Civl society E-Book

• Herausgeber: Verlag Noir
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 585

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2021

Beschreibung

This publication brings together contributions dealing with the theory, history, and philosophical heritage of the civil society, as well case studies from actual practice.

Leseprobe

Wolfgang Mazal / Bettina Rausch

Civil SocietyToday

Principles and Political Potential

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Disclaimer:

This is a joint publication of the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies and the Political Academy of the Austrian People ´s Party. This publication receives funding from the European Parliament. The Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, the Political Academy of the Austrian People ´s Party, and the European Parliament assume no responsibility for facts or opinions expressed in this publication or any subsequent use of the information contained therein. Sole responsibility lies on the authors of the publication.

Reviewed by: Sandra Pasarić, WMCES (Brussels, Belgium) & Christian Moser-Sollmann, PA (Vienna, Austria)

edition noir

Imprint:

© 2021 Verlag noir, Vienna

Verlag noir, 1120 Wien, Tivoligasse 73

Editor: Christian Moser-Sollmann, Felix Ofner, Roman Schachenhofer, Lorenz Jahn

Art Direction: B. Könighofer

Translation: Robert McInnes

ISBN: 979-3-9504939-3-1

Table of Contents

Cover

Title Page

Copyright Page

Foreword

I.Fundamentals and theory of the civil society

From the Community of Citizens to the Civil Society Political Participation in Antiquity and Modern Times

Simon Varga

The Civil Society and the Bourgeoisie

Ernst Bruckmüller

Fundamental Principles of the Civil Society Which Trends Do We Need to Protect Ourselves Against?

Werner J. Patzelt

The Phenomenology of the Civil Society

Manfred Prisching

The Civil Society – A (neo-?) Liberal Project

Alexander Bogner

The Civil Society – Cure-All for Democracy or Just a Sweet Dream? A Plea for a Regulatory Policy for the Commitment Society

Michael Borchard

The Civil Society between the Poles of Security and Freedom

Peter Kampits

Missing: Bridge Builders – Considerations on the Polarisation of Western Societies and How This Can Be Overcome

Benjamin Hasselhorn

Participation, Codetermination, Moralisation: How Social Movements Have Changed

Christian Moser-Sollmann

The Sensitive “I” Thoughts on an Insecure Society Between Digitalisation and Hyper-Individualisation

Johannes Domsich

The State and the Civil Society – or the Citizen Society? Casting a Glance at Light and Shade

Till Kinzel

A Community of Free and Responsible People

Bettina Rausch

The Civil Society and Artificial Intelligence – Trends and Challenges for Dealing with AI in the European Union

Julia Juen / Verena Ringler

II.Civil virtues – case studies

Civil Society: Key Activities of the Political Academy

The Social Contract in Change

Michael Borchard / Ulrike Ackermann / Andreas Jankor

The “New Civil Society”: A State that Gives its Citizens Space to Breathe

Werner J. Patzelt / Günther Lutschinger

A Civil Society in Europe? Strong Impulses from the Regions Europe and Society Start at Home – on the Effective Power of Applied, Initiated Formats of Encounter and Dialogue in the Regional, as well as Cross-border, Context

Verena Ringler / Magdalena J. Schneider

Make Austria Flourish! The Role and Potential of Active Charitable Foundations for Society and the State

Ruth Williams / Christoph Robinson

“Cooperative?” “Nobody will come!” On the Rediscovery of an Often-Underestimated Legislation and Organisational Form

Justus Reichl

Social Entrepreneurship: Attempt at a Classification within the Civil Society

Elisabeth Mayerhofer

The Civil Society – the Family as a Learning Environment

Wolfgang Mazal

A Person with Courage Inspires Courage The Example of Kolping Austria

Christine Leopold

The Protection of Life in the Civil Society

Martina Kronthaler

Lived Civil Society Needs More Trust!On the Connection Between Civil-Society Commitment, Social Welfare, and Community Service as Reflected in Regulatory Policy

Elisabeth Anselm

Emmaus – From Paris to St. PöltenSocial Work Concerns Us All

Karl Langer

Authors

Foreword

In addition to the separation of powers and the liberal constitutional state, active citizens who help fashion the community are central pillars of our democracy. In this respect, citizens are not only the addressees of the state’s rules and norms, but also co-creators of precisely those norms. And, the community in a liberal state is more than government order; it is the interaction between people and their relationships to each other – in families and friendships, at work, and in organisations.

Active participation in the personal and public environment enriches many different facets of human life and, in doing so, makes our society more diverse and colourful. There can be no question that humans are political and social beings, and that their individuality can only fully develop within a community.

We find many different answers to how we want to organise our community, and our society, in democracies of the Western kind. Broadly speaking, the following differentiations can be made: Politics that are typically located on the left define themselves principally by way of the paternalistic state that monitors all spheres of life, and plans and regulates the way lives are led down to the smallest detail. In our eyes, although conservative politics relies on the state to set general parameters, it places individual freedom and responsibility at the core. It trusts the intrinsic drive in each and every citizen to want to make a contribution to a functioning community according to their abilities. This is the fundamental idea of the political concept of a “civil society” as a community of free and responsible people.

The Political Academy of the People’s Party and the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies have extensively discussed and studied just how varied and heterogeneous the concepts of the civil society are in theory and practice in its current focus of research.

The essential basis for this can be found in the image of man rooted in the Judeo-Christian-Greco-Roman tradition concept of humankind with the dignity of the individual person as its foundation. However, this also includes the obligation of actively making use of one’s abilities to benefit society, as expressed in the parable of the talents in the Bible. Or, to use Immanuel Kant’s words: “Man has an individual imperfect obligation – namely, that of developing one’s own talents – for oneself, as well as for others.”

In this publication, we requested that highly-respected scientists, publicists, and practicians give their fundamental thoughts on the potential and possibilities of the civil society in the 21st century.

Theoretical, historical, and philosophical contributions can be found here, as well as various case studies from practice. The diversity and pluralism of ideas of the contributions make it clear that the permanent voice and participation of an active public can enrich the political discourse and policy formulation of our country.

Wolfgang MazalBettina Rausch

From the Community of Citizens to the Civil Society

Political Participation in Antiquity and Modern Times

Simon Varga

Summary: This contribution focuses on the differences and evolution from the ancient community of citizens to the modern civil society. The question about the necessity and significance of political participation in antiquity and modern times forms the central point of this study. From the present socio-political perspective, it can be seen that the core of today’s civil society still incorporates a large section of the community of citizens. In the final analysis, this awareness calls for community-political empathy – understood as civil rights and obligations.

Introduction

At first sight, linking antiquity and the present day in political affairs might awaken suspicions of anachronism, especially seeing that political practice has already undergone many metamorphoses over the course of history, and will obviously also experience even more changes in the future. However, at second sight, a project of this kind seems to be not only historically, but also systematically, logical. Already present in the early stages of Greek political thought in its classical tradition, a question – that is still unavoidable for life in a union or community and that many modern states still struggle with – was asked and attempted to be answered, in theory and practice: that of the level and significance of the political participation of the individual in the political community.

Although it is not possible to provide a comprehensive portrayal of the many historical developments leading from the community of citizens of ancient times to today’s civil society in all its nuances, even sketching these developments leads to the – in no way surprising – conclusion that, then and now, citizen participation was and is an essential necessity for the organisation of political coexistence – and will continue to be so. However, as already indicated, this is something of a truism. The two central questions deal much more with the intensity of political participation the citizens can demand and where the fundamental differences between the ancient community of citizens and modern civil society can actually be discerned.

This essay begins with a brief depiction of the immediate ancient political practice of the so-called community of citizens, connected with a historical-political overview of political life in the classical Greek period (1). This was followed by a change in the political theory of antiquity. In it, the fundamentals of the politico-anthropological philosophy of Aristotle and his concept of political participation in the course of the “best imaginable state” developed by him are discussed (2). The transformation from the ancient community of citizens to the modern civil society – especially based on sociological observations – will, at least, be touched on in the next step (3). Taking the current global socio-political developments into consideration, the next section handles the current importance of the civil society that, in my opinion, can still be regarded to a large degree as a community of citizens – and maybe even increasingly so – without questioning the modern developments and achievements such as human rights, democracy, and civil liberties in any way (4). Finally, the last point leads to an investigation of the foundation of community policy empathy as a civic right and duty (5).

1. Ancient political practice: Organisation, participation, and dichotomy

There can be no doubt that ancient Greece occupies an important place in connection with the development and fundamental understanding of the political in Europe and even beyond its borders. This pertains particularly to the so-called Greek classical period beginning with the military conflicts between the Greeks and the Persians to the coronation of the soon-to-be Macedonian King Alexander the Great – the time from around 500 to 336 BC. In this classical period, the Greek city states (Old Greek: polis (sing.); poleis (pl.)), including Athens, Sparta, and Thebes, achieved their uniquely great historical, political, and cultural importance of global significance, which would have been impossible in this fashion without the political organisation of the polis. And that occured – surprising as it may seem – in spite of many internal political conflicts within the city states themselves, as well as those among the city states, and external military threats from other regions of the Mediterranean.

In the classical period, there were likely more than 800 settlements that could be classified as a polis; their physical appearance differed greatly although, “in principle, the inner structure of the settlement space was the same.”1 This usually consisted of an urban centre with a political, economic, and cultural infrastructure with the economic and/or political agora, the meeting place for trade and politics in the centre, bordering on administration and cult buildings, as well as the land surrounding the urban centre that was necessary for agricultural purposes. For example, all of Attica belonged to the polis of Athens and citizens living anywhere in Attica referred to themselves as Athenians even if they lived in a village far away from the main city itself.2 It seems that Athens, the most influential polis, had a population of between 200,000 and 300,000 during the classical period with the majority of the inhabitants living in rural areas.3

The ideal of the “political self-administration and government by the citizens and striving for internal and external independence” was a characteristic of the political self-image of the city states.4 This shows that the goals of political autarchy and autonomy, which were inseparable from the striving for permanent economic stability to be able to provide the citizens with the goods that were necessary and desirable for life at the time, stood at the forefront of the endeavours of the city states. This suggests that there was active economic exchange among many city states. However, most poleis had their own army, their own legal system as well as their own calendar, and different priorities were even set in connection with the mythical cult within the individual city states.

The political self-image of the ancient city state of the classical era was founded on two historical-categorical facts of political practice (and, to a large extent, also of political theory) that have to be dealt with in any examination of the subject of political participation in antiquity: the division of the polis into free and unfree people as well as the paradigm of the free (male) citizen within the polis. In spite of “the great variety of social and state manifestations in ancient Greece”, the separation into free and unfree must be considered “a fundamental characteristic of any ancient political system”,5 and the same also applies to the limitation of civic rights and duties to the free (male) citizens of the polis.

From the political perspective, the differentiation between free and unfree was an everyday normality, a common political practice. The citizen was usually considered free and could lay claim to a number of civic rights for himself: political participation, acquisition of property, etc. However, these rights usually went hand in hand with duties: military service, political participation in accordance with the valid laws, the obligation to accept a public office, accompanied by the obligation to fulfil public offices to the benefit of the polis for a specific period, etc. On the other hand, those who were considered unfree, especially slaves in the so-called “state of unfreedom”, were granted no personal and political rights. But there were social differences among the unfree members of society, and the spectrum of the different activities and obligations was rather large. On the one hand, there were state slaves (official servants, watchmen, and labourers). On the other hand, there were house slaves, maids and manservants, who carried out a number of duties in the oikos (the household or family property) where they worked as kitchen help, tutors, nannies, family physicians, etc. Women and children also had absolutely no political rights, although the woman’s position varied from polis to polis. The rights – or, more precisely, lack of rights – of guests (the metics) and foreigners (the xenoi) were also defined differently in the laws of the individual city states.

In connection with the classical Greek era, it is necessary to bear the following in mind:6(i) The dichotomy of the differentiation between “free” and “unfree” was a fact that was socio-politically accepted and unquestioned to a large degree in political practice even though there were occasional discussions about the (possible) justification for this separation in literature and philosophy. (ii) The differentiation between “free” and “unfree”, the designation of the “free citizen” in contrast to the “unfree slave”, not only reflected a formal legal status but also implied an ancient political self-awareness. It is already possible to identify this trace in the works of Aeschylus where the Athenians – after the Persians had asked them for the name of the ruler over the Athenians – were described as free citizens, the slaves of no master, and nobody’s subject.7(iii) On the “unfree” side, the slaves worked in a number of areas and relationships, some of them confidential, which did not change the existing legal status in any way except that of the master’s claim of ownership. (iv) Slaves were defenseless to human trafficking; they were regarded as goods, as possessions, and as tools. (v) Unfree (men, women, and children) were not only expropriated legally and politically, but also – from the anthropological-philosophical perspective – in a worse position and seen in a different way than free people.

2. Ancient political theory: Anthropology and participation in the best state

The thoughts of Aristotle form an indispensable – and, in almost all respects, important –component of ancient classical political philosophy. At the same time, he continued to cling to a fundamental differentiation between the free and unfree. In developing and presenting his practical philosophy, he nevertheless deals, in an astute and cautious manner, with the “philosophy of human affairs”,8 which is an inseparable symbiosis of ethics and politics as well as a concrete political anthropology, a political image of man in the broader sense,9 which has received a great deal of approval but also criticism in the course of the history of philosophy and political thought. The central pillars of this political anthropology will be depicted by way of three short points:

(i) In his Politics, Aristotle determines that man is a being that lives a political life by nature; in Old Greek, zôon politikon. However, according to Aristotle, this definition of man as a political being is not actually a unique feature of humans, seeing that, in his eyes, bees and other animals (such as ants, for example) also led their lives in a political manner.10 Aristotle’s definition of man as a zôon politikon is therefore, first and foremost, a biological view that applies to man and his nature – but not exclusively.

(ii) Only Aristotle’s second politico-anthropological definition describes man in a special manner. Man is not only a zôon politikon, a political being in the broader sense, but – going even further – also a zôon logon echon – a being gifted with reason and language. For Aristotle, language and reason made it possible for man to “have a conception of good and evil, of right and wrong”, be able to enter into a political exchange about this with others, and organise coexistence in this way from a political perspective.11 According to Aristotle, this definition provided the sole foundation for the difference between man and (other) animals.

(iii) The Aristotelian political anthropology positioned man and his lifestyle firmly in a political way of living with other people. The human being is therefore directly dependent on his fellow man for his survival as well as for the good and successful life in different ways. From this viewpoint, man is not only a zôon politikon like other animals – living politically by nature – and also not merely a zôon logon echon – gifted with reason and language – but, going beyond that, also a zôon koinonikon – a “community being”12 who needs the connection to his fellow man just as the individual is needed by the rest of the community. A formal, superficial (political) coexistence, similar to “grazing on the same pasture”,13 is impossible for the life of man according to Aristotelian political anthropology.

Aristotle powerfully records this insight – which is fundamental for everything political – of the indispensable belonging to a community in the centre of the development of his political anthropology in politics: the one – the individual person – who is either unable to participate in forms of community, or who has no need of the community with others because of his individual self-sufficiency, is firstly not part of the state (e.g. the polis) and secondly therefore either an animal or a god.14 But the wild animal on the one hand and the self-sufficient divinity on the other do not apply to humans and their nature, especially since they are dependent on different forms of community for their lives in many respects.

From an ethical-political perspective, this concept of belonging to a community demands active political involvement and the acceptance of political responsibility on the part of the citizen. Aristotle described this kind of involvement – in addition to other passages in the “Philosophy of Human Affairs” – in Politics VII and VIII where he develops his “best imaginable state”, the so-called “polis as required”.15 In the course of these ethical-political investigations, he initially deals with what he considers the desirable life of the citizen within the political community of this “best imaginable state” that inevitably includes an ethical-political foundation.16

On the one hand, Aristotle talks about the ethical, as well as political, indispensability of political participation on the part of the citizen within the political community, the politikê koinonia. The political participation is obligatory in this plan for the state17 as only the acceptance of civic duties (e.g. military, administrative, political, juridical, or cultic) could bring about civic rights – in the broader and narrower sense – (e.g. subjective legal claims, leisure, self-interest, self-responsibility for one’s lifestyle, self-fulfilment). This period of essential and required political involvement from the citizen – as well as that needed for the individual care and work for the household and farming community – was described by Aristotle as a time of “non-leisure” (ascholia) because it demanded practical activities that the citizen had to fulfil immediately. All of this was completely in the sense of the political autarchy and autonomy of the polis.

On the other hand, however, Aristotle deals with the period of the free citizen’s “leisure” (scholê ) in Politics VII and VIII. It investigates the period of the individual’s personal, meaningful way of life beyond politics and political participation. In other words: A person who honours his political civic duties in this Aristotelian “best imaginable state” and performs these duties according to the law and for the good of the polis conscientiously and virtuously merits – in the broader sense – the right to occupy himself with things outside of the political sphere. Fundamentally, this is a matter of the potential for an individual lifestyle (leisure) that can be decided on as one sees fit, but only after the period of political participation (non-leisure). This means only when the obligations in political affairs have been taken care of. And, for the leisure period, Aristotle recommends thoughtful philosophical study and education in general. Here, it would not be going too far to note that – at least in the texts mentioned – he had already thought about a kind of “educated class” of citizens.

3. From the community of citizens to the civil society: The modern era

From the philosophical perspective, the three most important points in the changes from the community of citizens of antiquity to the modern civil society can be portrayed under the concepts of individuality, independence, and society.

(i) Individuality

As previously mentioned, the Aristotelian practical philosophy in general, and its political anthropology, have experienced both acceptance and rejection over the course of history. In modern political thought especially, many Aristotelian positions of his ethical-political symbioses were questioned for their general validity. In the course of political thought, beginning in the modern era, a greater distance was established between ethics and politics in comparison with ancient classical theory. In addition to doubts about the Aristotelian basic constant that humans are by nature community beings, criticism was also expressed of the Aristotelian “practical-political way of life”, the bios practikos kai politikos,18 and its binding necessity for the citizen.

In his philosophy, John Locke had already stressed the possibility of many different lifestyles and provided them with a new individualisation. He anchored these personal possibilities firmly on the basis of the fundamental rights to “life, liberty, and happiness”. However what is modern about the modern era is not the postulation of the “pursuit of happiness” – which Aristotle had already dealt with – but lies in two other details: first, in the definition of this pursuit of happiness as an activity that anybody – not just the free (male) citizen – can organise and determine for him- or herself, and second, all should do as they see fit. According to John Locke, all people look for happiness in the organisation of the way they lead their own lives, but they do not all look for the same kind of happiness or happiness in the same things. John Locke summarised the maxim of the modern individual, when compared with antiquity, in the following way: “Although people choose different things [in connection with the individual lifestyle], they all make the right choice.”19

Accordingly, individual life concepts cannot – or can hardly – be generalized, let alone represented in a single overall picture. John Locke’s – not entirely irony-free – criticism of the practical-political philosophy of antiquity is that it tried to do so anyway and thus had an extremely limited perspective on the conduct of human life. And so, he states that one “might have as reasonably disputed, whether the best relish were to be found in apples, plums, or nuts, and have divided themselves into sects upon it”.20

(ii) Independence

In addition to the growing awareness of the individual in the knowledge of individuality, there was also the need for the independent person, as was the case in the course of the philosophy of Enlightenment most recently. Unlike in ancient philosophy, this now applied explicitly for all people. In a text from 1783, Immanuel Kant answered the question of “What is Enlightenment?” with the following words: “Enlightenment is man’s release from his self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is man's inability to make use of his understanding without direction from another. Self-incurred is this tutelage when its cause lies not in lack of reason but in lack of resolution and courage to use it without direction from another.”21

At this point, the individual person is responsible for himself. In short: independence cannot be prescribed but has to be developed out of the person, the individual. And the individualisation or subjectification of the human mentioned in a first step now demands – in a second step – the independence of the individual, which should be achieved in the course of the history of the political enlightenment, in particular through the equality of all people before the law, and the right to education, freedom of expression, solidarity, separation of powers, etc. That goes hand in hand with the individual’s self-determination of his or her own way of life within the legal provisions of the modern state. But Kant was already aware that the individual’s path to independence is not an easy one – and he also provides possible reasons for this: “Laziness and cowardice are the reasons why so great a portion of mankind, after nature has long since discharged them from external direction (…), nevertheless remains under lifelong tutelage, and why it is so easy for others to set themselves up as their guardians. It is so easy not to be of age.”22

(iii) Society

From the politico-philosophical perspective, individuality and independence, in particular, form two cornerstones of the modern understanding of society in contrast to the ancient political community. Of course, there are also many other aspects that play a role. This makes it clear that the comparison between the community of citizens and our civil society is not merely a semantic project. However, this comparison between community and society had already become a topic of discussion in sociology in the 19th century, indicating that this development thesis is in no way new. In his treatise Ancient Law, published in 1861, the historian Henry Sumner Maine dealt with the development of the political community from antiquity to the modern society as a development “from status to contract”.

Following in the footsteps of Henry Sumner Maine, the sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies made observations on – and divided apart – these two levels in a broader sociological form from the perspective of the period in his publication Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (Community and Society), which was published in 1887. He distinguishes the community will (if people are in favour of life within the community of the village, in a sports club, or in religion) from the social will (if people approve of taking part in public life, in forms of political involvement, or participation in a stock corporation). According to Ferdinand Tönnies, the difference between community and society lies in the fact that, on the one hand, the community is self-sufficient and can be chosen freely, while on the other hand, society is viewed as an individually applicable instrument that people can make use of or not.

To summarise: No matter to which politico-sociological extent and regardless of all kinds of side effects (even if they are positive), individuality as well as independence have contributed to man, in the course of his individual and varied striving for life, liberty, and happiness, being able to participate in social forms of coexistence, and actively help to shape the political society – or not, if he so chooses. In keeping with one’s own subjective judgement on the one hand and to the extent allowed by the laws of the land on the other, today people are – in principle – free to participate politically or lead a completely apolitical life, in the narrower sense, in our modern understanding and reject political participation in light of their own lifestyle. A fact that in ancient times – once again with the focus on the theory and practice of the classical Greek period – was neither accepted anthropologically nor in the politics of the community.23

4. On the topicality of also thinking of the “civil society” as a “community of citizens”

On no account should the comparison between the ancient community of citizens and modern civil society be overused, especially since there are socio-political and scientific developments between these two perspectives that can hardly be portrayed in a single overview – if at all. But still – first and foremost – the currently acute global COVID-19 pandemic has revealed that, on the one hand, the modern civil societies are possibly more like civic communities than the historical, sociological, and philosophical developments would lead us to expect and, on the other, the individual, independent citizens living in a society – and therefore left to their own judgement as to the extent of their political participation – would like to believe. This is compounded in this time of crisis by the fact that rationalisation, globalisation, and cosmopolitanism have, in no way, made the life of the people and their subjective lifestyles any easier.

Through the rationalisation processes in all areas of life and relationships, globalisation was, and continues to be, an additional thoroughly rational result and that with all its positive and negative consequences. Today, the economy, politics, and science take place in an increasingly global context. And, according to the sociologist Ulrich Beck, this leads to the necessity to alter the perspective from which society (or societies) is observed. Ulrich Beck believes that global problems – such as the pandemic that has had a worldwide impact – can only be solved in a global context.24 Ecological, economic, healthcare, and political crises have long not only had an impact on the country, region, or continent hit by them.

On the one hand, the COVID-19 pandemic shows just how fragile modern societies are in many parts of the world. Ulrich Beck also serves as an interesting point of reference in this case as, faced with the global developments, he spoke about risk societies as early as 1986. Characteristic for these risk societies is that they can easily tip from one extreme to the other due to modernisation and mechanisation – in short, research and development. On the other hand, it can be observed that modern societies are still dependent on a basic level of participation on the part of the citizens – in this current, acute crisis, by paying attention to the health-related development in one’s own country and possibly even beyond its borders, supporting any measures necessary to contain the pandemic, or reducing some personal habits one has become fond of – and which have usually developed out of a certain level of independence – for a certain period of time. All of this makes it apparent that – despite the many developments that have taken place – the civil society, at its core, also means a society of citizens. It would only take the actions of a few people to not only upset the hoped-for effects in the health, economic, and political areas, but – going even further – counteract them.

It can be concluded that, although the developments from the ancient community of citizens to the modern civil society were clearly accomplished through individualisation and independence, and by following the path towards the open societies of modern democracies, the community of citizens is still in existence – or must be. This can be recognised more clearly in times of crisis than in other periods. Evidence of this was provided in the speech given to the Austrian people at the beginning of November by the Federal President Alexander van der Bellen in connection with the regulations on the second corona lockdown in Austria. In his six-minute address, he appealed to “the community” six times and did not speak to or about “the society” even once.25

5. Community policy empathy as a civil right and obligation

And now it is necessary – in a final step – to use five points to compare ancient times with the present; however, all of the aforementioned limitations of the comparison must be taken into consideration.

(i) Ancient political theory, as well as large areas of political practice in the classical period, were already aware of the crucial necessity of the political participation of the citizen in the community, in the sense – and for the benefit – of the whole political body (also for the all sections of the polis), and demanded that this be fulfilled. However, this participation was not only considered a political, but also a moral obligation. Nevertheless, the wellbeing of the political community of the citizens of the polis was mostly given priority over that of the individual. Individuality, as well as independence in the modern sense of the word, was not in demand to this extent.

(ii) The developments from the ancient community of citizens to the modern civil society is connected with many significant and constitutive achievements, especially in Europe. They will not be questioned or criticised here – but they include, as mentioned previously, most notably the individuality and independence of the specific person in his life in society. In a subsequent step, this contributed to separating the community and society more clearly from each other than before. In this separation, political participation was transferred to the social area and removed even further from the immediate individual and independent way of life (of course, this did not happen everywhere).

(iii) However, the two aspects mentioned above should not lead to the assumption that the modern civil society does not still preserve a kind of community of citizens at its core. As just shown, how much the human being is a “community creature”, and not merely a social, individualised person in an environment that is completely free of politics, becomes crystal clear, especially in times of crisis. As Aristotle determined: The human being is dependent on his fellow man for his mere survival, on the one hand, and for a good and successful life, on the other. This forms the cornerstone for understanding the human (political) community. And, this perspective is still valid.

(iv) Seen from this politico-philosophical perspective of the human being as an individual, independent “community creature”, it can be further deduced that one cannot be completely indifferent to the life of the other – especially in one’s own state. The foundation of this non-indifference can be expressed with the necessity for a minimum of community political empathy. In the modern understanding of the political, ethics and politics are not as far away from each other as they might seem at first glance when observing current political practice. (Once again: There was already an awareness for the indissoluble symbiosis of ethics and politics in ancient times.)

(v) In the modern understanding, this community political empathy can be classified, from the ethical-political perspective, as a civic right and obligation. On the one hand, the citizens have a right to not be left behind, by politics on one side and their fellow citizens on the other, within the socio-political discourses and developments. On the other hand, it is possible to recognise the ethical-political challenge facing the individual and independent person within a political community, as well as society, of showing consideration for others and, ultimately, also recognise the individuality and independence of the other.

1 Funke, Peter: Die griechische Staatenwelt in klassischer Zeit. In: Gehrke, Hans-Joachim / Schneider, Helmuth (eds.), Geschichte der Antike, Stuttgart 2006, p. 176.

2 Lotze, Detlef: Griechische Geschichte – Von den Anfängen bis zum Hellenismus, Munich 2010, p. 21.

3 Bürgin, Alfred: Zur Soziogenese der politischen Ökonomie – wirtschaftsgeschichtliche und dogmengeschichtliche Betrachtungen, Marburg 1996, p. 30.

4 Cancik, Hubert / Schneider, Helmuth (eds.), Der neue Pauly – Enzyklopädie der Antike, Stuttgart 2001, vol. 10, p. 23, s.v. Polis.

5 Funke, Peter: Die griechische Staatenwelt in klassischer Zeit. In: Gehrke, Hans-Joachim / Schneider, Helmuth (eds.), Geschichte der Antike, Stuttgart 2006, p. 166.

6 Cf. Varga, Simon: Perspektiven kosmopolitischer Menschenwürde in der Philosophie der Antike. In: Sedmak, Clemens (ed.), Menschenwürde – Vom Selbstwert des Menschen, Grundwerte Europas vol. 7, Darmstadt 2017, pp. 118–119.

7 Cf. Aeschylus: Die Perser. Übersetzt vom Emil Staiger, Stuttgart 2015, pp. 242–245.

8 Aristoteles: Nikomachische Ethik. Übersetzt von Ursula Wolf, Hamburg 2006, X 10, 1181b15.

9 Höffe, Otfried: Geschichte des politischen Denkens, Munich 2016, p. 54.

10 Cf. Aristoteles: Politik. Übersetzt von Franz Susemihl, Hamburg 2003, I 2, 1253a7.

11 Cf. Aristoteles: Politik. Übersetzt von Franz Susemihl, Hamburg 2003, I 2, 1253a15.

12 Aristoteles: Eudemische Ethik. Übersetzt von Franz Dirlmeier, Berlin 1984, VII 10, 1242a25.

13 Aristoteles: Nikomachische Ethik. Übersetzt von Ursula Wolf, Hamburg 2006, X 9, 1170b11.

14 Cf. Aristoteles: Politik. Übersetzt von Franz Susemihl, Hamburg 2003, I 2, 1253a26-29.

15 Cf. Aristoteles: Politik. Übersetzt von Franz Susemihl, Hamburg 2003, VII 4, 1325b36.

16 Cf. Varga, Simon: Vom erstrebenswertesten Leben – Aristoteles' Philosophie der Muße, Boston / Berlin 2014, pp. 183–185.

17 Wolfgang Kullmann finds it “noteworthy” that, within the framework of the state to the best of its ability, there would be the possibility of “withdrawing from political life and living “unpolitically” in manner of speaking.

18 Aristoteles: Politik. Übersetzt von Franz Susemihl, Hamburg 2003, VII 2, 1324a27.

19 John Locke: Versuche über den menschlichen Verstand. Übersetzt von Carl Winckler, Hamburg 2006, Book II, XXI 55. (English: http://www.gutenberg.org/files/10615/10615-h/10615-h.htm#link2HCH0024 – (Book II, 56) accessed 28.11.2020).

20 John Locke: Versuche über den menschlichen Verstand. Übersetzt von Carl Winckler, Hamburg 2006, Book II, XXI 55.

21 Kant, Immanuel: Was ist Aufklärung?, Stuttgart 2002, p. 9. (English: https://resources.saylor.org/wwwresources/archived/site/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/What-is-Enlightenment.pdf – accessed 28.11.2020).

22 Kant, Immanuel: Was ist Aufklärung?, Stuttgart 2002, p. 9.

23 In the Hellenist era (directly following the Classical period), the various philosophical schools, including the Cynics, Stoics, and Epicureans, had already developed the first approaches to detach the human being from the immediate and categorical necessity of political participation. All of these schools made the attempt to relativise the political in its significance for the personal lifestyle of the individual. A basic tenet of the philosophy of the Hellenist period was that, in the final analysis, the political could not be made solely responsible for the good and successful life of the individual.

24 Beck, Ulrich: Der kosmopolitische Blick – oder: Krieg ist Frieden, Frankfurt 2004, pp. 7–10.

25 Alexander van der Bellen made an appeal to “Austrian men and women, and all those who live here” and asked for their understanding of the new measures “in the name of our community”. He continued by saying that the hardship that were to come as a result of the COVID-19 orders would be “especially difficult for some members of our community” to bear as well as that “community is not just an empty word”. Cf. https://www.bundespraesident.at/aktuelles/detail/tv-ansprache-anlaesslich-der-verordnung-zum-2-lockdown (Accessed: 10. 11. 2020).

The Civil Society and the Bourgeoisie

Ernst Bruckmüller

Summary: The modern formulation of the “civil” or “civic” society describes the common commitment of people in areas outside of their family and professional spheres – and usually outside of politics. “Citizens’ initiatives” can aim at influencing politics and the administration and, in special cases, even at changing the political system (as the občanské forum 1989 – citizens’ forum – did in the Czech part of former Czechoslovakia). This essay poses the question of the extent to which previous concepts of the bourgeoisie and “bourgeois society” have anything in common with the modern phenomena of the civil society. This is because, as a rule, civil-society activity takes place within the framework of legal possibilities, such as the right to personal freedom, the right to carry on a business, the freedom to practise a religion and express oneself, freedom of the press, freedom of association and assembly, the right to petition, etc. that were achieved by “bourgeois” visionaries, pioneers, revolutionaries, and politicians.

Citizen society, civil society, and the bourgeoisie

Today, when one speaks about the civil society or citizen society, one usually means the involvement of people in a great variety of areas outside of actual “politics” as well as their family and professional spheres. This involvement expresses itself in many ways in local, regional, and superregional initiatives in the fields of culture, the environment, the third world, care and support for asylum seekers, etc., but “civilian initiatives” can also have influencing politics and the administration as their goals. In authoritarian states, the civil society can even develop into a powerful movement to change the political system.1 It is worthwhile remembering the občanské forum (citizens’ forum) in the Czech part of what was once Czechoslovakia that was established on 19 November – only two days after the beginning of the Velvet Revolution in Prague.2 The terms “bourgeois society” and “civil society”, as well as občanské forum, are oriented towards mature, actively interested citizens who are prepared to become involved.

The following considerations deal with the question of the extent to which former concepts of the bourgeoisie and “bourgeois society” of the 19th and early 20th centuries have anything to do with the modern manifestations of the civil society. In modern democratic constitutional states, civil-society activity usually takes place within the framework of the legal possibilities achieved by “bourgeois” visionaries, pioneers, revolutionaries, and politicians. The central freedoms of the civil society include the right to personal freedom, the right to carry on a business, the freedom to practice a religion and express oneself, freedom of the press, freedom of association and assembly, and the right to petition. These are complemented by the protection of the private sphere (domiciliary right) and confidentiality of correspondence – although this is something that most of our contemporaries have voluntarily done away with by using the internet.

However, there is a conceptual problem in German that most other languages are not aware of. The German word “Bürger” denotes both the (fully entitled) inhabitant of a pre-modern city and the (fully entitled) citizen. French, on the other hand, differentiates between “citoyen” (citizen of a state) and “bourgeois” (inhabitant of a town, with its root in “bourg” that can mean a market or – in the form of “fauxbourg” – a suburb). English recognises the “citizen”, as well as the “burgher” (city resident), and, in Italian, we have the “cittadino” and the “borghese”. It is obvious that they have their roots in the Latin “civis” and the “civitas” connected with it, and the Germanic-late-Latin “burgus”, which originally only meant a fort but was later expanded to include “civil” settlements, markets, and cities.3 Slavic languages also differentiate between the citizen (“državljan” in Slovene) and town resident (“meščan” in Slovene – and very similar in Russian).

However, “zivile”, with its roots in the Latin “civis”, has remained alive in German alongside the local word. It was originally used as a contrast to the military but soon came to denote a certain – “civilised”, non-violent, equitable – behaviour when dealing with other people. Borrowed from the French “civil” (from the Latin “civilis”) in the 16th century, it meant middle class, patriotic, national, and public.4 During the Enlightenment in the 18th century, “zivilisiert” – in the sense of enlightened, non-violent, good behaviour – was added although the old bourgeois concept of “Ehrsamkeit” (respectability) and its inherent factors of being of legitimate birth and upright behaviour still resonated.

The behaviour required a juridical standardisation: In 1789, the great Austrian enlightener Gottfried van Swieten (1733–1803, son of the famous doctor Gerard van Swieten) defined the “bourgeois society”, as opposed to a “horde of wild people”, by “those principles of their affiliation” that there can be “no right without obligation, and no obligation without right.”5 The “civil society “(= society of citizens) therefore needed a “civil law” as a basis. This was codified at the time and came into force as the “General Civil Code” (ABGB) in the year 1812.6 The term “citizen” was first encountered in legislation during the reign of Joseph II. The ABGB also assumed a common citizenship of the residents of those Habsburg (Austrian) countries in which the ABGB was put into effect (but not in Hungary!).

But was society – not only in Central Europe but throughout the continent – so advanced that it could be interpreted as a society of people with equal rights? Feudal dependencies actually still existed in most regions. In no way could those living in rural areas, who made up the majority of the population at the time, be considered as being members of this new general bourgeois society. In 1789, the French Revolution asserted the abolishment of all feudal bonds in Europe with the victory of its slogan of “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity”. A few years previously, Joseph II had at least done away with serfdom in his “Austrian monarchy” (from 1781, first of all in Bohemia), but the farmers still had to rely on the manorial lords for their land and property. This dependence continued in the Austrian Empire until 1848; it was considered a component of the “state constitutions”, meaning that these conditions were not included in the AGBG (they were not regarded as a lease!)

The genesis of the “bourgeois society” in the Habsburg monarchy

Where can we look for the core of the new “bourgeois society”? It originally was comprised of men who were not dependent on domiciliary rights and not subjected feudally – therefore, first and foremost, townspeople. They were “citizens” in the traditional sense of possessing the civil rights of a town and being the subject of a monarch (and not a noble lord!). A new, educated bourgeois configuration, dominated by civil servants, buts also including writers, professors, teachers, and scientists – many of them in civil service (and more than a few ex-Jesuits after the repeal of their order in 1773) – developed out of this old urban bourgeoisie in the years after the reign of Maria Theresa and Joseph II. In addition, the emerging supra-regional market (and the almost equally significant market in the rapidly expanding residence city itself) resulted in considerable entrepreneurial growth, the prosperity of which formed the foil against which the bourgeois culture of the Biedermeier period could later develop. This new entrepreneurship was usually favoured by a state factory charter; i.e., it was possible to run a business without adhering to the restrictions and stipulations that the individual guilds, associations, and professional societies had formerly prescribed. This shows that the new educated bourgeoisie and new entrepreneurship were both the products of the state in the making!

Entrepreneurship, which was not regulated by a guild, and for which the name of “fabricant” was soon introduced to distinguish it from “master craftsman”, originally had no connection to the new educated classes. The entrepreneurs only gradually achieved some of the social standing that the intelligentsia had already claimed for itself. The state, which needed both, awarded outstanding members of the two groups with titles of nobility.7 These peerages (from a simple “von” to “knight” – or “baron” at the most) characterised the “second society” with their upper-class lifestyle who ranked behind the traditional high nobility but combined their sophisticated modes of behaviour with scientific, artistic, and literary interests. Schubert was honoured in these circles, and this is also where Grillparzer and Bauernfeld socialised. Grillparzer’s close ties were due to his uncle Joseph Sonnleithner’s connections. These circles were also the principal clients for painting which, along with music and theatre, rapidly blossomed in the Biedermeier and pre-March periods. Its master artists Friedrich von Amerling, Moritz Michael Daffinger, Josef Danhauser, Peter Fendi, Josef Kriehuber, and Ferdinand Georg Waldmüller created many portraits of members of this society.

The “second society” and the middle classes

The “second society” can be considered the leading group of the new bourgeois class that referred to itself as middle class. As early as in 1770, a rhyme typifying the self-awareness of the new middle class made the rounds:

“No-one’s lord, and no-one’s slave

That is the right of the middle-class”

The middle class therefore found itself between the ruling system (sovereign, bureaucracy, military, and nobility) and those who were still subjected to feudal domination – the mass of the farmers, as well as those dependent on domiciliary rights, apprentices, labourers, messengers, servants, and maids. In an anonymous document published in Leipzig in 1843 “Pia desideria of an Austrian Writer”, Eduard von Bauernfeld described all the intellectually active segments of society, “Professors, academics, artists, fabricants, tradesmen, economists, and even civil servants and clerics”, as belonging to the middle classes that were urgently demanding that censorship be relaxed and a general change in the political situation:

“… the Viennese have changed; they have become desperately serious. Here, as everywhere else, industry has set up its throne; a people that forms trade associations no longer has time to deal with what they prefer most: fried chicken, the Theatre in the Leopoldstadt, and the music of Strauss and Lanner.”8

With the Lower Austrian Trade Association (1839), the Inner Austrian Trade Association in Graz (1839), the Juridical-Political Reading Circle (1841), and the Concordia Writers’ Club (1844), the still-young middle-classes created new, modern organisational forms – ultimately also discussion forums in which, in spite of censorship and the police, certain demands on the state were also formulated.

Numerous problems were waiting to be solved – the farmers’ demands to abolish the feudal system, the growing need of the lower classes, and the national discontent that was becoming increasingly pressing, as well as the paralysis of the government that had been playing absolutism without a monarch (since the death of Franz I). Ferdinand I (1835–1848) was only nominally in power.

1848 – “… bourgeois revolution” –?

The long-expected revolution erupted on 13 March 1848 – it was a reaction to the Parisian February Revolution as well as Kossuth’s inflammatory speech in the Hungarian Parliament that was meeting not far from Vienna in Pressburg (Bratislava) at the time. Bourgeois circles prepared several petitions to be presented to the court, but the demands were expressed most clearly in the petition that the students formulated in the Aula and handed over to the Lower Austrian State Parliament on 13 March. The first success came soon after the first shots had been fired and the first people had been killed (“the fallen of March”). Metternich, the hated symbolic figure of the old regime, was overthrown on the same evening (the fact that he had already been disempowered was not known outside of court circles).

The Revolution quickly chalked up other victories. Freedom of the press, arming the people (national guards and the Academic Legion), and the promise of a constitution were announced on 15 March. When the so-called Pillersdorf Constitution was enacted on 25 April, it seemed as if the majority of the bourgeois demands had actually been fulfilled. But, the constitution, which was modelled on the Belgian version, had its weaknesses. It had been issued, or imposed, from above and allowed for a two-chamber system and an absolute veto from the monarch.

The “storm petition” of 15 May opposed this and especially the extremely restrictive electoral procedure that had been proclaimed on 9 May. The so-called May Revolution was borne mainly by students, craftsmen, and labourers whose situation had not improved since March. This led to the “bourgeois” revolution finding itself in a decision-making crisis. What was more important – especially for the members of the upper middle-class: the expansion of personal and political rights or the preservation of the Habsburg Empire? Faced with these alternatives, quite a few the dissatisfied bourgeois citizens remained silent. Or – like Franz Grillparzer in early June in his famous poem on Field Marshall Radetzky (“Good luck, Commander! Get it done! […] Austria is on your side”) – came out in favour of the nation state, the military, and ultimately, on the side of the counterrevolution.

However, the Austrian Reichstag assembled before the victory of the counterrevolution – this was the first elected parliament in the Western sector of Habsburg Monarchy (elections to the lower house had been held previously in Hungary – but only entitled members of the nobility had taken part). The election resulted in a clear bourgeois majority: approximately 55 per cent of the 383 representatives belonged to this class. Almost one quarter – 92 – were farmers. They considered the question of the constitution relatively unimportant; their main concern was with the agrarian reform to abolish the landlord’s primary ownership and resulting contractual obligations on the part of the farmer as well as the landlord’s jurisdiction and police force. This was actually passed by the Reichstag at the end of August and made the farmers fully entitled citizens. The differences between citizens and labourers, property owners and those without possession, intensified during these debates. When the empty state coffers caused the Minister of Labour to cut former subsidies, this resulted in mass demonstrations by the workers who were bloodily dispersed by the bourgeois National Guard (“Prater Battle”, 23 August 1848). It proved impossible to overcome this split.

The rest is well known: The Croat Banus Jelačić invaded Hungary, leading to war between that country and the imperial army. When it was planned to send troops from Vienna to Hungary, the October Revolution broke out and ultimately led to the military conquest of Vienna by the emperor’s forces on 31 October. This was followed by numerous arrests and executions.

But, similar to the retarding element before the catastrophic last act of a tragedy, the Reichstag assembled once again – this time, in Kremsier (Kroměňiče) in Moravia in the imposing castle of the Archbishop of Olmütz (the imperial family had been housed in his residence in Olmütz since October 1848). Here, the exclusively “German” liberals were isolated in a Czech environment and there was no danger of a popular uprising for this parliament. However, the Reichstag performed extremely positive work until its dissolution on 7 March 1849 – a draft for a constitution was agreed on: it not only proclaimed the principle of the sovereignty of the people and civil liberties, but also aimed to solve the problem of the coexistence of the different language groups in the multinational state. At the same time as the dissolution of the parliament, Prince Felix Schwarzenberg’s government proclaimed its own constitution (once again: imposed from above) dated 4 March 1849. The parliamentary representatives who were thought to be radical were arrested, and several were sentenced to death (including the “Preacher of the Revolution”, Anton Fuster, Dr Josef Goldmark, Dr Ernst (von) Violand, and the “liberator of the farmers” Hans Kudlich, who – like many others – was able to flee in time).9

The struggles for independence in Hungary – with Russian help – and Italy had been crushed by the summer of 1849.

Neo-absolutism – restoration or bourgeois control?

In contrast to the old form of absolutism, neo-absolutism was characterised by resolute government. Agrarian reform was quickly introduced. Now the “Empire of Austria” became a genuinely unified state for the first time, having been given a unified administration, a unified customs territory, and a unified (private) legal sphere. The decision-making authority was concentrated on the young Emperor Franz Joseph. The bureaucracy became the pillar of this new system of rule. It could be said that, as compensation for political codetermination, the German-Austrian, bourgeois-bureaucratic element was de facto given control not only of the bureaucracy but of all people living in the empire. Seeing that, after 1848, the German-Austrian bourgeoisie developed into the beneficiaries and bearers of the counterrevolution, Habsburg centralism, and concept of large national state, their memories of the “bourgeois” revolution were later relatively insignificant. At the same time, a slow change in the German bourgeoisie’s traditional feeling of cultural superiority led in the direction of an increasingly radical German nationalism (and increasingly radical antisemitism) in which, finally, anticlericalism remained the sole remnant of the once liberal heritage.10

The entrepreneurs also profited from the new unified state. During the Revolution, they had already taken the side of the government and military. The most important thing for them was the preservation of greater Habsburg Austria, with equal rights throughout the country and a uniform customs and currency area. If the counterrevolution guaranteed that the bourgeoisie would achieve their goal, and this was threatened by the Revolution, they would inevitably become an ally of the restoration. One small example:

On 27 March 1848, Giuseppe Miller-Aichholz, a Viennese wholesaler from Trentino, wrote to his father (in Italian) in Cles that the behaviour in Milan and Venice was hair-raising, that they had broken their oaths and were unfaithful traitors. In June, he travelled to Innsbruck as a member of a community committee to beseech the emperor to return to Vienna. On 13 August, he enthusiastically told his father about Radetzky’s victories over the Lombards and Piemontese. In March 1849, Miller was a member of the deputation of Viennese citizens chosen to thank the young Emperor Franz Joseph for the constitution and dissolution of the Reichstag. Only a few days later, he travelled to the war theatre in northern Italy, together with other councillors, to present Radetzky with the diploma making him an honorary citizen of Vienna. This put an impressive seal on the alliance between the upper classes and the army.

The brief reign of the liberal bourgeoisie

Initially, the “German” bourgeoisie only dominated in Austria in the form of the bureaucracy.11 However, simultaneously with the retraction of “civil” liberties, the entrepreneurial upper classes were granted considerable freedoms. The state’s difficult financial situation increased the possibilities of the financial bourgeoisie to have an influence, seeing that the state needed a tremendous amount of money to develop the new court and administration system with its countless new civil servants. At the same time, the expenses for the army and (new!) gendarmery remained high.12 And they increased even further when Austria occupied the Romanian princedoms during the Crimean War and stationed an army in Galicia. These politics led to a state of permanent hostility with Russia, without being able to win the liberal Western powers (England and France) as allies. Finally, after the defeat near Solferino in 1859, the Emperor was informed that there could only be new loans for the highly-indebted state with parliamentary representation – at least for a control of the state’s finances. In this way, the unwilling Emperor was forced to establish representative bodies from the individual parliaments and imperial Reichsrat that were principally intended to act as the taxpayers’ controllers of the state’s non-transparent expenditure policies.

The voting rights for the communities and individual parliaments, which were legislated within the framework of the “February patent” in 1861, from which the representatives in the Reichsrat were to be elected were quite clearly tailored to satisfy the interests of the bourgeoisie. Seeing that it was, in principle, a matter of controlling finances, the right to vote was linked to the tax payments: each person who paid a direct tax (property, trade, building, or income tax) in the communities was entitled to vote. However, only the top two-thirds of community voters, and those in the cities who paid taxes amounting to more than 10 guilders annually, were entitled to vote for the parliaments. Those in possession of an education patent – teachers, professors, priests, doctors, engineers, and attorneys, as well as captains in coastal regions – were also eligible. The aim was to ensure that community councils, parliaments and the “Reichsrat” were dominated by “property and education”.