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- Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
- Kategorie: Fachliteratur
- Serie: Communicating Science in Times of Crisis
- Sprache: Englisch
An authoritative compendium of new research findings and case studies in the application of communication theory during catastrophic events Communicating Science in Times of Crisis: Communication and Catastrophic Events addresses the practical application and research implications of communication theory in the context of man-made and natural catastrophes. Bringing together contributions by leading experts in crisis management and strategic communication, this timely collection of resources links scientific issues with public policy while discussing the challenges and opportunities for using communication to manage extreme events in the evolving media landscape of the 21st century. In this second volume of the Wiley-Blackwell Communicating Science in Times of Crises series, 15 substantial chapters explore a varied range of catastrophic conditions, such as mass violence incidents, disease outbreaks, catastrophic mudslides, cascading and simultaneous disasters, extreme weather events, diffusion of misinformation during crises, students traveling internationally during a global health crisis, and more. Each chapter focuses on a particular issue or concern, revealing the difficult choices that confront academics and practitioners across communication disciplines and presenting original frameworks and models alongside ongoing research programs. * Discusses approaches for balancing scientific findings with social and cultural issues * Highlights the ability of legacy and digital media to facilitate science in mitigating the effects of adverse events * Examines the ethical repercussions of communication during unfolding and unpredictable events * Addresses the use of social media communication during a crisis and navigating an increasingly media-savvy society with multiple levels of science literacy * Covers key theoretical and practical aspects of the associated fields of risk management and crisis management Available as a standalone book or as part of a two-volume set, Communicating Science in Times of Crisis: Communication and Catastrophic Events is essential reading for scholars, researchers, practitioners, and advanced students in the fields of crisis communication, risk and emergency management, disaster studies, policy management, social media communication, and healthcare communication.
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Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2022
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Table of Contents
Cover
Title Page
Copyright Page
Dedication Page
List of Contributors
1 Addressing Catastrophes Through Communication Science
Introduction
Strategic Risk and Crisis Management
Chapter Highlights
References
2 Where is it Safe? Questioning Education Policy, Safety, and Choices for Students Traveling Internationally During a Global Health Crisis
Introduction
Catastrophic Event: Early Spread of COVID‐19 and Responses
University Health and Safety Policies
Persisting Issues with Federal Guidance Throughout the COVID‐19 Pandemic
Communicating Health and Safety: An Uneasy Balance
A Closer Examination of Policy Communication and Miscommunication
Conclusions for a Clearer Path Forward
References
3 Addressing the Role of Prior Experience in the Development of Risk Perceptions, Information Seeking and Processing Behaviors During Natural Disasters
Introduction
Risk Perceptions and Attitudes
Prior Experience
Risk Information Seeking and Processing Behaviors
Conclusion
Considerations on Theory and Practice
References
4 Enhancing Catastrophic Event Preparedness and Response
Overview of Inoculation
Past Contextual Applications
Potential New Applications to Catastrophic Events
The Impact of Media and Modality on the Efficacy of Inoculation Messages
Conclusion
References
5 Communication Strategies to Initiate and Sustain Catastrophe Compassion
Introduction
The Case for Compassion
Strategically Designed Appeals to Compassion
Conclusion
References
6 Social Marketing Strategy
Social Marketing Overview
Lee and Kotler's 10 Steps of Social Marketing
Social Marketing: Relevance for Crises and Catastrophic Events
Severe Weather Events
Senseless Acts of Community Violence or Harm
Infectious Disease Outbreaks
Immigrant and Refugee Crisis
Conclusion
References
7 Building Risk Communication Infrastructure by Bolstering Emergency Managers' Formal and Informal Communication Networks
Challenges for Public Communication During Emergencies
Networked Resiliency
Local Emergency Planning Committees
Communication Strategies for Catastrophe
Conclusion
References
8 Individual Disaster Communication Following Catastrophic Mass Violence
Review of Literature
Method
Results
Discussion
Conclusion
References
9 Social Media Misinformation About Extreme Weather Events and Climate Change
Competing Beliefs About Extreme Weather Events and Climate Change in the United States
Factors Influencing the Spread of Climate Change Misinformation on Social Media
Studies of Climate Change Misinformation on Social Media Platforms
Combating Misinformation About Climate Change on Social Media
Conclusion
References
10 “The Princeton Outbreak”
Literature Review
Methodology
Findings
Discussion
Conclusion
References
11 Blue or Stormy Skies? The Roles of Strategic Risk Communication in Protecting Communities Before, During, and After Severe Weather
Warning Models and Theories
Crisis Narratives and Crisis Framing
Relational Strategies
Discussion
Conclusion
References
12 Risk and Crisis Communication
Instructional Risk Communication
Case Study Method
Description of the Disasters
Discussion
References
13 Risk, Science, and Health Collaborations During Cascading and Simultaneous Disasters
Science Communication and Cascading Disasters
Considering Stakeholders and Collaborators in Science Communication
Science Communication Challenges During Cascading Disasters
Future Research and Implications
Conclusion
References
14 Communicating Inclusively and Reliably About Climatological and Meteorological Events
Study 1: Social Network Analysis
Study 1—Discussion
Study 2—Texas Messaging Experiment
Proposal of Hypotheses and Research Questions
Method
Results
Study 2—Discussion
Conclusion
References
15 How Government Leaders Use Social Media During Disasters
How Government Leaders Use Social Media During Disasters: A Scoping Review
Methods
Findings
Evaluating Social Media as Disaster Communication Tools
Conclusion
References
Appendix A: Summary of Searches and Resulting Articles
Index
End User License Agreement
List of Tables
Chapter 1
Table 1.1 Terms Related to Catastrophes.
Chapter 8
Table 8.1 Regression Results for Post‐event Individual Disaster Communicati...
Chapter 10
Table 10.1 Princeton University Bexero Meningitis B Vaccine Participation R...
Chapter 14
Table 14.1 Familiarity with Sources of Climate Information
Table 14.2 Familiarity with Sources of Climate Information
Table 14.3 Familiarity Climate Information Providers
Table 14.4 Familiarity with Climate Information Providers
Table 14.5 Participant Scores of SCIPP and Other Organizations on Informati...
Table 14.6 Sources and Modes of Climate‐Related Information Retrieval
Table 14.7 Frequency of Information Seeking
Table 14.8 Correlations of Political Ideology and Other Study Variables
Chapter 15
Table 15.1 SCCT Crisis Response Strategies.
List of Illustrations
Chapter 3
Figure 3.1 Five key stages of natural disaster response.
Figure 3.2 The cyclical nature of prior experience, risk perceptions and att...
Chapter 7
Figure 7.1 Statutory requirements for LEPC Membership.
Figure 7.2 Hypothetical LEPC organizational structure.
Chapter 8
Figure 8.1 Hypothetical mediation model of the effect of pulse nightclub mas...
Figure 8.2 Final mediation model of the effect of Pulse nightclub mass shoot...
Chapter 10
Figure 10.1 Get the second shot flyer 1.
Figure 10.2 Get the second shot flyer 2.
Chapter 12
Figure 12.1 The IDEA model.
Chapter 14
Figure 14.1 Social network analysis steps to inform SCIPP future sustained a...
Figure 14.2 Social network analysis of key SCIPP stakeholder survey responde...
Figure 14.3 Social network analysis of all key SCIPP stakeholders and second...
Figure 14.4 Textual analysis of Texas resident responses.
Figure 14.5 General organization type of Texas resident responses.
Figure 14.6 Full social network analysis with SCIPP stakeholders, secondary ...
Figure 14.7 A comparison of source evaluation for message credibility.
Figure 14.8 A comparison of source evaluation for newsworthiness.
Figure 14.9 A comparison of message evaluation for credibility.
Figure 14.10 A comparison of message evaluation for newsworthiness.
Figure 14.11 A comparison of all conditions for message credibility.
Figure 14.12 MANCOVA (multiple analysis of covariance) of all conditions for...
Figure 14.13 MANCOVA of all conditions for newsworthiness controlling for ag...
Guide
Cover Page
Title Page
Copyright Page
Dedication Page
List of Contributors
Table of Contents
Begin Reading
Index
Wiley End User License Agreement
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Communication and Catastrophic Events
Strategic Risk and Crisis Management
Edited by
H. Dan O'Hair and Mary John O'Hair
University of Kentucky
This edition first published 2023© 2023 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
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Library of Congress Cataloging‐in‐Publication DataNames: O’Hair, Dan, editor. | O’Hair, Mary John, editor.Title: Communication and catastrophic events / edited by H. Dan O’Hair, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY, Mary John O’Hair, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY.Description: Hoboken, New Jersey : John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2023. | Series: Communicating science in times of crisis | Includes bibliographical references and index.Identifiers: LCCN 2022029601 (print) | LCCN 2022029602 (ebook) | ISBN 9781119751816 (paperback) | ISBN 9781119751830 (adobe pdf) | ISBN 9781119751823 (epub)Subjects: LCSH: Crisis communication | Risk management | Communicating scienceClassification: LCC HD49 .C658 2023 (print) | LCC HD49 (ebook) | DDC 363.34–dc23/eng/20220812LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022029601LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022029602
Cover Design: WileyCover Image: © Rasica/Shutterstock
This book is dedicated to the victims and survivors of catastrophic events and to those who are driven in their pursuit of communicating science in times of crisis, when strategic communication is needed most.
List of Contributors
Anita Atwell SeateDepartment of CommunicationUniversity of Maryland, College Park, MD
Joshua B. BarbourDepartment of Communication StudiesUniversity of Texas at AustinAustin, TX
David H. BierlingTexas A&M Transportation InstituteTexas A&M UniversityCollege Station, TX
Lauren B. CainCollege of Emergency PreparednessHomeland Security, and CybersecurityUniversity at AlbanySUNY, Albany, NY
Daniel P. ChaneyDepartment of CommunicationUniversity of KentuckyLexington, KY
Andrew ChristjoyTexas A&M Transportation InstituteTexas A&M UniversityCollege Station, TX
Megan E. CullinanDepartment of Communication and MediaMerrimack CollegeNorth Andover, MA
Lindsay L. DillinghamDepartment of Management, Marketing, and EntrepreneurshipLipscomb UniversityNashville, TN
Laura M. FischerDepartment of Agricultural Education and CommunicationsTexas Tech UniversityLubbock, TX
Sarah A. GeeganDepartment of Integrated Strategic CommunicationUniversity of KentuckyLexington, KY
Ralph A. GigliottiSchool of Communication and InformationRutgers UniversityNew Brunswick, NJ
Daniel HawblitzelNational Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)Silver Spring, MD
Erin B. HesterDepartment of Integrated Strategic CommunicationUniversity of KentuckyLexington, KY
Ellie HollidayDepartment of Curriculum and InstructionUniversity of KentuckyLexington, KY
Jason HopeUK International CenterUniversity of KentuckyLexington, KY
J. Brian HoustonDisaster and Community Crisis CenterDepartment of CommunicationUniversity of MissouriColumbia, MO
William T. HoweDepartment of Communication StudiesTexas Tech UniversityLubbock, TX
Bobi IvanovDepartment of Integrated Strategic CommunicationUniversity of KentuckyLexington, KY
Judy F. JarvisPrinceton Campus LifePrinceton University, Princeton, NJ
Johnny KhaukhaDepartment of CommunicationUganda Christian UniversityMukono, Uganda
Ji Youn KimDepartment of CommunicationUniversity of MarylandCollege Park, MD
John KolligianPrinceton University Health ServicesPrinceton UniversityPrinceton, NJ
Cara LawsonDepartment of Agricultural Communication, Education and LeadershipThe Ohio State UniversityColumbus, OH
Saymin LeeDepartment of CommunicationUniversity of MarylandCollege Park, MD
Brooke Fisher LiuDepartment of CommunicationUniversity of MarylandCollege Park, MD
Xin MaDepartment of CommunicationUniversity of MarylandCollege Park, MD
Ann Neville MillerNicholson School of Communication and MediaUniversity of Central FloridaOrlando, FL
Ann MugungaDepartment of CommunicationUganda Christian UniversityMukono, Uganda
Angella NapakolDepartment of CommunicationUganda Christian UniversityMukono, Uganda
H. Dan O’HairDepartment of CommunicationUniversity of KentuckyLexington, KY
Mary John O’HairDepartment of Educational Leadership StudiesUniversity of KentuckyLexington, KY
Kimberly A. ParkerDepartment of Integrated Strategic CommunicationUniversity of KentuckyLexington, KY
Amanda U. PottertonDepartment of Educational Leadership StudiesUniversity of Kentucky, Lexington, KY
Rebecca M. RiceDepartment of Communication StudiesUniversity of Nevada, Las VegasLas Vegas, NV
Taylor K. RuthDepartment of Agricultural LeadershipEducation, and CommunicationUniversity of Nebraska, Lincoln, NE
Mehroz SajjadDepartment of CommunicationUniversity of KentuckyLexington, KY
Deanna D. SellnowNicholson School of Communication and MediaUniversity of Central FloridaOrlando, FL
Timothy L. SellnowNicholson School of Communication and MediaUniversity of Central FloridaOrlando, FL
Maria ShpeerDepartment of CommunicationUniversity of OklahomaNorman, OK
Matthew L. SpialekDepartment of CommunicationUniversity of ArkansasFayetteville, AR
Bradley A. TrefzTexas A&M Transportation InstituteTexas A&M UniversityCollege Station, TX
Kevin B. WrightDepartment of CommunicationGeorge Mason UniversityFairfax, VA
1Addressing Catastrophes Through Communication Science
H. Dan O'Hair, Daniel P. Chaney, and Mary John O'Hair
University of Kentucky
Generating good science is a worthy goal among people who want to develop new ideas and processes that are exciting and novel, but the real value lies in science being applied in circumstances or contexts that can elevate conditions and states in the status quo. Science has limited value if it is not used, if it is not communicated to others. Unfortunately, there are too many scientists who feel they are either unskillful at communicating their science to others or believe communicating scientific findings is someone else's job (O'Hair & O'Hair, 2021, p. 3).
Introduction
It is believed that the term “catastrophe” was first used in the 1530's as a Greek expression to mean “reversal of what is expected … to overturn, turn down, trample on, to come to an end” (Online Etymological Dictionary, 2022). More recently, catastrophe refers to a host of extreme events both natural and human‐related. As one of the chapters in this volume quotes from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “At the national level, a catastrophic incident is one of such extreme and remarkable severity or magnitude that the Nation's collective capability to manage all response requirements would be overwhelmed, thereby posing potential threats to national security, national economic security, and/or the public health and safety of the Nation” (see Chapter 5). Other associated terms are employed to refer to similar causes and consequences in the same realm as catastrophes. Table 1.1 below describes many of these more common terms.
As one could quickly surmise, the overlap and interchangeability of these terms with each other is easy to observe, and especially with catastrophe, yet catastrophe was chosen as the contextual term for this book due to its seemingly broader encapsulation of a myriad of issues and contexts.
Table 1.1 Terms Related to Catastrophes.
Terms
Description
Exemplars
Crisis
Risk manifested (Sandman); “… emergencies that are so much more daunting than normal that they require extraordinary personnel, technical, and messaging responses” (Heath & O'Hair,
2009
, p. 9)
Johnson & Johnson Tylenol case
Hurricane Katrina
Exxon Valdez
Climate change
Ukraine–Russian conflict
Disaster
“An occurrence of a natural catastrophe, technological accident, or human‐caused event that has resulted in severe property damage, deaths, and/or multiple injuries.”
(
FEMA,
2022
) “All requests for a declaration by the President that a major disaster exists shall be made by the Governor of the affected State.” (Stafford Act,
2021
)
Floods
Tornedos
Wildfires
Hurricanes
Avalanches
Calamity
“An event that brings terrible loss, lasting distress, or severe affliction.” (The Free Dictionary,
2022
)
Blizzards
Tsunamis
Earthquakes
Floods
Extreme event
“… a term today most commonly understood and used in relation to extreme weather phenomena and experiencing an upsurge in its usage due to their increased frequency caused by climate change, is applied in a variety of scientific disciplines” (Broska et al.,
2020
) “An extreme event is a dynamic occurrence within a limited timeframe that impedes the normal functioning of a system or systems.” (Broska et al.,
2020
)
Heat waves
Strong storms
Widespread flooding
Hurricanes
Droughts
Mass casualty incident
“… an event that overwhelms the local health‐care system, where the number of casualties vastly exceeds the local resources and capabilities in a short period of time.” (DeNolf & Kahwaji,
2021
)
Chemical
Biological
Radiological
Nuclear agents
Catastrophic health events
High‐impact event
“
‘High‐impact, low‐frequency’
(
HILF
) is a term that refers to an event that happens with a low degree of frequency, usually in a manner that is irregular, unpredictable, and that causes a significant degree of disruption when it occurs. A closely related term is
‘high‐impact, low‐probability’
(
HILP
).” (Safeopedia, n.d.)
Dust explosions
Aircraft crashes
Oil/gas explosions
Refinery and offshore explosions
Cyberattack
“… a malicious and deliberate attempt by an individual or organization to breach the information system of another individual or organization. Usually, the attacker seeks some type of benefit from disrupting the victim's network” (Cisco.com, n.d.)
Malware
Phishing
Man‐in‐the‐middle attack
Denial‐of‐service attack
Strategic Risk and Crisis Management
Introduction
Focusing on risk and crisis communication may provide insight into the source of the message more than it does the audience: are they trying to arm people with response plans? Avoid panic runs at the grocery store? Reassure the population despite an absence of certainty or knowledge? We found that dissecting the message in the search for its intent is as difficult as trying to parse what the message(s) meant or were supposed to mean. The relative personal impact from the Delta variant, seemingly far worse than the Omicron variant and subvariants, made distinguishing risk vs. crisis very difficult (Heath & O'Hair, 2009). We are wary of falling for the trap of risk only becoming real when it becomes personal. Furthermore, the distinctions among care, crisis, and consensus communications (Lundgren & McMakin, 2013) became even more blurred thanks to COVID‐19. These distinctions were helpful to show an early imbalance: COVID care communication was at its infancy and consensus was elusive, leaving crisis communication as the bulk of what was communication science.
In the following sections, we briefly examine some noteworthy theories and concepts that discuss risk and crisis communication. First, the role of concepts and theory in risk and crisis contexts is examined, followed by a section on the social amplification of risk (SARF) theory that is intended to help distinguish between risks and crises. The following section focuses on the precautionary principle (“erring on the side of caution”). The section examines the role of science communication during risk and crisis management. Subsequent sections include science communication in catastrophic events, the discourse of renewal (DoR) theory, and finally, the role of social media in risk and crisis management.
Concepts and Theory
It is common for risk and crisis communication scholars to invoke “theory” as a basis or guide for developing practical plans for managing catastrophes. Overall, we are not certain risk and crisis communication is being driven by theory at the practitioner level, despite effective frameworks and foundations being available. We have learned and will continue to learn from theories as they expand and evolve, although currently, a real‐world gap persists between theory and praxis. In some cases, what is being done follows the guidance and projection of theories, particularly around the continuously emerging role of social media. However, we do not sense that risk communication theories and models are being consciously invoked by the planning and response teams before, during, or after an event. Nishizawa (2018) and Beaumont (2018) are somewhat retrospective, showing where theories and known approach did or would have made a difference, and Kamaté (2018) argues that the role of public input is important—even if it is underutilized. Nishizawa (2018) summed it up well: “However, it would not be an overstatement that the nature of effective risk communication is yet to be fully understood. As a result, risk communication is sometimes only partially integrated into risk management practice or is not considered at all” (p. 82). However, social media usage (by all stakeholders) may be a growing exception to this rule.
Social Amplification of Risk
Fellenor et al. (2020) took up the concept of SARF and the challenges around it and provided a holistic overview of the complexity of risk as it is seen by, developed for, and/or created in spite of “the public.” The whole idea of creating public awareness has a chicken‐and‐egg problem with respect to the media: does the media draw the public's attention to an existing problem or does the media generate public's attention by reporting a problem? Do policymakers follow the public's opinion or the media's interpretation of the public's opinion? (Ideally, they would follow the science, but we fear that ship may have sailed in many situations.) It seems like the more closely you try to define an aspect of the public's opinion on risk, the more complex catastrophic events become.
One of the core problems is the lack of a generally agreed‐upon source of information that is deemed to be trustworthy (unbiased, factual, serving the best interests of the public, etc.). We find SARF insightful as it applies to ripple effects across a broad range of topical areas: nuclear energy in the United States (perceived vs. actual safety), climate change over the decades (trustworthiness), the Russian–Ukraine conflict (political perception vs. the lens of the reporting organization), and any other worldwide event that we may or may not be trying to reference.
Precautionary Principle
We next point to Hansson (2020) on the Precautionary Principle's strengths, weaknesses, and usage limitations. Where Hansson observed that most see it as the “better safe than sorry” approach, we perceive it as “err on the side of caution.” The difference—as we see it—is how one handles uncertainty. For example, in climate science, “better safe than sorry” would suggest avoiding the use of a chemical that is potentially damaging to the environment until the impact could be assessed. “Erring on the side of caution,” however, would argue against making declarations that are not at least modestly supported by the science. Thus, two seemingly similar adages produce very different perspectives and results. From our view, “erring on the side of caution” can be read as a caution against making an assertion before all, or at least a preponderance, of the data is in—which is not the extreme of “do nothing until we know everything” as the author highlights. Another way of looking at it is to borrow a concept from the Hippocratic Oath: Do no harm. That is, do nothing until you are sure you can do (or be reasonably sure that you are doing) something (positive).
Science Communication
According to Hansson (2020), using the science‐based principle, with its heavy reliance on science as the evaluative source, simplifies things: science is data, and a lot of the scientific method is geared to remove as much error from the data as possible. Thus, the results are as solid as they can be (or, said another way, the risk of the data being “wrong” is as minimized as possible). Moreover, science continually questions itself, creating a closed loop cycle of continuously reducing error (risk of the unknown). Science, then—to our view—is objective and therefore much, much easier to deal with when factoring complexities like risk, crisis, response, etc. Of late, it seems, we have lost some of the general consensus that science produces objective facts because, somewhere along the way, the interpretation of the data—by people with varying levels of expertise—was somehow made generally equivalent, allowing for non‐satirical statements like “My opinion is as valid as your facts.” So long as this mindset continues to flourish (particularly among policy‐ and lawmakers), we are violating the underlying principles of many things, including the precautionary principle. The sheer size and implications of that risk, or should we say threat, can be overwhelming.
Discourse of Renewal
The DoR (Pile et al., 2020) approach to risk strikes us as a (healthy) mixture of Veil et al. (2020) pre‐crisis and post‐crisis constructs. DoR optimizes pre‐event planning but also sets some lofty goals, particularly around setting up relationships and expectations before the crisis occurs. Looking back on a few large events, we have observed aspects of DoR successfully employed in the corporate world during the post‐crisis stage, notably drawing on the “reservoir of goodwill” mentioned by Pile et al. (2020). Similarly, doing as much work up front as possible, as Berger‐Sabbatel and Journé (2018) suggest, is vital—building relationships and trust ahead of time is why the character of those relationships comes through when the crisis hits.
Positioning post‐crisis communication as provisionally forward‐focused is putting a more positive “we are in control” spin on post‐crisis communications. Yes, there will be a need, time, and place for the retrospective of what happened and how to prevent it, but this approach intends to make the post‐crisis communications focus very much on an “in the future” better post‐event state. Cynically, it has a certain amount of distraction capability, to shift the story to what will be versus what is and most recently was. But that shift can indeed be wrapped in optimism and, when done successfully, strong ethical positions, owning the issue, and banking heavily on preexisting good will can make it work (Pile et al., 2020).
In the cybersecurity world, there is some pre‐planning and pre‐crisis expectation setting going on when you hear CISOs (chief information security officers) for a corporation or large organization make statements like, “A cyber incident is not a question of if, it is when.” They are proactively setting the expectation that a successful breach is inevitable but also disabusing the stakeholders of the notion that any organization can be 100% safe from a successful attack.
Social Media
Several perspectives on social media highlight the challenge that people will discuss a perceived risk; the question is whether it will be an informed, coordinated, and collaborative discussion or whether it will happen in isolation, far removed from the policymakers and key stakeholders. Granted, this is not a binary, all‐of‐one‐none‐of‐the‐other landscape, but the degree to which public interaction is proactive/collaborative versus reactive/isolated can be controlled and influenced.
The logic behind public engagement appears sound: active is better than passive, informed is better than not, a trusting public is better than a wary one, and public engagement avoids the appearance of locking out an impacted stakeholder (i.e., the public at large). However, demanding access and using access are not synonymous. The COVID fatigue we are seeing highlights the difficulty in maintaining the public's interest—particularly during the informative stages (Kamaté, 2018, p. 22). Risks remain abstract in some cases or become both normalized and familiar in others.
Nonetheless, we do see glimpses of Kamaté's suggestions on organizing the debate in the early days of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention response to COVID. They strove for:
Trust and transparency
Asymmetry between participants (highly complex data conveyed by subject matter experts to non‐experts that need the data interpreted in order to be useful/evaluated)
Legitimacy of participants—(is it representative of the affected stakeholder population?)
Formal vs. informal discussion spaces (meetings vs. open‐dialogue town halls)
Similarly, Beaumont (2018) promoted the critical and positive role that social media can play during and after an event. We were particularly struck by the similarities between the response pattern explored in that research (Fukushima nuclear accident) and the initial U.S. federal response to COVID: transparency, trust, faithfully responding to each and every inquiry.
Strategic risk and crisis management is a complex blend of theory, practice, planning, execution, and coordination. Effective communication plays a key role in each of these aspects and can often be the difference between success and failure. What are the communicative goals: coordinate responses? avoid panic? inform the public? manage stakeholders? The communication style and structure will vary for each of these, yet all are required—often simultaneously—before, during, and after a crisis event. Modern risk management practitioners have a number of tools at their disposal: theory, principles, findings from science communication, and a long list of real‐world examples of what worked as well as what did not work. Navigating this abundance of options, however, requires both the broad overview presented in this chapter and deeper dives into specific areas. These will be covered in the following chapters.
Chapter Highlights
The Holliday, Hope, and Potterton chapter, entitled “Where is it Safe? Questioning Education Policy, Safety, and Choices for Students Traveling Internationally During a Global Health Crisis” (Chapter 2), explores issues of student international travel during a particular catastrophe, the COVID‐19 pandemic. The chapter follows universities' preliminary responses and continuing issues through guidance from federal agencies to address international travel. Additionally, the authors argue that federal sources may not be enough and accessing knowledge and practice from other sources would be a more prudent strategy for managing these types of risks and catastrophes.
Chapter 3 is authored by Fischer, Lawson, and Ruth and entitled “Addressing the Role of Prior Experience in the Development of Risk Perceptions, Information Seeking and Processing Behaviors During Natural Disasters.” This chapter takes the reader on a journey exploring how risk perceptions are developed and then identifies the effect of how prior experiences with a catastrophe influence an individual's cognitive processing and information seeking (both types of communication and content).
Chapter 4, entitled “Enhancing Catastrophic Event Preparedness and Response: The Inoculation Approach” and authored by Ivanov, Dillingham, Hester, and Parker, places careful attention on a reliable theoretical concept (inoculation theory) to develop unique means for communicating science before and during catastrophes. The authors argue that inoculation‐based strategies, as discussed in this chapter, offer a promising way to mitigate the effects produced by catastrophes.
Most of the author team returns for Chapter 5, “Communication Strategies to Initiate and Sustain Catastrophe Communication,” in order to delve into an area that is often overlooked in risk and crisis research. Hester, Ivanov, Parker, and Sajjad squarely focus on “catastrophe communication” as a means for addressing the feelings and emotions of those individuals who have experienced a catastrophe. Using case studies, the chapter illuminates the role of compassion when individuals and communities prepare for, and recover from, catastrophic events. The authors argue that compassionate strategies have a positive effect on social capital and facilitating positive social change.
By focusing on social marketing theory (SMT) in Chapter 6, Parker, Geegan, Hester, and Ivanov elucidate critical aspects of SMT toward the purpose of scaffolding and enriching strategies that address crises such as environmental protection, public safety, financial hardship, and community violence, among many others. In this chapter, entitled “Social Marketing Strategy: Enhancing Preparedness for Crises and Catastrophic Events,” the authors isolate three contexts that are worthy of a received‐based strategy such as SMT: excessive alcohol use, school violence, and gender‐based crime.
Chapter 7 takes on a fruitful discussion of a critical part of our risk management infrastructure—emergency managers and their communication strategies. Trefz, Bierling, Christjoy, and Barbour authored “Building Risk Communication Infrastructure by Bolstering Emergency Managers' Formal and Informal Communication Networks” with an eye toward emphasizing the role of Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs) at the local level. The authors make important points for how LEPCs act as crucial pieces of the risk communication infrastructure at the community level. Special attention is placed on social media as a networking mechanism.
Using the 2016 Pulse nightclub shooting as a case study, Spialek and Houston highlight individual disaster communication as a coping effect for individuals exposed to catastrophic mass violence through media coverage. In Chapter 8, “Individual Disaster Communication Following Catastrophic Mass Violence: The Case of the Pulse Nightclub Shooting,” the authors advance the argument that media outlets have the opportunity to contribute coping stratagems by “sharing restorative narratives that empower audiences,” and by identifying community resources that help with the healing process following traumatic events.
Chapter 9 is authored by Kevin Wright and is entitled, “Social Media Misinformation about Extreme Weather Events and Climate Change: Structures, Communication Processes, and Individual Factors that Influence the Diffusion of Misinformation.” Using extreme weather events and climate change misinformation as contexts, the chapter explores and uncovers many of the negative implications emerging from communicative interaction on social media platforms. As the title suggests, a number of factors influence the diffusion of misinformation, and this chapter exposes several of them.
In Chapter 10, Jarvis, Gigliotti, and Kolligian delve into Princeton University's health crisis involving the 2013 meningitis B outbreak on campus and the importance of communicating science throughout the outbreak. The chapter is entitled “‘The Princeton Outbreak’: A Case Study of a University Health Crisis and Implications for Communicating Science” in which the authors conduct interviews with various university and campus leaders and examine publications related to the crisis. The authors go on to highlight themes related to the specific crisis at hand and communicating science more generally during crises. The findings align in part with the best practices found in the literature, while other unique strategies were identified and are worthy of future exploration from scholars and practitioners. Overall, this chapter serves as a model for other higher education institutions facing similar public health crises.
As indicated by the title of Chapter 11, “Blue or Stormy Skies? The Roles of Strategic Risk Communication in Protecting Communities Before, During, and After Severe Weather,” authors Seate, Liu, Kim, Ma, Lee, and Hawblitzel provide a comprehensive review of message strategies that help alleviate the negative impacts of catastrophic weather. For example, the literature indicates that specific message strategies shown to be effective in one context may not apply to other contexts. The authors not only highlight research gaps and nuances but also provide guidance for important areas of future weather risk communication research designed to help communities become more resilient to severe weather.
Using the IDEA model (Sellnow & Sellnow, 2019) for risk and crisis communication, Chapter 12 authors Napakol, Miller, T. Sellnow, D. Sellnow, Mugunga, and Khaukha examine concerns expressed in interviews with survivors of catastrophic mudslides in the Bududa District of Uganda in Africa. In this chapter, entitled “Risk and Crisis Communication: Considering Catastrophic Mudslides in Uganda's Bududa District,” the authors highlight the survivors' multiple frustrations with the status quo, including the lack of information offered by the government, perils of a unidirectional instructional communication process, and the unfulfilling relocation options provided for Bududa District residents. The authors stress the key role that dialogue plays to avoid instructional communication failure as well as lessons learned from this important case study to inform future instructional risk and crisis communication research.
Chapter 13 is authored by Rice and Cullinan and entitled, “Risk, Science, and Health Collaborations during Cascading and Simultaneous Disasters.” This chapter stresses the pressing need for interorganizational collaboration among scientists and risk and crisis managers as societies face cascading and simultaneous disasters, and also proposes how organizational communication theories and practices can enhance understanding of these collaborations. Using a case study of a local crisis collaboration working during the COVID‐19 pandemic and the 2020 wildland fire season, authors make recommendations for risk, crisis, and science communicators, with an increased focus on strengthening relationships as simultaneous disasters become our new normal.
The Howe and Shpeer chapter, entitled “Communicating Inclusively and Reliably about Climatological and Meteorological Events: Social Network Analysis, Message Framing, and Communication Competence” (Chapter 14), examines internal and external issues in risk and crisis communication stemming from two studies designed to inform current practices as well as illuminate areas for growth in communicating about climate change before the effects of climate change are felt. The first study examines how disaster experts can look inward when considering how communication is occurring, and the second study demonstrates how we can look outward to determine the types of messages our audience are willing to receive.
In Chapter 15, “How Government Leaders Use Social Media During Disasters: A Scoping Review,” Lauren Cain highlights four theories in crisis communication (situational crisis communication theory, the social‐mediated crisis communication model, DoR theory, and dialogic communication theory) and provides implications for sharing crisis messages via social media. Additionally, the scoping review exposes both general benefits and potential concerns of using social media to share official messages during natural disasters.
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2Where is it Safe? Questioning Education Policy, Safety, and Choices for Students Traveling Internationally During a Global Health Crisis
Ellie Holliday, Jason Hope, and Amanda U. Potterton
University of Kentucky
Introduction
The halting of nearly all international travel due to the emergence of COVID‐19 created far‐reaching consequences for educational institutions that persist to this day. Rising numbers of cases and deaths, travel bans, and the designation of the novel coronavirus as a global pandemic in 2020 forced students who had been studying abroad to return to the United States. In the ensuing months, universities and international education organizations were presented with a challenge to balance their commitment to international education with fluctuating policy and health guidelines from the federal government that inform policies related to academic international travel. The result has been conflicting statements, stops and starts, pushback against federal government travel advisory levels, and a reconsideration of whom university leaders listen to when creating international travel policies. In this chapter, we present the context for the catastrophic event of the early spread of COVID‐19, universities' early responses, ongoing issues with guidance from federal agencies, an analysis of the reliance on federal guidance for international travel, and recommendations for educational institutions moving forward.
Catastrophic Event: Early Spread of COVID‐19 and Responses
In March of 2020, as the novel coronavirus was spreading rapidly around the world, U.S. students studying abroad were recalled home by their universities, schools, and study abroad program providers (Redden, 2020). The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and U.S. Department of State (DoS) travel advisories increased to levels that highly discouraged travel for all U.S. citizens. Many U.S. universities and international education organizations have traditionally relied on CDC and DoS travel advisories to gauge the risk to their students in potential education abroad locations (NAFSA: Association of International Educators [NAFSA], 2022). They also tend to have strict policies against student travel to countries with a DoS Level 4: Do Not Travel advisory (Alliance for International Exchange et al., 2021). As the cases of COVID‐19 rapidly increased around the world in early 2020, CDC and DoS travel advisory levels began to rise in specific countries such as China, South Korea, and Italy (Schumaker et al., 2020). This triggered the enforcement of policies that meant that students traveling in those countries were alerted to the situation and given the choice to come home, encouraged to come home, or forced to come home based on the specific institution or organization's policy.
On March 11, COVID‐19 was officially declared a global pandemic by the World Health Organization, or WHO (WHO, 2020). That same evening, President Trump addressed the nation from the Oval Office about an impending travel ban that would begin just two days later (Colorado Public Radio Staff and The Associated Press, 2020). The President said the following about travel:
After consulting with our top government health professionals, I have decided to take several strong but necessary actions to protect the health and well‐being of all Americans.
To keep new cases from entering our shores, we will be suspending all travel from Europe to the United States for the next 30 days. The new rules will go into effect Friday at midnight. These restrictions will be adjusted subject to conditions on the ground.
There will be exemptions for Americans who have undergone appropriate screenings, and these prohibitions will not only apply to the tremendous amount of trade and cargo, but various other things as we get approval. Anything coming from Europe to the United States is what we are discussing. These restrictions will also not apply to the United Kingdom. (para. 12–14)
These comments led to confusion, and his administration clarified them afterwards, noting that the ban applied to nonimmigrant travelers and not to U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents, who would be screened before entry (Liptak & Vazquez, 2020). However, in the Oval Office address to the public, Trump misstated that the ban would apply to “all travel from Europe to the United States for the next 30 days [emphasis added]” and did not explicitly mention an exemption for U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents (Liptak & Vazquez, 2020, para. 2). The speech sparked panic among U.S. citizens and legal residents who were actively traveling in Europe (Carroll & Moskowitz, 2020). The announcement came in the very early hours of the morning for travelers in affected European countries, which created an overnight crisis management situation for many students, parents, and educational administrators. By the time the President's administration officials clarified the terms of the travel ban, many universities and parents had already booked flights home for students studying abroad (Carroll & Moskowitz, 2020). Additionally, on March 19, 2020, the DoS issued an unprecedented global Level 4 health advisory (U.S. Mission Panama, 2020), which effectively ended any remaining U.S. study abroad programming and, for many universities and study abroad organizations, prevented any new programs from beginning.
During this time period in mid‐March 2020, thousands of U.S. citizens, including study abroad students, were rushing home to the United States (Carroll & Moskowitz, 2020). This resulted in massive crowds of people in airports around the world who were mostly unmasked and not socially distanced (Baker, 2020). Images of the airports flooded the Internet and sparked conversations about whether these people would contract and spread the coronavirus to each other and their families and classmates. It was around this same time that most universities were moving classes and meetings online and encouraging students to move out of university housing and back to their permanent residences (Kamenetz, 2020). At this early stage of the pandemic, much was still unknown about the nature and transmissibility of the virus, and the quick return of students from locations outside of the United States forced universities to grapple with questions about whether those students should return directly to their families' homes or quarantine for some period of time upon arrival (and, in the latter situation, who would support them during a quarantine). The risks of traveling home, being exposed to the virus in crowded spaces, and potentially exposing family and community members to the virus upon return had to be balanced against the risks of allowing students to stay in a potentially unfamiliar country with limited support while, concurrently, public services were becoming increasingly unavailable due to lockdowns.
University Health and Safety Policies
Within most U.S. institutions of higher education, study abroad or education abroad offices and staff members develop and facilitate programming in which students take courses or complete other types of experiences such as internships for academic credit that applies to their degree program. Therefore, any policies related to academic‐based international travel for students can also have implications for or apply to faculty and staff members traveling overseas if they are developing and leading education abroad programs. Additionally, many third‐party provider organizations exist that connect both high school and college students with schools or programs overseas at which they can be placed for educational experiences (Heyl, 2011). As one sector of the larger field of international education, education abroad offices, organizations, and the staff members within them generally adhere to guidelines and competencies published by leading professional development organizations such as NAFSA, The Forum on Education Abroad, and others. Student health, safety, and crisis management are priorities for those working in education abroad (Alliance for International Exchange et al., 2021; NAFSA, 2015). These priorities generally refer to both monitoring and understanding health and safety situations on the ground (e.g., illness outbreaks, risk of terrorism, natural disasters, kidnapping, crime, etc.) in countries to which school and higher education organizations send students. Education abroad offices and organizations also monitor and support the health of students before, during, and after their travel overseas (NAFSA, 2015).
One of the most easily accessible and reliable methods of monitoring conditions in overseas locations is through the U.S. DoS and CDC, and professional organizations in international education generally recommend the use of their travel advisory and notice systems in assessing risk for student travel (NAFSA, 2022; The Forum on Education Abroad, 2016). The DoS publishes “travel advisories” for all countries other than the United States, which are intended to “help U.S. citizens traveling and residing abroad by providing them important safety and security information” (U.S. Department of State, n.d.‐a). The CDC publishes “travel health notices” and, new in 2020, “COVID‐19 travel health notices” to “inform travelers and clinicians about current health issues that impact travelers' health” (CDC, n.d., para. 1). According to the DoS, many factors are used to determine the travel advisories for countries, and the information is gathered from “U.S. government sources” (U.S. DoS, n.d.‐a), while the CDC primarily uses incidence rate and new case trajectory to determine their travel health notices for COVID‐19 (CDC, 2021a). Both systems follow a relatively consistent pattern of notices/advisories that escalate from encouraging travelers to proceed as usual up to strongly encouraging U.S. citizens to avoid all nonessential travel to a certain country or region. There are two or three levels in between those that caution travelers to take enhanced precautions. While these systems have historically been independent of each other, in April of 2021, the U.S. DoS (2021a) updated the methodology they used for risk assessment to be more consistent with CDC travel health notices.
Because of the ease and reliability of a three‐ or four‐tiered warning system, and the acknowledgment by the DoS that the U.S. government may be unable to assist U.S. travelers in the event of an emergency if they are traveling in a country that has a high‐level warning or advisory (U.S. DoS, n.d.‐c), certain levels are used as triggers for universities to further review programs in those destinations or prohibit travel to them (Redden, 2018). Before the COVID‐19 pandemic, Level 4 advisories were generally reserved for countries where travel posed a significant and potentially immediate risk to a traveler's wellbeing, or even their life. Travel advisory pages on the DoS website for these destinations provided, and in some cases still do provide, links to specific travel recommendations (U.S. DoS, n.d.‐b). Included among these recommendations are considerations like, “draft a will,” “discuss a plan with loved ones regarding … funeral wishes,” “leave DNA samples with your medical provider,” and “be sure to appoint one family member as the point of contact with hostage takers” (U.S. DoS, n.d.‐b). Such dire warnings in many cases led to institutional policies that precluded even the consideration of student travel to those destinations, particularly for undergraduates. Some universities' policies as of this writing state that they will suspend and prohibit travel to DoS Level 4 travel advisory countries with the note that students already studying in those countries may be forced to return home (see University of Houston, 2019; University of Louisville, n.d.).
Persisting Issues with Federal Guidance Throughout the COVID‐19 Pandemic
The initial halting of international travel and publishing of advisories to return to the United States in March 2020 may have been prudent steps to take at the outset of the pandemic due to the uncertainty surrounding the trajectory of the disease in its early days. In addition to considerations related to the spread of the virus itself, the DoS warned U.S. travelers remaining outside the country that they “should be prepared to remain abroad for an indefinite period” (U.S. Department of State, 2020). As airlines stopped flying and embassies and consulates suspended operations, there was a real risk that travelers would end up on their own in an unfamiliar environment during the most significant public health crisis of our time.
However, ensuing issues related to federal guidance created barriers for educational institutions seeking to restart education abroad programming even after it seemed safe and reasonable to do so. In mid‐2020, the levels of many travel advisories/notices began to decrease as the first global wave of COVID‐19 cases receded. This enabled universities and organizations to resume some education abroad programming. However, on April 19, 2021, the DoS (2021a) updated their travel advisories to “better reflect CDC's science‐based Travel Health Notices,” which resulted in over 80% of countries around the world being assigned a Level 4 advisory once again (Romo, 2021). Many institutions found this change particularly perplexing because, by this point, the risk to individual travelers of contracting the disease had fundamentally changed due to wide (although not complete) rollout of vaccines for many individuals. It should be noted that on the same day the travel advisories were updated, the Biden administration announced that COVID‐19 vaccines were officially available to any adult in the United States who wanted one (Treisman, 2021). Furthermore, more than two weeks earlier, on April 2, 2021, the CDC (2021b) had issued guidance that fully vaccinated people could travel within the United States “at a low risk to themselves” (para. 1) without the need for testing or quarantine, and indeed that they could even travel internationally without being tested, unless the destination required it, and without quarantining upon return unless their home jurisdiction required it.
To discuss the changing DoS advisories, The Forum on Education Abroad (2021) held an open forum virtual meeting on May 3, 2021, over a year into the COVID‐19 pandemic. A series of polls were conducted with the approximately 191 participants (most of whom were staff members in education abroad offices across the United States) that asked how organizations used external factors such as CDC and DoS guidance in COVID‐19‐related decision‐making on education abroad programming. Approximately 65% of the attendees stated that CDC guidance was one of the top three main external factors that affected their decision‐making, and 74% stated that DoS travel advisory guidance was one of their top three factors (The Forum on Education Abroad, 2021). When asked whether their organization would allow travel to countries rated at Level 4 by the DoS, only 22% said yes, while 33% said “only as an exception,” 16% said no, and 30% were unsure (The Forum on Education Abroad, 2021, slide 6).
Two days later, on May 5, 2021, the DoS's travel advisory update was protested by international education professional organizations as well as associations made up of college representatives. Arguments included that the changes significantly impeded universities' ability to use the advisories as a primary risk analysis tool due to their lack of nuance, and that many of them were bound by institutional travel policies that did not allow them to send students to countries with the highest‐level ratings (Alliance for International Exchange et al., 2021). They argued that the new advisories did not acknowledge varying levels of COVID‐19‐related risk for different destinations and students, including the consideration of “vaccination rates and the status of individual travelers” (Alliance of International Exchange et al., 2021, p. 1). The Council on International Educational Exchange's Vice President for Risk Management, Bill Bull (2021), also argued that the updated methodology had made the Level 4 rating “essentially meaningless” (para. 3), due to the fact that it resulted in strange outcomes, noting that Germany and North Korea were assigned the same advisory level (thus implying that they were equally risky destinations for U.S. travelers). The international education professional organizations asked for the DoS to make clear that their own travel advisories should not necessarily constitute the sole source that educational organizations rely on to determine risk at overseas destinations, and they also requested a meeting with the DoS. On May 20, 2021, The Forum on Education Abroad reported that they had met with DoS officials along with several other education abroad organization representatives, and the DoS reportedly clarified that they would be “updating their advisories weekly and that 20 countries were returned to Level 3” (McCauslin, 2021, para. 3).
