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- Herausgeber: Wiley-VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA
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- Sprache: Englisch
Provides a hands-on approach to demilitarization and environmental aspects of energetic materials and munitions
This book gives an overview of the environmental impact of the production, use, and cleanup of energetic materials and munitions. It provides scientists, engineers, environmental specialists, and users with the understanding of environmental issues for munitions and of the ways to improve design and manage potential risks. It covers the various aspects of how chemical properties influence fate, transport, and toxicity of new formulations and prescribes tools for reducing or alleviating environmental risks. In addition, it discusses pyrotechnics and the problem of dealing with munitions underwater.
Chapters in Energetic Materials and Munitions: Life Cycle Management, Environmental Impact and Demilitarization look at demilitarization in general, as well as in the future. Topics covered include logistics, costs, and management; life cycle analysis and management; and greener munitions. Another introduces readers to the "One Health" approach in the design of sustainable munition compounds. Following that, readers are taught about land assessment for munitions-related contamination in military live-fire training. The book also examines the development and integration of environmental, safety, and occupational health information.
-Brings together in one source expertise and in-depth information on the current and future state of how we handle the production, use, and demilitarization of explosives and weaponry
-A handy reference for experienced practitioners, as well as for training young professionals in the field
-Every chapter contains real-life examples and proposes future directions for the field
Energetic Materials and Munitions: Life Cycle Management, Environmental Impact and Demilitarization is an important book for explosives specialists, pyrotechnicians, materials scientists, military authorities, safety officers, health officers, and chemical engineers.
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Seitenzahl: 532
Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2019
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Table of Contents
Cover
Preface
1 Introduction and Overview
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Legislative Impact
1.3 NATO Studies
1.4 New Ingredients and Compositions
1.5 Toxicology
1.6 Life‐Cycle Analysis
1.7 Managing Contamination and Clean‐Up
1.8 Disposal Now and in the Future
1.9 Recycling
1.10 Conclusions
References
2 General Introduction to Ammunition Demilitarization*
2.1 Part one – Logistics, Costs, and Management
2.2 Part Two – Environmental Issues and Demilitarization
References
3 Assessment and Sustainment of the Environmental Health of Military Live‐fire Training Ranges
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Background and Context
3.3 Munition‐Related Contaminants
3.4 Surface Soil Characterization in Live‐fire Training Ranges
3.5 Methodology for the Precise Measurements of MC Sources
3.6 Tailored Management Practices: Mitigation and Remediation
3.7 Emerging Constituents
3.8 Conclusion
References
4 Greener Munitions
4.1 Background and Context
4.2 Munitions Constituents of Concern
4.3 Source of Munitions Constituents
4.4 Greener Munitions Development Approach
4.5 RIGHTTRAC
4.6 New Enhanced and Green Plastic Explosive for Demolition and Ordnance Disposal
4.7 Conclusions
References
5 Pyrotechnics and The Environment
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH)
5.3 Qualification
5.4 Civilian Studies
5.5 Production
5.6 Site Location
5.7 Production
5.8 Raw Materials Acquisition and Quality Control
5.9 Specific Materials Production
5.10 Heavy Metals
5.11 Perchlorates and Chlorates
5.12 Smokes
5.13 Volatilization Smokes
5.14 Magnesium Teflon Viton (MTV) Countermeasures
5.15 Resins, Binders, and Solvents
5.16 Storage
5.17 Packaging Waste
5.18 Usage and Disposal
5.19 Heavy Metals
5.20 Perchlorates and Chlorates
5.21 Smokes
5.22 Disposal and Waste Burning
5.23 The Future?
5.24 Suitably Qualified and Experienced Person (SQEP) Issues
5.25 Integration
Acknowledgements
References
6 Munitions in the Sea
6.1 Introduction
6.2 The Controlling Factors
6.3 Tools for Assessment and Remediation
6.4 The Outstanding Problems
6.5 Moving Forward
Acknowledgements
References
7 Environmental Assessment of Military Systems with the Life‐Cycle Assessment Methodology
7.1 Overview of the Life‐Cycle Assessment Methodology
7.2 The Four Phases of the LCA Methodology Applied to a Case Study
7.3 Limitations of Life‐Cycle Assessment
7.4 Conclusions
References
8 Integrating the ‘One Health’ Approach in the Design of Sustainable Munition Systems
8.1 General Background
8.2 Munition Compounds and Aetiology of Environmental, Safety, and Occupational Health Issues: Lessons Learnt
8.3 Core Operational ESOH Data: Needs and Requirements
8.4 Current and Evolving Regulatory Interests
8.5 Case Studies and Cost Analysis
8.6 Summary
Acknowledgements
References
9 Overview of REACH Regulation and Its Implications for the Military Sector
9.1 Introduction
9.2 Regulation for Hazard Substances
9.3 Conclusions
References
10 Development and Integration of Environmental, Safety, and Occupational Health Information
10.1 Introduction
10.2 Phased Approach to a Toxicology Data Requirement
10.3 Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation
10.4 Other Data Requirements
10.5 Concluding Remarks
Acknowledgements
References
11 Research Priorities and the Future
11.1 Introduction
11.2 Greener Munitions
11.3 Studies and Their Effect
11.4 The Problems and the Changing Requirements
11.5 Security Issues and Their Impact on Requirement
11.6 Future Options and Needs in a Changing Political Landscape
11.7 Conclusions
References
Index
End User License Agreement
List of Tables
Chapter 2
Table 2.1 Generic list of demilitarization processes.
Chapter 3
Table 3.1 Munitions constituents (MC)
mostly detected in RTAs.
Table 3.2 Deposition of RDX and HMX and related detonation rates (DR) followi...
Chapter 4
Table 4.1 Water solubility of energetic materials
.
Table 4.2 Performance of GIM and CX‐85 relative to Comp B.
Table 4.3 IM tests results for the explosive candidates and reference formulat...
Table 4.4 Transport properties and toxicity of Comp B, GIM, and CX‐85.
Table 4.5 Gun propellant performance at 21 °C and mechanical properties, relat...
Table 4.6 IM tests results for the propellant candidates and reference formul...
Table 4.7 Transport properties and toxicity of M1, MSB, and L320.
Table 4.8 Detonation residues of live‐fire and blow‐in‐place of GIM‐ and Comp...
Chapter 5
Table 5.1 Historic gunpowder compositions.
Table 5.2 A comparison of dynamic behaviour of B
4
C‐based flares to W‐based HH...
Table 5.3 Common yellow‐light‐producing flare emission bands, excluding black...
Table 5.4 Successful yellow flare compositions from the Naval Surface Warfare...
Chapter 7
Table 7.1 Data referent to the materials used for the production of 9‐mm ammunit...
Table 7.2 Data referent to the materials used for the production of 9‐mm ammunit...
Table 7.3 Consumption of energy and water associated with the assembling of a...
Table 7.4 Life‐cycle inventory for the production of RDX and the intermediary pr...
Table 7.5 Emissions associated with the firing of the four different 9‐mm ammuni...
Table 7.6 Description of six environmental impact categories from CML method.
Chapter 8
Table 8.1 Chemical/physical properties of ESOH use.
Table 8.2 Relative cost estimates of selected toxicology tests needed for asse...
Chapter 9
Table 9.1 Limits of the physico‐chemical and toxicity properties established ...
Table 9.2 Physico‐chemical and toxicity properties associated with dibutyl phtha...
Chapter 10
Table 10.1 Data and
in silico
models available to predict chemical properties and...
Table 10.2 Data and methods needed at the synthesis stage.
a)
Table 10.3 Data requirements for testing and demonstration.
Table 10.4 Tests for engineering and manufacturing.
List of Illustrations
Chapter 1
Figure 1.1 Demonstration of (a) a large detonation
and (b) the aftermath – resi...
Figure 1.2 (a) Current and (b) proposed assessment practice – see Chapter 8.
Figure 1.3
Comparison of (a) smoky and (b) smokeless propellants.
Chapter 2
Figure 2.1 Basic flow chart for industrial demilitarization.
Figure 2.2 Typical process steps during industrial demilitarization. (a) Disass...
Figure 2.3 Recovering commercially viable materials
and preparing any hazardous...
Figure 2.4 Industrial demilitarization facilities. (a) Satellite view of demili...
Figure 2.5 Open burning and open destruction. (a) Preparation for open detonati...
Figure 2.8 Automated, semi‐manual, and manual processing. (a) High‐capacity pro...
Figure 2.9 An example of publically available emissions data as part of an indu...
Figure 2.11 Example of publically available data from the annual EMS report of ...
Figure 2.12 Mass detonation of ammunition in a deep mine facility in Norway.
Figure 2.13 (a) Diagram of a burning cage and (b) photo of a partially damaged ...
Figures 2.14 Example of cost and CO
2
used to examine two options for a major di...
Figure 2.15 CO
2
emissions for a typical long‐haul flight.
Figure 2.16 Typical CO
2
estimates
used to examine two options for the transport...
Figure 2.17 Example of a preliminary estimate to determine open burning vs EWI ...
Figure 2.18 Examples of mobile demilitarization plants
.
Figure 2.19 Practical demilitarization steps. (a) Initial disassembly of Multip...
Chapter 3
Figure 3.1 Surface soil sampling pattern.
Figure 3.2 Sampling post‐detonation residues
over snow.
Figure 3.3 Snow sample filtration
.
Figure 3.4 Sampling small arms propellant residues
using traps.
Figure 3.5 NG concentrations with the distance from a 9‐mm pistol.
Figure 3.6 Winter trial in Canada to compare the (a) snow and (b) trap methods.
Figure 3.7 Thermal treatment of surface soils.
Figure 3.8 Surface and subsurface soil temperatures with time.
Chapter 4
Figure 4.1 RIGHTTRAC concept.
Figure 4.2 A 105‐mm Howitzer gun
used for demonstration.
Figure 4.3 GIM detonation.
Figure 4.4 Set‐up for DM12 detonation and deposition rate measurement.
Chapter 7
Figure 7.1 Representation of the life‐cycle phases of a product.
Figure 7.2 The four phases of the life‐cycle assessment methodology.
Figure 7.3 Representation of the foreground and background systems.
Figure 7.4 System boundaries associated with the production and use of small ca...
Figure 7.5 Representation of the connection between the inventory data, environ...
Figure 7.6 USEtox framework for calculating the toxicological impacts on human ...
Figure 7.7 Environmental life‐cycle impacts
, calculated with the CML method, as...
Figure 7.8 Toxicological life‐cycle impacts
, calculated with the USEtox method,...
Figure 7.9 Main contributors to the environmental life‐cycle impacts, calculate...
Figure 7.10 Main contributors to the toxicological life‐cycle impacts, calculat...
Chapter 8
Figure 8.1 Unacceptable (a) and optimal (b) conceptual approaches to obtaining ...
Figure 8.2 Example flow chart using chemical/physical properties to infer on ex...
Figure 8.3 Example flow chart with appropriate bioassay to be used in a phased ...
Chapter 9
Figure 9.1 Comparison of the human toxicological characterization factors of di...
Figure 9.2 Comparison of the ecotoxicological characterization factors of dibut...
Guide
Cover
Table of Contents
Begin Reading
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E1
Energetic Materials and Munitions
Life Cycle Management, Environmental Impact and Demilitarization
Edited by
Adam S. Cumming
Mark S. Johnson
Copyright
Editors
Prof. Adam S. Cumming
University of Edinburgh
School of Chemistry
David Brewster Road
Joseph Black Building
EH9 3FJ Edinburgh
United Kingdom
Dr. Mark S. Johnson
US Army Public Health Center
5158 Black Hawk Rd
Aberdeen Proving Ground
21010 Gunpowder MD
United States
All books published by Wiley‐VCH are carefully produced. Nevertheless, authors, editors, and publisher do not warrant the information contained in these books, including this book, to be free of errors. Readers are advised to keep in mind that statements, data, illustrations, procedural details or other items may inadvertently be inaccurate.
Library of Congress Card No.: applied for
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A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
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The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at <http://dnb.d‐nb.de>.
© 2019 Wiley‐VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Boschstr. 12, 69469 Weinheim, Germany
All rights reserved (including those of translation into other languages). No part of this book may be reproduced in any form – by photoprinting, microfilm, or any other means – nor transmitted or translated into a machine language without written permission from the publishers. Registered names, trademarks, etc. used in this book, even when not specifically marked as such, are not to be considered unprotected by law.
Print ISBN: 978‐3‐527‐34483‐3
ePDF ISBN: 978‐3‐527‐81664‐4
ePub ISBN: 978‐3‐527‐81666‐8
oBook ISBN: 978‐3‐527‐81665‐1
Cover Design: Adam-Design, Weinheim, Germany
Preface
Concern for the environment is important in all aspects of science at present. Energetic materials and munitions are by design materials that result in environmental releases. While sustainable use of these materials is essential worldwide to meet defence and security needs, they are not exempt from regulations that are aimed at protecting public health. Therefore, mitigating past contamination, and minimising present and future impact while munitions are used will be of enduring concern as long as these materials are employed.
There have been several publications, both as books or scientific papers that have addressed aspects of the problem, but no overview has been produced aimed at drawing the various strands together.
This book is therefore intended to be an introduction to the wide area of environmental aspects as they affect munitions and energetics. It will introduce scientists, technologists and users to the understanding of environmental issues for munitions and of ways to manage potential risks. It is aimed at providing a basic understanding of the science and its application to reducing environmental risks in the design, use and disposal of munitions. It therefore provides chapters covering the various topics and considerations which will be shown to affect each other and to affect planning for the future.
The research, development, testing, production, use, and disposal of these munitions contributes to the overall environmental impact. Research and testing involves environmental releases, as do products from manufacturing and demilitarisation. Since handling of munitions with energetic materials requires great care and considerable cost, the approach to demilitarisation is covered with examples of the types of problems currently found and an assessment of future needs and directions.
The environmental impact of the processes must be acceptable to an increasingly critical general population to avoid anti‐military backlash or unintelligent imposition of any environmental law. Clean up and restoring areas where military activities have resulted in contaminated ground or water often requires significant resources. Past practices such as dumping at sea, open burning, or dumping into land‐fill sites are no longer generally acceptable. There is also a need to understand and minimise the environmental impact from munitions, so we can handle and manage that impact properly.
The chapters cover Demilitarisation; Toxicology; Greener Munitions of all kinds; Land Management and the problem of Underwater contamination as well as Life Cycle Analysis and also discusses options for the future through coverage of current research and how this might affect the application of technology.
It arose from a series of lectures sponsored by the NATO Science and Technology Organisation aimed providing just that overview and has been expanded and updated to more fully provide a useful review text, which should lead to deeper study where appropriate. The authors are international experts with wide experience in international collaborative work in the area and have drawn on that experience for their chapters.
We are grateful to our co‐authors for their time, support and contributions and to NATO STO for both providing the support for the initial lectures and agreeing to its development into this volume
Adam S. Cumming
Mark S. Johnson
1Introduction and Overview
Adam S. Cumming
University of Edinburgh, School of Chemistry, Joseph Black Building, The King's Buildings, David Brewster Road, Edinburgh, EH9 3FJ, UK
1.1 Introduction
Armed forces countries possess and use large quantities of munitions. Civil authorities, such as space agencies, also use quantities of energetic materials. The production, use, and disposal of these materials make a contribution to the overall environmental impact. Handling of munitions with energetic materials requires great care and considerable cost. The environmental impact of the processes must be acceptable to an increasingly critical general population to avoid public concern and be acceptable under environmental laws. Significant funds must be used to clean up and restore areas where military activities have polluted the ground or water. Past practices such as dumping at sea or into landfill sites are no longer generally acceptable. There is a need to know and minimize the environmental impact from munitions so that environmental management can be undertaken properly.
Governments have a duty of care to the members of their armed forces, and all reasonable precautions must be exercised to ensure safe use of munitions. For example, some weapons systems can spread over 70% of their energetic material, particularly propellant around the shooting range. This is a health risk with the hazard of fires after prolonged use of the shooting range and there is also a work environment hazard. It is also an environmental hazard since a propellant's environmental hazard assessment is usually based on the final combustion products and not on the propellant itself.
The design of new weapons should include disposal procedures and an environmental impact statement. The understanding of munitions disposal is still lagging behind this design requirement although progress has been made, as is noted in this volume. However, to better meet the requirement, it is important to fully understand the environmental issues so that they do not place undue constraints on the design of weapons. Such understanding can also reduce the costs.
To be able to assess the environmental impact of the munitions, we need the right environmental assessment tools. To minimize the impact of manufacture and manage green munitions, it is important to look at all processes governing these activities.
This activity has been developing for many years and has been reported [1–6].
Finally, there is the need to understand, manage, and decontaminate after events such as those mentioned subsequently (Figure 1.1).
Figure 1.1 Demonstration of (a) a large detonation and (b) the aftermath – residues left.
What we need to develop is a planned management method, and this is discussed later (Figure 1.2).
Figure 1.2 (a) Current and (b) proposed assessment practice – see Chapter 8.
1.2 Legislative Impact
Public pressure has led to the implementation of legislation to manage environmental impact. This has gradually evolved from ad hoc national approaches to systematic regulations such as the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) in the European Union (EU) where the law is limiting and controls the availability and use of materials.
While such legislation is of prime importance in the nations where it is directly applied, it has an effect elsewhere since import and export of materials is transnational and those imposing the legislation are usually the largest users and hence the largest market for the materials. For example the imposition of REACH terms affects the sales of energetic materials, etc. to EU nations from outside the EU [7].
The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the EU [7] have focused on minimizing impact, and in the EU legislation the control of chemicals is being introduced. Therefore, changing public perception and new legislation means that the environmental impact of munitions and their ingredients cannot be ignored. We require understanding of the problems if they are to be dealt with, simply:
(i) What is the impact of manufacturing processes as presently used and how may they be improved? Are there alternatives available or likely to become available?
(ii) What is the effect of use – on humans and on the environment?
(a) What are the toxicity effects in handling and use?
(b) What are the effects on land – that is managing contamination?
(iii) Are there disposal techniques available using safe methods?
(iv) Can improved disposal methods be devised?
(v) Finally, what are the costs involved? Are there spend‐to‐save options?
It is clear from examining the published literature that no one nation has all the answers and that no one nation has unique problems. While legal requirements do vary, there are common themes affecting all.
There is active work ongoing in the United States under the Strategic Environmental R&D Program (SERDP), a joint approach between Department of Defense (DoD), Department of Energy (DoE), and the EPA. There have been studies in the European Defence Agency and also studies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) – Science and Technology area.
These legislative requirements are driving research, as has been noted. However, they are discussed further in this book.
1.3 NATO Studies
Several activities have been completed or are in progress. Some have been openly reported [8, 9], but others may be available to NATO members and partners.
AVT 115
: Environmental Impact of Munition and Propellant Disposal – study completed in 2009 and reported as an open document
[10]
.
AVT 177
: Symposium in Edinburgh 2011 – Munition and Propellant Disposal and its Impact on the Environment.
AVT 179
: Design for Disposal of Present and Future Munitions and Application of Greener Munitions Technology (completed in 2013).
AVT 197
: Munitions‐Related Contamination – Source Characterization, Fate, and Transport (2012–2014).
AVT 269
: Sea‐Dumped Munitions and Environmental Risk (2016).
The first study, AVT 115, which was reviewed and discussed widely, produced the following conclusions:
Open burning/open detonation
(
OB/OD
) is not generally acceptable, although there are dissenting opinions and the use of amelioration technology is possible.
Note that forensic studies have shown that residues do remain after detonation – these are used as court evidence. Whether these are meaningful in contamination terms needs discussion and examination.
Technology exists for most current problems – current systems can generally be dealt with, although accidental failures or articles later discovered may need special treatment, and pyrotechnics can pose significant problems.
Technology and needs are separated in many cases – e.g. the United States has technology/information and it is needed in, for example, Georgia.
Availability of surplus systems must be considered as a target for terrorists as an easy source of materials.
Surplus systems can also be targets for terrorist action, which may trigger an event.
There are therefore good safety and security reasons for dealing promptly with disposal.
1.4 New Ingredients and Compositions
It has been argued that changes in materials will answer the requirement and there is evidence that they can improve matters.
There is, however, a need to demonstrate that new materials offer significant advantages, and this is shown in several of the reports now in the open literature [511–13]. An early example of this is the four‐power programme on novel propellants [14]. Again, this is an illustration of the approach and, as detailed later, the area of focus is now materials such as ammonium dinitramide (ADN), etc (Figure 1.3) [15–21].
Figure 1.3Comparison of (a) smoky and (b) smokeless propellants.
This was part of a multinational programme involving the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the United States [14].
It involved joint studies on the formulation and testing of a smokeless propellant for tactical systems. The aim was proof of principle, but environmental issues did not play a major part in the study. It has interesting aspects, however, as elimination of acid smoke has been a first target for environmental improvement.
This is an improvement in many ways, but there are still products and these may be just as hazardous as the eliminated smoke. In some ways, an invisible product can be more hazardous.
Therefore, there is a need for clear demonstration of safety and proven ways of assessing true impact. This needs examination and experimental proof.
In short, simple answers can be in error and assumptions need testing before acceptance. These are the constraints that must be addressed.
There has also been considerable work on the replacement of metals in pyrotechnics and related systems [22–24]. The presence of metals, particularly Pb, is both undesirable and dangerous. Work has been under way for some time funded by the US Army with promising results [25]. Detailed toxicity studies are needed to avoid future problems of the kind found in the past and this is discussed in a later Chapters 8 and 10 in this book.
This is perhaps the most advanced study area, although small arms of all kinds are also being developed with the removal of ingredients of known toxicity. This is not as simple as might be supposed, as a recent Norwegian study [26] has shown. A round was introduced which seemed to offer improved environmental impact, but in use several Norwegian servicemen were taken ill prompting a detailed investigation. The results indicated that the new materials were less benign than originally thought. This illustrates the problems with the introduction of new materials where less is understood of their behaviour.
The development of national and international policies for the manufacture and use of less sensitive materials (insensitive munitions) led to the introduction and use of new polymer‐bonded materials. While related to composite rocket propellants and themselves not possessing any significant problems, their manufacture make extensive use of isocyanates for curing the polymer. Many isocyanates are known carcinogens and therefore require careful handling, if not complete avoidance. To this can be added concerns over phthalates often used as plasticizers, which are now being banned in the EU.
Trinitrotoluene (TNT) has been used and is being used extensively and has been studied in depth by the US Army Corps of Engineers. It is toxic, but can be rendered non‐available through immobilization in soils. It has useful explosive properties and ease of handing in preparation. This has prompted renewed research into similar materials to avoid some of the problems with polymer bonded explosive (PBX) while offering reduced sensitivity, and also to offer cost savings. However, recent studies have shown that it will leave more residues in use, and, more particularly, field disposal methods do not operate efficiently [27–29]. This is discussed in detail in later chapters.
1.5 Toxicology
It is hard to introduce new materials into use if there are uncertainties over their toxicity. Existing materials may well be toxic; but as the understanding of toxicity develops, their use may also be called into question [30–33]. For example, knowing how 1,3,5‐trinitro‐1,3,5‐triazine (RDX) acts as a neurotoxin[31] helps manage the risk and should help devise treatment where possible.
This is a very active area and the likely main area of activity is in integrating this with other activities such as synthesis and formulation, as well as the study of the combustion and detonation products. It is often assumed that energetic materials are completely consumed when used in a design mode. However, forensic studies of explosives as detailed in the International Symposia on the Analysis and Detection of Explosives indicate that residues are left. An early paper [10] suggested that TNT could be trapped in explosives‐generated carbon, for example. The question remains on the significance of those residues in health terms. Equally, the work by Walsh et al. indicates that significant residues are left by non‐optimized function [30, 34, 35].
Contamination is of course not limited to the energetic materials, for metals in the system can be even more important and spread by explosive action [36].
First‐generation tools now exist for modelling and predicting likely toxicity [37]. These have been developed for the speedier development of pharmaceuticals. These can be used to indicate bioactivity and hence estimate toxicity. Any such indication should reduce the testing and hence delays in introducing materials into use. It is important that they are used intelligently.
1.6 Life‐Cycle Analysis
Environmental impact is part of the whole life of a munition and its ingredients. Experience elsewhere has shown that the whole life needs to be examined to understand and optimize the behaviour and so reduce the environmental impact. One of the areas identified for further immediate action within NATO was that of greener munitions. This formed the basis of a further study. Parts of the report are available and have been published [38].
At the outset of this study, the group identified several key issues that appeared to need examination:
Ingredients
Manufacturing
Use
Whole life‐cycle management
Disposal
Impact on environment.
It became clear that the concept of greener munitions is far from simple. Not only are the individual aspects more complex but their interactions are also important and equally complex.
The approach and state of the art is discussed in later chapters.
1.7 Managing Contamination and Clean‐Up
Land gets contaminated by use [2, 11, 14]. There is deposition from trials and tests as well as from impact and accidents. Often the use of ranges is poorly documented, and this is likely to be even more the case for battlefields. This is a prime source of contamination by hazardous materials, especially with incomplete functioning.
As reactive chemicals, energetic materials will have an effect on biology. This can be useful with nitrate esters being used to manage heart conditions, but on ranges, etc. it means that they can be bioavailable and therefore pose risks to health through incorporation into the food chain, perhaps through the water table.
For example, perchlorate is widely found in the water table, particularly in the United States, and as a bioactive material has provoked a series of programmes to understand its behaviour. Naturally, this has been extended to other energetic materials, with studies on behaviour and retention in soil and water. The behaviour depends on many factors including hydrogeology, soil structure, climate, and exposure. These all need consideration as do methods of assessing and managing any contamination.
Methods include bacteria and plants [39, 40] as well as more traditional chemical methods. Programmes on understanding the metabolism of energetics have been fairly successful and reported, with plants engineered to digest energetics. A problem arose in that energetic materials are not the preferred feedstock (other than ammonium nitrate) for bacteria; for example, energetic materials have less energy than more normal feedstock, although, of course, the energy that they have is released extremely rapidly in functional use.
As part of another multinational programme, there was a detailed study of ecotoxicology and land contamination. This work, involving the United Kingdom, United States, Canada, and Australia, was published in book form, but it forms a baseline for the assessment and management of land contaminated by energetic materials. It also includes a summation of the critical contamination levels as available at that point [35, 41, 42]. The first [41] report has produced a reference textbook on the Ecotoxicology of Explosives [43].
This publication [43] must mark the state of the art at the time, but requires updating on a regular basis to provide a measure of current understanding. However, the approach remains appropriate and the assessments and methods provide a sound basis for the necessary approach.
This is discussed in later Chapters 9 and 10.
1.8 Disposal Now and in the Future
The work by Walsh et al. indicates that there can be problems in disposing of new‐generation materials as many of the existing tools for on‐site disruption and disposal are insufficient for the task. This is specific for on‐site disposal and would not affect the programmed demilitarization of surplus materials where a greater range of procedures can be employed. However, these are affected by legislation and the tightening of limits. The study in NATO indicated that most of the tools exist. These are being employed by various organizations to assist in the disposal of surplus materials worldwide. Some are being employed and developed by the NATO Support Agency under formal support agreements and are detailed in this book.
Unplanned disposal is not likely to diminish and cleaning up is certain to remain a live issue. The year 2018 also reminds us that material from the 1914 to 1918 war still requires handling!
These problems will continue and new variants will arise. The world situation means that tools for handling next‐generation materials are needed, and tools must be applicable in a range of environments.
1.9 Recycling
Recycling is often seen as a way of covering the costs of disposal. However, experience has shown that at best it can be a disposal–cost offset. Metal parts can be recycled once certified free of explosives and the recovered energetics can possibly be reused for civil and military applications.
Techniques such as supercritical fluid extraction or liquid ammonia can produce recovered material which may be acceptable for use. However, a major drawback is the need to satisfy authorities of the consistency, and safety of the recovered materials. These materials need to be demonstrated to be safe in themselves and that no contaminants remain which will prevent safe use. This adds significantly to the cost. However, not all nations see this as an issue. It is likely to become more common especially with rare or expensive ingredients. It will require processes capable of producing a consistent product, or of making a consistent product from variable ingredients and hard evidence will be required to validate any such claims!
1.10 Conclusions
This is intended to provide an introduction to the technical area and to provide sufficient information to help manage environmental issues associated with munition systems.
In summary, to manage the potential environmental impact of energetic systems we need a range of approaches. Firstly, while it is not merely a matter of using new materials, they do offer sound options. However, they need to be understood well enough to deliver all the requirements placed upon them. This requires an understanding of likely toxicology and environmental and human impact as well as performance, ageing, and vulnerability. Since value for money also needs consideration, it may be that better specified and understood versions of existing materials will be more rapidly and effectively employed.
New processes can reduce manufacturing impact. Many processes were designed when there was less understanding of the effects and new approaches can be more efficient with reduced cost.
New‐range management methods avoid damage and remove old damage. This is not limited to test ranges but also to manufacturing plants and storage facilities.
Overall, therefore, systems design for life minimizes overall impact!
These constraints and requirements should be considered a major driver for research and a scientific and engineering challenge. They require the following:
New methods for analysis.
New or re‐engineered and well‐characterized materials for use.
New methods for disposal.
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2General Introduction to Ammunition Demilitarization*
David Towndrow
General and Cooperative Services Programme, NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA), 11 rue de la Gare, 8325, Capellen, Luxembourg
2.1 Part one – Logistics, Costs, and Management
2.1.1 Introduction
Following widespread reduction in operational ammunition stockpile requirements at the end of the Cold War, many nations were suddenly faced with large volumes of surplus munitions along with the need to make redundant many munitions production facilities. Around the same period, the previously accepted practice of deep sea dumping was outlawed and hence other disposal techniques were required. Investment by government and private contractors adapted a number of manufacturing facilities for the industrial demilitarization of large quantities of munitions. Industrial demilitarization is essentially the disassembly of munitions to separate the materials, recovering the commercially valuable materials and treating the hazardous materials to the point where they can be safely disposed of. In Europe, in particular, this is now a mature industry. From a Ministry of Defence (MoD) perspective, there is an imperative to deal with the full range of munitions, in various locations, quantities, and conditions; and this means having available a range of options to meet any one individual disposal/demilitarization action, including the ability to carry out open burning/open detonation (OB/OD) when required. Disposal/demilitarization must first be safe, then cost‐effective, and environmentally responsible. Nations have different policies, largely driven by legacy capacity and interpretation of legislation and national policy. Most munitions are simple to demilitarize within the range of technical options currently available, with the final decision based on logistics, price, and availability of commercial facilities or the urgency of the disposal action. Some munitions are problematic, and this may increase the complexity of demilitarization and its costs, but the industry has proved to be good at resolving potential problems and those involved in managing current munitions stockpiles should be confident that they will adapt for future requirements.
This chapter provides the reader with an overview of the issues faced by a nation in managing stocks of old or surplus munitions. It is written from a munitions management perspective that is broader than a simple list of demilitarization techniques and associated environmental and cost impacts. The first section describes the fundamentals of demilitarization with some specific examples. The second section provides more insight into the costs and environmental issues associated with disposal actions. Finally, there is a section on how nations might improve the situation, notably through making changes to the design of munitions to enable more efficient disposal. The work is not intended to address novel or exploratory demilitarization techniques in any detail. Developmental work is ongoing in industry, in academia, and in some nations through government‐funded programmes. Some developmental work is publically reported and some only apply to very specific munitions and situations. Either way, the majority of this chapter focuses on the techniques that have served well, are currently available, and, through innovation, would likely provide nations with adequate demilitarization capacity into the future.
2.1.2 Context of Demilitarization
2.1.2.1 The Scale of the Issue
Of the hundreds of thousands of tonnes of munitions in national inventories over the last two decades, only a small proportion was used for its intended purpose, slightly more in training and the rest destined for disposal……………..
In 2018, some nations still have very significant surpluses of military munitions, much of it obsolete and ageing. Quantities vary depending on the historic national approach to defence and its associated stockpiling of munitions. An extreme example would be in Albania during the late 1990s with a surplus stockpile of over 200 000 tonnes of ageing munitions. Such surpluses require resources to monitor, store, and secure, and will present a risk of accidental explosion, sometimes on a catastrophic scale. Other nations have successfully driven down stocks of surplus munitions and implemented munitions procurement regimes to reduce the overall stocks and minimize any future surplus.
At the end of the Cold War in Europe, the authorities quickly recognized that surpluses would need to be disposed of, and that munitions production facilities were well placed to be adapted to undertake munitions demilitarization. Early investment by government and commercial operators to provide the capital equipment, particularly hazardous waste incinerators, allowed the development of a number of commercially viable munition demilitarization facilities. Today, there are a number of commercial demilitarization facilities across Europe bidding for contracts from various nations. Together, they provide a safe, effective, and environmentally responsible industrial solution for most, if not all, demilitarization requirements in the region.
Many nations have developed government/military‐owned and/or operated demilitarization facilities, but these vary in scale and capacity from relatively simple low‐volume operations to high‐capacity full‐range facilities. Similarly, some nations have a strong munitions research and manufacturing background, whilst others simply buy munitions and have simple munitions management regimes.
2.1.2.2 Factors Influencing Demilitarization
The type and quantity of ammunition in any one nation's inventory varies significantly. Some items are held in low quantity, others are continually used at training (or operations) and procured almost as a consumable with limited surplus for disposal, and others are stockpiled in high quantity (single purchase of whole of life stocks) with little ever used in training or operations with a potentially significant disposal requirement.
From a technical perspective, munitions items are generally grouped by characteristic, for example, mortar ammunition or air‐dropped bombs, or by weapon effect, for example, smoke. From an operational perspective, there may be an important difference between two variants of small arms ammunition (SAA), but from a demilitarization perspective – assuming they are simply incinerated or pulled apart – they are substantially the same item. From the brief introduction given, it can be seen that it is important to consider all factors, not just the inherent munitions design, when considering any one decision on how to manage a demilitarization action.
National legislation and public acceptance will also have a major impact on a Defence Ministry's current and future ammunition disposal options. What is acceptable practice in one nation, or even in one location in a nation, may not be acceptable or sensible elsewhere: each case should be assessed separately.
Costs and associated logistics have a major influence on disposal actions. In Europe, transportation costs are typically between 20% and 30% of the total cost of the commercial demilitarization contract, i.e. to move, say, 500 tonnes of munitions from a military depot in Belgium to a commercial demilitarization facility in Italy. A nation may choose to store particular items, or consolidate with other nations until a bulk quantity is available in anticipation of lower commercial costs. For logistic resourcing reasons, a nation may choose to demilitarize items earlier than anticipated to allow for depot closure or simply freeing up storage capacity. Operational imperatives sometimes force non‐optimal demilitarization decisions; for example, at the end of an overseas mission, a military may need to destroy damaged or limited quantities of munitions quickly and locally to avoid repackaging them prior to return to the home base. In small quantities, this could be accepted as an extension of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) action that is used to destroy items judged unsafe for transportation.
Some nations have developed government‐owned and government‐operated sites, others use commercial contractors, and some have no demilitarization capacity, relying on uniformed personnel to destroy small quantities of munitions or arranging support from neighbouring countries. Most nations have the capacity to deal with EOD items under emergency arrangements. In North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) Ammunition Support Partnership provides a collective demilitarization service for NATO member and partner nations. In the period from 2010, NSPA has arranged demilitarization contracts for various nations at a total annual value of between 15 and 45 million euro/year.
Munitions are normally subject to a very high degree of security and accountability throughout ownership. Most governments strive to maintain accurate logistical data on the condition and location for all munitions under control. There is a high degree of confidence in the data and integrity of the logistic information systems in most NATO nations, but this is not necessarily the case in under‐resourced nations or those still in the process of defence reform or recovering from major conflict. Often, there is limited technical information about the history of the munitions. Even with mature systems, sometimes things go wrong, such as mistakes in the delivery of the precise type, quantity, or packaging of munitions, mistakes in the provision of technical data, or even subtle changes in the design of munitions presenting problems for an optimized demilitarization process; for example, screws suddenly found to be ‘glued in’, or, more seriously, changes to explosive fillings in subcomponents.
Within a nation, the responsibility for different aspects of munitions management usually falls to different Defence Ministry staff branches. Overall responsibility for the through‐life management of any one category or item of ammunition will usually rest with a nominated ‘Munitions Manager’. That individual will coordinate all activity associated with the munition, from development, procurement, dispositions, and usage, through to repair/modifications and, finally, disposal. Some items require simple routine management, whilst others require a dedicated team. Other munitions‐related activities tend to be centralized in other specialist departments. For example, the following activities usually fall to separate Defence Departments:
specialist teams for concept and development of new munitions,
storage in base depots or forward areas,
transportation coordinated with other defence commodities, albeit moved as ‘dangerous goods’,
the management of technical data,
safety and performance tests and trials – including health and environmental assessments, and
a munitions disposal team to coordinate the necessary activity between MoD departments and external industry.
Most nations will have developed clear policy and procedures to enable the different departments to work effectively together and provide advice, but it is the munitions manager who is ultimately responsible for coordinating activities for a particular munition and has responsibility for providing the demilitarization operators/contractors with critical information for their safety.
Ammunition demilitarization is a potentially hazardous activity, particularly where aged, damaged, or when out of anticipated specification ammunition is processed. Even under the most stringent regimes with the highest safety assessments, incidents still occur. Careful consideration is required when balancing the perceived environmental benefits and the risks associated with some demilitarization processes.
This chapter does not consider individual EOD procedures, sales, or transfers of munitions as a means of disposal. Neither does it cover deep‐sea dumping or landfill/burial (a legacy activity now widely banned; and although technically sound for some items in some locations, it would be difficult to defend on safety or environmental grounds).
2.1.3 Demilitarization Process
2.1.3.1 Basic Stages of Demilitarization
A munition demilitarization and disposal process essentially dismantles the munition so that the different materials may be separated. Some items may have significant commercial scrap value, whilst others are hazardous and need further treatment or disposal as ‘waste’. Whatever the process, it must be safe, economic, and environmentally responsible. Most processes follow the same basic process (Figure 2.1).
(i)
Removal from storage
: The demilitarization and disposal operation starts with collecting the munitions in suitable lots depending on the type and physical condition of munitions. The munitions must be labelled, controlled, and packaged as would be done for any other munition of its type. The munitions may then be transported and shipped to the organization or contractor responsible for the demilitarization and disposal operation. If munitions are found to be in an unsafe physical condition and cannot be transported, further inspection must be done to determine if EOD should be employed. The plan of action for a situation with munitions in an unsafe physical condition is beyond the typical scope of demilitarization, and a risk assessment may be needed to determine the appropriate emergency procedure required.
(ii)
Transportation
: Depending on the storage location of the munitions and the location of the demilitarization and disposal process site, various military or civilian regulations for transportation will need to be followed, especially if the transport involves crossing national or state borders.
(iii)
Preparation and pretreatment
: Munitions to be removed from military service use often involve a variety of materials, some of which do not present an explosive hazard, such as packaging materials and steel casings, and other materials, such as explosives and fuels, which are hazardous. After separation and screening, packaging materials, wood, paper, and metals should be collected for recycling, or disposal, according to the regulations for solid waste. Special attention must be paid to materials that require special treatment and disposal. The disassembly process will likely follow in reverse order the assembly procedures used in the production of the munitions. All hazardous materials should be identified for treatment by type. For example, igniters, fuzes, batteries, heavy metals such as lead, cadmium, mercury, asbestos‐containing materials, will all be regulated at different levels depending on the final disposal process (
Figure 2.2
).
(iv)
Size reduction/removal
: The size and volume of a complete munition can usually be reduced by separating explosive warheads, rocket motors, and other large sections that contain hazardous materials by means of mechanical sectioning, laser grooving/cutting, water jet cutting, and cryofracture. Washout or melt‐out processes are possible removal techniques. Whatever hazardous materials or hazardous components are remaining must be prepared and transported for treatment. The size reduction of explosive/pyrotechnic materials/components can lower the hazard from mass detonation to detonation of small parts or simply burning.
(v)
Treatment
: Any method or process designed to change the physical, chemical, or biological character or composition of any hazardous waste so as to neutralize such waste, or so as to recover energy or material resources from the waste, or so as to render such waste non‐hazardous; less hazardous; or safer to transport, store, or dispose of.
(vi)
Reuse, recovery, and recycling
: Once the munitions have been separated from other inert materials, several options for recycling, reuse, and recovery of explosives, metals, and other materials exist. Options that provide the most advantageous cost benefit, such as recovery of explosives for industrial reuse, are selected. The demilitarization and disposal options resulting in the highest degree of reuse, recovery, and recycling of the most valuable materials will usually be preferred. However, care should be taken to not saturate a particular reuse market segment such that the recovered explosives become a logistical storage problem in their own right.
(vii)
Residual material disposition
: The disposal of small quantities of original demilitarized constituents that are a by‐product of treatment (
Figure 2.3
).
(viii)
Waste disposal
: After completing the preceding steps, further processing may be required before the material is sufficiently safe to be released from government ownership. Options for demilitarization and disposal of waste military munitions and explosive hazardous waste are discussed later. Hazardous material refers to material that may pose a risk for the population, property, safety, or the environment owing to its chemical or physical properties or the reactions that it may cause. Authorized and trained personnel and permitted (and/or licensed) facilities will dispose of any materials remaining that cannot be recycled or reused. Inert substances usually can be disposed of at solid waste landfills, but hazardous materials must be disposed of at controlled and permitted facilities.
Figure 2.1 Basic flow chart for industrial demilitarization.
Figure 2.2 Typical process steps during industrial demilitarization. (a) Disassembly step for a sub‐munition‐filled artillery shell. (b) Saw cutting of HE‐filled artillery shell. (c) Cut segments ready for melt‐out of the explosive filling for recovery of energetic material. (d) Water jet cutting of artillery shell.
Source: Courtesy of D Towndrow.
Source: Courtesy of Nammo.
Figure 2.3 Recovering commercially viable materials and preparing any hazardous wastes of industrial demilitarization. (a) Recovered energetic material for civil reuse. (b) Ashes from an EWI packaged for approved hazardous waste disposal.
Source: Courtesy of D Towndrow.
Source: Courtesy of Spreewerk Luebben GmbH.
2.1.3.2 Demilitarization Facilities
All the demilitarization activities may be carried out at a single high‐capacity site, or may be spread between sites. Typically, a site will be run as a single industrial complex, i.e. a discrete secure fence enclosing all the operational and administrative activities of a given facility
