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- Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
- Kategorie: Wissenschaft und neue Technologien
- Sprache: Englisch
Provides a comprehensive examination of emergency management and offers concepts and strategies for creating effective programs
This book looks at the larger context within which emergency management response occurs, and stresses the development of a program to address a wide range of issues. Not limited to traditional emergency response to natural disasters, it addresses a conceptual model capable of integrating multiple disciplines and dealing with unexpected emergencies.
Emergency Management: Concepts and Strategies for Effective Programs, Second Edition starts by focusing on the three pillars on which successful emergency management is based: an understanding of history, knowledge of social science research, and technical expertise in emergency management operations. It provides insight as to how emergency management has evolved and suggests reasons why the current method of response planning doesn’t work as well as it should. The book then goes on to discuss establishing and administering the emergency management program. It looks at the analysis of risk as the basis for strategy development, and considers both the traditional macro view of hazard identification and analysis as well as the micro view required for continuity planning. Strategy development is examined next, followed by coverage of planning process, techniques and methods. The book finishes with chapters on coordinating response, leading in crisis, and crisis management.
- Features two new chapters on the development of national response strategy and leadership in a crisis
- Incorporates the Principles of Emergency Management adopted by many emergency management professional associations and agencies
- Encourages the development of an enterprise wide program to address a wide range of potential threats
- Covers the various phases of comprehensive emergency management
- Integrates academic research with practical experience and case studies
Emergency Management: Concepts and Strategies for Effective Programs is an important book that will benefit students, law enforcement, and state and local emergency managers and planners involved in emergency management.
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Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2019
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Table of Contents
Cover
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION
PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION
INTRODUCTION
Chapter 1: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES: THE EVOLUTION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
Chapter 2: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVEs: TOWARD A NATIONAL RESPONSE STRATEGY
ATRINA
Chapter 3: SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE BEGINNINGS OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT THEORY
Chapter 4: THE EMERGENCY MANAGER: EVOLVING ROLES AND SHIFTING PARADIGMS
Chapter 5: ESTABLISHING THE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
Chapter 6: ASSESSING RISK
Chapter 7: DEVELOPING STRATEGY
Chapter 8: PLANNING CONCEPTS
Chapter 9: PLANNING TECHNIQUES AND METHODS
Chapter 10: COORDINATING RESPONSE
Chapter 11: LEADING IN CRISIS
Chapter 12: CRISIS MANAGEMENT
CONCLUSION
Bibliography
Index
End User License Agreement
List of Illustrations
Chapter 1
Figure 1.1 Emergency hospital during the 1918 influenza pandemic, Ca...
Figure 1.2 Mount Vesuvius from space.
Figure 1.3
The Dance of Death
by Michael Wolgemut (1434–1519) was i...
Figure 1.4 The spread of SARS virus as of 28 March 2003, about a mon...
Figure 1.5 London, as it appeared from Bankside, Southwark, during t...
Figure 1.6
An Act for the Relief of Thomas Jenkins and Company
– Th...
Figure 1.7
An Act for The Relief of Sufferers of Fire in The Town o
...
Figure 1.8 The Freedmen's Bureau evolved from a wartime source of la...
Figure 1.9 The Great Thumb Fire in Michigan in 1881 was a literal “b...
Figure 1.10 Comprehensive Emergency Management Model.
Chapter 2
Figure 2.1 An example of FEMA's attempt to marry the ESF concept to ...
Figure 2.2 The National Planning Scenarios.
Figure 2.3 The planning components of the National Incident Manageme...
Figure 2.4 The Superdome in New Orleans showing damage to the roof c...
Figure 2.5 The six components of the
National Preparedness System
....
Figure 2.6 The five guiding principles that support the
National Res
...
Chapter 3
Figure 3.1 Damage in Anchorage, Alaska, following the earthquake on ...
Figure 3.2 NIMS Framework from the
National Response Plan 2004
demon...
Figure 3.3 The London Incident Management System makes use of the th...
Figure 3.4 Crisis hierarchy model.
Figure 3.5 The three operational levels as used in local response.
Figure 3.6 The official proclamation issued by Mayor Eugene Schmitz ...
Chapter 4
Figure 4.1 Basic preparedness functions – this list of functions has...
Figure 4.2 The adoption of an accepted definition of emergency manag...
Figure 4.3 Sequential management functions.
Figure 4.4 Emergency management program elements.
Figure 4.5 FEMA professional development series curriculum.
Figure 4.6 Organizational characteristics.
Figure 4.7 The New Zealand
Civil Defence Emergency Management Compet
...
Chapter 5
Figure 5.1 Advisory committee organization.
Figure 5.2 The Regional Homeland Security Coordinating Committee for...
Figure 5.3 FIRESCOPE planning model adapted to a local jurisdiction....
Figure 5.4 Strategic planning model.
Figure 5.5 FIRESCOPE vision and mission statements.
Figure 5.6 Public safety dispatch agency vision and mission statemen...
Figure 5.7 Checklist for evaluating performance objectives.
Figure 5.8 Implementing program plans. Note the relationship between...
Figure 5.9 The Woodbury Scale.
Chapter 6
Figure 6.1 Conceptual framework for assessing and managing extreme e...
Figure 6.2 The THIRA process.
Figure 6.3 Target analysis criteria used in the CARVER methodology d...
Figure 6.4 The 2003 blackout shutdown public transportation and forc...
Figure 6.5 Cumulative rainstorms from El Niño produced widespread fl...
Figure 6.6 The Boston molasses disaster leveled several blocks of Bo...
Figure 6.7 Four quadrant hazard analysis matrix.
Figure 6.8 Hazard analysis matrix.
Figure 6.9 Hazard analysis graph based on the matrix in Figure 6.8....
Figure 6.10 Crisis barometer. Based on a model by Steven Fink,
Crisi
...
Figure 6.11 Impact analysis matrix.
Figure 6.12 Hazard profile worksheet..
Figure 6.13 Impact analysis worksheet using numerical weighting.
Figure 6.14 Sample context descriptions..
Figure 6.15 National Essential Functions.
Figure 6.16 Mission Essential Function data sheet.
Figure 6.17 Business impact analysis worksheet model template.
Chapter 7
Figure 7.1 Comprehensive emergency management model.
Figure 7.2 Model recovery and reconstruction ordinance.
Figure 7.3 Areas of responsibility in the Emergency Operations Plan....
Figure 7.4 Strategic planning model.
Chapter 8
Figure 8.1 Planning continuum – Multiple plans may be implemented si...
Figure 8.2 Plan hierarchy – Although not a direct analogy to Maslow'...
Figure 8.3 National planning scenarios – Note the emphasis on attack...
Figure 8.4 Matrix from the
National Response Plan
showing 15 emergen...
Figure 8.5 Emergency plans consist of more than a single emergency o...
Figure 8.6 One of several models of illustrating comprehensive emerg...
Figure 8.7 Synchronicity in planning: a centrally developed operatio...
Figure 8.8 This model shows the relationships among agent‐ and respo...
Chapter 9
Figure 9.1 Emergency planning model.
Figure 9.2 Meeting facilitation process based on a diagram by Intera...
Figure 9.3 Sample agenda format. The agenda helps manage expectation...
Figure 9.4 Sample meeting memorandum. This document is quicker to pr...
Figure 9.5 Sample performance elements from a work plan.
Figure 9.6 Sample of the use of a Gantt chart to display work plan i...
Figure 9.7 Decision paper format. Providing a recommendation rather ...
Figure 9.8 Emergency operations plan format.
Figure 9.9 Example of flow‐charting as a planning tool. This diagram...
Figure 9.10 Graphic tools used to support planning. This is a graphi...
Figure 9.11 The map produced by Dr. John Snow during the London chol...
Figure 9.12 The tragic loss of the space shuttle Challenger might ha...
Figure 9.13 Charles Joseph Minard's 1995 map of Napoleon's Russian C...
Figure 9.14 Composite of GIS products showing liquefaction zones and...
Chapter 10
Figure 10.1 Hurricane Charley makes landfall in the Florida Panhandl...
Figure 10.2 Management characteristics of the Incident Command Syste...
Figure 10.3 The expanded ICS organization as developed under FIRESCO...
Figure 10.4
Hospital Emergency Incident Command System
(
HEICS
), ful...
Figure 10.5 Typical community response organization. Note the confli...
Figure 10.6 Community response organization distinguishing between c...
Figure 10.7 Chart summarizing the command and coordination organizat...
Figure 10.8 Communications model showing the relationship between te...
Figure 10.9 ICS Form 205 Incident Radio Communications Plan. Althoug...
Chapter 11
Figure 11.1 Definition, vision, and mission statements for emergency...
Figure 11.2 Principles of Emergency Management developed by the POEM...
Figure 11.3 Rational choice problem solving models – models used by ...
Figure 11.4 Conflict Decision Model. Based on
Decision Making
by Jan...
Chapter 12
Figure 12.1 Botterell's Laws of Emergency Management.
Figure 12.2 Typology of Organizational Adaptation in Crisis, also kn...
Figure 12.3 Recovery timeline distinguishing between operational and...
Figure 12.4 San Francisco Mayor Willie L. Brown, Jr. created a campa...
Guide
Cover
Table of Contents
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Emergency Management
Concepts and Strategies for Effective Programs
Second Edition
LUCIEN G. CANTON, CEM
Copyright
This edition first published 2020
© 2020 John Wiley & Sons Inc.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, except as permitted by law. Advice on how to obtain permission to reuse material from this title is available at http://www.wiley.com/go/permissions.
The right of Lucien G. Canton to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted in accordance with law.
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In view of ongoing research, equipment modifications, changes in governmental regulations, and the constant flow of information relating to the use of experimental reagents, equipment, and devices, the reader is urged to review and evaluate the information provided in the package insert or instructions for each chemical, piece of equipment, reagent, or device for, among other things, any changes in the instructions or indication of usage and for added warnings and precautions. While the publisher and authors have used their best efforts in preparing this work, they make no representations or warranties with respect to the accuracy or completeness of the contents of this work and specifically disclaim all warranties, including without limitation any implied warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. No warranty may be created or extended by sales representatives, written sales materials or promotional statements for this work. The fact that an organization, website, or product is referred to in this work as a citation and/or potential source of further information does not mean that the publisher and authors endorse the information or services the organization, website, or product may provide or recommendations it may make. This work is sold with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering professional services. The advice and strategies contained herein may not be suitable for your situation. You should consult with a specialist where appropriate. Further, readers should be aware that websites listed in this work may have changed or disappeared between when this work was written and when it is read. Neither the publisher nor authors shall be liable for any loss of profit or any other commercial damages, including but not limited to special, incidental, consequential, or other damages.
Library of Congress Cataloging‐in‐Publication Data
Names: Canton, Lucien G., author.
Title: Emergency management : concepts and strategies foreffective programs /
Lucien G. Canton, CEM.
Description: Second edition. | Hoboken, NJ : John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2020. |
Includes bibliographical references and index. |
Identifiers: LCCN 2018061423 (print) | LCCN 2019003431 (ebook) | ISBN
9781119560456 (Adobe PDF) | ISBN 9781119560470 (ePub) | ISBN 9781119066859
(hardcover)
Subjects: LCSH: Emergency management–United States–Planning. | Emergency
management–United States–Evaluation.
Classification: LCC HV551.3 (ebook) | LCC HV551.3 .C36 2020 (print) | DDC
363.340973–dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018061423
Cover design: Wiley
Cover image: Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, Arnold Genthe Collection: Negatives and Transparencies, LC‐USZ62‐128020
Dedicaton
For
David Fowler
1944–2001
Newsman, colleague, mentor and friend,
But, always, a true San Franciscan
And for
Roy Kite
1928–2015
and
Ken Chin
1936–2012
Good friends and colleagues, who taught me that service to others requires integrity, commitment, and the courage to take risks.
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION
Preparedness is the ultimate confidence builder.
—Vince Lombardi
Shortly after the publication of the first edition of this book, I accepted an invitation from Dr. Wayne Blanchard at the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to give a short presentation on the book at the annual Emergency Management Higher Education Program conference in Emmitsburg, Maryland. I was stunned to find myself on stage at a plenary session with Dr. Claire Rubin on one side and Dr. Russell Dynes on the other. The contributions of these two individuals to the discipline of emergency management are almost legendary, and to find that my book was considered worthy of being included in a discussion of their new works was humbling and, frankly, a bit frightening.
Anyone who has authored a book knows that authors are very aware of the shortcomings of their books. There are things you wish you had included, things you wish you had said differently, and things you just got plain wrong. I am no different, and I still cringe when I read parts of the first edition. Consequently, when the opportunity arose to revise my book for a second edition, I jumped at the chance.
Maybe, I should have tested the water before jumping in.
Emergency management is based on the concept of continuous improvement. This makes it a very dynamic field that is constantly evolving. Each disaster, and there have been many since my book was first published in 2007, presents us with new challenges and new solutions. We learn from our experiences and revise our strategies. This dynamic change is reflected in evolving national strategies, strategies that I am gratified to see incorporate some of the concepts I espoused in the first edition of this book.
There have been significant changes in the academic world as well, as emergency management has come into its own as an academic discipline. With the increase in higher education programs and the number of doctoral candidates, we have seen the emergence of academic journals devoted to emergency management and an increase in the volume of research on emergency management issues. Much of this work is being done by a new generation of researchers who are dedicated to this new discipline of emergency management.
Perhaps one of the most significant advances has been the emergence of an accepted definition of emergency management and of the Principles or Emergency Management. One of the major problems in emergency management has been a lack of identity. We still have a long way to go in defining who we are and what we do, but the Principles of Emergency Management project is a major milestone in that journey.
What has not changed, though, is the need for emergency managers to move beyond their traditional role as a response technician to that of a manager with responsibility for formulating program strategy and serving as an advisor to senior officials. The range of threats we face is increasing, particularly in cybersecurity. The rise of social media has drastically changed how we communicate warnings. The 24‐hour news cycle has had a major impact on our media relations. No single individual or small team can handle the diversity of problems we must confront. Now, more than ever, emergency management must be an enterprise‐wide program, and the emergency manager must be forward thinking and capable of seeing beyond just issues of response.
As I said in the preface to the first edition, no book is the sole product of the author, and I have leaned heavily on the work of many others. To my many friends in the academic community, thank you for your enthusiastic reception of my book and your many thoughtful suggestions for improving it. Without your work, this book would not exist. Thank you also to my colleagues and friends in the emergency management community; many of the ideas and concepts in this book came from you and your willingness to share your wisdom. One of the privileges I have enjoyed since the publication of the first edition was the numerous invitations to teach at universities in the United States and in Ireland. To all those students who let me try out new ideas and concepts on them and challenged me to learn more about my profession, thank you. The future is yours and you are up to the challenge.
Very special thanks go to the staff at John Wiley and Sons. This book took much longer than it should have, and throughout it, all my editors were encouraging and understanding. Their patience with this project was greatly appreciated.
And, as always, I am grateful for the love and support of my wife, Doreen. I am constantly amazed at her patience and willingness to put up with crazy ideas.
PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION
An invasion of armies can be resisted, but not an idea whose time has come.
—Victor Hugo
This is not the book I planned to write. When I first started this project in 2004, my original plan was to base the book on material I had developed for a course on emergency planning and management that I had taught for the University of California at Long Beach and to incorporate new information I had gained by teaching seminars on the National Preparedness Standard for New York University's INTERCEP program. It was to have been a very conventional book, focused on the tactical issues so dear to us old dinosaurs in emergency management.
Hurricane Katrina changed all that. As my colleagues and I wrestled with the issues of catastrophic response, I began to question a lot of our traditional approaches to disaster response. An article by Dr. E.L. Quarantelli on the qualitative differences between catastrophe and disaster added fuel to the flames and sent me back to the social science literature. A comment during a presentation at the 2005 International Association of Emergency Managers conference provided the catalyst that made all the disparate elements come together.
This book approaches emergency management from a different perspective than the traditional four phases of emergency management. It does not have the equally traditional listing of hazards and impacts. It does not even give a lot of detail about response. There are plenty of excellent books already available that deal with these topics. Instead, I have focused on the development of emergency management programs and attempted to position these programs within local government in a way that contributes to community goals by helping to manage community risk. The idea of emergency management as an enterprise‐wide program forms, I believe, the core of the National Preparedness Standard, NFPA 1600, and its derivative, the Emergency Management Accreditation Program Standard. This concept also demands a change in the role of the emergency manager from that of a technical expert who is responsible for everything vaguely related to disasters to that of a program manager who coordinates the community's management of risk.
This is a very different perspective from the way we have traditionally viewed emergency managers. However, the best emergency managers have either already adapted to this concept or are on their way to doing so. More importantly, an entirely new generation of future emergency managers is emerging from our educational institutions, potential leaders who are trained in this new paradigm. The real issue for our profession will be gaining the acceptance of elected officials and the public for this new role and overcoming the roadblocks created by the well‐meaning but out‐of‐touch Department of Homeland Security.
The ideas in this book are likely to be controversial and, I hope, spark discussion among my colleagues. There is no single best way to respond to disasters – by virtue of the need for innovation and creative problem‐solving during response, there really cannot be. However, we can define a common set of criteria that positions us for success. It is this belief that has caused a number of my colleagues to expend considerable efforts to develop NFPA 1600 and the EMAP Standard. Therefore, although some of my ideas may be controversial, they are grounded in this common set of criteria and in a considerable body of social science research.
I had hoped initially to write a book that would be applicable to both the public and private sectors. However, I began to realize that there are, in fact, qualitative differences between the two sectors that make such a task extremely difficult. The principles are the same, but there are enough subtle nuances that would have made the book cumbersome. Wherever I could, I have tried to focus on concepts and principles; therefore, it is my hope that this book may be of some value to my colleagues in the private sector.
I have had to make similar decisions in some of the titles I selected. Over the last few years, there have been many new players getting involved in disaster response. We are seeing a convergence of disciplines that will have a profound impact on our professions in the future. Risk managers, security managers, business continuity managers, and so many others are lending important new skills to our programs. Therefore, although I have focused this book on public sector emergency managers, it is my hope that there will be applicability to the other disciplines that are involved with disaster response. Each of these disciplines has a specialized body of knowledge that makes us experts in our field, but there is a commonality among disciplines when we start discussing emergency preparedness and response.
It has been said that no book is the sole product of the author and how true that is! The two most humbling things I know are teaching a course or writing a book about your profession. It forces you to confront how little you really know and how much better others have expressed the ideas you are groping toward. Thomas Edison once said that, “If I have seen farther than others, it is because I have stood on the shoulders of giants.” Many of those giants are listed in the bibliography.
I am an emergency management dinosaur. I came to the profession with previous experience in private security and the military at a time when you learned your craft from your mentors and your colleagues. It was years before I discovered that everything that I had learned the hard way had already been written about by social scientists such as Russell Dynes and E.L. Quarantelli. The advantage to coming to their work late in my career is that I know they are right – their work corresponds to the lessons I have learned in over 30 years of dealing with crisis. Therefore, to all those social scientists that are building the knowledge base so critical to our profession, at least one emergency manager has heard you and appreciates your hard work.
For the rest, there are friends and colleagues around the world who have taught me my craft and had a part, however unknowing, in the writing of this book. I am always amazed at the generosity of my fellow emergency managers and their willingness to help in any and all circumstances. If I have learned anything in this business, it has been because of you. You know who you are.
A final thank you goes, as always, to my wife Doreen, who suffered through multiple rereading's of the initial manuscript and encouraged me to keep plugging away. For over 20 years, she has been my moral compass and best friend.
INTRODUCTION
“I cannot imagine any condition which would cause a ship to founder. I cannot conceive of any vital disaster happening to this vessel. Modern ship building has gone beyond that.”
—Captain Edward John Smith, Commander, HMS Titanic
When on Friday, 24 February 2006, the White House issued a report entitled, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, one salty emergency manager observed “It ain't a lesson learned until you correct it and prove it works. Until then, it's just an observation.” The White House report was just one of several released around the same time, all saying essentially the same thing: as a nation, the United States is not prepared to deal with catastrophe.
How is this possible? The United States has been in the emergency management business for over 50 years. There are volumes of social science reports on human behavior in disaster. There are detailed records on historical disasters that have occurred in the past 300 years and geological records going back to prehistory. Millions have been spent on building the capacity to respond. Since September 11 there has been an even bigger push to strengthen and enhance emergency response capabilities. And yet, in the biggest test in US history, the system failed at all levels of government.
Despite vows to improve things, little has changed. Hurricane Sandy in 2012 highlighted weaknesses in key infrastructure. The multiple disasters in 2017 severely taxed the United State's ability to respond, particularly on the island of Puerto Rico. These are not, unfortunately, isolated cases. Every disaster seems to generate a list of failures couched as “lessons learned,” along with pledges to improve the system. Few of those pledges are ever implemented. Yet, like Captain Smith, citizens in the United States believe that a sophisticated system of response is in place to protect them from the unthinkable. There is an expectation that, no matter what the event, government will be there to provide immediate and effective relief.
To a certain extent, emergency management in the United States is a victim of its own success. Response is extremely fast compared to other countries, and there is a culture of professionalism among first responders that makes them second to none. However, this has led to the expectation that disaster response is a government responsibility, not a collective one, and there are increased demands for more immediate and detailed services. This is a demand that has obvious limits, as demonstrated by Hurricane Katrina.
Government officials at all levels go out of their way to reinforce these public expectations. In a speech to the Heritage Foundation, Michael Chertoff, at the time Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, encouraged people to be prepared, saying “…you cannot count on help coming in the first 24 or even 48 hours of a catastrophe … people who are prepared with that kind of planning do much better if they have to wait 24–48 hours than people who don't do that planning.” Secretary Chertoff seemed unaware that he had just shortened the normal recommendation of preparing for a minimum of 72 hours by 24–48 hours and further encouraged the public's expectation of immediate response.
It is unheard of for an elected official to admit the truth. Disasters, by definition, overwhelm available local resources. You can never be fully prepared; there is not enough money or political will to fund all the requirements for mitigation and preparedness planning that would ensure full readiness. Preparedness is a balancing act, with most politicians betting that a disaster will not happen on their watch and that the public will not discover the thin veneer that passes for preparedness. Jurisdictions are unprepared, and it is extremely unlikely that they will ever reach the level of preparedness that the public believes already exists. The bar has been set too high to be supported by local, state, or federal government without a major shift of priorities.
However, as one reads after‐action reports and “lessons learned,” one begins to sense commonalities. It is seldom the initial life‐saving response that is criticized. Police, fire, and emergency medical personnel usually get high marks for their efforts in a crisis. Witness the praise deservedly heaped on the US Coast Guard for its rescue of 33 000 victims during Hurricane Katrina (an operation so successful that Secretary Chertoff believed that only Coast Guard admirals were qualified to serve as Principal Federal Officials). Instead, criticism seems to fall into two areas. The first is related to traditional victim services such as sheltering or evacuation. Criticism of victim services usually reflects inadequacy of service or confusion in the delivery of services brought on by poor coordination among relief agencies. Indeed, some social scientists suggest that the biggest problem in disasters is not the impact of the event on the victims but the lack of coordination among multiple responding agencies. This confusion and lack of coordination can impede the delivery of services.
The second major area of criticism relates to long‐term issues. This is usually characterized by conflicts over reconstruction policies. Again, one notes concerns over confusion in the process. There is a lack of coordination and public participation that leads to delays in the rebuilding of a community and the restoration of its economic base. It is during this recovery period that one generally sees the emergence of finger‐pointing and an increase in underlying social tension. There is usually a conflict between citizens who want to rebuild quickly and return the community to the way it was and officials who push for improved structures or social re‐engineering.
Again, one must ask the question “Why?” Why, in a system that has almost 70 years of experience in countless disasters, that has national guidelines, that has millions in government funding, and that has reams of textbooks and social science reports, why is it that the system seems to fail more than it works, and why do those failures always seem to be in the same areas? Can the United States do better?
The fact that these failures seem to occur in almost every disaster and in almost always the same areas would seem to suggest that there is something wrong with the system. Social science suggests some of the reasons. Emergency management issues do not generally engage local officials. In many jurisdictions, the responsibility for developing emergency response capacity rests with a single individual and is usually an additional duty. Emergency planning is viewed as a task centered on the development of a paper plan, and there is no real linkage between emergency management and community goals and vision. Worse, emergency plans incorporate assumptions based on disaster myths that do not reflect the reality of human behavior in disasters.
This book suggests that the United States can do better by changing the nature of emergency management and traditional response. It is time for a different approach, one that is supported by social science and by new national standards for emergency management programs. This approach is based on the concept that emergency management is a distributed process, one that must be collectively performed by the community. This suggests that emergency management must be integrated with other community goals and, as such, must be perceived as adding value to the community. This added value is achieved by helping the community manage overall risk. The community‐wide approach also holds implications for the emergency manager. Instead of being a technical expert on emergency operations, the emergency manager becomes a program manager whose job is to facilitate the development of a community strategy for managing risk and to oversee the enterprise‐wide implementation of that strategy. This focus on strategy allows all the various components of the community to work together to achieve a common vision of resilience.
The first four chapters of this book focus on the three pillars on which successful emergency management is based: an understanding of history, knowledge of social science research, and technical expertise in emergency management operations. The chapters also provide insight as how emergency management has evolved and suggest reasons why the current method of response planning does not work as well as it should.
Chapter 1 briefly looks at the historical underpinnings of emergency management up to the 1950s. Chapter 2 focuses on the development of a national strategy for disaster response and a disaster bureaucracy. Chapter 3 traces the emergence of emergency management theory through the work of social scientists. Chapter 4 considers the changing role of the emergency manager.
Chapter 5 discusses establishing and administering the emergency management program. Traditionally, emergency management “programs” have been a collection of activities with only vague relation to each other, primarily driven by federal grants. Chapter 5 provides a mechanism for addressing program governance and oversight and for linking program elements through a strategic plan.
Chapter 6 considers the analysis of risk as the basis for strategy development. It considers both the traditional macro view of hazard identification and analysis as well as the micro view required for continuity planning.
Chapter 7 covers strategy development, a major weakness in many emergency management programs. The focus is not so much on individual strategies as it is on the interface between the strategies. It is this conceptual basis that helps build the flexibility needed in disaster response.
Chapters 8 and 9 focus planning and on the development of the various plans needed within the emergency management program. The chapters are more concerned with the planning process than with specific plans and with operational planning issues rather than field operations. Chapter 8 discusses planning concepts, whereas Chapter 9 suggests methodologies to translate these concepts into actual plans.
Chapter 10 considers issues related to operational response. It discusses the pros and cons of incident management systems and suggests a coordination methodology that may prove more effective than traditional command and control structures.
Chapter 11 looks at leadership, both in the day‐to‐day administration of the emergency management program and during response to a crisis. The chapter draws a distinction between the leadership styles demanded by each and looks at models that might assist in increasing the effectiveness of leadership during a crisis.
Chapter 12 focuses on the roles and responsibilities of senior officials in the management of strategic response. It suggests that the normal involvement of the senior officials in the emergency operations center may be counterproductive and suggests new ways of managing disasters using crisis management principles.
Together, the chapters make a case for a change in how emergency management programs are integrated into communities and in the role of the emergency manager. These changes are consistent with the direction of the National Preparedness Standard and the current guidance provided by the Department of Homeland Security and are supported by social science research. It is hoped that they might point toward a more effective system of disaster response.
Chapter 1HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES: THE EVOLUTION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
What experience and history teaches us is that people and governments have never learned anything from history, or acted on principles deduced from it.
—Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel
Since the dawn of time, humankind has had the need to deal with crises of all types. For much of history, this response was personal and intimate, and the victim did not always survive the encounter. As people grouped together for the common good, the idea of some sort of collective response to crisis gradually evolved. As governments came into being, this idea became an expectation that it was part of the responsibility of government to provide protection and assistance in times of crisis. From this expectation came the discipline of emergency management, the mechanism by which government discharges this perceived obligation.
Emergency management rests on three pillars as follows: a knowledge of history, an understanding of human nature expressed in the social sciences, and specialized technical expertise in crisis management. History tells us what happened, suggesting what events could occur again, and provides examples of how others have dealt with crisis. Social science suggests why people react to crisis in certain ways and why some methods of crisis management succeed and others fail. The technical expertise demanded of the emergency manager addresses how crisis is managed, both in the immediate response, but more importantly, in the development of strategies to reduce risk and build community resilience. This chapter and the one that follows consider the first leg of the tripod on which emergency management rests, that of historical perspective.
In a posting to the email list service for the International Association for Emergency Managers, a veteran emergency manager asked the question: “Given our advances in technology, what can we possibly learn from past disasters?” His query was prompted by a student's request for information on bioterrorism response and the suggestion by several members that the student examine historical disasters, particularly the Flu Pandemic of 1918 (Figure 1.1). The emergency manager asked the question as to how an early twentieth‐century response using limited technology could have relevance for a practitioner in the twenty‐first century, where mass communication is almost instantaneous and modern methods of treatment and diagnosis are so much further advanced. It is a reasonable question.
Figure 1.1 Emergency hospital during the 1918 influenza pandemic, Camp Funston, Kansas.
Source: Courtesy of U.S. Army Photo.
A slightly different way of phrasing the question is “Does the study of the history of disasters have any relevance for emergency managers?” The answer is a resounding, “Yes!”
It is common to look at an institution, process, or system and assume that it sprang into existence as the result of conscious decision‐making. In other words, there is an assumption that the end result is what was intended all along. In reality, institutions tend to develop and evolve over time and are influenced by a variety of factors. The result is almost always an imperfect system that is a result of compromises between an ideal state and political and economic realities, many of which shift over time. Understanding how an institution developed can tell a lot about why it operates the way it does and the likelihood of its changing or adapting to future conditions.
The study of historical disasters offers a number of benefits to the emergency manager:
Historical Disasters Suggest What Could Happen in a Community
. In conducting a hazard analysis, many planners are driven by the immediate past or by disasters that had a major impact on the community. For example, emergency planners in San Francisco are heavily influenced by the memory of the 1906 earthquake and fires and by the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake. On the other hand, New Yorkers plan almost exclusively for terrorist attack, a legacy of the 11 September 2001 tragedy. Few San Franciscans are aware that hazards such as tsunamis and tornadoes have occurred in the history of their city or that an outbreak of the plague occurred in the early 1900s. Likewise, many New Yorkers would be surprised to find that a fault line runs under Manhattan Island.
Historical Disasters Identify Hazards That are Foreseeable
. Emergency planners are expected to identify and plan for hazards that could have an impact on the community. Events that are foreseeable are of particular concern as the question is always asked after the event “Why didn't we plan for this?” Prior to 11 September 2001, would anyone have thought that an airplane could be used to attack a building? Possibly not, but the possibility of an airplane flying into a building was foreseeable. On 28 July 1945, a military bomber whose pilot was disoriented by fog and drizzle crashed into the Empire State Building, igniting a major fire and forcing the evacuation of 1500 people. This historical incident did in fact influence building design throughout the United States. These design parameters helped prevent the immediate collapse of the World Trade Center buildings and allowed the safe evacuation of thousands of occupants.
Historical Disasters Provide Long‐range Views of Potential Hazards
. By nature, people tend to focus on the near term and on incidents that are part of institutional memory. However, a brief review of the historical record, particularly those events involving geological hazards, can give one pause. Prior to the 1990s, few remembered the series of earthquakes that shook New Madrid, Missouri, in 1811–1812. Yet these were among the largest earthquakes in history, changed the course of the Mississippi River, destroyed almost 150 000 acres of forest, and were felt throughout most of the United States. The overall impact was low because of the sparse population of the region at the time. The probability of a similar earthquake is estimated at 90% by 2040 and would result in great loss of life and billions in damages.
Historical Disasters Provide Examples of the Social Impacts of Disasters
. When most people think of disaster, they think in terms of immediate needs and the response to the consequences of the event. An emergency manager, however, must be concerned with the long‐range impact of the event and the need to restore the community to some semblance of normalcy. By studying the long‐range impact of historical disasters, it may be possible to make reasonable assumptions as to what might occur. While the Black Death of the 1300s is remembered for its toll on human lives, it had a profound impact on the economics and social contracts of the Middle Ages, leading ultimately to increased wages, better living conditions, and the end of the feudal system. In his book,
Krakatoa: The Day the World Exploded: August 27, 1883
, author Simon Winchester suggested that the eruption of Krakatoa exacerbated anti‐Dutch sentiment and contributed to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the Eastern Pacific.
Historical Disasters Provide Examples of Cascading Events
. Cascading events are disasters in which an initial incident creates a ripple effect that triggers additional disasters or expands to encompass areas that would otherwise be unaffected by the incident. Such an event was the 2011 Tohoku earthquake in Japan that spawned a tsunami and lead to a meltdown at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. The historical record is replete with many other such events. In April 1815, Mount Tambora, an island east of Java, exploded, spewing an estimated 1.7 million tons of ash and debris into the atmosphere and casting a blanket of ash over 1 million square miles. The lighter ash formed a barrier at an altitude of some 25 miles that reflected sunlight back into space, resulting in a cold wave in 1816 that sparked world‐wide crop failure and famine. A similar record of unseasonable cold and famine found in Dark Age chronicles has also been associated with a volcanic event in the Pacific.
Historical Disasters are Focusing Events
. Social scientist Thomas Birkland (
1994
) defined a focusing event as an unexpected event of such consequence that it causes the public and elite decision‐makers to recognize a potential policy failure. A focusing event is a combination of factors that frequently result in significant changes to public policy. For example the Triangle Waist Factory fire in New York on 25 March 1911 was not particularly significant as a fire. The fire lasted less than 20 minutes and only affected the three top floors of a 10‐story building. However, poor safety practices led to the deaths of 146 workers, most of whom were young immigrant women, making the fire the deadliest industrial disaster in the city's history. It occurred at a time when the women's labor movement was at a high point and well organized, drawing the attention of Tammany Hall politicians who were seeking to remain in power. The result was the passage of some 38 new laws that significantly improved safety and working conditions in New York State.
The gift shop at Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)'s Emergency Management Institute in Emmitsburg, Maryland, used to offer a T‐shirt with a cartoon of Noah's Ark and the caption “The Original Emergency Manager.” One can certainly make a case for this: Noah conducted a hazard analysis based on a reliable weather forecast and the potential for catastrophic loss of life and developed and implemented plans to mitigate the effects of the coming calamity (selection of the animals) and to respond to it (the construction of the ark). At the onset of the event, he implemented his plan, conducted a preplanned evacuation, and managed a sustained shelter and feeding operation for 40 days and 40 nights. At the end of the incident, he implemented a recovery plan by releasing his animals and re‐establishing a community.
Whether or not Noah is the original emergency manager, there is no question that as long as there have been disasters, people have attempted to avoid them and deal with the consequences. One could make the argument that primitive attempts to touch and influence the Divine through sacrifice and ritual are in fact an early form of mitigation, an attempt to avoid disaster or reduce its impact by placating some outside force. The myths and legends that predate recorded history contain many examples of attempts to stave off or prepare for catastrophe, many of which may have been inspired by actual historical incidents. Stories of a great flood are common to all cultures, and variations on the story of Noah can be found in the Sumerian tales of Gilgamesh, in the Indian stories of Vishnu, and even in the Popul Vuh of the Mayans. Ancient texts also contain examples of more prosaic attempts to mitigate catastrophe: The Book of Genesis tells of Joseph's stockpiling of grain against the predicted years of famine in Egypt.
These early legends of catastrophe are more than just simple stories. In many cases, archeological evidence suggests that they might in fact be records of actual historical disasters. Geologists Walter Pitman and William Ryan in their book, Noah's Flood: The New Scientific Discoveries about the Event That Changed History, theorize that Noah's flood may recall an event in 5600 BCE that led to the formation of the Black Sea. According to the theory, the sudden formation of the Bosporus Strait caused the Mediterranean Sea to flood into an existing freshwater lake at the rate of 10 cubic miles of water per day (about two hundred times the rate of Niagara Falls), creating what is now known as the Black Sea. Plato's writings on Atlantis in 350 BCE, although generally regarded as myth, may in fact be related to the volcanic destruction of the island of Thera c. 1628 BCE that may have hastened the end of the Minoan civilization in the Aegean.
Not all ancient disasters are accessible only as myths. Historians of all ages have evinced an interest in disaster, and those of the Classical Age were no different. Many of their accounts are factual records based on firsthand observation. Thucydides provides a vivid description of the plague that struck Athens in 430–428 BCE and presaged the end of the Golden Age of Greece. Thucydides' record is of particular interest as he contracted and survived the plague.
Perhaps the most gripping eyewitness account of catastrophe is Pliny the Elder's description of the eruption of Mount Vesuvius and the destruction of Pompeii and Herculaneum in 62 BCE (Figure 1.2). While a minor footnote in history now, modern scientists have estimated that the eruption of Mount Vesuvius released thermal energy equivalent to 100 000 times that of the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima, Japan, in 1945. The consummate naturalist, Pliny chose to leave a safe vantage point in Misenum and move closer to Pompeii to make more detailed observations from the deck of a small galley. He recorded his observations moment by moment until he collapsed and died, most likely from a heart attack brought on by overexertion.
Figure 1.2 Mount Vesuvius from space.
Source: Courtesy of National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
Accounts of catastrophe such as those of Thucydides and Pliny offer more than just historical interest. In many cases, they contain detailed observations of the onset and effects of the event. These accounts also chronicle the reaction of people affected by disaster and allow one to draw conclusions about human nature. The reaction of people to catastrophe in the past is not significantly different from those in the present time.
As one considers the historical record, it is also possible to identify precursors to modern emergency management concepts. Over time, one begins to note the demand by people that their governments provide them with protection against potential disasters, leading to striking parallels to current emergency management concepts and methods. This suggests that there may be a certain commonality in how humans respond to crisis. This gives rise to the speculation that there may be certain default mechanisms for crisis response that are both natural and comfortable. If so, the closer emergency plans resemble this mechanism, the more effective they are likely to be.
Elements of emergency management make their appearance early in recorded history. In response to public demand that something be done about the fires that frequently plagued Rome, the Emperor Augustus established a brigade of vigiles in 6 CE who served as firefighters and night watchmen. The brigade consisted of seven cohorts of 560 men each, with each cohort responsible for two of Rome's 14 districts. A special detail of 320 vigiles was drawn from the Roman cohorts and rotated to the ports of Ostia and Portus every four months. The vigiles were stationed in seven major barracks and 14 watchtowers and performed nightly patrols to ensure the safe use of fires and lamps. In addition to the expected hooks, axes, ladders, rope, and buckets, equipment included high‐pressure water pumps capable of reaching to a height of 60–100 ft. Each cohort also had four physicians and the Roman equivalent of a chaplain, the victimarius, assigned to it. The parallels to modern firefighting organizations are striking.
In the plague that struck Europe in 1348 (Figure 1.3), one can see reflections of modern fears of bioterrorism or pandemics, such as severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) or Asian bird flu or Ebola, and of modern emergency management practices. The arrival of the disease was stunningly swift: within three years, anywhere from 25% to 50% of Europe's population had been killed. Major cities such as Florence, Venice, Hamburg, and Bremen lost at least 60% of their populations. Paris lost 50 000 people, half of its population. Many of the problems and solutions found in the plague record are reminiscent of those faced by twenty‐first century responders. To deal with the vast number of sick people, makeshift hospitals, usually run by the clergy or volunteers, were established. These hospitals would have looked remarkably similar to the temporary hospitals of 1918 shown in Figure 1.1. The large number of dead almost immediately overwhelmed the churches that normally disposed of remains through burial in consecrated ground, forcing the use of mass graves and cremation, techniques that are still used in disasters despite the fact that such practices are unnecessary and create severe problems for the victims' families. Cremation and mass burial continue to be used for the same reasons they were used in the Middle Ages: fear of contagion and a misunderstanding of the health hazards posed by mass fatalities.
Figure 1.3The Dance of Death by Michael Wolgemut (1434–1519) was inspired by the Black Death and was a common theme in medieval art.
The Black Death forced a reexamination of traditional medical practices. Up to this point, many treatments were based on biblical cures and traditional remedies. The almost universal failure of these remedies resulted in their replacement by techniques based on observed results. In some cases, observation supported traditional methods. For example, the frequent misdiagnosis of the plague as leprosy led to the imposition of a biblically mandated 40‐day quarantine. Despite this misdiagnosis, physicians noted that quarantining those ill with plague helped to protect others. The success of this practice led in turn to harsh quarantine restrictions in several areas. The city of Pistoia ceased all imports of wool and linen and barred citizens who had visited plague‐ridden towns from reentering the city. In other locations, such as Milan, houses where the plague appeared were sealed up, with both the dead and living inside. Other jurisdictions used fire to burn out the contagion. These measures did result in slowing the spread of the disease.
The outbreak of SARS (Figure 1.4) in 2003 forced a reexamination of the use of quarantine as a method for preventing the spread of contagion. The epidemic began in November 2002 and came to public attention in February 2003. In April, the World Health Organization (WHO) issued an advisory recommending only essential travel to Toronto, Canada, based on the number of cases there and concerns over the potential spread of the disease to other countries. However, only one confirmed case of SARS was “exported” from Canada, and new cases were all from among medical personnel who had treated SARS patients and who were subjected to severe quarantine restrictions. Nevertheless, the WHO persisted in prompting similar advisories from other countries that resulted in a severe blow to tourism in Canada. In the reaction of the WHO, one hears echoes from Pistoia.
Figure 1.4 The spread of SARS virus as of 28 March 2003, about a month after the initial outbreak in February.
Source: Library of Congress Geography and Map Division.
The relationship between disaster and attempts to prevent its reoccurrence or reduce its impact is one that repeats itself throughout history. The Great Fire of London in 1666 (Figure 1.5) offers another example of this relationship. Started by a careless baker who had failed to douse his oven fire at night, the fire burned for five days and destroyed some 436 acres, most within the City of London. Eighty‐seven churches and 13 200 houses, about 90% of the city's houses, were destroyed and between 100 000 to 200 000 people were left homeless. Oddly, only six fatalities are recorded, although there is anecdotal evidence that the initial toll was much higher and increased over time as survivors succumbed to disease and starvation. (Inaccurate casualty figures are common in historical accounts: until 2005, the official death toll for the 1906 San Francisco earthquake and fire was only 478. Research by historian Gladys Hansen convinced the board of supervisors to amend the official count in 2005 to over 3400. The original number had been deliberately distorted for political reasons.)
Figure 1.5 London, as it appeared from Bankside, Southwark, during the Great Fire – From a print by Nicolaes Visscher.
Source: Robert Chambers, Book of Days, 1864.
Following the fire, houses were rebuilt from brick and stone instead of wood and thatch to reduce the risk of fire. Insurance companies were chartered to provide both insurance indemnification and, in some cases, firefighting companies that would attempt to rescue insured properties. A water main system of hollowed tree trunks was laid under city streets to provide water to firefighters, who would dig down to the main and drill a hole to access the water. (The wooden plug used to seal the hole is the origin of the term “fireplug” still in use today.)
These examples of historical disasters demonstrate a number of key points. First, they emphasize that while catastrophic events often seem sudden and unexpected, in many cases, they are at least foreseeable. This unwillingness to see the possibility of catastrophe and to instead treat foreseeable disasters as “Acts of God” is a common theme throughout history. The refusal of the Lord Mayor to deal with London's fire risk in 1666 is echoed again in the failure of San Francisco's Mayor Schmitz to act on the warnings of his fire chief prior to the earthquake and fires in 1906. The potential for failure of the New Orleans levee system was well known prior to Hurricane Katrina, but little was done to prevent it.
A study of historical disaster shows another disturbing trend: the practice of preparing to deal with the last catastrophe instead of considering all possible hazards. The Great Plague of London had begun in 1664 and reached its peak in 1665, killing 68 596 (this is the official figure, but it is highly likely the total exceeded 100 000). The primary concern of the citizens of London, despite warnings and predictions of destruction by fire that included a letter of concern from King Charles II to the Lord Mayor, was plague, not fire. One sees the same pattern in the focus on nuclear war planning in the civil defense era that resulted in inadequate response during Hurricane Hugo in 1989 and Hurricane Andrew in 1992. The overwhelming emphasis on terrorism prevention and response after September 11 at the expense of all‐hazards planning and the resulting debacle during Hurricane Katrina is yet another example.
A subtler lesson, however, is how quickly good emergency management practices can deteriorate. London had a firefighting capability similar to that established by Augustus in Rome in the first century. However, when the legions withdrew in 451 CE, the system was allowed to fall into disuse. William the Conqueror had established a law in the eleventh century requiring that all fires be put out at night to reduce the danger from fire (called couvre‐feu or “cover fire” from which we derive the modern term “curfew”), but this was not well enforced in 1666. Building codes that dated from the twelfth century requiring party walls to be built of stone were likewise unheeded.
There are similar parallels to San Francisco in 1906. The city had suffered from several major fires throughout its brief history and had established a series of underground cisterns to provide firefighters with emergency water sources, the first being built in 1852. By 1866, a system of some 50 cisterns was in place across the city. The last cistern was built in 1872, at which time the city had 64 cisterns with a capacity of 3 million gallons. The advent of volunteer fire departments and the development of steam pumps made the system obsolete in the public mind, and cisterns were routinely used to dispose of rubbish or were destroyed during construction. By 1906, only 23 cisterns were still listed as active, the rest being considered “lost.” Pleas by fire chiefs for funding for the system, including Dennis Sullivan in 1905, went unheeded, with catastrophic results.
