Criticism and Compassion E-Book

• Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Serie: Metaphilosophy
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 804

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2018

Beschreibung

Criticism and Compassion: The Ethics and Politics of Claudia Card offers a unique perspective on the range of issues explored by Card during her distinguished career in philosophy. * Investigates her work as an early leader in the development of feminist philosophy, challenging many preconceptions about the society's norms regarding gender, marriage, and motherhood * Crossing many disciplinary boundaries, her concept of social death has come to play a significant role in multidisciplinary field of genocide studies * This volume combines many of Claudia Card's important essays with recently commissioned essays by leading philosophers whose work has been influenced by Card * The full scope of Card's philosophy is presented here - both in her own words and those of her critics and interpreters

Leseprobe

METAPHILOSOPHY SERIES IN PHILOSOPHY

Series Editors: Armen T. Marsoobian and Eric Cavallero

The Philosophy of Interpretation, edited by Joseph Margolis and Tom Rockmore (2000)

Global Justice, edited by Thomas W. Pogge (2001)

Cyberphilosophy: The Intersection of Computing and Philosophy, edited by James H. Moor and Terrell Ward Bynum (2002)

Moral and Epistemic Virtues, edited by Michael Brady and Duncan Pritchard (2003)

The Range of Pragmatism and the Limits of Philosophy, edited by Richard Shusterman (2004)

The Philosophical Challenge of September 11, edited by Tom Rockmore, Joseph Margolis, and Armen T. Marsoobian (2005)

Global Institutions and Responsibilities: Achieving Global Justice, edited by Christian Barry and Thomas W. Pogge (2005)

Genocide's Aftermath: Responsibility and Repair, edited by Claudia Card and Armen T. Marsoobian (2007)

Stem Cell Research: The Ethical Issues, edited by Lori Gruen, Laura Gravel, and Peter Singer (2008)

Cognitive Disability and Its Challenge to Moral Philosophy, edited by Eva Feder Kittay and Licia Carlson (2010)

Virtue and Vice, Moral and Epistemic, edited by Heather Battaly (2010)

Global Democracy and Exclusion, edited by Ronald Tinnevelt and Helder De Schutter (2010)

Putting Information First: Luciano Floridi and the Philosophy of Information, edited by Patrick Allo (2011)

The Pursuit of Philosophy: Some Cambridge Perspectives, edited by Alexis Papazoglou (2012)

Philosophical Engineering: Toward a Philosophy of the Web, edited by Harry Halpin and Alexandre Monnin (2014)

The Philosophy of Luck, edited by Duncan Pritchard and Lee John Whittington (2015)

Criticism and Compassion: The Ethics and Politics of Claudia Card, edited by Robin S. Dillon and Armen T. Marsoobian (2018)

Criticism and Compassion

The Ethics and Politics of Claudia Card

Edited by

Robin S. Dillon and Armen T. Marsoobian

This edition first published 2018

Chapters and book compilation © 2018 Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd, except as below.

First published in Metaphilosophy volume 47, nos. 4–5 (October 2016), except for the following, all reproduced with kind permission:

Rape as a Weapon of War by Claudia Card (Hypatia, volume 11, no. 4, Fall 1996 © Claudia Card), Addendum to “Rape as a Weapon of War” by Claudia Card (Hypatia, volume 12, no. 2, Spring 1997 © Claudia Card), Stoicism, Evil, and the Possibility of Morality by Claudia Card (Metaphilosophy, volume 29, no. 4, October 1998 © Metaphilosophy LLC and Blackwell Publishers Ltd), Women, Evil, and Gray Zones by Claudia Card (Metaphilosophy, volume 31, no. 5, October 2000 © Metaphilosophy LLC and Blackwell Publishers Ltd), Genocide and Social Death by Claudia Card (Hypatia, volume 18, no. 1, Winter 2003 © Claudia Card), The Paradox of Genocidal Rape Aimed at Enforced Pregnancy by Claudia Card (Southern Journal of Philosophy, volume 46, special issue supplement 1, 2008 © The University of Memphis), Surviving Long-Term Mass Atrocities by Claudia Card (Midwest Studies in Philosophy, volume 36, no. 1, 2012 © Wiley Periodicals, Inc.), Institutional Evils, Culpable Complicity, and Duties to Engage in Moral Repair by Eliana Peck and Ellen K. Feder (Metaphilosophy, volume 48, no. 3, April 2017 © Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd), Against Marriage and Motherhood by Claudia Card (Hypatia, volume 11, no. 3, Summer 1996 © Claudia Card), Gay Divorce: Thoughts on the Legal Regulation of Marriage by Claudia Card (Hypatia, volume 22, no. 1, Winter 2007 © Claudia Card), Challenges of Global and Local Misogyny by Claudia Card (A Companion to Rawls, First Edition. Edited by Jon Mandle and David A. Reidy © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.), and Taking Pride in Being Bad by Claudia Card (Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, vol. 6, ed. Mark Timmons, Oxford University Press © Claudia Card).

Registered Offices

John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 111 River Street, Hoboken, NJ 07030, USA

John Wiley & Sons Ltd, The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, PO19 8SQ, UK

Editorial Office

9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK

For details of our global editorial offices, for customer services, and for information about how to apply for permission to reuse the copyright material in this book please see our website at www.wiley.com/wiley-blackwell.

The rights of Robin S. Dillon and Armen T. Marsoobian to be identified as the authors of the editorial material in this work have been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, except as permitted by the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, without the prior permission of the publisher.

Wiley also publishes its books in a variety of electronic formats. Some content that appears in print may not be available in electronic books.

Designations used by companies to distinguish their products are often claimed as trademarks. All brand names and product names used in this book are trade names, service marks, trademarks or registered trademarks of their respective owners. The publisher is not associated with any product or vendor mentioned in this book.

Limit of Liability/Disclaimer of Warranty: While the publisher and editors have used their best efforts in preparing this book, they make no representations or warranties with respect to the accuracy or completeness of the contents of this book and specifically disclaim any implied warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. It is sold on the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering professional services and neither the publisher nor the author shall be liable for damages arising herefrom. If professional advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional should be sought.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication data is available for this book.

ISBN 9781119463139 (paperback)

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Cover Images: Front cover image: Untitled from the series Absent, acrylic on canvas, 2014. 80cm × 130cm © Kirkor Sahakoğlu

Back cover image: Claudia Card © Robert Streiffer, 2017

Cover Design: Wiley

Contents

Notes on Contributors

Introduction

References

Notes

Part One: War, Genocide, and Evil

Chapter 1 Rape as a Weapon of War

References

Notes

Chapter 2 Addendum to “Rape as a Weapon of War”

References

Chapter 3 Stoicism, Evil, and the Possibility of Morality

References

Notes

Chapter 4 Women, Evil, and Gray Zones

Gray Zones

What Makes Gray Zones Gray?

Women and Morally Gray Choices

Acknowledgments

References

Notes

Chapter 5 Genocide and Social Death

1. What Is Feminist About Analyzing Genocide?

2. Genocide, War, and Justice

3. The Concept of Genocide

4. The Specific Evils of Genocide

References

Notes

Chapter 6 The Paradox of Genocidal Rape Aimed at Enforced Pregnancy

1. The Problem and Its Background

2. What Is Genocide?

3. The “Logical Glitch”

4. Sperm as a Biological Weapon

References

Notes

Chapter 7 Surviving Long-Term Mass Atrocities

Conceptual Issues

The Ethics of Surviving

References

Notes

Chapter 8 Perpetrators and Social Death: A Cautionary Tale

Perpetrators: Persons, Not Monsters

Gangs, Social Vitality, and Moral Luck

“The tiny thing that would change me into a killer”

Responding to Evil Without Doing Evil

Acknowledgments

References

Notes

Chapter 9 Claudia Card's Concept of Social Death A New Way of Looking at Genocide

1. Introduction

2. Body Counts

3. Card and Genocide as Social Death

4. Conclusion

References

Notes

Chapter 10 Surviving Evils and the Problem of Agency An Essay Inspired by the Work of Claudia Card

1. A Grim Triad—Victims, Evils, and Survival

2. Survival Tactics

3. Autonomy and Agency

4. Survival Agency?

5. Surviving Trafficking and Sexual Violence

Acknowledgments

References

Notes

Chapter 11 Institutional Evils, Culpable Complicity, and Duties to Engage in Moral Repair

Introduction

Institutional Evils in Context: The Medical Management of Intersex Anatomies

Complicity in Evil Practices and Institutions

Culpable Complicity and Unnecessary Normalizing Interventions for Intersex

Responding to Culpable Complicity

The Reparative Work of Apology

The Culpably Complicit Person's Apology

Confronting Resistance to Asking for Apology from Culpably Complicit Persons

Conclusion

Acknowledgments

References

Notes

Part Two Feminist Ethical Theory and Its Applications

Chapter 12 Against Marriage and Motherhood

Backgrounds

Lesbian (or Gay) Marriage?

Why Motherhood?

Acknowledgments

References

Notes

Chapter 13 Gay Divorce: Thoughts on the Legal Regulation of Marriage

The Ideal: Deregulate, Not Further Regulate

The Reality: A Set of Undesirable Options

Acknowledgments

References

Notes

Chapter 14 Challenges of Global and Local Misogyny

Global and Local Misogyny

Evils

Principles for Individuals

Containing Unavoidable Injustice

“War” on Women

Ideal Contracts, Original Positions, and Hypothetical Agreements

Principles for Individual Self-Defense in a War on Women

Guerrilla Feminism

Acknowledgments

Works by Rawls, with Abbreviations

Other References

Notes

Chapter 15 Taking Pride in Being Bad

Kant's Theory of Radical Evil in Human Nature

The Atrocity Paradigm: A Theory of Evil

Solving Kant's Mystery

Korsgaard on Self-Conception as a Source of Normativity

Benjamin's “Important Persons and their Internalized Representations” (IPIRS)

Notes

Chapter 16 Hate Crime Legislation Reconsidered

1. Introduction

2. Hate Crime Legislation

3. Card's Concerns About Hate Crime Legislation

4. What's So Special About Hate Crimes?

5. Critique: What Sort of Comparative Judgment, if Any, Does Penalty Enhancement Presuppose?

6. Card's Likely Response

7. More Cardian Rejoinders

8. Concluding Thoughts

Acknowledgments

References

Notes

Chapter 17 Misplaced Gratitude and the Ethics of Oppression

Introduction

Card's Feminist Lens

Card's Critique of Care Ethics

Ambiguity Is Not Enough

Misplaced Gratitude Versus Gratitude

How to Express Gratitude?

Concluding Reflections

References

Notes

Chapter 18 The Challenges of Extreme Moral Stress: Claudia Card's Contributions to the Formation of Nonideal Ethical Theory

1. Introduction

2. Claudia Card's Place in Nonideal Ethical Theory

3. Cardian Contributions: Administrative Perspectives and Intolerable Harms

4. Conclusion: Did Card Need NET? Do We?

References

Notes

Chapter 19 Radical Moral Imagination and Moral Luck

1. Radical Moral Imagination

2. Taking Responsibility, and Moral Luck

3. Assessing Risky Undertakings

Coda: A Duty to Resist Oppression?

References

Notes

Chapter 20 The American Girl: Playing with the Wrong Dollie?

Preface

1. The Doll: A Very Brief History

2. Doing a Doll

3. Feminism and the American Girl

References

Index

EULA

Guide

Cover

Table of Contents

Introduction

Pages

ii

vii

viii

ix

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

11

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

31

32

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

41

42

43

44

45

46

47

48

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

56

57

58

59

60

61

62

63

64

65

66

67

68

69

70

71

72

73

74

75

76

77

78

79

80

81

82

83

84

85

86

87

88

89

90

91

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

100

101

102

103

104

105

106

107

108

109

110

111

112

113

114

115

116

117

118

119

120

121

122

123

124

125

126

127

128

129

130

131

132

133

134

135

136

137

138

139

140

141

142

143

144

145

146

147

148

149

150

151

153

154

155

156

157

158

159

160

161

162

163

164

165

166

167

168

169

171

172

173

174

175

176

177

178

179

180

181

182

183

184

185

186

187

188

189

190

191

192

193

195

196

197

198

199

200

201

202

203

204

205

206

207

208

209

210

211

212

213

214

215

216

217

219

220

221

222

223

224

225

226

227

228

229

230

231

232

233

235

236

237

238

239

240

241

242

243

244

245

246

247

248

249

250

251

252

253

254

255

256

257

258

259

260

261

262

263

264

265

266

267

268

269

270

271

272

273

274

275

276

277

278

279

280

281

282

283

284

285

286

287

289

290

291

292

293

294

295

296

297

298

299

300

301

302

303

304

305

306

307

308

309

310

311

312

313

314

315

316

317

319

320

321

322

323

324

325

326

327

328

329

330

331

332

333

334

335

336

337

338

339

340

341

342

343

344

345

346

347

348

349

350

351

352

353

354

355

356

357

358

359

360

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Marcia Baron is the James H. Rudy Professor of Philosophy at Indiana University. Her main interests are in moral philosophy and philosophy of criminal law. Publications include Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology (Cornell, 1995), “Manipulativeness” (2003), “Gender Issues in the Criminal Law” (2011), “Self‐Defense: The Imminence Requirement” (2011), “The Ticking Bomb Hypothetical” (2013), “Rape, Seduction, Shame, and Culpability in Tess of the d'Urbervilles” (2013), and “Rethinking ‘One Thought Too Many’” (2017).

Mavis Biss is an associate professor of philosophy at Loyola University Maryland. She specializes in Kantian ethics and conceptions of moral creativity. Her current work deals with the complexities of rational agency in the face of contested moral meaning. She was awarded the 2015 Wilfrid Sellars Prize for “Kantian Moral Striving,” Kantian Review (2015).

Claudia Card was the Emma Goldman (WARF) Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin–Madison, where she also taught in women's studies, LGBT studies, Jewish studies, and environmental studies. Her books include Feminist Ethics (Kansas, 1991), Lesbian Choices (Columbia, 1995), The Unnatural Lottery: Character and Moral Luck (Temple, 1996), and a trilogy, The Atrocity Paradigm: A Theory of Evil (Oxford, 2002), Confronting Evils: Terrorism, Torture, Genocide (Cambridge, 2010), and Surviving Atrocity (forthcoming).

Victoria Davion was professor and chair of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Georgia and editor of Ethics & the Environment. Her primary interests were in ethics, including environmental ethics and feminist ethics, and political philosophy. Her recent work examines how concepts such as “nature” and “the natural order” are used to justify controversial ethical issues. Among her recent publications is “Feminist Perspectives on Global Warming, Genocide, and Card's Theory of Evil” (Hypatia, 2009).

Robin S. Dillon is William Wilson Selfridge Professor of Philosophy at Lehigh University. She writes on self‐respect—to which Claudia Card introduced her—and related concepts. Her publications include “Self‐Respect and Humility in Kant and Hill,” in Timmons and Johnson, eds., Reason, Value, and Respect (Oxford, 2015), and “Critical Character Theory: Toward a Feminist Theory of ‘Vice,’” in Crasnow and Superson, eds., Out from the Shadows (Oxford, 2012). She is writing a book on arrogance.

Ellen K. Feder is William Fraser McDowell Professor of Philosophy at American University in Washington, D.C., and the author of Making Sense of Intersex: Changing Ethical Perspectives in Biomedicine (Indiana, 2014) and Family Bonds: Genealogies of Race and Gender (Oxford, 2007).

Armen T. Marsoobian is professor and chair of philosophy at Southern Connecticut State University and editor in chief of Metaphilosophy. He has published on topics in aesthetics, ethics, pragmatism, and genocide studies. He has edited five books, including The Blackwell Guide to American Philosophy and Genocide's Aftermath: Responsibility and Repair with Claudia Card. His most recent book, Fragments of a Lost Homeland: Remembering Armenia, is based upon extensive research about his family during the declining years of the Ottoman Empire.

Diana Tietjens Meyers is professor emerita of philosophy at the University of Connecticut, Storrs. She currently works in four main areas of philosophy: philosophy of action, feminist ethics, aesthetics, and human rights. Her most recent monograph is Victims’ Stories and the Advancement of Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2016). Her most recent edited collection is Poverty, Agency, and Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2014). Her website is https://dianatietjensmeyers.wordpress.com/.

Kathryn J. Norlock is the Kenneth Mark Drain Chair in Ethics at Trent University in Peterborough, Ontario. She is the author of Forgiveness from a Feminist Perspective and the editor of The Moral Psychology of Forgiveness. Her research interests in ethical theory include moral emotions, pessimism, and relational ethics. Her interests in metaphilosophy include issues of diversity in the profession. She is a cofounder and coeditor of Feminist Philosophy Quarterly.

Eliana Peck is a doctoral student in philosophy at Vanderbilt University. She works at the intersection of ethics and social philosophy, with a special interest in the effectiveness of apology, moral repair, and punishment as responses to collectively perpetrated wrongs and structural injustices. More recently, she has been conducting research on questions emerging out of social epistemology and philosophy of race, regarding the affective component of resisting active white ignorance.

Robin May Schott is a senior researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies in the section Peace, Risk and Violence. She is a philosopher working in feminist philosophy, ethics, and political philosophy in an interdisciplinary key, and has written extensively on issues related to gender, conflict, war, and sexual violence. Among her book publications are Birth, Death, and Femininity: Philosophies of Embodiment (editor, 2010) and School Bullying: New Theories in Context (coeditor, 2014).

James Snow is a lecturer in the Department of Philosophy at Loyola University Maryland, where he teaches courses in philosophy and genocide and the genealogy of race. His recent publications focus on how gender is framed in genocide scholarship as well as in documentary films and docu- dramas concerned with the Rwandan genocide. He is the blog editor for the International Association of Genocide Scholars and the philosophy editor for the Journal of Perpetrator Research.

Lynne Tirrell is a professor of philosophy at the University of Connecticut, where she is also affiliated with the Human Rights Institute. Her research concerns language, power, and social justice, with a special focus on the role of linguistic practices in genocide. Researching the 1994 genocide of Tutsi in Rwanda led her to trips to Rwanda and the U.N.’s criminal tribunal in Tanzania. Her articles address genocide, hate speech, transitional justice, apology, forgiveness, metaphor, storytelling, and feminism.

INTRODUCTION

ARMEN T. MARSOOBIAN AND ROBIN S. DILLON

Claudia Card epitomized the highest virtues of the philosopher‐teacher. Her passing in September 2015 was a great loss to the profession and to the innumerably many students she taught and advised in her nearly forty years in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin – Madison. She had a long and distinguished career that began at a time when being a woman in the philosophy profession was not an easy matter—not that we can assume that it is easy today. She earned her Ph.D. in 1969 from Harvard with a dissertation on theories of punishment under the direction of John Rawls, despite the fact that women were not admitted to the Harvard Ph.D. program then except under the aegis of Radcliffe College. She was a pioneer in feminist and lesbian philosophy whose trailblazing work has influenced generations of philosophers. Indeed, as her then chairperson said in nominating her in 2011 for the University of Wisconsin's Hilldale Award, “Her books and articles have become as essential to feminist thinking as Das Kapital is to labor theory. You simply can't do feminism without reading Card, and even if you don't read Card, today's feminism bears her mark so deeply that you may not even realize that you have in some other way digested her theoretical perspectives.”1 Her influence goes beyond feminism, even beyond philosophy, however, as demonstrated by her concept of social death, which has had continuing impact in the field of genocide studies.

Card's writings in feminist philosophy and other areas in moral, social, and political philosophy take everyday life and ordinary experiences seriously, displaying a realistic sensitivity to all forms of oppression. Card's work is marked by a careful attention to and analysis of less obvious ways that oppression structures people's characters and life possibilities, and by a commitment to the necessity of fighting oppression, injustice, cruelty, and violence with integrity and without causing further damage to oneself or others, while also remaining alive to involvement with evil and one's capacity to compromise with it.

Card had a very productive career that unfortunately ended too soon. Starting with her first and still widely cited article, “On Mercy,”2 she published ten monographs and edited several volumes and nearly 150 articles and reviews, and gave more than 250 talks at conferences, colleges, and universities. Her research interests included ethics and social philosophy, including normative ethical theory; feminist ethics; environmental ethics; theories of justice, of punishment, and of evil; and the ethics of Kant, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche. Card published articles on mainstream topics such as gratitude and obligation, friendship and fidelity, justice, the value of persons, and the basis of moral rights. But she is most widely known for her influential work in analytic feminist philosophy and on evil. Her work in feminist philosophy was especially notable for discussions of difficult topics, such as sadomasochism, adult‐child sex, and lesbian battery, and for challenging standard feminist and lesbian positions on separatism, marriage, and motherhood, including arguing against same‐sex marriage. Card's feminist work includes ground‐breaking essays and a monograph on lesbian ethics;3 key essays and a monograph on moral agency, character, and moral luck in circumstances of oppression;4 and pioneering articles on dimensions of oppression, such as domestic violence, rape as a form of terrorism, gay divorce, homophobic military codes, and the evils of closeting, among many others.

In the later stages of her career, Card's attention turned explicitly to a topic whose various dimensions she had been writing and teaching about for years. In addition to more than twenty‐five articles on evils, Card was at the time of her death in the midst of finishing a trilogy of monographs on evil, the first two of which appeared in her lifetime.5 In the first book, The Atrocity Paradigm: A Theory of Evil, she developed a secular conception of evil as foreseeable, intolerable harms produced by culpable wrongdoing, and examined the evils of rape in war, domestic violence, and child abuse, the moral powers of victims and the moral burdens and obligations of perpetrators, and the predicament of people who are at once victims and perpetrators, which she called “gray zones.” In the second book, Confronting Evils: Terrorism, Torture, Genocide, she refined her analysis of evil, focusing on the inexcusability of atrocities and expanding her account to consider structural evil and collectively perpetrated and collectively suffered atrocities, such as genocide. But she also argued that not all evils are extraordinary and urged us to pay attention to evils that are so common that we tend to overlook them, such as racism, violence against women, prison violence and executions, and violence against animals. An important dimension of Confronting Evils was addressing the problem of how to preserve humanitarian values in responding to atrocities. The third book, Surviving Atrocity, on which she was working extensively until her death, focused on surviving long‐term mass atrocities, poverty, and global and local misogyny.

The significant contributions Card made to philosophy were acknowledged with numerous honors. The Society for Women in Philosophy, of which she was a longtime member, named her Distinguished Philosopher of the Year in 1996; the Central Division of the American Philosophical Association elected her president for 2010–2011; the APA invited her to give a John Dewey Lecture in 2008; and she was selected by the APA to deliver the prestigious 2016 Carus Lectures. She completed two of the latter lectures, “Surviving Homophobia” and “Gratitude to the Decent Rescuer,” which were delivered by two of the contributors to this volume, Victoria Davion and Diana Tietjens Meyers, respectively.

Just before her death, the Society for Analytical Feminism, of which Card was a long‐time member, organized two APA sessions that featured talks on various aspects of her work. Those papers, as well as a number of others that also explore and expand on her philosophical legacy, are contained in this volume. We are also fortunate to be able to include eleven of Card's articles, which here are brought together for the first time in one volume.6 These articles cover a span of twenty years, beginning in 1996, with the last article published the year after Card died, in 2016. This truly unique volume thus combines her own powerful voice with the best in recent scholarship on issues central to her own philosophical concerns.

Although Card's contributions are far‐ranging and cut across a range of topics, we have divided this volume into two parts: “War, Genocide, and Evil” and “Feminist Ethical Theory and Its Applications.” Of course, this is a somewhat arbitrary division, for Card always brings her feminist ethical insights to bear on the many social and political issues she explores. Her work on rape and sexual violence as a weapon of war, which was ground‐breaking when it first appeared in the mid‐1990s, is a case in point.

We begin part 1 of our volume, “War, Genocide, and Evil,” with “Rape as a Weapon of War” (1996), followed by “Addendum to ‘Rape as a Weapon of War’” (1997), in which Card expanded her treatment of the martial weapon of rape to include sex crimes against men. Such crimes can be as racist as they are sexist, and may be quite simply racist. The essays propose social strategies to change the meaning of rape in order to undermine its use as a martial weapon.

In “Stoicism, Evil, and the Possibility of Morality” (1998), Card explores the idea that the very possibility of morality, understood as social or interpersonal ethics, presupposes, contra Stoicism, that we do value things that elude our control. She argues that Stoic ethics is unable to recognize the validity of morality (so understood) and can at most acknowledge duties to oneself. A further implication is that moral luck, far from undermining morality, as some have held, is presupposed by the very possibility of morality.

In “Women, Evil, and Gray Zones” (2000), Card, building upon Primo Levi's reflections on “gray zone” in Nazi death camps and ghettos, contends that such zones develop wherever oppression is severe and lasting. They are inhabited by victims of evil who become complicit in perpetrating on others the evils that threaten to engulf themselves. Women, who have inhabited many gray zones, present challenges for feminist theorists, who have long struggled with how resistance is possible under coercive institutions. Card argues that resistance is sometimes possible, although outsiders are rarely, if ever, in a position to judge when. She also raises questions about the adequacy of ordinary moral concepts to mark the distinctions that would be helpful for thinking about how to respond in a gray zone.

“Genocide and Social Death” (2003) played a pivotal role in Card's two‐decade‐long eplorations into the concept and consequences of evil, beginning with The Atrocity Paradigm: A Theory of Evil and culminating in Confronting Evils: Terrorism, Torture, Genocide. Social death, central to the evil of genocide (whether the genocide is homicidal or primarily cultural), distinguishes genocide from other mass murders. Loss of social vitality is loss of identity and thereby of meaning for one's existence. Seeing social death at the center of genocide takes our focus off body counts and loss of individual talents, directing us instead to mourn losses of relationships that create community and give meaning to the development of talents.

In “The Paradox of Genocidal Rape Aimed at Enforced Pregnancy” (2008), Card explores the paradox raised in Beverly Allen's book Rape Warfare: The Hidden Genocide in Bosnia‐Herzegovina and Croatia (Allen 1996), which centers on whether enforced pregnancy is genocidal or simply a form of forced assimilation that produces “little Serbs.” Employing her concept of social death and the insight that military rape is a form of biological warfare, Card concludes that rape aimed at enforced pregnancy contributed to an overall plan of ethnic cleansing that was also genocidal in its intent, and not merely a policy of expulsion or assimilation. Producing unwanted progeny and diminishing reproductivity are a direct consequence of the trauma of rape and can lead to the annihilation of the targeted group. Such a plan was in effect in the Bosnian conflict and is thus more in line with Raphael Lemkin's original definition of “genocide” as “a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves” (Lemkin 1944, 79).

Card's essay “Surviving Long‐Term Mass Atrocities” (2012) provides us with a glimpse into the projected final volume of her trilogy on the concept of evil. First, she addresses the conceptual issue of the meaning of “survivor” in cases of mass atrocity. Second, she suggests some answers to the question: What is morally at stake in surviving long‐term mass atrocities? The moral costs and burdens incurred by many survivors present meta‐survival issues that problematize the judgment that one has survived. The most problematic of these are raised by those who are complicit in evildoing for the sake of their own survival.

The last of Card's essays in part 1 of our volume, “Taking Pride in Being Bad” (2016), concerns the possibility of valuing something in virtue of its being bad and, indeed, of taking pride in being bad. Immanuel Kant denied that human beings were capable of such evil, which he referred to as “diabolical evil.” In making sense of such evil, Card considers the limitations of Kant's conception of evil in order to bring into focus an alternative theory of evil, the “atrocity paradigm.” Employing this paradigm allows one to make sense of diabolical evil by combining Christine Korsgaard's Kantian conception of normativity with psychologist Lorna Smith Benjamin's theory of social attachment.

The concluding five essays in part 1 are by scholars whose work directly reflects many of the themes found in Card's corpus. Lynne Tirrell, in “Perpetrators and Social Death: A Cautionary Tale,” takes up Card's balanced approach of addressing both the grave wrongs done to the victims of evil and the perpetrator of those wrongs. Card's concept of social vitality was developed to explain what génocidaires destroy in their victims. This essay brings that concept into conversation with perpetrator testimony, arguing that the génocidaires’ desire for their own social vitality, achieved through their destruction of the social world of their targets, in fact boomerangs to corrode the vitality of their own lives. This is true whether they succeed or fail in their genocidal project. Card's recent analysis of “being a badass” is brought to bear on the cultivation of evil, and the essay suggests four strategies for meeting Card's “moral challenge of avoiding evil responses to evil.”

The concept of social death is explored, defended, and criticized in James Snow's “Claudia Card's Concept of Social Death: A New Way of Looking at Genocide.” Scholarship in the multidisciplinary field of genocide studies often emphasizes body counts and the number of biological deaths as a way of measuring and comparing the severity and scope of individual genocides. The prevalence of this way of framing genocide is problematic insofar it risks marginalizing the voices and experiences of victims who may not succumb to biological death but nevertheless suffer the loss of family members and other loved ones, and suffer the destruction of relationships as well of as the foundational institutions that give rise to and sustain those relationships. The concept of social death, which Card offers as the central evil of genocide, marks a radical shift in conceptualizing genocide and provides space for recovering the marginalized voices of many who suffer the evils of genocide but do not suffer biological death.

In “Surviving Evils and the Problem of Agency: An Essay Inspired by the Work of Claudia Card,” Diana Tietjens Meyers surveys Card's views about the nature of evils and the ethical quandaries of surviving them. Meyers then develops an account of survival agency that is based on Card's insights and in keeping with the agentic capacities exercised by Yezidi women and girls who have escaped from ISIS's obscene program of trafficking in women and sexual violence. Card holds that true survival requires not only staying alive and as healthy as possible but also preserving your good moral character. The essay maintains that while exercising agency to elude evil and protect yourself often depends on your own skills and personality traits, exercising agency to restore or develop your moral character often depends on social support.

Apology is arguably the central act of the reparative work required after wrongdoing. In “Institutional Evils, Culpable Complicity, and Duties to Engage in Moral Repair,” Eliana Peck and Ellen K. Feder ask whether apology is required of persons culpably complicit in institutional evils. To better appreciate the benefits of and barriers to apologies offered by culpably complicit wrongdoers, this essay examines doctors’ complicity in a practice that meets Card's definition of an evil, namely, the nonmedically necessary, nonconsensual “normalizing” interventions performed on babies born with intersex anatomies. It argues that in this instance the complicity of doctors is culpable on Card's terms, and that their culpable complicity grounds rightful demands for them to apologize.

“Part 2: Feminist Ethical Theory and Its Applications” brings together four of Card's essays, beginning with the early and controversial “Against Marriage and Motherhood” (1996). Written nearly two decades before the U.S. Supreme Court constitutionally guaranteed same‐sex marriage, this essay has gained an unexpected saliency. Card argues that the advocacy of lesbian and gay rights to legal marriage and parenthood insufficiently criticizes both marriage and motherhood as they are currently practiced and structured by Northern legal institutions. Instead we would do better not to let the state define our intimate unions. Parenting would be improved if the power currently concentrated in the hands of one or two guardians were diluted and distributed through an appropriately concerned community.

Now that the reality of gay divorce is legally upon us, Card's “Gay Divorce: Thoughts on the Legal Regulation of Marriage” (2007) holds some timely lessons. Card argues that although the exclusion of LGBT individuals from the rites and rights of marriage is arbitrary and unjust, the legal institution of marriage is itself so riddled with injustice that it would be better to create alternative forms of durable intimate partnership that do not invoke the power of the state. Card's essay develops a case for this position, taking up an injustice sufficiently serious to constitute an evil: the sheltering of domestic violence.

Card's “Challenges of Global and Local Misogyny” (2014) is taken from a volume of essays about the work of her Harvard mentor John Rawls. Card challenges Rawls's hypothesis that the worst evils that target women and girls will disappear once the gravest political injustices are gone. Her essay explores this hypothesis in relation to women's self‐defense and mutual defense against evils of misogyny. Card extrapolates and adapts Rawls's work, especially his writing on war, for this purpose, arguing that women need principles for forming social units of defense against global and local misogyny.

The five concluding essays in part 2 take up many of Card's themes, beginning with Marcia Baron's “Hate Crime Legislation Reconsidered.” Baron examines Card's arguments questioning the value of hate crime legislation. Card had questioned whether hatred makes a crime worse and whether hatred of the sort pertinent to hate crimes is worse than a more personal type of hatred. Card doubts whether the actual message sent by hate crime legislation is the intended message. Baron questions Card's assumption that penalty enhancement for hate crimes is warranted only if the crimes are worse than otherwise similar crimes that do not count as hate crimes. Instead, it may be the case that it is the proper business of the state to take a particular interest in such crimes, in part because they enact not just any hatred but civic hatred. If hate crimes are understood as enacting civic hatred, hate crime legislation can indeed serve to counter a message that very much needs to be countered.

Robin May Schott, in “Misplaced Gratitude and the Ethics of Oppression,” examines Card's notion of misplaced gratitude, which Card explored in one of her last papers, “Gratitude to the Decent Rescuer.”7 Whereas typically philosophers have been interested in the problems of the failures to honor obligations of gratitude, Card is more interested in the opposite fault of misplaced gratitude. Her interest reflects her social indignation and her fundamental commitment to opposing oppression, exploitation, and injustice in all its forms. The phenomenon of misplaced gratitude becomes visible from this perspective, where one catches sight of what oppression does to people. The essay looks at the question: What does Card's analysis of misplaced gratitude tell us about her own philosophical methods and contributions? Schott discusses Card's engagement with both care ethics and Beauvoir's phenomenology of oppression to clarify the centrality of misplaced gratitude in Card's ethics of oppression.

Kathryn J. Norlock, in “The Challenges of Extreme Moral Stress: Claudia Card's Contributions to the Formation of Nonideal Ethical Theory,” argues that Card is among the important contributors to nonideal ethical theory. Following philosophers including Lisa Tessman and Charles Mills, Norlock contends that it is important for ethical theory, and for feminist purposes, to carry forward the interrelationship that Mills identifies between nonideal theory and feminist ethics. Card's ethical theorizing assists in understanding that interrelationship. In her philosophical work Card includes basic elements of nonideal ethical theory indicated by Tessman, Mills, and others, and further offers two important and neglected elements to other nonideal ethical theorists: (i) her rejection of the “administrative point of view,” and (ii) her focus on “intolerable harms” as forms of “extreme moral stress” and obstacles to excellent ethical lives. Norlock concludes that Card's insights are helpful to philosophers in developing nonideal ethical theory as a distinctive contribution to, and as a subset of, nonideal theory.

Mavis Biss, in “Radical Moral Imagination and Moral Luck,” argues that, to a greater extent than other theorists, Card's analysis of moral luck considers the impact of attempts to transform moral meanings on the development of the agent's character and responsibilities, over time and in relation to other agents. Biss argues that this wider frame of reference captures more of what is at stake in the efforts of those who resist oppression by attempting to implement radically revised meanings.

Victoria Davion's essay “The American Girl: Playing with the Wrong Dollie?” extends many of the themes central to Card's feminist critique of oppressive sexist environments, particularly as they impact character development. The American Girl Just Like You doll is the lens through which Davion explores the highly problematic messages conveyed to young girls about self‐image and identity. The doll is not emaciated or overtly sexy, and is marketed along with outfits that supposedly send girls the message that they can achieve their goals. Davion adds that the doll comes in a variety of skin, eye, and hair colors, and the line is therefore marketed as racially and ethnically sensitive. Yet Davion argues that although the Just Like You line appears to be empowering and racially sensitive on a superficial level, an in‐depth feminist analysis indicates that it is not.

As is evidenced in the essays in this volume, Claudia Card's voice continues to resonate in the work of many philosophers today. Some of us were privileged to have been in her classes, while others encountered her in many forums, either in person or in print. All of us have been enriched in doing so.

References

Allen, Beverly. 1996.

Rape Warfare: The Hidden Genocide in Bosnia‐Herzegovina and Croatia

. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Lemkin, Raphael. 1944.

Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress

. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Notes

1

Russ Shafer Landau, quoted in “Four Professors Honored with Hilldale Award,”

http:// www.supportuw.org/news‐post/professors‐honored‐with‐hilldale‐award/

2

“On Mercy,”

Philosophical Review

81, no. 2 (April l972): 182–207.

3

Lesbian Choices

(New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).

4

The Unnatural Lottery: Character and Moral Luck

(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1996).

5

The Atrocity Paradigm: A Theory of Evil

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), and

Confronting Evils: Terrorism, Torture, Genocide

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). The third,

Surviving Atrocity

, was to have expanded upon her 2011 Presidential Address to the Central Division of the American Philosophical Association, “Surviving Long‐Term Mass Atrocities: U‐Boats, Catchers, and Ravens.”

6

We have chosen not to update the references in these articles, since, in this electronic age, readers can do so quite easily.

7

Unpublished manuscript of the Paul Carus Lecture, APA Central Division meeting, Chicago, 2016.

PART ONEWAR, GENOCIDE, AND EVIL

CHAPTER 1RAPE AS A WEAPON OF WAR

CLAUDIA CARD

Rape in war—martial rape—has even arrived in the movies. Within the past year, films I have seen featuring or portraying rape in war or in warlike situations include Death and the Maiden (featuring a woman who survived rape by a physician who was hired to oversee her political torture), Rob Roy (portraying a strategic rape—intended to provoke a husband—by an English “nobleman” charged with putting down a Scottish rebellion), and Immortal Beloved (briefly showing the apparently gratuitous rape of a civilian stagecoach passenger by one of Napoleon's soldiers). Closely related is Braveheart, which presents imperial rape in the “rite of the first night,” which licensed English “nobles” to rape Scottish “commoner” brides on their wedding nights.1 Although this imperial rape was not officially an act of war, it had some of the same goals as martial rape: genetic imperialism and a realignment of loyalties in future generations (which are made explicit in Braveheart). Each of these films displays a different aspect of martial rape. No one (to my knowledge) has yet portrayed mass rape in war.

Mass martial rape in the real world, however, is receiving media attention, and public consciousness is being raised about it. What is new is not the practice of mass rape but the extent of its relatively recent publicity and some of rape's consequences for public health in an era of HIV. Martial rape is an ancient practice. Patterns of intelligibility to be found in it have important continuities with patterns to be found also in civilian rape. Despite differences in the structures of the relevant causes, Judith Herman argues that the “shell shock” in World War 1 combat survivors has important similarities to posttraumatic stress disorders as experienced by female survivors of domestic violence and rape. She finds that “the most common post-traumatic disorders are those not of men in war but of women in civilian life” and that women and children subject to civilian rape and domestic violence are in a war:

The subordinate condition of women is maintained and enforced by the hidden violence of men. There is war between the sexes. Rape victims, battered women, and sexually abused children are its casualties. Hysteria is the combat neurosis of the sex war. (Herman 1992, 28–32)

Although my focus here is on martial rape as a weapon wielded by male soldiers of one country (or national, political, or cultural group) against typically unarmed female civilians of another, much of what I say can be applied also with certain modifications in (so-called) civilian contexts.

A little more than ten years ago I began writing about rapes that are often “domestic” in two senses: they are (generally) rapes of citizens (or residents) by other citizens (or residents) of the same state, and they were often committed by members of a household against other members of the same household (Card 1991). I now find that an important aspect of both civilian and martial rape is that it is an instrument of domestication: breaking for house service. It breaks the spirit, humiliates, tames, produces a docile, deferential, obedient soul. Its immediate message to women and girls is that we will have in our own bodies only the control that we are granted by men and thereby in general only that control in our environments that we are granted by men.

Instruments of taming include terrorism and torture, which rely on the energy-consuming and debilitating effects of fear and, as Nietzsche noted (1967, 61–62), our ability to remember what hurts.2 Taming is often for service—utilitarian, recreational, or both—which sets limits to terrorism and torture in that “taming” carried too far may leave an animal who is neither useful for much nor even entertaining. In the case of civilian rape, purposes commonly served include both utilitarian and recreational exploitation. Women and girls raped are often primary instruments of the exploitation of other women and girls. As with other kinds of terrorism, rape as a practice often has two targets (O'Neill 1991). One target may be a throwaway or sacrificial victim who is used to send a message to others. The role of women who are raped and then murdered is like that of people who are murdered in a bombing. They are used to send a message to the second targets, whose compliance with various demands and expectations is sought by the terrorist.

The ubiquitous threat of rape in war, like that of civilian rape, is a form of terrorism. The aim in war, however, may not be service (the aim generally served by civilian rape) but expulsion or dispersion. Expulsion and dispersion do not set limits to the extent and degree of terrorism and torture as the hope of future exploitation would do, because it does not matter to the terrorists whether those to be expelled or dispersed survive. Again, there are often two targets, sacrificial victims and others to whom their sacrifice is used to send a message. Martial rape domesticates not only the women survivors who were its immediate victims but also the men socially connected to them, and men who were socially connected to those who did not survive.

If there is one set of fundamental functions of rape, civilian or martial, it is to display, communicate, and produce or maintain dominance, which is both enjoyed for its own sake and used for such ulterior ends as exploitation, expulsion, dispersion, murder. Acts of forcible rape, like other instances of torture, communicate dominance by removing our control over what enters or impinges on our bodies. Rape is a cross-cultural language of male domination (that is, domination by males; it can also be domination of males). This is its symbolic social meaning. Civilian domination characteristically issues in exploitation for service, although some forms of even civilian rape—such as college fraternity party gang rapes—may be best understood as a kind of training for war.3 An aim of civilian rape is female heterosexual dependency and service. The rapes of some women send a message to others that they need “protection” (Griffin 1979; Card 1991). The ever-present threat of rape from childhood through old age produces a society of females who are generally oriented toward male service—females animated by the hope of securing male protection as a reward for such service—females who often feel bound to those they serve through misplaced gratitude for a “protection” that is mostly only a withholding of abuse (Card 1991). By contrast, martial rape aims to splinter families and alliances and to bind not women to men but warrior rapists to one another. The activity of martial rape, often relatively public, can serve as a bonding agent among perpetrators and at the same time work in a variety of ways to alienate family members, friends, and former neighbors from each other, as in cases where the perpetrators had been friends or neighbors of those they later raped.

Accounts from recently surviving rape victims and perpetrators indicate that purposes currently served in Bosnia-Herzegovina include genocide, expulsion, revenge, and obedience (although in many cases, not service) and that its ultimate targets are entire peoples (Stiglmayer 1993). The same patterns are discernible historically in the rapes of Vietnamese women by U.S. GI's (Brownmillet 1975, 86–113) and of Native American women by British soldiers (Storm 1972).4 As forcible impregnation, martial rape can also be a tool of genetic imperialism. Where the so-conceived child's social identity is determined by that of the biological father, impregnation by martial rape can undermine family solidarity. Even if no pregnancy results, knowledge of the rape has been sufficient for many men in patriarchal societies to reject wives, mothers, and daughters, as was reported to have happened to many Bengali women raped by Pakistani soldiers in 1971 (Brownmiller 1975, 76–86). Ultimately, martial rape can undermine national, political, and cultural solidarity, changing the next generation's identity, confusing the loyalties of all victimized survivors.

There is more than one way to commit genocide. One way is mass murder, killing individual members of a national, political, or cultural group. Another is to destroy a group's identity by decimating cultural and social bonds. Martial rape does both. Many women and girls are killed when rapists are finished with them. If survivors become pregnant or are known to be rape survivors, cultural, political, and national unity may be thrown into chaos. These have been among the apparently intended purposes of the mass rapes of women in Bosnia-Herzegovina, of Rwandan women by Hutu soldiers (Lorch 1995), of Vietnamese women by U.S. GI's, of the systematic rapes of Bengali women by Pakistani soldiers in 1971, and earlier of Native American women by British soldiers.

Where genocide by cultural decimation is the principal aim, universal slaughter of captives is unnecessary. Instead of being slaughtered, captives may be enslaved or dispersed. Historically, women have often been thus enslaved for sexual service. In his history of slavery, Milton Meltzer (1993) notes that one primary source of slaves in the ancient world was the practice of taking war captives who, in a pre-agricultural age, would have been slaughtered. John Rawls observed in A Theory of Justice:

There may be transition cases where enslavement is better than current practice. For example, suppose that city-states that previously have not taken prisoners of war but have always put captives to death agree by treaty to hold prisoners as slaves instead. Although we cannot allow the institution of slavery on the grounds that the greater gains of some outweigh the losses to others, it may be that under these conditions, since all run the risk of capture in war, this form of slavery is less unjust than present custom. … The arrangement seems an advance on established institutions, if slaves are not treated too severely. In time it will presumably be abandoned altogether, since the exchange of prisoners of war is a still more desirable arrangement, the return of the captured members of the community being preferable to the services of slaves. (Rawls 1971, 248)

This semi-speculative account, however, does not address the situation of women who are enslaved as war captives and treated as booty. Even in a pre-agricultural age, the practice prior to enslavement of enemy soldiers may have been to slaughter the males but enslave females for sexual service. Captured and impregnated females might be “persuaded” to alter their loyalties where nothing comparable could have been done to change the loyalties of their fathers or spouses. Mary Renault's historical novels (e.g., Renault 1972) present captive women and adolescents of both sexes as enslaved for sexual service in the ancient world and sold on an international market, a practice that may have existed long before any such an agreement as Rawls imagined was reached among men. What would such a new agreement do to improve the lot of women?

For men, enslavement rather than slaughter as war captives has two apparent advantages. First, if any man might become a war captive, it could be to his advantage to survive (rather than be killed) even as a slave and hope for a reversal of fortune. Second, slavery instituted a class system, providing exploitable productive labor for conquerors. But to what advantages could a woman look forward who was enslaved rather than slaughtered? Would a captured woman who was impregnated, gave birth, and then survived to be freed when political fortunes changed be better off after the change of political fortune? What would have become of her identity? Of her children and her ties to them? If she were not a lesbian, who would be eager to have her returned in an exchange of prisoners of war? Or, as a woman of the victorious party, what would it do for her were her husband to take female concubines from defeated peoples?

Under universal (bisexual) slavery for productive labor (as opposed to female concubinage), enslaved women have been permitted to live temporarily in families with enslaved men. This was true, for example, under American slavery. That practice, however, coexisted with enslaved women's continual liability to rape by free men and to fear of being sold. Here rape continues to send the message of dominance, to enforce dominance, and has the potentiality to wreak havoc with bonds among those enslaved, especially as survivors may be portrayed as willing rather than raped.

Although some women have been exploited as sexual slaves and others as sacrificial victims, enslavement and service have not been the apparent primary aims of the rapes of women in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Rather, the expulsion and dispersion of entire ethnic groups appears to be a primary aim of some perpetrators and, failing that, genocide by a combination of murder and forcible impregnation. The idea has not been to bind captive women to captors, but to destroy family and community bonds, humiliate and terrorize, ultimately to drive out and disperse entire peoples in “ethnic cleansing,” the current euphemism for genocide.

When I refer to the purposes of martial rape, I have in mind its strategic purposes, those appreciable at the level of authority and command. Individual rapists, those who carry out the strategy, may not intend those purposes or be moved by them, just as they may be ignorant of larger purposes served by various orders they implement. Thus there is room, as we will see, at the level of particular acts of rape for many motives. Like civilian rape, martial rape has become a political institution. As with other institutions, the purposes that it serves and that lead those with power to maintain it need not move many of its participants. Sometimes the purpose is more likely to move those who do nothing to resist the practice or who support it as relative outsiders. Thus, civilian rape serves a domestic protection racket (Griffin 1979) whereby males secure the services of females in exchange for protection (against other males). But this does not imply that men who rape intend to terrorize women into seeking male protection; they may or they may not. It may be more likely relative outsiders, judging that a raped woman was “asking for it,” who intend protectionism. Likewise, martial rape is a practice defined by unwritten rules (for example, the rules that only females are “fair game,” that age does not matter, that soldiers who rape “enemy women” are not to be reported for it, that anonymous publicity of it may be desirable). Action in accord with these norms serves purposes identifiable independently of the motives or intentions of individual rapists. A soldier may rape because he was ordered, or because he felt like it. Superior officers, on the other hand, may look the other way because of the martial purposes such rapes serve.

Some women survivors in Bosnia-Herzegovina assume, because those who raped them were previously neighbors from whom they could not imagine such brutality, that the soldiers must have been under orders (Stiglmayer 1993, 120). Yet rape violates international rules of war. Soldiers may not always be given direct orders. They may be induced in other ways, for example, they may be given reason to believe that if they do not participate, they will be beaten or raped themselves. Some interviewed rapist captives gave other explanations. Borislav Herek from Sarajevo, who admits to raping and shooting three unarmed women, said that if he did not do it, his superiors would have sent him “to the worst front line” or to jail and that they would have taken away the Muslim's house that they had given him (Stiglmayer 1993, 147–54). One is reminded, by such accounts, how banal evil can be at the level of motive. When pressed on why he was willing to kill people with whom he had no past history of animosity, he indicated that he was told—apparently in an attempt to incite revenge—that Muslims had killed his father and burned his house. Another motive emerged when Herek admitted that his superiors gave him women to rape along with wine and food as a reward for good behavior and to induce camaraderie with fellow soldiers.

At the level of the motivations of individual rapist soldiers, it can be difficult to see patterns. It is at the level of strategy—of order-giving, hate-mongering, rewarding and penalizing, and, equally important, of refusing to investigate and penalize on the part of military authorities—that coherent strategic patterns emerge. Alexandra Stiglmayer reports (1993, 160–61) that in the opinion of some, paramilitary groups are using rapes “to build up a kind of solidarity” among the rapists, to teach “who is ‘good’ and who is ‘contemptible,’ ” and to destroy bonds of friendship that had existed between former neighbors. Herek's testimony supports that view.

A sense of purposes served by martial rape is a step toward developing strategies of resistance. But we must also ask why rape is used to achieve these purposes. Consider the aims to demoralize and disrupt bonds among those victimized and to create bonds among perpetrators. Many forms of terrorism or torture can achieve this. Why rape?

Many forms of terrorism and torture are