Education and Expertise E-Book

• Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Serie: Journal of Philosophy of Education
• Sprache: Englisch
• Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2018

Seitenzahl: 372

Beschreibung

The relevance of expertise to professional education and practice is explored in this collection of original contributions from educationalists, philosophers and psychologists. * Discusses the increasingly prominent debates about the nature of know-how in mainstream analytical epistemology * Illuminates what is involved in professional expertise and the implications of a sound understanding of professional expertise for professional education practice, curriculum design and assessment * All contributions are philosophically grounded and reflect interdisciplinary advances in understanding expertise

Leseprobe

The Journal of Philosophy of Education Book Series

The Journal of Philosophy of Education Book Series publishes titles that represent a wide variety of philosophical traditions. They vary from examination of fundamental philosophical issues in their connection with education, to detailed critical engagement with current educational practice or policy from a philosophical point of view. Books in this series promote rigorous thinking on educational matters and identify and criticise the ideological forces shaping education.

Titles in the series include:

Education and ExpertiseEdited by Mark Addis and Christopher Winch

Teachers' Know-How: A Philosophical InvestigationChristopher Winch

Citizenship for the Learning Society: Europe, Subjectivity, and Educational ResearchNaomi Hodgson

The Ways We Think: From the Straits of Reason to the Possibilities of ThoughtEmma Williams

Philosophy East/West: Exploring Intersections between Educational and Contemplative PracticesEdited by Oren Ergas and Sharon Todd

The Ways We Think: From the Straits of Reason to the Possibilities of ThoughtEmma Williams

Philosophical Perspectives on Teacher EducationEdited by Ruth Heilbronn and Lorraine Forman-Peck

Re-Imagining Relationships in Education: Ethics, Politics And PracticesEdited by Morwenna Griffiths, Marit Honerød Hoveid, Sharon Todd and Christine Winter

Education and the Growth of Knowledge: Perspectives from Social and Virtue EpistemologyEdited by Ben Kotzee

Vygotsky, Philosophy and EducationJan Derry

Education Policy: Philosophical Critique Edited by Richard Smith

Levinas, Subjectivity, Education: Towards an Ethics of Radical ResponsibilityAnna Strhan

Philosophy for Children in Transition: Problems and ProspectsEdited by Nancy Vansieleghem and David Kennedy

Reading R. S. Peters Today: Analysis, Ethics, and the Aims of Education Edited by Stefaan E. Cuypers and Christopher Martin

The Good Life of Teaching: An Ethics of Professional Practice Chris Higgins

The Formation of ReasonDavid Bakhurst

What do Philosophers of Education do? (And how do they do it?)Edited by Claudia Ruitenberg

Evidence-Based Education Policy: What Evidence? What Basis? Whose Policy?Edited by David Bridges, Paul Smeyers and Richard Smith

New Philosophies of LearningEdited by Ruth Cigman and Andrew Davis

The Common School and the Comprehensive Ideal: A Defence by Richard Pring with Complementary EssaysEdited by Mark Halstead and Graham Haydon

Philosophy, Methodology and Educational ResearchEdited by David Bridges and Richard D Smith

Philosophy of the TeacherBy Nigel Tubbs

Conformism and Critique in Liberal SocietyEdited by Frieda Heyting and Christopher Winch

Retrieving Nature: Education for a Post-Humanist AgeBy Michael Bonnett

Education and Practice: Upholding the Integrity of Teaching and LearningEdited by Joseph Dunne and Pádraig Hogan

Educating Humanity: Bildung in PostmodernityEdited by Lars Lovlie, Klaus Peter Mortensen and Sven Erik Nordenbo

The Ethics of Educational ResearchEdited by Michael Mcnamee and David Bridges

In Defence of High CultureEdited by John Gingell and Ed Brandon

Enquiries at the Interface: Philosophical Problems of On-Line EducationEdited by Paul Standish and Nigel Blake

The Limits of Educational AssessmentEdited by Andrew Davis

Illusory Freedoms: Liberalism, Education and the MarketEdited by Ruth Jonathan

Quality and EducationEdited by Christopher Winch

Education and Expertise

Edited by

Mark Addis and Christopher Winch

This edition first published 2019 Originally published as Volume 51, Issue 3 of The Journal of Philosophy of EducationChapters and editorial organization © 2019 Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain

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CONTENTS

Notes on Contributors

Introduction

IMPLICATIONS OF THE SPECIAL ISSUE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE DESIGN AND CONDUCT OF PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION AND ASSESSMENT

CONCLUSION

NOTES

REFERENCES

1 Activity Concepts and Expertise

INTRODUCTION

PHENOMENOLOGY OF EXPERTISE

INTELLECTUALISM AND THE PROLIFERATION OF KNOWLEDGE

PERCEPTIONS AND THE PRECONCEPTUAL

PERCEPTIONS AS CONCEPTUALLY STRUCTURED COGNITIVE ENGAGEMENTS

EXPERT LEARNERS

CONCLUSION

NOTES

REFERENCES

2 The Role of ‘Autonomy’ in Teaching Expertise

INTRODUCTION

CONCEPTIONS OF AUTONOMY

RETHINKING ‘AUTONOMY’ IN TEACHING EXPERTISE

PROFESSIONAL AUTONOMY IN CURRENT EDUCATIONAL POLICY

NOTES

REFERENCES

3 Three Views on Expertise: Philosophical Implications for Rationality, Knowledge, Intuition and Education

INTRODUCTION

KNOWING-HOW AND KNOWING-THAT

PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF PHILOSOPHY TO EDUCATION

THREE VIEWS ON EXPERTISE

APPLICATION OF THE THREE VIEWS TO PHILOSOPHICAL KEY THEMES

DISCUSSION

CONCLUSION

REFERENCES

4 Drawing on a Sculpted Space of Actions: Educating for Expertise while Avoiding a Cognitive Monster

INTRODUCTION: LEARNING, EXPERTISE AND A TRANSITION TO MULTIPLE WAYS OF COGNITIVE PROCESSING

CONCERNS ABOUT A COGNITIVE MONSTER

EXPLAINING EXPERT PERFORMANCE: DRAWING ON A SCULPTED SPACE OF ACTIONS

PREDICTIVE PROCESSING IN EXPERTS, FACILITATED BY A SCULPTED SPACE OF ACTIONS

EDUCATORS’ PLANFUL AGENCY AND EXPERTISE HELP TO MASTER THE COGNITIVE MONSTER

EDUCATION AND LESSONS FROM THE COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENTIFIC ACCOUNT OF EXPERTISE

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

NOTES

REFERENCES

5 Two Social Dimensions of Expertise

INTRODUCTION

CONSTRUCTIVISM AND REALISM ABOUT EXPERTISE: LESSONS FROM THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE

EXPERTISE AS A THREE-PART RELATIONSHIP

INSTITUTIONAL ATTRIBUTIONS OF EXPERTISE

CONCLUSION

NOTES

REFERENCES

6 Making Sense of Knowing-How and Knowing-That

INTRODUCTION

REVISITING RYLE'S USE OF THE DISTINCTION

A CORRECTIVE TO RYLE'S NOTION OF DISPOSITIONS

A QUESTION OF KNOWLEDGE ATTRIBUTION

A QUESTION OF KNOWLEDGE

CONCLUSION

NOTES

REFERENCES

7 Professional Knowledge, Expertise and Perceptual Ability

INTRODUCTION

PERCEPTION PLAYS A DIFFERENT ROLE IN DIFFERENT LANGUAGE GAMES

PERCEPTION AND EXPERTISE

PERCEPTION, EXPERTISE AND PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION

IMPLICATIONS FOR PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION

NOTES

REFERENCES

Index

End User License Agreement

List of Tables

Chapter 3

Table 1

List of Illustrations

Chapter 4

Figure 1

Spaces of Actions of a Novice and an Expert

. [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com] The expert's space of options for action is sculpted along (at least) three dimensions which represent the compliance of these action options with situational conditions (z-axis), with motor expertise (y-axis), and with distal intentions (x-axis) respectively. This sculpting process entails that an expert's action options are no longer randomly distributed across the space—as is the case in the novice's space that is filled by action options that are neither preferred nor suppressed. Instead, the expert's sculpted space of actions is filled with more action options, some of which occupy sub-spaces as a function of having become strongly preferred (red triangles in Expert panel), or strongly suppressed (green dots in Expert panel), depending upon their degree of compliance with three important action characteristics, with some indifferent (blue squares) options scattered through the space. (Figure adapted from Keestra, 2014, p. 375 with permission.)

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Notes on Contributors

Mark Addis, Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science, London School of Economics and Political Science, 7 Portugal Street, London WC2A 2HJ, United Kingdom.

Irene Bucelli, Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom.

Fernand Gobet, Department of Psychological Sciences, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, L69 7ZA, United Kingdom.

Machiel Keestra, Institute for Interdisciplinary Studies, University of Amsterdam, Science Park 904, 1098 XH Amsterdam, Netherlands.

Ben Kotzee, University of Birmingham, School of Education, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham, B15 2TT, United Kingdom.

JP Smit, Department of Philosophy, Stellenbosch University, Private Bag X1, Matieland, 7602, South Africa.

Gerard Lum, School of Education, Communication and Society, King's College London, Waterloo Bridge Wing, Waterloo Bridge Road, London SE1 9NH, United Kingdom.

Christopher Winch, School of Education, Communication and Society, King's College London, Waterloo Bridge Wing, Waterloo Bridge Road, London SE1 9NH, United Kingdom.

Introduction

MARK ADDIS AND CHRISTOPHER WINCH

This volume brings together a number of related contributions on the topic of expertise and education. Expertise is a topic that is beginning to receive more attention in the Philosophy of Education and discussions are closely related to the epistemological debate concerning the nature of know-how which has also burgeoned in recent years within ‘mainstream’ epistemology. More specifically, this volume focuses on the relevance of expertise to professional education and practice, with the aim of shedding light on what is involved in professional expertise and the implications of a sound understanding of professional expertise for professional education.1 Although all contributions have roots in philosophical discussion, there is an element of cross-disciplinarity among them, reflecting the advances that have been made to our understanding of expertise from psychology in particular.

Two Senses of Expertise

It cannot be stressed too much that any philosophical engagement with expertise and professional education will need to take account of the seminal work of Gilbert Ryle in two important respects (see the extended discussion of Ryle by Lum in this volume). The first is his characterisation of ‘intelligence epithets’ (Ryle, 1946, 1949) as applicable to know-how in a way that they are not applicable to singular attributions of propositional knowledge. Ryle's discussion of intelligence epithets has not received the attention that it deserves, but is important in understanding how expertise is related to know-how. Second, Ryle's discussion of ‘adverbial verbs’ (Ryle, 1979) alerts us to the difficulties of characterising all know-how, and by implication professional expertise, in terms of skills. Ryle's account of adverbial verbs is particularly important for a range of professional activities which cannot be adequately characterised as skills: planning, co-ordination, communication, control and evaluation, which are all characteristics of occupations whose practice requires a degree of independence, teamwork and professional discretion. The vocational education and training (VET) systems of some countries such as Germany place a particular emphasis on such attributes calling them (Fähigkeiten) as opposed to skills (Fertigkeiten) (see Hanf, 2011). Although Ryle is referred to intermittently in this volume, the relevance of his contributions in this area looms large. These contributions touch on a number of themes which are important in understanding expertise and, perhaps even more important, in avoiding confusions about it.

The first is a potential confusion about whether expertise is something that one has in virtue of possession of a certain kind of know-how. Thus, I could be said to be an expert in English in virtue of it being my mother tongue (Collins, 2013; and for a critique see Addis, 2013). In this sense, all native speakers of English are experts in English.2 Let us call this the constitutive sense of expertise. We are interested in this sense of ‘expertise’, particularly in relation to the contrast between someone who is competent in an occupation and someone who is not, and it is important to recognise this sense of ‘expertise’, as it is sometimes confused with the other sense, which is also important to our discussion. This is the idea that for a given activity-type or occupation, someone can be more expert than another practitioner. Let us call this the relative sense of expertise. It is common to claim that not only can one identify one practitioner's expertise relative to another's, but that one can give an account of what this difference in expertise consists in. Sometimes this is done through a graded hierarchy ranging from novice to expert as in the popular schemata set out by Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus (see, for example, Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1996). It can also be done less formally by appealing to the Rylean notion of an intelligence epithet which yields appropriate evaluative vocabularies relating to the various dimensions which relative expertise involves: situational, technical, theoretical, moral and aesthetic, all related to the particular sphere of activity in which they are applied.

It is important to keep these senses of ‘expertise’ distinct, because of our interest not only in whether or not someone is capable at some threshold level of practising an occupation, but also in the degree to which someone advances in relative expertise by comparison to their previous level of competence and in their expert standing within the occupation relative to others. This concern is evident in the papers by Gobet on the detail of expertise amongst already-competent chess players as opposed to masters and grandmasters, in Bucelli's concern with independent action within teaching, in Winch's concerns with how growing perceptual ability is part and parcel of growing expertise, and in Keestra's concerns with characterisations of the growth of expertise.

Why is it important for professional education that these two senses be kept distinct from each other? There are two main points. The first is concerned with initial qualification and licensure within an occupation. A qualification is a guarantee, not just to the practitioners of the occupation but to the public and society at large that the holder can practice that occupation to at least a threshold degree of competence. The importance of such guarantees can hardly be exaggerated since they not only concern efficiency in practising the occupation but also the protection of client and public welfare. This applies across a vast range of occupations, not just the recognised professions and semi-professions. Initial professional qualifications are primarily concerned with the constitutive sense of expertise as they are expected to guarantee that a holder can operate at a threshold level of competence that at the very least marks him or her as more capable than a layperson. On the other hand, it may also be that an initial qualification aims to distinguish between degrees of competence. BTEC qualifications which award a pass, a merit or a distinction are examples of such qualifications (e.g. Edexcel, 2008). In this case, expertise is being assessed in a relative sense as well within the same qualification.

The second point concerns progression within an occupation. A conscientious practitioner will be expected to improve with experience and further study. We would expect an increasing range of positive intelligence epithets to apply to their professional actions. Whether we make informal judgements about this growth in ability or seek to formalise it with post-initial qualifications, we are here concerned with the relative sense of expertise, considering progression in excellence within an occupation. Here another important theme emerges, the idea that expertise in this sense involves the pursuit of excellence within the occupational field. It is noteworthy that some national VET systems, such as that of Germany, have enhanced professional educational qualifications recognised at level 6, which are generally called Meister qualifications, which demand not just technical excellence in the chosen occupation, but also pedagogic and entrepreneurial ability. A Meister would typically have responsibility for the workplace learning of those pursuing an initial qualification in his/her enterprise, Auszubildende or apprentices. Thus progression within the occupation is not just a matter of ascending levels of technical competence, but also of increasing polyvalence in activities (see Syben, 2008 for a comparison of how this is handled in the German and Hungarian construction sectors).

The Intellectualist–Anti-intellectualist Debate and its Relevance to Professional Action

The second major theme concerns the relationship between the so-called intellectualist–anti-intellectualist debate about the nature of know-how and whether or not it should be subsumed as a form of propositional knowledge (Bengson and Moffett, 2007; Stanley and Williamson, 2001), or whether it should be considered a distinct, or even the dominant epistemological category, a view which is perhaps most strongly associated with Gilbert Ryle writing in the 1940s (Ryle, 1946, 1949). The debate really took on life once again with the publication of Stanley and Williamson (2001), but was foreshadowed by two important papers published by David Carr (1979, 1981) and also in White (1982). Unfortunately, the debate has largely been confined to the pages of mainstream epistemological journals, with little evidence of engagement either within or with the philosophy of education community. Notable exceptions include work by Kotzee (2016) and Winch (2009, 2010a). This is unfortunate as one of the features of this debate in the mainstream philosophical journals is a focus on a range of technical issues and a narrow range of examples, generally far removed from considerations of professional action.3

Intellectualist accounts come in two main forms, propositional and non-propositional (Bengson and Moffett, 2011b). In the propositional account advocated by Stanley and Williamson (2001) for someone to know how to do something is for them to be acquainted with a way of doing that thing in a practical mode of presentation and in a contextually relevant manner (p. 430). For the non-propositional account (Bengson and Moffett, 2007), for someone to know how to do something is to be acquainted with a way of doing that thing. In both cases, it is assumed that knowing how to do something involves a relationship with a way of doing that thing. The validity of this critical assumption does not seem to be questioned within the literature on the topic, although Ryle (1979) in his discussion of adverbial verbs had raised the possibility that there may be many different ways of doing the same thing. More radically we might question whether or not knowing how to do something does always presuppose that the agent knows a way to do that thing. It may be that an agent who knows how to do something, such as solving a problem, knows how to find a way to solve that problem. Another important consideration raised by Hornsby (2011), is that knowing how to do something does not involve being able to do it once, but repeatedly and with appropriate contextual variation. This would rule out the kind of singular instance of an action type being a sufficient condition of know-how along the lines that Stanley and Williamson advocate.

The anti-intellectualist Rylean account of know-how is generally thought to underpin vocational qualifications that depend on learning outcomes related to the carrying out of relatively simple tasks, such as lower level NVQs, trenchantly criticised by Hyland (1993). Despite the fact that many of Ryle's examples involve complex and quite intellectual activities such as giving courtroom speeches or playing chess (discussed in detail here by Gobet (2016), it is reasonable to suggest that Ryle's work may have been an inspiration to the designers of the NVQ, a qualification suited to Taylorised routine semi-skilled work. However, it is perhaps more surprising to find that some intellectualist accounts can also lend themselves to such an interpretation (see Addis in this volume). According to Stanley and Williamson, it is sufficient for an agent to know how to F that the agent perform F on one occasion. This is equivalent to the third person manifestation of knowledge of a single proposition. Thus an NVQ descriptor could just as easily fit an intellectualist know-how attribution as could a non-intellectualist one if interpreted according to the approach recommended by Stanley and Williamson.

What is missing here? There are three points to make about the requirements for the proper attribution of know-how to an agent. The first is that the agent be able to repeat the relevant action in contextually variable situations (Hornsby, 2011). Stanley and Williamson's intellectualist account does not meet this criterion.4 Bengson and Moffett's intellectualist account only requires that the agent be able to give an account of how something is done. Second, neither the strictly Rylean anti-intellectualist nor the intellectualist of either the propositional or non-propositional variety is capable of showing how it is that theoretical considerations have a bearing on professional action. This is quite disabling if one wishes to use either of these two approaches to know-how as a way of explaining professional action. Third, intellectualists, because they subsume know-how to a relationship between a knower and singular propositions, are unable to incorporate Ryle's insight about intelligence epithets into their accounts.5 One cannot apply an intelligence epithet meaningfully to someone's knowledge of a single proposition. Once again, this is disabling for a philosophical account that aims to explain what either sense of professional expertise involves.

But even here we have not fully set out the inadequacies of the capacity of intellectualism to account for professional action. Transversal abilities (what the Germans call Fähigkeiten) are critical to professional action. These are examples of the ‘adverbial verbs’ of which Ryle talked in his later work (see above) and cannot be reduced to ways of doing things. Critical to their mastery is the ability to accomplish diverse activities in ways that exhibit both independent action and the ability to co-ordinate with and pay regard to the work of others. They demand a degree of seriousness and attention that mark them off from the more routine exercise of skill and often involve both proximal and distal situational awareness (see Keestra in this volume). Whatever its shortcomings in failing to acknowledge the importance of systematic knowledge to practice, Rylean ‘anti-intellectualism’ is quite comfortable with the Fähigkeiten up to the point at which they do not require this.

The second area which is a blind spot for intellectualism in relation to professional action is that of tacit knowledge.6 Although there is a general consensus that tacit knowledge is only with difficulty, if at all, articulable by its possessor (‘We know more than we can say’: Polanyi, 1958), some commentators think of it in propositional rather than practical terms. In Psycholinguistic theory for example, tacit knowledge is a body of organised grammatical propositions which are ‘cognised’ rather than ‘recognised’ by a speaker as a condition of thought and communication (e.g. Chomsky, 1988). Some commentators think that tacit knowledge can be captured in propositions and applied to computer-based expert systems, while others deny this but hold that some form of contextual but discursive articulation should be possible (Gascoigne and Thornton, 2013). Our view is that tacit knowledge is an aspect of know-how which is beyond articulation, although some transfer might be possible through exemplification, imitation and practice (see also Hutchinson and Read, 2011).

Given that the issue is of enormous importance for professional action, one would expect that it would be addressed by the main currents of philosophical thought concerning know-how. Conventional intellectualist accounts struggle here. Stanley and Williamson's reliance on third person attributions of knowledge of ways of acting to the relevant agents falls on the contextual variability of action-types, whose variation is often manifested through the tacit knowledge required to deal with this contextual variability. Since they are committed to a view that know-how can be manifested through knowledge of a way to F in a single instance, they have nothing to say either about contextual variability (as opposed to contextual appropriateness of a single action) or a fortiori about the ways in which variability is manifested in professional action.7 Tacit knowledge is also manifested in the ability to find a way to achieve an end, something about which intellectualism has nothing to say. The ability to employ tacit knowledge effectively is also in many cases a feature of relative expertise as opposed to novicehood or competence and underlies the attribution of intelligence epithets. Again, intellectualism has nothing to say about this. It is not surprising that attempts have been made to go beyond the intellectualist/anti-intellectualist dichotomy in seeking to gain a better understanding of expertise. Kotzee and Smit's article in this volume is an important contribution to this debate.

Towards a Criterial Conception of Expertise

Kotzee and Smit in this volume distinguish between constructivist and realist accounts of expertise. Crudely speaking, the constructivist holds that expertise consists in no more than the attributions of expertise of others to the putative expert.8 Realists, on the other hand consider expertise to be a real epistemic attribute of an expert, whether this be conceived in practical or propositional terms or both. Kotzee and Smit maintain that there are elements of truth in both of these approaches to expertise and that they are reconciliable. We will not discuss the details of their argument here, but will go on to briefly outline another way of looking at the matter, which is related both to the discussion of know-how and expertise in the previous section, but also to our discussion of professional education below.

Our view is that professional expertise is delineated by criteria which allow a community to distinguish between novicehood, competence and expertise.9 These criteria are embedded in practices of training, habituation, education, evaluation and qualification which are more than intersubjective agreements: they have an institutional foundation with its own set of implicit ways of doing things and formal and informal rules for making necessary distinctions. In the case of professional education we expect these rules to be relatively formalised. Thus expertise is attributed by some to others, but the way in which this is done is far from arbitrary. Expert practise makes a real difference to how well an agent acts. This does not imply, however, that there are some identifiable attributes (like certain brain structures) which make an expert what s/he is, although they may be necessary conditions of experthood (see Kotzee and Smit, Gobet and Keestra in this volume), but rather the ability to meet relevant criteria, as evidenced in action, is what makes an attribution of experthood true or false and allows us to place our trust in professional qualifications, which are formal expressions of at least some of these criteria.10

How does a criterial account of expertise match up to the requirements that we set out in the previous section? We will address this question in relation to criteria for professional expertise and in relation to the implications for professional education and assessment. It might be objected that criterialism is just a form of realism in disguise, as to truly say that a criterion has been satisfied is to say it corresponds to the fact that the criterion has been satisfied. On the other hand, if a criterion is satisfied when an authoritative individual deems it to have been satisfied, then the operation of the criterion is socially constructed. So there is nothing distinctive about the criterial view of expertise.11 To reply only briefly, on the one hand it does not follow that if it is true that a criterion has been satisfied that there is a corresponding fact that satisfies the criterion. That would only follow if one held that for any true proposition there is something in reality (a fact) which corresponds to it.12 On the other hand, someone's saying that a criterion has been satisfied is not sufficient, on a criterial account, for that being so. Not only would the individual making the pronouncement have to be authoritative, but there would need, in the case of professional expertise, to be independently existing criteria against which such a judgement could be validated. Saying that it is so, even by a prestigious individual, does not make it so, there needs to exist a practice in which the application of the criterion operates.

The Novice – Competent Practitioner – Expert Transition

It is a well-established practice that an initial professional qualification is a guarantee of the ability of the holder of that qualification to competently perform the requirements of the occupation. The criteria for a person being competent are embedded in the assessment arrangements that govern the award of the qualification. Some initial qualifications, as we have noted, specify higher levels of competence that may be achieved initially, as with BTEC Merit and Distinction awards, which have their own criteria which are more demanding than those required for a pass. An alternative is to consign the formal specification of an ascent in expertise through the provision of further post initial qualifications as in the case of the German Meister Certificate.

Fine-Grained Distinctions which Allow for Grading Levels of Expertise

The existence of formal criteria for ascent in expertise are relatively easy to understand and are well-established. A tougher proposition for a criterial account is the use of informal criteria for establishing both absolute prowess (progression from original competent state) and relative prowess (expertise relative to other practitioners). These kinds of judgements are made constantly in professional contexts and occur in circumstances in which intelligence epithets relevant to the occupation are deployed. How does one judge that one advocate is more persuasive than another, that a teacher has become more sensitive to the needs of her pupils over a period of months or that a journalist has become more astute in following up a lead? (See Lum on expansive assessment in this volume.) Judgements are invariably made by peers who are themselves more than competent, and may well themselves be expert relative to others in the field. They belong to a community who make judgements of this kind on a regular basis.

However, this is not enough in itself to establish criteria for the accurate application of intelligence epithets. There must exist a practice amongst experts of judging constitutive and relative expertise and such judgements have to be put to the test through justification if necessary. Claim and justification will relate to how the agent practises occupational activities in relation to the aims of that activity, or to what MacIntyre (1981) calls its internal goods. We cannot rely on individual judgements of this kind if they are unmediated by some form of check, otherwise they become no more than statements of subjective opinion. This check has to come from the established activities of judging, explaining and justifying judgements and reaching agreement with other experts, perhaps using past experience, analogies and reference to aims and both internal and external goods.13 In other words, criteria for expertise arise within and are sustained by the activities of making qualitative judgements about professional action within a professional community. They are meaningful because they are constantly having to be renewed through explanation, debate and justification. Where these are not present to a sufficient degree, it is difficult to maintain that judgements are undergirded by criteria.

The point is a very important one for judgement of professional expertise. Formal criteria, such as are found in assessment practices for the award of a qualification, have to be applied. They need to be understood in such a way that those who apply them can agree in their judgements. Having formal criteria is not even a necessary, let alone a sufficient, condition of reliable criterial judgement if it is not sustained by a common view about how those criteria are to be applied, for example by specifying hours of study and content (Ofqual, 2016). This can only come about if the kinds of informal practices described above underpin the use of the formal criteria. One further condition needs to be in place for the existence of a criterial practice. Once agreement is reached, it is accepted as authoritative, the judgement of the (relative) expert practitioners in the practice is authoritative and cannot be subject to legitimate questioning.14 The variety of the kinds of intelligence epithets to be applied, ranging from the situational, technical, theoretical, social and aesthetic to the moral dimensions, ensures that the range of facets of performance that need to be judged for their relative expertise is covered. We can therefore conclude that the informal application of intelligence epithets within expert groups within occupational communities underpins criterial judgements of occupational expertise.

The Assessment of Expertise in Multiple Situations and in Hypothetical Situations

It is an important feature of many professional practices that they encompass a variety of different situations and contexts, making the practicality of direct observation of action problematic. How can expertise criteria be applied in such circumstances? We need first to distinguish between assessing expertise in multiple situations and assessing it in hypothetical ones. First, one would expect the appropriate degree of flexibility and situational awareness in exercising know-how across a varied landscape of different situations and the criteria for expertise would need to recognise ability to adapt to varied situations, for relative expertise quite possibly to a considerably greater degree than for an agent who is just competent. Keestra, in this volume, makes good points about this, drawing attention to the expert managing automatic responses and situational adaptability while, at the same time, keeping in mind the aims of the activity (see also Hager, 2011). All those who are competent will be expected to do this, but one would expect an enhanced ability from an expert, which could include a better understanding of the situation from a theoretical perspective (what evidence of this kind might be evidence of) and enhanced perceptual ability (see Winch in this volume).

Given the variety of situations that a complex occupation can offer, it is unlikely that assessment at any level is able to encompass in situ assessment in anything other than a small proportion of them. The assessment of expertise in such situations depends on forming a judgement as to the agent's understanding of a situation on the one hand and on the quality of the kinds of explanation they offer concerning courses of action on the other. In such circumstances one would expect a profound grasp of the systematic knowledge underpinning the occupation, coupled with an ability to know where to access relevant knowledge if necessary, together with an ability to apply that knowledge to complex situational circumstances (cf. Eraut, 1994). Once again, formal criteria can be deployed to assist with judgements in such situations, but as pointed out above, such formality depends on an underlying practice of making judgements which, in turn, depend on something like agreement in judgement (Wittgenstein, 1953, §242).15

Underlying Theoretical Knowledge

We have already noted the importance of underlying theoretical knowledge in forming judgements about actions in hypothetical situations. But what can we say about the possession of relevant theoretical knowledge in terms of expertise? The relative expert is in possession of a considerable amount of applicable theoretical knowledge which s/he should be able to readily deploy. One would normally expect such knowledge to be wider and deeper than that of the competent practitioner and thus to involve considerable further study (see Syben, 2008 on the Polier, a senior construction worker in Germany). Such grasp involves being able to find one's way around the body of knowledge, by being able to make appropriate connections through inference and perhaps most notably by being able to demonstrate the ability to critically assess or even to advance the body of knowledge. Such abilities mark the difference between a technician (an applier of theoretical knowledge) on the one hand and a technologist (a contributor to the practical side of the theoretical knowledge) on the other, and perhaps even a role as a researcher within the relevant field (Winch, 2013). It is not difficult to see that the criteria for ascent to such a level of professional expertise can be handled through largely academic criteria of excellence, albeit adapted to the need to demonstrate relevance to professional action. For this, professional curricula are required, adapted to the needs of the technologist rather than the non-applied researcher. Such curricula provide the basis for formal criteria for the assessment of underlying theoretical knowledge.

Tacit Knowledge

What, finally, of the tacit knowledge that is so important a feature of expert professional practice? By its nature, this cannot be adequately captured in discursive criteria, so we are obliged, if we are to use criteria at all, to accept that these must be informal, but it does not imply that in terms of professional expertise, we have to accept that they are implicit. The assessment of professional expertise sets more demanding conditions than the assessment of expertise more generally, because the stakes are higher. Thus, even if one does not expect complete reliance on formally stated criteria, there must be a basis for justification of judgements and this in turn implies the ability to debate the applicability of informally held criteria in coming to judgements and then, usually, benchmarking these against formal criteria. Thus the possession of tacit knowledge can fall under a criterial account of expertise.

We can conclude, through a sketch of how a criterial account of expertise might work, that it is at the very least a plausible way of thinking about, not only competent practice (constitutive expertise), but the way in which expert practice (relative expertise) might be distinguished from competent practice.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE SPECIAL ISSUE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE DESIGN AND CONDUCT OF PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION AND ASSESSMENT

The remainder of this introduction will deal briefly with how the discussions in this volume impact upon professional education and assessment in both constitutive and relative senses of expertise. It has already been noted that the way in which we deal with expertise in professional action differs in significant ways from how it is dealt with in non-work and non-professional situations more generally. Professional education almost invariably takes place within a formal structure with its own specific educational categories. Thus we expect certain values to underlie a profession and these should receive embodiment both in the aims of the professional education and quite probably in a specific code of ethics. We also expect to find a prescribed content for that education at varying levels of qualification, in other words, a curriculum. Pedagogy can be quite variegated as it is likely to include episodes in a classroom, simulated professional experience and a considerable amount of work-based learning, perhaps necessitating specialised forms of pedagogic expertise. Finally, assessment is almost certain to loom large as the guarantee that a practitioner is competent or expert has to be accepted, not just within the profession itself, but by the government and the public.

So what implications do our contributions have for our understanding of these requirements? Let us first have a look at the values and aims that underpin professional education. These will be intimately related to the values and aims of the occupation for which it is a preparation. Who should those be, whose responsibility it is to articulate and maintain those values and aims? One natural response is to mention those who are experts within the profession. However, since it is most likely that the profession will have an impact not only its clients but also on the broader society affected by its operations, it would be natural to assume that those others affected ought also to have a role, even though they may not be experts in either sense of that term. Whatever arrangements are actually made, the role of experts within the occupation is likely to be critical. They are, in a sense, the custodians of the occupation and the interpreters of its interests. It is quite likely that they will hold their roles of influence through appointment or election to trade unions or to collegial bodies concerned with the governance of the profession.16

One of the most important elements of professional education is the design of the curriculum. For the importance of perception in this see Winch in this volume. Before this can be done however, the aims of education in any given profession have to be negotiated. Some, however, might dispute this. They might argue that the important issue is what a practitioner can do and secondly, what he has to know in order to do what he has to do. This means enumerating the kinds of things that he has to do and then inferring what he needs to know in order to do what he has to do. Here we have two contrasting approaches to the design of a professional education. We deliberately do not say to the design of a professional curriculum, because it is not clear that, in this latter conception of professional education, a fully articulated curriculum is required. Even if it is, it can be set out in terms of a series of learning outcomes and associated assessment criteria for those outcomes. Broadly speaking, this approach is well-suited to an occupational governance approach where the employer is the primary determinant of the professional qualification. The employer works out what the required professional tasks will be and it is the job of the qualification designer to translate these into learning outcomes and assessment criteria. This, broadly speaking, is the approach adopted in the UK. Such an approach typically leads to a preoccupation with the tasks that need to be accomplished and hence to the know-how needed to accomplish them. It is often assumed that once the tasks have been carefully specified, the skills needed to undertake them successfully can be deduced. We will call this generic approach to professional curriculum design the learning outcomes approach.

The major alternative is to think in terms of the aims of the occupation and to reflect its values in the explicit aims stated. Thus, one might think in terms of what one would like a doctor, lawyer, engineer, plumber, teacher or farmer to be like in terms of their values, the scope of their activities and the primary abilities that they are going to require. For example, one might wish to think of a doctor as someone with the technical ability to engage in diagnostic and curative work, but also with the attributes of a teacher who can help prevent illness through addressing prevention by advice and education. A doctor might also need to be a scholar, not only to master the underlying theoretical knowledge that forms the basis of the great majority of his professional judgements, but also in order to maintain his knowledge within the field and, potentially to become an advancer of knowledge