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- Herausgeber: ibidem
- Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
- Serie: An Interdisciplinary Series of the Centre for Intercultural and European Studies - CINTEUS
- Sprache: Englisch
This timely book seeks to contribute to the debate on the transfer of values, rules, and practices by European actors to former soviet countries. The actors in focus include multilateral organizations, such as the European Union, the Council of Europe, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, as well as European governments and non-governmental organizations. The contributions in this collection address different aspects of the export or transfer of values, such as democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, as well as rules and practices in the fields of education and migration management, examining motives, mechanisms, and effects of the European engagement.
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Seitenzahl: 387
Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2016
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ibidem Press, Stuttgart
Table of Contents
Editorial
This series is intended as a publication panel of the Centre of Intercultural and European Studies (CINTEUS) at Fulda University of Applied Sciences. The series aims at making research results, anthologies, conference readers, study books and selected qualification theses accessible to the general public. It comprises of scientific and interdisciplinary works on inter- andtransculturality; the European Union from an interior and a global perspective; and problems of social welfare and social law in Europe. Each of thesearefields of research and teaching in the Social- and Cultural Studies Faculty at Fulda University of Applied Sciences and its Centre for Intercultural and European Studies. We also invite contributions from outside the faculty that share and enrich our research.
GudrunHentges, VolkerHinnenkamp, AnneHoner, Hans-Wolfgang Platzer
Editorial
Die Buchreihe versteht sich als Publikationsforum des Centrums für inter-kulturelle und europäische Studien (CINTEUS) der Hochschule Fulda. Ziel derCINTEUS-Reihe ist es, Forschungsergebnisse, Anthologien,Kon-gressreader, Studienbücher und ausgewählte Qualifikationsarbeiten einer interessierten Öffentlichkeit zugänglich zumachen. Die Reihe umfasst fachwissenschaftliche und interdisziplinäre Arbeiten aus den Bereichen Inter- und Transkulturalität, Europäische Union aus Binnen- und globaler Perspektive sowie wohlfahrtsstaatliche und sozialrechtliche Probleme Europas. All dies sind Fachgebiete, die im Fachbereich Sozial- und Kulturwissenschaften der Hochschule Fulda UniversityofAppliedSciencesund dem angegliederten Centrum für interkulturelle und Europastudien gelehrt und erforscht werden. Ausdrücklich eingeladen an der Publikationsreihe mitzuwirken sindauch solche Studien, die nicht 'im Hause'entstanden sind, aberCINTEUS-Schwerpunkte berühren und bereichern.
GudrunHentges, VolkerHinnenkamp, AnneHoner, Hans-Wolfgang Platzer
Acknowledgements
This volume evolved from the young researchers workshop"An exercise in normative and real power: Promoting European values in the post-Soviet space", held at Fulda University of Applied Sciences, Germany, in October 2013. I would like to thank the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) for sponsoring this event, which brought together young scholars from Germany and former Soviet states.
I am also indebted to the Centre for Intercultural and European Studies and the Department of Social and Cultural Studies at Fulda University, who supported the organisation of the workshop and this publication. I am particularly grateful toProf.Dr.Hans-WolfgangPlatzerfor his support and insightful comments that helped to develop the volume to its present shape.
I would further like to express my appreciation to everyone who provided valuable feedback on the concept of the volume and individual chapters, especially to OlgaBurlyuk,EamonnButler, Eduard Klein, andAllaLeukavets. I am grateful to Bastian Heck for his editorial assistance in putting this book together and to NateBreznaufor his excellent work on proofreading the text that went far beyond language-related aspects. Special thanks go to all workshop participants, also those who are not represented in this volume. Finally, I would like to thank my fellow contributors for their intellectual effort, fruitful cooperation, and extensive patience.
VeraAxyonova
October 2015
On theexportof European values, rules and practices:Introducing the debate
Vera Axyonova
A spread of values, rules and practices across time and space is not a new research field. It has been viewed by scholars with different perspectives, involving a variety of conceptual and methodological approaches. A substantial literature evolved around this phenomenon addressing it as a process of transfer of rules and policies, i.e."a process in which the knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions etc. in one time and/or place is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements and institutions in another time and/or place"(Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996, p. 344). Following this definition, the objects being transferred are not limited to rules and policies and may include instruments, institutions and structures, but also more general ideas, values and conceptions of"normal"(Manners, 2002, p. 239).
A range of actors may participate in the process of transfer, both as aggregate entities such as supra-national institutions, state agencies, political parties and civil society organisations, and as individuals, e.g. elected officials, civil servants, members of pressure groups, and policy entrepreneurs (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996, p. 345). Depending on the role of these actors and the instruments they use, scholars distinguish various types of transfer mechanisms. These range from processes of diffusion (that lack any specific agency) and lesson-drawing (a voluntary adoption of ideas, norms or policies from without) to socialisation or social learning (a process in which a socialiser is attributed with a more active role as a facilitator or instructor), and active promotion of policieswherein promoters may go as far as coercing their targets into the adoption of these policies.[1]
While the process of transfer in its various forms is central to this volume, we have deliberately chosen to use a somewhat more narrow term ofexportin its title. The reason is the emphasis of this term on the existence of origin and destination in the process of (a cross-border) transfer, which is of particular interest to authors of this volume. In addition, the concept of export implies a presence of actors who (equally) participate in the process, i.e. exporters and importers. It grants these actors greater and more specific roles than the frameworks of diffusion or lesson-drawing could allow. At the same time, while exporters remain in the spotlight, importers are not deprived of agency. Export is thus not limited to promotion, which ascribes an intrusive nature to one part of actors by distinguishing between promoters (subjects) and their targets (objects) in the process of transfer.
Drawing on these concepts, the book seeks to contribute to the scholarly debate on transfer of values, rules and practices to former Soviet countries by mapping the multi-faceted engagement of various European actors—both in active promotion and facilitation—in this broader region. Among the European actors, the European Union (EU) is a frontrunner in terms of the number of publications that address European involvement in transfer processes. Reviewing them all would be an impossible task for this brief introductory chapter, but several major works need to be mentioned. Burlyuk (2013, pp. 29–31) identifies among them those that apply the concept of isomorphism developed within organisational theory to explain policy diffusion within the EU (Radaelli, 2000), approach institutions (including the EU) as promoters and sites of socialisation (Checkel, 2001, 2005), and make a strong case for conditionality policiesin explaining rule transfer through the EU external governance (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004).
Starting with the enlargement debate, a vast literature emerged on the modes and mechanisms of EU rule transfer and EU transformative power, both within the process of accession of new member states and beyond. A specialised cluster focuses on the role played by and transfer of values and principles in EU foreign affairs (e.g. Manners, 2002; Lucarelli & Manners, 2006; Cremona, 2011), while a considerable number of studies are devoted specifically to the EU's promotion of democratic and human rights norms (Schimmelfennig, Engert, & Knobel, 2002; Fierro, 2003; Kubicek, 2003; Börzel & Risse, 2004; Vachudova, 2005; Jünemann & Knodt, 2007; Freyburg, Lavenex, Schimmelfennig, Skripta, & Wetzel, 2009, to name just a few). These studies reveal that neither EU documents nor scholarly literature provide a clear differentiation between the concepts of values, norms and principles that are promoted by the EU. In fact, these terms are often used interchangeably (Cremona, 2011, pp. 280–281; Ghazaryan, 2014, p. 17) and commonly include (yet are not limited to) liberty, democracy, respect for human rights, rule of law, and good governance. These values[2]are also central to this volume. Although the transfer of European rules and practices in other spheres, such as higher education and migration management, that are illustrative of the European engagement in post-Soviet countries, are equally included in selected chapters.
Apart from the EU, other European actors advancing their values, rules and practices have attracted less scholarly attention. Systematic analyses of rule transfer beyond European borders initiated specifically by European national (i.e. governments of EU Member States) and societal (i.e. civil society organisations) actors have been rare.[3]The same is true for the analyses of normative engagements by multilateral actors, such as the Council of Europe (CoE) and the Organization forSecurity and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Some recent larger works include a book by Andrea Gawrich (2014) conceptualising democracy promotion by the CoE and the OSCE and an earlier monograph by Solveig Richter (2009) on external democratisation through the OSCE in South Eastern Europe.[4]While studies of EU engagement also dominate this volume, it seeks to exercise a more inclusive approach and incorporates accounts of other European actors: the CoE, the EU Member States'governments, and non-governmental organisations.
Finally, the countries under study, where these European actors are engaged, include the independent states that emerged as the result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, excluding the Baltics. These countries have rarely been brought together in studies of European value and rule transfer. Instead, scholars tended to examine European engagement in separate states, especially in the case of Russia (e.g. Fischer, 2007; Gänzle, 2008; Saari, 2009), or sub-regions (the six countries addressed by the Eastern Partnership framework of the EU: Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia (e.g. Kubicek, 2005; Beichelt, 2007; Gordon & Sasse, 2008; Sasse, 2008; Bosse & Korosteleva, 2009), the latter three South Caucasus republics (e.g. Jawad, 2007; Pardo Sierra, 2011; Börzel & Pamuk, 2012), or the five states in Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (e.g. Crawford, 2008; Warkotsch, 2009; Hoffmann, 2010; Urdze, 2010; Axyonova, 2014)). The present volume deliberately focuses on the broader post-Soviet region, as we assume that all the countries retain certain similarities, e.g. they remain affected—even if to different extents—by their communist legacies. At the same time, we admit that European actors have varying degrees of influence in these states, considering the latter's commitments to the OSCE and the CoE, their relations with individual European countries, and the lacking EU membership perspective in all post-Soviet states.
The book does not intend to provide a structured comparative perspective, but rather a set of in-depth case studies shedding light on various aspects of transfer processes. It consciously engages in"analytical eclecticism"(Katzenstein & Okawara, 2002), and uses an author-driven approach, meaning that the contributing authors are given the freedom to choose their analytical lens and define concrete objects of their studies within the given thematic framework.
Elena Kropatchevaopens this set of studies with an analysis of EU democracy promotion policy for Ukraine. She focuses specifically on the presidency of Victor Yanukovych, the turbulent period of transition to the presidency of Petro Poroshenko, and the signing of the Association Agreement which was the main instrument the EU used to encourage democracy in Ukraine. Kropatcheva also discusses other political, diplomatic, economic and assistance instruments applied by the EU. In doing so, the author examines three factors that impacted the EU's Ukraine policy, namely the capacities of the EU to act as a normative power, the Russian factor, and the domestic constraints in Ukraine. Kropatcheva emphasises shortcomings in the EU's policies towards both Ukraine and Russia, yet shows a certain evolution of the EU approach from an underestimation of Russia's role in the shared neighbourhood to more decisive measures (sanctions) against the Kremlin. Despite this evolution, the author questions the EU's ability to stabilise the situation in Ukraine under the conditions of the major crisis in Europe.
Following Kropatcheva,ShushanikMinasyanalso engages in the debate of successes and failures of the EU's external democratisation policy. She looks at EU democracy promotion in the three South Caucasus republics: Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Focusing on conditionality instruments applied by the EU, Minasyan reveals a limited impact of EU involvement on political regimes in the region, which she attributes to considerable misconceptions and inconsistencies in the EU's approach. The author makes a strong case for limitations of the use of conditionality policies towards countries that lack EU membership prospects, in particular in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy.
Continuing the line of authors who focus on the EU's Eastern Partnership countries,AronBuzogányargues for including civil society into the analysis of EU democracy promotion. In doing so, he employs two approaches towards conceptualising the role of civil society in external democratisation: a functionally-driven external governance perspective,which has been a preferred way of analysing the role of civil society in EU democracy promotion, and a Foucault-inspired governmentality perspective that emphasises the practices embedded in governance networks and devotes particular attention to how power is constituted therein. Using these two lenses, Buzogány investigates the role of civil society organisations in the Neighbourhood Policy framework both at the EU-level and in the Eastern Partnership countries.
Also focusing on the EU's democratisation policy,AijanSharshenovaexamines EU efforts beyond its immediate neighbourhood. She scrutinises assistance provided by the EU to Kyrgyzstan, one of the five post-Soviet Central Asian republics. Being the most liberal state in Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan has a potential to provide a fruitful environment for democracy promotion from abroad. Yet, Sharshenova observes that the EU's good intentions are distorted by a variety of negative external and domestic influences. A lack of clear economic and security interests on the part of the EU with regard to the country, the EU's inability to compete with other international aid donors, and the fusion of formal and informal practices in Kyrgyzstan hinder the EU from inducing genuine democratic change in the country.
Remaining in the domain of democratisation policies,Tsveta Petrovaintroduces a new actor into the analysis of external democracy promotion. She looks at the engagement of one of the EU's post-communist member states, namely Poland, whose democratic history is comparably short. Petrova examines Polish democracy promotion in Belarus from 1989 to 2009, and compares it to the democracy promotion efforts of the United States and the European Union. The author finds out that, having transitioned from a recipient to a supplier of democracy support, Poland exercises a democratisation policy that incorporates both a US-like approach of political pressure and a non-intrusive EU-like approach. At the same time, unlike both of these actors, Poland prefers to persuade and pressure through quiet diplomacy and chooses engagement over sanctions, which gives it a comparative advantage in the context of the authoritarian regime in Belarus.
René Lenzbreaks the line of authors focussing on democracy promotion and brings the analysis to a new (sub-national) level. He discusseswhether and how academic institutions and individual actors diffuse organisational models and practices. More specifically, Lenz concentrates on academic exchange between German organisations and Russian higher education institutions. He observes that, while working in Russia, German organisations and individual academics transfer their ideas and methods of teaching and organising work to the new environment. In doing so, they use the Bologna-Process as a framework that provides the instruments, rhetoric means, and models in the process of transfer. Yet, while some practices are successfully adopted by Russian actors, more far-reaching institutional reforms encounter severe impediments. Thus, the diffusion of institutional models remains largely superficial.
Following the chapter by Lenz,Bettina BrunsandHelgaZichnerreturn to the EU, yet focus on a completely different sphere of its engagement. They investigate the EU's attempts to involve Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus in its migration management, with a specific focus on asylum policy and refugee matters. The authors present an in-depth study of the EU-funded Regional Protection Programme (RPP), which aims to enhance asylum capacities in the three countries and enable the states to observe high international standards in refugee protection. Opposite to their expectations, Bruns and Zichner find that in reality the harmonisation with EU provisions leads to a lowering of precisely these standards in the three countries.
Finally, in her chapter,Olga Burlyukremains at the supra-national level of analysis and looks at two actors, the EU and the CoE, that find themselves pursuing similar tasks in similar fields: promoting the triptych of European values—democracy, human rights and the rule of law—in post-Soviet states. Bulyuk scrutinises the nature of the relationship between the EU and the CoE by zooming in on their rule of law promotion efforts in Ukraine. Her findings reaffirm that the EU and the CoE are in a complex interactive relationship, with elements of both cooperation and competition, and reveal three important tendencies therein. First, cooperation prevails over competition at substantive, political and operational levels, while competition is concentrated at the institutional level. Second, cooperation at the political and operationallevels precedes and even triggers cooperation at the institutional level, bending the reluctant institutional structures of the two organisations. And, third, the growing political, financial and normative leadership of the EU does not cancel out the traditional and special relevance of the CoE in this particular region and policy area.
The chapters thus address different aspects of export (active promotion and facilitation) of values, e.g. democracy, human rights and the rule of law, as well as rules and practices in the fields of education and migration management. The studies examine motives, mechanisms or effects of the European engagement, while the (process of) transfer of values, rules and practices remains central to each contribution. The synthesis of perspectives on various European actors'engagements in the post-Soviet space provides the value-added of this collective exercise.
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[1]This list is by no means exhaustive. Scholars use a variety of terms to conceptualise different types and mechanisms of transfer, often without a strict differentiation between them. For different conceptual approaches see e.g. Bennett, 1991; Majone, 1991; Rose, 1991, 1993; Haas, 1992; Börzel, 1999; Checkel, 2001, 2005; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004. For an overview of approaches see Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996.
[2]In this volume, we follow the definition of"values"provided by Sonia Lucarelli (2006, p. 10) as"notions laden with an absolute (i.e. non-instrumental) positive significance for the overall order and meaning we try to give to our world".
[3]For some exceptions see e.g. Mikulova & Simecka, 2013; Petrova, 2014; Pospieszna, 2014.
[4]See also policy-oriented papers by Evers (2010) and Boonstra (2007).
The EU's policy of democracy promotion and Ukraine's bumpy path to the Association Agreement—amidst a major crisis in Europe[1]
Elena Kropatcheva
Introduction
On March 21, 2014 Ukraine and the EU signed the Association Agreement (AA), which advanced their political relations to a new level, and then on June 27, 2014 the parties signed the economic part, involving close economic cooperation and the creation of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). This happened after a"Euro-Maidan revolution,"Russia's annexation of Crimea, and grave destabilisation in the East of Ukraine; thus, amidst a major crisis in Europe.
This chapter analyses the EU's policy of democracy promotion towards Ukraine from February 2010, when Victor Yanukovych was inaugurated as president, until June 27, 2014 when the new Ukrainian president, Petro Poroshenko, signed the economic part of the AA. The study examines the following factors, which have impacted the EU's Ukraine policy: 1) availability of the necessary capacities for the EU to act as a normative power in Ukraine, 2) the Russian factor, and 3) domestic conditions in Ukraine. The importance of both domestic and international factors for the success of democracy promotion is noted in most studies on democracy promotion and conditionality(Carothers, 1999; Kelley, 2004; Schimmelfennig, 2005).
The chapter starts with a short overview of EU-Ukraine relations before President Yanukovych came to power. Then it examines the EU's democracy promotion (meaning, more generally, democratic practices and standards) during the Yanukovych presidency via political and diplomatic as well as financial/economic and assistance instruments. It then considers the role of the Russian factor during this period and domestic conditions inUkraine. Next the transition period from the"Euro-Maidan"to Poroschenko's signing of the DCFTA is discussed. The last section draws conclusions regarding the EU's policy.
Overview of EU-Ukraine relations before Victor Yanukovych's presidency: On the slow way to the AA
EU-Ukraine relations were established in 1991.[2]However, Ukraine started pursuing a European integration policy only during Leonid Kuchma's presidency (1994–2004) in 1994,[3]when Ukraine and the EU signed a 10 year Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), which went into force in 1998 (a year after the PCA with Russia went into force). This is why the EU was criticised for its"Russia first"approach(Tocci, 2008, p. 62; Solonenko, 2009, p. 715). The PCA with Ukraine went into force earlier than with some other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, who in turn criticised the EU for its"Ukraine first"policy.
In the 1990s, EU policy was overall quite passive towards Ukraine(Moshes, 2003), with the focus on stability and market economy reforms(Solonenko, 2009). Only with enlargement, did the EU become more active in general and in promoting democracy in particular. Ukraine played a special role in the considerations of the EU about a"Wider Europe"policy and, in 2004 the country was included in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Nonetheless, EU-Ukraine relations mostly remained"binding in rhetoric but shallow in action"(Korosteleva, 2012, p. 84). Kuchma's foreign policy became notorious because of its multi-vector character, which in practice meant that the ruling elites instrumentalised and prioritised either the Russian or the Western vector at different times, without a real commitment to either(Kuzio, 2003; Kropatcheva, 2010a; Wolczuk, 2003). The country was not moving forward on democracy(Wilson, 2005).
The"Orange Revolution"in Ukraine in the winter of 2004–2005 and the coming to power of the pro-Western President Victor Yushchenko raised many futile hopes, both within Ukraine about its quick prospect formembership in the EU, as well as in the EU about a quick democratic transformation of Ukraine. On January 22, 2007 the Council of the EU adopted the negotiating directives for an"enhanced agreement"between the EU and Ukraine(Council of the EU, 2007). This was a procedural window of opportunity, which coincided with a political one: the PCA had to be replaced with a new agreement in any case. This gave the EU a chance to support Ukraine and enhance the level of their relations without giving Ukraine a clear membership prospect. In September 2008, the EU and Ukraine decided that their new agreement would be an AA with a DCFTA.[4]In 2008, Ukraine was also included in the Eastern Partnership (EaP) Initiative (European Commission (EC), 2008).
Despite this, Yushchenko's presidency was notorious for constant internal strife and political crises(Kropatcheva, 2010b)as well as"stagnated Europeanization"(Korosteleva, 2012, p. 85). Nevertheless, there were some important democratic achievements such as free elections and mass media.
The 2010 presidential election reversed the political situation in Ukraine once again, by transferring power from Yushchenko to his former rival Yanukovych. Overall, neither the EU nor Ukraine showed enough commitment to build a long-term strategy for developing their relationship. The EU failed to understand complex domestic processes in Ukraine, especially after the"Orange Revolution,"which led to its overly optimistic expectations and later to mutual disappointment.
The mismatch between EU efforts at democracy promotion and Ukraine's performance during the presidency of Victor Yanukovych
At the start, EU-Ukraine relations seemed to develop positively after Victor Yanukovych's election. During his pre-election campaign, he promised to strengthen thestrategic partnership with the EU, while alsoresetting relations with Russia(Kropatcheva, 2013). Yanukovych chose the EU for his first foreign policy visit as president. Representatives of the new Ukrainian government consistently reaffirmed Ukraine's commitment to proceed on the path towards European integration (Delo.ua, 2012), and thegovernment of Yanukovych did much more within the country to promote EU integration than his predecessor.[5]
To support Ukraine, the European Parliament (EP) passed a resolution that explicitly acknowledged that Ukraine"may apply for membership of the EU like any European state that adheres to the [EU] principles …"(EP, 2010b). Economic relations were developing well.[6]In 2011, Ukraine became a member of European Energy Community. By the end of 2011, Ukraine completed negotiations on the AA, the first EaP country to do this, as well as on the DCFTA.
Nonetheless, the overall record of achievements by the Yanukovych government in terms of approximating EU democratic values and practices was negative. Though there were specific advances in a few sectors, the Ukrainian government implemented EU rules selectively and was prepared to work only on reforms that would not undermine the power of the ruling elite, just like the past Ukrainian governments(Casier, 2011; Razumkov Centre, 2012; Natorski, 2013).
President Yanukovych had centralised power by undertaking such steps as changing legislative procedures to create a pro-presidential parliamentary majority, expanding the president's formal powers through a return to Ukraine's original constitution, creating a party of power (Party of Regions) and using different coercive approaches against his (potential) opponents(Kudelia, 2014, pp. 19–23). As a result of frequent attacks on the mass media, human rights activists and the opposition, as well as the dependency of the judicial system on executive power and the growing role of the security services (Korrespondent,2011), the situation in the country was described in terms of"Putinisation"(Zhdanov, 2010)or even"Lukashenization"(Bezsmertny, 2012). According to the Bertelsmann-Transformation-Index (BTI, 2012), Ukraine was the only country of 128 studied by BTI in which all aspects of political participation had worsened by comparison to the situation in 2010. Freedom House downgraded Ukraine's rating from"free"in 2010 to"partly free"in the following years (cf. FreedomHouse, 2010 and 2013) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) (2012) assessed the parliamentary elections in 2012 as"a step backwards."
The EU tried to counteract these developments, by"diffusing"its norms and values and"socialising"Ukraine.[7]Thereby, the EU addressed different levels of society—government officials, business representatives, local authorities, educators and civil society activists(Casier, Korosteleva, & Whitman, 2013). The EU used many political and diplomatic channels, such as various joint EU-Ukraine executive bodies and communication formats, and bilateral and regional agreements reflecting and reiterating the EU's acquis (Korosteleva, 2012). Most of the EU-Ukraine documents signed in this period stress the"common values"of the two parties and task Ukraine with strengthening them through reforms with the guidance and assistance of the EU.
The main leverage that the EU had vis-à-vis Ukraine during Yanukovych's presidency was exerting influence based on his pledge to sign the AA and DCFTA during his term. He saw this as a way to achieve more domestic and international legitimacy for his rule and strengthen his chances of being re-elected. The next sections take a closer look at the political/diplomatic and economic/financial instruments the EU applied in promoting democracy in Ukraine.
The EU's use of political and diplomatic instruments in the Tymoshenko case
The most obvious example of the EU's inability to have a serious impact on Ukraine was the imprisonment of Yulia Tymoshenko, former Prime Minister of Ukraine. In 2011, she was found guilty of exceeding her powers while in office by ordering the state energy firm, Naftogaz, to sign a burdensome gas deal with Russia in 2009. This case was used politically by Yanukovych to eliminate his opponent.[8]Before the court ruling on the Tymoshenko casewas made, the EU condemned the trial and tried to influence it (Kudelia, 2013). However, overall, the EU was rather passive at that time because European officials did not believe that a guilty verdict was possible.[9]This is why the EU belatedly became more active, after the imprisonment of Tymoshenko. The focus of this section is largely on the actions of the European Parliament, because of its very active role in this case, but also because this helps to demonstrate the different positions and indecisiveness within the EU.
The EU used statements, calls and resolutions, attempting to employ"blaming and shaming,"promises and warnings that all amounted to rather futile efforts to impact the Ukrainian government's conduct. On October 27, 2011 the EP adopted a harsh resolution on Ukraine, criticising the imprisonment of Tymoshenko and warning that a failure to review her conviction would"jeopardize"the conclusion of the AA, pushing the country further away from"the realization of its European perspective"(EP, 2011b).
Even though the EU was unified in condemning the case, there was no unity about what to do next. This reflects the lack of a long-term strategy towards Ukraine in general, but also the divergent specific interests of EU member states. For instance, Polish representatives, who aimed to make their presidency in the Council of the EU as well as the Poland-driven EaP look successful, argued that negotiations on the AA"should be completed and the document should be initialled as planned under the Polish Presidency... Subsequently, its signature and ratification could be declined if no changes take place in Ukraine"(EP, 2011a). Poland was also afraid that a strict EU position could push Ukraine towards closer relations with Russia. A Romanian representative, on the contrary, wondered"why we need to continue doing what we have been doing for a good few months. … Yanukovych was not at all receptive to this message…"(EP, 2011a).
At the Ukraine-EU summit in November 2011"a common understanding"was reached on the text of the AA, but the document was not initialled. The joint declaration revealed the pressure that the EU exerted on Ukraine:"Ukraine's performance, notably in relation to respect for common values and the rule of law, will be of crucial importance for the speed of its politicalassociation and economic integration with the EU, including in the context of conclusion of the Association Agreement."[10]
Subsequently, the EU's critique of the deterioration of democracy in Ukraine continued in 2012 and 2013. Nonetheless, instead of granting Tymoshenko amnesty, new charges of fraud and tax evasion were raised against her. In 2012, the former Interior Minister Yury Lutsenko was also sentenced. The EU criticised this verdict as well.[11]
The critical positions of the EU were presented by the Yanukovych government as something positive.For instance, according toKostyantynGryshchenkothe then Minister of Foreign Affairs, the critique of the EP reaffirmed that Ukraine was on course towards European integration (RBC Ukraine, 2011). Another example is the official response of Ukraine to a very critical article written by the heads of Ministries of Foreign Affairs of five EU states(Bildt, Hague, Schwarzenberg, Sikorski, & Westerwelle, 2012): the Ukrainian MFA saw in it a"confirmation of Ukraine's belonging to the European family"and the EU's readiness"to contribute to Ukraine's Eurointegration."[12]These messages were addressed to a domestic audience and were intended to show Yanukovych's confidence and progress in negotiations with the EU, but they alsoindicate thatthe Ukrainian government was not taking EU criticism seriously enough. It believed that the EU would proceed with the AA in any case.
Indeedon March 30, 2012 the AA and DCFTA were initialled.In December 2012, the Council of the EU (2012) set requirements, which Ukraine needed to fulfil, for the AA to be signed. However, in practice, the main focus was on the Tymoshenko case, while other conditions remained in the background. The EP set up a special mission, which undertook 22 visits toUkraine, requesting Tymoshenko's pardon(Cox &Kwasniewski, 2013). Even though officially the EU did not set deadlines for its partner countries to decide on signing the AA, different representatives of EU member states emphasised that the EaP summit in Vilnius was an important deadline for Ukraine in terms of"now or never"—otherwise the prospect of its European integration would be delayed"for years."[13]
Nonetheless, new charges were raised against Tymoshenko in 2012 and 2013. The only achievement was that Lutsenko was released in April 2013. Just before the EaP summit in 2013, the Ukrainian Rada failed to pass a resolution, which would have been a compromise solution allowing Tymoshenko to go abroad for a medical treatment, even though this refusal could have endangered the signing of the AA.
Again, the EU was divided on whether to sign the AA with Ukraine during the Vilnius EaP summit.Some members argued for strict conditionality, that Ukraine had to fulfil the conditions first ("more for more"principle), while others wanted"to avoid giving Putin the time and opportunity"to exploit Ukraine's vulnerability(Emerson, 2012).Gradually the latter argument became predominant, because throughout 2013Russia increased pressure on Ukraine. Another argument was that the EU could not punish the whole country and especially pro-EU forces in Ukraine because of Yanukovych.As a consequence, by autumn 2013 the EU became ready to sign the AA with Ukraine, even though the government had not fulfilled its requirements.
In summary, the EU was using its traditional method of diplomatic and political pressure to bind the Yanukovych government to democracy values and norms and a European integration course. Thereby, however, the EU's normative agenda became mixed with geopolitics. The latter intervened in the conditionality politics of the EU. The EU competed with Russia in their common neighbourhood, and, as a consequence, conditionality became less important. There was no urgency to push Ukraine to sign the AA at the Vilnius Summit. The issue could have been postponed until Ukraine fulfilled the EU requirements.
At the same time, the EU applied influence belatedly, selectively, too softly and without a longer-term strategy in mind. The Yanukovych governmentfelt the EU's indecisiveness and internal divisions and even tried to exploit them. For instance, the EU could have threatened to boycott the 2012 European Football Championship, but it did not do so. The EU did not threaten the Yanukovych government with sanctions. Instead, it initialled the AA with Ukraine, which was considered by the Yanukovych government a sign of EU weakness and a signal that it could go on with its status quo policies.
The EU's insufficient use of financial/economicand assistance instruments
Besides political/diplomatic influence, the EU also had some financial means and economic aid and assistance tools to try to impact Ukraine. The usage of these instruments had increased greatly over the years. The EU began to operate in Ukraine in early 1992 within the scope of the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) programme.[14]Until 2007, it paid for the ENP programmes out of TACIS funds. In 2007, the European Commission established a special budget to implement the ENP and later EaP, the ENP Instrument (ENPI).
Most EU Ukraine-related programmes ran under the ENPI, but there were also special democracy-related interregional programmes within the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) and, since 2013, within the European Endowment for Democracy (EED). In 2011–2013, €470.1 million were allocated for programmes in the areas of good governance and rule of law, facilitation of entry into force of the AA and DCFTA, and sustainable development.[15]Overall, there were more than 400 programmes and smaller projects running in Ukraine in 2011–2013.[16]They dealt with different aspects of EU-Ukraine relations, from democracy promotion, support for human rights and civil societyper se, to differentprojects in the areas of economy, security, environment and education, which also promoted EU values and standards.
Most of these programmes, however, were rather brief (running for just 2–
