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Tailored to the Ethics components of AQA Philosophy and OCR Religious Studies.What does pleasure have to do with morality? What role, if any, should intuition have in the formation of moral theory? If something is ‘simulated’, can it be immoral? This accessible and wide-ranging textbook explores these questions and many more. Key ideas in the fields of normative ethics, metaethics and applied ethics are explained rigorously and systematically, with a vivid writing style that enlivens the topics with energy and wit. Individual theories are discussed in detail in the first part of the book, before these positions are applied to a wide range of contemporary situations including business ethics, sexual ethics, and the acceptability of eating animals. A wealth of real-life examples, set out with depth and care, illuminate the complexities of different ethical approaches while conveying their modern-day relevance.This concise and highly engaging resource is tailored to the Ethics components of AQA Philosophy and OCR Religious Studies, with a clear and practical layout that includes end-of-chapter summaries, key terms, and common mistakes to avoid. It should also be of practical use for those teaching Philosophy as part of the International Baccalaureate. Ethics for A-Level is of particular value to students and teachers, but Fisher and Dimmock’s precise and scholarly approach will appeal to anyone seeking a rigorous and lively introduction to the challenging subject of ethics. , , , , , , , , , ,
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Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2017
ETHICS FOR A-LEVEL
Ethics for A-Level
Mark Dimmock and Andrew Fisher
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© 2017 Mark Dimmock and Andrew Fisher
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Mark Dimmock and Andrew Fisher, Ethics for A-Level. Cambridge, UK: Open Book Publishers, 2017, https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0125
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PREFACE
1
1.
Exam Specification Details
1
2.
Book Structure
1
References
2
INTRODUCTION
3
1.
Philosophy, Ethics and Thinking
3
2.
Respecting Ethics
3
3.
The A-Level Student
4
4.
Doing Ethics Well: Legality versus Morality
5
5.
Doing Ethics Well: Prudential Reasons versus Moral Reasons
5
6.
Doing Ethics Well: Prescriptive versus Descriptive Claims
6
7.
Doing Ethics Well: Thought-Experiments
6
8.
Doing Ethics Well: Understanding Disagreement
7
Summary
7
Questions and Tasks
8
References
8
PART I
NORMATIVE ETHICS
CHAPTER 1
UTILITARIANISM
11
1.
Utilitarianism: An Introduction
11
2.
Hedonism
11
3.
Nozick’s Experience Machine
12
4.
The Foundations of Bentham’s Utilitarianism
13
5.
The Structure of Bentham’s Utilitarianism
14
6.
Hedonic Calculus
15
7.
Problems with Bentham’s Utilitarianism
16
8.
Mill’s Utilitarian Proof
20
9.
Mill’s Qualitative Utilitarianism
21
10.
Mill’s Rule Utilitarianism versus Bentham’s Act Utilitarianism
22
11.
Strong versus Weak Rule Utilitarianism
23
12.
Comparing the Classical Utilitarians
24
13.
Non-Hedonistic Contemporary Utilitarianism: Peter Singer and Preference Utilitarianism
24
Summary
26
Common Student Mistakes
26
Issues to Consider
26
Key Terminology
27
References
28
CHAPTER 2
KANTIAN ETHICS
31
1.
An Introduction to Kantian Ethics
31
2.
Some Key Ideas
32
3.
Acting for the Sake of Duty and Acting in Accordance with Duty
33
4.
Categorical and Hypothetical Imperatives
34
5.
The First Formulation of the Categorical Imperative
36
6.
Perfect and Imperfect Duties
37
7.
Second Formulation of the Categorical Imperative
38
8.
The Third Formulation of the Categorical Imperative and Summary
38
9.
Kant on Suicide
39
10.
Problems and Responses: Conflicting Duties
42
11.
Problems and Responses: The Role of Intuitions
43
12.
Problem and Responses: Categorical Imperatives and Etiquette
43
13.
Problems and Responses: The Domain of Morality
44
Summary
45
Common Student Mistakes
45
Issues to Consider
45
Key Terminology
46
References
47
CHAPTER 3
ARISTOTELIAN VIRTUE ETHICS
49
1.
Aristotelian Virtue Ethics Introduction
49
2.
The Function Argument
49
3.
Aristotelian Goodness
50
4.
Eudaimonia and Virtue
51
5.
Developing the Virtues
54
6.
Practical Wisdom (Phronesis)
55
7.
Voluntary Actions, Involuntary Actions and Moral Responsibility
56
8.
Objection: Unclear Guidance
58
9.
Objection: Clashing Virtues
59
10.
Objection: Circularity
59
11.
Objection: Contribution to Eudaimonia
59
12.
Moral Good and Individual Good
61
Summary
62
Common Student Mistakes
62
Issues to Consider
62
Key Terminology
63
References
63
CHAPTER 4
AQUINAS’S NATURAL LAW THEORY
65
1.
Introduction to Aquinas
65
2.
Motivating Natural Law Theory: The Euthyphro Dilemma and Divine Command Theory
65
3.
Natural Law Theory
66
4.
Summary of Aquinas’s Natural Law Theory
70
5.
Putting this into Practice: The Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE)
70
6.
Some Thoughts about Natural Law Theory
73
Summary
75
Common Student Mistakes
75
Issues to Consider
75
Key Terminology
76
References
77
CHAPTER 5
FLETCHER’S SITUATION ETHICS
79
1.
Situation Ethics Introduction
79
2.
Fletcher’s Overall Framework
80
3.
The Four Working Principles of Situationism
81
4.
How to Work out What to Do: Conscience as a Verb not a Noun
83
5.
The Six Propositions of Situation Ethics
83
6.
Problems with Fletcher’s Situationism
86
Summary
88
Common Student Mistakes
88
Issues to Consider
88
Key Terminology
89
References
89
PART II
METAETHICS
CHAPTER 6
METAETHICAL THEORIES
93
1.
Metaethics: Introduction
93
2.
The Value of Metaethics
94
3.
Cognitivism versus Non-Cognitivism
95
4.
Realism versus Anti-Realism
98
5.
The Metaethical Map
99
6.
Cognitivist and Realist Theory One: Naturalism
100
7.
Objections to Naturalism
102
8.
Cognitivist and Realist Theory Two: Non-Naturalism
104
9.
Objections to Intuitionism
105
10.
Cognitivist and Anti-Realist Theory One: Moral Error Theory
106
11.
Objections to Moral Error Theory
110
12.
Non-Cognitivism
111
13.
Non-Cognitivist and Anti-Realist Theory One: Emotivism
112
14.
Objections to Emotivism
113
15.
Non-Cognitivist and Anti-Realist Theory Two: Prescriptivism
115
16.
Objections to Prescriptivism
115
Summary
116
Common Student Mistakes
117
Issues to Consider
117
Key Terminology
118
References
119
PART III
APPLIED ETHICS
CHAPTER 7
EUTHANASIA
123
1.
Euthanasia Introduction
123
2.
Key Terms
123
3.
Case One: Persistent Vegetative State
125
4.
Case Two: Incurable and Terminal Illness
125
5.
Pro-Euthanasia: Argument One
126
6.
Pro-Euthanasia: Argument Two
128
7.
Pro-Euthanasia: Argument Three
130
8.
Anti-Euthanasia: Argument One
132
9.
Anti-Euthanasia: Argument Two
132
10.
Anti-Euthanasia: Argument Three
133
11.
Anti-Euthanasia: Argument Four
135
12.
Allowing versus Doing
136
Summary
138
Common Student Mistakes
138
Issues to Consider
139
Key Terminology
139
References
140
CHAPTER 8
BUSINESS ETHICS
143
1.
Introduction to Business Ethics
143
2.
Employers and Employees
145
3.
Businesses and Customers
147
4.
A Business and the Environment
149
5.
Business and Globalization
151
Summary
152
Common Student Mistakes
153
Issues to Consider
153
Key Terminology
154
References
154
CHAPTER 9
CONSCIENCE
157
1.
Introduction
157
2.
The History of Conscience
158
3.
Aquinas on Conscience
160
4.
Freud and the Conscience
161
5.
Freud’s Psychosexual Development Theory
163
Summary
165
Common Student Mistakes
165
Issues to Consider
166
Key Terminology
166
References
167
CHAPTER 10
SEXUAL ETHICS
169
1.
Philosophy of Sex Introduction
169
2.
What Is It to “Have Sex”?
170
3.
Natural Law and Sex
171
4.
Kant and Sex
173
5.
Sex and Utilitarianism
175
6.
Sex and the Virtue Theory
176
Summary
178
Common Student Mistakes
178
Issues to Consider
179
Key Terminology
179
References
180
CHAPTER 11
STEALING
183
1.
Stealing: Introduction
183
2.
Defining Stealing
183
3.
Kantian Ethics on Stealing
184
4.
Act and Preference Utilitarianism on Stealing
187
5.
Rule Utilitarianism on Stealing
190
6.
Virtue Ethics on Stealing
191
7.
Metaethics and Stealing
193
Summary
195
Common Student Mistakes
195
Issues to Consider
195
Key Terminology
196
References
196
CHAPTER 12
SIMULATED KILLING
199
1.
Introduction
199
2.
Utilitarianism and Simulated Killing
201
3.
The Kantian and the Virtue Ethics Approach
203
4.
Films and Plays
203
5.
The Paradox of Tragedy (or More Correctly the Paradox of “Negative Emotions”)
204
Summary
205
Common Student Mistakes
206
Issues to Consider
206
Key Terminology
207
References
207
CHAPTER 13
TELLING LIES
209
1.
Introduction
209
2.
What Is It to Lie?
209
3.
Utilitarianism
211
4.
The Kantian and Lying
213
5.
Some Final Thoughts about the Political Context
214
Summary
214
Common Student Mistakes
215
Issues to Consider
215
Key Terminology
216
References
216
CHAPTER 14
EATING ANIMALS
219
1.
Eating Animals Introduction
219
2.
Justifying Meat Eating
219
3.
Act Utilitarianism
221
4.
Challenges to Bentham
223
5.
Utilitarian Reasons for Eating Animals
224
6.
Kantian Ethics and Eating Animals
226
7.
Virtue Ethics and Eating Animals
227
8.
Cora Diamond
229
Summary
232
Common Student Mistakes
232
Issues to Consider
233
Key Terminology
233
References
234
GLOSSARY
235
This book deals with the Ethics components of AQA Philosophy and OCR Religious Studies. It has been written in line with these specifications, covering the material necessary in a way that, we hope, is engaging for students, teachers and anyone interested in understanding ethical study.
Some chapters are, therefore, directly relevant only to one of these two courses. Students studying Ethics as part of OCR Religious Studies do not need to read about the ethics of simulated killing, while students studying AQA Philosophy do not need to consider Natural Law or Situation Ethics. This is not to say that there is not, we hope, some independent value in engaging with these chapters as part of your wider reading.
However, the split is not always so clear. Both OCR and AQA require students to engage with the theory of Utilitarianism, for example. However, the specifications differ slightly and so not all of the content is relevant to all students; relevance will depend on the course being sat. We suggest two options in dealing with this:
Early on in your course — engage with the content in the chapter regardless of your specification. This should give you a full and informed context in which to evaluate the theory.Later in your course and nearer exams — use your specification to focus on the exact content that may figure in your exam. Your teacher is best placed to advise you on this.In writing this book we followed Andrew Fisher’s approach of focusing on the judgement of the student in evaluating when they are being taught effectively.1 We take the student as authoritative on this matter; we want to create an “engaged” student. To this end we include ways that students can check their judgements on whether the material has taught them anything or not. For example, we include sections on “Common Student Mistakes”, “Issues to Consider” and “Key Terminology” within every chapter.
Following the specification requirements of AQA and OCR, the book deals with Normative Ethics, then Metaethics and finally Applied Ethics. What is the difference?
Consider an analogy put forward by Andrew Fisher (2011).2 Imagine that ethics is like football.
The normative ethicist is like a referee interested in the rules governing play. What interests him is the general theories that govern our moral behaviour; how do we work out what is right and what is wrong?The metaethicist is like a football commentator. What interests her is how the very practice of ethics works. For example, the metaethicist might discuss how people use moral language; or comment on the psychology of immoral people; or ask whether moral properties exist.The Applied Ethicists are like the players. They “get their hands [or feet] dirty”. They take the general rules of normative ethics and “play” under them. What interests them is how we should act in specific areas. For example, how should we deal with issues like meat-eating, euthanasia or stealing?So guided by the AQA and OCR exam specifications, you will find various normative theories explained. You will then find those theories applied to real life examples. Sandwiched between these is the Metaethics chapter which asks: “But what is ethical practice?”
With all three types of ethics covered we hope to provide a good grounding in ethics, both in terms of content and a general philosophical approach. Where possible we give as many examples as possible and avoid technical jargon, although sometimes we need to use specific philosophical terms. With this in mind we have included an extensive Glossary at the end of the volume. Our hope is that you will feel able to pick up this book dip into it, or read it from cover to cover. Whatever you choose we hope you’ll gain confidence with the content needed for your exams, that you practice and strengthen your ability to think with clear reasoning and with justification about the topics covered, and get as excited and fascinated by ethics as we are.
Fisher, Andrew, Metaethics: An Introduction (Oxford: Routledge, 2011), https://doi.org/10.1017/upo9781844652594
―, and Tallant, Jonathan, How to Get Students Talking: An Instructors Toolkit (Oxford: Routledge, 2015), https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315670645
1 This approach can also be found in: Fisher and Tallant, How to Get Philosophy Students Talking.
2 Fisher, Metaethics, pp. 1–4.
Philosophy is hard. Part of the reason it can feel so annoying is because it seems like it should not be hard. After all, philosophy just involves thinking, and we all think — thinking is easy! We do it without…well, thinking. Yet philosophy involves not just thinking, but thinking well. Of course it is true that we all think. But thinking, like football, maths, baking and singing is something we can get better at. Unfortunately, people rarely ask how. If you do not believe us, then just open your eyes. Society might be a whole lot better off if we thought well, more often.
Admittedly, doing A-Level Philosophy will not give you the ability to solve the problems of the world; we are not that naive! But if you engage with philosophy, then you will be developing yourself as a thinker who thinks well. This is why A-Level Philosophy is useful not merely to would-be philosophers, but also to any would be thinkers, perhaps heading off to make decisions in law, medicine, structural engineering — just about anything that requires you to think effectively and clearly.
However, if Philosophy is hard, then Ethics is really hard. This might seem unlikely at first glance. After all, Ethics deals with issues of right and wrong, and we have been discussing “what is right” and “what is wrong” since we were children. Philosophy of Mind, on the other hand, deals with topics like the nature of consciousness, while Metaphysics deals with the nature of existence itself. Indeed, compared to understanding a lecture in the Philosophy of Physics, arguing about the ethics of killing in video games might seem something of a walk in the park. This is misleading, not because other areas of philosophy are easy, but because the complexity of ethics is well camouflaged.
When you study A-Level Ethics, and you evaluate what is right and wrong, it can be tempting and comforting to spend time simply defending your initial views; few people would come to a debate about vegetarianism, or abortion, without some pre-existing belief. If you are open-minded in your ethical approach then you need not reject everything you currently believe, but you should see these beliefs as starting points, or base camps, from which your enquiry commences.
For example, why do you think that eating animals is OK, or that abortion is wrong? If you think that giving to charity is good, what does “good” mean? For true success, ethics requires intellectual respect. If you might think that a particular position is obviously false, perhaps take this reaction as a red flag, as it may suggest that you have missed some important step of an argument — ask yourself why someone, presumably just as intellectually proficient as yourself, might have once accepted that position.
If you are thinking well as an ethicist, then you are likely to have good reasons for your views, and be prepared to rethink those views where you cannot find such good reasons. In virtue of this, you are providing justification for the beliefs you have. It is the philosopher’s job, whatever beliefs you have, to ask why you hold those beliefs. What reasons might you have for those beliefs?
For example, imagine the reason that you believe it is OK to eat meat is that it tastes nice. As philosophers we can say that this is not a particularly good reason. Presumably it might taste nice to eat your pet cat, or your neighbour, or your dead aunt; but in these cases the “taste justification” seems totally unimportant! The details of this debate are not relevant here (for more on this topic see Chapter 14). The point is that there are good and bad reasons for our beliefs and it is the philosopher’s job to reveal and analyse them.1
Philosophy is more than just fact-learning, or a “history of ideas”. It is different from chemistry, mathematics, languages, theology etc. It is unique. Sure, it is important to learn some facts, and learn what others believed, but a successful A-Level student needs to do more than simply regurgitate information in order to both maneuverer past the exam hurdles and to become a better ethicist.
One aim of this book is to aid you in engaging with a living discipline. Philosophy, and in particular Ethics, is a live and evolving subject. When you study philosophy you are entering a dialogue with those that have gone before you. Learning about what various philosophers think will enable you to become clearer about what you think and add to that evolving dialogue.
You will notice that in this book we have not included “hints and tips boxes”, or statements of biography concerning the scholars. Although these things have their place, we did not want the reader to think that they have learnt philosophy if they know what is in the boxes.
In reality, university Philosophy departments often work with first year students to lose some of their less academically successful habits. Why? Well, one of the authors has taught ethics at university for many years. Philosophy students often say something like this: “I thought we’d do hard stuff at University! I did Utilitarianism at A-Level, can I have something different to study, please?”
This statement reveals a whole host of things. Most important is the view that to “do” ethics is to remember information. That is why a student can say they have “done Utilitarianism”. They have learnt some key facts and arguments. But philosophy is not like this. In order to understand philosophy you need to be authentic with yourself and to ask what you think, using this as a guide to critically analyse the ideas learned and lead yourself to your own justifiable conclusion. Philosophy is a living and dynamic subject that we cannot reduce to a few key facts, or a simplistic noting of what other people have said.
Some people distinguish between “ethics” and “morality”. We do not. For us, nothing hangs on the difference between them. In this book you will see us switching between the terms, so do not get hung up on this distinction.
Moral questions are distinct from legal questions, although, of course, moral issues might have some implications for the law. That child labour is morally unacceptable might mean that we have a law against it. But it is unhelpful to answer whether something is morally right or wrong by looking to the laws of the land. It is quite easy to see why. Imagine a country which has a set of actions which are legally acceptable, but morally unacceptable or vice versa — the well-used example of Nazi Germany brings to mind this distinction. Therefore, in discussions about ethics do be wary of talking about legal issues. Much more often than not, such points will be irrelevant.
Something to keep separate are moral reasons and prudential reasons. Prudential reasons relate to our personal reasons for doing things.
Consider some examples. When defending slavery, people used to cite the fact that it supported the economy as a reason to keep it. It is true, of course, that this is a reason; it is a prudential reason, particularly for those who benefited from slavery such as traders or plantation owners. Yet, such a reason does not help us with the moral question of slavery. We would say “OK, but so what if it helps the economy! Is it right or wrong?”
Another important distinction is between descriptive and prescriptive claims. This is sometimes referred to as the “is/ought” gap. We return to this in later chapters, especially Chapter 6. But it is such a common mistake made in general ethical chat that we felt the need to underline it.
Consider some examples. Imagine the headline: “Scientists discover a gene explaining why we want to punch people wearing red trousers”. The article includes lots of science showing the genes and the statistical proof. Yet, none of this will tells us whether acting violently towards people wearing red trousers is morally acceptable. The explanation of why people feel and act in certain ways leaves it open as to how people morally ought to act.
Consider a more serious example, relating to the ethics of eating meat. Supporters of meat-eating often point to our incisor teeth. This shows that it is natural for us to eat meat, a fact used as a reason for thinking that it is morally acceptable to do so. But this is a bad argument. Just because we have incisors does not tell us how we morally ought to behave. It might explain why we find it easy to eat meat, and it might even explain why we like eating meat. But this is not relevant to the moral question. Don’t you believe us? Imagine that dentists discover that our teeth are “designed” to eat other humans alive. What does this tell us about whether it is right or wrong to eat humans alive? Nothing.
You will also be aware, especially in reading this book, of the philosophical device known as a “thought experiment”. These are hypothetical, sometimes fanciful, examples that are designed to aid our thinking about an issue.
For example, imagine that you could travel back in time. You are pointing a gun at your grandfather when he was a child. Would it be possible for you to pull the trigger? Or, imagine that there is a tram running down a track. You could stop it, thereby saving five people, by throwing a fat man under the tracks. Is this the morally right thing to do?
The details here are unimportant. What is important, is that it is inadequate to respond: “yes, but that could never happen!” Thought experiments are devices to help us to think about certain issues. Whether they are possible in real life does not stop us doing that thinking. Indeed, it is not just philosophy that uses thought experiments. When Einstein asked what would happen if he looked at his watch near a black hole, this was a thought experiment. In fact, most other subjects use thought experiments. It is just that philosophy uses them more frequently, and they are often a bit more bizarre.
Finally, we want to draw your attention to a common bad argument as we want you to be aware of the mistake it leads to. Imagine that a group of friends are arguing about which country has won the most Olympic gold medals. Max says China, Alastair says the US, Dinh says the UK. There is general ignorance and disagreement; but does this mean that there is not an answer to the question of “which country has won the most Olympic gold medals?” No! We cannot move from the fact that people disagree to the conclusion that there is no answer. Now consider a parallel argument that we hear far too often.
Imagine that you and your friends are discussing whether euthanasia is morally acceptable. Some say yes, the others say no. Each of you cite how different cultures have different views on euthanasia. Does this fact — that there is disagreement — mean that there is no answer to the question of whether euthanasia is morally acceptable? Again, the answer is no. That answer did not follow in the Olympic case, and it does not follow in the moral one either. So just because different cultures have different moral views, this does not show, by itself, that there is no moral truth and no answer to the question.
If you are interested in the idea that there is a lack of moral truth in ethics, then Moral Error Theorists defend exactly this position in the chapter on Metaethics.
You will not be assessed, by either AQA or OCR, on the core content of this chapter. If any of the content is specifically relevant to assessment, it is discussed in proper detail in the following chapters.
Still, we hope that we have signposted some errors to avoid when it comes to thinking about ethics, and some strategies to consider instead. It may be worth occasionally revisiting the ideas discussed here during your studies, to test your own lines of argument and evaluate how “thinking well” is progressing for you. This would not be a weakness! Both the authors, and any honest philosopher, can reassure you — philosophy is hard! We hope you find this textbook useful and rewarding in helping you on your own journey through Ethics.
Hospers, John, An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis, 4th ed. (New York and London: Routledge, 1997), https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203714454
1 For an excellent introduction to good and bad ways of thinking we recommend John Hospers, ‘An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis’.
Part I
NORMATIVE ETHICS
Music snobbery is the worst kind of snobbery. It forces people who like something a bit mainstream, a bit of pop like Girls Aloud or Take That! or ABBA to say “It’s my guilty pleasure!” I hate that phrase. It is an insult to top quality pop. It is also an insult to guilt.
Dara Ó Briain (comedian)
Some things appear to be straightforwardly good for people. Winning the lottery, marrying your true love or securing a desired set of qualifications all seem to be examples of events that improve a person’s life. As a normative ethical theory, Utilitarianism suggests that we can decide what is morally right or morally wrong by weighing up which of our future possible actions promotes such goodness in our lives and the lives of people more generally.
Hedonism is a theory of well-being — a theory of how well a life is going for the person living that life. What separates Hedonism from other theories of well-being is that the hedonist believes that what defines a successful life is directly related to the amount of pleasure in that life; no other factors are relevant at all. Therefore, the more pleasure that a person experiences in their life then the better their life goes, and vice versa. Whereas other theories might focus on fulfilling desires people have, or an objective list of things such as friendship and health.
The roots of Hedonism can be traced back at least as far as Epicurus (341–270 BC) and Ancient Greece. Epicurus held the hedonistic view that the primary intrinsic good for a person is pleasure; meaning that pleasure is always good for a person in and of itself, irrespective of the cause or context of the pleasure. According to this theory pleasure is always intrinsically good for a person and less pleasure is always intrinsically bad.
Hedonism is a relatively simple theory of what makes your life better. If you feel that your life would be better if you won the lottery, married your true love or achieved your desired qualifications, then the hedonistic explanation of these judgments is that these things are good for you only if they provide you with pleasure. Many pleasures may be physical, but Fred Feldman (1941–) is a defender of a theory known as Attitudinal Hedonism. According to this theory, psychological pleasures can themselves count as intrinsically good for a person. So, while reading a book would not seem to produce pleasure in a physical way, a hedonist may value the psychological pleasure associated with that act of reading and thus accept that it can improve a person’s well-being. This understanding of hedonistic pleasure may help to explain why, for example, one person can gain so much pleasure from a Lady Gaga album while another gains nothing at all; the psychological responses to the music differ.
One important problem for Hedonism is that our well-being seems to be affected by more than just the total pleasure in our lives. It may be the case that you enjoy gaining a new qualification, but there seems to be more to the value of this event than merely the pleasure produced. Many people agree that success in gaining a meaningful qualification improves your life even if no pleasure is obtained from it. Certainly, many believe that the relationship between what improves your life and what gives pleasure is not directly proportional, as the hedonist would claim.
Robert Nozick (1938–2002) attacked the hedonistic idea that pleasure is the only good by testing our intuitions via a now famous thought-experiment. Nozick asks:
Suppose there was an experience machine that would give you any experience you desired. Super-duper neuropsychologists could stimulate your brain so that you would think and feel you were writing a great novel, or making a friend, or reading an interesting book. All the time you would be floating in a tank, with electrodes attached to your brain. Should you plug into this machine for life, pre-programming your life experiences? […] Of course, while in the tank you won’t know that you’re there; you’ll think that it’s all actually happening […] would you plug in?1
Nozick’s challenge to Hedonism is based on the thought that most people who consider this possible situation would opt not to plug in. Indeed, if you ask yourself if you would actually choose to leave behind your real friends, family and life in favour of a pre-programmed existence you also might conclude that plugging into the experience machine would not be desirable. However, if Hedonism is correct and our well-being is determined entirely by the amount of pleasure that we experience, then Nozick wonders “what else can matter to us, other than how our lives feel from the inside?”2 The experience machine guarantees us pleasure yet we find it unappealing compared to a real life where pleasure is far from assured. This may suggest that our well-being is determined by other factors in addition to how much pleasure we secure, perhaps knowledge or friendships.
The hedonists need not give way entirely on this point, of course, as they may feel that the experience machine is desirable just because it guarantees experiences of pleasure. Or, you might believe that our suspicions about the machine are misplaced. After all, once inside the machine we would not suspect that things were not real. You may feel that the hedonist could bite-the-bullet (accept the apparently awkward conclusion as a non-fatal implication of the theory) and say that any reticence to enter the machine is irrational. Perhaps the lives of those choosing to be plugged in to the machine would go extraordinary well!
Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) was the first of the “classical utilitarians”. Driven by a genuine desire for social reform, Bentham wanted to be as much involved in law, politics and economics as abstract philosophising.
Bentham developed his moral theory of Utilitarianism on the foundation of the type of hedonistic thinking described in section two. For Bentham, the only thing that determines the value of a life, or indeed the value of an event or action, is the amount of pleasure contained in that life, or the amount of pleasure produced as a result of that event or action. Bentham is a hedonistic utilitarian. This belief in Hedonism, however, was not something that Bentham took to be unjustified or arbitrary; for him Hedonism could be empirically justified by evidence in the world in its favour. According to Bentham:
Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do.3
Bentham moves from this empirical claim about the factors that guide our behaviour to a normative claim about how we ought to live. He creates a moral theory based on the bringing about of more pleasure and less pain.
When first understanding Utilitarianism, it is also crucial to understand what is meant by the term “utility”. Bentham defined it as “[…] that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness […] or […] to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness”.4 Utility is thus promoted when pleasure is promoted and when unhappiness is avoided. Bentham’s commitment to Hedonism means for him that goodness is just an increase in pleasure, and evil or unhappiness is just an increase in pain or decrease in pleasure. With this understanding of utility in mind, Bentham commits himself to the Principle of Utility:
By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question: or, what is the same thing in other words, to promote or to oppose that happiness.5
In effect, this principle simply says that promoting utility, defined in terms of pleasure, is to be approved of and reducing utility is to be disapproved of.
The Principle of Utility, backed by a commitment to Hedonism, underpins the central utilitarian claim made by Bentham. Based on a phrase that he wrongly attributed to Joseph Priestley (1733–1804), Bentham suggests that the measure of right and wrong is the extent to which an action produces the greatest good for the greatest number of people. Of course, what counts as good, for Bentham, is pleasure. We can then rephrase what Bentham himself call his fundamental axiom as a requirement to promote the greatest pleasure for the greatest number of people, in order to act morally.
In addition to being hedonistic, Bentham’s Utilitarianism is also:
Consequentialist/TeleologicalRelativistMaximisingImpartialBentham’s Utilitarianism is consequentialist because the moral value of an action or event is determined entirely by the consequences of that event. The theory is also described as teleological for the same reason, based on the Greek word telos that means “end” or “purpose”. If more pleasure follows as a consequence of “Action A” rather than “Action B”, then according to the fundamental axiom of Utilitarianism “Action A” should be undertaken and is morally right; choosing “Action B” would be morally wrong.
In addition, Bentham’s Utilitarianism is Relativistic rather than Absolutist. Absolutist moral views hold that certain actions will always be morally wrong irrespective of context or consequences. For example, many campaigning groups suggest that torture is always morally unacceptable whether it is carried out by vindictive dictators seeking to instil fear in a population or whether it is authorised by democratically elected governments seeking to obtain information in order to stop a terrorist attack. For absolutists then, the act of torture is absolutely wrong in all cases and situations.
