Dealing with Aging Process Facilities and Infrastructure E-Book

• Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
• Kategorie: Fachliteratur
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 321

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2018

Beschreibung

Examines the concept of aging process facilities and infrastructure in high hazard industries and highlights options for dealing with the problem while addressing safety issues This book explores the many ways in which process facilities, equipment, and infrastructure might deteriorate upon continuous exposure to operating and climatic conditions. It covers the functional and physical failure modes for various categories of equipment and discusses the many warning signs of deterioration. Dealing with Aging Process Facilities and Infrastructure also explains how to deal with equipment that may not be safe to operate. The book describes a risk-based strategy in which plant leaders and supervisors can make more informed decisions on aging situations and then communicate them to upper management effectively. Additionally, it discusses the dismantling and safe removal of facilities that are approaching their intended lifecycle or have passed it altogether. Filled with numerous case studies featuring photographs to illustrate the positive and negative experiences of others who have dealt with aging facilities, Dealing with Aging Process Facilities and Infrastructure covers the causes of equipment failures due to aging and their consequences; plant management commitment and responsibility; inspection and maintenance practices for managing life cycle; specific aging asset integrity management practices; and more. * Describes symptoms and causal mechanisms of aging in various categories of process equipment * Presents key considerations for making informed risk-based decisions regarding the repair or replacement of aging process facilities and infrastructure * Discusses practices for managing process facility and infrastructure life cycle * Includes examples and case histories of failures related to aging Dealing with Aging Process Facilities and Infrastructure is an important book for industrial practitioners who are often faced with the challenge of managing process facilities and infrastructure as they approach the end of their useful lifecycle.

Leseprobe

Dealing with Aging Process Facilities and Infrastructure

CENTER FOR CHEMICAL PROCESS SAFETY of the AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CHEMICAL ENGINEERS New York, NY

This edition first published 2018© 2018 the American Instiute of Chemical Engineers

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: American Institute of Chemical Engineers. Center for Chemical Process Safety, author. Title: Dealing with aging process facilities and infrastructure / Center for Chemical ProcessSafety of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers. Description: New York, NY :  Wiley, 2018. | Includes bibliographical references and index. |Identifiers: LCCN 2018010560 (print) | LCCN 2018012416 (ebook) | ISBN 9781119430766 (pdf) | ISBN 9781119430759 (epub) | ISBN 9781119430834 (cloth)Subjects: LCSH: Chemical plants--Maintenance and repair. | Chemical plants--Equipment and supplies--Deterioration. | Service life (Engineering)Classification: LCC TP155.5 (ebook) | LCC TP155.5 .D425 2018 (print) | DDC 660--dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018010560

Cover images : Courtesy of CCPSCover design by Wiley

CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

PREFACE

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 OVERVIEW

1.2 PURPOSE

1.3 AGING: CONCERNS, CAUSE AND CONSEQUENCES

1.4 HOW AGING OCCURS

2 AGING EQUIPMENT FAILURES, CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES

2.1 AGING EQUIPMENT FAILURE AND MECHANISMS

2.2 CONSEQUENCES OF AGING EQUIPMENT INCIDENTS

2.3 MECHANICAL FAILURE OF METAL

2.4 SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL AGING

2.5 AGING STRUCTURES

3 PLANT MANAGEMENT COMMITMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY

3.1 PROMOTING SITE SAFETY CULTURE

3.2 MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES

3.3 MONITORING AGING PROCESS AND MEASURING PERFORMANCE

3.4 HUMAN RESOURCES REQUIREMENTS

3.5 PLANNING FOR EQUIPMENT RETIREMENT AND REPLACEMENT

3.6 APPRECIATING THE IMPORTANCE OF AGING INFRASTRUCTURE TO THE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE

3.7 ADDRESSING AGING INFRASTRUCTURE IN DECISION PROCESS

4 RISK BASED DECISIONS

4.1 RISK MANAGEMENT BASICS

4.2 RISK BASED DECISIONS

4.3 HOW TO APPLY RISKED BASED DECISIONS

4.4 EMBRACING RISK BASED MANAGEMENT

4.5 DEALING WITH UNEXPECTED EVENTS

4.6 RISK BASED DECISIONS SUCCESS METRICS

5 MANAGING PROCESS EQUIPMENT AND INFRASTRUCTURE LIFECYCLE

5.1 LIFECYCLE STAGES

5.2 ASSET LIFECYCLE MANAGEMENT

5.3 GENERAL TOPICS

5.4 PREDICTING ASSET SERVICE LIFE

5.5 INFRASTRUCTURE SPECIFIC TOPICS

6 INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE PRACTICES FOR MANAGING LIFE CYCLE

6.1 INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE GOALS

6.2 INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE PROGRAM ELEMENTS

6.3 INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE PROGRAM RESOURCES

6.4 ADDRESSING INFRASTRUCTURE DEFICIENCIES

7 SPECIFIC AGING ASSET INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT PRACTICES

7.1 STRUCTURAL ASSETS

7.2 ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION AND CONTROLS

7.3 EARTHWORKS: ROADS, IMPOUNDMENTS, AND RAILWAYS

7.4 MARINE FACILITIES: TERMINALS AND JETTIES

7.5 UNDERGROUND UTILITY SYSTEMS

8 DECOMMISSIONING, DISMANTLEMENT AND REMOVAL OF REDUNDANT EQUIPMENT

8.1 INTRODUCTION

8.2 EQUIPMENT HAZARDS

8.3 FINAL DECOMMISSIONING PRACTICES

8.4 DISMANTLING AND DISPOSAL

9 ONWARD AND BEYOND

ACRONYMS

REFERENCES

APPENDIX A AGING ASSET CASE STUDIES

CASE STUDY 1: GAS DISTRIBUTION PIPELINE EXPLOSION

CASE STUDY 2: MISSISSIPPI BRIDGE COLLAPSE

CASE STUDY 3: SINKING BUILDING FOUNDATION

CASE STUDY 4: TAILINGS DAM FAILURE

CASE STUDY 5: SINKING OF THE BETELGEUSE

CASE STUDY 6: ALEXANDER KIELLAND DRILLING RIG DISASTER

CASE STUDY 7: ROOF COLLAPSE AT ORE PROCESSING FACILITY

INDEX

EULA

List of Tables

Table 2.2-1. Deaths and Injuries Statistics for MARS Reportable Major Accident Hazard Incidents

Table 2.2-2. Total Losses (Million € Equivalent) for MARS Reportable Major Accident Hazard Incidents

Table 2.3-1. Examples of Corrosion Mechanisms

Table 2.3-1. Examples of Corrosion Mechanisms, continued

Table 2.3-2. Typical Refinery Elements Contributing to Elevated Corrosion Rates

Table 3.2-1. Component Condition Health Metrics

Table 3.2-1. Component Condition Health Metrics, continued

Table 4.2-1. Guidelines for Risk Based Decisions

Table 4.3-1. RBD Documentation Guidelines

Table 4.6-1. Corrective and Preventive Metrics Definitions

Table 4.6-1. Corrective and Preventive Metrics Definitions, continued

Table 5.4-1. Estimated Mean Life for the 500-kV Reactors (IEEE, 2006)

Table 6.1-1. Budgeting Guidelines for Various Types of Infrastructure to be maintained

Table 7.1-1. Analogous Inspection Practices for Structures

Table 7.1-1. Analogous Inspection Practices for Structures, continued

Table 7.1-2. Example Checklist for Structural Assets

Table 7.2-1. Inspection Practices for Electrical Infrastructure

Table 7.2-2. Example Checklist for Electrical Systems

Table 7.2-3. Inspection Practices for Control Systems Infrastructure

Table 7.2-4. List of UPS Disturbance Causes

Table 7.3-1. Inspection Practices for Road Infrastructure

Table 7.3-2. Example Checklist for Roads Maintenance and Inspection

Table 7.3-2. Example Checklist for Roads Maintenance and Inspection, continued

Table 7.3-3. Inspection Practices for Earthwork Infrastructure

Table 7.3-4. Example Checklist for Earthworks Infrastructure Maintenance and Inspection

Table 7.3-5. Example Checklist of Inspection Practices for Rail Spur Infrastructure

Table 7.4-1. Inspection Practices for Marine Infrastructure

Table 7.4-2. Example Checklist for Marine Infrastructure

Table 7.5-1. Inspection Practices for Underground Cable Systems

Table 7.5-2. Example Checklist for Maintenance and Inspection of Underground Cable Systems

Table 7.5-3. Inspection Practices for Underground Utility Piping Infrastructure

Table 7.5-3. Inspection Practices for Underground Utility Piping Infrastructure, continued

Table 7.5-4. Example Checklist for Underground Utility Piping Infrastructure

List of Illustrations

Figure 1.1-1. Image of an Aging Facility Containing Silos

Figure 1.1-2. Vintage Vessels Fastened with Rivets

Figure 1.4-1. Suggested Spectrum for Aging Facilities

Figure 1.4-2. External Corrosion of a Pipe Due to Leakage of Steam Tracing (Sastry, 2015)

Figure 1.4-3. Image Showing Scoring on a Shaft

Figure 2.2-1. High Level Categorization of MARS Incidents

Figure 2.2-2. Causes of Technical Integrity Incidents in MARS Data

Figure 2.3-1. Typical Stress vs. Strain Diagram Indicating the Various Stages of Deformation

Figure 2.3-2. Catastrophic Failure of Electrical Generator Rotor

Figure 2.3-3. Rotted Railway Ties Providing Weakened Support

Figure 2.5-1. Grain Loading Conveyor Collapse in Ama, Louisianna

Figure 2.5-2. Image of Corroded Oil Recovery Vessels

Figure 2.5-3. Image of Aging Iron Making Facility

Figure 2.5-4. Image of Aging Gas Plant

Figure 2.5-5. Image of Aging Process at Marine Facility

Figure 2.5-6. Image of Aging Process Facility

Figure 2.5-7. 1911 Vintage 3-Cylinder Internal Combustion Engine

Figure 4.1-1. Dimensions of Choice

Figure 4.1-2. Example of a Risk Matrix

Figure 4.3-1. Aging Assets RBD Logic Diagram

Figure 5.2-1. Asset Lifecycle Management

Figure 5.3-1. Codes and Standards Applied to Facility Assets

Figure 5.3-2. Probability of Failure vs. Time for a Safety Instrumented System (Dräger, 2007)

Figure 5.4-1. Basin Curve for Failure Rate of Equipment

Figure 5.4-2. Relationship Between Failure Rate and Age for a Normal Probability Distribution

Figure 5.4-3. Relationship Between Failure Rate and Age for a Weibull Probability Distribution

Figure 5.4-4. Relationship Between the Value, Time, and Preventive Maintenance for Aged Equipment

Figure 5.5-1. Aged Conveyor System in Backup Service

Figure 6.1-1. Vintage Steel Mill Retired from Active Service

Figure 6.1-2. Vintage Chemical Plant Dust Reduction Facility

Figure 6.1-3. Cable Failure Rates

Figure 6.4-1. Vintage Grain Elevator Awaiting Renewal (or Refurbishment)

Figure 6.4-2. Expected Uniform Annual Cost

Figure 7.1-1. Image of a Building That Developed a Crumbling Crack

Figure 7.1-2. Photo of Primitive Structural Supports

Figure 7.1-3. Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) Storage Sphere Collapsed While Being Filled for a Hydrostatic Pressure Test

Figure 7.1-4. Chemical Plant Shelter Showing Signs of Severe Deterioration

Figure 7.1-5. Building Presenting Aging Signs

Figure 7.1-6. Photo of Aged Chemical Silos

Figure 7.2-1. Motor Control Center (MCC) Thermal Scan of a Phenol Unit – Photo

Figure 7.2-2. Motor Control Center (MCC) Thermal Scan of a Phenol Unit – Photo

Figure 7.2-3. Thermography Image Showing Hot Terminals

Figure 7.2-4. Damaged Contacts in Lighting Panel Circuit Breaker

Figure 7.2-5. Loose A Phase on 3 Phase Circuit Breaker and Possible Unbalanced Load

Figure 7.2-6. Loose Connection on A Phase in a 2 Speed Motor Contactor

Figure 7.2-7. Medium Voltage (15kV) Indoor Open-Air Switchgear

Figure 7.3-1. Picture of Vintage Tank Car Fastened with Rivets

Figure 8.1-1. Image of Building Awaiting Demolition

Figure AP.1-1. Example of an Old Facility Presenting Aging Signs

Figure AP.1-2. Sketch Showing Bending Moment as a Result Unbalanced Buoyancy Forces

Guide

Cover

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E-1

LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.2-1. Deaths and Injuries Statistics for MARS Reportable Major Accident Hazard Incidents

Table 2.2-2. Total Losses (Million € Equivalent) for MARS Reportable Major Accident Hazard Incidents

Table 2.3-1. Examples of Corrosion Mechanisms

Table 2.3-1. Examples of Corrosion Mechanisms, continued

Table 2.3-2. Typical Refinery Elements Contributing to Elevated Corrosion Rates

Table 3.2-1. Component Condition Health Metrics

Table 3.2-1. Component Condition Health Metrics, continued

Table 4.2-1. Guidelines for Risk Based Decisions

Table 4.3-1. RBD Documentation Guidelines

Table 4.6-1. Corrective and Preventive Metrics Definitions

Table 4.6-1. Corrective and Preventive Metrics Definitions, continued

Table 5.4-1. Estimated Mean Life for the 500-kV Reactors (IEEE, 2006)

Table 6.1-1. Budgeting Guidelines for Various Types of Infrastructure to be maintained

Table 7.1-1. Analogous Inspection Practices for Structures

Table 7.1-1. Analogous Inspection Practices for Structures, continued

Table 7.1-2. Example Checklist for Structural Assets

Table 7.2-1. Inspection Practices for Electrical Infrastructure

Table 7.2-2. Example Checklist for Electrical Systems

Table 7.2-3. Inspection Practices for Control Systems Infrastructure

Table 7.2-4. List of UPS Disturbance Causes

Table 7.3-1. Inspection Practices for Road Infrastructure

Table 7.3-2. Example Checklist for Roads Maintenance and Inspection

Table 7.3-2. Example Checklist for Roads Maintenance and Inspection, continued

Table 7.3-3. Inspection Practices for Earthwork Infrastructure

Table 7.3-4. Example Checklist for Earthworks Infrastructure Maintenance and Inspection

Table 7.3-5. Example Checklist of Inspection Practices for Rail Spur Infrastructure

Table 7.4-1. Inspection Practices for Marine Infrastructure

Table 7.4-2. Example Checklist for Marine Infrastructure

Table 7.5-1. Inspection Practices for Underground Cable Systems

Table 7.5-2. Example Checklist for Maintenance and Inspection of Underground Cable Systems

Table 7.5-3. Inspection Practices for Underground Utility Piping Infrastructure

Table 7.5-3. Inspection Practices for Underground Utility Piping Infrastructure, continued

Table 7.5-4. Example Checklist for Underground Utility Piping Infrastructure

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1-1. Image of an Aging Facility Containing Silos

Figure 1.1-2. Vintage Vessels Fastened with Rivets

Figure 1.4-1. Suggested Spectrum for Aging Facilities

Figure 1.4-2. External Corrosion of a Pipe Due to Leakage of Steam Tracing (Sastry, 2015)

Figure 1.4-3. Image Showing Scoring on a Shaft

Figure 2.2-1. High Level Categorization of MARS Incidents

Figure 2.2-2. Causes of Technical Integrity Incidents in MARS Data

Figure 2.3-1. Typical Stress vs. Strain Diagram Indicating the Various Stages of Deformation

Figure 2.3-2. Catastrophic Failure of Electrical Generator Rotor

Figure 2.3-3. Rotted Railway Ties Providing Weakened Support

Figure 2.5-1. Grain Loading Conveyor Collapse in Ama, Louisianna

Figure 2.5-2. Image of Corroded Oil Recovery Vessels

Figure 2.5-3. Image of Aging Iron Making Facility

Figure 2.5-4. Image of Aging Gas Plant

Figure 2.5-5. Image of Aging Process at Marine Facility

Figure 2.5-6. Image of Aging Process Facility

Figure 2.5-7. 1911 Vintage 3-Cylinder Internal Combustion Engine

Figure 4.1-1. Dimensions of Choice

Figure 4.1-2. Example of a Risk Matrix

Figure 4.3-1. Aging Assets RBD Logic Diagram

Figure 5.2-1. Asset Lifecycle Management

Figure 5.3-1. Codes and Standards Applied to Facility Assets

Figure 5.3-2. Probability of Failure vs. Time for a Safety Instrumented System (Dräger, 2007)

Figure 5.4-1. Basin Curve for Failure Rate of Equipment

Figure 5.4-2. Relationship Between Failure Rate and Age for a Normal Probability Distribution

Figure 5.4-3. Relationship Between Failure Rate and Age for a Weibull Probability Distribution

Figure 5.4-4. Relationship Between the Value, Time, and Preventive Maintenance for Aged Equipment

Figure 5.5-1. Aged Conveyor System in Backup Service

Figure 6.1-1. Vintage Steel Mill Retired from Active Service

Figure 6.1-2. Vintage Chemical Plant Dust Reduction Facility

Figure 6.1-3. Cable Failure Rates

Figure 6.4-1. Vintage Grain Elevator Awaiting Renewal (or Refurbishment)

Figure 6.4-2. Expected Uniform Annual Cost

Figure 7.1-1. Image of a Building That Developed a Crumbling Crack

Figure 7.1-2. Photo of Primitive Structural Supports

Figure 7.1-3. Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) Storage Sphere Collapsed While Being Filled for a Hydrostatic Pressure Test

Figure 7.1-4. Chemical Plant Shelter Showing Signs of Severe Deterioration

Figure 7.1-5. Building Presenting Aging Signs

Figure 7.1-6. Photo of Aged Chemical Silos

Figure 7.2-1. Motor Control Center (MCC) Thermal Scan of a Phenol Unit – Photo

Figure 7.2-2. Motor Control Center (MCC) Thermal Scan of a Phenol Unit – Photo

Figure 7.2-3. Thermography Image Showing Hot Terminals

Figure 7.2-4. Damaged Contacts in Lighting Panel Circuit Breaker

Figure 7.2-5. Loose A Phase on 3 Phase Circuit Breaker and Possible Unbalanced Load

Figure 7.2-6. Loose Connection on A Phase in a 2 Speed Motor Contactor

Figure 7.2-7. Medium Voltage (15kV) Indoor Open-Air Switchgear

Figure 7.3-1. Picture of Vintage Tank Car Fastened with Rivets

Figure 8.1-1. Image of Building Awaiting Demolition

Figure AP.1-1. Example of an Old Facility Presenting Aging Signs

Figure AP.1-2. Sketch Showing Bending Moment as a Result Unbalanced Buoyancy Forces

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) and the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) express their appreciation and gratitude to all members of the Aging Process Facilities and Infrastructure Subcommittee for their generous efforts in the development and preparation of this important concept book. CCPS also wishes to thank the subcommittee members’ respective companies for supporting their involvement in this project.

We appreciate the involvement and writing contributions of Brian Kelly and Terry White. Special thanks are extended to the team of technical writers from ioMosaic Corporation who coordinated inputs and developed the manuscript. The ioMosaic team consisted of Elena Prats, Peter Stickles and Kathy Anderson.

The members of the CCPS project subcommittee were:

Eric Freiburger

Praxair, subcommittee chair

Brian Kelly

CCPS staff consultant

Laura Bellman

Covestro

Larry Bowler

SABIC

Bill Callaghan

Nova Chemicals

Derin Adebekun

Air Products

Susan Lubell

Nexen Energy

Bennie Barnes

Pacific Gas and Electric

Jonas Duarte

Chemtura

Reyyan Koc

ExxonMobil Chemical

John Murphy

CCPS emeritus

Jatin Shah

BakerRisk

Ken Tague

Archer Daniels Midland

Sudhir Phakey

Linde

Nancy Faulk

Siemens Energy

Tom Sandbrook

Chemours

Robb Van Sickle

Flint Hills Resources

Terry White

Pacific Gas and Electric

Bob Wasileski

formerly Nova Chemicals

All CCPS books are subjected to a rigorous peer review prior to publication. CCPS gratefully acknowledges the thoughtful comments and suggestions of the following peer reviewers:

Robert Bartlett

Pareto Engineering & Management

Consulting

Andrew Basler

Mallinckrodt Pharmaceuticals

Michael Broadribb

BakerRisk

Mark Jackson

FM Global

Morteza Jafari

ABS Group Consulting (USA)

Pamela Nelson

Solvay

Chad Patschke

Ethos Mechanical Integrity Solutions

Perianan Radhakrishnan

Petrochemical Corporation of Singapore

M.S. Rajendran

ABS Group Consulting (Singapore)

Darrell Wadden

Nova Chemicals Ltd.

Dan Wilczynski

Marathon Petroleum Company

Della Wong

Canadian Natural Resources Ltd.

PREFACE

The process safety community, through professional and industry associations, has focused considerable attention on Asset Integrity Management (AIM) of equipment directly involved in process operations. The purpose of this book is to address integrity management of assets that often fall outside the traditional process safety management asset integrity program, because they are not ranked high as “safety critical’’ and have long lifecycles. In particular, such assets include process supporting infrastructure like pipe racks and bridges, equipment supporting structures, sewer and drain lines, rail spurs, and process buildings to name a few. Failure of these types of assets can be contributing factors to process safety incidents and should not be ignored.

Aging process equipment, facilities and infrastructure are common in industry today. The developed world has expanded at an ever increasing rate placing high demands on our existing infrastructure. In many instances, equipment is now required to operate at conditions well beyond those anticipated in the original design. Service life may also have been extended. The option to retire and replace aging equipment is often not practical or economical. In fact, sometimes decisions are made to run equipment to failure.

Industry needs to better manage what it has built and acquired over the past several decades. There is no established set of rules for doing this. Each company or operating facility must examine its own business practices and goals and determine a strategy that meets its own risk criteria.

Aging equipment presents a challenge to managing the integrity of plants and associated infrastructure. This book examines the concept of aging equipment and infrastructure in high hazard industries. It specifically looks at the causes and effects of aging in many types of facilities. Possible options for dealing with the problem are highlighted without providing prescriptive advice. Related publications from the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) and others are cross referenced to provide the reader with a better understanding of the problems encountered by others and some of the solutions that have been applied. The challenge of dealing with aging process facilities and infrastructure is merely one component of a “broad based” Asset Integrity management program. The material herein was developed and compiled by a team of industry practitioners to supplement and expand upon the discussion of aging facilities and infrastructure in the CCPS publication “Guidelines for Asset Integrity Management”.

The American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) has been closely involved with process safety and loss control issues in the chemical and allied industries for more than four decades. Through its strong ties with process designers, constructors, operators, safety professionals, and members of academia, AIChE has enhanced communications and fostered continuous improvement of the industry’s high safety standards. AIChE publications and symposia have become information resources for those devoted to process safety and environmental protection.

CCPS is chartered to develop and disseminate technical information for use in the prevention of major chemical accidents. The center is supported by more than 190 Chemical Process Industries (CPI) sponsors who provide the necessary funding and professional guidance to its technical committees. The major product of CCPS activities has been a series of guidelines and concept books to assist those implementing various elements of a process safety and risk management system. This book is part of that series.

1INTRODUCTION

All physical systems and process equipment undergo continuous change as a result of their chemical exposure, natural environment, service conditions, electromagnetic fields and gravity just to mention a few. When systems change, their physical properties and performance characteristics are often altered. Usually this alteration is one of deterioration or worsening. When there is a mismatch between assumed design properties and actual properties, system integrity may be compromised and failure may be more likely. The lifecycle of existing industrial facilities has increased over the past few decades. Many facilities are now operating beyond their intended life span and at somewhat harsher or more aggressive conditions. Consequently, aging may be more prevalent under more severe operating conditions, harsh weather extremes and an increase in the number of upsets, start-ups and outages than may have been originally planned or designed.

We generally measure age in increments of time. In fact, from a scientific perspective, time is simply a measure of change. Time can be measured in years or decades, or in the number of operating hours. Some forms of aging (e.g., metal fatigue) are measured in terms of the number of unit operating cycles a structure is subjected to. We often associate aging with deterioration. As we grow older our bodies deteriorate and we are often unable to undertake activities we enjoyed in earlier times. Physical structures and process equipment also have a tendency to deteriorate with age. In some venues aging is not necessarily viewed as negative; vintage wines often improve with age. From an aesthetic perspective society tends to value older architecture as well as ancient ruins and artifacts. However, this is not the case for Industrial facilities.

As systems age chronologically, three outcomes are possible:

Properties may improve

No change may take place

Properties may deteriorate

While the first two of the listed outcomes are not typical for process and infrastructure facilities and are not addressed in the book, the third represents a risk to a safe and reliable operation in the process industries.

1.1 OVERVIEW

Aging equipment presents a challenge to managing the integrity of plants and associated infrastructure. Included in this scope are chemical plants, oil refineries, power plants (including nuclear), steel mills, manufacturing plants, pipeline terminals and railways to mention just a few. Rigorous in-house methods must be employed to gauge quality and reliability at a given point in time. Second, and most important, the aging process and associated deterioration is not necessarily linear with time, making strategic decisions somewhat difficult.

As indicated, the aging process in physical systems and equipment is one associated with deteriorating properties and conditions. However, equipment aging does not necessarily correlate with chronological age or time in service. Aging does not necessarily equate to visible wear and tear, either. Given that time is not the only factor in the aging process, aging can simply be considered as negative or undesirable change that can result in diminished integrity and reliability. There are many ways in which material may react with its environment. Changes may affect the physical as well as chemical properties of the material including but not limited to the thickness, the crystalline structure, the tensile strength, the conductivity, and the ductility. Everyone associated with the operation and management of chemical facilities shares the challenge to operate facilities safely and reliably. To do so, it may require not only timely intervention to fix problems when they occur, but periodic inspections and system testing throughout the entire lifecycle of equipment change.

1.2 PURPOSE

This book is about the aging of process facilities and infrastructure. It explores some of the many ways that equipment in the process industries might age and suggests some of the warning signs for which to look. It is primarily intended to provide helpful ideas and suggestions to persons on the front line charged with the responsibility for dealing with aging equipment. The scope herein not only includes equipment in direct contact with process fluids or exposed to operating conditions but, additionally, the infrastructure that supports the operation. Included in this category are roads, buildings, support structures (pipe racks and access platforms), sewers, power lines, pipelines, tanks, silos, loading racks, marine facilities, and waste water/sewage ponds. Electrical equipment and instrumentation are also subject to physical aging as well as redundancy. This category includes conduits, cable trays, transformers and switchgear.

This book highlights a growing concern in the process industries. It is intended to enlighten the reader on some of the current issues confronting the safe operation and management of industrial facilities. It does not provide prescriptive advice for dealing with aging but suggests some ideas that might be applied as part of an Asset Management program. Many of these ideas have been tried and tested by CCPS member companies. Ultimately, some difficult decisions will need to be made to determine what equipment to replace and what equipment may continue to be operated safely. By recognizing and understanding aging it is hoped one can adopt strategies to help operate facilities in a safe and responsible manner.

Some examples of aging facilities are shown in Figures 1.1-1 and 1.1-2. While the effect of passage of time on this equipment is recognizable from external appearances, this is not always the case. Visual appearance alone is not sufficient to gage the condition of an asset.

1.3 AGING: CONCERNS, CAUSE AND CONSEQUENCES

What is it about aging equipment that should be of concern? It is the unknown and increased potential for failure, resulting in safety, environmental incidents or business interruption. Such failure may be physical or functional. Either category can have catastrophic consequences. An example of physical failure is material breakage due to pre-existing high stresses or deteriorated properties. A functional failure is one that impedes or interferes with the intended functional capacity of a system. Instrumentation and control systems are susceptible to functional failure due to aging.

Physical failures are often visible to the naked eye and there may be warning signs prior to major consequences. Sometimes physical integrity may be difficult to detect or measure through visible means. Hidden defects can contribute to a future failure. Likewise, functional failures are often less obvious and may be more difficult to detect. A physical failure can coincide with a functional failure if a system is unable to perform its required function following failure. An example of a physical failure without functional consequence might be paint peeling or deteriorating on a metal surface while the properties and performance of the metal component are not immediately affected.

Figure 1.1-1.Image of an Aging Facility Containing Silos

Figure 1.1-2.Vintage Vessels Fastened with Rivets

On the other hand, a purely functional failure might be the inability of equipment to operate at high (previously demonstrated) throughput. A system that does not perform properly when required to do so can undermine the safety and integrity of an operation. Electrical and instrumentation systems fall into this category. We depend on high availability under all situations.

Physical failure can occur in systems and equipment being exposed to forces whether they are mechanical, electrical or magnetic. The actions of chemical (both environmental and process chemicals) exposure can also contribute to physical failures. For instance, Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC) issues on pipelines are both environmental and mechanical physical failures (stress related and time dependent).

The simplest of these forces is gravity. Gravity exerts a downward force on all equipment and upon prolonged exposure it can cause bending or sagging. If moving parts are involved, shaft alignment may become distorted causing increased wear from friction.

Structural creep is a phenomenon related to gravity whereby slight dimensional changes take place upon prolonged exposure to high loads. Structural creep is irreversible. Creep in metals occurs at a higher temperature and causes minute, incipient grain boundary melting or micro voids that cause weakening. Creep often occurs in boiler and process heater tubes (e.g., ethylene cracking furnaces). Sometimes creep is accompanied by surface or concealed cracking which may progress towards a mechanical failure. Creep may also occur at normal environmental temperatures resulting in sagging. An extended structural member or long span of piping is subject to normal gravity as well as operating loads and weather (snow and ice). Over time such components may bend or sag in response to these forces. Whether the strength of the affected components is impaired may require careful inspection and analysis.

Electric and electromagnetic forces are present in all operating equipment and structures. Electric and electromagnetic forces can alter the grain structure of steel leading to local weak spots creating the potential for failure.

Physical materials are typically chosen because of their tensile strength as well as their chemical properties. Ferrous metals are commonly employed in the process industries for vessels, piping and other equipment. Metal must be rigid and strong enough to withstand forces in an operating environment. Properties such as thermal or electrical conductivity, hardness, resistance to chemicals are some of the prerequisites to material selection. Process equipment materials may also include glass, rubber, ceramic and other metals including alloys. When the important properties of process equipment are diminished or compromised, such equipment may no longer be fit for service and a failure may be more likely to occur. Failures related to equipment aging will be dealt with in more detail in subsequent chapters.

Chemical exposure is another contributor to equipment aging. All equipment is exposed to chemical substances which constitute the operating environment. That environment may include air, steam, water, corrosive liquids and vapors, reactive chemicals, organic compounds and biomatter. Various forms of residue may accumulate in equipment and, if not properly cleaned for several years, can contribute to material degradation and plugging. This material may be difficult to remove if service conditions have changed and it has become integrated with the base metal.

The most common category of chemical change is corrosion. When two or more incompatible materials come into contact, chemical change is inevitable. Chemical change affects not only the exposed surface of equipment but it may penetrate far into the material thickness compromising the physical properties for which the material was selected. System incompatibility may result due to hybrid systems comprised of old and new components. Some incompatibility may exist contributing to confusion and human error, adjustment of dimensional discrepancies using improper materials, galvanic corrosion and electromagnetic currents (e.g., at underground and above ground piping transitions).

Many of these mechanisms may be involved in service aging. Service aging is the product of the operating history of the equipment, including failures, breakdowns and process upsets and how these operating conditions have impacted the remaining life of the equipment. This is particularly true when the equipment was originally designed based on known/expected damage mechanisms and failure modes as determined by a process hazard analysis, but during its operating life those original design conditions have changed, resulting in increased deterioration and the potential for breakdown.

Natural events can also affect equipment and structural aging. As equipment gets older it has a higher probability of being exposed to "rare" events which may not have been thought of in the design. Flooding allows ingress of water and moisture into structures with deleterious impact, or subjects vessel supports to upwards stress due to buoyancy. Drought can cause changes in the water table and impartment of equipment ground systems. Natural settling causes foundation sinking or distortion that weakens support structures. Extreme wind can exceed wind loads or cause surface erosion from blowing sand and dust. Soil creep, expansive soils, and seismic activity may produce long term cumulative effects.

Lack of documentation and knowledge is also a concern associated with aging equipment. Record keeping on older facilities was not always to the level of detail as required by current safety regulations. A written history of service conditions or upsets during the entire lifecycle often does not exist, and tenured staff with this information may have left or retired. Often older facilities have had several owners, and equipment records have been lost or misplaced. Third party leased equipment and facilities may also present these problems: unknown design basis and materials of construction, unknown history, unknown previous service, liabilities, etc.

1.4 HOW AGING OCCURS

Aging is about change and it is driven by exposure conditions and forces. Aging may involve changes in physical dimensions and appearance or it may involve changes in properties. Even if those conditions or exposures are constant, there is no guarantee that aging will progress in a linear fashion. Visual changes such as discoloration, cracking, peeling paint and other surface blemishes are often cosmetic in nature and are unlikely to pose a risk of failure. They are still indicative of change however and should trigger a more in-depth look at properties to determine if these have been altered.

Aging is commonly associated with the progression of time within the lifecycle of a system or facility. From a reliability and integrity perspective, however, aging also recognizes that physical and chemical properties may deteriorate upon continuous or intermittent exposure to normal or upset operating conditions. The fact is, even exposure to a stable or dormant environment can bring about deterioration in some systems. Such deterioration, if not detected and addressed, can make systems more prone to failure. The goal is to aim for better understanding of the process of aging so that better informed decisions can be made, and catastrophic events avoided. Figure 1.4-1 depicts an aging scale which illustrates how aging evolves from minor cosmetic defects to total destruction.

Figure 1.4-1.Suggested Spectrum for Aging Facilities

1.4.1 Metallic Corrosion

Metallic corrosion and surface deterioration are likely the most visible symptoms of aging and are familiar to all of us. Most metals including alloys react with their environment. The rate at which this occurs is a function of the base metal properties, other materials or contaminants at the point of exposure and conditions such as temperature. For simple rust to occur, air and moisture must be present. If the surface contaminants are in the low pH range, corrosion will occur at a more rapid rate. A layer of rust, if left undisturbed, can actually provide a protective layer to prevent further corrosion of some ferrous metals. Operating parameters such as fluid velocity can influence the removal of corrosion products thereby exposing base metal and further aggravating the problem. What’s interesting about corrosion is that, once it begins it is difficult to stop it even if the exposure is controlled. Removal of surface deposits down to base metal is often required but this causes harm since it reduces the metal thickness. Unless surface protection such as paint is applied and efforts are made to control the exposure, further deterioration can occur. It is also important to mention that episodic corrosion due to exposure from an accidental release of a corrosive material (such as acid) can also take place, and may damage the surface of the infrastructure. Having proper spill prevention programs in place may prevent infrastructure deterioration caused by releases of corrosive. Also, corrosion products which are toxic or pyrophoric may be classified as hazardous waste and may require regulated disposal procedures.

While rust is a common form of corrosion found on the surface of ferrous metals, there are many other related corrosion mechanisms that can also hinder the properties of various metals. These include pitting, fretting, stress-corrosion cracking, galvanic corrosion, hydrogen attack and sulfidation. Each mechanism has its own symptoms and causes, and a thorough knowledge of metallurgy is required to ensure that systems are designed to match all anticipated operating conditions. In the past, some facilities may have been designed and built without the benefit of such knowledge. Furthermore, as operating conditions evolved over later years, a mismatch between design and operation may have occurred without being recognized.