC) of all experiences in Lopés-Silva’s paper. The author uses arguments from a disrupted sense of mineness, such as in schizophrenia, that is specifically cases of “Thought Insertion” but as well reflects cases of somatoparaphrenic delusion and alien hand syndrome as arguments against Zahavi´s notion of mineness and the “I” as the subject of self-awareness in the sense of a necessary feature of givenness of all experience.

Here the question arises how for example Zahavi explains (or fails this task) how the conceptual distinction between sensed and sensing grounds the distinction between the sense of agency and mineness. Altered self experiences such as autoscopic experiences, mindfulness or buddist no-self models pose general questions to a coherent concept of the self and deeply question the coherence of the body as one global minimal bodily self.

14 José Luís Pio Abreu - Schizophrenia is the Collapse of Self-Recognition. What Self?

(CFCUL, Portugal)

The professor of psychiatry Pio Abreu (Abreu 2012) addresses questions of the self in schizophrenia from a standpoint of an intentional self and the problem of self-recognition. After introducing an account of neurobiology of schizophrenia, Abreu shows difficulties that patients with schizophrenia are confronted with as having problems on the neuronal level with brain connectivity by way of “long fibers” which link distant zones of the neo-telencephalon (Fornito et al., 2011). These difficulties for Abreu are due to several genetic variations and early environmental aggressions that disturb the development and organization of long fibers in the telencephalon, which are disrupted in pre-schizophrenic and schizophrenic subjects. He asks why we need such a large telencephalon. His thesis is that we need it (1) to handle signs – words, drawings and manufactured objects - which permits us to extend our territory, since signs are essential for all cognitive activities; (2) to recognize other people and ourselves, since human territory is composed of other people, (3) to evaluate reality while shifting between our intentions and the intentions of others. Schizophrenic patients have specific difficulties in every one of these three domains. Abreu defines the main problem of the schizophrenic self as the alternating between its and others' intentions, and assuming alternative meanings. All through life, there are situations where self-recognition and recognition of self-agency is decisive but laborious. These -for Abreu- are the situations that might precipitate a schizophrenic episode.

The lack of unity of the self in schizophrenia is expressed by Abreu in the following way: In psychopathology, we usually say that schizophrenic symptoms disrupt the unity of the self as opposed to self identity which is disturbed in dissociative pathologies and is concerned with the temporal continuity of the autobiographical self. In his point of view we should look for the self, which is disturbed in schizophrenia in upper areas of the brain. His take on the intentional self is shown by the example of why we can’t tickle ourselves: if I have the intention of tickling myself, I do not feel ticklish because the efferent copy inhibits my sensorial perception. In this case, normal people feel ticklish, but schizophrenic patients have some difficulty in feeling the difference, perhaps because they cannot organize the efferent copies through long fibers in the telencephalon very well. In Pio Abreu’s concept of the unity of self-, which is challenged when schizophrenic symptoms are experienced- we have to consider an upper intentional self, constructed by learning, and processed in the more recent areas of the brain, above the autobiographical (or narrative) self, the nuclear self and the primordial self.

15 Georg Northoff - How is our Self altered in Psychiatric Disorders – Neuropsychopathological Hypotheses

(University of Ottawa, Canada)

The Neurophilosopher and Neuroethicist Georg Northoff in his chapter and special issue of “Psychopathology of the Self in Psychiatric Disorders – Neuropsychopathological Hypotheses” conceives the self as central to our experience that has often been assumed to be necessary for any kind of consciousness in philosophy. For Northoff to understand the working and failures in the self we have to focus empirical attention on the midline structures in the brain. Recent investigations in neuroscience demonstrate- according to Northoff- a particular set of regions like the cortical midline regions to be associated with the processing of stimuli, specifically related to the self as distinguished from those remaining unrelated to the self. Furthermore, findings show close overlap between self-related activity and high levels of resting state activity in especially anterior midline regions. Recent findings in psychiatric disorders like depression and schizophrenia show both resting state abnormalities in exactly these regions that is, the cortical midline structures. Based on the psychopathology of the self and the recent neural findings of the resting state, Northoff develops a specific neuropsychopathological hypotheses about the self in depression and schizophrenia that are amenable to future experimental testing.

Altered Social Selves? Autism and Intersubjectivity

16 Inês Hipólito - On Autism and Interaction Theories of the Self

(New University of Lisbon, Portugal)

Hipólito reminds us that persons with Autistic Spectrum Disorder show various difficulties in social skills, cognitive processing and other co-occurring behavioral and physical problems. As people with autism demonstrate a lack of ability in dealing with others, the study of autism, with its specific constellation of behavioral and cognitive deficiencies this may highlight the structure, development and nature of social cognition in general and Self/Other awareness in particular. Hipólito challenges the failure in >Theory of Mind< in Autism view that characterizes social cognition as an individual achievement that happens within a particular person’s brain and body and treats social phenomena as external events that require interpretation, namely, mind-reading. Alternatively, she defends Gallagher’s “Interaction Theory” (Gallagher 2009) which proposes that the ability to “read” others is primarily a form of body reading rather than mind reading. Hereby the capability to comprehend other persons ultimately rests in a form of embodied practice that is emotional, sensory-motor, perceptual and nonconceptual.

Interaction Theory comprehends primary intersubjectivity and secondary intersubjectivity. Primary Intersubjectivity is seen hereby as the innate or early developing capacity to interact with others manifested at the level of perceptual experience— we see or more generally perceive in the other person’s bodily movements, facial gestures, eye direction, what they intend and what they feel. On this view, in second-person interactions, the mind of the other is not entirely hidden or private, but is given and manifest in the other person’s embodied behavior. Interaction theory- according to Hipólito- contends that these embodied practices constitute our primary access for understanding others, and continue to do so even after we attain theory of mind abilities, that in autism in this view is supposed to fail.

17 Anna Ciaunica - Autism: a Relational Self Impairment?

(University of Fribourg, Switzerland)

Ciaunica treats the controversy over the basis for young children’s experience of themselves and others as separate yet related individuals, each with a mental perspective on the world – and over the nature of corresponding deficits in autism. On the dominant view, it has been argued that the human aptitude at inferring mental states is one of the crucial preconditions for the evolution of cooperative social structure in human societies. Consequently, limitations in psychological perspective-taking among autistic children have been regarded as signs of a “Mindblindness” deficit in having metarepresentational mental states (Baron-Cohen et al 1985; Leslie 1994). Lombardo and Baron-Cohen (2010) recently acknowledged that Mindreading researches have left a gap in terms of devices that may be responsible not only for atypical self-referential processes in autistic children but also in their integration into the bigger picture of how individuals navigate and interact with the social world. This paper defends the idea that the intersubjective relatedness of the self is foundational for the development of higher order mentalizing skills and not the other way around. Hence, autistic individuals might suffer from a specific Relational-Self Impairment which triggers metarepresentational deficits.

Ciaunica argues for a developmental account of the self in which the Self is build through Others by the centrality of what has come to be termed as “primary intersubjectivity” characterizes the mental experience of infants during infant– caregiver interactions from the earliest phases of life. Given this attunement between a baby’s subjective experience of her own as well as of the caregiver’s experience during the organized patterns of mother–infant interactions from birth (Rochat and Striano, 1999), it has been hypothesized that there is a basic human-specific drive to share psychological states with others such as in joint attention (see: Seeman 2011; Metcalfe & Terrace 2013) and joint intentionality (Tomasello et al 2005, 2014). Moreover, attention has been paid to the intricate organization of the early bi-directional affective and imitative interaction sequences and their characteristic contingent ‘protoconversational’ turn-taking structure (Beebe et al 1997; Jaffe et al 2001). Later, towards the end of the first year, infants relate to others’ actions and attitudes with reference to a shared world, for example by showing things to others and making requests, imitating others’ actions on objects, and engaging in social referencing (Bretherton 1992). A further stage that occurs between the middle and the end of the second year is when children show conceptual understanding of self and other, for example in adjusting their actions to the needs and feelings of others, referring to themselves as ‘I’ and addressing others as ‘you’, and talking about their own and others’ mental states. This latter stage has been typically taken to reflect a child’s ‘theory of mind’, but also the child’s increasingly sophisticated concept of ‘selves’, i.e., of individual persons who have distinctive psychological relations with the social and physical world. These findings according to Ciaunica suggest that infants’ capacity to understand other minds is rooted in their capacity to actively engage in intersubjective scenarios. The self in this view is not understandable without an irreducible embodied aspect to such interactions (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007). The “interaction component” thesis stipulates that interaction constitutes, not just causally contributes, to intersubjective understanding.

Ciaunica’ s chapter opens up towards a second part of the Lisbon research on the social (cognitive) foundations of self, an important follow up result of the Altered Self and Altered Self-Experience.

Lisbon, July 2014

Alexander Gerner & Jorge Gonçalves

Endnotes

1http://foundationsoftheself.squarespace.com/

2 FCT research funding: PTDC/FIL-FCI/110978/2009

[email protected]

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I

Altered Self-Experience

Emotional Aspects of Altered Self-Experience

1

Emotions and Altered Self

Dina Mendonça

Instituto de Filosofia da Nova (IFLNOVA), FCSH-UNL, Portugal

The paper1 examines how emotions alter the self in various ways and explores the importance of recognizing different types of deepness of emotions in order to establish different ways in which emotions alter the self and proposing that anger works as a sonar device to find out information about the world and ourselves.

Why should we begin with anger?2 In a very interesting article entitled “Anger, Present Injustice, and Future Revenge in Seneca’s De Ira” Katja Maria Vogt writes that Seneca said that anger was the most hideous and frenzied of all the emotions, and that the general assumption about anger was that understanding its nature was a way to avoid its occurrence. As Vogt writes, “[t]he idea that we should aim at getting rid of anger is tied to the theoretical discussion of anger: once we understand what we actively do when we experience anger, we can stop short of getting angry” (Vogt 2006, 57) further on pointing out that, for the most part, scholarly debate assumes that Seneca’s analysis of anger to be an exemplary analysis of an emotion and it can be expanded to a general theory of all emotions (Vogt 2006, 60). Vogt offer a thorough analysis of the definition and treatment of anger for Seneca raising several questions about its nature and the response given by the Stoic philosophical position. She explains how anger is, in spite of the particular attention that is devoted to it, particularly and surprisingly difficult to understand within the Stoic framework. One of the difficulties she indicates is the fact that emotions do not present a specific course of action (Vogt 2006, 61, 69, 73). The exemplary case of anger identified by the ancient tradition is perhaps due to the fact that anger is said to be one of the most frequently experienced emotions (Averill 1982), having consequences for health and illness for denying to feel anger, controlling its outbursts and general suppression of its experience is linked to a myriad of health problems such as asthma, ulcers, headaches, coronary heart disease and cancer (Tucker and Friedman 1996; Siegman 1994; Tavris 1982: cited in Schieman 1999, 274).

In this paper I will begin by looking at the specific case of anger to unfold different levels of emotion’s deepness, and similarly to Seneca’s insight, think that some of the issues we observe with anger can be taken to be part of the overall conception of the emotions. One of the questions I want to keep in the background of the analysis is this questions about the connection of emotion to a course of action and the fact that no determinate course of action seems, at least at first, to be attached to emotions and return at the end to this pressing query.

It seems that when a person gets angry one alters the self because it makes a person perceive the world through the lenses of anger. The tone of subjectivity introduced by the feeling of anger can be identified as showing that anger makes people think more optimistically because dangers seem smaller, actions seem less risky, ventures seem more likely to succeed, and unfortunate events seem less likely (Lerner & Keltner 2001, 150). Consequently, angry people are more likely to make risky decisions, and make more optimistic risk assessments because anger increases the perception of what is familiar and decreases the perception of what is risky (Gambetti & Giusberti 2009, 14).

In addition, because emotions trigger certain changes in cognition, physiology and action the alterations caused by anger manifests itself in retrospective thinking as well, and therefore anger makes people less trusting, and slower to attribute good qualities to outsiders when they reflect upon events (Lerner & Keltner 2001, 151). An the list goes on as an angry person tends to anticipate other events that might cause anger, and tends to place more blame on another person for the misery, and anger can make a person more desiring of an object to which anger is tied, etc. The changes given by anger also seem to be sensitive to proximity of other people, that is, the status of anger changes with proximity and with the type of intimacy we have with people such that people who are close to us can offend us, wrong us, or deny us and overall make us more angry than distant people and thus anger is a far more difficult issue with those same close relationships.

What the previous description tells us is that when we consider anger solely by the episodic moments of anger we get a very poor image of what anger is making it be bound to simply identify physical events that happen with anger, or specific types of injustice that may cause anger. It is within this critical position about the nature of anger that we can understand Nichola Dent article entitled “Anger is a Short Madness: dealing with Anger in Émile’s Education”. Dent writes that we clearly “misunderstand anger, its depth and pervasiveness, if we think of it principally in terms of episodes or bouts, rather than in terms of a mode of understanding or a cluster of such modes, with accompanying estimates of value, imperatives for action, patterns of reaction and so on which can endure and shape an entire character or culture” (Dent 2000, 314). Dent’s paper indicates how we must conclude that, in order to understand emotion in all its complexity, it is necessary to think how anger modifies the person who feels it, how it modifies the persons’ relationships to others and to the overall reality (Dent 2000, 314).

Thus, there are a wide variety of reasons why we can identify that people get angry and though we may be able to identify a specific episode for the manifestation of anger it is important to list all possible causes of anger to properly understand these episodes, as well as its consequences. First, people become angry when they think they, or those mattering to them, have been treated unjustly, contrary to their expectations of good treatment, when assumed social and interpersonal norms are violated. Secondly, people become angry when they are injured or insulted (hubris) by another such as when the person doing the action wants to show their superiority to the other person (bullying is a good example). Thirdly, people can get angry with another person not for what they in fact do or have done, but for what one assumes they are likely to or will do.